


History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960



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HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Alfred Goldberg, *General Editor*

Volume I: Steven L. Rearden, *The Formative Years, 1947-1950* (1984)

Volume II: Doris M. Condit, *The Test of War, 1950-1953* (1988)

**HISTORY OF THE OFFICE
OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

Volume IV

**INTO THE
MISSILE AGE
1956-1960**

Robert J. Watson

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Foreword

The series of volumes on the History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense constitutes a history of national security policy focusing on the role of the secretary of defense and OSD written from the records of the highest levels of the U. S. Government. This volume, the fourth in the series, appears before the third volume because it was ready for publication sooner, and it did not seem sensible to hold it back pending the completion of Volume III. It is self-contained and may be understood without access to the predecessor volume.

The range of the volume for the period August 1956-January 1961 is extensive. These were years of great international challenges and enormous technological change that profoundly affected the making of national security policy. The instability of the world manifested itself in all parts of the globe. The secretary of defense confronted crises in the Middle East—Suez in 1956 and Lebanon in 1958—and in the Far East—the Taiwan Strait in 1958 and the worsening situation in Indochina. In Europe the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the Berlin crisis of 1958-61 exacerbated tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Closer to home, the emergence of Fidel Castro's Cuba as a Soviet ally portended a future crisis with which the next administration would have to deal. The rising tide of anti-colonialism, particularly in Africa, affected relations with allies as well. Alliance relationships—especially with NATO—and arms control efforts required much time and attention from the Department of Defense. Military assistance to allies and other countries remained a key element in U.S. policy.

The volume emphasizes the centrality of the budget in national security policy considerations. Other influences—particularly the fast-moving technological revolution in weapons—played a significant role. Developments in nuclear weapons and missiles of ever-increasing range and potency exercised a powerful effect on all aspects of planning and programming and quickened the arms race with the Soviet Union. During these years continental defense and the organization and direction of strategic forces presented major issues requiring decisions that had long-term effects.

Finally, there occurred a major reorganization of the Department of Defense in 1958 that established the basic shape of the department for most of the next three decades.

The arrangement and presentation of so intricate and complex a subject have been difficult, requiring careful selection and discrimination by the author. The great bulk of material and diversity of topics that had to be addressed are largely responsible for the length of the book. The volume is based mainly on official sources, up to the topmost levels, to which the author has had access. Such things as may be missing had to be omitted for lack of time, space, or source materials.

The author, Robert J. Watson, holds the Ph.D. degree from the University of Virginia and served as a historian with the National Security Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, where he was chief historian for a number of years. He is the author of several politico-military studies, including *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954*.

Volume IV was circulated to interested government agencies for official review and its contents were declassified and cleared for public release. Although the text itself has been declassified, some of the official sources cited in the volume may remain classified. This is a publication prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but the views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

ALFRED GOLDBERG
Historian, OSD

Preface

This fourth volume of the History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) focuses on the second term of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. To provide continuity from the previous volume, it begins approximately in the middle of 1956, shortly before the end of Eisenhower's first administration. By that time the president had terminated the Korean War, reduced the high wartime defense budgets, and instituted the "New Look" in defense planning, which aimed to maintain a carefully controlled level of defense expenditures for the "long haul," while at the same time continuing the effort to "contain" the power and influence of the Sino-Soviet bloc of nations. Provision of an adequate defense at the lowest possible cost was to be achieved by maximizing the potential of weapons of mass destruction and, it was hoped, thereby deterring the Soviet Union from any attempt to expand its power or influence by force.

Holding down the cost of defense was difficult in the face of rising Soviet military capabilities and the increasing expense and complexity of weapons. Long-range missiles, under development for a number of years, entered the U.S. inventory between 1956 and 1960. It was also necessary to maintain U.S. deployments abroad, to continue efforts to strengthen the alliance of Western nations embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty, and to provide military assistance to friendly nations whose military capabilities supplemented those of the United States. In 1956 and again 1958, the administration had to cope with alarming developments overseas, some of which raised the possibility of major hostilities.

During these years, three men held the position of secretary of defense: Charles E. Wilson (until 8 October 1957), Neil H. McElroy (9 October 1957-1 December 1959), and Thomas S. Gates, Jr. (2 December 1959-20 January 1961). Gates had served as deputy secretary of defense from 8 June to 1 December 1959. Others who served as deputy secretary were Reuben B. Robertson (5 August 1955-25 April 1957); Donald A. Quarles (1 May 1957-8 May 1959), who died in office; and James H. Douglas, Jr., (11 December 1959-20 January 1961).

The volume treats a wide range of subjects, many of them overlapping, a fact that made a sustained narrative difficult. The first 12 chapters follow a roughly chronological order in dealing with policy, strategy, budgeting, and the development of missiles and satellites, along with the foreign crises of 1956 and 1958. The ensuing chapters examine topics spanning the entire four-year period: nuclear weapons, continental defense, target planning, relations with other countries, military assistance, and arms control. Chapter XXII describes the major developments of 1960, Eisenhower's last year in office.

To hold the length of the volume within acceptable bounds, it was necessary to limit the scope to the more important matters with which OSD was concerned. Subjects not treated, or merely touched on, include foreign bases, the status of U.S. forces abroad, intelligence, stockpiling, industrial mobilization, and relations with Latin America.

The happy task of acknowledging the assistance of others who contributed to the volume begins with my colleagues in the office of the OSD Historian: Alice C. Cole, Doris M. Condit, John P. Glennon, Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald D. Landa, Richard M. Leighton, Steven L. Rearden, Stuart Rochester, and Roger R. Trask. They offered many stimulating comments, besides providing a very congenial work environment. Particular thanks go to Ronald Landa, who read and critiqued most of the chapters; he also facilitated access to various records and saved the author considerable time and effort by conducting research in records of the State Department and in the papers of Thomas S. Gates at the University of Pennsylvania. Henry Glass furnished considerable information based on his years of experience in DoD, and reviewed some of the chapters. Ruth Sharma and Gloria Moore provided substantial administrative assistance. Carolyn Thorne typed most of the manuscript.

Research for the volume benefited enormously from assistance lent by other offices and agencies. The Directives and Records Division of OSD provided access to records of the Department of Defense. Most of these were at Suitland, Maryland, in the Washington National Records Center of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), where personnel were helpful in making records available and providing work space. In Washington, the Military Reference Branch and the Fiscal and Judicial Branch of NARA furnished records. The JCS Historical Division, particularly Willard J. Webb and Walter S. Poole, provided information on various matters and steered the author toward a number of sources. The JCS Documents Division, under Edmund F. McBride and Janet M. Lekang, supplied copies of JCS documents and facilitated access to JCS records at the National Archives. The Naval Historical Center made available the invaluable files of Admiral Arleigh Burke and various other records. Also helpful were the U.S. Army Center of Military History, the Center for Air Force History, the Marine Corps History and Museums Branch, the National Defense University, the Department of State, and the Pentagon Library.

Outside the Washington area, the most valuable resource was the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library at Abilene, Kansas, without whose records this book could hardly have been written. Special thanks go to David Haight for his tireless assistance and his extraordinary ability to locate needed documents. Other research was conducted at the Charles E. Wilson Archive in Anderson, Indiana; the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University; the Eisenhower Oral History Project at Columbia University; and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University. I am indeed grateful to the librarians and archivists at all these institutions.

Except where otherwise indicated, photographs were obtained from the files of the OSD Historical Office. Frank Hall, former DoD photographer, supplied a number of the photographs.

My wife, Laura M. Watson, besides providing moral support, materially assisted with research in unclassified records, particularly at the Eisenhower Library.

Finally, I am indebted to the OSD Historian, Alfred Goldberg, for the opportunity to write the volume, for his constant interest and encouragement, for his editorial improvements, and for seeing the book through to completion. That he suffered through the tedium of reading several complete drafts of the manuscript attests to his conscientious devotion to the quality of the finished project.

ROBERT J. WATSON

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History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960

CHAPTER I

The Close of the Wilson Era, 1956-1957

The United States and the World in 1956

The middle of 1956 found Dwight David Eisenhower well into the fourth year of his term as president of the United States. His election in 1952 had brought in a Republican incumbent for the first time in 20 years. Within a few months of taking office, his administration had ended the Korean War, cut back military expenditures, and undertaken a "New Look" at defense requirements, with important consequences for American military policy. In 1954 he steered the country peacefully through a dangerous crisis in Indochina. A recession in that year had helped the Democrats to recapture Congress in the midterm elections. But by 1956 the country was prosperous and the president's popularity and prestige stood high. His prospect for reelection, should he decide to run again in 1956, seemed promising.

Foreign relations were dominated by the continuing Cold War between the Western democracies, led by the United States, and the Sino-Soviet bloc of Communist nations. This seemingly permanent state of hostility short of armed conflict had prevailed ever since the breakdown of the Big Three partnership in World War II. In the months following the war, the Soviet Union had violated its wartime agreements by seizing control of almost all the countries of Eastern Europe, imposing rigid dictatorships on them and ruthlessly excluding or liquidating advocates of democracy. In China, the Soviets had assisted with massive aid the Communist insurgents led by Mao Tse-tung in overthrowing the established government and bringing the country under a "people's democracy." A huge Communist empire, apparently under monolithic control from Moscow, stretched from the Oder River in Europe to the shores of the Pacific, its rulers publicly committed to the Marxist doctrine of conflict between themselves and the capitalist world.

Recent developments in the Communist world had given some hope of relief from this forbidding prospect. Premier Josef Stalin, who died in 1953, had been succeeded by leaders who, while reaffirming their commitment to communism, seemed at least marginally less obstructionist. In 1955 they had agreed to a treaty that ended the four-power occupation of

Austria and restored that country to genuine independence. In the same year, Soviet leaders traveled to Geneva to confer with the heads of state of the three major Western powers—the United States, United Kingdom, and France—in the first “summit” meeting since World War II. Although no specific agreements were reached, the resulting improved atmosphere of East-West relations—the “spirit of Geneva”—seemed a hopeful augury for the future. Early in 1956 the world learned of a remarkable speech (acquired through clandestine means) by Nikita S. Khrushchev, who had emerged as the dominant leader of the USSR, before a party congress in which he admitted “errors and distortions” on the part of earlier Soviet rulers and denied the inevitability of war between communism and capitalism.

Still, these limited moves toward accommodation could not be read as evidence of a basic change in the nature of Soviet totalitarianism or of the long-term goals of communism. The Soviet Union showed no disposition to settle the grave issues that divided the two sides—notably the status of occupied Germany and Berlin—on terms that the Western powers could accept, or to agree to enforceable measures to restrain the growth on both sides of arsenals of increasingly destructive weapons. It was generally accepted that the United States could not afford to relax its guard and would have to maintain a military establishment of a size without precedent in U.S. peacetime history.¹

The Department of Defense

As of 30 June 1956, the nation’s armed forces had a strength of 2,806,000 men and women—enough to support an Army of 18 divisions, 973 naval vessels, 3 Marine Corps divisions, and 131 Air Force wings. Backing up the uniformed personnel stood a civilian work force of 1,179,489.² The maintenance of this military establishment accounted for more than half the cost of running the federal government. In his annual budget message to Congress in January 1956, President Eisenhower forecast military expenditures for FY 1957 of \$34.6 billion, or 54 percent of the estimated total federal expenditures of \$64.3 billion.³

Responsibility for controlling this massive aggregation of people and property fell to the Department of Defense (DoD), which owed its origin to the National Security Act of 1947. The act set up the National Military Establishment, consisting of three military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force), headed by a secretary of defense with limited and uncertain authority. Appointed from civilian life by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate, the secretary served as the “principal assistant to the president in all matters relating to the national security.” Two years later, the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 converted the National Military Establishment into the Department of Defense and enlarged the powers of the secretary. The transition to an executive department with clear-cut lines of authority was completed in 1953 by President Eisenhower’s Reorganization Plan No. 6.⁴

The Secretary of Defense

The organizational framework set up by Reorganization Plan No. 6 was in effect in 1956 (see Chart 1). The departmental chain of command ran from the secretary of defense to the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The secretary exercised broad policy control, leaving maximum initiative to the service departments, which were considered the operating elements of DoD. Grouped around the secretary of defense were the assistant secretaries and assistants to the secretary who functioned as staff advisers. In large measure, this organization reflected the management philosophy and experience of the incumbent secretary, Charles E. Wilson, formerly president of General Motors Corporation. Wilson favored maximum decentralization of operations subject to policy direction at the top. In DoD, the assistant secretaries were considered the equivalent of corporate vice presidents, while the service departments were analogous to manufacturing divisions of General Motors.⁵


The legislation of 1947 and 1949 had left some ambiguity concerning the extent of the secretary's authority. He was given "direction, authority and control" over the entire department, but the service departments were to be "separately administered" by their respective secretaries. President Eisenhower had moved promptly to clear up this uncertainty. Armed with an opinion from the general counsel of the department that the secretary possessed "supreme power and authority" to run the department, the president, in sending his reorganization plan to Congress, set forth in unequivocal terms his view of the secretary's role:

With my full support, the Secretary of Defense must exercise over the Department of Defense the direction, authority, and control which are vested in him by the National Security Act. He should do so through the basic channels of responsibility and authority prescribed in that act—through the three civilian Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, who are responsible to him for all aspects of the respective military departments (except for the legal responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to advise the President in military matters). . . . The Secretary is the accountable civilian head of the Department of Defense, and under the law, my principal assistant in all matters relating to the Department. I want all to know that he has my full backing in that role.⁶

These instructions were reflected in a DoD directive issued in 1954, which prescribed that "no function in any part of the Department of Defense, or in any of its component agencies, shall be performed independent of the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense."⁷

There still remained several statutory limitations on the secretary's authority. He was forbidden to establish a "single Chief of Staff over the armed forces" or an "armed forces general staff." He might not merge the service

CHART 1
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
30 JUNE 1956



departments, or transfer, reassign, abolish, or consolidate the combat functions assigned to the military services by law. Finally, the service secretaries and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (consisting of the military chiefs of the services and their chairman) were guaranteed the right to present to Congress, on their own initiative, after first informing the secretary of defense, any recommendations relating to DoD that they might deem proper.⁸

The organizational elements making up the Office of the Secretary of Defense included (besides the immediate office of the secretary and his deputy) the assistant secretaries of defense, the special assistants to the secretary, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The personnel strength of these elements on 30 June 1956 totaled 2,474: 1,766 civilian and 708 military (Table 1).

TABLE 1
Civilian Employees and Assigned Military Personnel,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 30 June 1956

	Civilian	Military
Office of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary ^a	73	60
Assistant to the Secretary (Atomic Energy)	13	19
General Counsel	47	—
Assistant Secretary (Legislative and Public Affairs)	93	52
Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs) ^b	194	88
Joint Chiefs of Staff	177	312
Assistant Secretary (Comptroller)	142	6
Assistant Secretary (Manpower, Personnel and Reserve)	254	71
Assistant Secretary (Supply and Logistics) ^c	492	25
Assistant Secretary (Properties and Installations)	73	—
Assistant Secretary (Research and Development)	142	61
Assistant Secretary (Applications Engineering)	50	2
Assistant Secretary (Health and Medical)	11	9
Special Programs	5	3
Total	1,766	708

^a Includes the Assistants to the Secretary for Special Operations and for Guided Missiles.

^b Includes personnel of the Office of Defense Advisor, USRO.

^c Includes personnel of the Cataloging Division, which was transferred to the Department of the Air Force, effective 30 July 1956.

Source: *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1-December 31, 1956*, Table 11, and *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1-June 30, 1957*, Table 11.

The secretary's duties were manifold. As principal assistant to the president in all defense matters, he conferred frequently with the chief executive. As the responsible head of the entire Department of Defense, he met weekly with the secretaries of the military departments and the military service chiefs. He was a member of the Cabinet and the National Security Council, and attended meetings of those bodies. He dealt directly with heads

of other departments and agencies, notably the secretaries of state and of the treasury, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the director of the Bureau of the Budget, and others. He represented DoD before congressional committees. As departmental spokesman to the American people, he gave frequent press conferences and made numerous speeches. He represented the department at international meetings, notably those of the defense ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He made frequent inspection trips to keep himself informed about the state of the military establishment.⁹

Charles Erwin Wilson, the incumbent secretary of defense in 1956, and the fifth man to hold that position, had been appointed in January 1953 and had already served longer than any of his predecessors. Born in 1890 (the same year as Eisenhower), Wilson had been trained as an engineer and had risen through the ranks at General Motors to become president in 1941 (hence his nickname of "Engine Charlie").* Never having served previously in government or in the military, he had no experience in foreign affairs, military strategy, or the organization and use of military forces. During World War II, however, he had supervised the production of upwards of \$10 billion worth of military materiel by General Motors.¹⁰ This experience with defense production and military logistics had given him some knowledge of the nature of the problems of the military establishment, though not of their depth or scope. "I have found that organizing the Pentagon and keeping it manned is a somewhat bigger job than I thought it would be three years ago," he remarked in August 1956.¹¹

As secretary of defense, Wilson found himself working for a superior whose background of military experience was unique in American history. None of Dwight D. Eisenhower's predecessors, not even George Washington or Ulysses S. Grant, could match the breadth and depth of his military background. From his service with the War Department in Washington before World War II, right on through to his final assignment as supreme commander for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, his Army career had afforded him extraordinary insight into the problems of military planning at the highest level and of the relationship between military and other elements in the formulation of national policy. As a result, he entered office with a clear conception of what he later called "logical guidelines for designing and employing a security establishment."¹²

The president's background shaped his conception of the role of the secretary of defense. Having little need for advice on strategy, he expected the secretary to apply business methods to bring the military establishment under control and insure that it operated at maximum efficiency and minimum cost. Wilson carried out that task faithfully, in full agreement with the president's goal to bring down military expenditures. In the words

* Given to distinguish him from another Charles E. Wilson, president of General Electric ("Electric Charlie"), who had served as director of defense mobilization under President Truman.

of one writer, Wilson "treated the job like a production and management problem" and "regarded strategy as something to be fought out between the military professionals and the policymakers at the White House."¹³

Concentration on administrative and managerial responsibilities came naturally to Wilson. He was not, nor did he pretend to be, a profound student of national or international politics. One of the president's assistants who saw Wilson frequently characterized him as "a classic type of corporation executive: basically apolitical and certainly unphilosophic, aggressive in action and direct in speech." During a Cabinet meeting, he once astounded his colleagues and the president by casually suggesting what was then politically unthinkable—that the United States offer to recognize Communist China as part of an overall Far Eastern settlement.¹⁴

As a manager, Wilson allowed full scope to his subordinates and worked through established staff channels. His style emphasized extensive fact-gathering and informal discussions with experts in order to reach consensus solutions of problems. Perhaps for this reason, some felt that he occasionally delayed inordinately in reaching a decision, although he could render decisions quickly when necessary. Army officers, frequently at odds with Wilson on matters of policy, tended to be especially critical of his methods.¹⁵

Wilson met frequently with the Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC) and the Joint Secretaries (to be described later). He rarely met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body, but conferred often with their individual members—particularly the chairman, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, with whom he quickly achieved a meeting of the minds.¹⁶

One of Wilson's major innovations was an annual conference of senior Defense officials, military and civilian, held each year at the U.S. Marine Corps base at Quantico, Virginia. These meetings focused on world trends and budgetary and other problems confronting DoD. The practice was continued by Wilson's two successors.¹⁷

Because Wilson preferred to maintain direct relationships with his subordinates, he operated without elaborate staff coordinating machinery. He ran the department with an immediate office which in 1957 consisted of 31 persons (Table 2), headed by two special assistants, one military, the other civilian. The functions of the office included preliminary review of papers, general staff advice, provision of secretarial services for the Armed Forces Policy Council and the Joint Secretaries, and handling of Cabinet matters.¹⁸

The military assistant, Col. Carey A. Randall, USMC, was held in special regard by Wilson, although he was a holdover from the Truman administration. The scope of Randall's position in fact far exceeded what was implied in his job title; he enjoyed Wilson's full confidence and could speak for him authoritatively. When the Marine Corps withheld Randall's promotion to brigadier general, Wilson insisted on it.¹⁹

In manner, Wilson was genial and approachable, with a somewhat folksy sense of humor. A Cabinet colleague described him as "exuding

friendliness and cheerful self-confidence." He was popular with both associates and subordinates. "He was the kindest, nicest individual," said General Randall. "Everybody that knew him loved him." Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, who served as chief of naval operations during Wilson's last two years in office, when Wilson was under considerable strain, recalled that he had never seen Wilson lose his temper. He worked harmoniously with his opposite numbers in NATO, the defense ministers of the other member countries.²⁰

TABLE 2

Civilian Employees and Assigned Military Personnel,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 30 September 1957

	Civilian	Military
Office of the Secretary	9	22
Office of the Deputy Secretary	5	3
Administrative Secretary	25	23
Assistant to the Secretary (Atomic Energy)	12	19
Assistant to the Secretary (Legislative Affairs)	7	5
Assistant to the Secretary (Special Operations)	12	6
Assistant to the Secretary (Guided Missiles)	14	4
General Counsel	58	—
Assistant Secretary (Public Affairs)	74	50
Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs) ^a	216	86
Joint Chiefs of Staff	176	311
Assistant Secretary (Comptroller)	147	4
Assistant Secretary (Manpower, Personnel and Reserve)	211	63
Assistant Secretary (Supply and Logistics)	257	16
Assistant Secretary (Properties and Installations)	70	—
Assistant Secretary (Health and Medical)	11	10
Assistant Secretary (Research and Engineering)	147	17
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group	18	33
Mutual Weapons Development Program	11	8
Special Programs	13	3
Total	1,493	683

^a Includes personnel of the Office of Defense Advisor, USRO.

Source: *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1-December 31, 1957*, Table 11.

To the general public, Wilson's salient characteristic was his willingness to speak out, sometimes in a rather injudicious manner. Indeed, his "penchant for the colorful but politically disastrous phrase" occasionally made him something of a liability for the Eisenhower administration. This same characteristic, however, helped to endear him to the press; he was good copy. "We always count on you to brighten up the day a little bit," a reporter once told him. His ability to laugh at himself was another engaging quality.²¹

Wilson's relations with Congress were not always smooth; he was occasionally tactless in his attitude toward that body. One of his subordinates thought that he sometimes treated Congress like the stockholders of General Motors—people who were not supposed to interfere with management.²² Also, as President Eisenhower remarked in his diary, Wilson was prone to "lecture" Congress.²³ Indeed, he sometimes used this technique consciously, in dealing with members of Congress and others, to evade an answer to a question. He himself referred to this practice as taking a questioner on a "trip around the world."²⁴

As head of an executive department, Wilson had direct access to the president. He usually arranged this through Sherman Adams, chief of the White House staff, which was organized somewhat along military lines. It included a secretariat that provided a clearinghouse for papers reaching the president. The staff secretary, however, discharged a wide range of other responsibilities. He was officially designated as liaison officer with DoD, and in fact served the president as an informal adviser on matters of national security, briefing the president on issues and insuring that decisions were followed up.²⁵

The position of staff secretary was held in 1956 by Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Andrew J. Goodpaster, an associate of the president from his Army days. By direction of the president, Goodpaster attended presidential conferences with the secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other officials, and prepared a summary account of the discussions.²⁶ In 1957 the president's son, Maj. John S. D. Eisenhower, was assigned to the White House as Goodpaster's assistant.

Secretary Wilson's relationship with the president was not entirely harmonious. The two men held differing conceptions of their respective spheres of responsibility. Wilson, of course, properly looked to Eisenhower for major decisions on defense policy. The president, however, felt that Wilson deferred to him excessively and took up too much of his time asking for decisions that should have been made by the secretary. As time passed, his disillusionment with Wilson grew.²⁷ "I have got a man [as secretary of defense] who is frightened to make decisions," he grumbled to Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey in December 1956. "I have to make them for him."²⁸ The complaint, uttered in a moment of irritation, perhaps was not meant to be taken literally—Wilson, after all, had successfully headed one of the world's largest corporations—but it was indicative of the president's attitude. So, too, was the fact that the president "never said one good word" about Wilson.²⁹

At the same time, the president could not resist the temptation to be in some measure his own secretary of defense. Perhaps this was inevitable, given that he knew more about Wilson's area of responsibility than Wilson himself. As he once remarked, he "knew too much about the military to be fooled."³⁰ On his own initiative, he frequently sent Wilson instructions relating to the internal administration of DoD.³¹ In so doing, he may have encouraged in Wilson the very tendency that he deplored.

On Wilson's part, the reciprocal of the president's attitude was a conviction that he did not receive enough of the president's time or obtain sufficient guidance in major matters. "The President just won't give any orders," he once said, according to Secretary Gates.³² On at least one occasion, Wilson considered resigning. One of the president's advisers, Bernard M. Shanley, recalled an incident when a discouraged Wilson emerged from a conference with Eisenhower. "Do you think I ought to resign?" he asked Shanley. "I think you should have done it six months ago," replied Shanley.³³

Still, there was never a breach between the two men; their relations remained correct and even cordial. Wilson kept the promise he had made to the president to stay through a full term. Soon after Eisenhower's second inauguration, the two began discussing a replacement.³⁴ In the end, Wilson stayed until 8 October 1957. His successor, Neil H. McElroy, came directly from corporate life, like Wilson, with a minimum of government experience.

The Deputy Secretary

The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act established the position of deputy secretary of defense, specifying that he was to be a civilian and was to "perform such duties and exercise such powers" as the secretary might prescribe. Secretary Wilson maintained a very close relationship with his deputy, and formally granted him plenary power to act in any matter. In 1953 President Eisenhower named the deputy secretary as the DoD representative on the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), which was set up to oversee the implementation of national security policies.³⁵

Within the department, the deputy secretary, when not required to act as the secretary's alter ego, concentrated primarily on problems of internal management. He served as the "day-to-day business manager" of the department.³⁶ He had a small staff headed by a military and a civilian assistant, like the secretary. He also had in his immediate office the administrative secretary, who was responsible for issuing directives and for sending and receiving correspondence and messages.³⁷

The position of deputy secretary in 1956 was held by Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., a former president of the Champion Paper and Fibre Co. He came to the department in 1955 after serving on the Hoover Commission, to be described below. One of his primary responsibilities as deputy was to implement within DoD the recommendations of the commission.

Robertson's two predecessors as deputy secretary had, like Wilson himself, come into OSD directly from civilian life. However, when Robertson resigned in March 1957 to return to private business, Wilson reached into the ranks of DoD for a replacement and selected Donald A. Quarles, secretary of the Air Force. A scientist by training, Quarles had worked on weapons projects at Bell Telephone Laboratories and had served as assistant secretary of defense for research and development from 1953 to 1955,

before taking the Air Force post. His appointment as deputy secretary was announced on 26 March 1957.³⁸ Since Wilson already knew at that time that he would be leaving soon, he probably felt that a deputy with a technical background and a considerable measure of experience in OSD would be useful to his successor.

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense

The 1949 legislation provided for three assistant secretaries of defense in addition to the deputy secretary. Reorganization Plan No. 6 in 1953 increased the number to nine, plus a general counsel with the same rank and status.³⁹ The titles are shown in Chart 1.

The new assistant secretaries replaced various interservice boards and committees that had dealt with development, production, and allocation of weapons. In other words, they provided the machinery that made possible the transition within DoD to a conventional executive department. President Eisenhower in 1953 gave the following somewhat idealized description of their role:

Without imposing themselves in the direct lines of responsibility and authority between the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the three military departments, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense will provide the Secretary with a continuing review of the programs of the defense establishment and help him institute major improvements in their execution. They will be charged with establishing systems, within their assigned fields, for obtaining complete and accurate information to support recommendations to the Secretary.⁴⁰

The assistant secretaries served the secretary in maintaining uniform policies and practices throughout DoD. They aided the secretary in drafting directives to the service departments and issued supplementary or clarifying instructions. They reviewed directives issued by the service secretaries for conformity with overall policy. Empowered to request information from the service departments as necessary, they reviewed stated requirements of the services in men, materiel, and facilities, coordinated service operations to avoid duplication, and reviewed the operations of the departments to insure effectiveness and efficiency.⁴¹

In the formulation of national security policy at the highest level, the assistant secretary for international security affairs (ISA) played the most important role. He was responsible for advising the secretary on politico-military and economic aspects of foreign military affairs. As one of the holders of the position expressed it, "ISA provides the focal point in the Secretary's office for development of defense positions based on the advice of all of its affected elements, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments."⁴² His field of responsibility embraced U.S.

participation in joint defense efforts, such as NATO; negotiations with foreign governments concerning U.S. forces overseas; and preparation for meetings with foreign defense officials. He administered the Office of the Defense Advisor, United States Regional Organizations (USRO), located in Europe, which provided liaison with NATO.

These responsibilities necessarily involved ISA with the National Security Council, the president's advisory body for the coordination of military and diplomatic policies. The assistant secretary represented DoD on the NSC Planning Board, which drafted papers for consideration by the council.

ISA also had primary responsibility for the military assistance program. In cooperation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department, the assistant secretary developed guidance for the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) in each recipient country. The MAAGs drew up individual country plans which ISA reviewed and combined into an overall program for the budget.

The responsibilities of the assistant secretary were such that he could not be confined, even on paper, to a pure "staff" role. He had been authorized by the secretary "to issue such directives and instructions and exercise such supervision and control, including the redelegation of his authority, as are necessary to carry out [his] assigned duties and responsibilities."⁴³

Of necessity, the assistant secretary maintained very close contact with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and consulted with the Department of State almost daily. His office was organized with directors for major regions of the world, paralleling the organization of the State Department. Alone among the assistant secretaries, he sat with the service secretaries as a permanent member of the Joint Secretaries (described below), and had his own comptroller, primarily to handle budgeting and funding of the military assistance program; this was by agreement with the assistant secretary of defense (comptroller).⁴⁴

The assistant secretary (ISA) in 1956, Gordon Gray, was a seasoned and bipartisan public servant who had been secretary of the army under President Truman. In 1957 he moved on to other roles in the administration and was succeeded by General Counsel Mansfield D. Sprague.

The position of assistant secretary of defense (comptroller) was the only one specifically established by statute. It had been created by Title IV of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, which dealt with budgeting and fiscal procedures. Title IV made the DoD comptroller responsible for supervising the preparation of the DoD budget, for establishing policies and procedures and supervising their execution, and for budgeting, accounting, statistical reporting, and expenditure and collection of funds. The secretary of defense (in practice, the comptroller) was authorized to approve scheduled rates of obligation by the service departments and to withhold obligated funds until this approval had been given.⁴⁵

These provisions made the comptroller a figure of towering importance. He sat in judgment on the budget requests of the military services,

which went to him for initial review. The services had the right of appeal to the secretary of defense, who made the final decision, but more often than not he upheld the comptroller. Since the budget in the final analysis determined military capabilities, and thus shaped strategy, the comptroller's influence was apparent. Another source of power was the secretary's authority, which the comptroller exercised on his behalf, to control the flow to the services of funds for expenditure.⁴⁶

The office of the comptroller was in some degree the creation of the man who held it. Wilfred J. McNeil had been associated with the first secretary of defense, James V. Forrestal, since World War II, when Forrestal was secretary of the Navy. Within the Navy Department, McNeil had risen to the rank of rear admiral, specializing in fiscal matters. As one of the three civilian assistants allowed Forrestal under the 1947 act, McNeil had been *de facto* comptroller; he was the obvious choice when the position was created. He was in fact influential in shaping Title IV of the 1949 law.⁴⁷

By mid-1956, therefore, McNeil had for all practical purposes held his position for nine years. In contrast, the average tenure for other assistant secretaries was approximately two years. McNeil's detailed knowledge of the department and its inner workings was without rival and enhanced the prestige and influence inherent in his position. Successive secretaries relied on him for advice outside his immediate specialty.⁴⁸

Although McNeil had come into office under President Truman, he liked and admired Wilson and worked well with him. His competence and his thorough mastery of the intricacies of budgeting had won him the respect of Congress. "We always lean very heavily upon Mr. McNeil for advice and counsel," observed Rep. George H. Mahon of Texas, the influential chairman of the subcommittee on defense appropriations of the House Committee on Appropriations, in 1957. In 1954 McNeil was so little known to the public that a magazine writer characterized him as a "mystery man." Before he left office in 1959, however, he had been mentioned in the press as a possible secretary of defense.⁴⁹

McNeil received credit for a number of improvements in DoD financial procedures, notably the establishment of uniform budgeting, appropriation, and accounting structures among the services. He instituted working-capital funds to finance inventories of common supplies and services and to provide common industrial- or commercial-type activities of DoD. He persuaded Congress to adopt continuing appropriations not expiring with the fiscal year, allowing funds to be carried over, as well as "full-year funding," or appropriating in advance the entire amount for procurement and construction of major weapons systems, so that the complete cost was evident. On his initiative, the Bureau of the Budget assigned personnel to work in the Pentagon with the comptroller's office, shortening the time needed to review the Defense budget. In connection with the budget for 1957, he introduced a "financial plan"—a massive tabulation indicating at a glance the status of all funds available to the department.⁵⁰

In an age of rapidly changing military technology, the assistant secretary

for research and development (R&D), Clifford C. Furnas, played a key role. He assisted the secretary in overseeing the research and development programs of the service departments and had authority to assign responsibilities to the departments to avoid duplication. He collaborated with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in the development of nuclear weapons and provided administrative direction of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG), which conducted scientific analyses of weapons for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁵¹

Furnas's responsibilities overlapped with those of Frank D. Newbury, the assistant secretary for applications engineering (AE), who oversaw the stage between development and production of weapons. It was his task to insure that development programs gave due consideration to means of production. The organizational separation of this function reflected practice at General Motors, where in fact it had been Wilson's specialty. Just where "research and development" gave way to "applications engineering" depended on each item—whether it required intensive research to develop a new technology or could be produced largely with "state of the art" techniques. Coordinating committees, representing the two assistant secretaries, had been set up for various fields of weaponry, but they did not succeed in eliminating all friction.⁵²

The assistant secretary of defense for supply and logistics dealt with procurement, production, distribution, transportation, storage, cataloging, and mobilization planning. He established policies and procedures for determining supply requirements; appraised the feasibility of strategic plans in terms of materiel availability; recommended the assignment of procurement responsibilities to the military departments; and made recommendations for stockpiling of strategic materials.⁵³ His work force was the largest in OSD (Table 1). The office became vacant on 27 June 1956, when the incumbent, Thomas P. Pike, became an assistant to the president.⁵⁴ Six months later he was succeeded by E. Perkins McGuire.

Supervision of DoD bases, housing, and industrial facilities came under the assistant secretary for properties and installations, Floyd S. Bryant. He developed policies and procedures for acquisition, utilization, management, and disposal of real estate, as well as standards for service construction programs.⁵⁵

The assistant secretary for manpower, personnel, and reserve formulated plans and policies for manpower management, evaluated strategic plans with regard to availability of manpower, and formulated and reviewed plans for administration of reserve affairs. In two fields of responsibility he had the assistance of specialized advisory groups, the Reserve Forces Policy Board and the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS). Carter L. Burgess, who had been appointed to this position in 1954, held it until January 1957, when he was succeeded by William H. Francis, Jr.⁵⁶

Robert T. Ross, the assistant secretary for legislative and public affairs, covered two somewhat disparate fields of activity. In one capacity, he was responsible for developing the DoD legislative program (other than budgetary

or fiscal legislation) and for liaison with Congress. In the other, he supervised and directed the consolidated public information activities of DoD and its agencies and issued news releases.⁵⁷

The assistant secretary (health and medical) was responsible for policies and standards for health and sanitation, medical care, and administration of treatment facilities. Frank B. Berry, M.D., who had been appointed to this position in January 1954, held it for the next seven years.⁵⁸

The general counsel served as the chief legal officer of the department and provided all legal services. The incumbent in 1956, Mansfield D. Sprague, became assistant secretary (ISA) in February 1957 and was replaced by Robert Dechert.⁵⁹

As the preceding summary of the responsibilities of the assistant secretaries should make clear, it was not easy to confine them entirely to a staff as distinct from an operating role. The assistant secretary (ISA) and the comptroller were in a class apart; both had expressly been given operating authority, the one by delegation, the other by legislation. For their colleagues, the power to cite departures from policy, to evaluate requirements, to issue "supplementary" instructions, and to require the submission of information put them in a strong position to influence operations directly, or, in invidious terms, to interfere. Some friction with the service secretaries was therefore unavoidable, especially in the early years, when the assistant secretaries were feeling their way.⁶⁰

In fact, wide differences of opinion existed over the proper role of the assistant secretaries. Charles A. Coolidge, a former assistant secretary who made a study of their authority in connection with the Hoover Commission (described below), concluded in December 1955 that their assigned functions did not violate the "staff" concept; he also felt that they had "more potent powers than some of them realize." But another study carried out earlier for the commission noted complaints that the assistant secretaries tended to get into operations. The criticism was repeated in 1956 by the House Appropriations Committee, which cited as an example an instruction from the assistant secretary for properties and installations regulating the mowing of grass on military installations.⁶¹

The Assistants to the Secretary

Advisory functions that, for one reason or another, lay outside the regular organizational framework were handled by officials bearing the title of assistant to the secretary. They shared some of the powers of the assistant secretaries: they could issue supplementary instructions, review departmental directives, and spot-check and review departmental operations.⁶²

The assistant for special operations, General Graves B. Erskine, USMC (Ret.), dealt with intelligence, psychological warfare, and other sensitive matters. He served on an interdepartmental body known as the "5412 Committee," or "Special Group," which supervised covert operations. Initially he

was also responsible for providing staff support to the deputy secretary of defense as a member of the Operations Coordinating Board; this responsibility, however, was reassigned to the assistant secretary (ISA) in 1956.⁶³

Another military retiree, Maj. Gen. Herbert B. Loper, USA, served as assistant for atomic energy and advised the secretary on "atomic energy aspects" of DoD policies and programs. He also chaired the Military Liaison Committee, which provided the channel of communication between DoD and the Atomic Energy Commission on matters involving the development, manufacture, use, and storage of atomic weapons.⁶⁴

A position of assistant for guided missiles, established on 27 March 1956, provided the secretary of defense with a full-time executive to assist in coordinating the development and production of missiles, particularly of the long-range "ballistic" type. The position went successively to Eger V. Murphree and William M. Holaday, both experienced research administrators with backgrounds in petroleum engineering.⁶⁵

The Service Secretaries

For a century and a half the armed forces of the United States were administered by two departments, War (renamed Army in 1947) and Navy. The National Security Act of 1947 added a third department for the newly independent Air Force. The 1949 amendments downgraded these departments from "executive" to "military" status and removed their secretaries from the National Security Council. At the same time, it reaffirmed the autonomy of the departments through the provision for their separate administration, and it specified that their secretaries outranked the assistant secretaries of defense.⁶⁶

The service secretaries bore full responsibility for all activities within their departments. They provided advice to the secretary of defense both directly and through their membership on advisory bodies. Thus, although not actually part of OSD, their relationship to it was close.⁶⁷

In addition, since 1953 the departmental secretaries had been in the line of command to the unified commands, which controlled most of the combat forces. The unified command system, intended to provide a single responsible military commander in each theater of operations, had its origins in World War II and was formalized in 1946. The Joint Chiefs of Staff parceled out to their members the responsibility for serving as "executive agents" for the commands. The executive agent provided a channel for the transmission of orders to the commander and of reports back to Washington. President Eisenhower discontinued this system in 1953 and ordered that the departmental secretaries, rather than the military service chiefs, be designated as executive agents. The purpose of this change, he said, was to provide "clear and unchallenged civilian responsibility in the Defense Establishment." But, to avoid excessive civilian interference with military operations, it was provided that, "for strategic direction and for the conduct of combat

operations," the secretary designated as executive agent would authorize his military chief to act for him, thus in effect redelegating his authority.⁶⁸

The departmental secretary played a dual role. As a member of the management team of the secretary of defense, he was expected to accept and carry out, in letter and in spirit, the policies of his superior. At the same time, to retain the loyalties of his service, he had to try to uphold its interests to the best of his ability.

The role was particularly exacting for the secretary of the Army, whose service was the principal target of the relentless Eisenhower-Wilson economy drive. Wilber M. Brucker, who left the position of OSD general counsel to become secretary of the Army in 1955, was a former governor of Michigan and thus enjoyed a unique status as the only official in OSD who had held elective office. His strength in the Republican Party afforded him a certain freedom of action in vigorously upholding the Army's interests, as he saw them, within the councils of OSD. Although his forthright stance earned the warm approval of professional Army men, it brought him into sharp and even acrimonious disagreement with his colleagues and superiors. Nevertheless he remained in office through 1960.⁶⁹

The secretary of the Navy, Charles S. Thomas, had held important positions in the Navy Department in World War II. Under Eisenhower, he served as under secretary of the Navy and assistant secretary of defense for supply and logistics before becoming secretary of the Navy in May 1954. One of his major acts was the selection as chief of naval operations of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, who set a record of six years in the position. When Thomas retired in 1957, he was succeeded by his under secretary, Thomas S. Gates, Jr.⁷⁰

The civilian head of the Air Force was Donald A. Quarles, who held the position until 1957, when, as already noted, he became deputy secretary of defense. He was succeeded by his under secretary, James H. Douglas, Jr.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

In their capacity as military chiefs of their services, the chief of staff, U.S. Army, the chief of naval operations, and the chief of staff, U.S. Air Force, were responsible to the secretaries of their departments. Each of these officers, however, wore a second hat as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a body charged with responsibility for providing military advice to the highest levels of government.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff came into existence during World War II by executive action. The National Security Act of 1947 gave the JCS statutory sanction. The 1949 amendments provided for a permanent chairman as the fourth JCS member. In 1952 the commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, became a member in a qualified sense: he was given "co-equal status" when matters of concern to his service were under consideration.⁷¹

By law, the JCS were the "principal military advisers" to the secretary of defense, the president, and the National Security Council. Their statutory

duties were to prepare strategic and logistic plans; to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces; to establish unified commands; to review requirements of the military forces; and to formulate policies for joint military training and education. To assist them, they had a Joint Staff composed of not more than 210 officers drawn from the services in approximately equal numbers, headed by a director.⁷²

The responsibilities of the JCS chairman were separately described. Appointed by the president for a two-year term, he was eligible for one reappointment. Though he had no command authority, he took precedence over all other officers of the armed services. He presided over JCS meetings but was to "have no vote." Since the JCS were an advisory body and did not engage in formal "voting," this provision served only to express traditional congressional fears of a "man on horseback." The chairman also provided agendas for JCS meetings and informed the secretary of defense (or, when appropriate, the president) of issues upon which the JCS could not agree.⁷³


The president's reorganization in 1953 had made important changes in the status, functions, and internal operation of the JCS. The removal of JCS members from their executive agent role, and the substitution of civilian secretaries, have already been noted. The entire JCS organization was enjoined to cooperate during the planning process with other elements of OSD and with outside experts. The chairman was given responsibility for "managing" the Joint Staff, including the right to approve the appointment of officers thereto and the selection of the director, subject to the approval of the secretary of defense. The chairman was instructed to inform the secretary of his own views on any matter on which the JCS disagreed.⁷⁴

The purpose of these changes was to strengthen civilian control, speed up JCS deliberations, and improve the quality of joint plans by making sure that the chiefs took into account policy and economic considerations as well as scientific developments.⁷⁵ They had the effect of enhancing the stature of the chairman and giving the secretary more influence over JCS deliberations, both directly and through the chairman.

The JCS were advised by the Joint Staff and by various interservice committees, as shown in Chart 2. The Joint Staff, which was responsible for preparing initial drafts of plans and other papers for JCS consideration, was organized into three groups dealing with strategic plans, logistics plans, and intelligence. Each of these reported to a correspondingly named committee made up of senior service officers sitting part-time, which reviewed and frequently revised Joint Staff papers before forwarding them to the JCS. Of the remaining committees, the most prestigious, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, consisted of three senior officers who advised the JCS on overall military strategy and its relations with national and international policy.⁷⁶

The JCS exercised their advisory function in various ways. Usually they presented formal conclusions in memorandums addressed to the secretary of defense or the president, setting forth an agreed position or, if

CHART 2
JCS ORGANIZATION
30 JUNE 1956



necessary, dissenting views of individual members. On occasion they met, as a group or individually, with the president or the secretary or both.⁷⁷ The chairman regularly attended meetings of the National Security Council, as did his JCS colleagues when invited. In addition, the JCS had a representative on the NSC Planning Board and were thus able to influence the output of papers prepared for NSC consideration. Such papers, when completed, were circulated to NSC members before discussion. The secretary of defense normally referred them to the JCS for comment, and usually accepted JCS advice in preparing a defense position to present to the council.*

The JCS maintained close relations with the Department of State. They met frequently, usually on a weekly basis, with the secretary or with lower ranking officials of the department, generally with ISA representatives present. By 1958 another channel with State had opened up, involving representatives of the Joint Staff and ISA with members of State's Policy Planning Staff.⁷⁸

President Eisenhower, himself a former JCS member, had a clear conception of the role that he wished the JCS to play. In his view, their corporate role took precedence over their position as chiefs of services. The services were staffed and organized to handle their internal problems with limited supervision by the chief. Hence, the JCS should look outward, rather than inward, and should "form the union between the military establishment and our country as a whole, its public, its government, etc." Their principal task should be to develop "military doctrine in its overall terms," without getting into "minute details of tactics and operational procedures." By "doctrine" the president meant "for example the great decisions which increase or decrease the chance of war, which affect our basic relationships with other countries, which establish the best means of preserving peace. This doctrine deals with how best to unite military with psychological and other factors to the best interests of our country."⁷⁹

Unfortunately, the JCS found it difficult to fill this role entirely. Agreement on "doctrine" was not easily reached by men with sharply differing conceptions, shaped by years of experience in their respective services, of how best to deter a war or to conduct it if it occurred. The difficulty became greater in a time of severe budget reductions, when the problem before the JCS was to allocate scarcity. Disagreements within the JCS gave rise to repeated criticisms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for supposedly placing service interests ahead of those of the nation.⁸⁰ By May 1956 the president was "inclined to think" that the JCS system had "failed."⁸¹

All the incumbent members of the JCS in 1956 were men chosen by Eisenhower and Wilson. All had had distinguished combat careers in World War II and since had served at high command and staff levels.⁸²

The chairman, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the second man to hold the position, had succeeded General of the Army Omar N. Bradley in 1953. He came to the office from the position of commander in chief, Pacific (CINCPAC),

* See below for the operation of the NSC.

one of the unified commands. He was a forceful man—"handsome, articulate, and assured," as one observer wrote.⁸³ Radford was not the man to hang back from using the enlarged authority granted him in the 1953 reorganization. He himself remarked in 1956 that "the responsibility and the authority of the Chairman is greater than appears in the law."⁸⁴ His position afforded him certain advantages. As the principal spokesman for the JCS, he spent more time with the president and the secretary than did any of the others. Moreover, disagreements among the chiefs operated to enhance the chairman's influence, providing him with the obligation—and opportunity—to refer matters to the secretary with his own recommended solutions.⁸⁵ Although Radford had no service responsibilities, he sought to involve himself in Navy affairs and to state Navy positions on issues before the JCS. This earned him the frequent displeasure and opposition of his contemporaries as CNO, Admirals Carney and Burke.⁸⁶

Radford enjoyed close relations with Wilson and Eisenhower, both of whom respected his judgment. When he was appointed, the president urged him to speak up freely on any subject in the National Security Council. He met with the president every week until the president's heart attack in 1955, and often thereafter. Secretary Wilson might or might not be present at these meetings; the president often discussed strategy and force planning with Radford alone, just as he sometimes discussed budgetary problems with the secretary of defense in Radford's absence.⁸⁷

Radford's views on strategy were in complete harmony with the Eisenhower-Wilson "New Look," which emphasized strategic nuclear capability ("massive retaliation") more than conventional balanced forces. This was surprising in light of the views expressed by Radford in 1949, during congressional hearings on unification and the role of the Air Force's B-36 bomber. At that time, Radford had strongly denounced any strategy that placed primary reliance on strategic bombing. For whatever reasons, he had changed his opinions by 1953, when he was appointed JCS chairman.⁸⁸

A major goal of the New Look strategy was to make possible budget reductions. President Eisenhower was convinced that economic stability was virtually coequal with military security and that it was endangered by excessive spending, whether for military or other purposes. Radford had wholeheartedly accepted this view from the moment he assumed office. He said in 1954 that "the economic stability of the United States is a great factor of military importance," and that military men must "take economic factors into consideration."⁸⁹

Within the JCS, Radford aggressively put forward his views, which were of course those of the president. He was in fact the one JCS member on whom the president could rely for unfailing support. Not unnaturally, Eisenhower saw him as a "tower of strength in struggling for better teamwork among the services. He was nearly unique among professional military men," added the president, "in his understanding of the relationships between national military and economic strength." From a different viewpoint, General Taylor, the Army chief of staff, described Radford as "an able

and ruthless partisan, who did his utmost to impose his views upon the Chiefs."⁹⁰

When Radford left office in 1957, the Air Force chief of staff, General Nathan F. Twining, succeeded him. As would be expected from his background, Twining was on record as a firm supporter of the New Look strategy. "In assessing the competing requirements for force-in-being during the 1950-1960 time period," he later wrote, "I always leaned strongly to the side of the strategic deterrent force." Nevertheless, the announcement of his impending appointment in March 1957 brought pleasure from at least some elements of the Army; one Army commentator thought that Twining's "fairness and willingness to hear all sides will go far toward calming the tensions seething in the Pentagon."⁹¹

These expectations were not entirely disappointed. Twining never compromised his convictions; he firmly opposed the view, put forth increasingly after 1957, that conventional forces should receive a larger share of the budget. On occasion he, like Radford, clashed with Taylor (who nevertheless described him as "a most pleasant change from Radford"). But he was less forceful, both in office and in public, in expounding his views; nor did he exploit to the utmost the authority of the chairman. "His unusual human qualities did much to achieve the necessary interservice cooperation," in the words of President Eisenhower. Admiral Burke developed such confidence in Twining's fair-mindedness that he was willing to allow Twining to present the Navy side of issues to the president. Twining was also on excellent terms with Secretary Wilson, whom he admired.⁹²

The Army chief of staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, came to his position in the Pentagon after serving as commander in chief, Far East (CINCFE). Within the JCS, he became the principal opponent of the strategy and budgetary trends promoted by Wilson and by Eisenhower, his old comrade in arms. He was firmly convinced that overemphasis on strategic striking power left the United States unprepared for anything less than all-out war and hence imposed needless rigidity on U.S. military strategy. Like Radford, he was an articulate spokesman for his viewpoint, with the result that JCS meetings frequently turned into a clash between the two.⁹³ Despite Taylor's reputation as a dissenter, when his term expired in 1959 Secretary McElroy offered to retain him on active duty as supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR). He declined the offer, retired, and took his case to the public through the printed word.*

The chief of naval operations, Admiral Burke, had gained fame during World War II as an intrepid commander of destroyers. He was a relatively junior rear admiral, with a command in the Atlantic, when selected for the post of CNO in 1955. His six years of service as CNO attested to the high regard in which he was held by his superiors. Like Taylor, he occasionally clashed with Radford, as already noted. President Eisenhower had a high opinion of Burke's abilities and often used him as a "sounding board" (in Burke's own words) on matters not directly related to the Navy.⁹⁴

* For the circumstances of Taylor's retirement, see Chapter XI.

The Air Force chief of staff in 1956, General Twining, had held the position of vice chief, following command of two numbered air forces in World War II and service as commander in chief, Alaskan Command (CINCAL). When Twining took over as JCS chairman in 1957, he was succeeded in turn by his vice chief, General Thomas D. White. White had the distinction of having graduated from the U.S. Military Academy just short of his nineteenth birthday in 1920. By 1957 he had been in the Pentagon for nine years, and had served on the prestigious Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the JCS.

The commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, General Randolph McC. Pate, was for all practical purposes a fifth member of the JCS. The law granting him "co-equal status" allowed the commandant himself to determine what matters concerned his service, subject to a possible veto by the secretary of defense on recommendation of the JCS chairman. A precedent for extended participation by the commandant was well fixed by 1956; General Pate's predecessor, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, had been encouraged by Admiral Radford to sit in on discussions not limited to Marine Corps matters.⁹⁵

Other Advisory Bodies

The National Security Act had established the Armed Forces Policy Council (originally called War Council) to advise the secretary of defense on "matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces." Chaired by the secretary, who had power of decision, it included the deputy secretary, the three service secretaries, and the four statutory members of the JCS. The weekly meetings of the AFPC dealt with matters of the highest importance, such as budget problems, force levels, major weapons programs, and reports to be rendered the National Security Council. Indeed, the AFPC could be regarded as a sort of in-house equivalent of the NSC. The AFPC at first operated with no formal agenda or minutes, but by 1956 the circulation of agendas was established practice, along with distribution of formal records of action following meetings. These practices were sanctioned by a directive in 1959.⁹⁶

Another statutory organization was the Military Liaison Committee (MLC) to the Atomic Energy Commission, created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The committee consisted of a chairman appointed by the president, with senatorial consent, and one or more representatives from the military departments, in equal numbers, assigned by the secretary of defense. It served as the channel of advice and consultation between DoD and AEC concerning the development, manufacture, use, and storage of atomic weapons. The committee chairman in 1956, as already noted, was the secretary's assistant for atomic energy, Herbert B. Loper.⁹⁷

A purely civilian body, having no legislative basis, the Joint Secretaries included the secretary and deputy secretary of defense, the secretary and under secretary of each military department, and the assistant secretary of

defense for international security affairs. Others attended at the secretary's discretion; thus the comptroller was frequently present. Like the AFPC, the Joint Secretaries met weekly and were served by a secretariat which circulated formal agendas before each meeting and advices of action afterward.⁹⁸

As a means of informal staff coordination within OSD, Secretary Wilson in December 1955 revived the Staff Council, an organization that had fallen into disuse. It included the secretary and deputy secretary, the assistant secretaries, the general counsel, the assistants to the secretary, and a representative of the JCS, plus others at the secretary's discretion. The deputy secretary normally presided. The Staff Council advised the secretary concerning matters requiring staff action.⁹⁹

The National Security Council

The secretary of defense participated in establishing policy as a member of the National Security Council, established in 1947 to advise the president concerning the integration of military, political, and diplomatic policies. Its membership in 1956 consisted of the president, the vice president, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, and the director of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), who was responsible for integrating civilian and military mobilization plans. The JCS and the director of central intelligence served as advisers. The council was served by a staff headed by a civilian executive secretary.¹⁰⁰

Like DoD, the National Security Council was extensively reorganized by President Eisenhower, who regularly presided at meetings. He invited the secretary of the treasury and the director of the Bureau of the Budget (BoB) to attend meetings regularly, and others when occasion required. He instituted systematic procedures for bringing matters before the council and for supervising execution of approved policies.¹⁰¹

Matters for NSC consideration came first to the Planning Board, which included representatives of all the statutory members plus others such as Treasury, Budget, the JCS, and the CIA. The board drafted papers for NSC consideration which circulated in advance to member agencies. Disagreements within the board went to the NSC for resolution. The president made the final decisions in council meetings. Following each meeting, a formal record of each action taken was circulated to the members for comment. The president's action on this written record (including the resolution of any remaining differences of opinion) constituted the authoritative decision, which was transmitted to member agencies by the executive secretary.¹⁰²

The president kept in touch with the NSC through his special assistant for national security affairs, a position that he established in 1953. This official set the agenda for NSC meetings, briefed the president in advance, and kept the president informed regarding the execution of policies established in the NSC; he also chaired the Planning Board. During 1956 the position of special assistant was held successively by Dillon Anderson and

William H. Jackson. In January 1957 Robert Cutler, the first holder of the position in 1953, was reappointed and served until July 1958.¹⁰³

The special assistant was an important official, though less prominent and influential than under Eisenhower's successors; he was a staff coordinator rather than a policy advocate. To some extent, his responsibilities overlapped those of the staff secretary. Broadly speaking, the special assistant dealt with matters of larger or long-range importance, the staff secretary with more immediate problems. Difficulties were avoided by a free exchange of information between the two officials and the maintenance of an easy and informal working relationship.¹⁰⁴

As already noted, the assistant secretary (ISA) represented DoD on the NSC Planning Board, but the JCS were also represented on the board by an "adviser." Normally, ISA prepared a coordinated Defense position to present to the board, but it was possible, on rare occasions, that a paper might go to the NSC embodying separate DoD and JCS positions.¹⁰⁵

To supervise the execution of approved policies involving more than one department or agency, President Eisenhower established in 1953 the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). Membership consisted of the under secretary of state, the deputy secretary of defense, the director of central intelligence, and the director of the Foreign Operations Administration (which was concerned with foreign economic aid), plus a representative of the president. Normally the ASD (ISA) substituted for the deputy secretary as the OSD representative. At first the under secretary of state served as ex officio chairman. In February 1957 he was replaced by a chairman appointed by the president. At the same time, the OCB was placed within the structure of the NSC.¹⁰⁶

As a vehicle for policy formulation, the NSC encountered extensive criticism. In 1955 a Hoover Commission task force complained that it was failing to provide DoD with adequate guidance. Other critics charged that the NSC was prone to seek meaningless compromises and that it was an unsuitable vehicle for generating new departures in policy.¹⁰⁷ These criticisms, which were to be extensively aired before a Senate committee in 1960, were ignored by the president. He used the NSC as he wanted: to provide a forum in which all sides of an issue could be aired and advocates heard before a decision was made.¹⁰⁸

In the deliberations of the NSC, the dominant figure, next to the president, was Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (until ill health forced his resignation in 1959). Dulles, a prominent international lawyer, was well prepared for his position through extensive diplomatic experience. Though long associated with the Republican Party, he had served as an adviser to the State Department during the Truman administration and had assisted in negotiating the 1951 peace treaty with Japan. As a dedicated opponent of communism, Dulles strongly supported the "containment" policy; indeed, in 1952 he had gone further and spoken of "liberating" the satellite countries from Soviet rule. A firm supporter of the New Look strategy, he had provided its most prominent public articulation in a speech in 1954 that

gave rise to the phrase "massive retaliation," although by 1957 he was beginning to rethink his position. He was often criticized for his rigidity and his alleged insensitivity to the views of other world leaders. The president, however, retained a high opinion of him. Dulles's brother, Allen W. Dulles, served as director of central intelligence.¹⁰⁹

Secretary Dulles was on cordial terms with Admiral Radford, whose judgment he rated higher than that of Wilson. Dulles in fact encouraged contacts between State and the JCS, and himself met with the latter frequently, as already noted. This did not prevent occasional clashes of opinion between Radford and Dulles in the NSC.¹¹⁰

Secretary Dulles was considered one of the three strong men in the Eisenhower Cabinet and the NSC, along with Secretary of Defense Wilson and Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey, formerly president of the Mark A. Hanna Corporation. An ardent conservative and forceful spokesman for economy in government, Humphrey frequently spoke up in favor of cutting military spending; he was critical of the services, but praised Radford and Twining, both of whom accepted the need for budget austerity. He was occasionally at odds with Wilson, though the two remained friendly.¹¹¹

The director of defense mobilization, Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, inherited the seat on the NSC originally allotted by the National Security Act to the chairman of the National Security Resources Board, which had been abolished by President Eisenhower in 1953. Flemming chaired a Defense Mobilization Board, of which the secretary of defense was a member, along with most of the other Cabinet members. Also part of ODM was a Science Advisory Committee, headed by Lee A. DuBridge, which advised the director and the president on research and development for defense.¹¹²

Not a statutory member of NSC but a regular participant in council discussions, the director of the Bureau of the Budget, Percival F. Brundage, like Humphrey, held conservative views on government spending and lent his voice in support of economy. His contacts with OSD were not limited to the NSC, since the bureau took active part in preparation of the defense budget. Analysts of the military division of BoB worked side by side in the Pentagon with those from McNeil's office. Their review of service budget requests was guided by a constant attempt to justify reductions, during which they did not hesitate to challenge service requirements on purely military grounds.¹¹³

Changes in Organization and Management, 1956-1957

That the defense establishment should be operated at minimum cost and maximum efficiency was an objective that had been sought from the earliest days of the National Security Act. It required a never-ending effort to improve DoD operations. Major improvements taking place during Wilson's last year or so included introduction of the "single manager" plan,

whereby one department provided common services and supplies for all users; expansion of working capital funds, under which supplies or services were "sold," with proceeds going directly to replenish the capital of the operation, and users were provided with an incentive to minimize their consumption; and completion of the enormous task, begun in 1952, of identifying every one of more than three million items in military supply systems, a necessary step in controlling and ultimately reducing the number.¹¹⁴

Two organizational changes occurred at the assistant secretary level. Establishment of the assistant for guided missiles created an office whose responsibilities overlapped those of the assistant secretaries for research and development and for applications engineering. In February 1957 Wilson merged the two assistant secretaryships into a single assistant secretary for research and engineering. The position was held briefly by Frank D. Newbury; he resigned in May and was replaced in September 1957 by Paul D. Foote.¹¹⁵

In February 1957 the assistant secretary for legislative and public affairs, Robert T. Ross, resigned. Finding that the combination of these two functions had not worked well, Wilson took the opportunity to separate them. Responsibility for developing the DoD legislative program went to the general counsel; legislative liaison was given to a new assistant to the secretary, Brig. Gen. Clarence J. Hauck, Jr. An assistant White House press secretary, Murray Snyder, became assistant secretary for public affairs.¹¹⁶


A step that proved important for the future was the establishment in 1956 of a Defense Science Board (DSB) in the office of the assistant secretary for research and development, Furnas, who served as chairman. Other members were the chairmen of the technical advisory panels in his office and of the scientific advisory committees of the services, plus representatives of outside scientific organizations (the National Academy of Sciences, the National Bureau of Standards, the National Science Foundation, and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics). The DSB held its first meeting in September 1956 and received its formal charter three months later.¹¹⁷

The merger of the two assistant secretaryships and the establishment of the Defense Science Board accorded with recommendations submitted by a commission headed by former President Herbert Hoover. This commission, established in 1953, made a sweeping survey of the entire executive branch. It submitted 19 reports, plus 21 supporting reports by task forces and subcommittees, containing 359 recommendations applicable to the Department of Defense. Wilson and Robertson reviewed the reports and directed the appropriate assistant secretaries to implement the recommendations they had approved.¹¹⁸

In scope, the recommendations of the commission and its staff groups ranged from major organizational changes to minute details of operations. For DoD, the most important report was that on business organization of the department.¹¹⁹ Others largely applicable to the department dealt with personnel, food and clothing, research and development, and intelligence (the majority of these latter being classified).

CHART 3

30 SEPTEMBER 1957



Most of the recommendations were minor and could readily be implemented by administrative action. Some, such as those for improving supply management, squared with what Wilson wanted to do. Others that required congressional action included proposals for higher pay to attract and retain capable people.¹²⁰ Ultimately, of the 359 applicable recommendations, DoD put 96 into effect fully and 137 partially.¹²¹

Among the recommendations not adopted were some that would have involved important changes in DoD organization. One of these would have reduced the number of assistant secretaries of defense to four (not counting the general counsel), responsible respectively for logistics, research and development, personnel, and financial management. Wilson concluded, however, that the existing organization was sound. He had already taken steps to improve coordination among the assistant secretaries.¹²²

Later, however, as already described, Wilson moved part way toward the commission's recommendations by merging two assistant secretaryships into one for research and engineering. Both Newbury and Furnas concurred in the merger, and after Furnas left in February 1957, Wilson took the opportunity to make the change.¹²³

The commission concluded that maximum economy in supply management required the creation of a separate organization, under civilian management, to administer common supply and service activities. In Wilson's view, such a step would merely create another layer of paper work and confuse the responsibilities of the service departments. The advantages of the proposal could be fully accomplished under the single manager plan, which was well under way in the department.¹²⁴

In sum, the work of the Hoover Commission led to no major changes in DoD, but served as a catalyst to stimulate and assist ongoing efforts to improve efficiency and economy. Wilson was thoroughly in sympathy with the objectives of the commission, but he undertook as far as possible to fit the proposals into the existing framework.

As a result, the organization that Secretary Wilson handed on to his successor in October 1957 (Chart 3) had changed little in four years, although its work force had shrunk from 2,474 to 2,176—a reduction of 12 percent (Table 2). In essence, it was the same structure established by Reorganization Plan No. 6. A thoroughgoing reorganization of the defense establishment—the fourth within a decade—was to come a year later, under the pressure of growing presidential, congressional, and public dissatisfaction with the performance of DoD.

CHAPTER II

Defense Policies and Problems in 1956

When President Eisenhower took office in 1953, he had committed himself to broad foreign policy goals that commanded bipartisan support: maintenance of world peace, resistance to the expansionist drive of a dynamic Communist world, and adherence to the commitments undertaken by the United States to the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These goals called for a continuing high level of military preparedness. At the same time, Eisenhower had made clear his determination to cut back federal spending, which in his view, if continued at levels set by his predecessor, President Truman,* could jeopardize the nation's economy. Preservation of American safety and welfare, therefore, required a careful balance between the objectives of defense and economy. "We must achieve both security and solvency," Eisenhower had said in one of his 1952 campaign speeches. Or, as he put it several months later in his first state of the union address, "Our problem is to achieve adequate military strength within the limits of endurable strain upon our economy." Implicit in these and other statements by him was a conviction that the Truman administration had misjudged the balance between "security" and "solvency," stressing the former to the neglect of the latter.¹

The New Look

Soon after taking office, Eisenhower and his advisers undertook what Secretary Wilson called a "new look at the entire defense picture," seeking a strategy to uphold national objectives at a lower cost—a cost that could be maintained indefinitely over the "long haul." The result was a decision to give clear primacy to nuclear retaliatory power, relying on the increasing destructiveness of modern weapons to justify reductions in conventional surface forces. This strategy, variously referred to as the "New Look" or "massive retaliation," was embodied partly in NSC directives, partly in decisions made in connection with the budgets for fiscal years 1955 and 1956.²

* Truman's high level of spending was, of course, occasioned by the Korean War. Before the war, Truman had been a zealous budget-cutter.

A corollary of the New Look entailed a downward revision of the military force goals inherited from the Truman administration. Thus the Army, which in December 1952 stood at 20 divisions (one short of its approved goal), had by June 1956 dropped to 18 divisions. In the same time span, the Navy's strength dwindled from 1,116 to 973 vessels. Only the Air Force—the key element in the new strategy—was allowed to continue expanding: from 96 wings in December 1952 to 131 in June 1956. The final goal of the Air Force, which Truman had established at 143 wings, was reduced to 137 but the reduction was in troop carrier wings and hence affected the Army more than the Air Force. (See Table 3 for force levels as of 30 June 1956.)³

Total military personnel shrank from 3,512,453 in December 1952 to 2,806,441 in June 1956—a reduction of 20 percent, and actually below the authorized figure of 2,850,000 set in the budget for FY 1956 (which ended on 30 June 1956). The Army's share of this total fell from 48 to 37 percent, while that of the Air Force rose from 27 to 32 percent.⁴

Smaller forces meant a corresponding decrease in military spending. The following table compares appropriations requests and expenditure estimates in Truman's last budget (January 1953) with that for FY 1956 submitted by Eisenhower two years later:⁵

FY 1954 (Truman) Budget
(billions)

	New Obligational Authority		Expenditures	
	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent
Army	\$12.120	29.3	\$15.300	33.7
Navy	11.381	27.6	12.000	26.4
Air Force	16.788	40.6	17.510	38.6
OSD and Interservice	1.031	2.5	.590	1.3
Total	\$41.320	100.0	\$45.400	100.0

FY 1956 (Eisenhower) Budget
(billions)

	New Obligational Authority		Expenditures	
	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent
Army	\$ 7.303	22.2	\$ 8.850	24.8
Navy	8.937	27.2	9.700	27.1
Air Force	14.536	44.2	15.600	43.6
OSD and Interservice	2.123	6.4	1.600	4.5
Total	\$32.899	100.0	\$35.750	100.0

The FY 1957 Budget

By January 1956, when President Eisenhower sent Congress his defense budget for FY 1957, the major economies expected of the New Look had

been achieved. The president actually asked for an increase over the preceding year, within an overall federal budget that was expected to produce a small surplus. He sought \$35.7 billion for military programs, of which \$785 million would be transferred from stock funds, leaving \$34.9 billion to be provided in new obligational authority. Of this amount, \$33 billion was asked at once, with \$1.9 billion to be requested later, mostly for construction. The budget emphasized continuation of qualitative improvements begun earlier. The Army, which would be authorized 19 divisions, would convert an infantry division into an airborne for experiment with new tactics and weapons. The Air Force would reach the 137-wing goal toward which it had been building for several years. All its combat wings would be fully equipped with jets by June 1957 except the heavy bomber wings, in which the propeller-driven B-36 was already giving way to the B-52; this meant an enlargement of the force as well as a qualitative improvement, since each B-52 wing would have 45 aircraft as compared with 30 per wing for B-36s. The Navy would expand slightly to 1,005 active ships, including 411 warships—battleships, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. Construction of another aircraft carrier of the *Forrestal* class—the Navy's newest and largest combat vessel—would be authorized, to join the five others of this class already in service or under construction. Continental defense would be augmented with additional warning and control facilities. The services would be authorized approximately 2,840,000 men and women, a slight increase over FY 1956.⁶

The president forecast expenditures of \$35.547 billion for FY 1957, very close to the \$34.575 billion expected for FY 1956 and \$36.533 billion actually expended in FY 1955.⁷ This suggested that the New Look had reached a point where the "long haul" could begin—a period when the United States could live indefinitely with a level of expenditures that would not strain its resources. One influential journal, commenting on the 1957 budget, foresaw a "period of stability in military strength," which "would be most desirable and economical in that it would permit long range planning and procurement."⁸

The reception of the budget in Congress, however, did not augur well for the prospect of "stability." The services were growing restive under the economy program. From the beginning, the Army especially had viewed the New Look with misgivings. But dissident voices were now heard from the Air Force, despite the fact that it had been favored under the New Look. Disturbing reports in the media declared that the Soviet Union, which already surpassed the United States in quantity of aircraft, was beginning to close the gap in quality and that the Soviets were making ominous progress in developing long-range missiles. The assistant secretary of the Air Force for research and development, Trevor Gardner, resigned in protest against budget restraints and aired his dissatisfaction in magazine articles in May 1956.⁹

Concerned over the existing status and future prospects of U.S. air power, a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, chaired

TABLE 3
Major Forces and Personnel Strengths of Each Service
as of 30 June 1956

Army:	
Divisions	18
Regiments/Regimental combat teams	10
Air defense battalions:	
Guided missile	47
Other	86
Total	133
Active aircraft inventory:	
Helicopters	1,456
Fixed-wing	2,117
Total	3,573
Navy:	
Warships	404
Other ships	569
Total active ships	973
Carrier air groups	17
Marine divisions	3
Marine air wings	3
Active aircraft inventory:	
Operating	9,687
Logistic support	2,630
Total	12,317
Jet aircraft as percent of active aircraft inventory	35
Air Force:	
Strategic wings	51
Air defense wings	32
Tactical wings (including airlift)	48
Total wings	131
Active aircraft inventory:	
Operating	21,564
Nonoperating	5,196
Total	26,760
Jet aircraft as percent of active aircraft inventory	56

Active Duty Personnel
(Rounded to nearest 1,000)

Army	1,026,000
Navy	670,000
Marine Corps	201,000
Air Force	910,000
Total	2,807,000

Source: *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1959*, 433.

by Stuart Symington of Missouri, a former secretary of the Air Force, opened hearings on the subject in April 1956. After questioning a wide range of officials over the next two months, the subcommittee concluded that the United States lacked sufficient long-range jet bombers, manpower, and bases.¹⁰

Faced with these pressures, President Eisenhower and Secretary Wilson took a second look at the budget. As a result, in April the president forwarded a supplemental request for \$547.1 million in obligational authority. The largest item in the request was \$248.5 million to increase production of B-52s to 20 aircraft per month instead of the current rate of 17. Another \$128 million was for expanded base facilities to accelerate dispersal of the B-52 force. Other funds would go for continental defense, missile research, and conversion of conventional ships to guided missile capabilities.¹¹

After receipt of the supplemental budget and various minor adjustments, the total requested by the administration in new obligational authority amounted to \$35.189 billion, divided as follows:¹²

(thousands)	
Army	\$ 7,404,425
Navy	10,212,600
Air Force	16,894,500
OSD and Interservice	<u>677,775</u>
Total	\$35,189,300

This new request did not, however, deflect the attack on the budget that was already underway in Congress. With the Senate taking the lead, Congress voted an extra \$900 million for the Air Force: \$800 million for procurement and the rest for research and development. Secretary Wilson did not want the extra money and frankly said so. He used the word "phoney" in referring to the Senate's action, with the result that several senators urged his removal from office. Later, testifying before the Symington subcommittee, Wilson rejected a suggestion that he apologize to Congress for using the word; rather, he felt, "it would not be out of order for certain Senators to apologize to me."¹³

The final defense appropriation bill carried a total of almost \$34.7 billion. An additional \$1.5 billion, mostly for military construction, was added later in a general supplemental appropriation act. By service, the totals were as follows:¹⁴

	(thousands)		
	Initial	Supplemental	Total
Army	\$ 7,539,280	\$ 88,000	\$ 7,627,280
Navy	9,999,497	165,000	10,164,497
Air Force	16,459,125	1,246,500	17,705,625
OSD and Interservice	<u>658,825</u>	<u>5,450</u>	<u>664,275</u>
Total	\$34,656,727	\$1,504,950	\$36,161,677

Wilson declined to make any promises to Congress concerning the use of the extra money voted for the Air Force. He would not impound it, he said, but would treat it just like any other appropriation.¹⁵

Basic National Security Policy: NSC 5602/1

President Eisenhower's revision of policy was accomplished by NSC directives issued during 1953 and revised the following year. Beginning in 1955 the administration undertook the systematic preparation, early in each calendar year, of a paper setting forth "basic national security policy." Each such document defined the broad objectives of U.S. policy and indicated the military, diplomatic, political, and economic courses of action needed to advance those objectives. Each was approved by the president after thorough discussion in the National Security Council.¹⁶

The 1956 paper, NSC 5602/1, approved by the president on 15 March of that year, declared the basic objective of U.S. policy to be the preservation of "the security of the United States, and its fundamental values and institutions." The basic threat to the nation derived from the "hostile policies and power" of the Soviet-Communist bloc. Without undermining U.S. values or weakening the national economy, the basic problem was to meet the threat and ultimately to reduce it to "acceptable proportions." Since military action for this purpose was ruled out, there remained only the alternative of attempting to influence the Soviet bloc to "abandon expansionist policies." To do so would require "a flexible combination of military, political, economic, psychological, and covert actions which enables the full exercise of U.S. initiative."¹⁷

Military objectives and courses of action were set forth in NSC 5602/1 in terms that were wholly compatible with the New Look, but were broad enough to lay the basis for a different strategic emphasis if the president so preferred. Deterrence required military forces with sufficient "strength, flexibility and mobility" to deal quickly with aggression and to wage general war if necessary. These forces must be fully equipped with nuclear weapons. Concerning the use of these weapons, NSC 5602/1 stated that "it is the policy of the United States to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States. Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President. Such authorization as may be given in advance will be determined by the President."

In addition to strategic retaliatory forces, according to NSC 5602/1, the United States needed ready forces capable, with appropriate help from allies, of quickly suppressing "local aggression," a phrase not defined. With the coming of nuclear parity, the ability to apply force "selectively and flexibly" would become increasingly important. Hence the United States must avoid being forced to choose between ignoring local aggression or applying force in a way that would entail "undue risks of nuclear

devastation." By themselves, these provisions could be interpreted to support the "strategy of flexible response" that was being developed by Army leaders under General Taylor.¹⁸

Other provisions of NSC 5602/1 recognized the need to maintain the strength and cohesion of free world nations; to supply military and economic assistance to allies and other non-Communist countries; to conduct covert operations where necessary; and to carry out foreign information and cultural exchange programs. In dealing with the Soviet-Communist bloc, the United States should be willing to negotiate when its interests could be served by so doing, and should seek a "comprehensive, phased and safeguarded" system for reducing armaments. Finally, all courses of action must have due regard for a "strong, healthy and expanding U.S. economy."

Strategic Planning

Ideally, the link between policy and budget would have been provided by military plans prepared at the highest level—plans for raising and deploying U.S. forces in peacetime and for fighting a war if necessary. Such plans would (insofar as it was possible to do so) determine the kind of forces that would be sufficient to deter war or to conclude it successfully. Budgets could then be tailored to the establishment and support of these forces. But in practice, budgetary decisions rather than strategic plans shaped the interpretation of the rather ambiguous policy guidance in NSC 5602/1 and similar directives.

Preparation of strategic and logistic plans was a statutory responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A JCS directive in 1952 placed the planning process on a systematic regular basis. It instituted a "family" of three inter-related plans, intended to provide guidance for both peace and war and to be updated on a regular schedule. The most important of these three, in terms of its influence on the future, would be a Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), tailored to the "mid-range" period and oriented toward an assumed D-day several years after approval of the plan (originally three years, changed to four in 1955). It would guide the development and deployment of forces in peacetime and provide guidance for the initial phases of a war. To meet contingencies in the immediate future, there would be a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) with an assumed D-day one year ahead. Finally, a Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE) would look ahead ten years, providing strategic guidance as well as objectives for research and development.¹⁹

From the outset, the program failed to develop as intended. Completion of the plans fell behind schedule, owing principally to disagreement among the services over the nature of a probable conflict and of the military establishment needed. Air Force planners argued that in the nuclear age any major conflict must be fought essentially with forces in being on D-day or mobilized quickly thereafter. Army and Navy representatives,

unwilling to gamble on the assumption of a short war, believed that plans should provide a wide range of forces to insure strategic flexibility. The issues were fought out first in the Joint Strategic Plans Group of the Joint Staff; then, after agreement was reached at that level, draft plans were passed to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, where disputes might be reopened. Often the planners, having deadlocked, had to seek guidance from their superiors in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who in turn occasionally had to consult the secretary of defense—a possibility not envisioned when the program for planning was drawn up.²⁰

The JSCP, which simply accepted forces already in existence, gave least difficulty. Two successive JSOPs were issued by the JCS in 1954 and 1955. Meanwhile, unable to agree on a JSOP, the Joint Chiefs temporarily abandoned the effort and substituted a Joint Mid-Range War Plan, more limited in scope, which provided guidance for a war assumed to begin on 1 July 1957. All these plans envisioned a conflict beginning with an exchange of nuclear blows, followed by operations of indeterminate nature and duration.²¹

Work on a JSOP began anew in August 1955. The plan was referred to as "JSOP-60," since the target D-day had been adjusted to 1 July 1960. If completed on schedule, it could be of material assistance in planning the budget for FY 1958, which would go to Congress in January 1957. Once again the process was delayed for months by service disagreements. General Taylor argued at some length against what he considered excessive emphasis on preparation for all-out nuclear war; he carried his case to the president but was overruled.

During discussion of the plan, Admiral Radford, in preparing force tabulations (tabs) setting goals for 1960, drew up proposals that would in effect have pushed the New Look to its ultimate conclusion, with sharp cutbacks in overseas deployments and heavy overall cuts in manpower that might reduce the Army almost to a home guard. When these proposals leaked to the press, Congress and the NATO allies reacted with such alarm that the entire effort to write a JSOP was hastily suspended. As a result, budget planning for FY 1958 had to proceed without guidance from the JSOP.²²

The Unified and Specified Commands

Plans prepared by the JCS provided general strategic guidance for war and set forth missions for U.S. forces. Accomplishment of these missions, should war occur, would take place in accord with more detailed operational plans drawn up by the commanders of the responsible forces. The majority of these commanders held "unified" commands, controlling all land, sea, and air forces assigned to a particular theater of operations, following the pattern used successfully in World War II. Some commands limited to forces of a single service were important enough to have

missions assigned directly by the JCS; these were known as "specified" commands. Each commander in chief of a unified or specified command was responsible in peacetime to the civilian secretary of a designated military department and thence to the secretary of defense and the president. In wartime, the military chief of the service would be inserted into the chain of command below the service secretary.

Establishment of unified and specified commands remained the responsibility of the JCS, subject to the approval of the secretary of defense and the president. A comprehensive "unified command plan" was drawn up by the JCS in 1946 and revised at intervals thereafter. As of 1956, under the plan approved by Secretary Wilson in 1955, there existed seven unified commands, one "joint" command usually grouped with them, and three specified commands. The area responsibilities of five of the unified commands were clearly indicated by their titles: Atlantic (LANTCOM), Pacific (PACOM), Caribbean (CARIBCOM), Alaskan (ALCOM), and U.S. European (USEUCOM). The Far East Command (FECOM) embraced U.S. forces in Japan, Korea, and islands west of Hawaii. The U.S. Northeast Command (which had no acronym) covered Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland. All except the last of these had responsibilities also for administering military assistance to recipient countries in their areas.

The "joint" Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) had responsibility for air defense of the entire continent except for Alaska and northeastern North America, which were assigned respectively to ALCOM and the U.S. Northeast Command. The secretary of the Air Force served as executive agent for all three of these commands; the secretary of the Army for FECOM, CARIBCOM, and USEUCOM; the secretary of the Navy for LANTCOM and PACOM.

The most prominent of the specified commands, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) of the U.S. Air Force, maintained the nation's long-range offensive power. The others, the U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) and the U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (NELM), were responsible to the JCS for missions outside USEUCOM's area of operations, but they served primarily as USEUCOM's air and naval components.²³

In approving the 1955 unified command plan, Wilson directed the JCS to review it annually. The first such review, in 1956, resulted in several changes. On 21 June, acting on unanimous JCS recommendations, Wilson ordered the U.S. Northeast Command abolished and its responsibilities assigned to CONAD, which would also take over air defense of Alaska (leaving ALCOM with sharply reduced responsibilities). Also, USAFE would lose its status as a specified command and become merely the air component of USEUCOM. Apparently as an afterthought, Wilson then referred these changes to the secretary of state, who concurred. The president approved them on 29 June.²⁴

At the same time, Wilson approved the abolition of FECOM, a step recommended by all the JCS members except General Taylor. This was

complicated by the presence in Korea of the United Nations Command (UNC), in existence since the Korean War. Wilson approved a JCS proposal that the senior U.S. Army officer in Korea be designated CINCUNC and also Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUSKOREA). FECOM went out of existence on 1 July 1957.²⁵

Service Roles and Missions: The Directive of 26 November 1956

Allocation of roles among the U.S. military services did not present a problem until after World War I. Clear-cut separation of functions derived from the fact that the Army operated on land, the Navy at sea. The rise of military aviation blurred the traditional distinction, since aircraft could fly over either medium. A running dispute between the Army and the Navy over aviation missions, beginning in the 1920s, was complicated by the demand of Army airmen for recognition as a third service. The airmen finally won their way with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, which established a separate Air Force. The law did not, however, end disputes over roles and missions; rather it simply increased the number of disputants from two to three.

These disputes generally aligned the Army and the Air Force against the Navy. The first two took the position that missions and the control of the weapons required therefor should follow the environment in which the services operated. Thus all land forces should be assigned to the Army, all aircraft to the Air Force (with the limited exception of aircraft essential for Army functions). The Navy Department contended that a service should control all the weapons needed to perform its missions, and thus justified possession of its own (carrier-based) air force and its own land force (the Marine Corps) for amphibious landings. The Key West Agreement of 1948, approved by the secretary of defense and the president, generally followed Army and Air Force recommendations in allocating missions but endorsed appropriate roles for the naval air arm and the Marine Corps.²⁶

The Key West Agreement failed to prevent further disputes, which were intensified by the conflict among the services for sharply limited funds. The Korean War gave rise to a new dispute between the Army and the Air Force over the role of Army aviation, which was settled by detailed agreements worked out by Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., and Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter in 1951-52. These agreements limited Army aircraft to the missions of observation, liaison, artillery spotting, transportation, and aeromedical evacuation. Army aircraft were to operate within a combat zone understood to be up to 100 miles deep. Fixed-wing Army aircraft were not to exceed 5,000 pounds empty weight. No weight limit was specified for rotary-wing aircraft (helicopters).²⁷

President Eisenhower took office in 1953 convinced that elimination of duplication of effort among the services could lead to major economies. His new JCS appointees studied this question, however, and concluded

that no change was needed in the Key West Agreement. Secretary Wilson then issued a directive that reaffirmed existing roles and missions.²⁸

By this time the rise of the guided missile had spawned a new source of service friction. This weapon could be regarded, according to one's point of view, as either a self-propelled artillery shell of extraordinary range or an aircraft without a pilot. Disputes over missile responsibilities between the Army and the Air Force began as early as 1951. The Navy stood somewhat apart from the disagreement, since the special requirements of ship-borne missiles were recognized by the other services.

Under an agreement worked out by the JCS in 1954, the Army received responsibility for "point" defense of cities and installations against hostile aircraft, using surface-to-air missiles with a range of 50 miles or less; the Air Force for "area" defense, using missiles with longer ranges. The Army would be allowed to develop and use surface-to-surface missiles for use against tactical targets within the zone of Army combat operations, which was not defined. The Air Force secured sole responsibility for developing missiles with intercontinental ranges (approximately 5,000 miles).²⁹

Responsibility for surface-to-surface missiles with intermediate ranges, between the purely tactical and the intercontinental, did not become a problem before 1955, when development of missiles with ranges of approximately 1,500 miles began. Both the Army and the Air Force claimed this responsibility. Secretary Wilson authorized two such projects, one to be undertaken by the Air Force, the other jointly by the Army and Navy, but said nothing at the time about responsibility for deploying the missiles.*

Early in 1956 a dispute between the Army and the Air Force concerning surface-to-air missiles broke into the open. It exacerbated a broader quarrel over roles and missions in general, touched off by public information activities sponsored by the services in connection with the impending tenth anniversary of the National Security Act of 1947. In the background, enhancing the sensitivity of overanxious Army and Air Force officers, was the question of the land-based intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), which was approaching operational availability. The dispute came to a head in a press conference on 21 May 1956, at which Wilson, assisted by the service secretaries and the JCS members, succeeded in defusing the issues, at least for the moment.³⁰

The circumstance giving rise to all such disputes was the expansion of service missions in an age of technological change, a matter necessarily under constant study by Wilson and his advisers. On 18 June 1956 the Joint Secretaries, probably inspired by the recent "flap," agreed to consider a number of "high priority problem areas," mostly involving new weapons. Following further discussion in the AFPC and the Joint Secretaries, Deputy Secretary Robertson on 3 August circulated to AFPC members a list of 28 such "problem areas." Most of them involved missiles—the need to clarify service responsibilities for developing and using them and to determine

* See Chapter VII.

the level of effort to be applied to each. Others included the role of carriers in strategic warfare, the Army aviation program, tactical air support for ground forces, requirements for air transport, the vulnerability of SAC aircraft, effects of atomic weapons on military planning, mobilization base policy, levels of military assistance, and the possible need to revise the current roles and missions directive.³¹

Despite the need for urgency implied in the Joint Secretaries' action, circulation of the list did not lead to any immediate result. Some of the "problem areas" required lengthy study; some were already under consideration; others were settled in the normal course of events over the next few months or were overtaken by events. Wilson eventually concentrated his attention on several matters involving aviation and missiles, which were set forth in a cogent memorandum from Deputy Secretary Quarles on 14 August. Quarles believed it important to settle the differences between the Air Force and the Army. He submitted recommendations which, he said, were intended to be objective and avoid favoritism. He added that his views were not to be considered those of General Twining.³²

Dealing first with the unresolved matter of the Army's aviation program, Quarles recommended that the Pace-Finletter agreement of 1952 be issued as a JCS memorandum bearing approval of the secretary of defense, so as to give it full authority. He recommended no changes except for removal of functional limitations on Army helicopters, which would leave the Army free to develop and use such aircraft as it might see fit.

Quarles then addressed missile issues. For close support of troops, he recommended limiting Army missiles to a range of approximately 200 miles; this would suffice to cover the zone of operations (which he defined as extending not more than 100 miles beyond the front lines) and to allow deployment of missiles up to 100 miles behind the front. For antiaircraft missiles, Quarles believed that the Air Force should have full responsibility, but if such a change were considered too drastic, the Army should be allowed missiles with a 100-mile range.

Wilson referred the Quarles memorandum to the JCS, asking their recommendations "as a matter of urgency." The chiefs grappled with the questions for more than two months before submitting split recommendations. Meanwhile Secretary Brucker on 10 September forwarded his own comments on the Quarles proposals. He judged the Pace-Finletter agreement satisfactory except for the 5,000-pound weight limitation on fixed-wing aircraft, which he believed should be modified. He opposed any arbitrary range limitation on Army missiles: this should depend entirely on advancing technology. Responsibility for employing the IRBM, he felt, should be determined on the basis of service capability as well as requirements (which would obviously give the Army the right to use the weapon).³³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their views in October and November. On the matter of Army surface-to-surface missiles, all agreed there should be no "arbitrary" range limitations, but except for Taylor, all suggested limits of 200-250 miles. All agreed that the Air Force should remain responsible

for close support of troops against targets beyond the capability of organic Army weapons. Twining and Radford urged that the Air Force have sole responsibility for land-based IRBMs; Burke expressed no opinion on this matter.³⁴

The Army aviation program, which had been under study in the JCS since July 1955, became the subject of a separate memorandum. Taylor argued that the Army was the best judge of its own aviation requirements. Any differences between Army and Air Force should be resolved in accord with the Pace-Finletter agreement, which should remain in effect until superseded after a complete review of service roles and missions. Burke was willing to accept the Army aviation program with a limit of 5,000 aircraft until the Army justified the need for more; he also considered the Pace-Finletter agreement satisfactory. Twining favored issuance of a directive to replace the agreement, essentially restating its provisions but establishing a numerical limit on numbers of Army aircraft. Radford favored a directive that would set a boundary 100 miles ahead of the combat zone for operation of Army aircraft and would establish a 10,000-pound weight limit for Army helicopters, in addition to the 5,000-pound limit for fixed-wing aircraft.³⁵

Wilson, as usual, was inclined to settle the issues along lines recommended by Radford. In a conference with the president on 8 November, he presented his views on these and a number of other subjects, receiving a noncommittal reply from the president, who declined to be drawn into a discussion of details. Wilson drafted separate memorandums dealing with several of the issues and circulated them to the services and the AFPC for comment. He then incorporated them into a general directive dated 26 November 1956, issued as a memorandum to members of the AFPC and released to the public.³⁶

The directive first addressed the overall question of roles and missions. The current statement thereon, in effect since 1953, was pronounced adequate and in need of no basic changes. However, the development of new weapons and strategic concepts, together with almost nine years' operating experience since the original Key West Agreement, pointed to a need for "clarification and clearer interpretation."

Of several "problem areas" singled out for attention, three dealt with missiles. The responsibilities for developing and using land-based surface-to-air missiles were reaffirmed: the Army those for point defense, the Air Force for area defense. As for surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), the Army would be allowed to develop those for use against "tactical targets within the zone of operations," which was defined as extending not more than 100 miles beyond the front lines. Since the zone was regarded as normally extending about 100 miles to the rear, according to the directive, the effect was to place a range limit of approximately 200 miles on Army SSMs, as Quarles had recommended. Tactical air support beyond that range remained an Air Force responsibility.

Operational employment of the land-based IRBM was to be the sole

responsibility of the Air Force. The Army, however, would be allowed to make "limited feasibility studies" of missiles with ranges longer than 200 miles. The Navy would continue responsible for operational employment of the ship-based IRBM.

For Army aviation, the directive specified a zone of approximately 100 miles on either side of the battle line (as for Army SSMs) within which Army aircraft might operate. Fixed-wing aircraft, convertiplanes, and vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft would not exceed 5,000 pounds empty weight, and rotary wing aircraft, 20,000 pounds, though exceptions might be granted by the secretary of defense. The Army was not to maintain its own aviation research facilities but would make maximum use of those of the Air Force and Navy on a reimbursable basis. These provisions, intended to supplement the Pace-Finletter agreement, were later (18 March 1957) published as a separate directive which superseded it.³⁷

The basic assignment of roles and missions thus remained unchanged. The effect of the directive was to circumscribe the responsibilities of the Army. The decision carrying the greatest impact pertained to control and use of the IRBM; this dealt a severe blow to the morale of the Army's missile team, whose efforts to produce a usable missile were nearing success. The Army made no effort to reopen the issue, but its "feasibility studies" of surface-to-surface missiles eventually led to a relaxation of the 200-mile limit.*

Defense as an Issue in the 1956 Election

By the middle of 1956 President Eisenhower's defense policies had been subject to several years of criticism. The apparent evidence of a lag in U.S. air power developed by the Senate hearings of 1956 and the acrimonious public disputes between the services provided additional basis for charges that the administration was placing economy ahead of security and could not control the military establishment. It was to be expected, therefore, that defense would figure largely in the 1956 election, which, like that four years earlier, pitted Dwight D. Eisenhower against Adlai E. Stevenson.³⁸

In fact, the election, like most of those in U.S. history, was fought out primarily on domestic issues: the state of the economy, agricultural policy, civil rights, and others. Naturally, given the world situation, foreign policy and national security played a prominent role. Nevertheless, the Democratic challenger chose not to make a major issue of defense policy in general. In one of his speeches, he charged that the administration had cut defense spending "with more of an eye on today's budget than on tomorrow's security" and without proper consultation with military leaders, and cited the action of Democrats in Congress in pushing through

* See Chapter VII.

extra money for the Air Force. He did not, however, develop this theme further.³⁹

Instead, Stevenson seized upon two specific defense-related issues, the testing of hydrogen bombs and the military draft. He introduced both in one of his earliest speeches, on 5 September. He urged that the United States take the initiative in ending H-bomb tests, seeking an international agreement, and consider the possibility that the armed services, in an age of growing complexity of weapons, might rely on a long-service volunteer force in lieu of draftees. In the weeks after, he repeated these themes, stressing especially the test issue, which seemed to strike a responsive chord with the public. The president rejoined that both nuclear testing and the draft were essential to national security. He assailed Stevenson's statements on the test issue as calling for a unilateral U.S. moratorium and, for security reasons, tried to discourage public discussion of the issue.⁴⁰

Stevenson's campaign was not helped when he received unsought support from an unwelcome source. On 19 October the State Department released the text of a letter to President Eisenhower from Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin of the Soviet Union. The letter urged that the two nations agree to the banning of tests of all nuclear weapons and pointed out that "certain prominent public figures" in the United States were advocating a similar step. The president, in his reply, accused the Soviets of interfering in U.S. internal affairs and pointed out that they had repeatedly refused to agree to any effective means of enforcing a test ban.⁴¹

Near the end of the campaign, in late October and early November, there occurred a crisis in Hungary, where an anti-Soviet rebellion broke out, and another in the Middle East, as Israeli and Anglo-French forces invaded Egypt seeking to overthrow the regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Naturally, both candidates tried to turn these developments to their own advantage. Stevenson charged that the administration had been caught by surprise by both crises and that its foreign policy was a "catastrophic" failure. The president warned against any major change of policy during the crises. "This is no time to stop the draft—this is no time to stop perfecting our weapons," he said on 29 October. As might be expected, these overseas developments worked to the advantage of the president.⁴²

Secretary Wilson did not play a major role in the campaign, since this was not part of his responsibilities. He briefly addressed the Republican convention on 21 August, declaring that the United States was secure against attack and that no nation was ahead of the United States in military power or was likely to be "if we resolutely follow our present programs under President Eisenhower's leadership." Appearing on a radio and television interview program on 14 October, he defended the need both for H-bomb testing and the military draft. In another such appearance two weeks later, he denied that the administration had been caught off guard by world developments and reaffirmed the necessity of bomb testing. What was frightening the world, he declared, was the possible use of atomic bombs in war, not their testing.⁴³

In the end, Eisenhower won reelection with 36 million popular votes to 26 million for his opponent; he carried all but seven states and enjoyed a 457 to 74 edge in the electoral college. He failed, however, to carry Congress, where both houses remained under Democratic control.⁴⁴

The president could, and no doubt did, regard the electoral outcome as vindication of his policies, including those relating to national defense. At the same time, his opponents could use Congress as a sounding board for their criticisms. During the next few years, these criticisms mounted in intensity, enhanced by indications that the Soviet Union might be outstripping the United States in military technology. Throughout Eisenhower's second term, national security became increasingly an issue, and the president found that his military credentials carried less weight as he strove to hold the line on his defense policies.

CHAPTER III

The 1956 Crises: Suez and Hungary

During October and November 1956, when the nation's attention was fixed largely on the presidential election campaign, the Eisenhower administration found itself confronted simultaneously by two great international crises. That in the Middle East centered about the control of the Suez Canal, a waterway of major strategic economic importance. In Eastern Europe, the rising tide of unrest and disaffection among the satellite countries in protest against Soviet domination reached its climax in the Hungarian revolution. Fighting and bloodshed attended both crises, which abated before the end of the year, leaving bitter legacies for the future.

The Middle East in 1956

That part of the world where Asia, Africa, and Europe come together has for centuries been recognized as a region of great importance, where age-old trade routes interconnect and warring nations have battled for dominion. For billions of people throughout the world, it also holds profound emotional and psychological meaning as the birthplace of three of the world's great religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. At various times much of the region was united under powerful empires. The most recent of these, that of the Ottoman Turks established in the late Middle Ages, gradually decayed and eventually fell apart completely in World War I.

By 1956 the region contained a large number of separate countries, some—Egypt, Turkey, and Iran—ancient and long-established. Others, recent and artificial creations fashioned out of the detritus of the Ottoman Empire after 1918, included Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and various ministates in the Arabian peninsula. To the Western world, these countries were known collectively as the “Near East” or “Middle East.”¹

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries two great developments enhanced the economic and military importance of the Middle East. In 1869 the opening of the Suez Canal, running from Port Said on the Mediterranean to Suez on the Red Sea, afforded a direct route from the


Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and thence the Pacific. Ships en route from Europe to the Far East no longer had to circumnavigate Africa. More recently, parts of the region, notably Iraq, Iran, and the Arabian peninsula, were found to possess enormous reserves of petroleum, the lifeblood of the age of internal combustion. Middle Eastern oil proved of vital importance to Western Europe, which lacked major oil reserves of its own. It was loaded onto tankers in the Persian Gulf and shipped through the Suez Canal or pumped through pipelines to the eastern edge of the Mediterranean.

A still more recent development, the establishment in 1948 of the state of Israel, convulsed the whole area by exciting the universal hostility of the newcomer's Arab neighbors. Created by Jewish leaders out of the former British-mandated Palestine territory to provide a homeland for their people, the new nation was democratic, politically stable, technologically advanced, and firmly oriented toward the West. Arab hostility toward Israel, stemming basically from ethnic and religious differences and a sense of loss of an Arab land, was heightened by the bitterness of defeat in the fighting that accompanied Israel's creation. Frequent and often bloody clashes occurred along the borders separating Israel from Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.

Until the close of World War II, the United Kingdom was the predominant power in the Middle East. British decline after that conflict forced the United States to take a more active interest in the region. American objectives were to prevent communism from gaining a foothold (a possibility by no means remote, given the instability of the region), to maintain access to Middle Eastern oil for the Western nations, and to secure peace. A U.S.-British proposal in 1951 to establish a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), on the model of NATO, foundered in the face of Egypt's opposition, but the United States undertook a modest program of military assistance to selected countries of the Middle East.²

In keeping with U.S. efforts to insure stability in the Middle East, on 25 May 1950 the United States, Britain, and France issued a tripartite declaration expressing their desire to "promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability" in the area and their "unilateral opposition to the use of force or threat of force between states in that area." If any state or group of states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, the three nations would "immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violations." On 9 November 1955 President Eisenhower pledged the full commitment of his administration to the policy embodied in the tripartite declaration. Secretary of State Dulles reaffirmed the commitment on 17 April 1956.³

In July 1954 the Eisenhower administration defined U.S. interest in the Middle East in a formal policy paper, NSC 5428, which was still in effect two years later. It declared that U.S. security interests would be "critically endangered" if the region passed under Soviet influence or control. The weakness and instability of many Near Eastern countries offered an opportunity for Soviet exploitation. U.S. objectives could best be achieved through political and economic measures to settle differences and promote



Eastern Mediterranean

economic development. However, NSC 5428 also called for establishment of a collective defense system based on the "northern tier" countries—Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan.⁴

The idea for reliance on these four nations originated with Secretary Dulles. He saw that the shifting sands of Arab lands offered little foundation for a solid defensive barrier against the Soviet Union; the Arab countries, engrossed in their quarrels with Israel or with the former colonialist countries, Great Britain and France, gave little thought to the danger of Communist imperialism. The foundation for the new system was laid on 24 February 1955, when Turkey and Iraq signed a defense treaty at Baghdad. Soon afterward, the United Kingdom, Iran, and Pakistan joined this nucleus, and a formal Baghdad Pact Organization (BPO) was set up, complete with a governing council and a military committee to plan a collective defense against the USSR. The United States was not a member of the BPO but sent observers to meetings of its military committee.⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended that the United States join the BPO. In March 1956 they again urged this step. The occasion was propitious; the situation in the Middle East seemed to be taking a dangerous turn owing to a sudden flare-up between Israel and Egypt. Secretary Wilson was inclined to agree with the JCS and urged that the question be considered by the NSC. Dulles, however, believed that U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact would injure relations with Arab countries and might lead to pressure to extend a U.S. security guarantee to Israel. Moreover, it was doubtful that Congress would approve. Wilson then suggested that consideration of the subject be postponed until later in the year, with a view to announcing U.S. adherence during the January 1957 meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council.⁶

Egypt and the Suez Canal

The events that caused serious trouble during 1956 stemmed from developments in Egypt, where the monarchy had been ousted in 1952 by a coup d'état carried out by army officers. Lt. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged as the new leader and quickly proved himself dynamic and militantly nationalistic, determined to modernize Egypt and enhance its prestige. Though not a Communist, Nasser nevertheless did not share the fear of Sino-Soviet aggression held by the leaders of Western countries. He became one of the leaders of the "third world" of neutralist nations trying to steer a course between the two hostile blocs. For Nasser, as for other such leaders, the guiding principle was repudiation of anything smacking of "colonialism," which was associated with Western Europe. Such a stance made it unthinkable for Nasser to collaborate with the West in any sort of a collective anti-Communist defense. He responded to the Baghdad Pact in October 1955 by forming a military alliance with Syria, thus putting Israel in a vise with northern and southern jaws.⁷

Nasser sought military assistance for Egypt. In 1953 and 1954 the United States had contemplated granting such aid but concluded that there were more important claimants for available funds. In any event, the amount of military assistance envisioned by the United States would by no means have satisfied Nasser. Unable to obtain what he wanted from any Western nation, he turned to the Soviet bloc for weapons of the kind and in quantities that he desired. In 1955 he concluded an agreement with Czechoslovakia to obtain heavy weapons, including tanks and aircraft, in exchange for cotton and rice. This event registered strongly on public and official opinion in the United States.⁸

But it was Egypt's relationship with the Suez Canal that brought Nasser to blows with the two major allies of the United States, Britain and France, and plunged the world into a serious crisis. The canal was constructed entirely within the borders of Egypt by a private company under a concession granted in the nineteenth century by the Turkish ruler (khedive) of Egypt. This was to run for 99 years after the opening of the canal, at which time the canal would become the property of the Egyptian Government. Since the canal opened in 1869, the concession would expire in 1968. An international convention adopted at Constantinople in 1888 declared that the Suez Canal was always to be "free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag." Because the British regarded the canal as vital to their lifeline to India and the Far East, they acquired a controlling interest in the stock of the Suez Canal Company.⁹

The British also occupied Egypt in 1882, maintaining a "condominium" there until 1952. They maintained a major base along the Suez Canal which they evacuated in 1954 under an agreement giving them the right to use it in case of an attack by an "Outside Power."¹⁰

The international crisis over the Suez Canal in 1956 was actually precipitated by a controversy over the Aswan High Dam—a major symbol of Egyptian prestige to which Nasser had committed himself and his country. A gigantic dam on the upper Nile River at Aswan, it would supersede a smaller dam near the same location, serving purposes of irrigation, flood control, and electric power generation, all of great economic importance to Egypt.

Unable to finance construction of the dam from Egypt's own resources, Nasser turned to outside help. In October 1955 the Soviet Union publicly announced its willingness to furnish assistance. Spurred to action, the Western powers outbid the Soviets. In December 1955 it was announced that the World Bank, the United Kingdom, and the United States would jointly finance the dam at a cost of \$1.3 billion.¹¹

It remained only to negotiate with Egypt the details of the loan to be granted. For various reasons, these dragged out for some months. During this period the Eisenhower administration became convinced, rightly or wrongly, that Nasser sought to "blackmail" the United States by angling for a better deal with the Soviet Union. Nasser did not help his cause when in May 1956 he recognized the Government of Communist China; he also

scheduled a visit to Moscow. Meanwhile opposition to U.S. support for the dam intensified, inspired by fear of competition from Egyptian cotton, dislike of Nasser's neutralism, and support for Israel.¹²

At length Eisenhower and Dulles determined that the U.S. offer should be withdrawn. Accordingly, on 19 July 1956 Dulles informed the Egyptian ambassador that for various reasons, among them the cost of the project and the state of U.S.-Egyptian relations, the United States would not participate in the project "at this time." Without U.S. support the entire deal would fall through.¹³

Nasser had, in fact, been expecting withdrawal of the offer. Nevertheless, offended by the manner in which it was handled and determined to go ahead with the dam, he did not wait long to react. In a public speech in Cairo on 26 July, he announced that Egypt would take over the Suez Canal and nationalize the company, and that revenues from canal tolls would be used to finance the Aswan High Dam. Even as he spoke, Egyptian officials, in a well-planned move, took control of the major installations along the canal.¹⁴

Nasser's action could be defended as legal, and there was no reason to believe that there would be any interference with canal traffic. Indeed, it would obviously be in his interest to keep traffic, and therefore revenues, flowing without interruption. Nevertheless the British Government reacted instantaneously, convinced that the nation's survival was at stake. Prime Minister Anthony Eden at once ordered the British Chiefs of Staff to begin studying the possibility of forcibly seizing the canal. On 27 July Eden wired President Eisenhower (an old friend from World War II days), urging that both nations take a "firm stand," lest their influence throughout the Middle East be "finally destroyed." He urged "maximum political pressure" on Nasser, and added that it was necessary to be prepared to use force.¹⁵

On the same day, the U.S. ambassador in Paris, Douglas Dillon, reported that the French Government compared Nasser's action to Hitler's seizure of the Rhineland in 1936. French military chiefs were already collaborating with those in the United Kingdom in studying the possibility of military action. Besides fearing for her oil resources, France had another quarrel with Nasser, resulting from his encouragement of the rebellion in Algeria, France's colonial possession in Arab North Africa.¹⁶

Although the United States was not directly involved at the moment, the possibility of violence could not be ruled out. To alert U.S. forces was an elementary precaution. On 28 July CNO Admiral Burke directed CINCNELM to be prepared to execute on short notice plans to evacuate U.S. personnel from Egypt; he also ordered the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean to be prepared to sail to the eastern part of that sea on 24 hours' notice.¹⁷

Diplomacy in Action

Because Secretary of State Dulles was out of the country when Eisenhower learned of the British reaction to the canal seizure, the president

sent Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy to London to consult with the British. A few days later, spurred by an alarming message from Murphy that the British were determined to "drive Nasser out of Egypt," he sent Dulles to join Murphy in London. In a five-day meeting (29 July-2 August) with British and French representatives, Dulles convinced them that force should be a last resort. He won their agreement to an international conference, to be held in London, to seek a solution. If Nasser proved intransigent, the situation would then be clarified and a political basis for stronger action would exist.¹⁸

The JCS meanwhile had put their views in writing. In a memorandum on 31 July, they advised Secretary Wilson that the Egyptian action was "militarily detrimental" to the United States and its allies. The Suez Canal must be placed "under a friendly and responsible authority at the earliest practicable date." If necessary, the United States should consider taking military action in support of the United Kingdom, France, and other countries as appropriate. They strongly recommended that the secretary place the issue on the NSC agenda. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson forwarded these views to the NSC on 2 August, adding a word of caution; he urged that all feasible political and economic measures be taken before force was used.¹⁹

Amplifying their views the next day, the JCS warned of possible consequences if Nasser succeeded in his nationalization. His prestige might become so great that he could dominate the Arab world and turn it against the United States; he would improve his opportunity to play off the West against the Soviet Union; other Arab states might follow his example in expropriating and nationalizing property. They were studying the problem and would soon be able to suggest military courses of action. These views also went forward to the NSC.²⁰

Dulles had by now returned from London, and he and Eisenhower discussed the JCS recommendations of 31 July. They agreed that there should be no thought of U.S. support of military action until after the forthcoming London conference.²¹

Thus far the situation remained one for the diplomats rather than the soldiers. Wilson, of course, was following it, but in his public comments he downgraded its importance. At a press conference on 7 August, he declined to comment on the Suez situation. When a reporter referred to it as a "little minor upset," Wilson replied: "I think you have described it well."²²

For Britain and France, however, the matter was anything but "minor." The British ambassador, Sir Roger Makins, made clear his unhappiness at Wilson's remarks.²³ Whether or not in response to this reaction, the president, in his own news conference on 8 August, characterized the Suez dispute as "very serious." He indicated that the United States would make every effort to see that it was settled peaceably, but he was not rigidly opposed to the use of military force under all circumstances.²⁴

When the NSC discussed the situation on 9 August, Dulles stressed the seriousness of Nasser's challenge. Radford cited a message from the supreme

allied commander, Europe, General Alfred M. Gruenther, who had recently met with the British Chiefs of Staff and warned that they would unquestionably recommend military action if the forthcoming conference did not produce a solution. Arthur S. Flemming, director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, foresaw serious consequences for the Western countries if Middle Eastern oil supplies were interrupted.

Wilson was inclined to take a somewhat relaxed view of the situation. If the British felt so strongly about the canal, he said, they should never have left it. He suggested that the United States try to restrain its allies from "drastic action." Nationalization, he added, was "too familiar to cause excitement," and he pointed out that the British themselves had engaged in the practice, to which Secretary Dulles rejoined that the two situations were not parallel. The upshot of the meeting was that the president directed State and Defense jointly to prepare contingency studies of possible actions.²⁵

Wilson assigned to the assistant secretary of defense (ISA) and the JCS the responsibility for collaborating with State in these studies. The two departments established a joint Middle East Policy Planning Group (MEPPG), on which Lt. Gen. Alonzo P. Fox, military adviser to the ASD (ISA), represented Defense.²⁶

In reporting to Wilson the preliminary results of their studies on 8 August, the JCS warned of the consequences for Western Europe if the Suez Canal were closed, especially if the oil pipelines were also interrupted. Military action by the United Kingdom, France, or the United States would probably require withdrawal of forces from NATO and would thus temporarily weaken Western defenses in Europe, but these effects would be of small consequence as compared with the long-term results of canal closure on NATO and the loss of Western prestige in the Middle East. Should the United Kingdom take military action, the United States could assist by giving public endorsement and by furnishing economic support and military supplies, and could strengthen its support of the Baghdad Pact, possibly through formal adherence.²⁷

In a later report to the secretary on 23 August, the JCS analyzed eight possible courses of action, ranging from complete U.S. inactivity to joint or unilateral use of military force. The one that they recommended was to endorse publicly a British-French military action, to provide political, economic, and logistic support therefor, and to guarantee publicly that the United States would take "appropriate action" in the event of "significant military intervention by third parties," obviously referring to the Soviet Union.²⁸

The JCS studies went to the State-Defense planning group, which produced seven contingency papers between 24 August and the middle of September. The London conference on Suez had by then been held and had proposed an international board to operate the canal. The first two papers considered the possibility (as eventually occurred) that Egypt might reject the proposal, and recommended continuing negotiations or, if Egyptian intransigence continued, economic and diplomatic pressure to

bring Nasser around. Two others dealt with the possibility of referring the matter to the United Nations Security Council and the effects of possible Soviet moves. A fifth envisioned British-French military action against Egypt, and reflected JCS views in recommending that the U.S. provide political and logistic support plus action against third-party intervention. The assistant secretary (ISA) reviewed these papers and, on behalf of DoD, concurred in their conclusions, but they apparently played no part in the administration's final decisions.²⁹

On the eve of the London conference, on 15 August, the JCS alerted CINCNELM to its possible failure and directed him to be ready to undertake on short notice tasks related to protection of U.S. interests and evacuation of U.S. nationals from Egypt and other Arab countries. CINCNELM accordingly directed the Sixth Fleet to remain within 48 hours' steaming distance of the Egyptian coast.³⁰

The London conference (16-23 August) approved a U.S. proposal to establish an international board to operate the canal for the benefit of world trade and Egypt. When Nasser rejected this proposal, the next demarche, also sponsored by the United States, called for a Suez Canal Users Association to control shipping and establish a regular system of traffic and finances. This body, approved by a second conference in London on 19-21 September, was formally established in London on 1 October, but it proved stillborn and did not influence the eventual settlement of the crisis.³¹

These efforts attested to U.S. determination to seek a non-violent solution to the crisis. The president made this clear on 11 September. The United States was not, he said, "going into any kind of military action under present conditions. . . ." Dulles affirmed this policy in a press conference on 13 September. If Egypt blocked the canal, he said, the United States would send its ships around the Cape of Good Hope. "We do not intend to shoot our way through," he added.³²

Meanwhile one major source of concern had been removed. Pilots and other employees of the Suez Canal Company, having been warned that if they remained on the job after 15 September they would lose their pension rights, left on that date. The Egyptian authorities, however, had anticipated this move and had lined up replacement pilots. On the day after the walkout, 42 ships safely transited the canal. Within a week the number had risen to 254 ships, with no break in traffic. As Eisenhower later wrote, "any thought of using force, under these circumstances, was almost ridiculous."³³

Already, however, Britain and France had taken the Suez controversy to the United Nations. After hearing charges and countercharges, the Security Council on 13 October approved a resolution setting forth principles for a settlement, including free transit through the canal, respect for Egypt's sovereignty, and arbitration of disputes between the Suez Canal Company and Egypt. Egypt accepted these as a basis for negotiation, and the secretary general of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden, began discussions with representatives of the countries concerned. These developments gave hope for a peaceful resolution.³⁴

Behind the scenes, however, the fateful commitment for a military assault on Egypt had already been made. By the middle of October Franco-British plans were well in hand, and a new actor had entered the scene: Israel, whose leaders viewed with grave alarm anything that would enhance Nasser's power and prestige. France apparently took the initiative, in August 1956, by working out a tacit alliance with Israel for an attack on Egypt. This soon expanded into a tripartite plan involving the United Kingdom. Israel would open the campaign with a drive to seize the east bank of the Suez Canal. Britain and France would then issue an ultimatum demanding that both Egypt and Israel withdraw their forces from the canal zone. It was expected that Egypt would refuse, providing a pretext for Anglo-French invasion in order to "separate" the combatants. Eventually the entire canal zone was to be occupied and an attack on Cairo launched in order to overthrow the Nasser regime, while Israel would be left in possession of the strategically important Sinai peninsula and the Gaza Strip.³⁵

These preparations were concealed from U.S. officials, who suspected that something was in the wind but knew nothing of the details.³⁶ Military preparations of the three nations were on a scale impossible to conceal. Indeed, the very attempt to do so was a tipoff that something was in the wind as contacts of U.S. officials with their opposite numbers in the three nations concerned dried up. British Ambassador Makins, who was retiring, left Washington on 11 October; his replacement, Sir Harold Caccia, did not arrive until 8 November.³⁷

At this moment, attention was diverted from Suez by a sudden flare-up of violence between Israel and Jordan. On 10 October the Israelis carried out an attack on a Jordanian village in reprisal for earlier actions by Jordan. Israel's mobilization could not be concealed, but it was easy to conclude that Jordan would be the target of any major action. On 28 October President Eisenhower wrote to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion of Israel, urging him to do nothing to endanger peace. The Department of State announced the initiation of actions to reduce the numbers of Americans, particularly dependents, in several (unnamed) Middle Eastern countries.³⁸

In a television interview at 5:00 p.m. the same day, Secretary Wilson declined to state what the United States would do in the event of war between Israel and Jordan or what preparations had been made. "We have great military strength that could be used in any proper way that furthered the national interest," he said. Any military intervention anywhere, he added, would require approval of Congress and the president.³⁹

Eastern Europe Boils Over

As October neared its end, the second foreign crisis of 1956 approached a climax. As in the Middle East, there was no question of U.S. military involvement; nevertheless, the developments in Eastern Europe were of great political importance to the U.S. Government and aroused strong

emotion in the American public, as hopes for genuine freedom in one of the Soviet satellites were first aroused, then shattered.

The crisis in Eastern Europe had its roots in World War II, when the victorious Red Army, on the heels of the retreating Germans, swarmed into the nations of the area. Under the direction of Soviet Premier Josef Stalin, the Communists established ruthless dictatorships, driving out or liquidating non-Communist political leaders. That nationalist sentiment nevertheless remained alive and well in these countries was exemplified by Yugoslavia, where in 1948 Josip Broz (Marshal Tito), though a staunch Communist, nevertheless defied Stalin and maintained an independent regime. A successful resistance leader during World War II, Tito had established his own government at the end of the war, free of Soviet overseers or advisers; moreover, his nation enjoyed ample access to the West. These circumstances afforded Yugoslavia a degree of maneuvering room not available to the nations that had been turned into Soviet satellites: Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. In 1955 these nations were brought into a military alliance with the Soviets known as the Warsaw Pact.

After Stalin's death in 1953, something of a Thermidorean reaction to the excesses of the Stalin era occurred in the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia was readmitted to the Communist fold; Soviet officials admitted errors and offered to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia and other Communist countries. Nikita S. Khrushchev, emerging as principal spokesman for the Soviet Government in his capacity as first secretary of the Communist Party, proclaimed a doctrine of "different roads to socialism." In February 1956, at the twentieth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev, speaking before assembled leaders of foreign Communist parties, openly denounced Stalin's crimes.

These developments in the Soviet bloc were of course carefully followed by the Eisenhower administration and occasioned a formal review of U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe. NSC 5608/1, approved by the president on 18 July 1956, took note of the liberalizing trend in the Soviet bloc but concluded that Soviet domination "remains firm and there appears little immediate prospect of basic change in this regard." The long-range U.S. goal was to oppose Soviet control of the satellites and seek its eventual elimination, but the United States was not prepared to resort to war for that purpose, nor did there seem any prospect of its attainment through internal revolution. Hence, the United States should seek to encourage "evolutionary change" that might weaken Soviet controls and lead to national independence in the satellites.⁴⁰

During 1956 the drive for liberalization became particularly evident in Poland. Wladyslaw Gomulka, a Communist but also an ardent nationalist, emerged as the leader of a reformist group in the Polish Communist Party. After a tense factional struggle came to a head in October, Gomulka succeeded in purging the governing council (politburo) of its Stalinist members.⁴¹

But when the movement spread to Poland's near neighbor, Hungary,

events took a different turn; popular revolt swept the leaders along with it, resulting in a ghastly tragedy. Trouble began there on 23 October, when students in Budapest demonstrated in favor of the Polish liberalization movement. The demonstration turned into a demand for sweeping reforms. Over the next few days the movement became a violent uprising which could not be suppressed by police or troops. The apparatus of Communist rule was quickly swept away; revolutionary councils sprang up and seized control in various localities.

Borne by the tide of events, the central committee of the Hungarian Communist Party issued a statement on 26 October admitting that crimes had been committed in the past and promising negotiations with the Soviets on a basis of equality. The next day Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy announced formation of a new government. But these concessions only fed the revolutionaries' demands, which now included Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. On 28 October Nagy ordered a unilateral cease-fire, declaring that government forces would fire only if attacked. Fighting then gradually died down and had largely ended by 29 October. The Hungarian revolution seemed to have succeeded.⁴²

In Washington, the NSC on 26 October discussed the situation in Poland and Hungary, devoting more attention to it than to the Near East. CIA Director Allen Dulles characterized the Hungarian revolt as the most serious threat ever posed to Soviet control of the satellites. The president directed that the Planning Board study the situation, and he warned Admiral Radford and the CIA director to be "unusually watchful and alert."⁴³

The United Nations was an obvious recourse. On 25 October Under Secretary of the Navy Gates suggested to Wilson that a resolution on the subject of Poland and Hungary be introduced in the UN.⁴⁴ Wilson's response is not indicated in available records. Two days later, however, Secretary Dulles, having sounded out friendly governments, obtained the president's approval for a move to place the Hungarian situation on the Security Council agenda. The council agreed to consider the subject.⁴⁵

On 31 October the Planning Board circulated its analysis of the Eastern European situation. The board concluded that the objectives in NSC 5608/1 remained valid but that courses of action should be revised to reflect recent developments. Regarding Poland, the board proposed several actions, including reorientation of Polish trade toward the West and provision of economic and technical assistance (if requested by Poland) sufficient to provide the Poles with an alternative to complete Soviet dependence. For Hungary, the board suggested that the United States "mobilize all appropriate pressures, including UN action," seek a neutral Hungary "on the Austrian model," and encourage the new Hungarian leaders to carry out reforms and try to bring about withdrawal of Soviet forces. Also, immediate disaster relief should be offered to the Hungarian people.

The paper included two splits. One involved a proposal that the United States assure the Soviets that it did not consider Hungary or other satellite states as potential military allies; the other was a suggestion that the United

States offer to withdraw some forces from Western Europe in return for withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Hungary. Both of these proposals were opposed by the JCS and DoD representatives on the board. The first might undermine U.S. influence on whatever government was established in Hungary; the second might be seized upon by the Soviets to propose a general U.S. withdrawal from Europe.⁴⁶

Without awaiting NSC action on this draft, the president decided to put into effect the first of these disputed proposals. "The United States has no ulterior purpose in desiring the independence of the satellite countries. . .," said Secretary Dulles in a speech on 27 October. "We do not look upon these nations as potential military allies." President Eisenhower made a similar public statement on 31 October.⁴⁷

The Attack on Egypt

At the moment when the Hungarian situation seemed to have quieted down, the smoldering Suez crisis suddenly flared into open war. The first, or Israeli, phase of the assault on Nasser's Egypt began on the afternoon of 29 October, Near Eastern time (approximately 9:00 a.m. in Washington). Israeli armored and airborne forces launched their drive across the Sinai peninsula. The Israeli Government announced that the action was being taken to eliminate bases of Arab guerrillas (*fedayeen*) in Egypt.⁴⁸

In Washington, a press dispatch brought news of the Israeli action about 3:00 p.m. on 29 October.⁴⁹ President Eisenhower had left that morning for a quick campaign swing through the South; he learned of the action in the afternoon while en route to Richmond. He delivered his scheduled address there, then hurried back to Washington. At 7:15 p.m. he met in the White House with Secretaries Dulles and Wilson, Radford, and Allen Dulles.⁵⁰

The conferees discussed the Israeli action and its consequences. Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles thought that the United States was bound to assist Egypt, however reluctantly, under the terms of the 1950 tripartite declaration, since Egypt had clearly been attacked. Dulles feared that the canal would be disrupted and pipelines broken, leading to British and French intervention. Wilson thought that the Israelis were probably counting on Anglo-French support at a time when the United States was distracted by its election campaign and the Soviet Union by the unrest in Hungary. The president said, as recorded by his military staff secretary, Goodpaster, that he did not "care in the slightest whether he is re-elected or not." He felt that the United States must make good on its word and that its honor was at stake. Wilson asked what the Soviet Union was likely to do, but received no answer. The only decision made was to take the matter to the UN Security Council as quickly as possible in order to forestall such action by the Soviet Union.⁵¹

The president next summoned the British chargé d'affaires to the White House and told him that it was important for the United States and

the United Kingdom to live up to their pledge under the tripartite declaration. Otherwise the Soviet Union was likely to insert itself into the Middle Eastern situation.⁵²

Earlier on 29 October the JCS had met and agreed on measures to enhance U.S. military readiness in the Mediterranean. They alerted a C-124 wing, an Army regimental combat team (RCT), and a Marine battalion landing team in the continental United States for possible movement to the Middle East, as well as another Army RCT in Europe. After hasty clearance with Defense and State, they directed CINCNELM to shift his flag from London to a ship in the Mediterranean by 2 November and ordered a hunter-killer carrier group and two submarines then at Rotterdam to move into the Mediterranean. They also canceled the Sixth Fleet's participation in a forthcoming NATO exercise and ordered a carrier strike force to take position within six hours' sailing distance of Cyprus. They warned the unified and specified commanders of a possible war between Israel and Egypt and added that the British and French would probably intervene with force.⁵³

On the following day, 30 October, Eisenhower cabled Eden urging that the two nations act together. His message crossed with one from Eden declaring that Egypt had brought the attack on itself and that the United Kingdom could not afford to see the canal closed.⁵⁴

In New York the UN Security Council, at the request of U.S. representative Henry Cabot Lodge, approved a resolution calling on all members to refrain from use or threat of force in the area and to give no military, economic, or financial assistance to Israel until it complied with the resolution. The vote was 7-2, with the British and French representatives exercising for the first time their right to veto.⁵⁵

That afternoon in London the British Government presented a joint Franco-British ultimatum to the ambassadors of Egypt and Israel. It requested them to stop action forthwith, to withdraw their forces from the Suez Canal, and to accept "temporary" British and French occupation of Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez. The recipients were given 12 hours in which to comply; otherwise British and French forces would intervene to enforce compliance.⁵⁶

Eden and French Premier Guy Mollet at once announced to their respective parliaments the issuance of the ultimatum. While Eden was speaking, U.S. Ambassador Winthrop Aldrich received a copy and recognized at once that it would be unacceptable to Egypt. The failure to provide advance notice to Aldrich increased Eisenhower's anger at the British Government. He at once sent messages to Eden and Mollet urging that "peaceful processes" prevail.⁵⁷

Behind the scenes in Washington, the JCS told Wilson that they had prepared plans to protect or evacuate U.S. nationals and to guard U.S. interests, including intervention in Arab-Israeli hostilities if necessary. These plans involved combat air units, which would require operating rights at Adana, Turkey, and rights for overflight and staging stops at airfields in Greece, Italy, and France. The JCS asked Wilson to seek immediate

approval for these rights. Wilson at once referred those requests to Secretary Dulles, who considered it unwise at that time to appear to be moving military forces into the area. He agreed, however, to keep a "careful eye on the situation."⁵⁸

The JCS were not destined to play a major role in either of the two crises; there was no U.S. military participation, nor did the JCS ever recommend such. In connection with Suez, however, Secretary Dulles established an informal relationship with Admiral Burke, supplementing the formal State-JCS liaison channels. Burke took a position toward Egypt that would later have been termed "hawkish." He believed that the United States should actively support Britain and France by supplying them with landing craft for an invasion. Burke maintained contact with his British opposite number, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Louis Mountbatten, First Sea Lord.⁵⁹

Meanwhile the Israeli attack rolled on. The original force aimed at the city of Suez. A second force, farther north, had Ismailia as its objective. A third moved southward along the west bank of the Gulf of Aqaba, intending to seize Sharm el Sheikh commanding the Strait of Tiran at the mouth of the gulf.⁶⁰

The Anglo-French ultimatum expired at 11:30 p.m. on 30 October, Washington time, or 6:30 a.m. the following day in the Near East. The next step in the two nations' plan was to launch their own attack on Egypt, starting with air raids. These began on the evening of 31 October (Cairo time) and left the Egyptian Air Force in ruins.

Nasser's reply was to sink ships to block the Suez Canal, thus bringing about the very condition that British and French leaders had hoped to prevent. He also ordered his troops in the Sinai to disengage and withdraw to Egypt proper.⁶¹

Clearly the U.S. effort to maintain peace in the Near East had failed. Offsetting this, however, news from Hungary seemed unbelievably favorable. On 30 October Nagy announced the abolition of one-party rule and the establishment of a new government that included surviving leaders of non-Communist parties. At the same time the Soviet Government issued a declaration setting forth principles for strengthening "friendship and cooperation" with other Communist countries. In it the Soviets admitted to mistakes and promised that their troops would be withdrawn as soon as the Hungarian Government considered it necessary. The Soviets seemed as good as their word; their units in Budapest began withdrawing the same day.⁶²

Another encouraging development came from New York, where Lodge reported on the morning of 31 October an "absolutely spectacular" outpouring of UN support for U.S. policy. It came not only from the traditionally "neutralist" countries of Asia and Africa, which automatically sided with Egypt, but also from Latin America and Europe.⁶³

The president spent 31 October in preparing a speech, which he delivered to the nation at 7:00 p.m. that evening. After summarizing events in Eastern Europe, where he saw a "new Hungary" arising, he turned to the Near East.

Israel, Britain, and France, he said, had suffered "grave and repeated provocations," but their actions were hardly reconcilable with the "principles and purposes of the United Nations." He promised that the United States would not become involved in the present hostilities but would seek to end them as soon as possible.⁶⁴

Already the Sixth Fleet was engaged in evacuating U.S. citizens from Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Syria. These operations began on 31 October and continued until 2 November, by which time 2,086 persons had been evacuated by ships and aircraft. Otherwise, the Sixth Fleet maintained a scrupulous neutrality, careful not to become involved in any way with the Anglo-French amphibious force steaming towards Egypt. Admiral Burke's orders to the fleet were to protect U.S. interests and to "take no guff from anyone."⁶⁵

The Suez War Ends

Speaking to the NSC on 1 November, Secretary Dulles reported the gratifying news of support for the United States in the UN. The whole world was looking to the United States for leadership, he continued; if it were not forthcoming, the Soviet Union would step into the breach. The United States could not afford to support Britain and France on this issue for fear of alienating the large number of newly independent countries. It was excruciating for the United States to be thrust onto the horns of this dilemma just when it appeared that "we are on the point of winning an immense and long-hoped-for victory over Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe."

Turning to courses of action, the secretary proposed that the United States suspend government assistance to Israel, a step that he described as a "very mild" sanction. Wilson, supported by Humphrey, suggested waiting until the UN General Assembly determined the aggressor. Wilson also felt that the United States should not "make a goat out of Israel alone." Dulles feared that postponement would allow the Soviet Union to move in with its own much harsher resolution. The president brought the meeting to a close with the statement that the United States must "do what was decent and right, but still not condemn more furiously than we had to." He directed Dulles to draft an announcement of suspension of aid to Israel and a "moderate" resolution to be submitted to the assembly.⁶⁶

Following the meeting, Dulles cleared with the president via telephone the text of a "mild sanctions" statement concerning Israel. He then hastened to New York, where he submitted to the General Assembly a resolution that, without seeking to pinpoint blame, would call for an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of forces behind the armistice lines, and reopening of the Suez Canal. The assembly approved this resolution early on the morning of 2 November.⁶⁷

Egypt at once announced acceptance of the resolution, conditional upon an end to attacks. Israel agreed to an immediate cease-fire provided a similar answer was forthcoming from Egypt. The United Kingdom and France declared

their willingness to cease military action on condition that Egypt and Israel accept a UN force to maintain peace until an Arab-Israel peace settlement was reached and satisfactory arrangements made regarding the Suez Canal.⁶⁸

These replies amounted to something less than unconditional compliance. The General Assembly accordingly enacted two more resolutions early on the morning of 4 November. One called for compliance with the resolution of 2 November; the other requested the secretary general to submit within 48 hours a plan to set up an emergency UN force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.⁶⁹

UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld thereupon requested all four parties to the dispute to halt military action by 2000 hours GMT on Sunday, 4 November (3:00 p.m., Washington time). He later extended this to 0500 GMT on 5 November. The Egyptian Government had already accepted the resolution; Israel likewise acceded to Hammarskjöld's request.⁷⁰

Britain and France, after hasty consultation, replied on the morning of 5 November (London time) that neither Egypt nor Israel had accepted the proposal for an international force, nor had any plan for such a force been approved by the assembly. "Certain Anglo-French operations with strictly limited objectives" would therefore continue until Israel and Egypt accepted, and the UN endorsed, a plan for an international force.⁷¹

Later that day, the General Assembly voted to establish a force to supervise the cessation of hostilities and authorized the chief of staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East, Maj. Gen. E. L. M. Burns of Canada, to recruit officers from countries not having permanent membership on the Security Council. But it would take time to organize and deploy the force.⁷²

The Israelis had no need to continue fighting. They held the entire Sinai peninsula; their forces had reached the east bank of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Suez and had captured Sharm el Sheikh. They were also in possession of the Gaza Strip along the Mediterranean coast, the launching point for many *fedayeen* raids into Israel.⁷³

In Eastern Europe, the deceptive calm was abruptly shattered at the beginning of November. The Soviet Government, in violation of the assurances given earlier, had determined to smash the Hungarian revolution and reinstall a subservient regime. The attack on Budapest began early on the morning of 4 November. Soviet troops launched a ruthless and bloody assault, using tanks, infantry, and heavy artillery. The Budapest radio broadcast frantic appeals for help before going off the air. A new leader, János Kádár, announced the formation of a new "revolutionary worker-peasant" government. Refugees began to pour across the border into Austria. The UN Security Council enacted a resolution censuring the Soviets, but the action was meaningless.⁷⁴ President Eisenhower wrote to Premier Nikolai Bulganin of the Soviet Union, urging "in the name of humanity and in the cause of peace" that the Soviets withdraw their forces at once.⁷⁵ Such empty appeals formed the limit of U.S. action, since there was little else to do; assistance to the Hungarian rebels would have risked touching off a third world war.

Early on 5 November, the same day that Britain and France refused to end military operations, their paratroopers landed at Port Said, at the mouth of the Suez Canal. Fighting continued all day; in the evening the local Egyptian commander agreed to a cease-fire. At the UN the British representative, Sir Pierson Dixon, announced the fact and added that all bombing throughout Egypt was being terminated, though other air action might continue to support ground operations.⁷⁶

The Soviet Union now seized the opportunity to thrust itself into the Suez situation, acting as the advocate of peace and champion of the underdog. Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov cabled a proposal to the United Nations that the Security Council call on member states to aid Egypt by sending naval and air forces and "volunteers" if the Franco-British attack did not cease. At the same time, Bulganin wrote to the leaders of the major nations involved. To President Eisenhower he suggested joint military action to support Egypt. To Eden and Mollet he hinted at the possibility of rocket attacks or other "terrible means of destruction." To Ben-Gurion he assailed the Israeli Government as a "tool of foreign imperialist powers" and announced that the Soviet ambassador in Tel Aviv was being withdrawn. Eisenhower scorned Bulganin's letter as "an obvious attempt to divert world attention from the Hungarian tragedy."⁷⁷

The JCS would have been remiss had they not alerted the unified and specified commanders to the Soviet threats. On the afternoon of 5 November they dispatched the following message:

The contents of note received by United States Government from USSR late this afternoon when taken together with those of subsequent Soviet notes addressed to UK, France and Israel indicate at a minimum a very disturbed situation in Moscow and may indicate serious intent on the part of the Soviets. JCS consider situation requires special vigilance on your part and that of your principal subordinates. This is not repeat not intended to extend to a general alerting of your command.⁷⁸

On the morning of 6 November in Cairo, the British and French launched the last phase of their assault: an amphibious landing at Port Said to link up with the paratroopers, who were still encountering sporadic resistance despite the cease-fire. By the end of the day they had secured the city and begun an advance along the canal toward Ismailia.⁷⁹

In Washington early that morning, the president received the latest intelligence reports from Allen Dulles, who thought there was a real possibility that the Soviets might intervene, perhaps by staging fighter planes into Egypt. Then, since it was election day, the president and Mrs. Eisenhower drove to Gettysburg to vote, returning to Washington by helicopter about noon.⁸⁰

That morning (6 November) the Armed Forces Policy Council discussed the situation, with Deputy Secretary Robertson presiding in the absence of Wilson who was visiting his old home in Detroit. Admiral Radford characterized the Middle East situation as "much more serious than we

realize," though he doubted that the Soviet Union wanted war. He thought the Soviets were testing the United States. The JCS (who had met earlier that morning) favored measures, he said, to alert U.S. forces in the United States and strengthen those in or near the Middle East. The conferees generally agreed on the need for some sort of action, along with the importance of avoiding anything that would appear provocative. They also agreed that Wilson should be telephoned and urged to return to Washington.⁸¹

The measures tentatively approved by the JCS included the following: to recall military personnel from leave; place interceptor aircraft of the Continental Air Defense Command on advanced alert; deploy SAC tanker squadrons to forward bases; alert heavy troop carrier wings in the zone of the interior; send all picket ships to their stations in the seaward extensions of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line and all antisubmarine warfare units to sea; deploy submarines to reconnaissance stations; reinforce the Sixth Fleet; and dispatch forces to the Persian Gulf area in Turkey.⁸²

Immediately on returning from Gettysburg, Eisenhower met at the White House with Radford, who submitted the list of actions proposed by the JCS, most of them to begin the next morning. The president approved the greater number but ordered them executed by degrees in order to avoid alarming the public. During the meeting, Radford downgraded the probability of Soviet intervention. Their only "reasonable" method of intervening would be through long-range nuclear air strikes, which he considered unlikely.⁸³

Later that day Wilson flew back from Detroit, and the AFPC reconvened at 4:00 p.m. Radford went over the list of alert recommendations approved by the president, indicating those that were to be carried out immediately. Radford "said he might hold up on orders from 1900 until 2200 to await U.N. session developments. Mr. Wilson said this would suit him better." There was a brief discussion of air transport for the proposed UN police force. Radford mentioned preliminary plans to have the United States transport at least part of the UN police force by air to the Suez area. Later that night the JCS issued instructions for the approved readiness measures.⁸⁴

In London the British Government came under increasing pressure from public opinion to call off the action against Egypt. To top it all, a serious financial crisis loomed, with the pound growing weaker. Harold Macmillan, chancellor of the exchequer in Eden's Cabinet, asked Washington to approve a large withdrawal of dollars from the International Monetary Fund to enable the British Government to continue buying sterling and thus prop up the price of the pound. Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey agreed to the withdrawal, but only in return for a cease-fire.⁸⁵

There seemed no alternative. The British Cabinet agreed on a cease-fire to begin at midnight London time (2:00 a.m. in Cairo). Eden at once telephoned Mollet and, after several hours' delay, obtained reluctant consent from the French Cabinet. The British Government then ordered the British commander of the invasion force to cease firing at 2:00 a.m.⁸⁶

All these actions had been completed by 6:00 p.m. in London, or 1:00 p.m. in Washington. Eisenhower learned of the British decision from Goodpaster when he landed by helicopter from Gettysburg. During his meeting with Radford, he called Eden, making use of a recently installed telephone cable, and expressed his pleasure. The two leaders discussed the proposed UN caretaker force. Eden urged that the United States furnish troops; the president, however, believed all the major powers should abstain in order to exclude the Soviets.⁸⁷

On the same day (6 November), Britain and France formally notified Secretary General Hammarskjöld that, if he could confirm that Egypt and Israel had accepted an unconditional cease-fire and that the proposed international force would suffice to assure attainment of the objectives of the resolution of 2 November, they would agree to stop military operations. They added that clearing of the canal was of "great urgency" and proposed that technicians accompanying the Franco-British force begin the task at once. Pending confirmation of these points, the force would cease firing at midnight GMT unless attacked.⁸⁸

Hammarskjöld apparently did not reply formally to the British or French Government, but he had already certified to the Security Council on 5 November that both Egypt and Israel had confirmed their willingness to end hostilities.⁸⁹ The Anglo-French cease-fire therefore remained in effect, and the war came to an end.

Picking Up the Pieces

The Suez Canal war had lasted a little over a week, following its beginning on 29 October. The clear winners, paradoxically, were the two bitterest enemies: Israel, now in possession of greatly increased territory, and Nasser, who emerged politically stronger than ever after defying the Western powers.

The fighting in Hungary also came to its preordained conclusion. The last pockets of resistance in Budapest were crushed on 7 November. Elsewhere, some Hungarian forces continued to hold out for two more weeks or so before giving up.⁹⁰

In the Middle East, the pot continued for a while to simmer even after it stopped boiling. A news report from Moscow on 6 November stated that "volunteers" had begun applying for service with the Egyptian armed forces. On 10 November the Soviet news agency, Tass, warned that if the three invading countries did not withdraw, Soviet authorities "will not hinder the departure of Soviet citizen volunteers" wishing to take part in Egypt's struggle for independence. Fortunately all these alarms proved groundless.⁹¹

The JCS kept U.S. forces on alert. On 14 November, with the approval of Wilson, they directed the Air Force to place SAC in a state of increased readiness and to deploy tanker aircraft to Labrador, Newfoundland, and

Greenland. A carrier force en route from the West Coast to reinforce the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific would remain at Pearl Harbor for training, ready to sail to the Far East if the Seventh Fleet found it necessary to send forces to the Persian Gulf.⁹²

Already U.S. officials had foreseen that the United States might be called upon to transport the UN peacekeeping force. On 5 November the JCS agreed that the Air Force should be prepared to provide airlift for four or five battalions. On 9 November Assistant Secretary Gray authorized the JCS to direct appropriate commanders to make air- and sealift available to move advance elements of the force to Egypt. The JCS named the Department of the Navy as executive agent for assistance after the movement of the advance elements.⁹³

The president approved a directive that the United States, on call from the UN, would provide initial lift for forces designated to participate in the UN force, currently estimated at from 3,500 to 5,000. Nations with which the United States had bilateral military assistance agreements were authorized to use MDAP equipment for forces participating in this assignment. On request from State, Defense would provide logistic support, subject to reimbursement from the UN. No U.S. military personnel were to enter the area under supervision of the UN force, nor were any U.S. supporting facilities to be established therein.⁹⁴

On 23 November Deputy Secretary Robertson instructed the Air Force to airlift advance parties and main bodies to Naples, Italy, from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Colombia, and India, movements requested by the Navy as executive agent for DoD.⁹⁵

By this time contingents of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), as it was called, were well on their way. The first detachments, from Denmark and Norway, reached Egypt on the morning of 15 November. Eventually the force reached a strength of some 6,000, deployed along the Gaza Strip, the eastern border of the Sinai peninsula, and in the region of Sharm el Sheikh. Other countries that contributed to the force included Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Finland, India, Indonesia, Sweden, and Yugoslavia.⁹⁶

Deployment of UNEF facilitated but did not at once assure the withdrawal of the invaders' forces from Egyptian territory, as the countries concerned sought to extract some political advantage. The General Assembly twice passed resolutions urging withdrawal. At length, on 3 December British Foreign Minister Lloyd announced that allied forces would begin withdrawing at once, and by 22 December all British and French troops had departed. Israel began withdrawing its troops by stages on 3 December but attached conditions which held up the process, with consequences to be described later.⁹⁷

By the beginning of December tensions in the Middle East had largely dissipated. As a result, U.S. forces stood down from their alert status. On 7 December SAC reverted to normal readiness conditions. Six days later CINCNELM returned his flag to London and the U.S. Sixth Fleet resumed normal operations in the Mediterranean.⁹⁸

Eden, defeated and exhausted, resigned on 9 January 1957. His successor, Harold Macmillan, was highly regarded by Eisenhower, with whom, like Eden, he had worked during World War II. The president, a frank anglophile, wished to give the British "every chance to work their way back into a position of influence and respect in the Middle East."⁹⁹

The effect of Suez on Western Europe's oil supplies caused much concern in the United States. When the crisis began, Western Europe was using 1.2 million of the 1.5 million barrels of oil that passed through the canal daily. This represented approximately one-half of the oil used by Western Europe; another one-quarter came from Middle Eastern pipelines. Loss of this oil could have serious consequences for the region and for collective defense plans. Some European countries began rationing oil before the middle of November.¹⁰⁰

Well before fighting broke out, Arthur Flemming, director of ODM, formed an emergency committee made up of experts from leading petroleum companies to work with officials of the U.S. Department of the Interior in pooling oil resources in an emergency. They quickly devised a plan for what amounted to a cartel to control temporarily all the oil available to the United States from any source and to ration it as necessary. The Federal Trade Commission and the attorney general approved the plan.¹⁰¹

When Egypt blocked the canal early in November, it was time to think about putting the plan into effect. The NSC twice discussed it, but took no action. Wilson took no part in detailed discussion of the oil problem. He held a minor interest in a small oil company organized by one of his brothers and wished to avoid any appearance of impropriety. He therefore authorized Robertson to represent DoD in discussions with ODM.¹⁰²

As Europe's oil situation worsened, the need for action became urgent. Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., discussed the problem on 29 November with Flemming, Humphrey, and Radford. The conferees approved Flemming's cartel plan despite considerable argument from Radford, who feared that the Arabs might sabotage the one remaining pipeline. He was won over when the others pointed out that further delay in announcing the plan might seriously strain the NATO alliance. Flemming obtained the approval of the president (who was not at the meeting) and announced the action on 30 November. In the weeks to come, the plan served its purpose, abetted by several other favorable developments: increased oil output, conservation measures in European countries, and a mild winter on the European continent. Thus the world, and especially Western Europe, escaped a serious crisis.¹⁰³

The final act in liquidating the Suez crisis was to clear and reopen the canal. For obvious political reasons, Egypt refused to allow the task to be carried out by Britain and France. Secretary General Hammarskjöld arranged to have it done by salvage firms from other European countries under the direction of a U.S. expert, Raymond A. Wheeler, the cost being paid by a surcharge on canal tolls. Even after the work began, the Egyptians held it up pending withdrawal of Israeli troops. The canal reopened

to small vessels on 8 March 1957. The first convoy sailed through on 29 March, and the last sunken wreck was removed on 29 April.¹⁰⁴

Responsibility for operating the reopened canal became the subject of further controversy. Egypt claimed full jurisdiction over it; the Western nations sought some kind of international control. At length Egypt's claim was tacitly accepted. In return, Egypt promised to abide by the Convention of 1888 and to maintain free and uninterrupted navigation for all nations through the canal.¹⁰⁵

Thus ended what President Eisenhower later characterized as "one of the most difficult episodes in recent American diplomatic history."¹⁰⁶ The consequences for the United States were less catastrophic than had at one time been feared. The principal losers were Britain and France, whose political and military prestige had been severely damaged. Nasser, despite his military defeat, emerged as the leading spokesman for the Arab cause and an impressive figure in the so-called "Third World." His meddling in Near Eastern affairs was to contribute to a crisis in Lebanon in 1958, but he was far from being a stooge for communism. The Soviet Union's position in the Middle East seemed no stronger after Suez than before, despite Soviet efforts to present themselves as the saviors of Egypt from Western imperialism. Israel's only tangible gain, as explained below, was a guarantee of access to the Gulf of Aqaba, but the Israelis had demonstrated beyond doubt that they were the strongest military nation in the region. The strain on U.S. ties with Britain and France was not fatal. A meeting between Eisenhower and his friend Macmillan in March 1957 did much to restore the "special relationship" between the United States and Britain. Relations with France remained much as they had been before, until the accession of de Gaulle in 1958 sent them off on a new course.

The Eisenhower Doctrine

The collapse of British and French prestige in the Middle East meant a power vacuum which might be filled by the Soviet Union. This possibility threw a new light on the question of U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact, which, as already noted, had been laid aside by the administration with the understanding that the issue would be reopened later in the year.

On 13 November, after the Suez war had come and gone, the AFPC discussed the Baghdad Pact and agreed that it was time for a new and urgent recommendation to the Department of State. Radford foresaw a quick collapse of the BPO if the United States did not join. Wilson accordingly wrote Dulles on 14 November that immediate review of the matter was required.¹⁰⁷

Dulles still retained the reservations that he had expressed earlier. As an ingenious alternative, he suggested that Iran might be induced to join the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), of which Iran's eastern neighbor, Pakistan, was a member, along with the United States. Since

Iran's neighbor to the west, Turkey, enjoyed a U.S. guarantee as a member of NATO, the result would be, in Dulles's words, "a solid United States guaranteed line from Turkey to Pakistan."¹⁰⁸

In a meeting with the president on 21 November, Robertson, expressing the OSD position, made a strong statement on behalf of U.S. adherence to the pact. He thought that Iraq, Iran, and perhaps Saudi Arabia would welcome such a move. The president feared that it might adversely affect relations with the Arab states, which might conclude that Britain was manipulating the United States into joining the pact. He approved an alternate suggestion by Hoover for U.S. support for the pact. The State Department accordingly released a statement on 29 November that any threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the BPO member states "would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity." Apparently OSD was not consulted in the preparation of the statement.¹⁰⁹

This statement did not go far enough for the JCS, who, on the following day, sent Wilson strong arguments for U.S. membership. They noted that Egypt, Syria, and Jordan seemed to be allying against Israel, with the encouragement of the Soviet Union. The Western nations had no effective way to counter such an alliance, but adherence to the pact would provide an opportunity to establish a U.S. military position in the area, if necessary, and would help to offset Nasser's recent gains.¹¹⁰ The JCS views had no influence, however, on U.S. policy.

On the same day, 30 November, the NSC discussed the Suez situation. The meeting revealed a consensus that the time had come for the United States to exert pressure against Nasser, instead of against the three friendly nations that had attacked him. Secretary Wilson was particularly outspoken in expressing the view that the United States must "take over the burden of the British and French in dealing with Nasser," who must be told to "quit throwing his weight around." The conferees recognized that Nasser might turn to the Soviet Union for support. The president's disarmament adviser, Harold Stassen, suggested a firm warning to the Soviets against moving into the area, such as had been issued to the Chinese Communists in connection with the crisis in the Taiwan Strait in January 1955. Radford heartily endorsed this suggestion; he thought that the congressional resolution enacted at that time, authorizing use of armed forces to protect Taiwan, had prevented war in the Far East and that a similar resolution might have the same result in the Middle East. There is no evidence that either Stassen or Radford thought of such a resolution as an alternative to Baghdad Pact membership, but their suggestion was to have that effect.¹¹¹

Early in December Hoover informed Wilson that the question of Baghdad Pact adherence was being carefully considered by the State Department and the NSC Planning Board. Unwilling to leave the matter there, Wilson referred the matter to the president in a letter of 4 December (with a copy to Secretary Dulles). "The difficult position of the West in the Middle East," he wrote, "with the attendant unfavorable effects in Western Europe and in the Free World alliances as a whole, has apparently reached a stage where

some additional decisive actions are needed." The Defense Department had long felt that the situation would be improved if the United States formally joined the Baghdad Pact. Wilson hoped to settle the question in a meeting with the president in Augusta on 7 December. In fact, when this meeting took place, it was devoted primarily to the 1958 budget; the Baghdad Pact was apparently not mentioned.¹¹²

The proposed congressional resolution on the Middle East took shape in the State Department over the weekend of 14-16 December. State produced a draft which Dulles, Wilson, Radford, and others reviewed on 17 December. Dulles then redrafted the resolution and took it to the president on 20 December, accompanied by Wilson and Radford. Dulles explained his objections to Baghdad Pact membership: the question had become entangled with Arab politics; it was opposed by Nasser and, more importantly, by King Saud of Saudi Arabia, the only Near Eastern figure who might serve as a counterpoise to the Egyptian ruler; Senate ratification of U.S. membership would be difficult to obtain, especially if it had to be coupled with a guarantee to Israel. No one took issue with Dulles, and the discussion moved to consideration of the details. It was agreed that Dulles and Radford would prepare a new version for submission to Congress.¹¹³

The president unveiled his proposal to Congress in a meeting with leaders of both parties on 1 January. He stressed the importance of having the United States fill the vacuum in the Middle East before the Soviets did so. It was important to be able to offer economic assistance to the Middle Eastern nations and to move quickly with military force to block the Soviets if necessary.¹¹⁴

The final version of the proposal went to Congress on 5 January in the form of a joint resolution. It authorized the president to employ U.S. armed forces to protect the territorial integrity and independence of any nation or group of nations requesting such aid against overt aggression from a Communist country. It also authorized military and economic cooperation with such nations.¹¹⁵ In committee hearings before both houses, Dulles was the principal witness. Radford spoke for the Department of Defense and firmly supported the proposal. The House approved it on 30 January by a comfortable margin.¹¹⁶

Action in the Senate was delayed by a controversy between the United States and Israel concerning the withdrawal of the latter nation's forces from Sinai. Understandably loath to yield their spectacular gains, the Israelis sought to hold on to the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh. The United States lined up with the majority in the UN to put diplomatic pressure on Israel. The Israeli position found considerable support for the doughty little state among American admirers, who included a number of persons prominent in public life. At length, however, Ben-Gurion announced on 1 March that Israeli forces would withdraw. The Israelis had to be satisfied with a U.S. statement that amounted to a guarantee of "free and innocent passage" for the ships of all nations into and out of the Gulf of Aqaba.¹¹⁷

After the Israeli declaration, the Senate passed the resolution on 5 March and the president signed it four days later. In its final form, it authorized the president to cooperate with and provide military assistance to any nation or group of nations in the "general area of the Middle East" seeking economic development as a means of maintaining national independence. Furthermore, continued the resolution,

the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: *Provided*, that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States.

A sum of \$200 million was authorized for use during FY 1957, from any available appropriations for mutual security, for economic and military assistance under the resolution.¹¹⁸

The policy embodied in the resolution became known as the "Eisenhower Doctrine." It was to be implemented in the near future.*

Aftermath in Hungary

In the other contemporary trouble spot, the outcome was much less satisfactory. Unable in any way to influence events, as it had done in connection with the Suez crisis, the United States had to stand by helplessly while the Hungarian freedom movement was suppressed. "What can we do that is really constructive?" asked the president rhetorically in an NSC meeting on 8 November. Having written Bulganin earlier on the subject, he had that morning received a reply stating, in effect, that what happened in Hungary was none of his business; it was a matter "completely and entirely under the competence of the Hungarian and Soviet Governments."¹¹⁹

All that could be done was to help the refugees pouring across Hungary's borders. The president announced that the administrator of the Refugee Relief Act would process up to 5,000 refugees "as expeditiously as possible."¹²⁰

On 1 November the NSC had considered NSC 5616, the draft revision of policy toward Poland and Hungary, but had deferred action, presumably to await developments. The Planning Board then circulated an amended version (NSC 5616/1) on 13 November, after the Hungarian revolt had been all but totally suppressed. The board suggested some rather ineffectual measures designed to try to influence the Soviets in connection with Hungary. Regarding Poland, NSC 5616/1 envisioned that the Soviets might seek to

* See Chapter VIII.

reverse the trend toward independence in that country and that the Gomulka regime might request UN action. In such an event, the United States should be prepared to support the UN, including use of force if necessary, to prevent the USSR from reimposing its control.¹²¹

Two proposals to which the JCS had objected in NSC 5616—for assurances to the Soviets regarding the satellites as allies and a possible mutual withdrawal of force—were again presented in NSC 5616/1. The JCS again expressed their opposition to these, and the council deleted them when the members discussed NSC 5616/1 on 15 November. On the first proposal, the president noted that such assurances had already been given twice. As for the mutual withdrawal, it had already been overtaken by events, as Wilson pointed out, although he expressed the view that the United States might eventually have to make a “package deal” with the Soviets concerning Germany and Central Europe.¹²²

The president approved the paper in slightly amended form on 19 November as NSC 5616/2. Its most significant passage was a “policy conclusion” to the effect that the United States “should strive to aid and encourage forces in the satellites moving toward U.S. objectives without provoking counter-action which would result in the suppression of ‘liberalizing’ influences.” This represented the limit of what was possible.¹²³

Assistance to Hungarian refugees continued as their number swelled. At the NSC meeting on 30 November, Allen Dulles estimated the number at 90,000 to 100,000, or roughly one percent of Hungary’s population. Most went to Austria; a count at the end of 1956 showed that 155,085 had entered that country.¹²⁴

Eisenhower announced on 1 December that the United States would offer asylum to an additional 21,500 Hungarian refugees. He directed the secretary of defense to work out arrangements for their transportation in cooperation with the Austrian Government and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM).¹²⁵

The ICEM would be responsible for the movement of 6,500 refugees by chartered aircraft, DoD for the remaining 15,000. About two-thirds of this latter number were airlifted by the Military Air Transport Service; the remainder traveled by ships of the Military Sea Transportation Service. On arrival in the United States, the refugees were housed and fed by the Army at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, until arrangements could be made to settle them.¹²⁶

Shipment of the first quota was completed in January 1957. The administration then extended the program to take in additional refugees. By the middle of May, when the program was practically completed, 31,983 Hungarians had been resettled. The Immigration and Naturalization Service had assumed responsibility for receiving and housing those that were still arriving. The International Cooperation Administration would reimburse the military services for the costs incurred in the program.¹²⁷

Thus ended the brief and bitter story of the Hungarian revolt. The flame of freedom had glimmered momentarily in one corner of the Communist

empire only to be snuffed out. The United States and the United Nations had contributed only moral pressure, which the Soviets contemptuously ignored, secure in the knowledge that the Western powers would not regard their actions in Hungary as constituting a *casus belli*.

CHAPTER IV

The Budget for FY 1958

The annual budget served as the means by which the Eisenhower administration gave specific direction to the size and shape of the military establishment, and thus translated policy into military capability. The process was a lengthy one, involving almost a year of planning before the budget document was submitted to Congress in January; then, after legislative approval, the execution of the budget for the ensuing fiscal year, beginning on 1 July, had to be supervised. In the preparation of the budget, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided overall guidance on the size of forces and the secretary of defense, following the president's lead, set financial limits. Preparation of detailed appropriations requests and expenditure plans was the responsibility of the service departments.

Early Budget Estimates

During President Eisenhower's first few years in office, defense budgeting began with an estimate prepared by the JCS of the numbers of major combat forces of each service (Army divisions, Navy combat vessels, Air Force wings) required for national security. These forces were then priced out by the service departments. The costs were invariably too high, and the final budget was arrived at through a process of give and take involving Secretary Wilson and his staff, the president, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the service secretaries.¹

For FY 1958, Wilson, with the president's approval, adopted a different method. He directed the JCS to prepare an "outline military strategy," along with guidance for determining the size, composition, and deployment of U.S. armed forces for fiscal years 1958 and 1959. This procedure was similar to that adopted by the Eisenhower administration in 1953, when the newly appointed JCS members were given the task of drafting proposals that became the basis for the New Look.²

Meeting at Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico, in March 1956, the JCS concluded that existing military programs, reflecting current military strategy, would remain valid through 1960. However, to maintain them would become

increasingly expensive, since costs were rising. They believed that, with careful management, annual expenditures for the years 1958 through 1960 could be held to approximately \$38-40 billion if existing force levels and deployments were maintained.³

These conclusions warned of the great difficulty of holding expenditures level over the "long haul," as the president hoped. Current military expenditures were running at approximately \$35 billion annually. Radford warned the president on 24 May that additional service requests were coming in that would run well above the JCS "maintenance level." Eisenhower, however, remained optimistic and mentioned a target figure of \$37 billion.⁴

Planning for the FY 1958 budget began with a directive to Wilson from Budget Director Brundage on 5 April. Brundage recognized that in 1958 the administration's record of successive expenditure reductions would be broken, owing to increases in salaries and expanded programs in many departments and agencies. Nevertheless, wrote Brundage, barring a major change in the international situation, the president was "irrevocably committed" to a balanced budget in 1958, and the utmost restraint must therefore be exercised in planning. Assistant Secretary McNeil relayed these instructions to the services on 21 April, giving them a deadline of 15 May to submit estimates of new obligational authority for 1958, with expenditure projections through 1960.⁵

The service replies must have startled both McNeil and Wilson. The estimates added up to slightly over \$48 billion—far above even the highest JCS figure, and even more striking when contrasted with the \$34.9 billion request for FY 1957 that was currently before Congress.* Almost half of the total (\$23.6 billion) was accounted for by the Air Force, primarily to expand the heavy bomber force to 14 wings, also for expanded procurement of missiles and of the new B-58 medium jet bomber that was soon to enter service. The Navy's estimate of \$12.5 billion covered the cost of six new submarines and an aircraft carrier, all nuclear-powered. The Army estimated \$12 billion, to finance an increase in personnel and to expand atomic support forces in Europe. Expenditure projections prepared by the services totaled \$39 billion, \$44 billion, and \$47 billion, respectively, for FYs 1958 through 1960.⁶

After a quick preliminary review of these figures, Wilson forwarded them to Brundage on 1 June. Slight reductions had been offset by the addition of \$698 million for OSD and interservice activities, bringing to \$48.4 billion the FY 1958 total for new obligational authority. Wilson assured Brundage that the figures were only preliminary. "We do not expect to recommend any such amounts . . . when the FY 1958 budget estimates are submitted later in the year," he wrote. But, he added, the figures illuminated the difficulty in trying to reconcile defense needs with economic feasibility.⁷

Wilson recognized that defense costs would inevitably rise. He told the NSC on 17 May 1956 that he and Radford "simply could not carry out their commitments on the basis of the budgets on which the Defense

* See Chapter II.

Department now operates." Radford corroborated the statement.⁸ It appears that Wilson was thinking in terms of the need to reduce commitments rather than to enlarge budgets. But in the absence of any immediate prospect of such a reduction, the alternative was manifest.

Getting Down to Reality

Obviously the service budget requests could not be brought down to an acceptable figure merely by routine staff reviews to prune out waste. Reductions on the order of \$10 billion would require careful weighing of risks in the light of the best military judgment.

On 14 June Wilson opened his campaign to reduce the estimates. He sent the service secretaries an analysis of the principal "problem areas" affecting the budget, prepared by McNeil's office. There had been, he pointed out, no change in the international situation to justify any enormous increase over 1957. He directed the secretaries to submit, by 1 August, revised estimates more in line with the figures agreed on by the JCS in Puerto Rico.⁹

The defense budget had already been discussed at White House level. On 23 May McNeil explored with Brundage and presidential assistant Sherman Adams ways of bringing down the service estimates, such as institution of a clearly defined ceiling, or careful review of NSC-approved policies to determine their cost. They agreed only that the president should be kept fully informed of budgetary problems, particularly those programs for which the services were projecting the largest increases.¹⁰

Wilson and Radford discussed budgetary problems at the White House on 12 July 1956, again with Adams and Brundage. Wilson confessed that it seemed impossible to bring down the service estimates to the JCS figure without a fundamental review of overseas commitments. Radford commented that the absurdly high Air Force estimates reflected that service's conviction of its support in Congress. Adams warned of a change in political atmosphere that would make Congress reluctant to provide appropriations of the current magnitude—a prescient remark, as it turned out. Wilson suggested target figures of \$38.7 billion in new obligational authority and 2.5 million personnel.¹¹

At a meeting with the president on 31 July, Wilson expressed the belief that it was impossible to go below \$38.7 billion without drastically disrupting programs. McNeil, in a breakdown of the initial service requests, showed costs rising in every area of defense. The president stressed the importance of scrutinizing "every nickel" of expenditures.¹²

During July 1956, a newspaper story appeared alleging that Admiral Radford sought to reduce military strength by 800,000 men over the next four years.* Both Radford and Wilson had immediately repudiated the story. Asked about it at a press conference on 7 August, Wilson repeated his denial

* See Chapter II.

and connected the report with the initial "flash" estimate of \$48 billion for FY 1958. He knew of "no responsible person," he said, who was advocating either proposal, but he thought that the 1958 budget request would be somewhat higher than for 1957, along with some reduction in manpower.¹³

On 15 June the NSC directed the preparation of three-year cost projections for all national security programs, broken down by principal elements specifically related to policies.¹⁴ The object, clearly, was to tie programs to policies in the manner suggested in McNeil's conference of 23 May with Adams and Brundage. But the discussion, which took place on 16-17 August, never reached such a level of detail. The tone was set at the beginning by the Bureau of the Budget, which forecast deficits of \$500 million, \$1.6 billion, and \$6.1 billion for fiscal years 1957, 1958, and 1959, respectively. Against this background, McNeil presented service budget estimates amounting to \$48.75, \$49.0, and \$49.6 billion for the next three years. Wilson admitted that these were "incredible," but stressed the difficulty of reducing them. The nation's commitment to NATO, he pointed out, remained as large as ever; moreover, the New Look policy had never been fully clarified, nor had it been completely accepted by the Army. The council directed that all the budget projections be reviewed in the light of the overall fiscal outlook—obviously expecting them to be revised downward.¹⁵

In a separate meeting on 17 August with Wilson and Radford, Eisenhower tacitly approved Wilson's target figures of \$38.7 billion and 2.5 million personnel. He adduced a further argument for the latter figure: it had been proposed in connection with disarmament discussions. Wilson suggested, and the president agreed, that he should tackle the major budgetary problems at once, with a target date of early November for submitting a budget.¹⁶

By setting the 1958 goal at \$38.7 billion, Eisenhower and Wilson had bowed to the inevitability of a significant increase over 1957. The effect was to shift the defense budget to a new and higher plateau. Never again, for the remainder of Eisenhower's term, was a figure less than \$38 billion to be considered.

Deputy Secretary Robertson took charge of the study of major budget problems. During September and October the services submitted to him summaries of their programs for construction, research and development, guided missiles, continental defense, and other areas of major spending. The effect was to pinpoint the fields in which the most difficult decisions were required.¹⁷

Several important issues were taken up directly with the president. On 2 October Robertson, McNeil, Radford, and Secretary of State Dulles discussed with him the question of U.S. forces in Europe. It was agreed that there should be no reduction in the number of divisions there, but that they should be "streamlined."¹⁸

On 11 October General Taylor, accompanied by Wilson and Brucker, briefed the president on a proposed reorganization of Army divisions for the nuclear era. A "pentomic" division, with five self-contained "battle

groups," would replace the old "triangular" division with its three regiments. The president approved the reorganization and expressed the hope that it would lead to personnel reductions; Taylor, however, believed that any saving would be partially offset by troop increases at corps and army level.¹⁹

Expectations of a decrease in personnel for FY 1958 were thrown into question by the sudden worsening of the international situation at the end of October, as described in the preceding chapter. There was little or no prospect of U.S. military involvement in the anti-Soviet rebellion in Hungary, but the Anglo-French-Israeli military action in the Suez area raised for a time the grave possibility of an armed clash between the two superpowers.

The Suez crisis also provided an example of a situation that could not be resolved merely by threatening to unleash the nuclear armed bombers of the Strategic Air Command. "In the present situation," wrote Admiral Burke to Wilson on 6 November, "the usefulness of naval power and the consequences of its neglect are well demonstrated." Echoing the views of General Taylor, he argued that recent budget trends had overemphasized preparation for the least likely contingency, namely, all-out war.²⁰

Early in November, Wilson met with the service secretaries and set limits for NOA as follows: Army, \$9.75 billion; Navy, \$11.0 billion; Air Force, \$19.5 billion. These, he said, were not "fixed" figures, but budgets for each service must be "in that area." All the secretaries objected. Secretary of the Navy Thomas was particularly outspoken; he openly accused the Air Force of being "disloyal" by indulging in "machinations" to influence Congress and the public in order to obtain more money, a charge hotly denied by Air Force Secretary Quarles. Regarding manpower, Wilson said he had planned to cut the total by some 200,000 (i.e., to about 2.6 million), but was rethinking this plan in light of the Suez crisis.²¹

Wilson told the president on 8 November that the world situation would not permit reduction of personnel to 2.6 or even 2.65 million. He had succeeded in reducing the obligation requests to \$41 billion overall, but any further reduction would make it very difficult to "hold his people in line." Eisenhower thought that it might be necessary to impose a rigid ceiling for each service, a method that he had always opposed. He went so far as to suggest that, if the situation was as Wilson described, it might be necessary to convince the public that an increase in taxes was required.²²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff placed themselves on record as opposing any sharp cuts in forces. In a memorandum to Wilson on 15 November, apparently sent on their own initiative, they affirmed that in view of the international situation, military programs should "continue to be based upon essentially the present force levels and personnel strengths as far as preparation of the FY 1958 budget is concerned." It might even be necessary to seek increases if the situation grew more dangerous.²³

In a discussion with Wilson the same day, Taylor and Twining accepted Wilson's proposal to hold forces and personnel strengths level. Burke, however, pointed out that the Navy could not long maintain the abnormal deployments necessitated by the Near East crisis. He was not prepared at

that time to ask for an increase in the Navy's personnel ceiling, but some relief would be necessary if the situation persisted.²⁴

More specific manpower guidance was furnished the service secretaries on 16 November, when Wilson laid down the following strength objectives for 31 December 1956, which were to be maintained through FY 1958:²⁵

Army	1,000,000
Navy	675,000
Marine Corps	200,000
Air Force	<u>920,000</u>
Total	2,795,000

The effect would be to project current strengths through 30 June 1958.

Trying to pin down the president to a definite decision, Wilson sent him a copy of his memorandum of 16 November to the services, along with the JCS memorandum of 15 November. "It would seem desirable," he wrote, "for us to fix a definite personnel ceiling for budgetary limitation for the years ahead." He was thinking of a "substantially level" military program, assuming that personnel strengths, force levels, and rates of expenditure would remain about the same and that there would be "no inflation or deflation."²⁶

On 21 November Wilson addressed a final appeal to the service secretaries to observe the utmost austerity in budget planning. He reminded them that the JCS had twice pronounced that military programs should be based on current force levels and personnel strengths—in other words, that no increases were necessary. He expected that their budget recommendations would represent "the considered opinion of yourself and of your senior advisers" as to the "minimum essential programs" and their costs.²⁷

But when the service budget submissions arrived on 26 and 27 November, it seemed that Wilson's exhortations had fallen on deaf ears. Computed in terms both of direct obligations* and of new obligational authority, the figures were as follows (in billions):²⁸

	<u>Direct Obligations</u>	<u>New Obligational Authority</u>
Army	\$11.295	\$11.526
Navy	11.967	11.913
Air Force	21.370	21.070
OSD and Interservice	<u>.722</u>	<u>.722</u>
Total	\$45.354	\$45.231

* "Direct obligations" (sometimes referred to as "program") meant money to be obligated during the fiscal year. It did not coincide either with obligational authority for the year (since it might include funds made available but not obligated earlier) or with expenditures (some of which might be for obligations incurred in prior years). See testimony by McNeil in Senate Cte on Appros, *DoD Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 369-70 (where, however, McNeil used the phrase "planned obligations"). As McNeil said, such obligations "are a measure of the level of new activity planned for the year." This budget planning category seems to have been introduced for the first time in connection with FY 1958.

The estimates greatly exceeded the guidelines laid down by Wilson a few weeks earlier. The Navy's submission came closest. Based on a program intended by 1965 to replace obsolete World War II ships, it would finance for 1958 construction of 23 vessels, including a nuclear aircraft carrier, and the conversion of 15 others. For the Army, the most significant item was a request for \$1.9 billion for procurement and production, for which the Army had received no money in any of the three previous budgets. The Army would cut its divisions, however, from 19 to 17.²⁹

The Air Force request, part of a four-year program of modernization to be achieved by FY 1960, would provide for 130 wings in 1958, declining to 126 by 1960 but with a rise in the number of heavy bomber wings from 11 to 17.³⁰ Accordingly, the Air Force proposed to add 240 B-52 aircraft during FY 1958 (continuing the production rate of 20 per month), plus jet-propelled (KC-135) tankers for in-flight fueling and improved fighters of various types. The Air Force request included \$8.386 billion for aircraft and related procurement, of which \$2 billion was for missiles. Its program was designated ME-58 (for "Minimum Essential"), and Secretary Quarles assured Wilson that it was indeed minimal.³¹

Analysts from the Bureau of the Budget had already reviewed the service submissions and suggested a number of reductions, many of which were ultimately to be adopted. Thus they recommended only 11 wings of B-52s, with a final production run of 98 aircraft in 1958.³²

When the service submissions were presented, Secretary Wilson commended the presentations but made it clear that the services were asking for too much money. He cited the example of West Germany, which had begun with plans for a military force of 500,000, or one percent of its population, but was now reconsidering. On the same basis, the United States should be able to make do with a force of 1.6 million.³³

In subsequent discussions, Wilson indicated that the budget should be planned on the basis of existing force and expenditure levels, subject to increases or decreases not exceeding 5-10 percent. Also, in light of the world situation, current operations should be emphasized at the expense of development and modernization. He warned against "beating the drums" for more money from Congress during hearings. "If I catch any of you at it this spring, I won't look at it with much favor," he remarked during discussions with the Navy.³⁴

Applying these principles in a detailed review of service appropriations requests, Wilson was able to pare them down to a level that he considered acceptable. He cut the Air Force to \$18.4 billion and the Army to \$9.2 billion, the largest cuts coming in procurement. With \$11.2 billion for the Navy and some \$800 million for activities under OSD, the total came to \$39.6 billion. Expenditures had been brought down to \$39.039 billion and direct obligations to \$41.4 billion.³⁵

Wilson and McNeil took these figures to Augusta, Georgia, where the president was vacationing, and discussed them with him on 7 December. Eisenhower rejected them. He had recently received from Brundage a

recommendation for a limit of \$37.7 billion in NOA for defense.³⁶ The president did not go so far as to adopt Brundage's limit, but he insisted that new obligational authority be held to \$38.5 billion. Wilson demurred, holding out for a minimum of \$39 billion, and the discussion became heated. At one point, the president left the conference to put in a telephone call to Secretary Humphrey, in which he described Wilson as "kicking and storming." Humphrey agreed to go along with \$38.5 billion, though he considered even this too high. When the conference resumed, Wilson agreed to accept that figure for NOA, with other limits of a flat \$38 billion for expenditures and \$40 billion for direct obligations ("program").³⁷

Wilson, though unhappy with the president's decision, loyally carried it out.³⁸ To bring his figures into line, he applied reductions to the services on a pro rata basis, reducing each service by the same percentage as its share of the total request. Thus the Air Force, which had accounted for approximately 47 percent of the total of appropriations and of direct obligations, would receive the same percentage of the smaller figure in each instance.³⁹

The final figures, approved by Wilson for transmission to the National Security Council, were (in billions):⁴⁰

<u>Service</u>	<u>NOA</u>	<u>Direct Obligations</u>	<u>Expenditures</u>
Army	\$ 8.920	\$ 9.651	\$ 9.170
Navy	10.922	11.094	10.389
Air Force	17.746	18.735	17.600
OSD and Interservice	.727	.697	.726
	<u>\$38.315</u>	<u>\$40.177</u>	<u>\$37.885</u>
Proposed for later transmission	.185	.185	.115
Total	<u>\$38.500</u>	<u>\$40.362</u>	<u>\$38.000</u>

The force levels (major units) to be supported in the budget were as follows:⁴¹

Army:	
Divisions	17
Regiments/RCTs	9
Antiaircraft Battalions	127
Atomic Support Commands	6
Navy:	
Major Combatant Ships	422
Other Ships	<u>561</u>
Total Active Ships	983
Carrier Air Groups	17
Marine Corps Divisions/Air Wings	3/3
Air Force:	
Strategic Wings	45
Air Defense Wings	32
Tactical Wings	36
Troop Carrier Wings	<u>15</u>
Total Wings	128

The Air Force would lose 9 wings during FY 1958, since the long-sought goal of 137 wings was expected to be attained by the end of 1957.⁴² Of the wings to be dropped, five would be strategic fighter, one tactical bomber, and three fighter-bomber. The changes reflected the declining need for strategic fighters, as the B-52 replaced the more vulnerable B-36, and for tactical aircraft for close support of the Army, which had growing surface-to-surface missile capability. B-52 procurement would be limited during 1958 to 101 aircraft to complete the 11-wing force; the question of further expansion would be determined later. The Air Force would receive \$6.2 billion for aircraft and related procurement.⁴³

The Army's potential role in nuclear war would be emphasized by establishing five atomic support commands in Europe. On the other hand, the cut in the Army's procurement money to \$583 million dealt a severe blow to its hopes for modernizing its conventional weaponry. The Navy would be allowed 19 new vessels, including the nuclear-powered carrier, and 12 ship conversions.⁴⁴

The manpower strength of the services would be continued through 1958 at the currently authorized figure of 2,800,000, slightly more than the limit set by Wilson on 16 November. The Air Force had been granted an additional 5,000 men. The allocation was as follows:⁴⁵

Army	1,000,000
Navy	675,000
Marine Corps	200,000
Air Force	925,000
Total	2,800,000

Eisenhower gave this budget his general approval on 19 December, and the NSC discussed it in more detail two days later. The military service chiefs described their programs, emphasizing that they represented minimum requirements, but the service secretaries accepted the budget as the best attainable for the money available. McNeil contrasted the budget with those for 1956 and 1957, showing rising expenditure trends, drawing from the president the statement that eventually a level-off position must be reached. Wilson pointed out that the 1959 cycle would soon begin, and suggested that FY 1958 be used as a basis for initial planning. The president agreed and set a fiscal ceiling of \$39 billion for 1959 for both new obligational authority and expenditures. Then, in answer to a question from Wilson, the president declared the DoD program for 1958 to be "acceptable."⁴⁶

Three weeks later, on 11 January 1957, in approving the record of action at this NSC meeting, the president inserted a statement that, barring some unforeseen emergency, he did not intend to request from Congress during the rest of his term of office more than \$39 billion in new obligational authority for the Department of Defense in any fiscal year. He took this action, as he told Wilson, to avoid a situation like that occurring some months earlier, when the services had submitted their fantastically high \$48 billion requests.⁴⁷

On 26 December Wilson formally submitted to BoB the figures that had been discussed at the NSC meeting. He broke down the total in new obligational authority to \$36.2 billion to be requested at once and \$2.3 billion to be requested later, primarily for construction.⁴⁸

Brundage replied on 29 December that the president had approved the NOA request, with slight adjustments. He added a caution on the need for economy. "You have assured us," he wrote, "that total expenditures for all of the military programs of the Department of Defense will not exceed \$36,000,000,000 in fiscal year 1957 and \$38,000,000,000 in fiscal year 1958." Wilson refused to be drawn into a hard-and-fast commitment to these limits. He replied that the FY 1958 budget figures remained "subject to variation," and were "not rigid ceilings."⁴⁹

With the budget completed, Wilson turned his attention to insuring its full support by the service chiefs during congressional hearings. He and Radford discussed the matter on 29 December with Goodpaster and other administration officials. Goodpaster's impression (and he thought that of the president as well), from attending two meetings of the JCS with the president, was that they considered the program to involve an acceptable risk. Radford admitted that when he brought the JCS in to meet the president, they had sat "like bumps on a log," though given a chance to express any disagreement. All agreed that this important question should be clarified.⁵⁰

Goodpaster accordingly drafted a statement to be signed by the service chiefs, military and civilian. It declared that, although each chief was aware of areas in which increases would be desirable, the FY 1958 military program as a whole was "well-balanced and satisfactory," and each "can and will give the program his wholehearted support, as involving an acceptable degree of risk and providing a reasonable and wise degree of security."⁵¹

Goodpaster presented this statement to the Joint Chiefs and the service secretaries on 31 December. Wilson, who was present, pointed out that there would be no difficulty if the president would state frankly that he had set a "ceiling" for the budget. Goodpaster objected to this word; he "understood" that the president had not set a ceiling, but had "decided upon a figure between the present program and the one proposed, after considering and discussing the main elements of the program." Admiral Radford, Admiral Burke, General Pate, and Secretary of the Navy Thomas, in signing the statement, expressed concurrence. General Twining signed without comment. Secretary of the Army Brucker and General Taylor did so after being given assurances, the former that his signature would not preclude larger requests for certain programs next year, the latter that frank answers to congressional questions would be permissible. Secretary of the Air Force Quarles demonstrated some reluctance. He hesitated to endorse the program as "well-balanced" until Goodpaster explained that the statement referred to the program as a whole, i.e., that deficiencies in one service were canceled out by other services' capabilities. But, asked Quarles, what was his responsibility with regard to the assertion that the risk involved was "acceptable." Was he simply to accept the president's judgment in this matter? Goodpaster's

reply was somewhat involved: "I indicated that as I would understand the matter, it would be a question of exercising his own judgment on these matters insofar as he felt capable of doing so, and finding his own judgment consistent with the President's and then feeling confidence in the President's judgment on matters he felt to be outside his own competence." Thus reassured, Quarles also signed the statement.⁵²

Wilson, Radford, and McNeil briefed congressional legislators of both parties on the budget on 1 January 1957. The president stressed the need for economy, aiming his remarks at opposition leaders, who had pushed through a large increase in the 1957 budget.⁵³

Before sending the budget to Congress, the president discussed it with the Cabinet on 9 January. Secretary Humphrey read a draft of a proposed "open letter" to the president, urging strenuous efforts to hold expenditures *below* the budgeted amounts. Secretary Dulles objected that the letter was too critical, and Brundage that it would be interpreted as evidence of disagreement within the administration. The president, however, saw no objection to releasing the letter; rather he felt that it would help to head off any moves in Congress to increase the budget. He could not foresee that his worries on that score would prove groundless, and he failed to realize that, as Dulles and Brundage had warned, he was sowing the seeds of trouble by approving Humphrey's intention to air his views in public.⁵⁴

Public Presentation of the Budget

President Eisenhower unveiled his FY 1958 budget on 16 January 1957, a few days before formally beginning his second term. The figures that he presented to Congress (slightly altered from those submitted to the NSC a month earlier) were as follows (in billions):⁵⁵

	<u>New Authority</u>	<u>Obligational Expenditures</u>
Army	\$ 8.539	\$ 9.130
Navy	10.517	10.347
Air Force	16.481	17.472
OSD and Interservice	.705	.704
	<u>\$36.242</u>	<u>\$37.653</u>
Proposed for later transmission	2.258	.347
Total	<u>\$38.500</u>	<u>\$38.000</u>

The expenditure estimate for 1957 had risen to \$36 billion. The increase of \$2 billion expected in 1958 the president attributed to increases in the numbers of bases and other installations and the growing complexity of new weapons, particularly missiles and aircraft. Expenditures for missiles was expected to reach \$2.0 billion in 1958, compared with \$1.5 billion in 1957 and \$1.2 billion in 1956.⁵⁶

For the budget as a whole, the president asked \$73.3 billion in new

obligational authority and forecast \$71.8 billion in expenditures. Both figures were the highest since he took office—indeed, the highest in U.S. peace-time history. Nevertheless the president foresaw a surplus of \$1.8 billion for FY 1958 and a slightly smaller one for 1957.⁵⁷

Unfortunately, at the moment of sending his budget to Congress, Eisenhower was upstaged by his irrepressible secretary of the treasury. Side by side with the account of the budget, the newspapers reported a press conference at which Humphrey read the statement that the president had approved on 9 January.⁵⁸ In the statement, Humphrey gave perfunctory praise to the hard work that had gone into the FY 1958 budget but went on to imply that it was too high. "We should now all go to work," he said, to make "actual and substantial reductions." His answers to reporters' questions were even more pointed. "I think there are a lot of places in this budget that can be cut," he said, though he declined to cite any. He would be "very glad" to see Congress cut the budget if it could do so. Reduction of expenditures was essential in order to reduce the "terrific" tax rate. If no such reduction was made, "I will predict that you will have a depression that will curl your hair, because we are just taking too much money out of this economy that we need to make the jobs that you have to have as time goes on."⁵⁹

Humphrey was only stating views for which he was well known, but the wording and timing of his remarks created something of a sensation. "Never in the history of executive budgeting since 1921," in the words of one student of the presidency, "had there been anything to match the spectacle of a first-rank Cabinet officer publicly assailing the presidential budget on the very day it was sent down."⁶⁰ The secretary's words had an immediate effect on the prospects for the budget in Congress. The next day, leaders of the "economy bloc" in that body were reported to be counting on specific backing from Humphrey in trimming the budget.⁶¹

The Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives called both Humphrey and Brundage to testify on 23-24 January. Humphrey declared that he supported the budget, but added that hard work should reveal "lots of places" where expenditures could be cut. Brundage defended the budget as "our best considered estimate." "I hope you can make some reductions," he said, "but I hope particularly that you will not increase it this year." Neither he nor Humphrey was willing to suggest specific cuts. But they managed to leave the impression, at least among some members of Congress, that Congress had an obligation to make reductions.⁶²

The president made matters worse at a news conference on 23 January 1957. He had, he said, gone over "every word" of Humphrey's memorandum "and it expresses my convictions very thoroughly." He defended the size of the budget, but added that anyone who examined it "ought to find some place where he might save another dollar. If they can, I think if Congress can, its committees, it is their duty to do it." Here was a virtual invitation to members of Congress to sharpen their pruning knives.⁶³

Secretary Wilson must have wondered about the quality of support that

he could expect in getting the Defense budget through Congress. He himself defended the budget forthrightly when the House began hearings on 30 January. His prepared statement concluded as follows:

I cannot foresee, at this time, any justification for a reduction in the Military Establishment, nor in the total annual military expenditures of the Department of Defense below the present level, short of a drastic improvement in the international situation. With prudent management, neither do I foresee the need for any important increases in these forces or their costs short of a war.⁶⁴

"I wish I could tell you where to cut another billion dollars off this budget, but I cannot," he said in answer to a question. "I will probably want to fight you if you try to take a dollar off it."⁶⁵

Controversy over the National Guard

Just at that moment, Wilson's relations with Congress had been strained by another of his injudicious remarks. This one grew out of an effort to improve the quality of the National Guard, which, normally controlled and administered by the state governments, constituted an element of the reserve forces of the Army and the Air Force subject to call-up for national service in an emergency.

Training requirements for the reserve forces had been set forth in the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, which allowed young men between the ages of 17 and 18 1/2 to enlist directly in the reserves but required from them either two years' active service or six months of basic training in the active reserve followed by an obligatory period of reserve service. Neither requirement applied to the National Guard.⁶⁶

The National Guard constituted a part of the Ready Reserve. The act set a ceiling of 2,900,000 men in the Ready Reserve, which was subject to call-up by presidential action. In a directive on 26 November 1956, Wilson set the actual limit at 2,500,000. He also called attention to the need to improve the quality of the reserve, some components of which suffered from a preponderance of untrained men. For this purpose, as soon as feasible, but no later than 1 April 1957, all men entering the reserve components would be required to undergo basic training shortly after enlistment if they had not already done so. The training was to last long enough to insure that individuals were qualified as "basically trained for duties assigned."⁶⁷

To carry out the directive, Secretary Brucker approved a proposal by General Taylor to require six months of active duty training for all entrants into either the Army Reserve or the National Guard. The Army considered this the minimum necessary to qualify enlistees. The proposal was adopted over the objection of the National Guard Bureau of the Department of the Army, which had recommended two three-month training periods for

the benefit of recruits still in school. The Army announced the new rule on 14 January, to become effective on 1 April.⁶⁸

The opposition of the National Guard Bureau to this rule reflected the views of officials of the National Guard in the various states. Fearing that the six-month training requirement would handicap recruiting efforts, they sought to bring pressure on Congress through the politically influential National Guard Association, composed of high-ranking Guard officers in each state. On 15 January Rep. Carl Vinson, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, announced that a subcommittee headed by Rep. Overton Brooks would begin hearings on 4 February to ascertain whether the Army directive violated the intent of the Reserve Forces Act.⁶⁹

On 28 January Wilson briefed the House Armed Services Committee on the military posture of the United States. In a discussion of personnel problems, he spoke of the excessive number of untrained men in the reserves. Questioned further, he admitted that he was referring specifically to the National Guard and went on to criticize that organization. National Guard recruitment, he said, "was really sort of a scandal during the Korean War. It was a draft-dodging business. A boy 17 to 18 1/2 could enlist in the National Guard and not be drafted and sent to Korea and fight."⁷⁰

The reaction to this remark was immediate. Maj. Gen. Ellard A. Walsh, president of the National Guard Association, called it "a damn lie." Other association officials also assailed the secretary, as did some members of Congress, where National Guard influence had always traditionally been strong. Four state governors condemned Wilson's remarks, and legislative bodies in Georgia and South Carolina quickly enacted resolutions of disapproval.⁷¹

Secretary Wilson conferred with the president on 29 January. Afterward, questioned by newsmen outside the White House, the secretary made it clear that he was not "against the National Guard" but considered that it was "not a very well trained outfit that can be depended upon." He would not say what subjects he had discussed with the president, except that the National Guard issue was not one of them. "This is not my dung-hill," he added, referring to the White House. "Anything to be announced, somebody else ought to announce it."⁷²

At a press conference the next day, Eisenhower dissociated himself from Wilson's criticism of the Guard. Wilson had made a "very unwise statement," he thought, in implying that National Guard volunteers had been "slackers." His remarks drew a prompt rebuttal from Jessie C. Wilson, the secretary's wife. She characterized the president's words as "uncalled for" and expressed a wish that her husband would receive as much backing as Secretary Dulles, whom the president had praised at the press conference. "Everybody knows that some men did dodge the draft by joining the guard during the Korean War," she said.⁷³

Wilson issued a statement on 1 February in which he recognized the "great contribution" of National Guard units in war and denied any intention to cast aspersions on those who joined. But, he added, there was an

"unacceptably high percentage of persons without military training" in the Guard, and the Army's new directive was justified.⁷⁴

Eisenhower backed Wilson fully on the six-month training requirement.⁷⁵ The dispute was settled by a compromise worked out by Rep. Brooks under which the six-month requirement would not become effective until January 1958.⁷⁶ Relations between the president and the secretary were unharmed by the incident. Eisenhower wrote a placatory letter to Wilson denying that his words had constituted a "rebuke," as some press accounts had alleged, and expressing appreciation for Wilson's efforts. Replying in the same vein, Wilson assured the president that there was "no misunderstanding on my part about anything that you might have said." The next day the Wilsons flew with the president to Augusta, then continued in the presidential aircraft to Florida for a holiday.⁷⁷

The controversy thus died down with no apparent effect on congressional reception of the budget. Wilson probably felt vindicated when, over the next few weeks, he received numerous letters from the general public expressing agreement with his statements about the National Guard and commending him for his outspokenness.⁷⁸

The Economy Push in Congress

When the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations began hearings on 30 January 1957, Secretary Wilson's fears of an "end run" proved groundless. Far from "beating the drums" for more money, the chiefs, military and civilian, gave assurances that they fully supported the budget. At the same time, each indicated that the budget for his own service was minimal, and the subcommittee, in questioning, drew out the fact that they had originally asked for considerably more.⁷⁹

Indeed, it soon became evident that there had been a major shift in sentiment, and that the administration stood in no danger of having unwanted money thrust upon it. Instead, members of Congress of both parties were soon vying with each other in proposing deep budget cuts, only too happy to accept the suggestions by Humphrey and Eisenhower that they had an obligation to do so. The mood in Congress reflected that of the country at large, or at least its most vocal segment. Among the earliest critics were traditional advocates of governmental economy, the United States Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. But as time passed, it appeared that the critics were riding a crest of opinion. Mail, much of it openly critical of the president and praising Humphrey, poured in to Congress and the Executive Branch urging reductions. Foreign aid and school construction were favorite target areas of the budget, but defense was not ignored. A widely read news and advisory letter reflecting a business viewpoint charged that "the military is the greatest pressure force for larger spending" and that service waste and duplication were "costing billions."⁸⁰

The House subcommittee was not stampeded by the rush to economy. In questioning Defense witnesses, the members probed for opportunities for savings but also sought assurances that the budget was adequate. Chairman Mahon suggested to the service secretaries that they examine the effect of an increase or decrease of \$500 million, \$1 billion, and \$1.5 billion on their budgets. Later, he presented this request directly to Wilson.⁸¹

The request raised a question of policy: whether the data concerning possible revisions of the budget should be subject to the same process of high level review and presidential decision as the original budget. OSD officials considered this possibility but rejected it. Information prepared by the services, showing how they would respond to the suggested increases or decreases, was sent directly to Mahon after a quick scrutiny by McNeil's office.⁸²

On 12 March 1957 the House of Representatives, after intense partisan debate, approved a resolution prepared by the Appropriations Committee requesting the president to "indicate the places and amounts in his budget where he thinks substantial reductions may best be made." This was a clear riposte to the president's earlier statement that Congress had a "duty" to reduce the budget.⁸³

The president accepted this challenge. Following discussions with Wilson, Dulles, Brundage, Adams, and others, he drew up a list of postponements in requests for new obligational authority totaling \$1.342 billion and forwarded it to Speaker of the House Rayburn on 18 April. The largest single item was \$516 million in Army procurement and production (nearly all of the \$583 million initially requested for that purpose). He suggested also a cut of \$500 million in military assistance, made possible by shortening procurement lead times and other managerial improvements. Adjustment of construction schedules would facilitate another postponement of \$213 million. The remaining reductions were unrelated to DoD programs.⁸⁴

The Problem of Rising Expenditures

While experiencing more than usual friction with Congress over the 1958 budget, the administration found itself confronted with grave difficulties in holding military expenditures within the figures that the president had forecast. Rising costs threatened to unbalance the budget for the current fiscal year as well as for 1958.

The upward trend in defense expenditures had several causes. One was a rise in the general price level, which, after holding steady from 1952 through 1955, increased by 6 percent during 1956 and 1957.⁸⁵ At the same time, improved procedures, instituted earlier by OSD, shortened lead times and led to a faster rate of expenditures, and a tight money market induced suppliers to send in bills more promptly. Wilson later admitted that the expenditure estimate of \$36 billion for FY 1957 had been too

low, especially when it had not been increased to reflect the additional \$900 million appropriated by Congress for the Air Force.⁸⁶

Realization of the problem emerged early in 1957, after monthly expenditures had risen from an average of \$2.9 billion for the months July-September 1956 to \$3.3 billion for October-December.⁸⁷ On 14 January McNeil warned the Joint Secretaries of rising expenditure trends for both military and mutual defense programs. The secretaries agreed to take immediate action to hold expenditures within budgeted limits.⁸⁸ On 29 January, in a letter to Wilson, Brundage foresaw that costs might run \$1 billion over the FY 1957 estimate and asked Wilson to advise him of steps being taken to remedy the situation. Wilson made no formal reply at the time.⁸⁹

Two months later, according to Brundage, there loomed the prospect that FY 1957 expenditures for military functions and military assistance combined might reach \$40 billion.⁹⁰ For FY 1958, military expenditures would reach \$38 billion unless prompt actions were taken within the next 60 days. Brundage repeated his request, this time as a matter of urgency, for information on remedial actions within DoD.⁹¹

Wilson was already moving to meet the problem. On 18 March he directed a reduction of 12 percent in military and civilian personnel in the headquarters of DoD and the military departments, at a rate of 1 percent per month during FY 1958 using as a base the strengths on 31 December 1956.⁹²

Over the next few weeks, the services put into effect further economies, doubtless at Wilson's prodding. The most drastic were made by the Air Force, which reduced production rates for the B-52 from 20 to 15 per month, thus postponing until 1959 the completion of the 11-wing B-52 force, and canceled development of a new jet transport, the C-132. In addition, flying programs were cut back, construction was slowed, and reserve exercises scheduled for FY 1957 were postponed.⁹³

The Navy ordered all units to economize on fuel, restricted overtime work, postponed land acquisitions, and instituted other minor economies in operations. The Army anticipated no difficulty in holding down its expenditures for FY 1957 to the scheduled rate, but undertook to expedite collection of money from its "customers" for the stock and industrial funds and the military assistance program.⁹⁴

In a discussion with the president on 20 May, Wilson proposed two further steps: reduction of overtime (then being used for production of missiles and B-52s) and temporary freezing of new contract commitments until expenditures had been brought under control. The president agreed with these suggestions. Looking ahead, Wilson noted that to prevent a further rise in expenditures in FY 1959, it would be necessary to reduce forces well in advance of that date. He added that the proposals thus far discussed would affect the 1958 budget, but that little could be done for the current fiscal year. The president nevertheless insisted that savings be made in FY 1957.⁹⁵

Wilson thereupon resorted to a drastic step: a direct order to the services to cut expenditures by a fixed amount. On 22 May he reduced by the following amounts the money available to the services for FY 1957 for major procurement and production, research and development, and construction: Army, \$100 million; Navy, \$150 million; and Air Force, \$250 million. He ordered each department to submit a detailed plan by 12 June for meeting expenditure objectives for 1958.⁹⁶

The Bureau of the Budget had of course been kept informed of Wilson's economy measures. Wilson listed the major steps in a letter to Brundage on 29 May, intended as the formal reply to Brundage's letter of 29 March.⁹⁷

A fiscal problem occurring at the same time, only indirectly related to the immediate need to restrain expenditures, was the matter of "full" versus "partial" funding of military programs. One of the budgetary reforms credited to Assistant Secretary McNeil was his insistence that major procurement programs be fully funded at the outset, so that the total cost would be revealed. This practice, adopted in connection with the FY 1952 budget, replaced the earlier method of requesting appropriations sufficient only to cover estimated expenditures for the coming year. "Full funding" did not mean immediate *obligation* of the total cost; this would have defeated the purpose, which was to make possible better control of obligations.⁹⁸

Full funding was not at first rigidly or uniformly enforced, owing, it appears, to the complexities of contract procedures and variations in practices among the services. The Air Force particularly departed from the requirement, for several reasons. One was the laudable desire to reduce lead time in aircraft procurement, which led to requests to manufacturers to begin production before a firm order was placed. The Air Force also engaged in "overprogramming," placing orders in excess of available funds on the assumption that not all the ordered items on the list would be available and other items could be substituted without delay.⁹⁹

As early as October 1956, BoB analysts were aware of the growing use of partial funding by the Air Force. As they pointed out, the practice would mean a temporary reduction in obligations requests followed by higher ones later. Partial financing, they wrote, "is uncontrollable and permits the services to initiate larger programs than have been approved and generate commitments which have to be funded in subsequent years."¹⁰⁰

On 21 May 1957 Wilson issued a directive, drafted by McNeil, to require uniform full funding practices by all three service departments. No procurement of materiel or services was to be authorized unless adequate funds were available, under the DoD financial plan, for obligation. Purchase of long lead-time components in advance of procurement of related end items was allowed, as was "preproduction" funding (acquiring tools and facilities and making other preparations for production). Procurements made from appropriations for research and development were excepted, along with any others that might be specifically designated by the secretary of defense.¹⁰¹

Congress Acts on the Budget

Meanwhile the House of Representatives, after weeks of hearings, was moving toward a decision. On 7 May Mahon informed Wilson by letter that the House would probably take final action late that month. Had there been, he asked, any "significant change in the world situation" that would warrant a reevaluation of defense problems.¹⁰²

Wilson replied on 15 May that the international situation provided no basis for reducing the budget. Europe and the Far East were "still full of difficult, unresolved problems," and although the Near East was peaceful at the moment, "the problems in that part of the world have not been resolved." He defended the budget forcefully:

I would be the last one to say that no more savings and improvements could be made, but I do believe that for fiscal year 1958 we will be fortunate indeed if the savings we can make will offset the added costs that are likely to be incurred in carrying out the military program deemed necessary for the security of the country

The budget as submitted is already an austere one and represents a great push toward economy. A good case could be made for increasing it somewhat rather than decreasing it. In the opinion of many of us it is already a peril-point budget.

The secretary added that he had discussed his reply with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had unanimously concurred in it.¹⁰³

Foreseeing the prospect of reductions by the House, Wilson had already begun an appeal to public opinion. In a news conference on 2 May, he remarked that he was "disgusted" by criticism of the budget from his "friends" in the Chamber of Commerce. They had never been more prosperous, he said, "and for them to squawk so much about the budget gives me a pain."¹⁰⁴ In later statements, he declared that the budget was "just right where it is."¹⁰⁵

The annual celebration of Armed Forces Day (18 May) provided an opportunity to rally support. Speaking in New York, Deputy Secretary Quarles criticized those who were calling for reductions. Other appeals for support were made by Admiral Burke, General Thomas D. White (already designated to succeed Twining as Chief of Staff, USAF), and Secretary of the Army Brucker.¹⁰⁶

The president also spoke out. On 14 May he addressed the nation on the cost of government, devoting most of his speech to defense. The present budget, he said, represented "the proper dividing line between national danger on the one hand and excessive expenditure on the other." Drawing on his long military experience, he pointed to the "terrible consequences," which he had more than once seen, of unwise budget reductions. The next day, asked about a rumored \$2.5 billion cut, the president replied that if the House could find an "honest cut," over and above

what he had pointed out earlier, "then I want to see how it is done." But he went on to admit that there was "some squeezing" possible, and his statement that it was not the function of the president to "punish anybody for voting what he believes" suggested doubt as to his willingness to fight for his program. A week later, in a news conference, he appeared more forceful; he would "never rest," he said, "until the United States gets what my associates and I believe to be necessary for the operation of this Government."¹⁰⁷

None of the pleas by administration spokesmen sufficed to prevent the House Appropriations Committee, on 21 May, from recommending a reduction of \$2.6 billion. Of this amount, \$1.2 billion, or almost half, was at the expense of the Army. It included the \$516 million reduction in carry-over funds that the president had suggested in his letter of 18 April. Other large cuts affected personnel and operations. (Significantly, no reduction was proposed for the National Guard). The Navy lost \$686 million, with the largest reduction being made in personnel. The committee also proposed to cut \$80 million of the \$100 million requested for Marine Corps procurement, since a large unobligated balance was already available for that purpose. For the Air Force, the reduction was \$669 million, of which \$354 million was from aircraft procurement; however, the committee indicated its desire that none of the reduction be applied to B-52 production or to missiles. The committee proposed to offset its cuts in part by transferring \$590 million from Army and Navy stock funds, and it assumed that U.S. forces in Europe would receive \$127 million in support funds in the form of West German currency (deutschmarks) from the German Federal Republic.¹⁰⁸

Of the committee's recommended reduction, \$1.313 billion was on paper only. This included the \$590 million transferred from stock and industrial funds, the \$596 million in unobligated balances for Army and Marine Corps procurement, and the \$127 million in deutschmark support. As Eisenhower observed on 22 May, these reductions were merely a "bookkeeping operation and will not reduce 1958 expenditure by one cent."¹⁰⁹ The remainder would mean actual reductions in programs. Despite efforts by administration supporters, the full House accepted practically all the reductions recommended by the Appropriations Committee and approved a sum of \$33.563 billion on 29 May.¹¹⁰

Wilson had already accepted the action of the House as inevitable and had begun a campaign to have the major sums restored in the Senate, which opened hearings on the Defense budget on 23 May. He told the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that he could "live with" the \$1.3 billion in "paper" reductions but hoped that "most" of the other proposed cuts would be restored. Admiral Radford endorsed Wilson's remarks and attributed to the JCS the view that large reductions would "risk the security of the nation and the free world."¹¹¹ Later, on 29 May, after OSD had had an opportunity to study the House bill in detail, McNeil asked for restoration of almost the full amount of the cuts in programs—\$1.220

billion in all. Secretary Wilson formally made this request in a letter to Senator Dennis Chavez of New Mexico, the subcommittee chairman.¹¹²

The Military Program Reexamined

Despite the best efforts of the administration, defense expenditures for FY 1957 ran slightly over the target—\$38.4 billion, of which the Air Force accounted for \$18.4 billion.¹¹³ The total would have been higher without Wilson's heroic emergency measures, which reduced expenditures successively from \$3.5 billion in April to \$3.3 billion in May and \$3.1 billion in June.¹¹⁴ Nevertheless, the goal of a balanced budget was realized. Total government expenditures for the year ran higher than anticipated, but were more than offset by unexpectedly high revenues, producing a surplus of more than \$1 billion.¹¹⁵

The outlook for 1958, however, remained alarming. A study prepared in Brundage's office predicted that, on the basis of forces and programs in the budget, defense expenditures would run to \$39.6 billion—well above the \$38.0 billion forecast by the president.¹¹⁶

Once again the pressure was on Wilson, already feeling the strain. In a discussion of military expenditures in the NSC, in connection with revision of the basic national security paper (NSC 5602/1), he admitted that he felt "rather defensive" about the budget. He had done his best, he said, pointing out that after months of struggling to pare expenses to a minimum, he had had to cut \$1 billion from the budget at the last minute. In this meeting, and later in a Cabinet discussion of budget problems, he attributed rising expenditures primarily to inflation, which was beyond his control. He told the Cabinet that drastic measures would be needed to hold FY 1958 expenditures to \$38 billion. Eisenhower insisted that the goal be kept in mind even though it might be necessary finally to settle on \$39 billion.¹¹⁷

Between 11 and 13 June Wilson received the replies from the services on the effects of limiting 1958 expenditures to \$38 billion. The Army indicated the least difficulty; its goal could be met by routine measures such as prompt collection of accounts and liquidating obligations as soon as possible to reduce the carryover into 1958. The Navy and Air Force, however, reported that substantial reductions in personnel and force structure would be necessary, with disruptive effects on many activities; the details would have to be worked out later.¹¹⁸

On 28 June Brundage transmitted to all agencies the president's instructions to keep rates of commitments, obligations, and expenditures for FY 1958 at or below the 1957 level, "to the extent feasible."¹¹⁹ Two weeks later this letter was leaked to the press—at a particularly inopportune time, since the administration was still seeking restoration of Defense money cut by the House. Rep. Clarence Cannon of Missouri, chairman of the Subcommittee on Public Works of the Committee on Appropriations, charged

that the letter "repudiates the 1958 budget." Administration officials, he declared, were trying to induce Congress to appropriate more money than needed.¹²⁰

Speaking with the president on 27 June, Wilson remarked on the difficulty of meeting the \$38 billion ceiling, and pointed out also that overcommitment of funds by the Air Force, primarily to meet rising missile costs, had thrown the program out of balance. It would be necessary to shift funds to the Air Force from the Army, even though that service had not overspent. He promised to submit a revised program by the middle of July, and asked how "stiff" the \$38 billion figure was. The president, displaying his usual reluctance to lay down fixed limits, replied that the Defense Department should "work for" that figure.¹²¹

True to his promise, Wilson submitted his revised program on 10 July to provide a basis for adjustment in FY 1958 and to lay the groundwork for the 1959 budget. It was based on the expectation that the DoD appropriation for 1958 would approximate \$36 billion. Unobligated carry-over funds would be used to support the military program at a level of \$38 billion. However, to maintain the program at the same level, appropriations of \$38 billion would be required in 1959. This would give the appearance, Wilson warned, of a \$2 billion increase in the military program, which would be difficult to explain to Congress and to the country.

Expenditures for the first half of calendar 1957, according to Wilson, were running at an annual level of \$40.25 million. He proposed to cut this to \$38 billion for FY 1958 and to reallocate the amounts among the services as follows (in billions):

Army	\$ 8.950
Navy	10.400
Air Force	17.900
OSD and Interservice	.750
Total	\$38.000

To meet the expenditure goal, personnel would be cut back to the following limits:

	End FY 1958	End FY 1959
Army	900,000	850,000
Navy	645,000	630,000
Marine Corps	180,000	170,000
Air Force	875,000	850,000
Total	2,600,000	2,500,000

Since current authorized strength totalled 2.8 million, these new limits would require cuts of 200,000 during 1958 and an additional 100,000 in 1959. The 1958 reduction would involve withdrawal of 100,000 personnel from overseas, of which 35,000 would be taken from Europe, although it did not appear that major units would have to be redeployed.

Projecting drastic cutbacks in major force levels, Wilson tentatively set the following goals to be maintained through 1959: 13 Army divisions, 366 major combat ships (with 13 attack carriers), and 105 air wings. Reductions would be made gradually over the two-year period. The result would be a military organization that, in Wilson's words, represented an "absolute minimum in the absence of a real improvement in the international situation."

Wilson had discussed this program in general terms with the service secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS had been unable to agree on force levels for the JSOP for FY 1961, so they were not in a position to provide detailed guidance. Wilson urged the president to act promptly on the revised program, since the longer the delay, the more disruptive the eventual reductions.¹²²

The president read Wilson's plan carefully and essentially agreed with it. He approved the personnel reductions, though withholding judgment on the proposed service distribution. Both agreed that Congress must be informed of the changes. The president urged a reduction in the proportion of officers in the services; never before, he pointed out, had the nation attempted to maintain full officer strength in peacetime.¹²³

Wilson's proposal meant a lower expenditure limit for the Army and a higher one for the Air Force. This aroused the ire of Secretary Brucker when, later in the day, Wilson discussed the subject with the JCS and the service secretaries. Brucker assailed the proposal as "unfair, unethical and uncalled for." The Army, he said, had consistently lived within its expenditure limitations and was now being penalized for having done so. He received some support from Gates, who wondered why money was being taken from the Army to be given to the Air Force. The reason, as Wilson explained, was that the Air Force found itself "really in a bind" with its expanding programs.¹²⁴

On 16 July Wilson, with the president's approval, directed a reduction of 100,000 (88,135 enlisted, 11,865 officers) during the first half of FY 1958, distributed as follows: Army, 50,000; Navy, 15,000; Marine Corps, 10,000; Air Force, 25,000. Wilson estimated that this step would save \$200 million.¹²⁵ The effect of this action was to leave the services with the following authorized strengths for 1 January 1958:¹²⁶

Army	950,000
Navy	660,000
Marine Corps	190,000
Air Force	<u>900,000</u>
Total	2,700,000

Target figures for the end of FY 1958 remained to be determined; they would, Wilson told the president, be considered later in connection with plans for FY 1959.¹²⁷

Wilson's revised program for FYs 1958 and 1959 was based on a longer-range and more detailed one prepared by Admiral Radford, in connection with discussion of the JSOP, which projected personnel reductions to 2,200,000. The Radford program, presented to the AFPC on 23 July 1957, "hit the armed services like a bombshell," in General Taylor's words.¹²⁸ Taylor and Brucker prepared rebuttals in preparation for an NSC discussion scheduled for 25 July. They protested against continuing reductions in conventional forces and warned that the program would require withdrawal of at least three divisions from overseas.¹²⁹ Earlier General White had learned of the proposed \$17.9 billion expenditure limit for the Air Force and had objected that it would seriously hamper modernization plans. Secretary Douglas generally agreed with White, though he felt that White had exaggerated matters somewhat.¹³⁰

When the NSC met on 25 July, Wilson's program was presented by General Randall, his military assistant. The service secretaries and military chiefs were given their innings, and Wilson then defended and enlarged upon his plan, which, he pointed out, was tentative and subject to detailed staffing. Service disagreements over personnel strengths and force levels, he said, had forced him to make decisions in consultation with Radford. His plan for the Army, substituting firepower for manpower, would admittedly require substantial redeployment from Europe. Radford described the program as an extension of the New Look and suggested that the services could lessen its impact by reducing unit strengths. Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles thought that a satisfactory defense could be obtained for \$38 billion, but with forces being reduced, it might be difficult to convince Congress that that amount was needed. General Twining, called on by Wilson to speak as Radford's designated successor, agreed that a satisfactory deterrent could be provided for \$38 billion and approved the proposed allocation of expenditures.

Aside from the services, the only dissenting voice came from Secretary of State Dulles, who warned that withdrawals of forces from overseas had implications for U.S. foreign policy. He urged that no decisions be made until he had a chance to study the matter. It was important, he said, to maintain the capability of the Navy and the Marine Corps to cope with local crises.

In the end, President Eisenhower rejected the protests and approved Wilson's program subject to further study within OSD. He set expenditure limits of \$38 billion for FY 1958 and \$19 billion for the first half thereof. He also approved a personnel figure of 2.7 million by January 1958, with a further reduction (not over 100,000) to be determined in connection with FY 1959 budget formulation. Initial planning for 1959 was authorized under limits of \$38 billion for both expenditures and new obligational authority. The president directed, however, that Wilson consult with Dulles regarding the foreign policy implications of the 1959 program. Insofar as planning for 1960 and 1961 was necessary, the \$38

billion limit would apply to those years. He stressed that, unless some foreign emergency occurred, he would not, during his remaining years of office, support defense expenditures exceeding \$38 billion. Indeed, he was not certain that Congress or the nation would be willing to support even that level of military spending.¹³¹

Following the meeting, Wilson directed the services to observe the 1958 expenditure limits he had discussed with the president on 10 July, with the amounts divided equally between the two halves of the year. The service secretaries were to submit monthly expenditure plans and periodic reports on their actions to keep within the limits; the Joint Secretaries were to keep the entire matter under review.¹³² Five days later he formally promulgated to the services the 10 July personnel figures, totaling 2.6 million and 2.5 million, respectively, for the end of FYs 1958 and 1959.¹³³ On 13 August he approved the expenditure plans that had been submitted by the secretaries and instructed them to feel "personally responsible" for executing the plans.¹³⁴

Even before Wilson presented his revised program to the president, he had begun a new round of economy measures. He reduced the output of intercontinental missiles, instituted restrictions on overtime for missile projects that had not been affected by the earlier directive on overtime, and limited progress payments on contracts to 70 percent, instead of the 75 percent then prevailing. The Air Force canceled a long-range missile (Navaho) and cut back production of fighter aircraft. The Navy announced plans to deactivate 61 combat ships and 46 tankers. All three services closed down some installations and reduced their civilian employment. These steps were taken by the end of August.¹³⁵

Final Congressional Action

Secretary Wilson's plea to the Senate to restore the House budget cuts had not been without effect. On 2 July the Senate approved an appropriation of \$34.534 billion—\$971 million above the House figure. But while making restorations, the Senate imposed some countervailing reductions; thus all procurement money was eliminated for both the Army and the Marine Corps.¹³⁶

Two weeks later, while a conference committee was attempting to reconcile the separate bills passed by the two houses, the manpower reduction approved by the president made it possible to reduce the money needed for personnel and operations. On 17 July Wilson informed Mahon of the manpower cut and asked him to support a final appropriations figure of \$34.392 billion, or \$142 million less than the Senate had approved. At the same time, he asked for restoration of the procurement money deleted by the Senate. Again the timing was unfortunate; the administration's supporters on the committee, who had been working to restore the full amount originally

asked by Wilson, were described as "annoyed" that their efforts had been undercut.¹³⁷

The final legislation, approved by Congress on 1 August and signed by the president the following day, provided appropriations of just under \$33.76 billion, divided as follows:¹³⁸

OSD	\$ 16,350,000
Interservice	682,375,000
Army	7,264,550,000
Navy	9,866,355,000
Air Force	15,930,220,000
Total	\$33,759,850,000

The law provided \$7.1 billion for Air Force procurement, of which \$5.9 billion was for aircraft and \$1.2 billion for other purposes. The Navy received \$1.8 billion for aircraft procurement and \$1.6 billion for ship-building and conversion. But all procurement money for the Army was deleted.

The final total amounted to only \$197,125,000 more than the original House figure. In other words, the administration had failed to obtain any significant increase. How far this could be attributed to the administration's own actions, it is impossible to say. At a news conference on 1 August devoted mainly to the budget, Wilson was asked about his willingness to settle for a lower budget than at first asked. He explained that the rising expenditure rate had brought the original program into conflict with the expenditure target of \$38 billion. Also, he pointed out, the international situation had eased since the crises of late 1956. He thought that the country now had "a reasonable, minimum program in the light of things as I see them." Some of the questions were rather sharp, implying that the administration had placed economy ahead of national security and that the Bureau of the Budget had exercised undue influence.¹³⁹

A separate bill for military construction had meanwhile been making its way through Congress. The DoD construction program, completed in June, totaled \$1.93 billion, but was reduced to \$1.67 billion after discussions between Wilson and Brundage. Wilson warned the president that this reduction would delay the construction of bases and facilities and adversely affect the early warning system and the dispersal of SAC. As with the regular DoD appropriation, the House imposed a reduction which the Senate partially restored. The two houses eventually compromised on \$1,535,500,000, of which \$900 million was for the Air Force, \$365 million for the Army, \$265 million for the Navy, and the rest for projects under OSD.¹⁴⁰

Thus the total for all military purposes in the two bills was \$35,295,350,000. This was more than \$3 billion below the \$38.5 billion requested by the president in January. The effect of the congressional reduction, as McNeil told Mahon, would be that in 1958 practically the entire backlog of unobligated funds would be used up, so that to maintain the

military program at a \$38 billion expenditure rate would require at least that much money in new obligational authority in 1959.¹⁴¹

The Budget in Retrospect

The 1958 budget destroyed the hope of the Eisenhower administration that it could maintain the existing level of military force indefinitely. To do so would require costs that were considered wholly unacceptable—far beyond the modest increases that Wilson and the president reluctantly accepted for 1958. Faced with a choice between “stability of expenditures” and “stability of program,” the administration chose the former, accepting as inevitable some sacrifice in military strength.¹⁴²

The 1958 budget, the last to be completed under Wilson, was perhaps his most troublesome one. Caught between rising price levels and the administration's relentless demand for economy, it was with the greatest difficulty that he devised a budget satisfactory to the president. In Congress it encountered the usual attacks, led this time by those who wished to spend less instead of more (unlike the situation a year earlier). The administration's ineptitude in handling the budget, marked by conflicting statements and confusing signals to Congress, made Wilson's task no easier. After placing himself on record that the budget represented an irreducible minimum, he was obliged to reexamine his entire program to keep costs within the budget figures. The manner in which this process was carried out laid the administration open to a charge of placing economy ahead of national security—a charge that assumed particular relevance after Sputnik.* Inevitably, Wilson received much of the blame for what was perceived as a U.S. failure to stay abreast of the Soviet Union. After he left office, the psychological effects of Sputnik and concern over the “missile gap” were to drive the administration into some relaxation of its rigid budgetary restraints, easing the task of those who succeeded Wilson.

* See Chapter V.

CHAPTER V

Policy Under Review, 1957

Military Issues in Policy Discussion

By the beginning of 1957, revision of basic national security policy had become an annual exercise for the Eisenhower administration. On 9 January the assistant secretary of defense (ISA), Gordon Gray, informed his OSD colleagues that the NSC Planning Board, on which he represented the Department of Defense, would soon begin a review of the current policy directive, NSC 5602/1. The first step would be to identify major issues to be discussed in the NSC and resolved by the president, after which a new policy statement would be drafted by the board. Gray asked for suggestions for issues that should be brought before the board.¹

To transmit these suggestions, Secretary Wilson reconstituted an ad hoc committee that had been set up during the drafting of NSC 5602/1. It consisted of Gray, the under secretaries of the military departments, and the vice chiefs of the services.² Meeting on 22 January, the committee agreed that a major issue required clarification—the use of nuclear weapons, especially in situations short of general war, concerning which NSC 5602/1 had said merely that the United States should “make its own decisions.” Other key issues included mobilization planning, provision of nuclear weapons to allies, and the proportion of resources to be devoted to national security. All of these matters were to be considered by the council in the ensuing weeks.³

Discussion began in the NSC on 28 February with a report on problems arising out of changes in the world situation.⁴ The first such change listed in the report was the increasing ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to destroy one another in a nuclear war. This situation appeared likely to encourage the Soviet bloc to undertake aggressive actions short of general war.⁵ When the NSC discussed this, the members showed no disposition to suggest any alteration in U.S. policy. Secretary Dulles, after criticizing the paper for an excessively pessimistic appraisal, pointed out that the contingency of local Communist aggression was clearly covered under existing policy, which left the initial response to allied forces. The president concurred with this statement. The council simply noted the board's paper.⁶

Subsequently the Planning Board prepared a series of six "discussion papers" which laid out existing policy on various matters and posed alternatives. One such paper, dealing with national security costs in relation to total resources, was considered on 28 March; as would be expected, the discussion was dominated by Humphrey and Brundage, both of whom stressed the need for economy. Brundage urged that all budget projections for the next several years hold expenditures at current levels, drawing from Wilson an objection to projecting expenditures "forever into the future."⁷

The council's most important discussion, held on 11 April, concerned NSC 5707/3, which dealt with the military elements of national security, beginning with whether the United States was devoting adequate effort to the ability to deal with local war and whether the increasing integration of nuclear weapons into the U.S. arsenal would create total dependency on them. The president settled these questions promptly. Nuclear weapons, he ruled, would in effect be regarded as conventional for U.S. forces; any plans for war not using such weapons would be confined to strictly defined "police actions." It was impossible, he continued, to earmark and set aside separate forces for use in local war. Since resources did not permit unlimited preparation for all contingencies, nonnuclear military capability must be sharply limited. Radford, asked for his views, replied that JCS planning had been developing in precisely that direction. Both the JCS and the DoD were proceeding on the assumption that, in any action involving U.S. forces, nuclear weapons would be used if necessary. He accordingly called for a clear policy statement on the subject. Under Secretary Herter, speaking for the State Department in the absence of Dulles, urged the need for a "considerable degree of flexibility" in weaponry. The president replied that the United States had now reached a point when "main," though not "sole," reliance should be placed on nuclear weapons.

Discussion then shifted to the possibility that the United States might provide nuclear weapons to its allies. There was general agreement against seeking any change in the law that prohibited this, although Wilson was inclined to favor a suggestion in NSC 5707/3 that they be furnished to a few carefully selected allies. Another suggestion, that the U.S. share custody and delivery capability for nuclear weapons under a NATO command, was judged premature by the president.

The participants came back to the ever-underlying question of money. Wilson pointed out that the budget ceiling of \$39 billion laid down by the president for FY 1959 would make it necessary to reduce force levels.⁸ Humphrey urged Wilson to take a "very practical view" of the domestic situation, meaning the need to minimize expenditures. Wilson was willing to agree if Humphrey would also take into account the international situation. He thought that the United States could indefinitely shoulder the present level of taxes and defense expenditures if necessary, to which Humphrey replied that to do so it would be necessary to keep the country "thoroughly scared."⁹

At its next meeting on 17 April, the council, starting with consideration of political elements of national strategy (NSC 5707/6), again wound up delving into military questions. Wilson complained that the discussion was "rather in the stratosphere." He wanted specific guidance on the military programs for FY 1959, as well as for the two succeeding years. He was certain that further personnel reductions would be necessary. Radford suggested drastic reductions in continental defense (the costs of which were skyrocketing) in order to pay for offensive capabilities. Following the meeting, Cutler promised Wilson that in the near future the council would give full attention to the questions that he had raised.¹⁰

Another influence on national security policy deliberation was provided by a study of mobilization policy that had been underway in DoD for over a year. On 18 January 1956 the National Security Council discussed a report by DoD and ODM on the status of the mobilization base. At the conclusion, the president directed the secretary of defense and the JCS to submit a report on the concept that should govern its development. Emphasis should be given, he added, to protection of critical supplies and facilities during initial phases of a nuclear war. By implication, therefore, the president shifted emphasis away from plans for the mobilization of large forces after the beginning of hostilities.¹¹

Mobilization planning at that time was governed by decisions laid down by Wilson in December 1954, in connection with the Joint Mid-Range War Plan under development within the JCS. The secretary directed that each service base its mobilization plans on the forces that it could generate within six months after M-Day (assumed to be identical with D-day). They would continue to develop mobilization plans for another 30 months (i.e., extending to D+36), but would not use these as the basis for appropriations requests without specific approval from his office. These provisions were incorporated into the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP-60) drafted by the JCS in 1956 but never approved by Wilson.¹²

JSOP-60 also contained a "strategic concept" providing that in a general war, "atomic weapons will be used from the outset," and that in operations short of general war, they would be employed "when required in order to achieve military objectives." This statement was less equivocal than that in NSC 5602/1, which provided for a presidential decision on using nuclear weapons in operations short of general war, and thus left some room for doubt concerning their employment when the chips were down. This was the discrepancy between JCS planning and national policy that Admiral Radford had in mind in his remarks to the NSC on 11 April.

On 19 December 1956 the JCS sent Wilson a memorandum to provide military guidance for the mobilization base. They set forth a strategic concept for general war or for lesser operations, drawn verbatim from JSOP-60, together with a study of the damage to U.S. industrial facilities that could be expected from nuclear attacks on M-day or up to six months thereafter. This expectation of extensive damage to the United States fundamentally altered the nature of mobilization planning. As they wrote:

In the past the military has placed emphasis on the capability of our industrial facilities to expand for support of our forces in war. Our capability to expand our industrial capacity was, in fact, an essential element in our "U.S. Mobilization Base" We were able to economize in time of peace by producing and stockpiling only those military supplies which would be required in war before industrial production could meet the demand. . . .

The present concept concerning the initiation of a general war by a surprise atomic attack eliminates, for all practical purposes, the effect of our previous time and space advantages from mobilization planning. Our concept of [the] "U.S. Mobilization Base" as related to potential industrial expansion after war commences must be brought into agreement with this particular aspect of the strategic concept. . . .

The JCS then set forth the requirements for the mobilization base. It must maintain active and reserve forces in readiness, support the expansion of forces to levels planned for M+6 months, meet the combat requirements of forces that would be mobilized by M+6 months, and provide pre-D-day stocks of supplies and equipment outside the United States for forces that survived an initial enemy attack. The size and composition of the forces to be mobilized by M+6 were matters for future determination. The JCS said nothing about the relation between M-day and D-day, but the implication was that the two would not coincide—that a period of mobilization would precede the onset of hostilities.¹³

Secretary Wilson formally approved this JCS paper on 6 March 1957, in connection with the JSOP, which he ordered to be developed by 31 May. In doing so, he reversed his previous position by laying down the assumption that M-day would precede D-day by six months.¹⁴

Wilson had already sent the new JCS mobilization concept to the NSC, calling attention to the provisions concerning the use of nuclear weapons.¹⁵ The council discussed the concept on 14 March. Admiral Radford, speaking for the JCS, explained that the six-month mobilization period was not an attempt to prejudge the length of time that would be allowed for mobilization during a conflict before all-out war began. Rather it was an arbitrary assumption intended to limit forces to a size that, in his view, would "meet our foreseeable needs in the early phases of a general conflict short of general war should it occur." "This in turn defines the mobilization base," continued Radford. "It means in terms of logistical resources, maintenance of a supply system and mobilization stocks necessary to meet peacetime training requirements and to support the expansion of forces to the level reached in six months of mobilization."

Radford considered the existing mobilization base already sufficient to meet these requirements. In the past, he continued, plans had been made to support in combat "huge forces" to be mobilized over a 36-month

period. Such forces made "unreasonable demands" on the mobilization base and assumed a vast wartime expansion of industry. "Our present concept of war," warned Radford, "offers little assurance that we should place any such reliance on industry during the initial phase of general war or for an indefinite period thereafter."¹⁶

Wilson, supplementing Radford's presentation, explained that the M+6 limitation would replace prior plans to stockpile "billions of dollars" worth of military materiel. He did not, however, attempt to estimate the savings. The president remarked that he had not "heard" a paper in four years in the NSC that pleased him so much. "Amen to that!" exclaimed Secretary Humphrey. The president and the council then agreed that DoD should present an outline of the revised mobilization base program and costs that would result from adopting the new concept.¹⁷

The follow-up presentation to the NSC on the mobilization base was given by Assistant Secretary McNeil on 11 April. "The so-called new concept is not completely new," McNeil pointed out. Previous budgets had in no way provided for full financing of M+36 requirements; rather they had "pointed in the direction" of the new policy. Between 1956 and 1958, money programmed for procurement of mobilization reserves for all the services had declined from \$900 million to \$355 million, plus \$250 million per year for maintenance of standby facilities. Further details of the effect of the new concept must await completion of JSOP-61, but it could be expected to lead to further reductions in the size of the military establishment.¹⁸

NSC 5707/8

Following the NSC discussions of 11 and 17 April, the Planning Board prepared a complete draft directive to replace NSC 5602/1. The first draft, completed on 24 April, went through three revisions before it emerged as NSC 5707/7, ready for submission to the NSC though with several issues still unresolved.¹⁹

Large portions of NSC 5707/7 simply restated existing policy. These included paragraphs dealing with the need for allies, military and economic assistance, foreign information activities, relations with the Communist bloc, and arms control. A section on mobilization policy included the objectives of the mobilization base set forth by the JCS, including the M+6 force expansion limit.

Most important in NSC 5707/7, three paragraphs dealt with the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy and in relations with allies. General policy regarding these weapons appeared in paragraph 11, which reflected the tenor of the discussion in the council on 11 April and also drew on the strategic concept for mobilization planning. The paragraph affirmed U.S. policy to place "main, but not sole," reliance on nuclear weapons, to consider them as conventional weapons "from a military point of view," and to use

them when required "to achieve military objectives." Advance authorization for their use would be "as determined by the President."

Paragraph 15, dealing with local wars, recognized the need for ready U.S. (and allied) forces to deal with "local aggression," but significantly it omitted a warning that such forces should not become completely dependent on tactical nuclear capabilities, which had been included in NSC 5602/1. A statement had been inserted that "the use of nuclear weapons in limited war is unlikely by itself to result in general nuclear war." To oppose local aggression, U.S. forces "must have a flexible and selective nuclear capability and, when its use is required, apply it in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities from broadening into general war."

Paragraph 17 called on U.S. allies to accept the full implications of nuclear weaponry: "The United States and its allies *must** accept nuclear weapons as an integral part of the arsenal of the Free World and the need for their prompt and selective use when required." The United States should, "as feasible and appropriate," provide "selected major allies" with nuclear weapons and assist them to develop their own advanced weapons systems. For these purposes, legislative authorization would be necessary.²⁰

The State Department member of the Planning Board had withheld his concurrence from these paragraphs, which he saw as predetermining a total reliance on nuclear weapons. In State's view, there was a growing danger of "nibbles" by the Communist powers in an age of "mutual deterrence." Since the United States was heavily dependent on alliances and foreign bases, policy must take account of foreign sensibilities. A politically acceptable strategy must not "risk erosion of alliance and base arrangements vital to our security," or prejudice moral leadership by an apparent commitment to use of "undue force." "The problem of limited use of force is of such importance and urgency," wrote the State member, "that it justifies thorough and coordinated analysis by an informed and disinterested group." The question of furnishing weapons to allies likewise required further study. In all these conclusions, State had the support of the ODM member of the board.²¹

The JCS recommended that paragraph 17 provide specifically for furnishing nuclear weapons to the United Kingdom and Canada, rather than to undefined "major allies." They opposed the study of limited war proposed by State, but if undertaken, they wanted it done within government rather than by an outside agency. Secretary of the Army Brucker supported the JCS views on paragraph 17 and proposed changes in wording designed to meet State's objections to other paragraphs. Secretary of the Navy Gates urged support of the draft as written, unless it were to be thrown open to general discussion, in which case he favored Brucker's proposed changes. McNeil sought amendments to tighten up the provisions of NSC 5707/7 dealing with economic aid. ISA endorsed the changes proposed by the JCS and McNeil.²²

* Emphasis supplied.

When the council discussed NSC 5707/7 on 27 May, Secretary Dulles argued the State Department position at some length. Although he recognized that general use of nuclear weapons was ultimately inevitable, he feared that matters were being unduly hurried. He doubted that the United States possessed small nuclear weapons that could be used selectively so as to avoid widespread devastation. When Lewis L. Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, assured him that such weapons were indeed available, Dulles rejoined that U.S. allies were not aware of the fact. Until they could be so convinced, the proposal to use nuclear weapons in local aggression, on the assumption that general war would not result, was dangerous. The United States could not disregard world opinion, which, in Dulles's view, was by no means ready to accept the general use of nuclear weapons in local conflicts. He had questioned each of his assistant secretaries, he said, and found that all feared the effects of the policy proposed in NSC 5707/7. Dulles predicted that foreign opinion would change, but the time had not yet come.

The ensuing discussion showed that Dulles's views were not as far from those of Defense officials as at first appeared. Radford agreed with much of what the secretary had said, but pointed out that the paper under discussion was not intended for foreign dissemination; it was for use in U.S. military planning, which was already headed in the direction indicated in NSC 5707/7. Wilson wanted clear-cut reliance on nuclear strategy, although he was willing to see this develop on an evolutionary basis, as Dulles had suggested. The Defense Department, he pointed out, had often been criticized for developing two different strategies, nuclear and conventional. As for limited war, he thought that any war involving U.S. personnel was likely to become a major conflict; the solution, therefore, was to keep out of small wars. Dulles, in turn, agreed in large part with Radford and Wilson but stressed that the evolution toward wider use of nuclear weapons must be properly timed in relation to military technology and world opinion.

President Eisenhower then stepped in and proposed his own revision of paragraph 15, retaining most of its substance while meeting Dulles's objections. He dropped the sanguine prediction that nuclear weapons could be used in local war without precipitating a general conflict (which was not, after all, a "policy" statement). He inserted a definition of "local aggression" as "conflict occurring in less developed areas of the world, in which limited U.S. forces participate because U.S. interests are involved." He proposed to say that "military planning" for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression would be based on development of a "flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use as authorized by the president"; also that force, when required, would be applied "in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid hostilities from broadening into general war." This wording, carefully designed to avoid suggesting a precommitment to use nuclear weapons, was acceptable to all, including Dulles.

Similar changes in the other two disputed paragraphs disposed of State's

objections. Paragraph 11 was amended to declare that nuclear weapons would be used to achieve "national" rather than "military" objectives. Paragraph 17 avoided any implication of compulsion by a statement that the United States should "continue efforts to persuade its allies to recognize nuclear weapons as an integral part of the arsenal of the Free World and the need for their prompt and selective use when required." Paragraph 17 otherwise remained unchanged, including the statement to which the JCS had objected, that "selected major allies" should be provided with nuclear weapons; apparently Wilson did not question this phrase. The council agreed that there was no need for a study of the "limited use of force" such as State had suggested. With the above amendments, the paper received approval and appeared on 3 June 1957 as NSC 5707/8.²³

With the adoption of NSC 5707/8, national policy was brought into line with strategy, as Radford and Wilson had urged. In placing nuclear weapons at the core of U.S. strategy, in sanctioning the abolition of explicit distinctions between these and other weapons, and in proposing to make them generally available to tactical forces, NSC 5707/8 followed in the wake of plans already developed by the JCS and the services.

Strategy in the Public Eye: The "Limited War" Debate

In approving NSC 5707/8, the president and the council firmly rejected the view maintained by General Taylor and other Army spokesmen that, in the age of approaching nuclear stalemate, specific preparation for "local" or "limited" war was needed. Still, the fact that the Planning Board had forced the issue onto the council's agenda indicated a measure of sympathy within the administration for the Army's viewpoint.

Among those who saw some merit in the Army position was Robert Cutler, the special assistant to the president for national security affairs. "The continuing importance to the United States of an ability effectively to deal with limited war is an issue which has constantly recurred in the Planning Board," he wrote the president on 7 August. Usually, he continued, it had been raised by civilian representatives, such as those from the State Department and ODM. Recently, however, he had received two memorandums on the subject from military representatives. The JCS adviser, Lt. Gen. F. W. Farrell, USA, warned against placing too much reliance on massive firepower at the expense of "needs for other instruments of policy." The AEC observer on the board, Capt. John H. Morse, USN, feared that the threat of massive nuclear retaliation was not entirely credible as a deterrent against attack on U.S. allies. He was "appalled," he wrote, "to hear high Government officials propose that we fight no more local wars, but depend entirely upon our big deterrent."

Cutler, impressed by these arguments, forwarded both memorandums to the president. "The issue of how best to deal with limited hostilities is a continuing one, to which an exact answer is difficult," he wrote. While

deterrence must have priority, "many of us working on policy issues feel that continuing attention should also be given to the U.S. capability to deal with hostilities short of general war." He suggested that the president establish a high-level committee to insure that the issue would receive "continuing attention." Such a committee, he suggested, might periodically present studies of U.S. capability to deal with hostilities in particularly threatened parts of the world such as Korea, the Middle East, Indochina, and others. The president took no action at that time, but Cutler's suggestion, in somewhat modified form, was eventually to be put into effect.²⁴

The looming threat of nuclear stalemate was a matter of public knowledge. Not surprisingly, therefore, many outside the government saw a growing danger of actions below the threshold of total war. At almost the same time that Cutler was writing to the president, the well-known military commentator for the *New York Times*, Hanson W. Baldwin, warned of an increasing prospect of the kind of situations for which "massive retaliation" would be inappropriate—situations that could be handled only by "men on foot with guns in their hands and artillery behind them."²⁵

The problem of limited war also increasingly engaged the attention of those civilian "defense intellectuals" who, since World War II, had proliferated in universities and research institutions. Many of them had from the first criticized the New Look for placing all the nation's strategic eggs in one basket. By 1957 some of them were well on their way toward working out a specific doctrine of limited war.²⁶

One of the earliest of these was William W. Kaufmann, who, writing in 1956, foresaw that the Communist bloc might increasingly resort to a strategy of "controlled and limited violence," to which the United States should be able to provide a graduated response, tailored to minimize the danger of escalation. His argument was taken up and elaborated upon by Robert Osgood in 1957. Osgood, like Kaufmann, believed that a local defense, short of all-out war, was perfectly feasible for the United States, despite the manpower advantage usually ascribed to the Soviet bloc. Such a defense required forces that were qualitatively different from those needed to deter or fight a global conflict.²⁷

Much greater public impact was made by another book appearing about the same time as Osgood's. This was *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, by Henry A. Kissinger, then a somewhat obscure Harvard professor (though he had reportedly served the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a "policy consultant").²⁸ His book, which became a best-seller, perhaps owed some of its success to its connection with the prestigious Council of Foreign Relations, having grown out of extensive discussions held under the aegis of that organization. Kissinger, like Osgood, stressed the need for flexible policy and strategy. He argued for a broad spectrum of capabilities in order to resist any Soviet action and to create contingencies from which the Soviets could only extricate themselves by launching all-out war, thus running up against the superior U.S. retaliatory capability. Again like Osgood, he stressed that the forces needed for limited war differed in kind from

those needed for nuclear deterrence; they should consist of "small, highly mobile, self-contained units," relying largely on air transport and equipped to wage war with tactical nuclear weapons.²⁹

For the U.S. Army and its spokesmen, the Osgood and Kissinger books provided valuable support.³⁰ The authors had challenged the contention, put forth by supporters of the New Look, that preparation for the more destructive contingency—nuclear war—automatically carried with it, as a cost-free byproduct, a capability for fighting local wars.³¹

Another emerging spokesman for a "flexible" military establishment was none other than John Foster Dulles—the man associated in the public mind with the "massive retaliation" doctrine which he had been the first to articulate in 1954. That he was by no means as rigid as sometimes thought was clearly shown by the views he expressed in the NSC in 1957, as earlier described. He spoke in a similar vein before the Quantico conference of Defense officials in 1957, when he stressed the need for a military capability to make the "punishment fit the crime," and suggested that the United States might be spending too much money on deterring general war and not enough for other contingencies. Admiral Burke, who heard this speech, characterized it as "right down our philosophy."³²

Implicit in the writings of Osgood and Kissinger was the value of tactical nuclear weapons in limited war. It now seemed possible to provide the means by which the Western powers, despite their manpower disadvantage, could defend themselves against the Soviet bloc without resorting to a nuclear holocaust. Dulles made this point clearly in a magazine article in September 1957. His argument ran as follows:

In the future it may thus be feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power. It may be possible to defend countries by nuclear weapons so mobile, or so placed, as to make military invasion with conventional forces a hazardous attempt. . . . Thus, in contrast to the 1950 decade, it may be that by the 1960 decade the nations which are around the Sino-Soviet perimeter can possess an effective defense against full-scale conventional attack and thus confront any aggressor with the choice between failing or himself initiating nuclear war against the defending country. Thus the tables may be turned, in the sense that instead of those who are non-aggressive having to rely upon all-out nuclear retaliatory power for their protection, would-be aggressors will be unable to count on a successful conventional aggression, but must themselves weigh the consequences of invoking nuclear war.³³

Dulles's article, the challenging Osgood and Kissinger books, and informative revelations about policy discussions within the administration gave rise to a spate of articles in the press suggesting that U.S. strategy and policy were undergoing a reappraisal in the summer and fall of 1957.³⁴

Secretary Wilson, asked on 19 September if any change had taken place or was under consideration, replied no, and added that he had not read Dulles's article. Wilson naturally took his guidance from the president, and there was no reason for him to participate in any public discussion of strategy, the more so in that he was about to leave office. Eisenhower, on the other hand, followed the discussion very closely; according to his son, he had the details "absolutely at his fingertips."³⁵

Whether or not there would be any basic change in policy would be determined the following year, when NSC 5707/8 would come up for review. Meanwhile, unknown to the public, developments in connection with the FY 1959 budget showed that the president, driven by what he considered relentless economic stringency, had every intention of pushing the New Look to its furthest extent.

JSOP-61 and the Budget

While NSC 5707/8 was evolving, Secretary Wilson and the JCS resumed work on the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan in the hope that it would be available to guide the budget. The new JSOP, with an assumed D-day of 1 July 1961, would be designated JSOP-61 and would replace JSOP-60, which had never been completed. On 6 March 1957, as already noted, Secretary Wilson directed the JCS to complete JSOP-61 by 31 May 1957, under the assumption that peacetime appropriations for FYs 1959 and 1960 would remain approximately at the levels in the FY 1958 budget.³⁶

The JCS thereupon attempted to develop a JSOP on schedule but failed owing to the difficulty of reaching agreement under the indicated fiscal limitation. On 25 April Radford reported to Wilson the efforts thus far made. The JCS had tried two approaches. In the first, based on pure requirements, each service listed the minimum forces considered necessary. This resulted in a total force level estimated to cost between \$52 and 55 billion—obviously out of the question. In the other approach, the services developed forces under a \$39 billion ceiling, but these were judged inadequate by the JCS to provide for national security. The principal difficulty, according to Radford, was that the Army, and to a lesser extent the other services, continued to plan for large-scale mobilization and operations after D-day. He urged that Wilson, in his discussions with the JCS, make it clear that \$39 billion was an absolute limit, also that nuclear weapons would be used from the outset in any general war.³⁷

Preliminary planning for the budget could not await the completion of the JSOP. On 8 April Budget Director Brundage asked Wilson to submit, by 1 May, estimates for NOA and expenditures for FY 1959, together with the best possible estimates for the three following years. For planning purposes, both NOA and expenditures should be set "significantly lower" than the 1958 budget, and the general level of expenditures should be held at about the current level for the next three years.³⁸

Wilson replied on 13 April, noting that the president in December 1956 had set a tentative ceiling of \$39 billion and had directed that force levels and personnel strengths in the FY 1958 budget be used as planning targets. He considered this guidance sufficient until more detailed figures became available through completion of the JSOP. In fact, on the preceding day, Wilson had obtained a tacit reaffirmation of the \$39 billion figure. He had told the president that he proposed to hold expenditures and NOA to that limit and to reduce manpower to approximately 2.5 million. Eisenhower raised no objection; he merely suggested that Wilson ask the JCS to identify lower priority programs that could be eliminated.³⁹

Following further abortive efforts to reach agreement on the JSOP, the JCS met with Wilson on 15 May to report on their progress. In Radford's absence, General Taylor spoke for the JCS. They could not reach agreement by 31 May, said Taylor, and hence they recommended that JSOP-61 be held in abeyance until the FY 1958 budget became firm. Although Taylor advised him that the JCS probably could agree on forces supportable by annual expenditures of \$41-42 billion, Wilson refused to approve a budget above \$38.3 billion.⁴⁰

By that time, the problem of rising military expenditures had become acute and had forced on the administration a downward revision of the military program on which the FY 1958 budget had been based—the program that would necessarily serve as the starting point for 1959. A Cabinet discussion of fiscal problems on 3 June 1957 was devoted primarily to the problem of 1958 expenditures, with the president holding firmly to a \$38 billion goal. Following the meeting, Brundage wrote Wilson that he had been “instructed” (presumably by the president) that a new limit of \$38 billion had been tentatively set for both NOA and expenditures for FY 1959. The president, he continued, wished to be advised by 10 June if Wilson felt it “impossible” to live within this amount.⁴¹

Wilson replied on 4 June that he could not provide detailed recommendations by 10 June. “Many important decisions,” he wrote, “are involved in the readjustment of our military program that will be necessary to meet a figure somewhere between \$38.0 and \$39.0 billion for expenditures.” When Brundage informed him that the \$38 billion was an absolute limit, Wilson demurred. “I did not understand,” he wrote, “that the matter was quite settled until we could see what kind of a military program we could buy with the \$38.0 billion.” To attempt to draw up final 1959 figures at that time was difficult and raised the danger of a leak. The amount at issue, about two and one-half percent of the total (i.e., the difference between \$39 billion and \$38 billion), required “considerable refinement to know exactly where we are.”⁴²

Brundage, however, had the last word. He informed Wilson on 26 June that the president had approved \$38 billion for both new obligatory authority and expenditures and desired Wilson to formulate the best possible program within that limit. Any essential items that could not be fitted under the ceiling might be submitted for separate consideration.⁴³

With the budget cut back from \$39 billion to \$38 billion, it was even less likely that the JCS could reach agreement on the force tabs for the JSOP. On 16 July, after the JCS had again reached an impasse, Admiral Radford sent Wilson the widely divergent proposals of the service chiefs, together with his own force level recommendations for the years 1959-61 and a suggested annual limit of \$37.3 billion in expenditures, nearly half to be allotted to the Air Force. Its share would increase from \$17.6 billion in 1959 to \$17.9 billion in 1961, while that of the Army declined from \$8.7 to \$8.2 billion. Radford believed that his proposals represented a reasonable calculated risk. He drew attention to the need to reduce overseas deployments. Since it was unwise to withdraw forces from Korea while the unstable truce there remained in effect, troop reductions must come from Europe. "We must face up to this problem," he warned.⁴⁴

Radford had discussed his proposals in advance with Secretary Wilson, who adopted them as the basis for the revised military program that he presented to Eisenhower on 10 July. It was designed to hold expenditures to \$38.0 billion in both 1958 and 1959. For the latter year, Wilson adopted Radford's manpower figure (2.5 million) and also his force goals, with minor changes. He told the president that the revised program would require withdrawal of approximately 100,000 overseas personnel. The president tentatively approved the program subject to further study.⁴⁵

The NSC discussed the program on 25 July 1957; the president reaffirmed his tentative approval, despite objections from General Taylor and Secretary Brucker, but with some adjustments. He approved a personnel strength for end FY 1959 not below approximately 2.6 million, the exact figure to be determined in connection with the formulation of the budget. Both NOA and expenditures in 1959 were to be held to approximately \$38 billion. But, with an eye on the effect of withdrawal of overseas forces, he directed Wilson to consult with Secretary Dulles before completing the budget.⁴⁶

The discussion thus far of budget initiatives for FY 1959 had been conducted largely in terms of expenditures rather than of new obligational authority. This perhaps reflected the prospect of expenditure overruns in the summer of 1957 which had led to the institution of strenuous restraints for both 1957 and 1958. In any event, Wilson, in relaying the president's decision to the services on 6 August, allocated the \$38 billion expenditure limit as follows:

Army	\$ 8.6 billion
Navy	10.5 billion
Air Force	18.1 billion
OSD	.8 billion
Total	<u>\$38.0 billion</u>

The same figures would apply, with minor changes, to 1960 and 1961. A personnel ceiling of 2.7 million was laid down for 1 January 1958, distributed as follows: Army, 950,000; Navy, 660,000; Marine Corps, 190,000;

Air Force, 900,000. Tentative limits were 2.6 million for end FY 1958 and 2.5 million for end FY 1959, with reductions in all services.

Wilson directed that emphasis continue on modernization and maintenance of equipment rather than on numbers of units. Reserve forces should be reduced in strength, in line with the policy of downgrading the importance of post-D-day mobilization. For planning purposes, the services were to consider a reduction of 10 percent in reserve strength in FY 1959 and an additional 5 percent annually over the next two years.

The service secretaries, assisted by the military chiefs, were to conduct detailed studies, to be completed by 3 September, of the impact of these budget and personnel limitations. They were also to comment on possible increases or decreases of \$300 million annually for fiscal years 1960 and 1961. Recalling the disastrous leak that had occurred in July 1956, Wilson ordered that these studies be conducted by a small group in the office of each secretary and that his fiscal and manpower limits not be generally distributed to departmental staffs.

The secretary also approved the conclusion of Admiral Radford (concurred in by his designated successor, General Twining) that no further progress could be made on JSOP-61 at that time. Thus the plan was shelved, to be revived several months later.⁴⁷

To allow the departments to proceed with routine budgeting, Wilson on 7 August issued a second memorandum to the service secretaries authorizing them to disseminate enough information to their staffs to enable budget estimates to be completed by 1 October 1957. At this time, he specified that the allocations provided on 6 August were to apply to new obligational authority as well as to expenditures.⁴⁸

The question of redeploying forces prompted a conference of Quarles, Twining, McNeil, and other OSD officials with Dulles and his senior subordinates. The OSD representatives stressed the probability of having to withdraw some divisions from both Europe and the Far East. Dulles urged only that withdrawals be done gradually and after consultations with State. He was particularly concerned about South Korea, where the United States was then engaged in difficult negotiations with President Syngman Rhee over military assistance; a sudden withdrawal might upset these talks.⁴⁹

The Cordiner Committee

One possible claimant for funds in the FY 1959 budget had been considered earlier and set aside for the time being: a proposed overhaul of the system of compensating military personnel and career civilian employees in the DoD. This grew out of Wilson's continuing efforts to improve personnel management and reduce turnover. It also owed something to the report of a task force of the Hoover Commission, which had urged

development of a corps of technical specialists to manage the various activities supporting the military services.⁵⁰

On 23 March 1956 Deputy Secretary Robertson appointed a Defense Advisory Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation, headed by Ralph J. Cordiner, president of the General Electric Corporation. Membership included Carter L. Burgess, the assistant secretary for manpower, personnel, and reserve, his opposite numbers in the military departments, a flag or general officer from each service, and several business executives. The mission of the committee was to advise the secretary of defense concerning the attraction and retention of competent technical and professional personnel and to recommend a method of compensating technical personnel other than by rewarding them with rank—the only method available at that time.⁵¹

Completed early in 1957, the committee's report found that the services were failing to attract and retain sufficient technical personnel. Turnover in both officer and enlisted ranks was unacceptably high. Rates of compensation were not competitive with civilian industry, especially at the higher grades, owing to piecemeal adjustments that had compressed the progression from lower to higher and produced a relatively "flat" pay pattern.

The committee recommended a pay scale that would recognize increased responsibilities and technical skill, eliminating longevity as a basis for compensation. Pay grades should be established for the two highest officer grades (O-9 and O-10, or three- and four-star rank), incentives provided to retain qualified reserve officers beyond their obligated service, and two additional enlisted pay grades (E-8 and E-9) instituted, along with a proficiency pay program. Improvements were also needed in fringe benefits such as medical, dental, and commissary services, travel allowances, and the like, all of which had eroded in quality since World War II. For civilian personnel of DoD, the committee recommended a general pay raise for professional, technical, and managerial employees, to make their salaries competitive with private industry.⁵²

Obviously these proposals would require more money at the outset. The committee estimated the increase at \$316.8 million in FY 1958, rising to \$662.4 million in 1962. Offsetting these, however, would be reduced training requirements and other administrative savings resulting from a stable and experienced work force, which should produce a net budgetary gain within two years. More importantly, the committee foresaw improvements resulting from a higher level of competence, reduction in accidents, reduction in training time required to deploy combat forces, and generally increased efficiency. Insofar as these savings could be quantified, the services estimated them at \$312.9 million in FY 1958 and no less than \$5.08 billion by 1962.⁵³

The committee's report was not officially submitted to Wilson until 8 May 1957, but its basic recommendations were rendered much earlier. In February 1957 Burgess established an interservice task force to draft

legislation to carry out the recommendations. The substance of the Cordiner report also became known to the press and Congress.⁵⁴

On 4 March Cordiner briefed Wilson and the president on the savings to be expected from his recommendations. Eisenhower expressed approval of the committee's proposals but favored a cautious approach, no doubt thinking of the added initial costs. He felt that the principal goal should be to concentrate on retaining personnel with "hard" skills. Wilson urged that the entire report be adopted; he predicted (accurately, as it turned out) that Congress would otherwise rush ahead with its own adaptation of the proposals. The president authorized Wilson to draw up specific recommendations to be submitted to the Bureau of the Budget.⁵⁵

Wilson proposed immediate legislation to put into effect the committee's new military pay structure, absorbing the additional costs within the FY 1958 budget. To demonstrate his confidence in the plan, he was willing to order a personnel reduction of approximately four percent as soon as the legislation was enacted. On 14 March President Eisenhower, without indicating either approval or disapproval of Wilson's proposals, authorized him to discuss them with the BoB.⁵⁶

Wilson accordingly submitted his proposed legislation to Brundage on 20 March. Among other features, it established additional grades for enlisted personnel, as recommended by Cordiner, and adjusted pay scales to eliminate pay inversions whereby juniors were paid more than their seniors. It authorized proficiency pay increases for qualified enlisted personnel; this could be done under existing law, but Wilson thought that its successful operation required legislative establishment of the proper number of pay grades and differentials. Contracts would be offered to specially qualified reserve officers to retain them on active duty after their terms expired. The legislation would be effective 1 January 1958, and the costs would be absorbed in the 1958 budget.⁵⁷

Replying on 4 April, Brundage rejected Wilson's plan. Proposals for comprehensive changes in service compensation, he wrote, "must be weighed against the importance at this time of avoiding any additional inflationary pressures." Changes should therefore be limited to measures needed to retain officer and enlisted specialists, as the president desired.⁵⁸

Wilson's exchange of correspondence with Brundage became a matter of public record, and the Bureau's action was interpreted by the press as a "snub." Within DoD, it seems to have occasioned genuine dismay. Since the plan involved no additional costs over and above the budget, Wilson had probably felt that it was thereby protected from charges that it was inflationary.⁵⁹

Accepting Brundage's decision as final, Wilson whittled down his plan to meet the two limited objectives. He proposed to institute enlisted proficiency pay increases through administrative action and to seek legislation to authorize officer retention contracts. He submitted these proposals to Brundage on 7 May, warning that they were "patchwork actions"; the comprehensive revision proposed by Cordiner remained a long-term

desideratum necessary for military manpower management. This time Brundage's approval was prompt. On 9 May Wilson instructed Burgess to implement the proficiency pay plan.⁶⁰

Legislation to authorize reserve officer retention contracts was later submitted to Congress but not acted upon. Meanwhile, as Wilson had foreseen, some members of Congress took the bit into their teeth and drafted bills to carry out the general pay revision recommended by Cordiner. Secretary Wilson informed Congress that the administration could support only the officer contract plan; other provisions of the Cordiner report required further study. They remained on the administration's agenda to be considered in connection with the 1959 budget.⁶¹

Budget Guidelines for FY 1959

Early in September, the service secretaries submitted the results of their appraisals of the manpower and financial limits set forth by Wilson on 6 August. All foresaw reductions that, in their opinion, would have serious implications for national security, particularly if an additional \$300 million reduction were made in FYs 1960 and 1961. Acting Secretary Franke of the Navy and Secretary Douglas of the Air Force indicated that \$300 million additional in those years was a minimum requirement for their services. Secretary Brucker stressed that the reductions would seriously impair the Army's ability to discharge its missions.⁶²

Service spokesmen presented their views to the AFPC on 10 September. Wilson heard them, but saw no reason to relax the limits he had laid down earlier. All agreed, however, that final manpower strengths for end FY 1958 should be fixed as soon as possible, so that plans could be made for an orderly reduction. Wilson accordingly drafted a memorandum for the president setting forth personnel goals for FY 1958 within an overall total of some 2.6 million men (adjusted to allow the Marine Corps an additional 8,000) and for 1959 a total under 2.5 million. Secretary Dulles, he added, had accepted these figures subject to advance consultation with ambassadors in some of the allied countries.⁶³

After discussing this memorandum with the NSC on 12 September, Wilson forwarded it to the president, along with the service appraisals of his fiscal and manpower limits. The president approved on 17 September.⁶⁴

Wilson thereupon informed the services of personnel limits for 1 July 1958 as follows:

Army	900,000
Navy	645,000
Marine Corps	188,000
Air Force	875,000
Total	2,608,000

The Marine Corps overstrength of 8,000 would be temporary (until early FY 1959). Reductions were to be made without "materially" affecting overseas deployments (except for certain withdrawals from Japan which had already been announced) and as promptly as possible.⁶⁵

Wilson followed up this directive with another establishing the following limits for end FY 1959:

Army	850,000
Navy	630,000
Marine Corps	170,000
Air Force	<u>850,000</u>
Total	2,500,000

The services were to develop manpower programs for FY 1959 within these limits and also within the expenditure limits laid down on 6 August.⁶⁶

Just before sending this new directive to the services, Wilson received from Secretary Brucker an Army FY 1959 budget estimate that all but ignored his earlier instructions. It assumed a force of 15 divisions, 900,000 personnel, and \$9.170 billion in expenditures. Brucker justified this curious document on the grounds that it represented the Army's "proper and indispensable share" of the \$38 billion total and that no lesser amount would meet the requirements to modernize equipment and maintain readiness. "In summary, in developing this budget," Brucker concluded, "the Army has reduced its personnel strength as far as possible in consonance with its military commitments."⁶⁷

This budget had been prepared by the departmental staff in response to direct orders from Brucker, who considered Wilson's guidance to be for "planning purposes only."⁶⁸ Why Brucker took this action is not clear; he could hardly have expected Wilson to approve such a budget. Presumably he was either writing for the record or trying to stake out a favorable position for ensuing negotiations. In any event, the result was as might have been expected. On 28 September, having signed the directive already described, Wilson sent a copy to Brucker with a terse note. "I have today signed a separate memorandum regarding the preparation of the 1959 budget, and am attaching a copy for your information," he wrote. "Since your submission of the Department of the Army budget is not consistent with the attachment, I am returning it to you for revision."⁶⁹

Another month was to pass before the Army's revised budget, together with those of the other two departments, was submitted. By that time, Secretary Wilson had left office and the budget picture had changed significantly.

While preparing for the 1959 budget, Wilson had to keep a careful eye on the rate of expenditures in FY 1958, which had begun on 1 July 1957. Rising prices, as described in the preceding chapter, had jeopardized the president's instructions to keep expenditures below \$38 billion.

Thus far, Wilson's economy measures had not succeeded. Defense expenditures for July and August 1957 ran \$275 million above the target level. For DoD and military assistance combined, the excess for the period June-September 1957 was \$300 million, although September showed some improvement over the earlier months.⁷⁰ Perhaps in response to this news, Wilson, in his memorandum of 19 September on manpower limits for 1958, exhorted officials of the departments "to continue aggressively the search for savings." On 1 October he prohibited all overtime (not merely that of the "premium" variety) except when absolutely necessary or when specifically authorized. This step was shortly to redound to the administration's discredit.⁷¹

Crisis at Little Rock

Just at this juncture, with the service budget estimates approaching completion, Secretary Wilson and President Eisenhower were forced to confront an ugly racial controversy in Little Rock, Arkansas—a controversy that required the use of troops to quell a civil disturbance. The incident placed some additional claim on DoD financial resources, but its budgetary effect proved far less serious than its political cost to the administration and its damage to the president's prestige.

The incident grew out of a 1954 decision by the United States Supreme Court that segregated public schools were unconstitutional. The decision aroused fierce hostility in the states of the former Confederacy, where segregation of the races in schools and other institutions was regarded as an indispensable feature of the social order. While some school districts, mostly in border areas of the South, complied with the ruling, others disregarded it and adopted various subterfuges or delaying tactics to avoid compliance. President Eisenhower publicly declared that the decision of the Supreme Court must be obeyed, but he scrupulously withheld comment on the issue and, to the dismay of many Americans, refused to engage the prestige and influence of his position to induce recalcitrant communities or officials to obey the court's ruling.

Matters came to a head in Little Rock in September 1957. The city's Central High School had scheduled admission of a small group of selected black students under a plan worked out by the school board and approved by the federal district court. Unexpectedly, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus, previously regarded in racial matters as a moderate (by southern standards), placed himself at the head of the opposition to the integration plan. He summoned the Arkansas National Guard to duty and ordered it to refuse the black students admission to Central High School. Federal intervention now became inevitable, since a federal court order had been directly challenged. Whatever his views on the wisdom of school integration, President Eisenhower would brook no defiance of federal courts.

The president's attempt to reach a compromise settlement with the governor in a meeting on 14 September at Newport, Rhode Island, did not have a successful outcome. On his return to Arkansas, Faubus withdrew the Guard but took no steps to prevent mob violence or to cooperate in carrying out the court-ordered desegregation.

The situation reached a climax on 23 September. An angry mob gathered outside the school, assaulted two black newspaper reporters, and threatened the lives of the black students seeking to enroll. Eisenhower now accepted the counsel of his attorney general, Herbert Brownell, that federal intervention was necessary.⁷²

From Newport, the president announced that he would "use the full power of the United States, including whatever force may be necessary" to carry out orders of the federal court. Later that same day (23 September), he issued a proclamation commanding all persons to "cease and desist" from obstructing the orders of the court.⁷³ He also discussed the situation by telephone with General Taylor and Secretary Wilson.⁷⁴ From Taylor he no doubt learned, if he did not know already, that the Army had foreseen the possibility of trouble and had for several weeks been discreetly preparing contingency plans for the situation.⁷⁵

Shortly after noon on 24 September, the president issued an executive order authorizing the secretary of defense to take "appropriate steps" to enforce the orders of the court and to order into U.S. military service, for an indefinite period, any or all units of the National Guard or Air National Guard in Arkansas.⁷⁶ Two hours later, at 2:15 p.m., Wilson ordered the Arkansas Guard into federal service, directed the secretary of the Army to carry out the executive order, and vested in him the right to exercise any and all of the authority conferred by the order.⁷⁷

Already alerted, a battle group of the 101st Airborne Division from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, moved by air to Little Rock, and by nightfall on 24 September some 900 paratroopers had landed. Within 24 hours, 1,240 men of the Arkansas National Guard had reported to Camp Robinson, Arkansas, for duty at Little Rock.⁷⁸

Secretary of the Army Brucker took charge of the operation, reporting directly to the president while keeping Wilson informed. The troops had little difficulty in imposing order, and the black students enrolled at Central High School. Within a few weeks, it proved possible to begin withdrawing the regular troops; the last of them had departed by the end of November. Faubus, however, refused to commit himself to enforce the court's decision, and elements of the National Guard were forced to remain until the end of the school year.⁷⁹

The troop movements and the prolonged federal support of the Arkansas National Guard constituted an unforeseen drain on the Army's FY 1958 funds. On 7 October Brucker informed Wilson that the cost was running approximately \$93,000 per day. The total could not then be foreseen, but Brucker thought it possible that a supplemental appropriation might prove necessary. Meanwhile, he asked Wilson to adjust the obligation

and expenditure ceilings for the appropriations for military pay and for operation and maintenance.⁸⁰

Wilson took no action at the moment, and it fell to his successor, Neil McElroy, to reply on 4 November. By that time, some troops had been withdrawn and costs had fallen to \$16,000 per day. Since \$146 million in unobligated money was available in the two appropriations accounts, McElroy saw no need to adjust the ceilings.⁸¹

The Shock of Sputnik

Well before the last paratrooper was withdrawn from Little Rock, the situation there had stabilized and was being crowded from public consciousness by new developments. Sudden evidence of a startling and potentially dangerous leap in the technological capabilities of the Soviet Union now claimed attention.

Already Washington believed that the Soviets had succeeded in developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). In June 1957 the United States had tested its first such missile (Atlas). The initial launch was successful, but the missile drifted off course and had to be destroyed in flight. A few weeks later, a newspaper columnist asserted that the Soviets had successfully tested a long-range missile even before the Atlas failure. There was no official confirmation at the time; U.S. intelligence reported only that development of an ICBM was a "high priority goal" for the Soviets.⁸²

Whether or not this report was true, the Soviet Government itself announced on 27 August that it had successfully fired a "multistage" ballistic missile. The range was not stated, but the results, according to the announcement, proved that missiles could be directed "into any part of the world."⁸³

President Eisenhower had once remarked upon the psychological importance of the ICBM and had predicted that if the Soviets achieved theirs ahead of the United States, the result would be near-panic among the American public.⁸⁴ Fortunately his prediction proved wide of the mark; the Soviet announcement occasioned less alarm than might have been expected. Asked about it in a news conference on 3 September, the president pointed out that Soviet announcements had not proved wholly reliable in the past, contrasted a single missile with a militarily significant capability, and assured the nation that the U.S. ICBM program was proceeding as rapidly as possible. Secretary Wilson told reporters on 19 September that the Soviet announcement was "probably true" but added that it "doesn't say very much." The United States, he said, could also have made the claim that rockets could be directed to any part of the globe. The public took their cue from these reassurances and showed little concern over the matter.⁸⁵

Then, on 5 October 1957 (Moscow time), or 4 October in Washington, came another announcement from the Soviet Union. The first man-made

satellite ("Sputnik" in Russian), 22 inches in diameter and weighing 184 pounds, had been successfully launched into orbit the preceding day. The statement was quickly confirmed by scientists at the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, who picked up radio signals from the satellite; by early morning of 5 October in Washington, they had recorded four crossings of the satellite over the United States.⁸⁶

The Soviet announcement did not come as a total surprise. It was widely known that technology for orbiting satellites around the earth, if not already available, was on the verge of accomplishment. The U.S. Government had announced a plan to launch a satellite equipped with instruments for scientific observation between July 1957 and December 1958 during the International Geophysical Year sponsored by the International Council of Scientific Unions. The project (known as Vanguard), though supported by DoD, was regarded as primarily a civilian project with little urgency behind it.*

To Wilson, satellites seemed of little importance. In 1954, when there were rumors that the Soviets were giving satellite development a high priority, he told a reporter that he did not care if the Soviets launched one ahead of the United States or got to the moon first. "I would rather they go off to the moon or some other place than come over here," he added. When the subject came up again in a press conference in 1956, Wilson said it would not be "too significant" if the Soviets were first with a satellite. Whichever country was first, it was merely a question of "a few months one way or the other," and in any case it was a "pure research" project, not a military one.⁸⁷

But when the news of Sputnik burst, it was clear that Wilson's view of its significance was shared by few of his countrymen. The public reaction was perhaps not too far from what the president had expected in connection with the Soviet ICBM—not outright panic but genuine consternation, followed by a veritable orgy of national self-examination and self-criticism. A single satellite weighing 184 pounds was in itself of little or no military significance, except perhaps for reconnaissance purposes. But the accomplishment by the Soviets proved a severe blow to the pride of a nation long accustomed to think of itself as the world's leader in scientific progress and to consider the Soviet Union backward. Clearly the Soviets had seized the lead in at least one important field of scientific research—and one with ominous long-range implications, since a technology capable of lifting a satellite aloft at the precise velocity needed to achieve orbit had obvious military applications. Further cause for alarm was seen in a claim by the Soviets on 7 October (confirmed by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission) that they had successfully tested a new hydrogen bomb war-head, presumably designed to be fitted to an intercontinental missile. There was perhaps something not far from panic in the prediction by an unnamed "high defense official" that by 1962 the

* Project Vanguard is described more fully in Chapter VII.

United States would be "virtually defenseless" against Soviet long-range weapons.

Across the nation, newspaper editorials recognized that U.S. prestige had suffered a grievous blow. The president and the secretary of defense were criticized for not pushing the U.S. missile and satellite programs with sufficient vigor—particularly after Army sources revealed that their service already had available a rocket (Redstone) fully capable of launching a satellite into orbit. The administration's recent efforts to control military expenditures were cited as evidence that a balanced budget rated ahead of national security in administration thinking. Democratic leaders, in Congress and elsewhere, were particularly sharp in their criticism. Scientists warned that the U.S. lead in science was in grave danger and that the Soviets were devoting considerably more effort than the United States to scientific research and education. An especially telling criticism came from Clifford C. Furnas, former assistant secretary of defense for research and development. He declared that "a year or more ago," he had warned that the Soviets would score a major propaganda victory if they won the satellite race and had vainly urged Wilson to speed up the Vanguard program. Wilson, by then out of office, replied mildly that Furnas "didn't have the complete picture."⁸⁸

President Eisenhower, as he later admitted, was quite unprepared for the intensity of the reaction to Sputnik, but he reacted characteristically. He rejected urgent recommendations from some officials for emergency measures to launch a U.S. satellite as soon as possible to retrieve the damage to national prestige. Refusing to be hurried, he sought instead to set an example of calm confidence.⁸⁹

The president took this tone in a meeting on 8 October with Deputy Secretary Quarles, Special Assistant for Guided Missiles William M. Holaday, and Alan T. Waterman, director of the National Science Foundation. He expressed the view that the basis for the Vanguard program was sound; to make a sudden shift now would "belie the attitude we have had all along." He tacitly approved, however, a suggestion by Holaday that the Redstone missile be regarded as a backup for Vanguard. Taking a long view, the president asked the group to "look ahead five years," and suggested the development of a satellite for reconnaissance purposes, to which Quarles replied that the Air Force already had such a project underway.⁹⁰

Later that day the president held his final conference with Wilson, who was about to leave office. Wilson suggested removal of some overtime restrictions, which, although they had had little adverse effect, might, he thought, give rise to criticism (as indeed they soon did). The president approved, but asked that the removal be "very precisely defined." The secretary also recommended that the Vanguard program continue unchanged for several more months, with preparations for a backup if delays should so require; this accorded with the president's own thinking.⁹¹

Following this meeting, Wilson spoke with newsmen and tried to

downgrade the importance of Soviet technological developments. It would be "some little time," he thought, before the Soviets had an operational ICBM. He characterized Sputnik as "a neat scientific trick" and pointed out that it had little military significance; bombs could not be dropped from an orbiting satellite, since they would burn up on entering the earth's atmosphere. He admitted that the U.S. satellite program had not received the highest priority, but contended that it had more "push" behind it than the public realized.⁹²

At a press conference on 9 October, the president distributed a statement in which he congratulated Soviet scientists on their achievement and reviewed the history of the U.S. satellite project, explaining why it had been kept separate from military developments. The subsequent questions, most of which dealt with Sputnik and the U.S. missile program, provided the president an opportunity to demonstrate his steady resolve. He made it clear that he had provided as much money, both for Vanguard and for missiles, as the sponsors of those programs had requested. As for Sputnik, it did not raise his apprehensions "one iota."⁹³

Also on 9 October, after Neil McElroy had been sworn in as Wilson's replacement, the president met briefly with the new secretary, Quarles, the service secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He deplored statements in the press suggesting that the satellite project involved a "race" and informed the group that he desired a policy of "no comment" on Sputnik.⁹⁴

But none of the president's efforts could conceal the fact that his prestige, and that of his administration, had suffered severely. Coming on the heels of the Little Rock situation, which the president had allowed to drift until military intervention became inevitable, the Soviet propaganda victory and the absence of a vigorous and immediate U.S. response reinforced the widespread impression of a lackluster and ineffectual president worn down by the burdens of his office. And the Soviet accomplishments in missile technology, compared with what seemed a U.S. lag in that field, called into question the president's military judgment. Critics who had charged neglect by the administration of limited war capabilities could now add an accusation that the strategic deterrent was being allowed to deteriorate.⁹⁵ In his remaining years of office, President Eisenhower, while remaining popular, encountered greatly heightened criticism of his military policies. This development added to the difficulties faced by the secretary of defense, who was primarily responsible for defending the policies.

These difficulties were long-term. The immediate task at hand was the 1959 budget, which was to take shape in a very different atmosphere from that prevailing a few months earlier. It was at this moment that Secretary Wilson departed, and it was left to his successor, Neil McElroy, to cope with the problems created by the strange new object now circling the globe.

CHAPTER VI

The FY 1959 Budget: Final

Change of Command at the Pentagon

Secretary Wilson's departure in October 1957 at the onset of alarm and anxiety over the first Sputnik was purely coincidental. His commitment to the president had been for a single term only, and they had agreed that he would leave soon after Eisenhower's second inauguration. The timing of his departure was the subject of a meeting between the two men on 14 March 1957. Wilson recommended that his successor take office in July or early August in order to have several months' experience before intensive budgeting began. He and the president informally discussed several possible appointees; one of these, suggested by Wilson, was Neil H. McElroy, president of the Procter and Gamble Company.¹

Over the next few months, a number of candidates received consideration or were mentioned in the press as possibilities. Besides McElroy, they included Clarence Randall, a steel company executive and consultant to the president (who reportedly declined the position); Ralph J. Cordiner, president of General Electric and recently chairman of the committee on military compensation described in the preceding chapter; General Alfred M. Gruenther, USA (Ret.), former NATO supreme commander, now president of the American Red Cross; and two of Wilson's subordinates, Deputy Secretary Donald A. Quarles and Assistant Secretary Wilfred J. McNeil.² Ultimately, the choice fell on McElroy. Called to Washington in July 1957 to meet with the president, he agreed to accept the appointment after informal discussions with members of the Senate Armed Services Committee indicated that he would encounter little difficulty in being confirmed.³

McElroy's appointment became known on 7 August when the president submitted his name to the Senate for confirmation. At the same time, Wilson formally tendered his resignation. The date of the changeover was not announced, but Wilson told the press on 15 August that it would probably be made early in October.⁴

The ease of McElroy's confirmation contrasted sharply with that of his predecessor four years earlier. Although he proposed to retain the stock that he owned in Procter and Gamble, the relatively small amount of

business transacted by that company with the Department of Defense obviated any charge of conflict of interest. McElroy was confirmed by the Armed Services Committee on 15 August 1957 and by the full Senate on 20 August.⁵

Before settling into his position, McElroy accepted Wilson's advice to spend a month or so in visiting defense installations around the country. Coincidentally, his final stop was at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in Huntsville, Alabama, which he was visiting when Sputnik was launched. The incident had a symbolic importance; the shadow of Sputnik fell across McElroy even before he assumed office.*

In accepting appointment, McElroy stipulated that he would limit his tenure to approximately two years. Eisenhower acknowledged this understanding in writing when he signed McElroy's formal appointment on 4 October.⁶

Secretary Wilson meanwhile was winding up his affairs. On 2 October he attended his last NSC meeting, where he received warm words of appreciation from the president.⁷ That afternoon he held his final press conference, and was given a standing ovation. The next day he reviewed troops at Fort Myer, Virginia, then was guest of honor at a reception.⁸

On Wilson's last day in office, 8 October, he first attended a meeting of the AFPC, along with McElroy, then met with the president and obtained approval to relax overtime restrictions on defense production. He bequeathed to his successor a recommendation that service roles and missions be clarified. The secretary suggested, and Eisenhower agreed, that McElroy and General Twining, who had succeeded Radford as JCS chairman in August, should meet regularly with the president until they became accustomed to their duties. Later that day, among his final actions, Wilson removed the restrictions he had placed on Army and Navy missile projects.⁹

On the following day, 9 October, at the White House, the president awarded Wilson the Medal of Freedom for "exceptionally meritorious service and contributions to the security of the United States." Immediately thereafter, McElroy was sworn in, and later the same day the Wilsons left Washington.¹⁰

Wilson bowed out with mixed feelings. As he told McElroy, he had been "anxious to let go," but "it's not easy, at my age, to turn over responsibility like this."¹¹ He clearly felt the burden of his years in office. "I'm leaving because I found myself making decisions from fatigue," he reportedly told friends. After a conversation with Wilson in July 1957, Navy Secretary Gates told Burke that Wilson was "much worried, very tired," and felt that he was "not getting along too well with the White House."¹²

On his departure, Wilson received numerous letters of appreciation from colleagues, from prominent persons across the country, and from ordinary citizens impressed by his outspokenness and his efforts at economy. Particularly significant was one from Assistant Secretary McNeil, who wrote

* For McElroy's visit to Huntsville at the time of Sputnik, see Chapter VII.

that throughout their entire association, he had never heard Wilson utter a single word of criticism of his predecessors.¹³

It was Wilson's misfortune to leave office just as Sputnik burst upon the scene. Inevitably, much blame fell upon him because it seemed that the Soviets had, for the time being at least, outstripped the United States in some technical fields. Had he stayed in office, he would doubtless have taken many of the steps to accelerate Defense programs that were to earn praise for his successor; indeed, he was already moving in that direction when he left. As it was, he suffered criticism for his lack of vision and for mistakes in weapons development and procurement made by some of his appointees.¹⁴ "The Soviets are unquestionably moving ahead of the United States in air-atomic power," wrote a prominent columnist, well before Sputnik. "That is the legacy which Charles E. Wilson, a likable and honorable man, leaves to his unlucky successor, Neil McElroy."¹⁵ Many agreed with this judgment, though, as events were to show, the appraisal of relative trends was unduly pessimistic.

On the other side of the ledger, Wilson could take pride in having provided an unparalleled degree of continuity to the position of secretary of defense. None of his predecessors had remained in office longer than a year and a half.* And although his judgment had been questioned, no one had impugned his integrity; when his resignation was announced, he was praised in Congress by members of both parties.¹⁶ Washington reporters were particularly sorry to see him go. "Charles Wilson is going to leave Washington, and the place just isn't going to be the same without him," wrote one.¹⁷

Wilson's successor, Neil Hosler McElroy, was just short of his fifty-third birthday when he assumed office. Born in Ohio (like Wilson) in October 1904, McElroy graduated from Harvard University, then took a position with Procter and Gamble. Here he spent his entire business career, rising to the presidency of the corporation in 1948. His background was in advertising and sales rather than in production. His only military experience consisted of several years in the Ohio National Guard. He and Eisenhower had met briefly while the latter was president of Columbia University, but their real acquaintance began when, in 1955, McElroy was asked to organize a White House conference on education. Early in 1957 he had heard rumors that he was being considered for secretary of defense, but these were not confirmed until his summons to Washington in July.¹⁸

Immediately after being sworn into office on 9 October, McElroy met briefly with the president and other Defense officials. That afternoon McElroy held his first press conference and set forth his conception of the secretary of defense as "captain of President Eisenhower's Defense team." He pronounced himself in favor of healthy competition among the services but not rivalry, and pledged to seek maximum economy, which

* The first two secretaries, James Forrestal and Louis Johnson, served for approximately 18 months. George C. Marshall served for almost exactly a year and Robert A. Lovett, Wilson's immediate predecessor, for 16 months.

was not incompatible with defense. Replying to questions, he promised that missile programs would be accelerated, but by removing bottlenecks rather than by spending more money. He declined to say whether he considered \$38 billion enough to provide an acceptable defense.¹⁹

Two days later, McElroy attended his first Cabinet meeting, where the president warned him against those who would try to force a choice between adequate defense and a sound budget. Both were essential, he said, and a proper balance must be struck. Earlier that day McElroy had met privately with the president, who urged him to let people know that he would "deal with a very heavy hand in putting his own ideas into effect."²⁰

McElroy began his new duties with a potential double handicap. Unlike Wilson, he had no experience in the production of munitions and no technical engineering background. On the other hand, he had amply demonstrated his ability successfully to direct a large organization engaged in production and research. Like Wilson, he conceived his job as that of an administrator and left to others the formulation of strategy.

McElroy owed some of his success to a quick mind and ability to learn rapidly, which greatly impressed his new colleagues in the Pentagon. A business associate recalled McElroy's remarkable memory as well as his ability to "look at a page with hundreds of figures on it and get to the source of any error." "I never saw a man whose learning curve was faster," said his military assistant, General Randall. "One month, plus a few meetings in Washington, and he had a grasp of what was going on." Before he had been six weeks in office, a newspaper editorial saw him "well on his way to mastering Pentagon intricacies." Later, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, the Army's chief of research and development, praised McElroy as the "most able" man who had been appointed to the position.²¹

McElroy's height and demeanor gave him a commanding presence. Possessed of an affable disposition, he was, according to his associates, pleasant and easy to work with. Indeed, Vice President Nixon judged him too easygoing. At the same time, he had a quick temper and could be severe when faced with incompetence.²²

McElroy tended to make decisions quickly, without, like Wilson, going through exhaustive fact-finding. General Lemnitzer thought that he was "inclined to make decisions before they were carefully thought out." A contrary impression that gained credence, that he had difficulty in making up his mind, probably stemmed from a few well-publicized incidents.²³

To a greater degree than Wilson, McElroy was baffled and upset by the frequency with which the JCS disagreed. "You have spent your lives in the military, you are the top men in the field," he once told them, as recalled by his assistant, Oliver Gale. "I am an industrialist from the soap works. Yet I ask you what should be done on a military matter, and you say you can't agree. So I have to make the decision."²⁴

In testifying before Congress, McElroy made a conscious effort to avoid confrontations. He impressed the legislators with his ability. Appearing

before Senator Lyndon Johnson's Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee on 27 November, the new secretary earned plaudits from two Democratic senators for his grasp of his job. Several months later, Rep. Daniel J. Flood of the House Appropriations Committee characterized him as "an extraordinary fellow." "I have listened to my distinguished colleagues work you over for about 3 hours," continued Flood. "They haven't put a glove on you."²⁵

In dealing with President Eisenhower, McElroy avoided Wilson's mistake of taking up too much of the president's time. He was careful to be well briefed before a conference, and as a result, as he himself later said, the president "didn't have to do a lot of fanning of the breeze unless he wanted to, and generally we could come to a conclusion pretty fast." He looked back upon his relationship with the president as "almost ideal." The president made and kept a promise to make himself available to McElroy at any time.²⁶

Although he ultimately presided over a major reorganization of the defense establishment, McElroy moved slowly at first, making few changes, and those only in connection with the special fields of missiles or research. Nor did he make immediate changes in personnel. It was not his mission to repudiate the policies of his predecessor, and he continued to work with the men who had been applying those policies. He was, said an associate, "greatly pleased by the points of strength he found in his organization." He thus disappointed those who expected him to institute a wholesale replacement of Wilson's appointees.²⁷

Lacking a technical background, McElroy relied to a considerable degree on the judgment of Deputy Secretary Quarles, a scientist by training. He also drew heavily on McNeil and Randall, the former for his fiscal expertise, the latter for his detailed knowledge of departmental operations.²⁸ Randall stayed on at McElroy's request and, with Eisenhower's permission, accompanied McElroy to presidential conferences, though the president hinted that McElroy might eventually want to replace Randall with an Army officer "as a means of improving attitudes in the Pentagon"—evidence that the president was aware of the morale problem affecting the Army after several years of budgetary stringency.²⁹

To supplement Randall's assistance, McElroy brought in a longtime associate from Procter and Gamble, Oliver N. Gale, to work in his immediate office. Gale functioned as a personal assistant to the secretary, besides handling liaison with the White House and Congress and Cabinet affairs. Randall dealt with matters relating to the operation of the department.³⁰

McElroy found no reason to replace any of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of whom had terms of office running until 1959 or later. General Twining had replaced Admiral Radford in August 1957 and had been succeeded by General White as Air Force chief of staff. General Taylor, of the Army, was to leave office in 1959, shortly before McElroy; Admiral Burke outlasted McElroy, as did General Pate of the Marine Corps. McElroy worked well with Twining, with whom he early established a cordial relationship.³¹

It does not appear, however, that he met with the JCS as a body any more frequently than had Wilson.³²

Outside the department, one important change had taken place in the cast of principals with whom McElroy would be involved. On 29 July 1957 Robert B. Anderson, who had served as deputy secretary of defense in 1954-55, took office as secretary of the treasury, replacing Humphrey, who had resigned. Anderson's basic views on the economy were identical with those of Humphrey. But he was less outspoken in Cabinet meetings, and he did not give the impression that he shared Humphrey's "single-minded doomsday approach to the budget."³³

McElroy's apparently rapid mastery of his position, plus his prompt steps to accelerate missile and satellite programs, created a highly favorable impression and gave him a "honeymoon" similar to that traditionally enjoyed by newly elected presidents. Within a few months of his appointment, he stood high with press, public, and Congress, and even received mention as a possible presidential nominee. The impression was of a hard-driving go-getter who, as one story had it, "moved fast and surely," making decisions "where for months there had been indecision," and reversing the policies that had caused the United States to fall behind the Soviets. Columnist Joseph Alsop, who had often criticized Wilson, judged McElroy a "confidence-producing new figure on the scene."³⁴

Eisenhower's judgment was equally favorable. "Secretary McElroy is, in my opinion, one of the best appointments that could be made," he wrote to a friend in February 1958. "He may have started out. . . without too much enthusiasm for service integration, but I think he is changing his views. He has, incidentally, absorbed with unexpected rapidity the enormous complexity of the Defense Department and will, I think, make a tremendous contribution there."³⁵

These early impressions were somewhat unrealistic, and it was no reflection on McElroy that they did not last. The technological rivalry with the Soviets was too complex to be reversed overnight. Moreover, the basic policies that McElroy had to apply came to him from a higher level.

The Immediate Response to Sputnik

Eisenhower's response to Sputnik, unlike that of many of his countrymen, was measured. On 10 October he met with the NSC for the first time since the news of Sputnik, with members of the scientific community (the National Science Foundation and the National Academy of Sciences) in attendance. The conferees reviewed the U.S. Vanguard satellite program. The president stressed that this was based on a carefully considered plan, adopted after due deliberation, and that he saw no reason to change it.³⁶

Nevertheless he recognized the need for some action. Meeting with McElroy on 11 October, he stressed the importance of an early successful test of an intermediate-range missile, two of which were under

development and approaching completion. The two men went on to discuss the administration of the missile effort, and agreed that some projects (notably the antimissile missile) should be directed from a level above the services.³⁷

In a memorandum to the service secretaries on 18 October, McElroy spoke of the importance of maintaining missile programs on schedule. All requests for overtime in connection with missile programs had by then been approved, but, he wrote, "continuing attention" should be given to removing or modifying any regulations that appeared to impede progress. The service secretaries were to advise Holaday, the assistant for guided missiles, of any assistance needed from other departments and furnish him with a weekly report of missile progress, marking a copy for McElroy's personal attention.³⁸

On the preceding day, the president had asked McElroy for a report on the effects of overtime restrictions on missile programs. McElroy's reply, on 21 October, made it clear that such restrictions were not a problem. Standing instructions allowed overtime to meet essential schedules or to eliminate bottlenecks. As a result, the services had indicated that their medium- and long-range missiles—Jupiter, Thor, Atlas, Titan, and Polaris—were not being impeded. "I will use all means at my disposal to insure that the ballistic missile programs remain on schedule," McElroy promised.³⁹

At the same time, McElroy had to cope with certain unforeseen consequences of efforts made several months earlier to limit expenditures for FY 1958.* Rigid ceilings had forced hard-pressed procurement officers to meet their goals simply by withholding payments on contracts. For contractors, the effects of this action had been compounded by the limitation of down payments to 70 instead of 75 percent. Forced thus to finance a greater proportion of their work in progress, contractors turned to banks for large loans. By the middle of October, complaints from contractors and bankers were reaching both administration officials and members of Congress.⁴⁰

These serious and complicated problems required resolution at the highest level. McElroy and McNeil discussed the situation with Anderson, Brundage, and Sherman Adams. There appeared no alternative to a relaxation of the \$38 billion ceiling on FY 1958 expenditures if the government was to meet its contractual obligations. The conferees agreed, therefore, that the ceiling for the first half of FY 1958 should be raised to \$19.4 billion, allowing \$300 million extra to the Air Force and \$100 million to the Navy. For the second half, those services would be allotted an extra \$100 million apiece and the Army \$70 million (earmarked for Jupiter), producing a limit of \$19.270 billion, or \$38.670 billion for the year. Brundage accepted these higher figures, although reluctantly, and the president approved them. McElroy thereupon assured contractors that bills would be paid as they fell due. Contractors would be expected to support a larger proportion of work

* See Chapter V.

in progress with their own funds, he added, but the additional investment would be taken into consideration in determining allowable profits.⁴¹

An obscure memorandum issued by Wilson on 17 August 1957, in connection with expenditure control, also occasioned some alarm when it leaked to the press. The memorandum directed that research and development projects partially supported by appropriations for production and procurement be adjusted to reduce procurement money by not less than 10 percent of the FY 1958 research and development appropriation for each department. The difference would come from research and development money; thus the effect would be to reduce the funds available for research. The purpose, as Wilson explained in a letter to McElroy after the controversy arose, was to force the services to review the practice (which Wilson believed was being abused) of charging pure research projects to procurement. On 20 October a somewhat sensational news story cited the memorandum and interpreted it as requiring a general 10 percent cut (computed by the reporter as amounting to \$170 million) in research funds; it thus appeared a direct violation of an assurance given by Wilson on 19 September that all research money appropriated by Congress would be utilized. At once the order was assailed in Congress as likely to "cut off some idea in mid-brain that might save the country from destruction."⁴²

McElroy discussed the problem with the service secretaries, and as a result, at their request, the 17 August memorandum was rescinded. He announced this action publicly and promised that service research programs would be restored to the full levels approved by Congress in the FY 1958 appropriations.⁴³

McElroy's attitude toward "basic" (as distinct from "applied") research differed from that of Wilson, though the difference was not as great as sometimes believed. Some of Wilson's statements could be interpreted as evincing indifference toward efforts to penetrate the secrets of the universe. "I think there are more important things than who takes the first close-up picture of the moon, myself," he once remarked. In fact, he took the position that such research should be left to private enterprise or to agencies such as the National Science Foundation, not undertaken or funded by the Department of Defense.⁴⁴

In his first press conference, McElroy was asked for his views of basic research, and specifically whether it might be profitable for one of the military departments to think about "rocket journeys to the moon," even though there would be no immediate military payoff. He replied that he was "sympathetic, and more than that, I think, to emphasis on a research program, part of which would be on pretty speculative, innovational kind of research, rather than strictly development."⁴⁵

Shortly thereafter McElroy issued a directive stating the policy of DoD to "support a broad and continuing basic research program to assure the flow of fundamental knowledge needed by the military departments." It defined "basic" research as that directed toward "increase of knowledge in science." The military departments were enjoined to support it by contract

or in government laboratories. The assistant secretary for research and engineering was responsible for enforcing the policy.⁴⁶

McElroy's view of the importance of scientific research accorded with Eisenhower's thinking. Even before Sputnik, the president had realized that policy formulation at the highest level would benefit from scientific advice. A possible such source was the Science Advisory Committee in the Office of Defense Mobilization. On 15 October 1957 the president met with the committee for the first time. The members approved a suggestion that had been made earlier for appointment of a scientific adviser to the president, supported by a body comparable in the scientific field to the Council of Economic Advisers. Following the White House meeting, the members adjourned to the Pentagon and met with McElroy, where they discussed the improvement of liaison between Defense and the scientific community.⁴⁷

In line with the committee's recommendations, a search at once began for a candidate for presidential science adviser. Meanwhile McElroy, in a parallel move, upgraded the Defense Science Board in the office of the assistant secretary for research and engineering. He ordered that the board report to him, through the assistant secretary, and added three new members: the chairmen of the ODM Science Advisory Committee, the General Advisory Committee of the AEC, and the Scientific Advisory Committee in the Office of the Special Assistant for Guided Missiles.⁴⁸

All three developments occurred during McElroy's first three weeks in office. At the same time, other events testified to the ferment going on in Washington. On 22 October, in a speech in New York, the president announced plans to deliver what would amount to a course of lectures on the nation's challenges: scientific progress and ways of accelerating it, responsibilities and opportunities abroad, the domestic economy, and the nature of defense programs. Five days later, the House Appropriations Committee announced plans to investigate U.S. missile and satellite programs, starting on 4 November.⁴⁹

Three days into November, the Soviet Union announced that a second Sputnik had been put into orbit. Much larger than the first, it weighed 1,110 pounds and was large enough to carry a small dog as an experimental passenger.⁵⁰ The news was not wholly unexpected and did not carry the impact of the first Sputnik; some spectacular feat had been reported in the offing for the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution on 7 November. But it demolished any comforting hope that Sputnik I was a mere fluke or "one-shot" propaganda affair. Moreover, as editorial writers were quick to point out, the ability to orbit a half-ton vehicle had obvious military applications. Some alarmed members of Congress called for a special session to deal with what they saw as a crisis. Premier Khrushchev, savoring his country's propaganda advantage, challenged the United States to a peaceful rocket-shooting contest.⁵¹

The White House promptly announced that the new satellite "fell within the pattern of what was anticipated." Secretary McElroy declared that it

would have no effect on U.S. missile developments. "We are already in a pressure program," he said. "Our program is in very good shape right now."⁵²

The House of Representatives already had an investigation of missile programs on the schedule; now the Senate, too, got into the act. Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, Senate majority leader and a member of the Armed Services Committee (chaired by Sen. Richard B. Russell of Georgia), took the lead. On 4 November—the day after the Soviet announcement—Johnson and Russell conferred at the Pentagon with McElroy, Quarles, and Twining and were briefed on service missile programs. The following day Johnson announced that the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, of which he was chairman, would begin hearings later that month. On 6 November Johnson discussed the investigation with the president, stressing that it would be nonpartisan and intended to induce Americans to "close ranks" and "do the job."⁵³

The Gaither Report

The second Sputnik coincided almost exactly with the report of a special committee appointed some months earlier to investigate the problem of defense against a missile attack. It grew out of discussion in the NSC concerning civil defense. In April 1957 the NSC Planning Board proposed an extensive program of constructing shelters for the civilian population. The board recommended further studies of various types of shelters and their costs. It also proposed that the ODM Science Advisory Committee study the relative value of "active" and "passive" defense measures, taking into account probable new weapons developments. The council approved this proposal.⁵⁴

To carry out the study, the Scientific Advisory Committee established a body known as the Security Resources Panel. The chairman, appointed by the president, was H. Rowan Gaither, chairman of the board of directors of the Ford Foundation. The membership of the panel and its committees came largely from industry and the academic world; others were chosen from ODM, CIA, and the Institute for Defense Analyses, recently established to support the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group. The panel's staff was drawn from OSD, the military services, and elsewhere. An advisory panel included former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett and Admiral Robert B. Carney, retired chief of naval operations. There was also a steering committee, headed by Robert C. Sprague, an electronics manufacturer who had served the NSC as a consultant on continental defense. When Gaither became ill in September 1957, Sprague assumed directorship of the panel, with William C. Foster, a member of the steering committee, as co-director.⁵⁵

The scope of the project was broadened when terms of reference for the panel were drafted. Robert Cutler, special assistant to the president for national security affairs, drew up a memorandum indicating that the

purpose of the inquiry was to form a "broad-brush opinion" of the value of various defense measures. It should consider the benefits and risks and the economic and political considerations involved in any decision to shift emphasis from passive to active defense or vice versa. Its mission, however, did not include examining national security policies or programs for the purpose of recommending changes therein. Cutler's memorandum, after review by the president and Deputy Secretary Quarles, became the terms of reference, with one important addition suggested by Quarles: that the "deterrent value of our retaliatory capabilities" would be within the scope of the study.⁵⁶

Gaither and his colleagues worked closely with the Department of Defense. Wilson designated Quarles's office as the point of contact for the panel, with authority to approve requests for information and briefings.⁵⁷

The panel's report, completed by early November 1957, showed that the members had indeed taken a "broad-brush" approach to their assignment. It opened with an assessment of the threat, pointing out that the gross national product of the USSR was more than one-third that of the United States and was growing half again as rapidly. This growth was concentrated on defense and heavy industry, for which Soviet spending approximately equaled that of the United States. If current rates continued in both countries, annual Soviet military expenditures might eventually be twice those of the United States, even allowing for some improvement in Soviet living standards. The panel credited the Soviets with 1,500 long-range bombers, 3,000 jet bombers of shorter range, and 175 army divisions. They were believed to have ballistic missiles of 700 nautical miles range already in production, and to be ahead of the United States in development of an ICBM.

Against the Soviet threat, the panel concluded, no defensive weapons, in being or planned, would afford significant protection. It followed that protection of the nation rested primarily on the deterrent power of the Strategic Air Command. Therefore, the highest priority should be assigned to measures to secure and augment this deterrent, most urgently steps to protect against the immediate threat of bomber attack. These included reduction of reaction time for SAC aircraft, modernizing and extending radars at the seaward extensions of the early warning line, and installation of an active missile defense (either Nike-Hercules or Talos) at SAC bases.

By 1959 a threat of ICBM attack was expected to materialize. Hence it would be necessary to develop a radar system to provide early warning of such an attack; to improve SAC's reaction time to an alert status of 7 to 22 minutes, depending on location of bases; to disperse SAC aircraft as widely as possible and protect them with hardened shelters; and to provide a missile defense against ICBMs. At the same time, SAC's offensive power should be increased—initial operational capability (IOC) of IRBMs (Thor or Jupiter or both) raised from 60, as then planned, to 240, and of ICBMs (Atlas and Titan) from 80 to 600. A "significant number" of

IRBMs should be operational overseas by late 1958 and of ICBMs in the zone of the interior by late 1959. The panel recommended phasing in of hardened bases for ICBMs as rapidly as possible and acceleration of operational availability of Polaris.

As a final step, the panel recommended that forces for limited military operations (both U.S. and allied) be augmented and given greater capacity to deter or promptly suppress "small wars." A doctrine governing the use of nuclear weapons in limited operations was also needed.

Turning to defense, the panel recommended a "massive" program to eliminate the two major weaknesses in the continental defense system: the vulnerability of radars to electronic countermeasures (ECMs) and the difficulty of defending against low-level attacks. The members also urged a nationwide program of shelters against radioactive fallout. They did not, however, recommend large-scale construction of blast shelters, believing that improved air defense would be a better investment.

The panel saw a need for better management of defense resources in an age of swiftly changing weapons that cut across service lines. It suggested greater authority for operational commands; concentration of research and development of major integrated weapons systems; emphasis on training and logistics in the military departments; more direct command channels between the secretary of defense and the operational commands; and provision of a staff for the secretary.

In a masterpiece of understatement, the report declared that "the added defense measures to which the panel has assigned relative values will probably involve expenditures in excess of the current \$38 billion defense budget." The highest priority measures—those to protect and strengthen the deterrent—carried a price tag of \$19 billion in expenditures from 1959 through 1963; for the first year, the figure was \$2.87 billion. Steps to protect the civilian population were estimated to cost \$25 billion, giving a combined total of \$44 billion for the five-year period 1959-63. Enormous as were these sums, their expenditure seemed justified. "The next two years seem to us critical," concluded the report. "If we fail to act at once, the risk, in our opinion, will be unacceptable."⁵⁸

On 4 November Gaither, now recovered, and several members of the steering committee summarized the panel's findings for the president. Cutler and Gordon Gray, director of ODM, were present, but no one from Defense. Eisenhower's response, characteristically, was restrained and somewhat skeptical. He thought that the panel had underrated U.S. strength by ignoring the advantage provided by overseas bases. In his opinion, aircraft would remain the primary means of attack for the next five years, during which the United States would enjoy an advantage. He agreed, however, that the security of the deterrent force must be enhanced, and that an increase in defense expenditures above \$38 billion was inevitable, if only because prices had risen since that figure was established. Recalling how Congress had cut the defense budget earlier in the year, the president spoke of the need to organize public support for higher amounts.⁵⁹

The NSC held a full-dress discussion of the Gaither panel report on 7 November, in one of the largest meetings in its history. The entire Gaither panel was present, along with the JCS and the service secretaries.⁶⁰ The members agreed with the president in opposing hasty action. Secretary Dulles criticized the report for overstressing the military side of the international struggle; he feared the effects on allied countries if the nation embarked on a massive shelter program for its own protection. In the end, the recommendations of the panel were assigned for further study, most to the secretary of defense.⁶¹

Following the meeting, the president met in his office with Dulles, McElroy, Twining, and others to hear a highly alarming report by Sprague on SAC's reaction capability. SAC's alert plan, by which 25 percent of aircraft could be launched with from two to five hours' warning time, had supposedly been instituted at least two years earlier, but had not been carried out owing to lack of money and personnel. Sprague had made a spot check on 16 September and found that not a single aircraft could have taken off within six hours. He had since been informed, however, that the situation had improved. Sprague computed that a successful Soviet surprise attack would require strikes on 60 targets (air bases and aircraft carriers); allowing four aircraft per target, only 240 aircraft would be needed—far fewer than the Soviets had available. This information was even more alarming than previously thought. A memorandum compiled by Cutler, dated 25 October, had stated that 17 heavy and 117 medium bombers could be airborne with weapons after 30 minutes' warning overseas or two hours in the United States.⁶²

The president then conferred briefly with Dulles, who poured cold water on the fevered tone of the Gaither report and of Sprague's briefing. Both envisioned possibilities so remote, in Dulles's view, that the high cost of remedial actions seemed hardly justified. A simultaneous unprovoked attack on the United States and its overseas bases, producing perhaps 100 million casualties, would be so "abhorrent" that Dulles doubted that even the Communist rulers would attempt it.⁶³

On the same evening—7 November—the president delivered from the White House the first of his proposed speeches. It contained little or no trace of the urgency of the Gaither panel's warnings. The president dwelt on the strength of the national defense, stressing recent improvement in weapons technology. His conclusion, supported by that of his "trusted scientific and military advisers," was that although the Soviets were probably ahead in development of satellites and possibly in some aspects of missiles, "the overall military strength of the free world is distinctly greater than that of the communist countries."

The only danger cited by the president was that the United States might eventually fall behind. This long-run threat called for better scientific education and more basic research. More immediately, the federal government's scientific effort must be better concentrated. In line with this objective, the president announced the appointment of James R.

Killian, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as his special assistant for science and technology. Also, he continued, he had directed Secretary McElroy to make certain that his assistant for guided missiles possessed full authority to speed up missile development. He and the secretary had agreed that henceforth any new missiles or related programs would, "whenever practicable, be put under a single manager and administered without regard to the separate services."

The president recognized other problems, such as the need to improve SAC's reaction time, but warned against hasty and expensive action. "Certainly, we need to feel a high sense of urgency," he said. "But this does not mean that we should mount our charger and try to ride off in all directions at once."⁶⁴

The second speech, delivered on 13 November in Oklahoma City, was more somber. The president pointed out that Soviet technological progress necessitated a reexamination of the entire defense position. He listed a number of matters requiring urgent attention, foremost being measures to protect the strategic deterrent: aircraft dispersal, shorter alert time, improved warning facilities, and antimissile defense, all of which had been recommended by the Gaither panel, though the president did not mention that body. To improve offensive power, development of long-range missiles would be accelerated where possible. The pay of members of the armed services must be raised as a matter of equity and to insure retention of technicians. Exploration of outer space would also be pursued, but at a lower priority.

The president warned of the additional costs of these measures, which dictated a search for every possible economy. He ruled out any attempt to eliminate conventional forces and rely solely on retaliation, which would be "self-defeating." Nor should there be any reduction in foreign military or economic assistance, which were essential to U.S. security. If non-military expenditures could not be reduced, then, he admonished, "by whatever amount savings fail to equal the additional costs of security, our total expenditures will go up. Our people will rightly demand it. They will not sacrifice security to worship a balanced budget. But we do not forget, either, that over the long term a balanced budget is one indispensable aid in keeping our economy and therefore our total security, strong and sound."⁶⁵

This speech turned out to be the last in the projected series, perhaps because on 25 November the president suffered a mild stroke—his third illness in two years. Fortunately the effects proved short-lived; he was able to meet with the Cabinet a week later and to attend a NATO conference in December. But there was evidence that the strain of his office was beginning to tell. "It has been the President's ironic misfortune—and the country's—that his physical capacity to endure the strain should be thrown into doubt almost at the same instant that his judgment and capacity for leadership were together being subjected to their severest tests," wrote an observer soon after the stroke.⁶⁶

The president's newly appointed science adviser, James Killian, sworn into office on 15 November, had an impressive record of public service going back to the Truman administration. He was a member of the ODM Science Advisory Committee and in 1955 had chaired a group (the Technological Capabilities Panel) that recommended high priority development of the ICBM. His new duties were to keep abreast of scientific developments, especially those affecting national security, and to advise the president and other officials having policy responsibilities. He was authorized to attend meetings of the NSC Planning Board and, when invited, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, he frequently sat with the NSC.⁶⁷

On Killian's advice the ODM Science Advisory Committee was enlarged and made responsible to the president. The committee was granted direct access to the president, independent of the science adviser, and could select its own chairman. At once the committee elected Killian to that position.⁶⁸

Before the end of November, a good deal of information about the Gaither report had leaked out, creating considerable alarm, which was probably exaggerated by lack of full knowledge. One widely read column characterized the report as "just about the grimmest warning" in American history. There were widespread demands, in Congress and elsewhere, that it be made public. The president, however, refused to release it, citing the need to protect the confidential nature of the advisory process.⁶⁹

Congressional probes into U.S. missile programs were now in full swing. On 20-21 November Mahon's subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee heard testimony from McElroy, Quarles, McNeil, Holaday, and representatives of the services. On 26 November Senator Johnson's Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee opened a more intensive series of hearings, which continued intermittently for two months. McElroy and Quarles both testified on 27 November.⁷⁰

McElroy, meanwhile, continued to push missile development. On 8 November he directed the Army to prepare a Jupiter missile to launch a satellite as a backup for the Vanguard program. A week later he elevated Holaday's position to that of director of guided missiles, with enlarged powers. On 27 November he informed the Johnson subcommittee that the two IRBMs under development—Thor (Air Force) and Jupiter (Army)—were being put into production at once.*

The FY 1959 Budget Takes Shape

A matter that pressed for immediate decision was how far to incorporate the accelerated programs recommended by the Gaither panel in the 1959 budget. The president had made clear his desire for a "go-slow" approach in implementing these recommendations, but public knowledge

* See Chapter VII.

of their general tenor could be counted on to impose severe pressure on the administration's efforts to hold the budgetary line.

At the same time, the conflict between military and budgetary needs intensified because of a slowdown in the economy, which eventually grew into perhaps the most severe recession since World War II. On 14 October the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers warned the president that the economy was "making a sidewise movement with a slight tendency to decline," and that revenue for FY 1958 might fall to \$72 billion, instead of the earlier forecast of \$76 billion.⁷¹

Coincidentally, 14 October was also the date of McElroy's first meeting with Eisenhower on the budget. McElroy proposed to bring the major issues to the president for decision, then to allow the services to indicate their areas of chief concern. The president approved this procedure, though he suggested that the services might be brought into the picture at an earlier stage. Discussing the \$38 billion target, McElroy said that he would like not to regard it as a "rigid ceiling." The president "welcomed" this comment. He had not wished to establish a target figure at all, he said, but had done so at Wilson's "repeated request," and had been surprised to find it spoken of as a "ceiling." Former Secretary Wilson, recalling that he had been informed by Brundage that \$38 billion was an absolute limit,* might have been surprised to hear this statement.

McElroy then turned to the Cordiner report. Until recently, he said, he had erroneously believed that the president opposed it. Eisenhower favored a "wise application" of its principles; in fact, he added, he would propose it as a "first order of business in the new Congress."⁷²

During the latter half of October McElroy received the service budget proposals. They had been planned under guidelines laid down by Wilson on 6 August as follows:⁷³

	Expenditures (billions)	Personnel
Army	\$ 8.6	850,000
Navy	10.5	630,000
Marine Corps	—	170,000
Air Force	18.1	850,000
Total	\$37.2	2,500,000

Secretary Brucker submitted the \$8.6 billion figure for both expenditures and new obligational authority. This budget, he warned, would require the withdrawal of one division from Korea and two battle groups (two-fifths of a division) from Europe, as well as reducing the Strategic Army Corps (maintained within the continental United States for reinforcement) from four to three divisions. He therefore submitted an "addendum" budget, assuming new obligational authority of \$9.735 billion and expenditures of \$9.17 billion; this would obviate the need for redeployments, allow

* See Chapter V.

"minimal" modernization, and maintain the "austere" level of operations permitted in FY 1958.⁷⁴

The Navy's submission envisioned a decline from 901 ships in 1958 to 864 by the end of 1959. However, it would finance a second nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and the first Polaris missile submarine, plus 3 other nuclear-powered submarines and 13 other new vessels. Secretary Gates also submitted a proposal assuming \$11.1 billion in new obligational authority that included additional funds to procure ships and aircraft, to improve the readiness of operating forces, and to allow the Marine Corps 180,000 men.⁷⁵

In a separate memorandum on 22 October, Gates proposed a speed-up of the Polaris submarine program, for which the initial target date was 1 January 1963. An additional \$341 million in NOA for 1959, plus some increase for 1958, would make it possible to have three submarines in operation by the end of 1962, though with a missile of somewhat shorter range (1,200 instead of 1,600 nautical miles). On 7 November Gates also recommended an additional \$339 million for 1959 for shipbuilding, aircraft procurement, and research and development. The recommendation was justified on the basis of "recent evidence of technical developments in the USSR," but it was described as the result of a continuing review of Navy programs and apparently was not a specific response to the second Sputnik launched a few days earlier.⁷⁶

The Air Force submission, dated 18 October, proposed a reduction in wings from 117 in 1958 to 103 in 1959. This was tentative, Secretary Douglas wrote, since the budget for FY 1959 depended on clearer evaluation of the effects of the expenditure reductions for 1958 instituted earlier.⁷⁷

The service submissions did not show the related force levels, which were provided later. The Army's basic budget was based on a force of 14 divisions and 89 antiaircraft battalions; for the addendum, the corresponding numbers were 15 and 90, respectively. The Navy's force of 864 ships would include 396 major combat types, including 14 large carriers (one less than in 1958). The Air Force foresaw a decline in wings to 103 in 1959 and a further drop to 98 in 1961; as a result, commitments to NATO and to North American air defense could not be met, and squadrons must be withdrawn from the Far East. In reporting these facts, Douglas proposed to submit a separate package listing urgent requirements not obtainable under the \$18.1 billion limit.⁷⁸

Appraising these force levels on 1 November, the JCS pointed out that they represented a considerable reduction, both in size and in rate of modernization, from 1957 and 1958. "There is no indication that the threat to the United States is diminishing," they noted. But, they concluded, the forces proposed by the service departments "constituted the most effective forces possible under the DoD guidelines."⁷⁹

The service submissions had taken no account of the Cordiner recommendations. At an AFPC meeting on 29 October, Assistant Secretary for Manpower William H. Francis outlined legislation for the forthcoming

session of Congress to provide a transition to the new pay structure proposed by Cordiner. McElroy approved a suggestion by Quarles that the costs of these proposals be omitted from the original FY 1959 budget and included in a supplement.⁸⁰

It was now clear that the budget would exceed \$38 billion. Meeting with the president on 30 October, McElroy proposed to submit the basic \$38 billion budget in the near future plus additions totaling perhaps several hundred million. A second meeting then might be held to allow the service chiefs to point up the deficiencies in their budget. McElroy observed that the Cordiner proposals would put additional pressure on the \$38 billion figure, to which Eisenhower rejoined that McElroy must make the services live up to their promise that these would reduce costs. They discussed the implications of overseas withdrawals. The president stressed the importance of avoiding any impression that the United States was losing interest in NATO, which, he thought, would "almost panic" the Europeans. Wilson had told him that the reduction to 2.5 million personnel could be carried out without cutting divisions or other combat units. McElroy, however, foresaw that some air units might have to be withdrawn.⁸¹

Over a three-day period (7-9 November), McElroy and Quarles discussed in detail the budget proposals with service representatives.⁸² The ever-vigilant Brundage warned McElroy on 7 November that questions of "outer space" would surely come up in the NSC; he urged McElroy, in talking with the services, to seek offsetting cuts for such programs.⁸³ From the opposite direction, Assistant Secretary Foote weighed in with a recommendation for \$100 million for basic research under OSD, over and above the service research programs.⁸⁴

McElroy told the president on 11 November that he had approved a basic budget of \$38 billion in expenditures with 2.5 million personnel. It did not include tentatively approved "add-on" items, such as pay adjustments for the Cordiner program, missile acceleration, improved SAC readiness, and space research, which totaled slightly over \$1.6 billion. A proposal to step up antisubmarine capabilities had not been included, but McElroy was considering it because, he said, "if we block off a big war we may need the means for a smaller one." Eisenhower deemed pay revision and SAC readiness the most important items. He believed that the total could be held to \$39 billion or \$39.5 billion. McElroy, concerned about the effects of overseas troop reductions, suggested allowing the Army an additional 20,000 men. The president apparently did not reply to this suggestion; he merely stated that reductions should be made through "streamlining" without removing combat units.

In the end, Eisenhower agreed to submit the budget to the NSC as a \$38 billion basic with approximately \$1.5 billion in add-on items. Quarles, who was present, suggested that the services be allowed to defend their requirements in the NSC. The president was willing to allow them to do so, though he looked forward to the time when a truly "unified" budget would be possible.⁸⁵

The council considered the budget on 14 November. After Twining described the overall military program, McNeil submitted the basic budget calling for \$38 billion in expenditures, \$38.60 billion in new obligational authority (including \$320 million to be derived from stock and industrial funds), and direct obligations of \$39.32 billion. Quarles then gave a general overview of the proposed supplemental, the details of which were to be submitted later.

The service presentations highlighted what the spokesmen saw as deficiencies in the basic budget and listed the additional programs considered essential. The price tag for these totaled over \$1.9 billion. In the ensuing discussion, Under Secretary of State Herter spoke of the importance of maintaining troop strength overseas, for which he thought an extra \$200 million would be well spent. The president's statements attested as usual to his concern for economy, but he also said, according to one account, that when he was convinced of the minimum needed, "I'll fight for it," regardless of the effects on the budget balance. The council took no action, awaiting the recommendations for add-on items.⁸⁶

On the following day, McElroy brought up with the president the controversial question of a nuclear-powered carrier. McElroy thought that the Navy would be willing to defer this vessel for a year in exchange for a promise to support it in 1960. The president suggested that money thus saved go to the Army; he felt that the budget showed "signs of too much of a squeeze" on that service.⁸⁷

The JCS screened the service add-on proposals and on 17 November indicated to McElroy those they considered most important. Their list (not in order of priority) included: maintenance of strength of the Army and Air Force in Europe and of the Army in Korea; alert and dispersal facilities for SAC; acceleration of Atlas, Thor/Jupiter, and Polaris; anti-submarine warfare; Army modernization; long-range radars for ballistic missile detection; and additional money for research and development for all the services. The cost totaled \$1.499 billion, which the JCS considered justified by the increasing Soviet threat. They added that some of the FY 1959 augmentations would require additional expenditures in FY 1958. The list did not include all the high-priority items needed to modernize the services, as General Twining told the AFPC on 18 November.⁸⁸

To this list, McElroy added \$100 million for research at OSD level, as Foote had recommended, and \$14 million to maintain Marine Corps strength at 180,000 men, bringing the total to \$1.613 billion. He also proposed \$700 million for the Cordiner plan in FY 1959 and \$411 million in FY 1958 supplemental funds for the Navy and Air Force for development and procurement of ships, aircraft, and missiles.⁸⁹

In discussions with McElroy and McNeil on 19 November, held at the president's vacation home in Augusta, Georgia, Eisenhower subjected both the basic and the add-on budgets to a searching review that demonstrated his familiarity with military matters. He directed some reductions and indicated that the technical items should be reviewed by Killian.⁹⁰

On the subject of the nuclear carrier, McElroy recommended, with Navy concurrence, that in view of more urgent needs, it be postponed until the following year except for \$35 million in long lead-time items. The president approved.⁹¹

On 22 November the NSC conducted its second discussion of the budget, now set at a total of \$39.801 billion in NOA for the basic plus the additions. McNeil described the capabilities that would be provided by the supplemental items. The initial operational capability (IOC) for both Atlas and Jupiter/Thor would be advanced to FY 1959 instead of 1960, and 9 and 16 squadrons, respectively, would be available by FY 1963, instead of only 4 of each as presently planned. Two Polaris submarines would be operational by June 1961 and a third thereafter; the full performance missile (1,600-mile range) would be available by mid-1963. An extra allowance of 20,000 personnel for the Army would avert the withdrawal of combat units from Europe or Korea; the Marines would gain 5,000 additional personnel to maintain their divisions at full strength. Total military strength would thus be increased to 2,525,000. There would be no increase for the Air Force, but adjustments would enable it to meet NATO requirements at least through 31 December 1958. These were in addition to improvements for SAC and for antisubmarine warfare (ASW), ballistic missile detection, Army modernization, and research.⁹²

In the ensuing exchange, Dulles urged a further speedup in IRBM development, so that he could announce to the North Atlantic Council in December that a squadron could be made available to NATO by the end of 1959, in addition to the commitment to the United Kingdom. McElroy believed it possible to have one squadron available by the end of FY 1958. However, no decision was reached on this point. The council agreed that, subject to normal budgetary review and final approval by the president, the military program for FY 1959 and the augmentation for FY 1958 were "generally consistent with national security policy objectives." The president, however, directed McElroy to discuss with Killian the amount of new funds that should go into the FY 1959 augmentation, other than those for military and civilian pay increases.⁹³

Following the NSC meeting, Eisenhower met with McElroy, Quarles, and Killian for further discussions that showed he remained unhappy about the augmentations. He wished to make certain that they were responses to real needs and not to public outcry. Furthermore, he feared that the prospect of an unbalanced budget would unsettle the business community. He suggested deferring expenditure of some of the additional money (totaling \$573 million) for missile deployment, but he abandoned this suggestion when McElroy and Quarles urged the vital importance for NATO of deploying missiles as soon as possible. McElroy pointed out that the increase in expenditures over 1958 was only \$700 million, which was just the amount of the proposed pay increase.⁹⁴

As a further expression of his concern, the president, in approving the formal record of action by the NSC on 22 November, included a statement

directing the secretary of defense to assure himself that the military programs involved represented what was necessary for national security without reflecting excessive concern. What he wanted, as Cutler informed McElroy, was that the secretary should be "*personally* satisfied" with the amounts of money involved.⁹⁵

The NSC decisions produced some dissatisfaction in the Army, as Brucker told McElroy. The JCS had endorsed 50,000 additional personnel for the Army instead of a mere 20,000, and their recommended funds for Army modernization had been reduced and then offset by cuts so that almost nothing was left. McElroy, in reply, pointed out that the situation was not as bad as indicated, since the Army was being allotted additional money from stock funds and receipts from the Military Assistance Program. In any event, Brucker had raised no issues that had not been considered when the decisions were made.⁹⁶

After further discussion of the missile program, McElroy, as already described, ordered that both intermediate-range missiles, Thor and Jupiter, be placed in production and operationally deployed. He set forth a deployment schedule calling for one squadron of each by December 1958, with a total of eight (four of each type) by March 1960.⁹⁷ This schedule, which doubtless reflected Dulles's urgings, represented a considerable advance over the rather vague one announced by McNeil at the 22 November NSC meeting, which envisioned only one squadron during FY 1959.

Later, McElroy decided to shift part of the proposed FY 1959 budget forward to the FY 1958 supplemental, considerably increasing the latter above the \$411 million that had been contemplated. After clearance with Secretary Anderson, McElroy and McNeil tentatively settled on an additional \$1.260 billion for 1958, distributed as follows:

	Millions
Construction of three Polaris submarines	\$ 350.0
SAC dispersal and alert facilities	219.0
Ballistic missile detection (long-range radars and ground control facilities)	329.0
Atlas	108.5
Thor/Jupiter	253.5
Total	\$1,260.0

All the money, except that for Polaris, would be placed in the Air Force budget. At the same time, the NOA request for FY 1959 was reduced to \$39.153 billion.⁹⁸

Eisenhower approved the revised figures on 5 December, with some reluctance. He also agreed that the end FY 1959 personnel strength of 2,525,000 should be tentatively used in planning for fiscal years 1960 and 1961. He thought that about two-thirds of the supplementary funds were more to "stabilize public opinion" than to meet real military needs, and McElroy agreed.⁹⁹

After further minor adjustments, McElroy obtained approval of the Bureau of the Budget for \$39.145 billion in NOA for FY 1959. Of this \$36.848 billion would be requested immediately; the remainder would be reserved for later transmission, including \$518 million for the Cordiner plan, \$205 million for the civilian pay raise, and \$1.574 billion for construction. The 1958 supplemental was also approved, with the addition of \$100 million in transfer authority for an emergency fund and \$10 million for a proposed new Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), which would administer research projects under OSD.¹⁰⁰

Before sending this budget to Congress, the president on 9 January 1958 delivered his annual state of the union address, in which he dwelled on the danger facing the nation and listed a number of "imperative" tasks, including acceleration of weapons research, reorganization of the Department of Defense, and closer cooperation with allies. There was only one brief reference to the need for economy, which usually received equal billing with national security in his statements.¹⁰¹

But if the president's listeners expected him to unveil a bold new program of action, they must have been disappointed by the budget that he submitted on 13 January. The \$39.1 billion that he asked in new obligational authority was only \$600 million higher than the \$38.5 billion a year earlier. The service breakdown was as follows:

	<u>NOA</u>	<u>Expenditures</u>
Army	\$ 8,532,000,000	\$ 8,663,000,000
Navy	10,284,500,000	10,630,000,000
Air Force	16,891,400,000	17,695,000,000
OSD and Interservice	<u>1,140,400,000</u>	<u>1,020,000,000</u>
Total	\$36,848,300,000	\$38,008,000,000

Programs proposed for later transmission, totaling \$2.3 billion, brought the total to \$39,145,400,000 (not including \$345 million from stock funds) in NOA and \$39,779,000,000 in expenditures. Major force objectives were 14 Army divisions, 396 warships, and 105 wings. Direct obligations were estimated at \$41.141 billion. The president also sought a \$500 million contingency reserve fund and authority to transfer up to \$2 billion between DoD appropriations. For the budget as a whole, he forecast a surplus of \$500 million, with \$74.4 billion in receipts and \$73.9 billion in expenditures.¹⁰²

The Mind of Congress

The reception of the budget differed markedly from that of a year earlier. There was no trace of the pressure for economy that had been evident in January 1957; rather the trend was in the opposite direction. Democratic leaders, as would be expected, were particularly strong in pronouncing the budget inadequate for military needs. Significantly, the U.S.

Chamber of Commerce, which had criticized the 1958 budget as excessive, announced its support for the full Defense appropriations request.¹⁰³

Those favoring higher military spending found reinforcement in another report on defense problems comparable to the Gaither report, except that it was prepared under private auspices. Released to the public on 5 January 1958, it was the product of a survey of the military aspect of international security by a panel headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller, a member of the well-known family with a long record of public service. Like the Gaither panel, this group saw the Soviets as gaining on the United States in military strength. The members called for improving both the strategic deterrent and forces for limited war. They estimated a need for \$3 billion additional in defense funds for each of the next several years.¹⁰⁴

The deepening recession perhaps helped to head off any push for budget reductions. In October 1957 industrial production had fallen to its lowest level since 1946. By December the unemployment rate was the highest since 1955 and the number of unemployed the largest since 1949. The Treasury Department, faced with falling revenues, was forced to ask for a one-year increase of \$5 billion in the national debt limit of \$275 billion. With such slack in the economy, it was less plausible to argue that high defense spending brought the danger of inflation.¹⁰⁵

Congressional opinion was reflected by action on the FY 1958 supplemental, which had been submitted to the legislators in advance of the 1959 budget. Although it contained no money for the Army, the House committee invited witnesses from that service to testify, then added \$40 million in transfer authority for Army missile development. The administration raised no objection; the Senate approved the addition, the bill passed both houses unanimously, and the president signed it on 11 February.¹⁰⁶

During testimony on the FY 1958 supplemental, administration witnesses indicated that, in the fluid state of weapons technology, some programs might benefit from an increase in money above the FY 1959 budget. "We are continuing to look at high priority programs," McElroy informed the Senate on 28 January, "and will not hesitate to propose further additions as information warrants." As possible examples, he cited Polaris, Titan (which was lagging behind its brother missile, Atlas), and the B-52, for which additional funds to keep open the production line might prove advisable, depending on the performance of the newly developed B-58. Earlier, Secretary of the Navy Gates had told the House that he was "quite sure" that there would be a recommendation of more money for Polaris, possibly involving a total of nine submarines.¹⁰⁷

Hearings on the 1959 budget did not begin until near the end of January. Meanwhile, two congressional committees helped to keep national attention focused on defense problems. McElroy and Twining spent parts of three days (13-15 January) testifying at the missile investigation of the House Armed Services Committee. The hearings extended intermittently

until 25 February and ended with no general statement or recommendations for action.¹⁰⁸

The Johnson Senate subcommittee, which had been in session since 25 November, ended its hearings on 23 January with a statement that the Soviet Union was ahead of the United States in missile development, space exploration, and numbers of submarines, and was rapidly catching up in manned aircraft. The statement set forth 17 recommendations for action, including modernization and dispersal of SAC, faster missile development, improvement in conventional forces, accelerated research, and exchange of scientific information with allies.¹⁰⁹

One notable incident during the Johnson hearings was an appearance by General White, chief of staff of the Air Force, on 8 January. Though he had testified earlier, he was recalled in executive session and questioned in some detail. He stated that the Air Force had sought more money for the ICBM and the B-52 than had been granted in the 1959 budget. The production run of B-52s was coming to an end; the lead time for production would run out in 1959 and the lines would be closed down, so that reorders would be difficult and expensive. His full testimony was not published until later, but its substance was revealed to the press and influenced action on the budget.¹¹⁰

The House opened hearings on the 1959 budget on 27 January. McElroy, the first witness, defended it but admitted that it might not be final and that a number of matters were still under study. It was, he said, "based on what we know now, and we think that as the research and development of new weapons proceeds we may have to appear again in support of some additions to these programs."¹¹¹

Following McElroy, the service secretaries and chiefs testified in support of the budget but, under questioning, cited what they saw as deficiencies. Brucker described a strength of 900,000 (30,000 above the budget target) as "minimal" for the Army. Admiral Burke warned that the Navy had been on the "ragged edge" for operations and maintenance for over two years; he described the budget for antisubmarine warfare as "barely adequate" and saw a need for acceleration of Polaris. General Pate believed that the Marine Corps needed a minimum strength of 200,000. Air Force Secretary Douglas, like McElroy, hinted at the possibility of a supplemental request for 1959, specifically for the B-52 and Titan. General White, asked how he reconciled his support for the budget with his recent statements to the Johnson subcommittee, explained that McElroy's promises to the Senate to reconsider the B-52 and Titan had met his concerns.¹¹²

During hearings on the individual service budgets, House committee members probed further into various programs, showing concern over the administration's plan to reduce the strength of the National Guard and the Army Reserve by 10 percent (from 400,000 to 360,000 and 300,000 to 270,000, respectively). They questioned at some length Rear Adm. William F. Raborn, head of the Polaris program, about the cost of provid-

ing nine ships. In Air Force hearings, the Minuteman solid-propellant ICBM attracted interest.¹¹³

Meanwhile on 31 January the United States launched its first satellite, known as Explorer.¹¹⁴ It was put into orbit by an Army Jupiter missile, after several failures of the Navy's Vanguard. The event helped to repair U.S. prestige and morale, but, as events showed, it did little to allay congressional concern over the adequacy of the budget.

The FY 1959 Supplemental Request

In part, the willingness of the administration to consider an enlargement of the 1959 budget reflected continuing study of the Gaither recommendations. The NSC deadline of 15 December 1957 for comments on the report by cognizant departments and agencies was not met.¹¹⁵ Not until 21 December did Quarles forward to Cutler a consolidated DoD reply which endorsed nearly all of the Gaither recommendations and pointed out that action was already underway on most of them as a result of programs funded in the 1959 budget or earlier.¹¹⁶

The DoD reply was circulated to the council, along with comments of other agencies, as NSC 5724/1.¹¹⁷ The NSC devoted the greater part of two meetings, on 6 and 16 January, to a discussion of the Gaither report and the comments. Quarles admitted that actions in progress fell far short of meeting the Gaither recommendations, and McElroy indicated that further consideration might involve requests for more money for FY 1959. The council called for study of various programs, beginning with reports to be submitted on the advisability of producing additional first-generation ICBMs (Atlas and Titan, of which 130 were programmed), as distinct from awaiting the solid-propellant Minuteman then under development; of financing additional Polaris submarines besides the three already funded; and of installing interim missile defenses at SAC bases, using weapons then available (Talos or Nike-Zeus).¹¹⁸

Although the NSC had called for the reports by 30 January, they were not ready until April.¹¹⁹ Before that date, however, it became necessary to make decisions on some of the programs in connection with a possible supplemental to the FY 1959 budget.

On 27 February McElroy referred to the JCS a list of projects that might be given additional funding in 1959. They totaled over \$6 billion; the most expensive were for Army modernization, antimissile missiles, and B-52s. McElroy asked the JCS to review them and submit recommendations under the assumption of two possible budget totals, \$1.5 billion and \$2.5 billion.¹²⁰

The reply, on 12 March, furnished an example of why the president had so often expressed disappointment in the JCS. They recommended projects in order of priority within each service but provided no indica-

tion of priority as between services. Moreover, they disagreed almost totally over the amount of money to be allocated to each. Thus, for Polaris, the Navy recommended \$400 million under the \$1.5 billion total and \$611 million under the \$2.5 billion; the Army and Air Force recommended only \$85 million in either case. Some of the projects on the JCS list had not been on McElroy's, and the recommendations of the individual JCS members added up to \$8.8 billion.¹²¹

McElroy and Quarles thereupon drew up their own list, totaling \$1.65 billion, an amount that the JCS still considered insufficient. In discussions with the AFPC, McElroy held firm, though he agreed to put in some money for Army modernization. The president went over the list with McElroy and approved it on 20 March, after he had discussed it with Killian.¹²²

As finally submitted to and approved by the Bureau of the Budget, the list totaled slightly less—\$1.46 billion to be sought immediately, plus \$137 million to be added to the military construction bill then being drafted. The service breakdown was as follows:

OSD (Advanced Research Projects Agency)	\$ 180,000,000
Army	245,800,000
Navy	452,847,000
Air Force	577,100,000
Total	\$1,455,747,000

Major items in the list included 39 additional B-52s, which would suffice to keep the production line operating through 1960; two more Polaris submarines; Titan, Minuteman, and other missile projects; and Army ground equipment. The remainder was for research projects under ARPA.¹²³

The president sent this supplemental request to the House on 2 April. Added to the original budget (not yet acted on by either house), it brought to \$38,304,047,000 the total thus far requested.¹²⁴

The Final Legislative Package

On 5 June 1958 the House of Representatives approved a bill authorizing \$38.41 billion in appropriations. The House added more than \$1 billion, the largest single item being \$638 million for four additional Polaris submarines, which would provide the full nine-ship program. It also provided money to maintain the strength of the regular Army at 900,000 men, the Marine Corps at 200,000, and the Army Reserve and National Guard at 300,000 and 400,000 respectively. Partially offsetting these increases, however, were some \$907 million in reductions, largely for spare parts; the \$35 million advance procurement for the nuclear carrier was also deleted.¹²⁵

The House action had been foreseen before the final vote, and McElroy was ready when the Senate opened hearings on 6 June. He asked for restoration of funds for aircraft spare parts and for the nuclear carrier. He did not desire the extra money voted for personnel. The extra appropriations for submarines, missiles, and Army equipment could not profitably be used at that time, but if Congress wished to provide it, it would be held in reserve for use when necessary, not interpreted as a mandate for crash programs.¹²⁶

By this time the Senate had before it a second supplemental, this one to carry out the Cordiner plan. Legislation establishing the new pay structure had been sent to Congress on 14 January. It would authorize proficiency pay, eliminate pay inversions, and add two more permanent grades for both enlisted personnel (E-8, E-9) and officers (O-9, O-10). It also provided for an increase in base pay for personnel with more than two years' cumulative service. Congress approved the bill with some changes that were expected to raise the cost; the president signed it on 20 May, characterizing it as "the best we can probably get."¹²⁷

On 6 June the president sent to Congress a request for an additional \$590 million to carry out the new pay plan. The Senate considered this second supplemental request along with the legislation already passed by the House.¹²⁸

After almost two months of deliberation, the Senate on 30 July voted the extraordinary sum of \$40.032 billion. This was more than \$1 billion above the amount approved by the House plus the second supplemental. The Senate bill not only retained the extra personnel money voted by the House but contained language mandating the personnel goals involved: 900,000 for the Army, 200,000 for the Marines, 400,000 for the National Guard, and 300,000 for the Army Reserve. It provided money for additional B-52 aircraft and restored some of the cuts made by the House, but not the nuclear carrier procurement. Senator Chavez (New Mexico) characterized the Senate bill as an "absolute minimum."¹²⁹

When the bill went into conference, McElroy wrote Chavez that he supported all the fund restorations made by the Senate. Since the two houses had agreed on the same amount of extra money for personnel, the conference committee could not consider that matter, but McElroy urged omission of the mandatory personnel strengths written into the Senate version.¹³⁰

In the end, the two houses compromised on \$39.6 billion, distributed as follows:

Army	\$ 8,992,859,000
Navy	11,359,427,000
Air Force	17,877,624,000
OSD and Interservice	<u>1,372,917,000</u>
Total	\$39,602,827,000

In nearly all major categories of procurement—aircraft, missiles, shipbuilding, and Army equipment—the amounts provided were higher than the House bill but somewhat lower than that of the Senate, and the legislation did not specify precisely how the money was to be used. In addition to the appropriation, \$535 million was authorized to be transferred from unobligated balances for personnel costs. The mandatory minimum strengths for the Army Reserve and National Guard remained, but not those for the regular Army and Marine Corps; this represented the administration's only victory.¹³¹

Eisenhower signed the bill on 22 August, though at the same time criticizing it. He noted that it had appropriated more than \$1 billion above what he considered necessary. His strongest comments, however, related to the floor placed under Army Reserve components. This provision introduced needless rigidity into the defense structure, besides wasting money, and he urged that Congress repeal it at the next session.¹³²

The military construction bill, submitted on 9 June 1958, called for \$1.731 billion in appropriations, including \$992 million for the Air Force, primarily for missile and aircraft bases and air defense facilities. The House of Representatives, demonstrating that its zeal for economy was by no means defunct, slashed the amount to \$1.2 billion, pointing to large balances on hand from prior years. The House also criticized the services for poor planning, particularly the Air Force in connection with construction of the new Air Force Academy, just getting under way. OSD officials were only partially successful in appealing to the Senate to restore the cuts. The final amounts provided were:¹³³

Army	\$ 236,250,000
Navy	303,000,000
Air Force	794,600,000
OSD and Interservice	20,000,000
Total	\$1,353,850,000

Aftermath

The total amount appropriated by Congress in the two bills, \$40.956 billion, exceeded the \$40.625 billion in the administration's three requests. The surplus for procurement and personnel had been counterbalanced by the sharp reduction in construction money. With the president's approval, Secretary McElroy proposed to apportion to the services only the amounts that the administration had requested. Any surpluses would be applied to requirements for new obligational authority in the 1960 budget, except where technological breakthroughs or other special circumstances warranted earlier use of the money.¹³⁴

The money withheld amounted to \$1.17 billion. McElroy was able to assure Senator Leverett Saltonstall, who had inquired, that all funds for procurement and research were available until expended and would eventually be used.¹³⁵

Congress had established no minimum strengths for the regular forces, and the administration was therefore free to proceed with the planned reduction to 2,525,000 by 30 June 1959. During the summer of 1958, however, there occurred two international crises: a potentially dangerous situation in the Middle East, and a threat of an attack by Communist China on islands in the Taiwan Strait held by Nationalist China. These potential crises, described in a later chapter, cast doubt on the wisdom of reducing the strength of the forces. The Middle East crisis involved primarily the Navy and Marine Corps; hence McElroy authorized those services to maintain their strengths at 645,000 and 190,000, respectively, until 30 September 1958. Before that deadline was reached, the situation in the Far East had deteriorated; McElroy therefore obtained the president's permission to maintain all four services at their current strengths pending further study.¹³⁶

The extra personnel funds appropriated by Congress for the Army and Marine Corps now proved useful. For the other services, costs could be covered by transfers; however, as McElroy informed the BoB on 27 September, another supplemental appropriation for 1959 would undoubtedly prove necessary. The matter was deferred for consideration in connection with the 1960 budget, which was then in preparation.¹³⁷

By that time it was obvious that there could be no thought of holding the budget to \$38 billion. It was not merely the immediate necessity of keeping abreast of real or apparent Soviet advances. The inexorable progress of technology was about to spawn a new generation of weapons and devices—long-range missiles, space satellites, nuclear-powered ships. The costs of moving into this new world of weaponry had to be paid if the United States was not to lag behind in the long run. Even so, in the 1959 budget the administration held the line against demands for massive increases. The final force and personnel goals in the budget were essentially those set in the summer of 1957, before the alarm over Sputnik and the submission of the Gaither report. Extra money, granted reluctantly by the president, went mostly for production or development of new weapons. Thus the administration held fast to the decision laid down in 1953 to emphasize firepower and weapons improvement at the expense of numerical strength of forces.

CHAPTER VII

Missile Problems and Progress, 1956-1958

Arrival of the Missile Age

Rocket propulsion, which enables a projectile to be hurled through the air by means of its own motive power, had been known in principle for centuries. Efforts to apply the principle to military use could be traced back to the Middle Ages in Europe and China. Only in the twentieth century, however, did sustained and systematic research in rocketry begin. Several countries, including the United States and Russia, produced noteworthy pioneers in rocket research, but Germany took the lead. The results might have been disastrous for the allies in World War II. Nazi Germany's large rocket weapon, the V-2, was primitive by later standards but might have affected the outcome of the war if developed earlier.

At the close of the war, both the United States and the Soviet Union captured large stocks of these German weapons, together with the scientists and engineers who had developed them. A number of German experts agreed to come to the United States, where their knowledge and skill provided a major stimulus to rocket developments already under way. All of the armed services were fully aware of the importance of this field of weaponry and pursued it intensively.¹

By 1956 self-propelled weapons, generally referred to as missiles and designated by distinctive names, had become standard equipment in all the services. Those in use at that time included Corporal, Regulus, and Matador, developed respectively by the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force for bombarding surface targets. For defense against air attack, the Army had Nike and the Navy, Terrier. Air-to-air missiles, fired by one aircraft against another, included Sparrow (Navy) and Falcon (Air Force). Naval aircraft carried the Petrel, a missile torpedo for attacking surface vessels.

All of these weapons had comparatively short ranges (700 miles or less) and hence were suitable only for tactical use. Relatively slow by later standards, their speeds did not exceed Mach 4, or four times the speed of sound (approximately 740 miles per hour). All were "guided" missiles, subject to some sort of control after launching, such as radar or directional

beams, or were equipped to seek out their targets. Most were "aerodynamic," being dependent on the atmosphere as a source of oxygen for combustion and for support in flight. The exception, Corporal, a true "ballistic" missile, could fly above the atmosphere at a height of 125,000 feet. Various liquid or solid chemicals served to provide motive power through combustion.²

Greatly superior weapons were already scheduled for introduction within a few years. Those for use against surface targets included Regulus I and Triton, Navy weapons with ranges of 1,000 and 1,200 miles respectively; an improved Matador (1,185 miles); and the Army's Redstone, with a range of only 175 miles but powerful enough to lift a full-sized thermonuclear warhead weighing 6,400 pounds. Air defense missiles included Hawk (Army) and Tartar (Navy), for use against low-flying aircraft; an improved Nike with a 50-mile range (Nike B, later named Nike-Hercules to distinguish it from the original version, Nike-Ajax); Talos, with a 70-100 mile range designed by the Navy for shipboard use but also being developed in a land-based version; and Bomarc, an Air Force weapon designed to range as far as 100 miles.^{3*}

Of the long-range strategic missiles already under development by the Air Force, the most promising for the near future was Snark, a low-flying aerodynamic (or "cruise") missile with a 5,500-mile range and a speed of Mach 0.9; it was expected to be introduced in 1958. Navaho, with the same range and a speed of Mach 3.25, had a target date of 1962. Both, however, were relatively slow and operated within the earth's atmosphere. Already in prospect was Atlas, a ballistic missile able to fly well above the atmosphere at the almost unimaginable speed of Mach 20. Development of Atlas received the highest possible Air Force priority in 1954, when a committee headed by John von Neumann, a world-renowned scientist, pronounced it feasible. To supervise the program, the Air Force established the Western Development Division (renamed Ballistic Missile Division in 1957) at Inglewood, California, under Brig. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever.

As a backup for Atlas, in 1955 the Air Force undertook to develop a second long-range missile, Titan. Smaller and lighter (weighing 220,000 pounds to 265,000 for Atlas), Titan's more advanced design would enable it to be stored in underground launching silos that could be hardened to withstand pressure from a nearby blast. Both Atlas and Titan would be lifted into position by "booster" engines which would drop off when the missile achieved its programmed velocity; at that time, a "sustainer" engine would supply power for the remainder of the flight. Atlas was known as a "one and a half stage" missile, because the booster and sustainer engines were ignited simultaneously at launch; in Titan, a true "two-stage" missile, the sustainer engine ignited at the end of the booster phase. Both missiles used liquid propellants, including oxygen in liquid form for combustion. These substances

* The above ranges are expressed in terms of the nautical mile of slightly over 6,076 feet, as contrasted with the statute mile of 5,280 feet. In technical documents, missile ranges are usually given in nautical miles, but general discussions usually speak merely of "miles" without indicating which is meant.

were difficult and dangerous to handle and had to be stored in special facilities at especially low temperatures. Solid propellants that could supply the tremendous thrust needed for intercontinental flights had not yet been developed.⁴

The Navy also proposed to develop a long-range missile, even though its claim to participate in strategic missile warfare, under the existing assignment of roles and missions, was questionable. Roving ships as missile launching sites offered obvious advantages over fixed bases. Even so, the proposal met some opposition within the Navy Department from those who feared diversion of funds from traditional naval forces and others who recalled the bitter interservice dispute of 1949, when the Navy had committed itself to the position that strategic bombing was not an effective strategy. But when Admiral Burke became chief of naval operations in August 1955 he quickly overrode the opposition and approved the long-range missile program.⁵

The introduction of missile weapons promised to produce a revolution in warfare no less thoroughgoing than that effected earlier by the airplane. Missiles could perform missions traditionally assigned either to artillery or to aircraft, and thus tended to blur boundaries between service functions. The Army and the Air Force quickly became embroiled in disputes over responsibilities for missiles for support of ground forces and for anti-aircraft defense. An agreement reached in 1954 limited the Army to development of surface-to-air missiles with horizontal ranges up to 50 nautical miles for point defense. The Air Force was to develop missiles of unlimited range for blanket defense of wide areas. Army surface-to-surface missiles would be limited to those for use against tactical targets within the "zone of combat operations," a phrase left conveniently undefined.⁶

Responsibility for development of missiles belonged to the individual services, subject to overall policy guidance from the secretary of defense. Two assistant secretaries, those for research and development and for applications engineering, advised the secretary concerning the entire spectrum of weapons development and production, including missiles. A Joint Coordinating Committee on Guided Missiles (JCCGM), composed of representatives of these two assistant secretaries and of the military departments, reviewed plans and programs for adequacy and balance and insured exchange of technical information.⁷

The missile effort was strongly influenced by a report submitted in February 1955 by a group known as the Technological Capabilities Panel, headed by James Killian, later to become the president's science adviser. This group recommended that development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) receive the highest priority. They also urged development of an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), with a range of 1,500 miles, capable of being launched from land or sea.⁸

The president and NSC in September 1955 adopted the first of these recommendations.⁹ The proposal for an IRBM, however, required more study. No such weapon was in prospect, nor was it clear which service

should be responsible for developing it or for employing it when it became available. The Air Force had an obvious claim, because of its long-range bombardment mission. The Army might seem excluded under the 1954 agreement, but that service was soon to contend that the "zone of combat operations" was in fact deep enough to justify use of 1,500-mile missiles. Moreover, the Army had an impressive record in developing missiles with gradually extending ranges, and it boasted an unusually talented team of scientists led by the redoubtable Wernher Von Braun, considered the father of the German V-2. And certainly for a shipboard launching capability, the Navy had to be included.

After the JCS disagreed over the matter, Wilson compromised by authorizing two IRBM projects: IRBM #1, a land-based missile to be developed by the Air Force, and IRBM #2, a joint Army-Navy project to produce both an early shipboard weapon and a land-based alternative to IRBM #1. A committee chaired by the secretary of the Air Force would manage IRBM #1; IRBM #2 would be under a joint Army-Navy committee with the secretary of the Navy as chairman and the secretary of the Army as vice-chairman. Both committees were to report regularly to the secretary of defense and the NSC on the progress of their respective programs.¹⁰

For overall supervision of the IRBM projects, Wilson established an OSD Ballistic Missiles Committee (BMC), including four assistant secretaries of defense and chaired by the deputy secretary of defense. The committee was to review and approve development plans for both IRBMs as well as Air Force plans for the ICBM. To provide technical advice, Wilson co-opted a committee set up by the Air Force under von Neumann to advise on the ICBM; it became the OSD Ballistic Missiles Scientific Advisory Committee.¹¹

At Wilson's request, the director of the Bureau of the Budget appointed a representative to sit with the OSD BMC. He also approved Wilson's suggestion for simplified fiscal procedures, allowing the annual development plan for each missile program to be accepted as the source of budget estimates and lump sum apportionments.¹²

On Wilson's recommendation, the president in December 1955 ordered that the IRBM programs receive equal priority with the ICBM. Mutual interference among the programs was to be avoided as far as possible; any serious conflict would go to the president for decision.¹³

The launching of the IRBM programs and the acceleration of the ICBM, in response to the Killian report, were not publicized, nor was the report itself released. Inevitably, however, some information about the Killian recommendations, and the general tone of alarm suffusing the report, leaked out, intensifying the concern already aroused by evidence of Soviet progress in heavy bomber construction. When Congress convened in 1956, something like the later furor over the "missile gap" erupted and led to the investigation of U.S. air power by the Symington subcommittee, described in an earlier chapter.¹⁴

The president, as he was to do later on such occasions, remained calm

and ignored the cries of alarm. Wilson, however, had already recognized that something more was needed to put punch behind the missile effort. On 1 February a reporter drew his attention to Sen. Henry M. Jackson's demand, made earlier in the day, for a single head for all missile programs. Wilson agreed that "another good man competent in this area would be helpful," and added that he was already seeking a qualified appointee. The new official would chair the OSD BMC and provide contact with other elements of OSD in connection with missile development. He would not be a "czar," but neither would he be a mere adviser. "This advice business gets a bit overdone," Wilson said. "I need some more doers."¹⁵

Almost two months elapsed before Wilson found his man: Eger V. Murphree, president of the Esso Research and Engineering Company of Standard Oil of New Jersey. On 27 March Wilson announced that Murphree would become his special assistant for guided missiles (SAGM), reporting directly to the secretary, with responsibility for the "direction and coordination" of all activities related to the research, development, and production of guided missiles, except those already adopted for use. It was expected, however, that he would concentrate on long-range (particularly ballistic) missiles. He would also chair the OSD Ballistic Missiles Committee.¹⁶

The word "direction" in Murphree's charter suggested a measure of executive authority. Wilson appeared to support this implication on 27 March, when a reporter asked if Murphree had been or would be given sufficient authority to do whatever was necessary to get missiles "really underway." "That is right," replied Wilson. The reporter did not pursue the matter.¹⁷

Rise of the IRBMs: Thor, Jupiter, Polaris

By early 1956 DoD had four long-range missile programs under way with the highest priority, under full-time supervision by a member of Wilson's office. The rate of progress would depend on American technology and the resources made available by the administration.

The OSD BMC, which began meeting on 25 November 1955, served as the forum for discussion of these missile programs. Since the ICBM projects were on stream, the committee at the outset devoted most of its attention to the two IRBMs. It approved development plans, authorized fund allocations, monitored progress, and reviewed reports from its Scientific Advisory Committee.¹⁸ The chairman of the BMC rendered a monthly report to Wilson, who in turn passed it to President Eisenhower with a brief synopsis.¹⁹

The Scientific Advisory Committee reported to the BMC on the progress of missile programs, also on various technical matters such as propellants, warheads, and components. The committee extended its range of interest to an Air Force proposal for an orbiting reconnaissance satellite (designated 117L); this was related to the ICBM program, since a powerful missile would be required to boost the satellite into orbit.²⁰

At the service level, direct supervision of development and production of IRBMs came under special organizations operating to some extent outside of regular channels. The Air Force placed IRBM #1 (Thor) under the Western Development Division, which already had responsibility for the ICBM. General Schriever, although officially responsible to the Air Research and Development Command, reported directly to the secretary of the Air Force. The Army established the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), a new command at Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama, headed by Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris, under the chief of ordnance. The Navy set up in Washington a Special Projects Office headed by Rear Adm. William F. Raborn, who reported directly to the secretary of the Navy. Medaris and Raborn were given sweeping powers to call on other elements of their services for cooperation.²¹

Both IRBMs progressed on schedule. Early in 1956 they were given distinguishing names, following the pattern of "mythological" nomenclature established with Atlas and Titan; IRBM #1 became Thor and IRBM #2, Jupiter. Both IRBMs benefited greatly from kinship with weapons begun earlier; thus Thor used many components developed for Atlas. To reach the goal of earliest possible operational readiness for Thor, the Air Force adopted the practice of "concurrency," already used for the Atlas program. Under this practice, preparations for production, base construction, and training of operational personnel began even before the weapon had been successfully tested. Also, completion dates for all components and subsystems were programmed into an overall calendar to insure that they would progress concurrently. The Navy later adopted a similar practice, PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique), in connection with its submarine-launched missile, Polaris.²²

Jupiter drew heavily on Redstone, which furnished not only components but also rockets for testing. One composite vehicle, designated Jupiter C, beat Thor to the punch; fired on 20 September 1956, it achieved a flight of 2,960 nautical miles. However, Jupiter suffered from delayed recruitment of personnel until the Army remedied a shortage of housing at Redstone Arsenal.²³

The Jupiter project aimed at producing two missiles, for use on land and at sea respectively. The Army, having gained experience with Redstone, took the lead in designing the missile, but Navy scientists participated in modifying the design for shipboard use. The Navy established a research team at Redstone Arsenal to work with ABMA.²⁴

Of necessity, both Jupiter and Thor, like Atlas and Titan, were designed to use liquid propellants. Solid propellants, safer and more convenient to store and handle, had compelling advantages, especially for shipboard use. The Navy, as part of the Jupiter project, pursued research on solid propellants, coordinating its effort with that of the Air Force in the same field. The first program for a Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) force called for an interim capability of converted merchant ships with liquid-propellant Jupiter missiles by 1960, followed by submarines with solid-propellant missiles by 1962-63.²⁵

The first "state of the art" solid-propellant Jupiter weighed 160,000 pounds, making it appreciably heavier and clumsier than the land-based liquid-fueled Jupiter (which weighed 110,000 pounds when developed). Navy scientists designed a much more manageable weapon weighing only 30,000 pounds. However, it would require redesign of all components as well as development of a more efficient solid propellant.²⁶

Also of vital importance was the size of the thermonuclear warhead to be fitted onto the missile. Only large missiles could carry the warheads available at the beginning of 1956. But major progress lay ahead. In the summer of 1956 a study group of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), convened at the request of the chief of naval operations, surveyed the entire field of undersea warfare, including the prospects of arming submarines with long-range missiles. Edward Teller, the well-known nuclear scientist who was attending, urged the Navy to base its missile designs on the expectation that, in line with previous experience, the next generation of thermonuclear weapons would be significantly smaller and lighter. "Why use a 1958 warhead in a 1965 weapon system?" he was quoted as asking.²⁷

Teller's prediction was formally confirmed by the Atomic Energy Commission on 5 October 1956, in reply to a request from the Navy Department. According to the AEC, there was a 50-50 chance that a warhead of the necessary yield, weighing no more than 600 pounds, would be available for stockpile in 1963. Such a warhead would yield between 0.3 and 0.6 megatons at least. Shortly thereafter the Ballistic Missiles Scientific Advisory Committee rendered its judgment that by 1962-63 it would be possible to deliver a 600-pound warhead with a solid-propellant missile weighing approximately 30,000 pounds.²⁸

With these developments, Navy officials decided to withdraw from the Jupiter project and concentrate on development of the lightweight solid-propellant missile, named Polaris after the north pole star (*stella polaris*).²⁹ Accordingly, on 9 November 1956 Secretary of the Navy Thomas formally requested permission for the Navy to delete the proposed interim sea-based missile capability, using surface ships, at a saving of \$1.05 billion; to withdraw from collaboration with the Army on the IRBM; and to pursue at top priority the development of an "optimum" submarine IRBM capability, to be achieved by 1963.³⁰

Wilson's special adviser, Murphree, recommended approval of the Navy request. Comptroller McNeil concurred; he believed that the interim surface ship capability would not be worth the cost.³¹ Reportedly, Wilson was also briefed by Admiral Raborn, who emphasized the monetary savings resulting from the change.³²

On 8 December Wilson authorized the Navy to discontinue the surface ship program and pursue the optimum submarine capability at high priority, with help from ABMA as necessary. He also dissolved the joint Army-Navy Ballistic Missile Committee.³³

The Navy at once pressed ahead with the development of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program, leaving Jupiter entirely to the Army. The two services

set up separate ballistic missile committees, headed in each instance by the service secretary, like the existing committee in the Air Force.³⁴

In establishing the two IRBM development projects, Wilson had intentionally ignored the question of responsibility for their eventual operational assignment. He took the position that each missile should be developed as efficiently as possible without regard to user. He thus sought to exploit the advantage of technical competition without prejudging the question of roles and missions.³⁵

There was little doubt that the Air Force could establish a requirement for a 1,500-mile missile to complement its medium-range bombers. Whether the Army could do so, in the face of an adverse majority in the JCS, was doubtful. The question of the operational assignment of the missile provided the background against which the two development teams raced to be the first to produce a usable weapon.³⁶

Army partisans argued that, in the modern age of fast-moving warfare, the battle lines would be so fluid that artillerymen must provide fire support from distances perhaps hundreds of miles from the advancing forces. Hence a missile with a range of 1,000-1,500 miles was a "prime and critical requirement of the Atomic Age Army."³⁷ Brig. Gen. John P. Daley frankly told the Symington subcommittee that "we are looking toward the intercontinental ballistic missile, confident that we can develop weapons to maintain the integrity and the independence of the land soldier."³⁸ And General Taylor, before the same group, argued that any missile able to destroy enemy ground forces ought to be available to the Army. He drew a distinction between availability and exclusive possession. Long-range missiles, in his view, should be part of a "national arsenal," to be employed by any service that could justify their use.³⁹ To the Air Force, such arguments appeared as a claim to a mission traditionally performed by aircraft—striking at targets well behind the front in order to seal off the battlefield.⁴⁰

The question of the IRBM was one of a number of issues that arose between the services in 1956. The other services sought to limit the Army to missiles with a 200-mile range. Wilson in effect agreed with them when, in his directive of 26 November 1956, he ruled that Army missiles must not outrange the zone of operations, defined as extending not over 100 miles beyond and behind the front lines. The Army might make "limited feasibility studies" of missiles with longer ranges but was not to plan "at this time" for operational employment of the IRBM.

Wilson's directive also dealt with missiles for air defense, restating the responsibility of the Army for those used in point defense, the Air Force for area defense. The existing state of the art, according to the directive, justified development of point defense missiles with a horizontal range of approximately 100 miles; this relaxed the previous limitation of 50 miles. The Navy remained responsible, in cooperation with the other services, for developing ship-based air defense weapons. Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) was responsible for stating requirements for air defense weapons, and no service was to plan for missile installations in support of

CONAD unless they had been recommended by CONAD and approved by the JCS.⁴¹

Wilson's directive did not forbid the Army to continue development of Jupiter. The OSD BMC had considered canceling either Jupiter or Thor, but decided it was too early to try to make a choice between them.⁴² The president tacitly approved continuation of Jupiter at an NSC meeting of 11 January 1957. Nevertheless the decision of 26 November dealt a shattering blow to morale at Redstone Arsenal. Army missile experts were now devoting their efforts to a weapon that, if it succeeded, must be surrendered to another service.⁴³

The impact on ABMA was so great that one highly trusted officer was driven to commit a grave indiscretion. Col. John C. Nickerson, congressional liaison officer at Redstone Arsenal, took it upon himself to try to get Wilson's IRBM decision reversed. In a paper entitled "Considerations on the Wilson Memorandum," Nickerson argued that the Army had a legitimate requirement for an IRBM and had led the field in developing surface-to-surface missiles. Not content to stop there, however, Nickerson went on to impugn Wilson's good faith and to accuse him of being unduly influenced by Admiral Radford (a "bitter enemy of the U.S. Army") and by lobbyists for corporations engaged in developing Thor.⁴⁴

Nickerson leaked copies of his paper to people who might prove sympathetic to his cause. One copy went to Jack Anderson, an associate of the well-known columnist Drew Pearson, who had often indulged in corrosive criticism of administration officials. Pearson acted responsibly; he showed the paper to an Air Force official, both to get a reply and to determine whether the memorandum contained classified information (as in fact it did). The official at once referred the paper to higher authority. When it reached Wilson, he confiscated it, classified it "secret," and launched an official investigation which quickly fixed guilt on Nickerson. Charged with divulging classified information, insubordination, and perjury, Nickerson eventually pleaded guilty to lesser charges and received a relatively light sentence.

Wilson kept out of the affair, content to let the Army handle it. Neither he nor other OSD officials allowed the incident to affect their administration of the missile program. What effect it may have had on service friction is difficult to say. General Medaris (who praised Wilson for his restraint) thought that it helped to harden Air Force opposition to any long-range missile capability in the Army.⁴⁵

Pearson asked OSD to return the memorandum, pointing out that he was already familiar with its contents and could make them public if he wished. DoD General Counsel Robert Dechert declined to return it for fear of prejudicing the case against Nickerson, which was then in preparation.⁴⁶ Pearson visited the Pentagon on 19 March 1957, intending, as he wrote, to "have it out" at a press conference. Wilson, however, not only stuck to his guns but won over Pearson by his "charm and frankness." "You can't go on arguing with anyone as nice as Charlie Wilson," Pearson wrote in his column on 27 March. Thereupon the two exchanged cordial

letters. Wilson thanked Pearson for his kind words; Pearson expressed the hope that Wilson would remain in office.⁴⁷

Deployment Planning

During 1956 progress on the ICBM made it necessary for the Air Force to begin preparations for deployment of these weapons. For each missile, Air Force plans contemplated establishment of an "initial operational capability" (IOC), using prototype weapons placed in operation before flight testing was complete.⁴⁸

In a plan submitted to the OSD BMC on 26 July 1956, the Air Force proposed an ICBM force to consist of one launching complex (three launchers) by March 1959 and a complete wing (3 bases with 40 missiles each, or 120 in all) by March 1961. Meeting the schedule required that all the bases be "soft," i.e., unprotected from nuclear blasts. As for the IRBM, it would be deployed overseas in order to be within range of Soviet bloc targets: initially 2 squadrons (each with 15 missiles) in place by June 1959 and one wing (8 squadrons) by June 1960.⁴⁹

A more complete Air Force plan, drafted in November 1956, reflected better estimates of funds available. It provided for an IOC consisting of 4 squadrons each of Atlas and Titan, with 10 missiles per squadron, all operational by the end of March 1961, except that the final Titan squadron would not acquire its full complement of missiles until July 1961. The IOC force of the IRBM would consist of four squadrons, to become operational between July 1959 and July 1960.⁵⁰

Air Force representatives presented this plan to the BMC in December 1956. It called for a planned rate of production for Thor of six missiles per month, on a two-shift basis. For Atlas and Titan, monthly production rates would be six and seven per month respectively. The BMC approved the plan in principle, subject to submission of further details concerning funding.⁵¹

On 11 January 1957 the NSC heard reports from Murphree and from the heads of the service programs—Medaris, Raborn, and Schriever. Murphree proposed to continue both Jupiter and Thor far enough into 1957 to make certain that at least one would succeed. The council merely noted and discussed these proposals.⁵²

Because the Air Force needed a decision, the NSC, at Wilson's request, considered the proposed deployment plan on 28 March. The president approved it, noting that the objective was to achieve initial operational capability for the IRBM and the ICBM "at the earliest practicable date," in accordance with the NSC decision of September 1955. He also requested that DoD prepare a report indicating the relative military advantage of these missiles in comparison with others expected to be available at the same time and with manned aircraft.⁵³

The report was prepared for OSD by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG). The director of WSEG, Lt. Gen. Samuel E. Anderson, presented

the findings to the NSC on 20 June. The report concluded that, for the period under consideration (1961-67), manned aircraft would remain superior to both aerodynamic and ballistic missiles (at least those of the first generation) in accuracy, payload, and target acquisition. Hence, aircraft would remain the primary weapon for attacking the majority of targets, but missiles would complement the aircraft and complicate the enemy's defensive problems.⁵⁴

Overseas deployment of IRBMs would require advance agreement from foreign countries. As early as 21 May 1956, Assistant Secretary Gray told the State Department that the JCS had recommended discussions with other countries on the assumption that base facilities would be needed by 1958. They had listed Turkey, Norway, the United Kingdom, Japan, Okinawa, and France as the most desirable locations.⁵⁵ Discussions with the United Kingdom began in 1956, and in March 1957 Prime Minister Harold Macmillan agreed in principle to the placement of U.S. IRBMs in his country. A detailed agreement was concluded in 1958, and actual deployment followed soon after. By that time, discussions were under way with several other allied nations.*

Problems of siting long-range missiles in the United States engaged the attention of the Armed Forces Policy Council in March and April 1957. Air Force officials recommended initial deployment in the north central states. Some of the suggested sites would require discussion with Canada, since they might result in missile overflights of that country. Wilson postponed any decision on deployment of Atlas or Titan until more information became available on their performance and the JCS could study the matter.⁵⁶

Army Tactical Missiles

Denied the use of Jupiter, the Army pinned its hopes on Redstone as the most promising weapon for tactical support of troops. With a range of 175 miles (well within the limit of 200 laid down by Wilson), Redstone was expected to go into production in FY 1958. It had disadvantages of weight (62,000 pounds) and use of liquid fuel.⁵⁷

Hopes for improvement of Redstone rested on the possibility of a lighter warhead (thus a smaller and lighter missile) and a solid propellant. On 15 June 1957 Secretary Brucker informed Wilson of significant progress toward both these goals. Already in sight were a Redstone with a range of 400-500 miles and an unnamed solid-propellant missile, highly mobile and transportable by air and less than one-quarter the size of Redstone, with a range of 100-500 miles. Brucker asked Wilson to authorize the Army to pursue these projects.⁵⁸

Wilson sent this request to Radford for comment, calling attention to the limit of 200 miles established for Army missiles. Was there now, he

* See Chapters XVI and XVII for missile discussions with the allies.

asked, an operational requirement by the Army, or by another service, for a 500-mile missile? Meanwhile he asked Brucker for more information about the Army's plans.⁵⁹

Radford referred Wilson's query to his colleagues, who split along predictable lines. Radford, Burke, and Twining saw no need for a 500-mile missile for any service. Taylor believed that the Army required such a missile and that it should be available to other services as necessary. A 500-mile missile would be an important addition to the "national arsenal" in Taylor's view, because it would fill a gap between the present Redstone and the 1,500-mile IRBM. Moreover, there was evidence that the Soviets possessed such a weapon, and why should the U.S. Army be inferior in equipment to its most dangerous enemy?⁶⁰

While Wilson's decision impended, information about the Army missile proposals leaked to the press in exaggerated form. On 1 August reporters asked Wilson about a supposed 800-mile missile being developed by the Army. "Well, if they are going ahead with it, I don't think they're going very far," he replied. He did not correct the reporters' misstatement of the range of the proposed missile.⁶¹

When Army officials drew the president's attention to the reporters' error, which seemed to have Wilson's tacit acceptance, Eisenhower was moved to intervene. He had learned that the Army had taken no action to violate Wilson's limit but had merely requested authority to extend the range of Redstone to 500 miles in order to provide greater flexibility in operations, while depending on the Air Force, as usual, for reconnaissance of targets. "Actually the whole proposition seems sensible to me," he wrote in his diary. He was "disturbed" by the implication that Army officials were violating Wilson's orders, when, in fact, they had acted quite properly. Eisenhower called Taylor and suggested that he confer with Wilson.⁶²

Taylor met with Wilson on 6 August and confirmed that with a slightly different warhead and a solid propellant, Redstone could achieve a range of 500 miles at a relatively modest cost of some \$50 million. Summarizing this conference for the president the next day, Wilson expressed doubt that a 500-mile missile would be worth the cost. The president, however, thought that it would be useful in backing up the front lines. He would never, he added, have approved development of a 500-mile missile as a primary objective, but a range extension for an existing missile seemed a different matter. Wilson explained that Redstone was already obsolete; what was needed was a mobile land-based missile—a smaller version of Polaris. He proposed to discuss the matter further after he had more information.⁶³

On 8 August Brucker's office furnished the additional information that Wilson had requested, setting forth the advantages of a mobile, dispersible missile with a 500-mile range, deployed in relatively secure areas, and available by the end of 1959 at a cost of \$45 million. The longer-range project—a smaller solid-fuel missile—was conservatively estimated to cost

\$247 million over a nine-year period. It would fully exploit advances in all missile programs.⁶⁴

Wilson then drafted a memorandum for the president in which he recommended rejection of the interim liquid-fueled Redstone. He was, however, prepared to allow the Army to begin work on a solid-propellant missile weighing 10,000-15,000 pounds, with a 1,500-pound warhead and a range of approximately 200 nautical miles. With a lighter warhead, such a missile could attain a range of 500 miles at reasonable cost.⁶⁵

Wilson took this memorandum to the White House on 12 August for a conference with the president, attended also by Brucker, Quarles, Radford, and Army Vice Chief of Staff General Lyman L. Lemnitzer. In the absence of Goodpaster, Maj. John Eisenhower, the president's son, acted as recorder and later recalled that the meeting was "as intense and as disagreeable as any I ever attended." Wilson, he wrote, was "quietly furious about having the matter brought up at all." Wilson described the disadvantages of Redstone—its size, weight, and reliance on a liquid propellant—and recommended moving at once to a solid-propellant missile. Brucker and Lemnitzer saw value in the modified Redstone and added that its cost would be modest. Radford took his stand on the 200-mile limit for the Army, which, he said, the JCS still considered valid. The IRBM, he pointed out, which was designed for a minimum range as low as 300 miles, could cover gaps in the range spectrum. The president judged it unwise to take a rigid view of missile ranges or of service roles and missions, and acknowledged the morale problem for a service that felt its talents were not being properly used. Speaking no doubt from his own experience, he commented on the difficulty for ground commanders to be dependent on the Air Force, which sometimes gave tactical support of troops a low priority.

In the end, the president overruled Wilson and Radford and decided in favor of the Army. No service was to be restricted to a rigid range limit; specifically, the Army was not to be denied a 500-mile missile merely on the grounds of its range.⁶⁶

Following the meeting, Major Eisenhower, alert to protect the interests of his service, took steps to insure that the president's oral decision was not overlooked or lost in the maze of Pentagon bureaucracy. He took his memorandum of the meeting to his father and had it initialed, after which he prepared a written record of the decision and sent it to Wilson.⁶⁷

As a follow-up to this incident, Wilson sought the views of the new JCS chairman, General Twining. Twining agreed with Radford that the Army had no need for a 500-mile missile and wanted the Army to concentrate on the small 200-mile missile, which would be useful for both U.S. and allied forces. His statement, of course, did not affect the decision of the president, who, a few months later, reasserted his desire for the Army to be equipped with missiles that could be sited well back from the battle area.⁶⁸

Other Missile Programs

Special Assistant for Guided Missiles Murphree, in accord with his charter, devoted most of his attention to the difficult and demanding problems associated with the ICBM and IRBM. He did not, however, neglect other programs. Wilson in fact specifically sought his advice from time to time on some of these.⁶⁹

Murphree had accepted the appointment with the stipulation that he would stay for only one year. When his term of office expired on 3 April 1957, Wilson apparently experienced some difficulty in finding a successor. A month elapsed before the announcement that William M. Holaday, formerly deputy assistant secretary of defense for research and development, was assuming the position. Murphree continued to serve Wilson as a part-time adviser and in fact remained as chairman of the BMC until his successor was appointed.⁷⁰

By the time of Holaday's appointment, Wilson had decided to broaden the scope of the position. On 3 May he authorized Holaday to coordinate practically all DoD missile activities, including, in addition to the IRBM and ICBM programs, the following: Redstone and other ballistic missiles of equal range; the cruise missiles Navaho and Snark; Triton (a Navy cruise missile with a range comparable to Polaris); the antiballistic missile program; and, most sweeping of all, "guided missile range extensions and utilization." He would remain chairman of the BMC, which was given supervisory authority over the scientific earth satellite program (Vanguard) then in progress.⁷¹

Holaday inherited Murphree's staff and continued also to draw on the resources of the assistant secretaries of defense. Their number had been reduced by one on 18 March 1957, when Wilson formally combined the assistant secretaryships for research and development and for applications engineering. Frank D. Newbury, who held the latter position, assumed the new post of assistant secretary for research and engineering. From his old office, Newbury retained an organization along functional lines, with subdivisions for various major fields of weaponry, including an Office of Guided Missiles, which coordinated its activities with Holaday's office. The Joint Coordinating Committee on Guided Missiles also passed under the control of the new assistant secretary, with enlarged membership to include representation from SAGM and a scope of activity broadened to embrace ground control equipment and training devices as well as missile components proper.⁷²

Of the programs newly placed under the jurisdiction of the SAGM, the most significant, in terms of its future potential, was the antiballistic missile. This was an extrapolation from the antiaircraft missile. Even an attacking missile such as the ICBM, traveling at many times the speed of sound, might be vulnerable to destruction by one of its own kind that could match its speed and maneuverability.

The potentialities of antimissile defense had in fact been recognized

by the services shortly after World War II. The Army and the Air Force undertook serious research in the field. Apparently by coincidence, they pursued complementary lines of research. The Army focused on developing a missile (one of the Nike "family"), while the Air Force concentrated on long-range radar detection of hostile missiles.⁷³

In March 1956 Assistant Secretary Furnas, at Wilson's direction, established a committee headed by Hector R. Skifter to study the feasibility of an anti-ICBM. The committee concluded that a system to detect approaching missiles was feasible and could provide 8-25 minutes' warning time. An active defense, to intercept the missiles, presented much greater difficulty and should be studied carefully in the light of probable costs.⁷⁴

This report went to a higher level committee, chaired by Murphree and including Army and Air Force representatives. The members recommended proceeding on a research basis, with the Air Force to develop the early warning system, the Army the weapon with associated equipment. This division would accord with the ultimate operational roles of the two services. Wilson approved these recommendations and directed the two services to proceed with the research program, to be monitored by OSD.⁷⁵

An Army study completed in October 1956 showed that Nike-Zeus, already in prospect as an improvement on Ajax and Hercules, could be adapted for missile defense. The Army at once began developing "hardware." By that time the Air Force had in progress studies of "forward acquisition" radars which would form the outermost defensive ring.⁷⁶

Murphree's anti-ICBM committee recommended on 21 March 1957 a further delineation of responsibilities. Wilson approved its recommendations that the Air Force, besides developing the forward acquisition radars, should be responsible for transmission of information to the active defense system, that the Army should develop the radars for local acquisition and target tracking, and that an Army-Air Force committee should be established to coordinate the effort.⁷⁷

The NSC discussed missile defense on 11 April 1957 in connection with basic national security policy. A paper drafted by the Planning Board (NSC 5707/4) had suggested greater attention to both active and passive defense. The president, however, doubted that pouring more money into research would help.⁷⁸

On 5 September, after the Soviet Union announced its successful test of an intercontinental missile, Brucker told Wilson that an anti-ICBM system was urgently needed. He asked for additional funds for Nike-Zeus and a "national priority" for the system equivalent to that already accorded ICBM development. Wilson, however, took no action at that time.⁷⁹

Satellite Programs

From firing missiles that would operate above earth's atmosphere, whether for offensive or defensive purposes, the next step in rocketry was

to escape earth's gravitational field entirely. The hope of planetary exploration yet remained in the realm of science fiction, but a less ambitious intermediate step appeared feasible: to use rockets to hurl into rotation around the earth a man-made satellite fitted with instruments that would yield new data on astronomy, meteorology, and other sciences, or, alternatively, with equipment to carry out military missions such as reconnaissance or communications relay. The possibility accorded neatly with missile research, which could provide the powerful launch vehicles needed. By 1955 all the services had prepared tentative plans for launching satellites.⁸⁰

Although the Killian report in 1955 stressed the importance of a satellite for military purposes, the first one took shape under civilian auspices. Earlier, the International Council of Scientific Unions had agreed to sponsor a period of international cooperation to study various aspects of the earth and its upper atmosphere. The period of study was set at 18 months (July 1957-December 1958), although it was commonly referred to as the International Geophysical Year (IGY). American scientists would participate through the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). A plan for an orbiting research satellite, as part of the IGY, emerged from discussions between American geophysicists and their foreign colleagues. The National Science Foundation (NSF), a presidentially appointed body set up in 1950 to underwrite research, appeared as a possible source of federal funding.⁸¹

On the initiative of the NAS and the NSF, the Eisenhower administration in 1955 approved a proposal for a small satellite to be launched by DoD by 1958. Full information about the program would be made available to the international scientific community so long as no classified information was thereby compromised.⁸²

Within DoD, Assistant Secretary for Research and Development Quarles took charge of the project. He appointed an ad hoc Advisory Group on Special Capabilities, which reviewed service satellite proposals and approved one (later called Vanguard) by the Naval Research Laboratory to use a Navy rocket (Viking) to orbit a 34-pound satellite. A joint Army-Navy proposal, Orbiter, to use Redstone rockets and a smaller satellite, was rejected as technically inferior. The Air Force had proposed using Atlas to launch a 150-pound payload, but its plan would interfere with ICBM development.⁸³

OSD gave the Navy responsibility for managing the Vanguard program under the overall supervision of the advisory group.⁸⁴ Since OSD had not budgeted for the project, money had to come from emergency and contingency funds and the NAS and NSF.⁸⁵

The original Vanguard schedule called for six test launchings, all from the Air Force Missile Test Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida, between October 1956 and August 1957. There would follow an actual satellite launch (the first of six) about October 1957. Had this schedule been met, it would have put Vanguard in a dead heat with Sputnik.⁸⁶

Vanguard soon outran its initial cost projection of \$20 million. Wilson wrote the president on 5 April 1956 that the new estimate was \$60 million. At the same time, he noted, the NSF had submitted a supplemental budget

request to provide for six additional satellite vehicles, which, if approved, would cost DoD \$20 million more in unbudgeted funds. In an NSC meeting on 3 May 1956, the president agreed to make additional money available. He also directed that Vanguard be given sufficient priority to insure the launching of a satellite before the end of the IGY.⁸⁷

The Army was prepared to make satellite launching missiles available. Colonel Nickerson of ABMA appeared before the advisory group in April 1956 and offered the use of a Redstone test vehicle to launch a satellite in January 1957. It would require no additional funds, since the vehicle was already scheduled to be fired at that time. Six more attempts could be made by the end of 1958, Nickerson added, if money were provided. On recommendation of the advisory group, OSD rejected the offer because it might delay the military missile program and because there seemed no reason to doubt the success of Vanguard.⁸⁸

When the NSC again discussed Vanguard on 24 January 1957, the president ordered that the satellite program continue. Also, looking past its completion, he directed the Planning Board, in the light of experience gained from Vanguard, to prepare a report on whether "broad national security interests" would require a continuing program "for making explorations in and from the outer regions about the earth." This marked the first step toward a national space policy.⁸⁹

Costs of the program continued to mount. On 28 January 1957 Wilson told BoB that Defense would absorb extra costs for 1957 but that additional funds would be required in subsequent years. The president, alarmed, requested DoD to submit a new report to the NSC on the accomplishments and cost of the program, with an indication of how economies might be realized.⁹⁰

The program meanwhile had been lagging behind schedule. The first two test firings, scheduled for October and December 1956, did not take place until 8 December 1956 and 1 May 1957. The first "live" satellite launch had been moved back to March 1958.⁹¹

On 10 May 1957 the NSC once more reviewed Vanguard. Cost estimates by then had risen to \$110 million. The president directed DoD and the NSF to go to the cognizant congressional committees for the amount needed. On a more hopeful note, he requested DoD to report immediately if one of the test vehicles successfully orbited a satellite—a possibility that never arose.⁹²

With Vanguard slipping, another look at alternatives seemed in order. In June 1957 the advisory group warned Holaday that it might prove impossible to launch a Vanguard satellite at any time during the IGY, i.e., before the end of 1958. They suggested using the Army's modified Redstone reentry vehicle (Jupiter C), already successfully tested and available for an immediate launch. Holaday, however, vetoed the suggestion. Until there was clear evidence of Vanguard failure, he said, DoD would not go again to the NSC. Neither he nor the president, added Holaday, was concerned about the possibility that the Soviet Union might put up a satellite first. If

scientists wanted a more ambitious program, they must find the additional money themselves.⁹³

There the situation remained for the next few months. At the beginning of October 1957—on the eve of Sputnik—the third Vanguard test vehicle sat at Cape Canaveral, where it had been since June after being delivered in incomplete condition by the contractor. A static test firing, after repeated postponements owing to malfunctions, had been set for 10 October. Subsequent test firings were now scheduled to be completed by March 1958, with the first satellite launch in April.⁹⁴

For satellites having military applications, the most advanced was the Air Force project 117L—a reconnaissance satellite designed by the Western Development Division to be launched with an Atlas rocket. By February 1957 the program had advanced far enough to enable Air Force officials to suggest using it to put a scientific satellite in orbit, but nothing came of the suggestion.⁹⁵

In September 1957 Holaday turned to the advisory group for a review of military satellite programs. The group's experience with Vanguard made it the largest available repository of information on satellite problems in general; the members had in fact reviewed the 117L project in 1956. Holaday now asked the group to submit general recommendations for a DoD military satellite program. He gave the group a deadline of March 1958 for reporting its findings.⁹⁶

Missile Programs Reviewed

The 85th Congress convened in January 1957 in a very different frame of mind from that of its predecessor a year earlier. Economy in federal expenditures overshadowed worry about the U.S.-Soviet weapons race—although the situation would change again before the year was out.*

The House Appropriations Committee focused specifically on missile programs as a possible source of waste. A staff report alleged extensive service duplication and rivalry in missile development. Deputy Secretary Robertson assured the committee that most instances of supposed duplication were either complementary or represented a policy of multiple approach. He admitted, however, that in one instance, two projects—the Navy's *Regulus* and the Air Force's *Matador*—might profitably have been combined.⁹⁷

Shortly thereafter, Wilson inadvertently triggered similar concern about missile duplication in the mind of the president. The Navy's *Polaris* program had never received the high priority assigned to the land-based IRBM and ICBM, and Navy officials warned the BMC that the lack of such a priority might delay *Polaris* by as much as a year. The BMC accordingly recommended a high priority for *Polaris*. On 19 April Wilson informed

* See Chapter IV.

Secretary of the Navy Gates that Polaris was "properly a part of the IRBM/ICBM program as considered by the NSC and directed by the President," and as such should enjoy the same priority.⁹⁸

The president heard of Wilson's action and wrote him on 26 April. Before any authorization was given for expenditures for Polaris, he wished to know the specific details of the proposed funding; an indication of the extent to which Polaris was included in, or would replace, IRBM/ICBM programs previously proposed; and how much additional funding the project would require if approved.⁹⁹

Wilson read this letter as an implied rebuke (which it was no doubt intended to be) for failing to consult the president in advance. He sent Eisenhower the information requested and at the same time offered a justification for his action. OSD had given details of Atlas, Titan, and Thor to the NSC on 28 March and the president had approved them, but there had been no intent to imply that these constituted the entire IRBM/ICBM program. His directive to the Navy intended merely to assign to an established project a material preference rating that would avoid delay. It would not interfere with land-based missile programs or increase the cost of Polaris. In view of these considerations, and of the fact that progress on Polaris had been regularly reported to the president each month, Wilson had not considered that he needed specific prior approval for his decision.¹⁰⁰

The president accepted Wilson's justification and did not pursue the matter further. He did, however, ask Wilson to furnish the NSC with detailed information on the cost and date of availability of each missile program and the extent to which their capabilities overlapped. The information was to be projected through FY 1965.¹⁰¹

Holaday and Deputy Secretary Quarles presented the information to the NSC on 3 July 1957. The first intercontinental missile to become operational, Snark, in 1959, would attain its maximum force of eight squadrons by 1961. Atlas, Titan, and Navaho would achieve operational status in 1959, 1960, and 1962 respectively, with 1965 objectives of 36 squadrons for Titan and 24 each for the other 2. For Thor/Jupiter (considered as a single force), the operational date was FY 1959, and the 1965 objective 16 squadrons. Polaris would enter the force in FY 1963 with 2 submarines (each armed with 16 missiles), increasing to 6 vessels by 1965.¹⁰²

The president apparently drew from this meeting the conclusion that a good deal of duplication existed in missile development. On 8 July he wrote Wilson expressing gratification that some missile programs were scheduled to be phased out, including Corporal, Nike-Ajax, and the earlier versions of Matador and Regulus. Pairs of missiles that he singled out as apparently overlapping included Jupiter and Thor, Navaho and Snark, Atlas and Titan, Nike and Talos (land-based), and Polaris and Triton. He asked Wilson to suggest programs for elimination.¹⁰³

Before replying, Wilson took several actions to lower the costs of missile programs. These were inspired in part by a general need to reduce military expenditures, which, in the summer of 1957, were running at a

rate that jeopardized hopes for a balanced budget. Already Wilson had under scrutiny the use of overtime labor in connection with IRBM/ICBM projects. At his request, the BMC investigated and found that the ratio of overtime to total hours was running at approximately 4 percent for Polaris, 13 percent for Jupiter, and 14 percent for Air Force missile projects. Elimination of all overtime was not feasible; some was needed to offset short-term fluctuations in employment and in connection with test firings, since checkout and countdown, once begun, had to continue around the clock. The BMC agreed that the ratio of overtime to total hours should be reduced to 8 percent by 1 January 1958 except for test firings. Holaday at once directed the Army and Air Force to comply with this limit.¹⁰⁴

Wilson also moved to end the dual development of land-based IRBMs. The NSC had by implication approved the continuation of both Thor and Jupiter, and OSD had allocated funds to extend Jupiter at least through November 1957.¹⁰⁵ On 31 July, however, Wilson told the president that he proposed to appoint a committee to evaluate both programs and recommend one that, when adopted, would be under Air Force management. Meanwhile, he would suspend or cancel the production of both missiles except those needed for testing and eliminate overtime except that needed for flight testing or emergencies. He recommended further that the priority of Titan be reduced as an economy measure. Atlas should continue at high priority, but with a careful study of the use of overtime. Since these measures altered the NSC decision mandating the highest priority for ICBMs, Wilson obtained the president's approval of these measures on 1 August.¹⁰⁶

Accordingly, on 13 August Wilson appointed a committee composed of Generals Medaris and Schriever, with Holaday as chairman, to recommend by 15 September a plan for a single land-based IRBM. At the same time, he instructed the Army and the Air Force to commit no further funds beyond those needed for monthly production rates of one Jupiter and two Thor missiles through 1958, except for long lead-time commitments up to 12 months. He also directed that overtime in connection with Jupiter and Thor be limited to three percent of basic man-hours for the purpose of resolving bottlenecks, plus a "reasonable amount" in direct support of testing.¹⁰⁷

During August Wilson ordered the Air Force to reduce production of Thor and Titan to two per month, and of Atlas to four. He also imposed the three percent overtime limit on Atlas and Titan, with the same exception as for Thor and Jupiter. In a separate action, Holaday limited Polaris to three percent of overtime hours after being assured that this action would not jeopardize the program. Wilson had already directed a five percent reduction of effort on Polaris.¹⁰⁸

Atlas and Titan had by now progressed so well that it was possible to dispense with Navaho, which had been overtaken by technology. On 9 July 1957 Wilson approved the Air Force recommendation to cancel Navaho. Navaho's smaller but more advanced brother, Snark, survived; it was slower than Navaho but more difficult to detect owing to its small radar target

and low-level approach. The goal was 1 Snark squadron (15 missiles) by FY 1959, increasing to 8 squadrons by 1961.¹⁰⁹

On 9 August Wilson replied to the president's inquiry of 8 July about programs that might be eliminated. He cited steps already taken to reduce the scope and cost of the missile program: cancellation of Navaho, proposed elimination of Thor or Jupiter, and production cutback for Atlas and Titan. Regarding Nike and Talos, the final objectives had not been determined, but it was expected that they would be merged into one program, with increases in one balanced by reductions in the other. Discussions under way with the Navy concerned elimination of either Triton or Regulus II, which had ranges comparable to Polaris (1,200 and 1,000 miles respectively). Other programs under review included Bomarc, Redstone, and two Air Force air-to-surface missiles under development, one designed for the B-52, the other for the supersonic B-58 that was soon to join the active forces.¹¹⁰

The discussions with the Navy to which Wilson referred bore fruit a few weeks later, when the Navy announced the cancellation of Triton.¹¹¹ Shortly thereafter the Navy branched out in a new direction through an agreement with the Air Force to develop a land-based Polaris.¹¹² This was the sort of project to which neither Wilson nor the president would likely object, involving as it did full interservice collaboration from the outset.

Meanwhile, on 12 September Air Force officials discussed ICBM and IRBM monthly production rates with Wilson. The four-missile rate, they pointed out, would delay by periods of three months to over a year the IOC of Atlas, Titan, and Thor, as compared with the existing schedule based on a projected output of six per month for Atlas and Thor and seven for Titan. However, the delay for Titan would allow for the construction of fully "hardened" facilities to protect against atomic blast. A rate of two per month would mean further delays of more than a year for all three missiles. Wilson made no decision but stressed the administration's difficulties in trying to hold down expenditures.¹¹³

In response to a request from the Air Force, in October Wilson authorized production of Atlas and Titan to rise to four per month, Atlas by the second quarter of 1959 and Titan by the beginning of 1961. These schedules would meet the deadline projected by the Air Force: for Atlas, the first launching complex by July 1959, the complete IOC (four squadrons) by October 1961; for Titan, corresponding goals of November 1961 and October 1962 respectively. However, Wilson added, production rates beyond 1959 were for planning purposes only and subject to review.¹¹⁴

Wilson later suffered severe criticism for these economy moves, which came shortly before Sputnik. It is unlikely that they had much effect, since most were canceled within a few months. General Schriever was convinced that the cutback in Thor production delayed the program, though he could not say by how much.¹¹⁵ The overtime restrictions seem to have had little result during the time they were in force. Wilson in fact showed himself flexible in this matter; on 16 September, in reply to a reclama by Brucker,

he raised the limit on overtime hours at ABMA from three to five percent of the total, although at the same time he rebuked Brucker for reports of abuse of overtime at Huntsville.¹¹⁶ Following Sputnik, General Schriever told Holaday that the Air Force could continue to "live with" the three percent limit, and the Navy found no reason to ask for relief from the same restriction in connection with Polaris.¹¹⁷

On 1 October Wilson directed that all DoD contracts be performed without the use of overtime except when specifically authorized. As an exception, service secretaries might authorize overtime for continuous tests that otherwise could not reasonably be completed. This clause provided a loophole for missile testing. Deputy Secretary Quarles informed the service secretaries that compliance with the directive was "desirable but not mandatory" for urgent ballistic missile programs.¹¹⁸

While officials in Washington strove to balance weapons requirements against economy, ballistic missile projects continued to advance, though at an uneven pace. On 31 May 1957 a Jupiter missile fired at Cape Canaveral achieved its full range of 1,500 miles. This was the first successful test of a complete IRBM, but it did not mean that all problems had been solved. In particular, the best design of the nose cone, to withstand the tremendous heat generated when the missile reentered the atmosphere, remained to be chosen. Recovery of a nose cone from a Jupiter C reentry test vehicle on 8 August 1957 demonstrated the superiority of the "ablation" method favored by the Army (involving a covering material that peeled away, carrying excess heat with it) over the "heat-sink" design being pursued by the Air Force, in which the nose cone was designed to absorb the heat.¹¹⁹

The Air Force was less successful in its tests. Thor failed three times between January and August 1957; not until 20 September did a Thor missile achieve a flight of approximately full range (1,300 miles). Two Atlas firings, in June and September, likewise miscarried; both times the missiles were destroyed on command, with results readily visible to reporters and others witnesses at Cape Canaveral. Earlier, these spectators had seen the successful Jupiter flight of 31 May; in the absence of official confirmation, some had erroneously believed that it was an Atlas. Not until after Sputnik did a U.S. intercontinental missile achieve its full 5,000-mile range; this was the subsonic cruise missile Snark, fired from Cape Canaveral on 31 October. President Eisenhower, speaking to the nation on 7 November, cited this Snark flight and pointed to the recovered Jupiter C nose cone as evidence of U.S. missile progress.¹²⁰

Accepting failures as only temporary, the Air Force pressed ahead with preparations for the approaching day when long-range missiles would become operational. Camp Cooke, California, an Army base selected as the site for the first ICBM installation, was formally transferred to the Air Force in May 1957. The 1st Missile Division, already activated there on 15 April 1957, included units to provide training for Atlas, Thor, and Titan. Camp Cooke was soon to be renamed for the late General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force chief of staff from 1948 to 1953.¹²¹

Polaris meanwhile was gaining on its earlier established rivals. Requirements for the system, established between March and May 1957, called for 16 missiles on each submarine, the missile weighing 38,500 pounds with a length of 28 feet. Initial operational capability was set for 1 January 1963. The Navy's 1959 budget submission on 10 October 1957 included funds for construction of the first of six programmed submarines. Behind the scenes, Navy scientists were making remarkable headway with the staggering problems involved in fixing the precise location of a submarine at the instant of launch, holding it steady during firing, and steering the missile to its target without radio guidance. Their progress soon made possible a significant acceleration of the program.¹²²

The press and public had an incomplete picture of missile development. The accounts of unsuccessful test launches suggested a program that was seriously lagging, especially when contrasted with the announced success of the Soviet ICBM on 27 August. The administration's economy measures, widely reported in the press, seemed to indicate that weapons development was being subordinated to fiscal prudence. Commenting in August 1957 on Wilson's impending departure, Hanson W. Baldwin wrote that the secretary "is leaving with a trail of canceled projects," and added that the ax of economy "has bitten rather deeply into the nation's tremendous missile program."¹²³ The news of Sputnik greatly amplified the criticism of the administration in general and of Wilson in particular.

Initial Effects of Sputnik

Neil McElroy, whose appointment as secretary of defense was announced in August 1957, visited Redstone Arsenal on 4 October as part of a tour to familiarize himself with military installations. Accompanying him were Secretary Brucker, General Lemnitzer, and Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, the Army's chief of research and development. After being briefed during the day by Von Braun and others, the visitors attended a cocktail party that evening followed by a formal dinner. Suddenly news came through that the Soviets had announced the launching of Sputnik. General Medaris received the information from his public relations officer in the middle of a conversation with McElroy. Shortly thereafter, as Lemnitzer recalled, "the telephone started ringing all over the post," with reporters seeking information. When the dinner began, Medaris and Von Braun, flanking McElroy, seized the opportunity to emphasize that ABMA had the equipment and knowledge to orbit a satellite at once. The next morning, before McElroy's noontime departure, briefing officers continued to stress Army capabilities. "We all felt like football players," wrote Medaris later, "begging to be allowed to get off the bench and go into the game, to restore some measure of the Free World's damaged pride."¹²⁴

This experience provided McElroy with a striking introduction to the difficulties of his position. The apparent existence of a "gap" between Soviet

and U.S. missile capacity would provide the basis for the most acrimonious controversy of his two-year tenure. Sputnik triggered widespread anxiety over the extraordinary technological capability demonstrated by the Soviets. The president remained calm while he and his advisers considered how to respond to the phenomenon.

The restrictions imposed on missile programs during the economy drive attracted early attention. On 8 October 1957, his last full day in office, Wilson approved an Army request to remove all restrictions on overtime for the Jupiter program and canceled the five percent reduction that he had imposed on Polaris.¹²⁵ On the same day, Holaday informed Secretary Douglas that OSD would entertain a request for removal of overtime restrictions on the ICBMs.¹²⁶

On 18 October, little more than a week after taking office, McElroy stressed to the service secretaries the importance of maintaining missile programs on schedule. "All of the requests for permission to utilize overtime in the missile programs of which I am aware have been approved by this office," he wrote. However, he requested the secretaries to advise Holaday of any further actions needed to remove obstacles to progress and to furnish Holaday with a short weekly memorandum on missile progress, marking a copy for McElroy's own "personal attention." In closing, he assured the secretaries of his "constant availability" to assist in any way in resolving any problems connected with missile development.¹²⁷

When the president suggested to McElroy the removal of overtime restrictions on missile projects, McElroy replied on 21 October, reviewing the actions already taken. The Army had been given complete relief from overtime limitations; the Navy and the Air Force had assured him that the remaining regulations were acceptable. "I will use all means at my disposal to insure that the ballistic missile programs remain on schedule," he promised.¹²⁸

A more intractable issue came to a head about the time of Sputnik—the choice between Thor and Jupiter. The three-man committee appointed by Wilson spent some weeks in futile wrangling, with Medaris and Schriever ardently defending their respective missiles. Wilson told Eisenhower on 8 October that Jupiter's test results were substantially better and that he would choose that missile if he had to decide. The president, however, thought that Wilson should leave the question to his successor. McElroy thus found himself forced to render a decision on this matter before he was fairly settled in office.¹²⁹

The NSC discussed Thor and Jupiter on 10 October. McElroy, no doubt acting on the advice of Holaday and Quarles, recommended that both missiles continue under development until fully tested. This seemed the only possible course of action, given the failure of the ad hoc committee to find a basis for choice. The president approved this recommendation. At the same time, he stressed the political and psychological importance of achieving both an IRBM and an ICBM with the desired range and reasonable accuracy. He also instructed McElroy to consider a suitable management structure

for the ICBM and IRBM programs—perhaps an organization like the Manhattan District set up in World War II to develop the atomic bomb.¹³⁰

On 31 October McElroy officially informed Brucker and Douglas of the president's decision. He authorized production of each missile at the rate of two per month for development purposes. Two weeks later, at Douglas's request, McElroy removed the three percent overtime limit and authorized use of overtime as needed for Thor, thus placing it on the same basis as Jupiter.¹³¹ On 22 November overtime restrictions on ICBMs were lifted.¹³²

The Army had meanwhile begun an effort to obtain recognition of its satellite launching capabilities. On 7 October Brucker pointed out to Wilson that the Army's three-stage Jupiter C could be used to orbit a satellite within 4 months by adding a fourth stage engine, at a cost of some \$13 million. Quarles at once relayed the offer to the president, who, however, saw no need to modify existing procedures. On the following day the White House released a statement congratulating Soviet scientists on their success and adding that the U.S. effort "has never been conducted as a race with other nations." The present program, "well designed and properly scheduled," would go forward as planned.¹³³

Two weeks later Brucker again offered the services of ABMA, receiving this time a qualified acceptance. McElroy informed him on 8 November that two Vanguard launchings were scheduled in March 1958, but only if test firings planned in December were successful. Hence, he authorized Brucker to prepare for two Jupiter C launchings in March, with the actual dates to be set later.¹³⁴

For General Medaris, it was not enough to stand waiting in the wings while Vanguard was given further tryouts. He threatened to resign unless ABMA received immediate authorization to launch a satellite on a fixed date. His vehement protests were upheld by Gavin, Lemnitzer, and Brucker. Before the end of November, ABMA obtained from Holaday what Medaris called an "understanding," later confirmed in writing, to plan for a launch in January.¹³⁵

Within a few weeks of taking office, McElroy recognized a need for a source of scientific advice and met it by upgrading the Defense Science Board (DSB). The role of the DSB had been under discussion for some months. Established in 1956 by Assistant Secretary Furnas, it came under Newbury when he assumed the research function. Newbury's relations with the board were not happy; some members disagreed with his view of the scope of the board's activities and felt that he had a tendency to make "one-man" decisions. Disagreement came to a head on 4 April 1957 when DSB members decided to discontinue regularly scheduled meetings; they would meet only when called to consider specific issues.¹³⁶

Matters had apparently not been straightened out before Wilson left. After some discussion with board members and with Assistant Secretary Paul D. Foote (Newbury's replacement), Quarles approved a directive on 30 October 1957 that made the DSB advisory to the secretary of defense, through Foote. The board received a somewhat broader mission statement

and a larger membership, which now included the chairmen of the Ballistic Missiles Scientific Advisory Committee and of the similarly named committee in the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) (soon to become the President's Science Advisory Committee). These changes seem to have satisfied the DSB members.¹³⁷

Further action by the president followed soon after. On 7 November 1957, in his first talk to the nation after the two Sputniks, Eisenhower announced the creation of a position of special assistant for science and technology, to be filled by James R. Killian. The president added that he was directing Secretary McElroy to make certain that his executive in charge of missiles "is clothed with all the authority that the Secretary himself possesses in this field, so that no administrative or interservice block can occur." He and the secretary, he said, had agreed that any new missile or related program would in future, whenever practicable, "be put under a single manager and administered without regard to the separate services." This was the germ of what was to become the Advanced Research Projects Agency.¹³⁸

In line with the president's instruction, McElroy on 15 November upgraded Holaday's position to director of guided missiles, with power to "direct all activities" relating to research, development, engineering, production, and procurement of missiles. This was stronger and more sweeping than the original directive to SAGM, which had authorized him merely to "assist in the direction and coordination" of missile activities and had not included production among his responsibilities. The director could also "require" information and reports from agencies of OSD and the military departments.¹³⁹

In a press conference that day, McElroy explained that Holaday's authority now extended to missiles that were considered operational; these were still susceptible of improvement, and Holaday's assistance would be needed in this connection. He had "veto power" over the procurement of any missile to the extent that he wished to use such power "through the Secretary of Defense." Over budgeting and funding he had advisory authority only.¹⁴⁰

When asked about Holaday's relationship with the service missile chiefs, McElroy gave a rather ambiguous reply that dwelt on the limitations of the director's power. He said:

Well, his authority stems from the authority of the Secretary of Defense. He is an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. He is not an operating executive who directs individuals who are working on any of these missile programs. That's done in the services themselves. His authority goes through the missiles people in the services by a combination of his own unquestioned ability and his relationship to the Secretary of Defense as an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

Asked if Holaday had authority to cancel a contract for a missile, McElroy replied: "If he is not an operating man he can't cancel a contract nor write

one." "He is an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense," McElroy concluded. "He is not an operating executive."¹⁴¹

McElroy's statement that Holaday was "not an operating executive who directs individuals" was difficult to reconcile with the clear statement in the charter that he would "direct" all missile activities. The Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, understandably confused, questioned McElroy in search of clarification. McElroy's somewhat roundabout reply was that the missile programs were operating satisfactorily and that no drastic change was necessary; hence he had simply widened Holaday's scope of activities and given him a new title that would "supply his coordinating authority with direction. It is not an order-placing, it is not an order-canceling kind of direction. It is a coordinating direction." The secretary retained final authority over missile programs.¹⁴²

Holaday himself compared his new position to that of vice president of a corporation, with the service secretaries as managers of corporate subdivisions. He now signed letters of instructions to the services himself instead of referring them to the secretary for signature. He considered that he had authority to cancel an existing program. As Deputy Secretary Quarles put it, Holaday was responsible for "direction" of the missile program but not its "administration." Holaday made it clear that he considered his authority sufficient and that his close working relationship with Secretary McElroy obviated any difficulty.¹⁴³

Holaday continued as chairman of the BMC. He enlarged his staff by absorbing the personnel previously assigned to guided missile responsibilities in the office of the assistant secretary (R&E), who remained responsible for recommending overall policy concerning research and development, including that relating to missiles.¹⁴⁴

Impact of the Gaither Report

The measures described above, taken during the first few weeks after Sputnik and largely in response thereto, were general in nature. The report of the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee (commonly known as the Gaither report from the name of the panel's chairman) focused attention on specific measures aimed at immediately strengthening missile capabilities.

The origin and background of the Security Resources Panel have been described in an earlier chapter. The panel's mission was to assess the value of measures of defense against atomic attack, including the deterrent value of strategic retaliatory capabilities. In its report, dated 7 November 1957, the panel saw no prospect of successful defense of the population of the United States against nuclear attack, and concluded that protection of the nation rested on the deterrent power of SAC. Its recommendations therefore centered primarily on strengthening SAC and defending it from destruction by surprise attack. The panel recommended a massive increase in initial

force objectives for long-range missiles: from 4 to 16 squadrons of IRBMs (240 missiles) and from 8 to no less than 60 squadrons of ICBMs (600 missiles). Every effort should be made to have a "significant number" of IRBMs operational overseas by late 1958, and of ICBMs in the Zone of the Interior (ZI) by late 1959. Hardened bases for ICBMs should be phased in "as rapidly as possible." The operational date of the Polaris system should be accelerated. To protect SAC's offensive power, the panel recommended, among other measures, immediate provision of an active missile defense (Nike-Hercules or Talos) against bombers, and a similar defense against ICBMs (expected to be a threat by late 1959), again using Nike-Hercules or Talos plus long-range radars already available in prototype. To protect the civilian population, an area defense against the ICBM should be developed as soon as possible.¹⁴⁵

The overall tone of the Gaither report, and some of its substance, became generally known and added to the heightened anxiety caused by the launching of a second and much larger Soviet Sputnik on 3 November. This feeling quickly found expression in congressional hearings. The House Appropriations Committee convened on 20-21 November to question McElroy, Quarles, McNeil, and others. Longer and more influential hearings followed before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. These began on 26 November and ran for two months, with testimony from a wide range of civilian and military officials of DoD as well as scientists and officials of corporations involved.¹⁴⁶

For McElroy and the president, the immediate question was how far, if at all, the recommendations of the Gaither panel should be reflected in the budget for FY 1959, then approaching final form. The initial service submissions, planned under an expenditure ceiling of \$38 billion, included \$3.8 billion in NOA for missile development and production. Most of this, for the Air Force, provided for procurement of Atlas, Titan, Snark, Matador, and Bomarc missiles, as well as the still unnamed air-to-surface missile for the B-52 and the reconnaissance satellite, plus limited production of Thor and Jupiter. The Army budget included \$660 million for Nike-Hercules, Redstone, and Corporal. The Navy budgeted for a Polaris submarine plus procurement of Regulus, Talos, and other missiles. Army and Air Force budgets also included money for the antimissile system.¹⁴⁷

Already McElroy had before him a request to accelerate Polaris. On 22 October Gates informed him that, with an additional \$341 million, it would be possible to have two submarines operational by early 1962, with a third three months later, though with a missile of slightly shorter range (1,200 miles) and smaller warhead. Thus the IOC of Polaris would be advanced by nearly a year from the current target date of January 1963.¹⁴⁸

McElroy made no formal reply at the moment, but he was disposed to approve the Navy proposal. After discussions with service representatives, he presented a tentative \$38 billion budget to the president on 11 November, with suggestions for increases to cover certain weapon developments. He proposed to accelerate Polaris as suggested by Gates, and to provide

additional money for the IRBM, looking toward deployment of one squadron (Thor or Jupiter) in 1959 and building up to 16 (the Gaither panel objective) by 1963. He would allow the services to request additional items not included in the basic budget.¹⁴⁹

The "add-ons" requested by the services, as presented to the NSC on 14 November, totaled \$1.9 billion. They included a proposal by the Air Force to enlarge ICBM goals to nine squadrons of Atlas and eight of Titan. The JCS winnowed the list and on 17 November recommended a group of high-priority programs totaling \$1.5 billion, including acceleration of Polaris and Thor/Jupiter, as McElroy had suggested to the president, and faster production of Atlas to meet the nine-squadron goal (but no increase for Titan). Another item provided money to begin a missile warning system, taking advantage of a recent breakthrough in radar technology making possible the detection of objects at ranges of 3,000 miles. The Air Force proposed construction of three long-range radar stations, to be completed by 1960.¹⁵⁰

The NSC consideration of the proposals on 22 November focused largely on the IRBM. McElroy and Dulles thought it important to have a squadron of IRBMs on the continent of Europe by the end of 1958 to improve the morale of the NATO allies, but the council reached no decision on this point. The members gave general approval to the accelerated military program, subject to the normal budgetary review and final action by the president.¹⁵¹

Expansion of missile programs had now become policy; preparatory actions could not await determination of the exact amounts of money to be budgeted. On 9 December Holaday formally authorized the three-ship Polaris program.¹⁵²

Faster production of IRBMs was also essential if deployment objectives were to be boosted. At a meeting in the White House on 26 November, presided over by Vice President Nixon in the absence of the president, McElroy proposed to go into full production of both Thor and Jupiter, looking toward a total of eight squadrons by January 1960. He had already suggested this step to the president, who had raised no objection. No one present opposed McElroy's suggestion, although Brundage expressed the hope that the cost could be offset by savings elsewhere, and Secretary of State Dulles explained that the Europeans were in no hurry to obtain actual missiles so long as they could be certain that the United States was not falling behind the Soviets.¹⁵³

On 27 November, therefore, Holaday instructed Douglas to proceed with operational deployment of both Thor and Jupiter, on a schedule calling for one squadron of each by December 1958 and four of each by the first quarter of FY 1960. Each missile was to be produced at a rate of six per month. The Army would man the first Jupiter squadron and would assist in training Air Force personnel for subsequent units. In the afternoon, McElroy announced these decisions to the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.¹⁵⁴

After receiving cost estimates for the increased Thor/Jupiter production,

McElroy incorporated them in a supplemental budget request for FY 1958, along with the additional money for Atlas, Polaris, and the ballistic missile warning system, all of which had originally been envisioned for the 1959 budget. These totaled \$1.26 billion, to which he added a request for \$10 million for the new Advanced Research Projects Agency and \$100 million for an emergency OSD fund. The president approved the request on 5 December.¹⁵⁵

On 12 December Holaday informed the Air Force of approval of the nine-squadron Atlas objective. Earlier, the Air Force, no doubt with OSD approval, had ordered a reduction in the Snark program to an ultimate objective of only two squadrons (one wing). Snark had slipped, and it now appeared that Atlas would come on line at the same time, or perhaps even sooner.¹⁵⁶

The Army's add-on list had included money for the lightweight solid-propellant missile to supersede Redstone. No Army items appeared in the 1958 supplemental, but \$40 million for the improved Redstone was in the 1959 budget.¹⁵⁷ Almost immediately, however, it became clear that progress in solid-propellant technology, notably with Polaris, had brought the new missile within the range of near-term possibilities. On 7 January 1958 the JCS recommended that the Army be authorized to proceed with it, subject to submission later of a detailed program and cost estimates. The new missile was to have a range of 200-300 miles and a maximum weight of 10,000 pounds. McElroy gave his approval the same day.¹⁵⁸

At House hearings on the supplemental in January, Brucker explained the situation with regard to the new missile, for which it was planned to draw \$20 million from the proposed emergency fund. Representative Mahon's subcommittee preferred to make a specific grant of \$40 million to the Army for the improved Redstone (which was soon to be named Pershing) and for other tactical missiles needed to modernize the Army. The House and Senate acquiesced in the bill as thus revised; the final legislation (11 February 1958) authorized the Army to transfer \$40 million from unexpended personnel funds.¹⁵⁹

By the end of 1957 piecemeal decisions, together with technological progress, had rendered obsolete the priority list of missile projects established by the president and the NSC in December 1955. Wilson, with the president's tacit consent, had annexed Polaris to the IRBM for priority purposes; the NSC had withdrawn Titan from the list and had granted Vanguard sufficient priority to assure success. The developing reconnaissance satellite, with its ability to peek behind the Iron Curtain, surely had a high claim. The same held true of the antimissile missile, the importance of which the Gaither panel had noted. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed in December 1957 that an anti-ICBM system was urgent, though they could not agree that it deserved the highest priority.¹⁶⁰

In January 1958 Holaday's office drafted a memorandum to be sent to the president listing the following systems (not necessarily in order of importance) as having the highest priority:

Atlas
 FBM (Polaris)
 Satellite projects determined by the secretary of defense
 to have objectives of "key political, psychological or
 military import"
 Antimissile missile weapons systems, including both active
 defense and early warning
 Thor/Jupiter
 Titan
 IGY scientific satellite program (Vanguard and Jupiter C)

McElroy discussed this list with the president on 21 January, and the next day the NSC noted that the president had formally approved it.¹⁶¹

Another action in January 1958 brought to a close the long period of fumbling uncertainty in the scientific satellite program and helped to restore some national prestige. On the night of 31 January 1958 ABMA, firing a modified four-stage Jupiter C rocket (Juno I) at the Air Force Missile Test Center, orbited a 31-pound satellite named Explorer I. President Eisenhower announced the achievement at 12:52 a.m. on 1 February. Another six weeks elapsed before Vanguard finally succeeded, after two more failures.¹⁶²

The Advanced Research Projects Agency

Eisenhower never tired of preaching the gospel of greater unity in defense organization. In the development of radically new technologies associated with missiles, he saw an example of a function requiring centralized control. The Soviet Sputnik and the accession of McElroy, two nearly simultaneous events, provided both a stimulus and an opportunity for introducing organizational changes. Missiles already far along the road to development might continue under individual services, but newer and more esoteric projects cutting across service lines seemed to call for other organizational arrangements.

On 11 October 1957, in one of his first conferences with his new secretary of defense, the president suggested the possibility of a "fourth service" to handle the "whole missiles activity." McElroy suggested a Manhattan District project for the antimissile program, which the president had already cited as a possibility for the ICBM and IRBM programs. Eisenhower thought that the idea might be extended to the military reconnaissance satellite.¹⁶³

In the end, however, the Manhattan model was rejected, probably as too sweeping. Instead, Eisenhower and McElroy opted for the "single manager" approach, already functioning successfully in connection with inter-service supply problems, with the managerial agency operating directly under OSD. The president, as already noted, announced this decision on 7 November. DoD General Counsel Robert Dechert rendered a legal opinion that, under the National Security Act as amended, the secretary had ample

authority to establish the proposed managerial agency, subject only to a requirement to notify Congress at the time he did so.¹⁶⁴

McElroy intended that the new agency would have jurisdiction over new weapons that were "not anything like as far down the road as the missile program," such as the antimissile weapon and "perhaps some other very upstream types of weapons projects." It would develop new weapons to the point of operational capability, when they would be turned over to one of the services. It would not be a "Manhattan project." "There were things you could do in wartime to throw money into the Manhattan project that are quite different from the way this will be handled," he said.¹⁶⁵

Some service spokesmen opposed the new agency. The most prominent, Air Force Secretary Douglas, considered it unnecessary and intrusive and believed that weapons systems, from their inception, should remain under the user service. Another argument, supported by the DSB, held that it would suffice to strengthen the authority of some existing official.¹⁶⁶

McElroy and Quarles ignored these objections and moved ahead with their plans. Their draft directive for the "Special Projects Agency" was reviewed by the JCS, who did not object in principle but recommended some changes, including one to limit the agency's activities to antimissile weapons and satellites. McElroy rejected this view because, as his military assistant, General Randall, explained, he wished the new agency to be free to take on other projects if desired. It was also intended that the director of the agency would have authority to enter into contracts, although he would normally contract through the military departments.¹⁶⁷

McElroy held up the formal establishment of the new organization, eventually named Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), pending the appointment of a director, who could be expected to play a key role in setting its course.¹⁶⁸ Meanwhile, as already noted, McElroy included \$10 million for ARPA's initial operating expenses in the FY 1958 budget supplemental.

The House Armed Services Committee, investigating the missile program, also evidenced much interest in ARPA, and McElroy encountered questions on the subject when he appeared before the committee on 13-14 February. Some members doubted McElroy's authority to establish by executive action an "operating" agency with power to hold property. Assurances given the committee by General Counsel Dechert failed to convince the skeptics.¹⁶⁹

This issue reached the floor of the House in connection with a bill to authorize construction of certain Air Force facilities in FY 1958, as part of the budget supplemental. The House adopted an amendment that expressly authorized the secretary to establish ARPA and allowed the agency to enter into production contracts. McElroy was willing to accept this provision provided it was so worded as to avoid any implication that the law was conferring an authority that did not exist. The Senate, however, deleted the House amendment as irrelevant to the rest of the bill. The conference committee retained its substance, but without mentioning

ARPA by name; the secretary "or his designee" was authorized to engage in advanced projects in the field of basic and applied research. In that form, the bill passed, with another provision added by the House authorizing not only military projects, but also "such advanced space projects as may be designated by the President"; this was intended to insure continuance of Vanguard. The president signed the bill on 12 February 1958.¹⁷⁰

By that time McElroy had found a director for ARPA: Roy W. Johnson, a vice president of General Electric. His appointment was announced on 7 February 1958. The directive establishing ARPA, issued the same day, authorized it to direct or perform projects assigned to it by the secretary of defense, using existing facilities of DoD as far as practicable, although it could also acquire its own facilities. A few weeks later Herbert F. York, director of the Atomic Energy Commission's Livermore Laboratory in California and a member of the Ballistic Missiles Scientific Advisory Committee, became chief scientist of ARPA.¹⁷¹

The 1958 reorganization, already in prospect by January of that year, brought about significant changes in the administration of research and development within OSD. Pending the reorganization, the relationship between the newly established director of ARPA, the director of guided missiles, and the assistant secretary for research and engineering was regulated by an agreement worked out by these officials and approved by McElroy. Under its provisions, the assistant secretary (R&E) acted as a staff adviser responsible for recommendations concerning the soundness and feasibility of all research and engineering programs and their consonance with DoD policies. The DGM had specific responsibility for advice of similar scope concerning guided missiles, but he also held delegated line authority in his field. The director of ARPA was primarily a line official, responsible for planning and directing assigned projects. All three officials were enjoined to cooperate closely and to keep one another fully informed.¹⁷²

From the beginning, it had been understood that ARPA would take over responsibility for development of antimissile defense and for military satellite projects. The first of these involved an area of rivalry between the Army and the Air Force, owing to the difficulty of distinguishing clearly between "point" and "area" defense. On 10 January 1958 Holaday informed McElroy that the Air Force had diverted some FY 1958 money to a full-fledged anti-missile project (known as Wizard), which overlapped the Army's work. Holaday recommended immediate action, without awaiting the organization of ARPA, to reaffirm the division of responsibilities prescribed earlier: the Air Force to limit its effort to long-range detection, the Army to develop the actual weapon. McElroy agreed. On 16 January he informed both service secretaries that the direction of the anti-ICBM program would eventually be assigned to ARPA, but in the meantime the two services were to continue their current lines of development.¹⁷³

As its first responsibility, ARPA took over coordination of a national military satellite program. The Advisory Group on Special Capabilities, in response to Holaday's directive of 6 September 1957, reviewed the satellite

programs of the services and submitted recommendations on 15 January 1958. The first step, it said, should be development of vehicles to be launched by the boosters developed for IRBMs. A longer-term project would exploit the still more powerful ICBM rocket engines. Looking beyond military satellites to exploration of space (which it was assumed would become a national objective), the group noted that unmanned explorations of the moon, Venus, and Mars appeared to be within the capabilities of presently planned systems, and recommended that a lunar probe be part of the IRBM-based satellite program. For manned space exploration, the group made no recommendations, merely observing that the X-15 hypersonic aircraft, a rocket-powered vehicle under development by the Air Force and the Navy, provided a basis for development in this field.¹⁷⁴

In response to a request from Holaday on 7 January 1958, the services submitted more specific recommendations for satellite programs. The Army on 10 January recommended a program that had been presented earlier to the advisory group, involving 16 satellite launchings between 1958 and 1960. Four days later the Army forwarded a long-range plan, beginning in January with the small satellite already scheduled for launch, followed by progressively larger and heavier satellites, then an unmanned moon landing in April 1959, manned landing and return in the spring of 1967, and a 500-man expedition to the moon by 1971.¹⁷⁵

The Navy reply on 15 January set forth, as a minimum, the goal of developing satellites with a 1,500-pound payload, followed by manned space flight. This would require extensive research experience with smaller satellites; hence the Navy recommended continuing the Vanguard program with successively larger payloads, leading logically to the use of Titan or Atlas boosters to reach the 1,500-pound goal.¹⁷⁶

The Air Force arrayed a smorgasbord of exotic projects, including the 117L satellite system, which could evolve into manned systems for orbiting the earth and the moon; the X-15, already described, and Dynasoar, a rocket-propelled supersonic glider, for manned space flight research; a nuclear-powered rocket and an ion-propulsion aircraft for actual space flight; and plans for lunar landings and probes of Mars and Venus.¹⁷⁷

The Army and Navy made further proposals in sending Holaday their comments on the report of the Advisory Group on Special Capabilities, the conclusions of which they endorsed. Brucker, in lieu of the 16-vehicle program presented earlier to the group, now recommended 12 launchings during 1958 and 1959, building up to a capability by October 1959 of a launch rate of one per month which could be continued indefinitely; he also recommended approval of the Army's longer-range program. Gates recommended that the Navy take on the following specific tasks: continuation of Vanguard, expanded through combinations with Thor or Jupiter; a television satellite system under development; a satellite tracking plan, already under study by the Navy in response to a request by Holaday; and development of a hypersonic aircraft as a basis for a manned space vehicle, to be launched by a three-stage rocket using boosters from Titan and Polaris.¹⁷⁸

Most of these ambitious proposals were clearly matters for long-term consideration. The principal exception, the Air Force 117L, gave promise in the near future of yielding a reconnaissance satellite. As early as February 1958 the Air Force planned one that would circle the earth three times, then eject a capsule containing photographs taken from aloft. McElroy and Quarles discussed this with Killian and Allen Dulles on 6 February, and the president approved it the next day with the understanding that it would come under the overall supervision of DoD and that CIA would control the intelligence aspects. On 24 February McElroy directed the Air Force to proceed with the project under the direction of ARPA.¹⁷⁹

The director of ARPA set forth his proposed method of operation in memorandums to the service secretaries on 27 March. Initially, ARPA would not acquire or operate its own laboratories, though it might do so later. Some projects might be assigned directly to military departments; those not readily identifiable with a specific weapon system would be handled by ARPA through contracts with military activities or other governmental or private agencies. Johnson forwarded copies of orders that he had sent directly to service installations the same day. ABMA was instructed to prepare four satellite launchings between August 1958 and January 1959, with successively larger payloads, using Juno I or a more advanced version (Juno II). He directed the Air Force to develop three lunar probes to be launched as soon as possible, with a three-stage launch vehicle drawing on Thor, Vanguard, and a solid-propellant rocket to be determined later. The Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, California, was to develop a ground scanning system for use in lunar probes. On the same day, after the president had approved the projects, McElroy announced them publicly.¹⁸⁰

ARPA was off to a fast start. The projects that it had set in motion would provide a basis for the program of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and eventually, after years of patient and costly experimentation, for the nation's first moon landing in 1969.

Further Acceleration of Effort

The 1959 budget carried slightly more than \$3.8 billion in new obligational authority for procurement of missiles, exclusive of research and development and of the \$340 million requested for ARPA. However, the figures were not necessarily final; technological progress might lead to requests for more support of some programs, as McElroy told the House Appropriations Committee on 27 January 1958.¹⁸¹

Uncertainty about final budget goals stemmed not only from the state of weapons technology but also from the administration not having completed its examination of the Gaither panel recommendations. The NSC discussed these on 6 and 16 January. It directed DoD, in consultation with the White House, to report on the advisability of enlarging the Atlas and Titan programs beyond the 13 squadrons programmed and of hardening

additional launching sites; also of constructing additional Polaris submarines and installing interim antimissile defenses at SAC bases, using modified anti-aircraft missiles already available. The report, originally scheduled for the end of January, was delayed until April.¹⁸²

Beyond Atlas and Titan now referred to as "first generation" ICBMs, the second generation already appeared on the horizon, born out of progress in solid propellants. The Air Force was cooperating with the Navy in developing a land-based Polaris, but its first solid-propellant missile was the product of its own thinking. By the end of 1957 the Air Force had worked out a design for such a missile with three stages, having the same range as Atlas and Titan but much smaller, lighter, and cheaper. Departing from the pattern of "mythological" names, the Air Force named the new weapon Minuteman, symbolizing its instant readiness for firing.¹⁸³

On 8 February 1958 Douglas informed McElroy that Minuteman would probably be available by 1962-63. He thought that it "represents capabilities and savings far beyond our hopes." For the end of FY 1962, Douglas proposed 9-13 squadrons of Atlas, 8 of Titan, and 16 of IRBMs. Thereafter Minuteman, beginning to phase in during FY 1963, would overtake the requirements for the other three missiles.¹⁸⁴

Before McElroy replied, Douglas forwarded to Holaday an informal Air Force proposal for 30 ICBM squadrons (13 Atlas and 17 Titan) by the end of FY 1963. This was for use in connection with discussion of the Gaither panel recommendations; it made no mention of Minuteman.¹⁸⁵ A revised and more detailed Air Force proposal, submitted on 21 February, called for 9 Atlas squadrons by FY 1962 and 11 Titan by 1963, with 10 Minuteman squadrons entering the inventory in 1963 and rising to 40 in FY 1964. At the same time, the Air Force submitted details of the proposed Minuteman development program, to begin in FY 1958 with \$26 million in funds already available to it.¹⁸⁶

While the Air Force pushed for a more modern ICBM force, Polaris also moved ahead. The Navy advanced the operational date of the first vessel to early 1960 by modifying a nuclear-powered attack submarine already under construction.¹⁸⁷

An expanded program for a total of nine Polaris submarines was already a possibility by mid-January 1958, when hearings opened on the FY 1958 supplemental. Asked why funds were being requested for three submarines, Secretary Gates admitted that he did not know and that the program was being reexamined practically on a daily basis. He was "quite sure" that "within the very near future," the Navy would recommend a further increase in Polaris, perhaps up to a maximum of nine vessels.¹⁸⁸ Later, Representative Mahon met with McElroy and suggested enlarging the program; McElroy concurred.¹⁸⁹

On 30 January Gates formally proposed to McElroy expansion of the Polaris program to nine vessels by the end of 1961. The cost would be \$421.5 million additional in FY 1958 funds and \$782.1 million in FY 1959.¹⁹⁰

McElroy referred to the JCS both the Polaris expansion proposal and the ICBM objectives proposed by the Air Force. In response to an AFPC decision on 28 January, the JCS already had underway a reevaluation of offensive and defensive weapon systems to include determination of an appropriate long-range weapons posture balancing ICBMs against Polaris. They therefore told McElroy on 24 February that it would be undesirable to take a final position at that time on either Polaris or the ICBM.¹⁹¹

On 27 February Holaday presented cost estimates to the NSC for the revised ICBM objective of 20 squadrons and for an expanded Polaris program, which he had pared down to 2 additional vessels (instead of 6) by FY 1961. He also discussed plans for interim defense of SAC bases against missiles. The Army had recommended immediate production of Nike-Zeus both for operational units and for test prototypes (adopting the Air Force "concurrency" principle), in order to have 16 batteries available by FY 1962. An earlier capability could be provided under a plan endorsed by the JCS to install land-based Talos units, modified to provide an antimissile capability. Since Holaday was not ready to submit recommendations concerning any of these alternatives, the council took no action.¹⁹²

Also on 27 February, Holaday partially approved the Minuteman program. He instructed the Air Force to limit it to research and development pending consideration of a land-based Polaris as an alternative, given the early operational availability of Polaris and the fact that manufacturing facilities for it were already under construction.¹⁹³

Minuteman came under scrutiny from a panel on ballistic missiles organized by Killian and chaired by George B. Kistiakowsky, later Killian's successor. In a report on 4 March 1958, the panel cited disadvantages in the first generation of ICBMs and IRBMs. Liquid-propellant engines were not wholly reliable and made quick response difficult; Polaris missiles were expensive and likely to suffer from technical problems at the outset. Second-generation missiles could be improved through use of solid propellants or by introduction of liquid propellants stable enough to be stored in the missiles, which could thus be kept ready for instant firing. As for Minuteman, the operational date of 1963 proposed by the Air Force would require a "crash" program; moreover, it was based on available propellants with comparatively low thrust, resulting in a design that was marginal in some respects. Two alternatives, both superior to the Air Force proposal, would improve Titan or set a more modest range objective (4,000 miles) for Minuteman, in either case awaiting better propellants.

Turning to IRBMs, the panel saw no need for both Jupiter and Thor and recommended the latter, since it could be modified to give it an extended range (2,000 miles), which would reduce its dependence on bases within reach of Soviet missiles. A land-based Polaris could be operational by 1960-61, and a still lighter solid-propellant IRBM by 1963-65 by using the two upper stages of the Minuteman; one or the other of these two missiles should be developed, but not both.¹⁹⁴

On 8 March Killian relayed this report to the president, endorsing most

of its recommendations: improvement of Titan, a "go-slow" approach on Minuteman, a choice between Thor and Jupiter, and development both of a longer-range Thor and of a solid-propellant IRBM (using either Polaris or Minuteman) to replace it. He added that DoD already had these under study.¹⁹⁵

Holaday, like Killian, was in no hurry to rush Minuteman. On 13 March he stressed to Douglas the importance of insuring that Minuteman make full use of advances in missile technology, particularly improvement in solid propellants, for which an integrated interservice research program would be undertaken. He recognized the importance of a small, solid-propellant land-based IRBM but believed it premature to use Minuteman as a basis; a better approach would be follow-on development of one of the liquid-fueled missiles or the adaptation of Polaris. Holaday's memorandum apparently crossed with one from Under Secretary Malcolm A. MacIntyre of the Air Force announcing that research and development on Minuteman had begun and assuring Holaday that cooperation with the Navy on solid-propellant missiles was excellent.¹⁹⁶

Seizing on Holaday's suggestion for a land-based Polaris, Gates informed him on 19 March that the feasibility of adapting Polaris in that fashion had been verified. At the same time, he affirmed the Navy's interest in improved propellants in order to lengthen the range of Polaris and thus enable missile submarines to reach targets from greater distances off the Soviet coast. Borrowing features from the Minuteman design would, he thought, make a 2,500-mile Polaris feasible. He therefore recommended that the Navy produce Polaris missiles and the Air Force the ground support for the land-based version. Apparently Gates was proposing an immediate alternative to Minuteman.¹⁹⁷

The Ballistic Missile Scientific Advisory Committee reviewed the Minuteman program on 14-15 March 1958; it concluded that it offered promise but required further research. Polaris, in their view, provided the earliest capability for a solid-propellant IRBM, and its land-based version should be supported to the utmost. Also, they recommended immediate development of storable liquid propellants for Titan.¹⁹⁸ The weight of authoritative opinion thus stood overwhelmingly against any plan to rush ahead with Minuteman.

During March 1958, McElroy and Quarles drafted a supplement to the 1959 budget request on the basis of service submissions, after the JCS proved unable to agree. It totaled \$1.46 billion, plus \$137 million to be added later to the military construction bill. In formulating the supplement, which went to Congress on 2 April, McElroy made some decisions on missile questions without awaiting further NSC discussion. He included \$324 million for two more Polaris submarines, thus rejecting the nine-vessel program. Other items included money for Minuteman and solid propellants generally, the B-52 air-to-surface missile (now called Hound Dog), Titan, and projects under direction of ARPA. There was no money for a larger ICBM force, and none to speed up Talos, which had apparently been ruled out as an interim antimissile weapon for SAC bases.¹⁹⁹

For the JCS, the secretary's decisions in connection with this request settled the question of the size of the ICBM and Polaris forces, and no further

action on their part was necessary. They so informed McElroy on 9 April.²⁰⁰

Discussion thus far had not included the IRBM. The Gaither panel had proposed a 16-squadron IRBM force, and the JCS had included this in their recommended list of budget "add-ons" in November 1957, but it had not received official approval. On 25 February Douglas asked McElroy formally to approve a goal of 16 squadrons by FY 1962. Since two squadrons would be deployed to Alaska (with the rest in foreign countries), Douglas asked that construction money for their bases be provided in time for the approaching construction season there. McElroy, however, took no action and did not include money for IRBMs in the FY 1959 budget supplement.²⁰¹

On 22 April Quarles and Holaday tentatively approved only 12 IRBM squadrons (9 Thor and 3 Jupiter), partly to hold down costs, partly because base agreements with potential host countries were lagging. They did, however, approve an increase in Thor production to eight missiles per month and an accelerated deployment schedule that would have the last squadron operational by March 1961. These decisions awaited NSC approval.²⁰²

Progress of Atlas and Titan now made it necessary to discuss the location of the programmed squadrons. The first operational Atlas squadron had been scheduled for Camp Cooke and two others were to be at Warren AFB near Cheyenne, Wyoming. Bases for the first five squadrons would be "soft" or unprotected against overpressure. An improved design for the last four squadrons, using all-inertial rather than radio guidance, would simplify the ground control equipment and make it possible to give the bases partial hardening (protection against 25 pounds per square inch of overpressure, instead of the full 100 pounds).²⁰³

On 12 April Douglas told McElroy that he had approved the siting of two Atlas squadrons near Omaha and Seattle, respectively. For Titan, he had approved four squadrons in the general area of Denver; there they would be within range of the facilities of the manufacturer, who would perform maintenance.²⁰⁴

The management of missile test ranges now became an issue. The Army had its Proving Ground at White Sands, the Air Force its Missile Test Center at Cape Canaveral. The Navy was expanding its range at Point Mugu, California. Eisenhower suggested to McElroy that all three be operated by DoD as "national" test ranges. However, McElroy and Quarles decided, with the president's approval, to leave them under service management, with each range to be available to all services. The Air Force and Navy ranges were renamed Atlantic and Pacific Missile Ranges, respectively; the Army's facility became the White Sands Missile Range.²⁰⁵

The technology of missile detection was also advancing. The 1958 supplemental request had included money to begin construction of facilities. On 14 January McElroy formally approved an Air Force proposal for a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), to consist of three stations. The first, at Thule, Greenland, was to be operational on a limited basis in 1959. The second and third, in Alaska and Scotland, respectively, had operational dates of December 1960, by which date supplementary radars for tracking

and verifying targets should be available. On 16 January the NSC directed DoD to study the possibility of advancing these deadlines.²⁰⁶

The size of the IRBM force, the location of Titan missiles, and the acceleration of the BMEWS came before the NSC on 24 April in connection with the long-delayed report from OSD on the Gaither panel recommendations. Concerning possible expansion of ICBM force goals, as the panel had urged, no recommendations were submitted; the JCS had not completed a study of the overall "mix" of delivery systems. However, Holaday recommended an additional \$454 million for another acceleration of Titan, explaining the plan to locate the first four Titan squadrons near Denver. The president questioned this plan; Quarles explained that the missile would be at least 45 miles from the city, but promised to reexamine the matter.

For IRBMs, Holaday recommended 9 Thor squadrons and 3 Jupiter: 1 squadron in Alaska, 1 in Okinawa or the northeastern United States, and 10 for NATO (a force that Quarles described as "minimal" for the alliance). The president approved this with the understanding that no new obligational authority would be required during FYs 1958 and 1959. The possible speedup of the BMEWS was disposed of by Quarles with the statement that the cost estimates had proved larger than originally expected; also, he pointed out, the Thule station alone could provide 75 percent of the expected coverage of the three completed stations.

The 24 April NSC meeting marked the council's last discussion of the Gaither recommendations. The only definite decision to emerge from the meeting was approval of 12 IRBM squadrons. Since the council took no action regarding ICBMs, the earlier decision in favor of 13 squadrons remained in force.²⁰⁷

Congress meanwhile had been debating the 1959 budget, beginning with House hearings on 27 January 1958. Polaris continued to be a major focus of attention. Questioning of Navy witnesses quickly elicited details of the proposed nine-ship program, and the House Appropriations Committee reported out a bill with \$638 million for the four additional vessels needed. McElroy told the Senate that this extra money was not wanted and would be held in reserve if provided. The final bill appropriated more than the administration had asked for the Navy shipbuilding program but did not specify how the money was to be spent.²⁰⁸

Minuteman also caught the congressional eye. Air Force witnesses described it as "really a technological breakthrough" that would provide a "whole new family" of solid-propellant missiles. As with Polaris, the legislation passed by Congress provided extra money for Air Force missiles without earmarking any of it for particular projects.²⁰⁹

During all this time, programs begun months earlier continued to bear fruit. On 23 March the Navy launched a Polaris missile underwater for the first time at San Clemente Island, California. The first three Polaris submarines, designated SSB(N) 598, 599, and 600, were under construction by May 1958. In June the Air Force accepted the first Titan missile and the Army placed Redstone in the hands of its troops. Between January and

June 1958 the Air Force activated a second Atlas strategic missile wing at Warren AFB, an Atlas squadron at Cooke AFB, and three IRBM squadrons, one for Thor at Cooke AFB, two for Jupiter at Redstone Arsenal. A Snark wing was established on paper (though not yet activated) on 17 June. None of the Air Force units, however, were as yet equipped with operational missiles.²¹⁰

The much-derided Vanguard program succeeded on 17 March 1958, when a satellite soared into orbit. Nine days later the Army launched Explorer III (Explorer II having failed), followed by Explorer IV on 26 July. Unfortunately, the luster of these accomplishments was somewhat dimmed when the Soviets on 15 May launched a third Sputnik with a payload of a ton and a half—far larger than the first four U.S. satellites combined.²¹¹

Progress in missile defense moved ahead after OSD released funds in May 1958 for the Air Force to proceed with construction of the first BMEWS station at Thule and with selection of a site in Alaska for the second.²¹² The Army and Air Force remained responsible for the research programs in progress, while ARPA took over advanced research on missile detection. In June 1958 Quarles established a steering group, headed by Hector Skifter, to monitor the entire program of antimissile defense. By this time the Talos antimissile system had been dropped, and effort now concentrated entirely on Nike-Zeus.²¹³

On the whole, the ballistic missile program had succeeded remarkably. As Kistiakowsky pointed out in February 1958, progress had gone faster than originally expected in 1953 and 1954. It was now evident that every major ballistic missile program could result in an operational prototype within or shortly after the originally planned time period.²¹⁴ This spoke well for American science and technology and for the competence of those in and out of uniform who were responsible for missile development and production.

Even so, there was no doubt that the Soviets were well ahead of the United States in long-range missile development. Their success in orbiting satellites, which had contrasted spectacularly with early U.S. failures, was largely the fruit of their early development of powerful rocket engines. The Soviets, immediately after World War II, had been quick to recognize the value of intercontinental missiles. As a result, they had a program of space technology well before 1958, when that of the United States was just beginning.²¹⁵ Technically speaking, the United States could have matched or outstripped the Soviet achievement; the chief obstacle may have been a lack of national will, which could be attributed to various causes. In any case, the situation derived from decisions made above the level of OSD.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The launching of Sputnik in October 1957 underlined a reality that had already begun to penetrate the consciousness of the American public: that the development of rocket technology was bringing nearer the

achievement of the age-old dream of the human race to reach other bodies in the solar system, and indeed in the entire universe. The potential was vast, but it could only be realized through a national commitment to make the necessary tremendous investment in further research and development.

Sentiment in favor of a national policy on the exploration of outer space crystallized rapidly in the weeks after Sputnik. The National Academy of Sciences, the American Rocket Society, and the National Society of Professional Engineers were among those proposing a federal agency to promote space exploration. The Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee hearings, though dealing largely with military aspects of missile technology, helped to focus attention on the broader subject of a national space program. When Congress met early in 1958, a number of bills were introduced to promote space research. Both houses set up committees on space and astronautics, that of the Senate chaired by Lyndon Johnson, the politically astute Texan who became a key figure in pushing legislation in this field.²¹⁶

The services had for some time realized the importance of space exploration. The Air Force took the lead in this field, as would be expected; its projects for planetary expeditions have already been noted. In December 1957 the Air Force "jumped the gun" by establishing a staff directorate of astronautics. The step was ill-advised, since the administration had not yet completed its own plans for organized space exploration. Douglas and Quarles had both seen in advance the proposed directive on the new organization and ordered it withheld. Nonetheless its contents leaked to the press on 11 December. The following day Quarles, about to leave Washington for a NATO meeting in Paris, publicly accused the Air Force of defying his wishes in releasing the directive. On 13 December Douglas ordered the new directorate dissolved.²¹⁷

An exemplar for centralized research in astronautics, under civilian direction but with full military cooperation, already existed: the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), established by Congress in 1915 to conduct research in flight technology. The committee consisted of 12 presidential appointees representing the War and Navy Departments and other branches of government, with some from private life. Despite its title, NACA grew into a large operating organization with its own research facilities. Its studies of aircraft design, in cooperation with the military services, had proved of enormous value during World War II. After the war, by natural extension, NACA concerned itself with rocket propulsion and supersonic flight, again in partnership with the services. By 1958 NACA controlled a work force some 8,000 strong, headed by Hugh L. Dryden, who reported directly to the committee (now enlarged to 17 members).²¹⁸

In January and February 1958 NACA proposed a space program to be conducted jointly by NACA and DoD, with advice from the National Academy of Sciences and the National Science Foundation. NACA would be considerably enlarged under this plan, but its relations with the services would not be affected.²¹⁹

The president had not yet been heard from. He assigned to his Science

Advisory Committee (PSAC) the task of drafting a space program and an organization to administer it. The plan that emerged in March 1958 was drawn up by the PSAC, in collaboration with the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization (PACGO) and the Bureau of the Budget. A new National Aeronautics and Space Agency would absorb NACA and assume responsibility for space and aeronautical research. Headed by a director appointed by the president, it would have an advisory National Aeronautics and Space Board of 17 members, of whom not more than 8 would be from government agencies, including at least 1 from DoD. The agency's relationship with DoD was briefly disposed of in an introductory statement of policy, which affirmed that space activities should be under civilian direction, unless they were "peculiar to or primarily associated with weapons systems or military operations, in which case the agency may act in cooperation with, or on behalf of, the Department of Defense." Existing activities and facilities relating to space might be transferred to the new agencies from other government departments with the concurrence of the department head and the approval of the president.²²⁰

The president sent his proposal to Congress on 2 April 1958. At the same time he directed the secretary of defense and the chairman of NACA to review existing and planned DoD programs and recommend those that should be placed under the new agency, plus an operating plan to assure DoD support of the latter.²²¹

During congressional hearings, DoD officials, while supporting the bill, disagreed over whether its language would adequately protect their department from infringement by the new agency. Deputy Secretary Quarles believed that it would; Roy Johnson, director of ARPA, feared that it might not. He recommended revision of the bill to require the new agency to cooperate with DoD when appropriate, instead of leaving cooperation optional. Otherwise, the composition of the advisory board should be changed to guarantee DoD additional representation. Representatives of the military departments were inclined to agree with Johnson. McElroy, asked about apparent disagreement among his top officials, attempted to smooth it over. All agreed, he said, in supporting the establishment of the new agency, and he had no doubt that the language of the bill could be construed to protect DoD interests, though there might be "some slight modifications" for clarification.²²²

Part of the reason, at least, why witnesses from DoD failed to present a clear position on the bill was the limited time that had been allowed them for consideration. The department had only 24 hours to review the draft bill and submit comments. BoB had sent the draft to the department on 27 March with a deadline of 31 March. On the face of it, then, the department had several days, but two of them (29 and 30 March) fell on a Saturday and Sunday. As it turned out, the department did not furnish its comments to the BoB until 1 April.²²³

On 12 May General Counsel Dechert wrote to the Senate committee suggesting changes on which there was "substantial agreement" within DoD.

They would make clear the full responsibility of DoD for activities primarily associated with weapons systems or military operations and would specify that a majority (nine members) of the board must be from the government, with at least three from Defense. BoB Director Maurice H. Stans told the committee that the administration would accept these amendments.²²⁴

On 2 June the House approved a bill that incorporated the substance of the amendments requested in Dechert's letter. It also changed the title of the proposed new organization to National Aeronautics and Space Administration (rather than agency) and of its head to administrator instead of director.²²⁵

The version approved by Johnson's committee on 11 June, and passed by the full Senate five days later, introduced an important change. The proposed advisory body had now become the National Aeronautics and Space Policy Board, a cabinet-level group reporting directly to the president and including the secretaries of defense and state among its members. It would recommend to the president a program of aeronautical and space activities and assign responsibility for their execution; in other words, it would establish the demarcation between the new space agency and DoD.²²⁶

The differences between the two bills did not seem important to officials of OSD, who felt that their interests would be protected in either case. Quarles, questioned by Republican Sen. Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, replied that the department could "live with" either version. He added his understanding, however, that the White House preferred the House version.²²⁷

Quarles was correct in this latter statement. President Eisenhower took strong exception to the proposed policy board, fearing an encroachment on presidential authority. In a conference with the president on 7 July, Senator Johnson suggested a happy solution: why not make the president himself the chairman of the board? Eisenhower agreed, and the bill was accordingly rewritten with this provision, blending elements from both the House and Senate versions.²²⁸

The legislation passed on 16 July and, as signed by the president on 29 July, retained the title National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). It also incorporated provision for a Civilian-Military Liaison Committee to consist of a chairman appointed by the president, with representatives from the Department of Defense and the military departments, to be assigned by the secretary of defense, and others chosen by the administrator of NASA. The National Aeronautics and Space Council, under the president as chairman, would include the secretaries of state and defense, the administrator of NASA, the chairman of the AEC, not more than one additional presidential appointee from the federal government, and not more than three others from private life. Its function was to advise the president in the performance of his duties under the act—to develop a program of space activities, to fix responsibility for their performance, and to provide for effective cooperation between NASA and DoD.²²⁹

The task of allocating existing space-related projects between DoD and NASA had already begun. As early as 9 May, ARPA and NACA had agreed

that the initial program for the new agency would provide for major effort in three principal areas: (1) use of unmanned space vehicles to collect scientific data; (2) development of technology and equipment for manned space flight; and (3) development of components and techniques to improve space technology. Predominantly military programs were listed as reconnaissance and surveillance, countermeasures against space vehicles, effects of nuclear weapons in space, and navigation aids. Primarily civilian programs included unmanned space flights for scientific purposes. Those still under discussion embraced man-in-space programs and a proposed rocket engine developing one million pounds of thrust.²³⁰

The establishment of NASA provided a logical complement to the earlier establishment within DoD of ARPA. Together the two agencies would assure centralized and cooperative direction of the immense and costly effort to develop a capability, both military and civilian, for operating in space. A third step in the same direction, part of the president's Defense reorganization plan of 1958, was soon to be taken: upgrading the authority of the official in OSD responsible for military research and development in all fields. These steps provided the degree of centralization that President Eisenhower considered essential.

CHAPTER VIII

Foreign Crises in 1958: Lebanon and Taiwan

In 1958, as two years earlier, the Eisenhower administration confronted two dangerous situations occurring in separate parts of the globe. One, in the Middle East, was the product of essentially the same forces of unrest and instability that had led to the Suez war of 1956. The other, in the Far East, sprang from the Chinese civil war in 1949, which had left mainland China under Communist rule while the anti-Communist government of Chiang Kai-shek established itself on the nearby island of Taiwan. The two crises followed closely in sequence but did not, as with Hungary and Suez in 1956, reach their peak of intensity at the same time.

Implications of the Eisenhower Doctrine

The outcome of the Suez war had greatly diminished the international prestige of the United Kingdom and France and stripped them of their position as major Middle Eastern powers. Inevitably, the United States filled the resulting vacuum. The new status of the United States in that part of the world was recognized in the resolution approved by Congress on 9 March 1957, authorizing the president to use armed force to assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against "armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism." This came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.*

In the Middle East itself, reaction to the resolution was mixed. The four Middle Eastern members of the Baghdad Pact—Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan—at once announced their approval; likewise the small nation of Lebanon, a predominantly Arab country with a foreign policy oriented toward the West. Most other Arab countries criticized it as embodying imperialism, colonialism, or Zionism.¹

Between 21 and 24 March 1957 President Eisenhower conferred in Bermuda with Harold Macmillan, the new prime minister of the United

* See Chapter III.

Kingdom. On 22 March the two governments announced that the United States was willing to join the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact. The statement was confirmed in the formal communiqué issued at the close of the meeting.²

This step was logical and might prove useful if it became necessary to put the joint resolution into effect. Eisenhower's press secretary, James C. Hagerty, said in Bermuda that the decision had been made several days earlier. Secretary Wilson no doubt concurred; he already stood on record as favoring full U.S. membership in the Baghdad Pact.³

During 1957 there was no occasion to carry out the Eisenhower Doctrine, although minor crises arose that year in Jordan and in Syria. In Jordan, a possibility of civil war appeared briefly in April 1957 owing to a split in the cabinet of King Hussein. The United States, in a show of force, moved the Sixth Fleet to Beirut (since Jordan had no port on the Mediterranean) and tendered \$10 million in emergency aid.⁴ In August a visit to Moscow by Syrian officials raised fears that Syria might become a Soviet base of operations in the Middle East. The United States speeded up delivery of MAP equipment to Syria's neighbors, giving priority to Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, in that order. In the end, both crises faded away, leaving the overall Middle Eastern situation unchanged.⁵

One result of the Syrian episode was to speed up U.S.-British contingency planning for the Middle East. A working group was set up in Washington to consider threats arising in the event of full Communist domination of Syria. The U.S. element, chaired by a State representative, drew membership also from CIA and JCS.⁶

CINCNELM, the specified commander for the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, served as the agent through which the JCS participated in planning for Middle East contingencies. For planning purposes, the JCS gave CINCNELM a second assignment as commander in chief, Specified Command, Middle East (CINCSPECOMME). He drafted plans for Middle East operations in the event of a general war, also a general plan for actions in support of the Eisenhower Doctrine.⁷

In November 1957 Jordan again briefly occupied the spotlight when Egypt and Syria mounted a propaganda campaign against King Hussein. There seemed a real possibility of a coup in Jordan. The State Department asked the JCS to prepare, on an urgent basis, a plan for U.S.-U.K. intervention in the event of an actual or imminent coup in Jordan or Lebanon or both. CINCNELM quickly drafted a U.S. plan which, after discussions with the British Chiefs of Staff, became part of a combined U.S.-British plan. The JCS approved it in January 1958 as a basis for further detailed operational planning. However, they recommended, and the State Department agreed, that this further planning be postponed to avoid any leak that might compromise U.S. relations with Arab countries.⁸

The same concern for security prevented the State Department from acting to obtain overflight and prestocking rights necessary to execute the plans. At the request of the JCS, Assistant Secretary Sprague called

the attention of the Department of State to the importance of obtaining these rights. However, as late as March 1958, State had delayed action owing to the sensitivity of the matter.⁹

By this time the NSC was reviewing basic policy toward the Middle East. The governing document, NSC 5428, had been outmoded by developments since 1954. Revision began in February 1957, when, in connection with discussion of policy toward Iran, the council called for a DoD study on the military implications of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Secretary Wilson assigned the study to the JCS.¹⁰

In a reply dated 13 June 1957, the JCS specified a requirement for contingency plans for three scenarios. The first was global war; plans already existed for operations in the Middle East in this eventuality. The second was a possible Arab-Israeli war, for which the JCS and the British Chiefs of Staff had exchanged, but not finally agreed on, contingency plans. The Eisenhower Doctrine did not apply in this situation, since it was concerned only with acts of Communist aggression. Such acts constituted the third situation for which plans were required. However, the JCS considered it impossible to plan in advance; there were so many possibilities that the actual situation must first be appraised. In general, they believed that small mobile U.S. forces, with nuclear capability, would suffice. Finally, the JCS believed that changes in the military aid program resulting from the Eisenhower Doctrine would occur only in the long run. At the moment, they saw no need for changes in the indigenous force requirements they had submitted in February 1957 for the FY 1959 military assistance program. Wilson relayed these conclusions to the NSC with his approval.¹¹

On 18 July 1957 the NSC considered a recommendation by the Planning Board for a review of Middle Eastern policy. Before approving it, the president directed that Secretaries Dulles and Wilson and Admiral Radford, with the participation of the director of central intelligence and Special Assistant Cutler, discuss the types of contingencies that might arise and U.S. capabilities to deal with them. Following this consultation, the JCS were to submit full information on military capabilities as a basis for a policy review.¹²

This NSC meeting was followed by a smaller conference at which Radford presented the JCS concept of operations for Middle Eastern contingencies. The JCS had considered six possible courses of action, ranging from deterrence aimed at preventing hostilities to full military intervention with air, land, and sea forces plus a maritime blockade. It was impossible, he stressed, to know in advance what degree of intervention would be appropriate. Also, before U.S. forces could directly intervene in certain parts of the Middle East, bases as well as landing and transit rights must be obtained. The JCS expected that small mobile forces in the Middle East or available from Europe would be able to handle most situations if the United States reacted promptly.¹³

Radford's presentation was incorporated in a memorandum which

the NSC considered on 8 August. The council accepted it as meeting the requirements of its decision of 18 July and directed the Planning Board to draft a new Middle East policy paper.¹⁴

The policy review voted by the NSC in July 1957 resulted in NSC 5801/1, approved in January 1958. This laid down four objectives: maintaining availability of the resources, strategic positions, and passage rights of the Near East, and denying these to the Soviets; maintaining stable and friendly governments there; achieving an early resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute; and limiting Soviet influence. The United States should assume the "major responsibility" toward the area, acting with other countries or the United Nations, and should seek to guide "revolutionary and nationalist pressures" into channels not antagonistic to the West. The United States would not join the Baghdad Pact, but would support it, notably by active participation in the work of its Military Committee. A neutralist orientation by Arab states would be acceptable provided that it was "reasonably balanced" by relations with the West.¹⁵

Developments in 1958

The year 1958 opened with a new triumph for Nasser. On 1 February Egypt and Syria proclaimed the merger of their countries to form a "United Arab Republic." This was announced as a first step toward unification of all the Arab peoples, and other countries were accordingly invited to associate themselves with the new entity. Five weeks later, Yemen accepted the invitation and became a member of a grouping known as the "United Arab States."¹⁶

Here was further evidence of the dynamism of the movement headed by Nasser. Iraq and Jordan, two monarchies with ties to the United Kingdom, responded to the alarming new development by announcing the formation on 14 February of an "Arab Union," headed by King Faisal of Iraq with King Hussein as his deputy.¹⁷

A few months later the turbulence endemic to the Middle East erupted again in acute form, this time in the small republic of Lebanon. This nation, lying on the Mediterranean coast and bordered on the north and east by Syria and on the south by Israel, represented something of an anomaly in the Arab Middle East. Approximately 50 percent of its population consisted of Christians, predominantly of the Maronite sect, which accepted the spiritual dominion of the Pope. This element had cultural and spiritual ties with the West, especially with France, which had administered the country as a protectorate after World War I. The precarious ethnic-religious balance among the country's population had to be maintained in its political structure. An agreement between Christian and Moslem leaders in 1943, when Lebanon became fully independent, stipulated that the president should be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Moslem of the Sunni sect, and the speaker of the chamber of deputies a Shi'ite Moslem.¹⁸

The president of Lebanon in 1958 was Camille Chamoun, elected by parliament in 1952 for a six-year term. His foreign policy, emphasizing collaboration with the Western world, aroused considerable opposition among Lebanese Moslems. His adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 stimulated the formation of a united front among the numerous Moslem opposition parties.¹⁹

Unrest in Lebanon flared into violence in May 1958, when a prominent newspaper publisher and critic of Chamoun was assassinated. Rioting and terrorism followed, accompanied in some areas by overt guerrilla warfare. President Chamoun was accused of plotting to remain in office after his term expired in September 1958. Egypt and Syria did their best to aggravate the situation; radio stations in Cairo and Damascus urged the Lebanese people to overthrow their government.

The 7,000-man Lebanese army, like the population, was divided in its loyalties. The commander, General Fuad Chehab, maintained a cautious neutrality; he sought to minimize the scope of hostilities but did not offer full support to the Chamoun government in suppressing armed opposition.²⁰

The Lebanese situation prompted a White House conference on the evening of 13 May. General Twining and Assistant Secretary Irwin represented DoD. Secretary Dulles reported that Chamoun had sounded out the United States, Britain, and France regarding the possibility of assistance to shore up his government. Dulles believed that the United States and Britain should respond favorably, but that France should stay out because of its involvement with Israel. The president directed that forces in the Mediterranean and in Europe be alerted. The possibility of combined action with the British was discussed. The president favored a single commander for any combined operations. He preferred a British officer, but Twining and Dulles thought the commander should be an American, owing to the widespread resentment toward the United Kingdom in the Middle East.²¹

Following the meeting, Dulles authorized the U.S. ambassador in Beirut to inform Chamoun that the United States would, "under the most compelling necessity," be willing to send in U.S. forces, subject to three conditions. Concurrently with any request for aid, Lebanon must file a complaint with the UN Security Council; at least some Arab states must publicly support the Lebanese appeal; and Chamoun should not push his candidacy for reelection if such a move appeared seriously to weaken his support.²²

At the same time, Admiral Burke directed CINCNELM to sail his amphibious forces toward the Eastern Mediterranean as soon as practicable. Earlier, even before the meeting with the president, the Navy had, "quietly and without publicity," ordered two destroyers to proceed to a position six hours from Beirut, arriving on station by 11:00 p.m. on 13 May (5:00 p.m. in Washington). These destroyers were still on duty, patrolling over the horizon from Beirut, when the crisis broke two months later.²³

On 14 May the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized CINCNELM to proceed with the detailed operational planning that had been contemplated, but

not undertaken, in the basic plan they had approved in January. Two days later they directed USCINCEUR to alert an Army battle group to enable it to reach Lebanon within 24 hours. The Department of the Army directed USCINCEUR to send 18 M-41 tanks to Beirut by 30 May 1958, charging them against the FY 1958 MAP.²⁴

Fortuitously, the Marine battalion landing team attached to the Sixth Fleet was at that moment due to be relieved by another that had just been sent to the Mediterranean. In view of the uncertain situation in Lebanon, however, both battalions were retained in the theater for the time being.²⁵

Planning for combined operations proceeded swiftly in London. On 16 May CINCNELM submitted to the JCS a plan (designated Blue Bat) that had already been tentatively approved by the British Chiefs of Staff. It provided for operations under CINCNELM (Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr.) as combined commander, to support or, if necessary, to reestablish a friendly government in Lebanon. Forces involved would consist of two U.S. airborne battle groups, two Marine Corps battalion landing teams, and a British infantry brigade group, supported by U.S. and British naval and air forces. U.S. troops would make the initial landings, with the British assigned to a follow-up role. The JCS approved this plan on 17 May.²⁶

The State Department remained unwilling to broach the matter of landing rights until a decision to intervene in Lebanon actually became necessary. The JCS therefore instructed CINCSPECOMME to ignore these rights to the extent required to execute the plan.²⁷

Chamoun's government appealed to the UN Security Council, charging the United Arab Republic with infiltrating armed bands and supporting acts of terrorism. The council established an observation group in Lebanon to insure against any infiltration of personnel or supply of arms across the Lebanese borders.²⁸

The situation seemed to have calmed somewhat, and the state of readiness of U.S. forces was relaxed. Under the direction of UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) began operations on 13 June.²⁹ Still, preparing for the worst, State drafted a political directive to govern military intervention in Lebanon, which the JCS and ISA reviewed and approved.³⁰

Events took a turn for the worse when, in Washington, U.S. intelligence received a warning on the night of 13-14 June that the opposition in Lebanon was preparing to overthrow the Chamoun government. The next day the U.S. ambassador in Beirut, Robert McClintock, reported that the situation in Lebanon was "out of control" and might require intervention by the United States or the UN. Lebanon's foreign minister, Dr. Charles Malik, a man with strong ties to the West, was in the United States attending the UN meeting. He sought U.S. assurance that the United States would provide assistance if needed. Secretary Dulles replied that the UN effort should first be given a chance to succeed. Furthermore, the United States would intervene in Lebanon only if Lebanese forces could not protect the lives of U.S. citizens there, and the United States must be assured of the

cooperation of Lebanon's own forces. In the end, the Lebanese Government had second thoughts about asking U.S. aid, realizing the probable reaction of its Arab neighbors, and the crisis passed.³¹

A remark by Secretary McElroy on 19 June at the annual Quantico conference was seized upon by the Egyptian Government to inflame anti-U.S. sentiment. In the course of questioning by reporters, McElroy remarked that the B-47 armed with conventional bombs could be very effective in a limited war, but he was not disavowing the use of nuclear weapons in such a conflict. "I think in limited war," he said, "we must be thinking of the use of atomic weapons of hopefully a clean and certainly a limited power in those situations where those would be militarily advantageous to this country." Asked if the Middle Eastern situation appeared to be one in which B-47s might profitably be used, McElroy did not think so, but he added, "I wouldn't hesitate to use the B-47 if I didn't have better aircraft right at hand."³²

Radio Cairo at once charged that McElroy was willing to employ nuclear weapons if U.S. forces went into Lebanon. Other hostile press sources carried similar charges; even moderate newspapers in Lebanon highlighted McElroy's statements. The State Department hastily cabled a verbatim text of the statements to Cairo and Beirut, noting that DoD had already made it clear that McElroy was speaking of the general use of B-47s in limited war, without reference to any specific area.³³

In Lebanon, UNOGIL found no clear-cut evidence of infiltration across the borders; most of the armed men observed in the country were Lebanese, and weapons seen were of varied British, French, and Italian manufacture.³⁴

For political reasons, the Department of State was unwilling to discuss the matter of overflight rights with countries that would be in the line of flight for U.S. forces moving into Lebanon. More urgent was the question of landing and prestocking rights at Adana, Turkey, which would be the main staging base. On 20 June 1958 the JCS told USCINCEUR that if Blue Bat were implemented, State was prepared to request the necessary rights from Turkey and anticipated no difficulty. State also stood ready to ask the Turkish Government to permit prestocking of ammunition and other supplies at Adana.³⁵

An encouraging development took place in Beirut on 9 July when President Chamoun assured reporters that he would leave office when his term expired, thus removing one of the grievances of dissident elements. The Army commander, General Chehab, seemed a promising replacement; he had the support of the ambassadors of the United States, Britain, and France.³⁶

Intervention in Lebanon

With UNOGIL at work, and with the situation in Lebanon partially defused by Chamoun's withdrawal, matters might eventually have quieted

down had it not been for a violent development in Iraq. Early on the morning of 14 July (Near East time), a group of military officers overthrew the monarchy and proclaimed a republic, headed by Brigadier Abdel Karim-al-Kassim. A new Cabinet was appointed, which included many leftists and Nasserites. It soon became known that King Faisal and Prime Minister Nuri as-Said had been murdered. The orientation of the new regime was in no doubt; one of its first acts was to announce recognition of the United Arab Republic.³⁷

In Lebanon, President Chamoun reacted immediately. Interpreting the coup as having been instigated by Nasser, he summoned Ambassador McClintock and requested U.S. military intervention within 48 hours, with no conditions attached. If the Sixth Fleet did not arrive within that time, he would at least know where he stood with regard to U.S. assurances. He added that he had already made a similar request to the British Government and planned to approach France.³⁸

News of this development reached Washington during the night of 13-14 July. The JCS had been alerted by 2:00 a.m. McClintock's message reporting Chamoun's appeal came at 8:35 a.m., but Secretary Dulles had already discussed the news with the president, who had been briefed by Goodpaster.³⁹

Like Chamoun, officials in Washington had no doubt whose subtle hand lay back of the events in Baghdad. "The shadow of Nasserism fell full across the Arab Middle East today," began a dispatch from the capital on 14 July.⁴⁰ The fate of Lebanon seemed to be trembling in the balance; if, as feared, it fell into Nasser's outstretched hands, no one could say what the consequences might be.

The NSC was scheduled to meet on the morning of 14 July. The president, after talking with Dulles, decided to go ahead with the meeting. However, the discussion dealt mostly with civil defense, and none of the statutory members, other than the president, were in attendance; there was no one from DoD. McElroy, who had left Washington on 11 July for a trip to the Pacific, heard of the Iraq coup while en route by air to the island of Eniwetok.⁴¹

Meanwhile Dulles had called Quarles and asked him to attend a meeting at the State Department. Quarles accordingly went to State, accompanied by Assistant Secretary (ISA) Mansfield Sprague and General Twining. In a brief meeting, the conferees agreed that the United States must take some action or see its entire position in the Middle East threatened. Twining reported that a battalion could be landed in the Middle East within 12 hours. Quarles stressed the importance of having a moral "umbrella," perhaps provided by the UN, to provide cover for any intervention. The conferees then adjourned to the White House to take up the matter with the president.⁴²

Quickly adjourning the NSC meeting, the president met in his office with Dulles, Quarles, General Twining, and CIA Director Allen Dulles to discuss the coup in Iraq. Eisenhower, as he later wrote, had "practically made up" his mind regarding the need for action. However, he listened while

Allen Dulles briefed the group on the situation. Secretary Dulles warned of probable adverse reactions if the U.S. sent troops to Lebanon. The Soviet Union would, he thought, limit itself to threats, but in the Arab countries, opinion would be inflamed; oil pipelines might be sabotaged and the Suez Canal blocked again, as it had been in 1956. Nevertheless, on balance he favored military action in Lebanon.

The president and his advisers tentatively agreed to respond favorably to Chamoun's request after consultations with congressional leaders. Secretary Dulles then informed Ambassador McClintock that, barring "strong opposition" from Congress, Chamoun would probably receive an affirmative reply.⁴³

Quarles and Twining were again present in the White House at 2:30 p.m., when the president met with congressional leaders. Secretary Dulles warned that if the United States did not respond to Lebanon's request, other friendly Middle Eastern governments would be quickly overthrown. The president added that he had received word from King Saud of Saudi Arabia that if the United States did not act, "we are finished in the Middle East." The congressmen asked a number of questions, but none raised any objections to the proposed action. The president received the impression that they would not try to impede intervention but would not support any more extensive action at that time.⁴⁴

After the congressmen left, Twining, Quarles, and the Dulles brothers stayed on for further discussion. All agreed that the United States should act on Chamoun's request. The president telephoned Prime Minister Macmillan in London, where the British Cabinet had been discussing the situation. They agreed that U.S. forces should make the landings, with British troops remaining in reserve. The extra Marine battalion then in the Mediterranean facilitated this decision.

The president wanted the initial landings to be made the next day at 3:00 p.m. in Lebanon (9:00 a.m. in Washington). At that time, Army units required in the Blue Bat plan would receive movement orders. Meanwhile elements of the Sixth Fleet then in the Western Mediterranean would be ordered eastward at once. An announcement of the landings would be prepared in advance, to be issued when they actually took place. A meeting of the UN Security Council would be sought as soon as possible.

The president gave the order that set the forces in motion. "All right, we'll send 'em in," he told General Twining, according to a news account. "Nate, put it into operation."⁴⁵

Twining relayed the president's orders to his JCS colleagues, already holding their third meeting of the day. At 6:23 p.m. Admiral Burke, as executive agent, ordered CINCNELM and the commander Sixth Fleet to land Marines at 3:00 p.m. the next day and to sail all elements of the fleet eastward at once. In a later message (6:49 p.m.), Burke noted that Blue Bat was not at once being ordered into operation in entirety because it was not then certain whether British forces would follow the U.S. Marines into Beirut or move into Iraq. However, the Blue Bat concept was to be followed insofar as possible.⁴⁶

There were in fact three Marine battalions in the Mediterranean, a third one having just reached the area as relief for one of the two already there.⁴⁷ This fact was to lead to further modification of Blue Bat.

At 8:31 p.m. the JCS informed all interested commanders of the orders that had been given CINCNELM and the Sixth Fleet. They instructed USCINCEUR to bring a battle group and its associated airlift to a state of readiness to enable arrival within 24 hours, and to be prepared to follow with another battle group. Aircraft called for under the Blue Bat plan would be furnished from the continental United States by the Tactical Air Command, and would stage through Adana.⁴⁸

The State Department instructed Ambassador McClintock to inform Chamoun at least three hours in advance of the scheduled landing. Ambassador Lodge in New York was directed to seek an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council the following day, at which time he would report the U.S. action.⁴⁹

That evening Secretary Dulles apparently had an uncharacteristic attack of doubt as to the wisdom of the course that had been chosen, with his approval. He asked General Twining to come to his home. Pacing up and down the room, as Twining remembered, Dulles admitted that he was worried. "Some of my people," he said, were predicting a strong Soviet response. Twining assured him that the JCS fully supported the decision and predicted that the Soviets would limit their action to verbal protests (as turned out to be the case).⁵⁰

On the following morning, 15 July, President Eisenhower informed the public and Congress, without going into details, that U.S. forces were being sent to Lebanon. Congressional reaction was favorable; leaders of both parties agreed that the president had chosen the only possible course. Public opinion also generally approved, as indicated by subsequent newspaper editorials.⁵¹

The Armed Forces Policy Council met at 9:30 a.m., with Quarles presiding and the JCS members represented by deputies. After Quarles informed the others of the president's decision, Sprague suggested that perhaps the time had come for the United States to seek full membership in the Baghdad Pact; he thought the State Department might by then have withdrawn its objections. Quarles asked General Twining's assistant, Brig. Gen. James F. Whisenand, USAF, to refer the question to Twining, but it was not followed up.⁵²

The 2d Battalion, 2d Marines went ashore at "Red Beach," about four miles south of Beirut and 700 yards from the Beirut airport, near the village of Khalde. Fears of opposition proved groundless; instead of being greeted by bullets, they were received "like a circus coming to town," according to a news dispatch from Beirut.⁵³

Still, there was some confusion. General Chehab had asked that the Marines enter the port of Beirut. Ambassador McClintock tried to radio this request to the Sixth Fleet, but he could not make contact. After the Marines landed, Chamoun and Chehab, who had heard rumors of an

assassination plot, asked that forces be sent to Beirut at once; Chehab even wanted them to reembark and land at Beirut. The Marine commander refused; he had his orders.⁵⁴

At 11:08 a.m. in Washington, the JCS instructed CINCNELM and USCINCEUR to execute the U.S. portion of Blue Bat, as modified by the substitution of TAC aircraft.⁵⁵ A few minutes later, General Twining assured the president that the landing operation was going well. Two more Marine battalions would land the next day (16 July); the two Army battle groups from Germany could land within 12 hours on call from CINCSPCOMME. All the JCS members, said Twining, firmly believed that the decision to send troops had been correct. The president stressed that the action should be justified on moral grounds, i.e., the right of the Lebanese people to govern themselves, not on such expedient considerations as protection of Western oil supplies. He approved some measures suggested by Twining to enhance the readiness of SAC and the Air Defense Command.⁵⁶

Assured that the Marines were safe on land, the president released a prerecorded statement announcing the landing and justifying it as a means of preserving Lebanon's independence in the face of civil strife "actively fomented" by the Soviet Union and Egypt. The situation in the Middle East, he said, was "the same pattern of conquest with which we became familiar during the period of 1945 to 1950." This was the capture of nations by "indirect aggression," as demonstrated in Czechoslovakia in 1948, in China in 1949, and the unsuccessful attempts by the Communists to take over Greece, Korea, and Indochina.⁵⁷

At a hastily called session of the UN Security Council, Ambassador Lodge, announcing that U.S. forces would remain only until the UN could assume the responsibility for insuring Lebanese independence, submitted a resolution calling for immediate cessation of illegal infiltration of men or arms across Lebanon's borders and of propaganda attacks on Lebanon by radio. It asked member states to contribute contingents of troops to protect Lebanon's borders. The Soviet representative had beaten Lodge to the punch; he had earlier submitted a resolution demanding that the United States cease its "gross intervention" in the affairs of Arab nations and remove its troops from Lebanon at once.⁵⁸

On the afternoon of 15 July, State received a complaint from Ambassador McClintock that the Marine force commander had denied his request to send Marines at once to Beirut. He had been told by the Department that his views regarding political matters were to be "controlling." The JCS, with State Department concurrence, had in fact already changed their political directive to remove reference to British forces. The revised version, sent to McClintock about the same time his message was received, reaffirmed his instructions on political matters.⁵⁹

Some of the confusion in Lebanon perhaps resulted from the absence of the overall commander, Admiral James Holloway. He was in Washington on 14 July when the crisis broke. He at once flew to the Mediterranean,

arriving off Lebanon early on the morning of 16 July, where he established his command in the USS *Taconic*. Subsequently, he and Ambassador McClintock established an excellent working relationship. In McClintock's words, military and civilian leaders in Lebanon worked together like a "band of brothers."⁶⁰

A few hours after Holloway's arrival, a second Marine battalion reached Lebanon, bearing an order from the overall Marine commander for the first battalion to move into Beirut and secure the city. The situation was potentially dangerous; Lebanese tanks, ready to resist, were blocking the route from the airport to the city. What followed, however, could almost be characterized as comic opera. While Admiral Holloway and the Marine commander headed for Beirut by automobile to straighten out the matter, McClintock and General Chehab in turn started for the airport. The two cars passed each other en route; the ambassador's car then turned around and caught up with the admiral at the tank roadblock. An impromptu conference followed, in which General Chehab agreed to have the Lebanese army escort the Marines into the city. The column moved out, led by the two official cars, and with Lebanese and Marine vehicles interspersed. "It was one of the more unusual politico-military processions in American history," wrote an Army historian, "and its progress marked the passing of the crisis of the American intervention in Lebanon." An armed clash between the Marines and Lebanese troops might have inflamed Arab opinion throughout the Middle East.⁶¹

Joint patrols by the Marines and the Lebanese army soon calmed the capital. Meanwhile the United Nations debated the Lebanese situation. The Soviet Union continued to demand immediate U.S. withdrawal, ominously asserting the right to take "necessary measures dictated by the interests of peace and security." The three remaining Asian members of the Baghdad Pact Organization—Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan—expressed their gratitude to President Eisenhower for his bold action.⁶²

On 16 July the president decided to send Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy to the Middle East as his political representative to act as political adviser to Admiral Holloway. His instructions, as Murphy himself wrote, were "conveniently vague"; he was simply to promote U.S. interests in the area.⁶³

On the same day, King Hussein of Jordan warned the United States and Britain of a coup d'état against his government by the United Arab Republic, expected to occur within 24 hours. He formally requested that both countries supply troops to guard the Syrian border and to protect the capital, Amman.⁶⁴

This request brought British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd winging his way across the Atlantic to concert measures with Washington. On 17 July Lloyd met with Dulles, McElroy (who had by now returned from the Pacific), and Twining. Lloyd told the Americans that the United Kingdom would send troops to Jordan, and urged them to follow suit. Dulles, however, thought it would be best if the United States furnished logistic support only. It was agreed that Jordan would be urged to submit a complaint

to the UN Security Council. The threat to Persian Gulf oil sheikhdoms was discussed, but no action was agreed on. Both sides believed that Nasser had a hand in the area's unrest.⁶⁵

Before the day was over, two battalions of British paratroopers from the island of Cyprus, 3,500 strong, had landed in Amman. The United States contributed to the stabilization of the situation in Jordan through an emergency airlift of petroleum to alleviate an acute shortage.⁶⁶

On the morning of 18 July a third Marine battalion made an amphibious landing. Shortly thereafter a fourth one began landing by air at the Beirut airport. Admiral Burke had directed that it be airlifted directly from North Carolina as a reinforcement.⁶⁷

Burke also put in train reinforcements from another part of the globe. On 17 July he directed the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet to send still another Marine battalion from Okinawa to the Persian Gulf. The force passed to CINCNELM's operational control on 1 August, but by then it was no longer needed in the Middle East; two days later Burke directed it to return to the Far East, where the Taiwan Strait crisis was looming.⁶⁸

Army forces from Europe had already arrived. An airborne battle group and a logistical command departed on 16 July by air from Germany and France respectively, staging through Turkey. Both had to fly a somewhat roundabout route because Austria and Greece refused to allow overflights. They arrived in Lebanon on 19 July. Air Force elements—bombers and fighters—assembled at Adana AFB, Turkey, as a composite air strike force (CASF).⁶⁹

With the arrival of Army units, a combined ground forces commander became necessary. In response to Holloway's request of 21 July, the JCS appointed Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams as commander in chief, American land force (CINCLANFOR), choosing an Army officer probably because Army forces were expected eventually to outnumber the Marines. General Adams, then in Europe, reached Beirut on 24 July.⁷⁰

An Army support force and a tank battalion sailed from German and French ports beginning on 24 July, reaching Lebanon in early August. They brought the total by 5 August to 5,842 Marines and 8,515 Army troops, or a total of 14,357. This was the peak strength for U.S. forces in Lebanon.⁷¹

Army reinforcements from Europe included a battery of Honest John rockets, which could fire nuclear warheads. With State Department concurrence, the JCS instructed USCINCEUR on 21 July that, if reporters raised questions on this matter, the presence of Honest John rockets was to be confirmed but that no circumstance requiring use of nuclear weapons in Lebanon could be foreseen.⁷²

Subsequently, State Department officials changed their mind. On 26 July Under Secretary of State Christian Herter asked that the Honest John missiles and launchers not be landed in Lebanon. Deputy Secretary Quarles concurred in this request, adding that there was no objection to maintaining the weapons afloat. Earlier, however, on 26 July, the Army chief of staff had learned of State's request and had so informed CINCUSAREUR, with

the result that the Honest John batteries and launchers had been unloaded in Bremerhaven, Germany, before scheduled departure.⁷³

Lebanon Pacified

Little more than a week after U.S. troops landed in Lebanon, the crisis, if such it was, seemed to be easing. In a televised press conference in Beirut on 24 July, Admiral Holloway and Ambassador McClintock agreed that the situation was no longer critical. On the same day, Secretary Dulles told the NSC that matters in Lebanon appeared "as satisfactory as can reasonably be expected." Even in Iraq, the situation was returning to normal; the population seemed to be accepting the new regime, which was maintaining a "facade of friendship" with the West, even if only to avoid disrupting sales of oil.⁷⁴

In the UN Security Council, the Soviet Union vetoed the U.S. resolution calling for a UN force to protect Lebanon's borders. Both the U.S. and Soviet delegates then introduced resolutions calling for an emergency meeting of the General Assembly, but the council took no action for the moment. President Nasser meanwhile flew to Moscow, reportedly to appeal for support in case of U.S. or British action against Iraq.⁷⁵

On 19 July Premier Khrushchev wrote to Eisenhower, assailing the United States and the UN for bringing the world to the brink of a new global conflict. He proposed a meeting of the heads of government of the Soviet Union, the Western Big Three, and India to draft recommendations to end the "military conflict" in the Middle East. Immediate action was necessary, he wrote, because "cannons are already starting to speak."⁷⁶

Eisenhower replied calmly, pointing out that the nearest things to armed conflict in the Middle East were the coup in Iraq and the plots directed against Lebanon and Jordan. The proposed five-power meeting, he thought, would "derogate from the authority and prestige of the United Nations." However, the United States would be willing to attend a meeting of heads of government and foreign ministers at the United Nations, as provided for in the UN Charter. In a subsequent exchange of correspondence, the two leaders agreed on such a meeting to be held at the UN.⁷⁷

At this point, Khrushchev suddenly veered off in a new direction, apparently as a result of a visit from the leaders of Communist China to Moscow between 31 July and 3 August. In a new letter on 5 August, he assailed the UN Security Council as "paralyzed" and incapable of taking any decision independent of the United States; also, the place of the "lawful representative" of the People's Republic of China was occupied on the Security Council by the representative of the "political corpse," Chiang Kai-shek. He now urged a special meeting of the General Assembly.⁷⁸

The United States agreed and the General Assembly accordingly convened on 13 August, with President Eisenhower as the first speaker. He urged action to insure the independence of Lebanon and Jordan and again gave

assurances that U.S. troops in Lebanon would withdraw when requested by the Lebanese Government or when, through UN action or otherwise, the nation was no longer in danger. Then, seeking to move the discussion beyond immediate problems, he called upon the members to address the fundamental causes of unrest in the Middle East. He proposed action to end the fomenting of civil strife through inflammatory propaganda; establishment of a UN Peace Force to prevent armed pressure and infiltration across borders; and creation of a regional economic development plan to improve living standards.⁷⁹

This appeal had little effect. The Assembly enacted a toothless resolution endorsing mutual respect for one another's system of government and asking the secretary general to facilitate withdrawal of troops from Lebanon and Jordan. The regional development plan never materialized.⁸⁰

The United States had not waited for UN action before moving to withdraw its forces. The basic problem was to settle the political future in Lebanon and thus remove the underlying cause of unrest. Deputy Under Secretary Murphy worked out a solution in meetings with the various factions in Lebanon. On 31 July all agreed on General Chehab as a "national reconciliation" candidate to replace Chamoun when his term expired. Murphy then toured other Middle Eastern countries; his visit to Iraq helped to remove fears that nation was in danger of becoming a Soviet satellite.⁸¹

In Washington, Herter told Quarles and Burke that State was alarmed at the influx of men and materiel into Lebanon. In the light of this concern, the JCS decided that it was not too early to begin planning for an "orderly but prompt" withdrawal of U.S. forces, and so informed CINCSPECOMME on 5 August. This message apparently crossed with one from Holloway indicating that he had begun withdrawal planning as soon as Chehab had been elected, and recommending early withdrawal of some forces to relieve the political pressure on Chehab.⁸²

CINCSPECOMME proposed to begin withdrawing the Marines first, to avoid tying them down in static occupation duties. He proposed to embark one battalion immediately, but to retain it for the time being in Lebanese waters. Both Chehab and the JCS approved this plan, and the embarkation was completed on 14 August.⁸³

In September, two more Marine battalions departed, and the Air Force withdrew its CASF from Adana. Army units began their withdrawal in October. On 6 November Ambassador Lodge notified the UN that the last U.S. troops had left Lebanon on 25 October, ahead of schedule. At the same time the British UN representative reported that his country had withdrawn its forces from Jordan.⁸⁴

Well before the Lebanese crisis was safely past, the NSC turned its attention to revision of policy toward the Near East. NSC 5801/1, though approved in January, was already outmoded. The Planning Board drew up a list of issues for discussion in the council, notably how to deal with Nasser and Arab nationalism, and proposed two "bedrock" objectives in the Near East, namely, denial of the area to the Soviet Union and availability of

oil to Western Europe on reasonable terms. The president approved these issues in the NSC on 21 August and directed the PB to draft a revision of NSC 5801/1.⁸⁵

In the paper that resulted, NSC 5820, a majority of the board took the position that for all intents and purposes, Nasser was inseparable from Arab nationalism and must be dealt with on that basis. Representatives of Defense, JCS, and the Treasury believed, on the other hand, that it would be possible to work with "authentic" Arab nationalism, which contained aspirations not inconsistent with U.S. objectives. This disagreement ran through several paragraphs of NSC 5820.

A second issue in the discussions leading to NSC 5820 was how far the United States should go in pressing for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Defense, JCS, and OCDM representatives recommended that the United States "take the initiative" in seeking a settlement within the context of Secretary Dulles's speech of August 1955. The majority believed that the United States should merely "seek opportunities" to take such an initiative. This accorded with the wording in NSC 5801/1, which stated that the United States should "constantly explore" the opportunities for a settlement.⁸⁶

The JCS approved NSC 5820 subject to adoption of the Defense-JCS versions of the disputed issues, as did Secretary of the Army Brucker. Assistant Secretary McNeil characterized the majority position on Arab nationalism as "based on blatant expediency and not on principle."⁸⁷

In the NSC, Secretary Dulles dissociated himself from the position taken by his representative on the Planning Board. He thought it possible that in the long run, moderate views might prevail over those currently dominant in Arab nationalism. Regarding the Arab-Israeli dispute, it seemed to Dulles that Defense and JCS expected the United States to "bull through" a settlement, whether or not the situation appeared propitious. Quarles, attending in place of McElroy, noted that Secretary Dulles had yielded on the issue of Arab nationalism; hence he was willing to accept the majority view on the Arab-Israeli issue. The council then sent NSC 5820 back to the board for revision in the light of its discussion.⁸⁸

The president approved the revised version on 4 November as NSC 5820/1. As compared with NSC 5801/1, the new directive laid more stress on the danger from Arab nationalism and its possible manipulation by the Soviet bloc. The two primary objectives of U.S. policy remained those set forth earlier by the Planning Board: denial of the Middle East to the Soviets and continued availability of oil. Other objectives were to be sought to the extent compatible with these two.

NSC 5820/1 called for action where necessary to demonstrate U.S. willingness to counter Communist aggression, under the policy established by the congressional resolution of January 1957. It abandoned hope of enlisting Arab nations in regional collective security arrangements. Opportunities would be sought to take the initiative in seeking settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute and to normalize relations with the UAR, dealing

with Nasser as the head of the UAR on specific issues but not as the leader of the Arab world.⁸⁹

By the time NSC 5820/1 was approved, U.S. troops had left Lebanon and the Near East was quiet. Another part of Asia now required serious attention.

The Taiwan Situation

The outcome of the Chinese civil war in 1949 had left the People's Republic of China (PRC), headed by Mao Tse-tung, in full control of mainland China. The Chinese Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek, defeated and discredited, had established itself on the island of Taiwan (Formosa), approximately 100 miles offshore, and on the nearby Penghu (Pescadores) islands.* Seeing in Chiang's government, and in the not inconsiderable remnants of his military force, a possible check to the further expansion of communism in the Western Pacific, the United States furnished both economic and military support to the Republic of China (as the Nationalist government was called). In 1954 the United States and the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) concluded a mutual defense treaty. Chiang retained a hope, albeit a fading one, of some day returning in triumph to the mainland; the People's Republic in turn made no secret of its desire to "liberate" Taiwan.⁹⁰

Besides Taiwan and the Penghus, the Nationalists, at the end of the civil war, held on to several small archipelagoes close to the mainland, notably Tachen, Matsu, and Quemoy. These were sometimes referred to collectively as the "offshore islands." They were useful to the GRC as defensive outposts or staging areas for raids on the mainland. At the same time, their proximity to the mainland made them obvious targets for Communist China.[†]

NSC 5503, approved by the president on 15 January 1955, affirmed the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan and the Penghus but not the offshore islands. An attempt would be made, according to NSC 5503, to preserve the status quo of these islands through UN action. The United States would provide the GRC with military equipment and training to assist in defending the offshore islands, but U.S. forces would not be committed to their defense "except as militarily desirable" in the event of an attack on Taiwan or the Penghus.⁹¹

Almost immediately this policy was put to the test. On 18 January 1955 the Communists landed troops on the islet of Ichiang, near the Tachen group, and quickly overran the garrison. Fearing that the Tachens might be

* Before 1957 Taiwan and the Penghu islands were more commonly known by their Westernized names, Formosa and the Pescadores. In NSC usage, the change to Chinese nomenclature was adopted in NSC 5723, described below. For convenience, Taiwan and Penghu are used here throughout.

† These "offshore islands" must be distinguished from the "offshore island chain" often referred to in NSC policy papers, meaning the larger islands considered essential to U.S. security: Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines.

next, the Nationalists asked for U.S. assistance in defending them. The administration rejected this request and instead assisted in evacuating Chinese forces from the Tachens. However, Eisenhower determined that the two groups closer to Taiwan, Matsu and Quemoy, would be defended against attacks believed to presage an assault on Taiwan or the Penghus.

This decision, embodied in a congressional joint resolution of 29 January 1955, gave the president authority to use armed forces to protect Taiwan and the Penghus, also to secure and protect "such related territories" and to take "such other measures" as he deemed appropriate. The intent of this passage, as Eisenhower indicated in submitting the resolution to Congress, was that this authority would be used only in situations that were "recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries to," an attack against the "main positions" of Taiwan and the Penghus.⁹² The outcome of the crisis of January 1955 left the Nationalists in possession only of Matsu and Quemoy.* Determined to defend the islands, they maintained a sizable garrison on Quemoy and a smaller one on Matsu. Quemoy was particularly vulnerable, being surrounded on several sides by Communist territory, within artillery range of the mainland, and only a few miles from the city of Amoy.

NSC 5503 came under review in October 1956 during an examination of the military assistance program. A debate in the council on 26 October focused on Taiwan and four other countries—Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, and South Korea—that were regarded as most critical. The council directed the PB to review the scope and allocation of military and economic aid to these countries and recommend changes in existing policies if necessary.⁹³

The council's decision necessarily led to a reexamination of NSC 5503. In the course of this process, board members disagreed over the interpretation of paragraphs bearing on the mission envisioned in U.S. policy for the armed forces of the GRC, which of course bore directly on the size of the military assistance program. Unable to settle this difference, the board referred it to the NSC on 9 September 1957.

The mission of the armed forces of the GRC, as set forth in NSC 5503, was twofold: to defend Taiwan, the Penghus, and the offshore islands, and to assist in collective defense against communism in the Far East.⁹⁴ The State Department representative contended that the intent of these passages was that Nationalist forces would contribute to deterrence in the Far East and, in case of war (as, for example, if hostilities were renewed in Korea), would be prepared to conduct offensive operations outside Taiwan. State proposed to revise relevant passages in NSC 5503 not merely to reaffirm the role of the GRC forces in collective defense but to keep open the possibility of "such other action as may be mutually agreed upon" under the 1954 mutual defense treaty. The JCS representative agreed fully with this interpretation. He accordingly believed that the force levels and personnel strengths of Nationalist forces as then constituted were

* Each of these is in fact a group of small islands, but they were often referred to in the singular, using the name of the largest island in the group.



Taiwan Strait

necessary from a military viewpoint; the State representative, in accepting this opinion, believed that they were also necessary "from a political and morale point of view."

The Bureau of the Budget representative argued that NSC 5503 had been intended to limit Nationalist forces to purely defensive missions. Any contribution to collective non-Communist strength was a byproduct of this mission, not a separate one justifying higher force levels.

The board proposed a few minor and less controversial amendments to NSC 5503. They would substitute the Chinese names (Taiwan and Penghu) for Formosa and the Pescadores. To clarify the status of the offshore islands, the board proposed to borrow language from the president's message to Congress concerning the joint resolution: the United States would defend these islands against attacks that the president judged to be "parts of, or definite preliminaries to," attacks against Taiwan or the Pescadores.⁹⁵

The JCS informed Secretary Wilson on 17 September 1957 that they considered NSC 5503 generally adequate from a military point of view. They endorsed the State-JCS interpretation of the missions of the Nationalist forces and supported the revisions proposed by State.⁹⁶

When the council discussed the PB report on 2 October, Secretary Dulles argued for a broad mission statement for Nationalist forces, in order to sustain their morale by keeping alive their hope of returning to the mainland. Wilson and Budget Director Brundage favored a policy of maintaining Nationalist forces at their existing level; in fact, Wilson suggested that they might be reduced. The council's final decision was a compromise. The mission of the GRC forces would include "other action" as agreed under the mutual defense treaty, as well as a contribution to collective defense, but action to accomplish these missions would be limited to that deemed necessary "to maintain the position and morale of the GRC."

The proposed revision of the passage relating to the offshore islands proved more controversial than expected. Secretary Dulles objected to the board's proposal to borrow wording from the presidential message to Congress. He regarded the situation as completely different from that of 1955. Defense of the offshore islands was now integral to the defense of Taiwan itself. Interpreting the board's language as unduly restrictive, he favored the more sweeping language of the resolution, which authorized the president to do whatever he considered necessary to defend Taiwan. The president, however, saw little significance in these differences in phraseology. The final decision was that the United States would defend the offshore islands "whenever the President judges such action to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus"; then, to cover all bets, the text of the joint resolution and relevant passages from the presidential message were included as an annex. The revision of NSC 5503 appeared on 4 October as NSC 5723.⁹⁷

In the study of limited war that they completed on 29 May 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered operations in defense of Quemoy and Matsu, as well as Taiwan. It was assumed that the United States would use

only naval and air forces, operating in conjunction with the Nationalists, and that 7-10 days' warning would be available to position the required forces. The decision to oppose the attack must be made at the earliest possible moment and must include a decision to use nuclear weapons from the outset. The study concluded that present and projected U.S. forces were capable of dealing successfully with these and other hypothetical situations considered.⁹⁸

Unlike most of the rest of the world, the United States continued to withhold diplomatic recognition from the People's Republic of China. It could not, however, ignore the existence of that country. Beginning in 1955 the United States held talks at the ambassadorial level with Chinese Communist representatives in Geneva, initially to obtain release of U.S. citizens detained in China. During the talks, the United States tried without success to obtain a declaration renouncing the use of force in connection with Taiwan. Early in 1958 the U.S. representative, U. Alexis Johnson, moved to the post of ambassador to Thailand, and the State Department informed the PRC that henceforth the United States would be represented by an official of lesser rank. The Communist government, professing offense at this decision, threatened to break off the talks entirely unless Washington agreed to resume them at the ambassadorial level. On 28 July the United States offered to do so, but suggested Warsaw instead of Geneva as the site. It was at this point that the Taiwan Strait crisis intervened.⁹⁹

The Threat to the Offshore Islands

Since the Chinese civil war had never been formally settled, clashes between Communist and Nationalist air or naval forces in or over the Taiwan Strait were not infrequent. In the summer of 1958 the situation had been relatively quiet for some time. During July and August, however, the PRC began building up its air strength along the coast, particularly in the province of Fukien, opposite Taiwan. MIG-17 jet fighters based there became noticeably more aggressive in their actions over the Strait. Troops in Fukien were also reportedly strengthened. Naturally these developments thoroughly alarmed the GRC; as early as 17 July all GRC armed forces were put on special alert.¹⁰⁰

Why the PRC chose this moment to bring military pressure against the Nationalists is not clear, but its decision may have owed something to the Middle East crisis. On 17 July the Chinese Communist press announced that the PRC had recognized the new regime in Iraq and proclaimed the opening of a campaign to drive the West out of the Middle East. The following day the press linked these themes with a campaign to "liberate" Taiwan.¹⁰¹

The influence of the Soviet Union, if any, is uncertain. On Khrushchev's visit to Peking from 31 July to 3 August, he was accompanied by the Soviet minister of defense, suggesting that military matters were discussed. Later

evidence, however, suggests that the Soviets were lukewarm in supporting any Communist initiative against the offshore islands.¹⁰²

U.S. intelligence credited the PRC with some 894,000 men under arms, organized in 12 armies, 3 of them, with a strength of 46,000 each, located in Fukien province. Approximately 393 artillery pieces were believed to be within range of Quemoy. The PRC was believed to have 4,350 aircraft, including 1,785 jet fighters and 450 jet light bombers. These estimates were as of 22 August, when the buildup in Fukien was probably near completion.

Opposing these forces, the Nationalist army had 450,000 men, 320,000 of combat capability. Of these 86,000 were stationed on Quemoy and 23,000 on Matsu—109,000 in all, or about a third of Chiang's best troops. Other Nationalist forces consisted of 450 jet fighters, 376 other aircraft, and 135 naval vessels.¹⁰³

The principal U.S. force in the Western Pacific was the Seventh Fleet, built around two aircraft carriers.¹⁰⁴ It was assigned to the Pacific Command (PACOM) under Admiral Harry D. Felt. Forces in the immediate vicinity of Taiwan came under the Taiwan Defense Command, commanded by Vice Adm. Roland N. Smoot, who also headed the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) on Taiwan.

The first military engagement of what was to become a crisis occurred on 29 July, while the PRC buildup was in progress. Four Nationalist F-84 jets patrolling over the Strait, attacked by an equal number of Communist MIG-17s, lost two of their number.¹⁰⁵

From Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, U.S. Ambassador Everett F. Drumright reported on 30 July that the Nationalist government was growing increasingly agitated. He suggested that the United States move fighter aircraft to Taipei. The JCS and the State Department concluded, however, on the basis of available intelligence, that there was no evidence that the PRC intended to take offensive action in the area. Drumright was instructed to try to allay the Nationalists' apprehension and also to remind the GRC of its commitment to consult the United States before undertaking any offensive action against the mainland.¹⁰⁶

The meeting between Khrushchev and Mao further alarmed the Nationalists. On 4 August Admiral Smoot reported that Chiang considered the offshore islands imminently threatened, and asked for a "positive demonstration" that the United States recognized the seriousness of the situation.¹⁰⁷ The JCS replied on 5 August that 20 modified F-86 jet aircraft with Sidewinder missiles would be shipped to Taiwan shortly. At the same time, Admiral Burke instructed CINCPAC to send a carrier group to the Taiwan area and promised that everything possible would be done to expedite materiel. Chiang, not wholly reassured by these moves, declared a state of emergency in the Penghu and offshore islands on 6 August.¹⁰⁸

In Washington on 7 August, the JCS informed Secretary McElroy of the steps they had taken, and asked him to obtain policy guidance from the secretary of state to assist them in refining present plans to

meet likely contingencies, especially an attack on the offshore islands. McElroy made no reply for the moment.¹⁰⁹

On the same day Allen Dulles told the NSC that there had so far been no buildup of ground forces, without which an invasion of the offshore islands was unlikely, but the Communists might try to seize control of the air over the Strait and blockade the islands. The president noted that the United States had no warrant to defend the offshore islands unless an attack on Taiwan appeared in the offing. The following day the Dulles brothers met with Quarles and agreed to form a special group, with membership drawn from State, Defense, JCS, and CIA, to study the Taiwan crisis.¹¹⁰

In a meeting with Deputy Secretary Quarles on 8 August, Secretary Dulles restated the view he had expressed some months earlier, that the defense of the off-shore islands was integral with that of Taiwan. He thought that this fact "was possibly not clearly recognized by responsible officers and possibly not by the President." Quarles believed that the time had come for "intensive contingency military planning." They agreed that Defense and State should provide a list of contingencies for which the JCS should prepare plans "on an urgent basis."¹¹¹

The JCS were already preparing contingency plans for Taiwan, as General Twining told the president on 11 August. They had also alerted commanders in the area. Twining pointed out that policy regarding defense of the offshore islands was unclear. The president replied that there were sound military reasons why the Nationalists should abandon the offshore islands, but such action would send a signal to all Asia that there was no hope of resisting Communist China.¹¹²

In preparation for NSC discussion, Gray asked the JCS to consider possible U.S. responses to the following Chinese Communist actions: aggressive air action in the Strait, air penetration over Taiwan, sea and air blockade of the offshore islands, or assault on Taiwan and the Penghus. He also asked the JCS whether the U.S. position should be publicly stated.¹¹³

The NSC discussed Taiwan briefly on 14 August. When Allen Dulles told the members that Chiang wanted a public U.S. promise to defend the offshore islands, the president restated established policy: the response would be determined by whether such attack appeared preliminary to an assault on Taiwan. No attempt was made to reach any decisions, since the matter was still under study. In fact, as it turned out, the NSC never formally held a discussion of the crisis in the Strait.¹¹⁴

The president continued the discussion informally in his office after the NSC adjourned. Twining gave the answer proposed by the JCS to the three questions Gray had put to the NSC: the United States should resist by force either a blockade of the offshore islands or an outright attack, but this decision should not be announced in advance, partly for fear that the Nationalists might stir up action on their own. The president concluded that nothing more could usefully be done at that time.¹¹⁵

On 15 August a group of State officials, headed by Acting Secretary Herter, met with the JCS in the Pentagon to discuss the defense of the

offshore islands. Sentiment at the meeting generally favored defending them, although General Taylor and several State representatives expressed doubts. There was tacit agreement that interdiction of the islands by the Communists was more likely than outright attack, and that it would require air and sea action; artillery alone would probably not suffice to cut the defenders' supply lines. It was agreed that a decision at the presidential level was necessary concerning U.S. policy in the event of an interdiction attempt; also that, rather than a public statement of policy, Communist China should be warned through diplomatic channels.¹¹⁶

On the same day, apparently after this meeting with State, the JCS met and agreed in principle that the GRC air force should be maintained in a position of qualitative superiority over that of the PRC. This would obviously be a long-range objective to be attained through the military assistance program. For the moment, the JCS recommended that six F-100 aircraft earmarked for NATO be diverted to Taiwan. McElroy approved this request on 21 August.¹¹⁷

On 20 August the Joint Staff completed a compilation of possible responses to various Communist actions, as Gray had requested. Aggressive air action limited to the Strait could be met with a step-up in military aid. Should the air space over Taiwan be penetrated, U.S. forces might be used if the GRC proved unable to defend itself alone. A sea and air blockade could be met by providing air cover and naval escort for Nationalist supply convoys. A major attack against the offshore islands or Taiwan would require full use of available forces, but it would mean all-out war with Communist China. The Joint Staff recommended against any public statement of U.S. policy toward the offshore islands. The JCS took no formal action on the Joint Staff conclusions, merely "noting" them on 3 September, by which time the key policy decisions had already been taken at a higher level.¹¹⁸

On 22 August Secretary Dulles met with Twining, Burke, and various State Department officials. Dulles expressed doubt of the willingness and ability of the Nationalists to defend the offshore islands. If they could hold the islands for a week, he believed, the United States would be drawn in. The conferees agreed on certain military measures, including some recommended earlier by Chiang. A third carrier should be added to the Seventh Fleet, and all three carriers should be kept in the Taiwan Strait; joint U.S.-GRC fleet and air defense exercises should be held; more fighters should be sent to Taiwan; the flow of supplies to the offshore islands and of weapons to Taiwan should be accelerated; three tank landing ships (LSTs) should be loaned to the Nationalist government. The president should make a public statement, perhaps at a press conference, that an attack on the offshore islands would constitute a serious threat to peace.¹¹⁹

An opportunity for such a public statement, though by Secretary Dulles rather than the president, was already at hand. The secretary had received a letter from Rep. Thomas E. Morgan of Pennsylvania, acting chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who had "noted with concern" recent reports of the buildup of Chinese Communist air strength opposite Quemoy

and Matsu. "I would appreciate having any comment you may wish to make regarding the situation," wrote Morgan. Dulles's reply, on 23 August, was carefully worded to convey a warning without committing the United States to any specific action. After pointing out that the ties between Taiwan and the offshore islands had become closer over the preceding four years, the secretary concluded with the following paragraph:

I think it would be highly hazardous for anyone to assume that if the Chinese Communists were to attempt to change this situation by force and now to attack and seek to conquer these islands, that could be a limited operation. It would, I fear, constitute a threat to the peace of the area. Therefore, I hope and believe that it will not happen.¹²⁰

At the same time, the State Department undertook to guard against rash action by the Nationalists. It instructed Ambassador Drumright to emphasize to Nationalist officials that they were committed to consult the United States before using force against the mainland, except in case of a massive attack requiring emergency action.¹²¹

The Artillery Blockade

Thus far the discussion in Washington had contemplated contingencies—"what if?" Suddenly, on 23 August, the danger moved from hypothetical to actual. At 6:30 p.m. in Taiwan (6:30 a.m. in Washington), artillery batteries on mainland China touched off a roaring barrage against Quemoy. The assault was apparently timed to coincide with a visit to Quemoy by the Nationalist minister of defense. A total of 40,000 shells fell during the day, producing 92 deaths and 300 injuries. The Nationalists fired back with 5,200 rounds. A few rounds of propaganda shells fell on Matsu, the only attack on that island to occur during the crisis. On the same day, in the air, Communist and Nationalist aircraft clashed for the first time since 14 August.¹²²

News of the attack reached State when Allen Dulles telephoned his brother. The secretary's first reaction was somewhat surprising; the man who had earlier expressed the view that the defense of the offshore islands was integral to that of Taiwan now thought at once of mediation. "If this [bombardment] seems really serious and critical," he wrote in a memorandum for his subordinates, "there is perhaps room for the good offices of some acceptable third power." He did not feel that the United States had a fully defensible case, since the Nationalists had used the islands as a base for fomenting strife and spreading propaganda on the mainland. "We are, in effect, demanding that these islands be a 'privileged sanctuary'," he admitted. He suggested that the UN Security Council consider the matter.¹²³

On the following day the Communists briefly interrupted their fire, and for the first and only time, bombed Quemoy from the air. They also

tried to land troops on a smaller islet in the Quemoy complex, but were driven off.¹²⁴

That evening the JCS alerted the unified and specified commands to "increased tension" in the Taiwan Strait area, with a possibility that U.S. forces "may become involved if military activity of [the] Chinese Communists against offshore islands increases to [the] point of seriously endangering these islands." They informed CINCPAC that U.S. policy would probably aim at insuring that neither the United States nor Nationalist China could be stigmatized as aggressors as a result of a premature attack against mainland China. Earlier, Admiral Burke told CINCPAC that the United States might defend the offshore islands, but that initial actions would be limited to use of conventional weapons, a policy of which Burke disapproved.¹²⁵

The president scheduled a meeting for the afternoon of 25 August to discuss the situation. In the morning, Herter met with Quarles, Twining, and Burke; they agreed to notify the GRC of the measures decided upon to strengthen U.S. forces around Taiwan. The JCS then drafted a message instructing CINCPAC to reinforce U.S. air defense forces on Taiwan and to prepare to assume responsibility for the air defense of that island; to prepare to escort GRC resupply ships to the offshore islands; to augment Seventh Fleet units as practicable; to sail the carrier *Midway* from Pearl Harbor; and to expedite the sailing of two Nationalist LSTs there. In the event of a major attack seriously endangering the offshore islands, CINCPAC was to prepare to assist the Nationalists through attacks on air bases, initially with conventional ordnance. The Department of the Army would expedite delivery of modern equipment for use of the troops on the islands. DoD had authorized restoration of a Nike battalion for the FY 1959 Military Assistance Program for the GRC. In addition to approving this draft message, the JCS prepared a policy statement that the United States would not permit loss of the offshore islands to Communist China and would defend them by force if necessary.¹²⁶

Present at the White House meeting that afternoon were Herter, Quarles, Twining, Burke, and Allen Dulles. Dulles reported that the Communists had not yet deployed sufficient force to capture Quemoy; they appeared to be merely trying to interdict supply movements. The policy statement drafted by the JCS was not approved, and in fact does not seem to have been extensively discussed; no doubt the president was not ready for such an unequivocal declaration. The JCS draft message to CINCPAC received approval, with the stipulation that Chiang would not be informed of preparations to escort supply ships or to defend the islands (the JCS had wanted the entire message passed to Chiang).

The conferees agreed that naval forces in the Pacific should be reinforced from the Mediterranean, where the Lebanon crisis had subsided. Since the carrier *Essex* and other vessels thus redeployed would have to pass through the Suez Canal, the movement could not be concealed from Nasser. Herter suggested a public statement that the vessels were leaving the Middle East entirely; the president, however, preferred that the U.S. ambassador

in Cairo give Nasser reassurance in private. Admiral Burke added that two more carriers were planned for deployment to the Mediterranean in September; Eisenhower suggested that the move be publicized.

Quarles and Herter feared rash action by Chiang, Herter pointing out that an explicit statement of U.S. intent (such as Chiang was still requesting) might encourage irresponsibility by the GRC. The president remarked that "we are coming" to consider Quemoy and Matsu worth defending, though not for their inherent military importance. Quarles warned that the decisions that had been taken would commit the United States to help the Nationalists run a blockade. At the suggestion of the JCS, the conferees agreed to define those precise islands in the Quemoy and Matsu groups in which the United States was interested; these would be limited to the larger islands in each group.¹²⁷

Following the meeting, the JCS forwarded their draft message to CINCPAC, adding the information that clearance had been obtained to sail the *Essex* and four destroyers from the Mediterranean to the Pacific. They instructed CINCPAC to be prepared to use atomic weapons, informing him that a squadron of B-47s from Guam could be made available for nuclear strikes against the mainland.¹²⁸

In a news conference on 27 August, the president avoided any commitment when asked about the danger of involvement of U.S. forces in the Strait. He replied merely that the United States was supporting the Nationalist government and would not desert its responsibilities. "I think that about the best thing that can be said at this moment," he concluded, "is the Secretary's letter of about a week ago or something of that kind."¹²⁹

After their first two days of concentrated shelling of Quemoy on 23-24 August, the Communists continued firing, but the rate fluctuated sharply, from a high of 16,200 rounds on 29 August to a low of 400 the next day. This slackening did not reassure the Nationalists. On 27 August the GRC minister of defense told Drumright that Dulles's letter had failed to act as a deterrent and that a stronger statement was needed. On the same day Chiang, in a letter to Eisenhower, asked him to declare that an attack on Quemoy constituted an attack on Taiwan. He also asked that the Seventh Fleet convoy supply ships to Quemoy and Matsu. Admiral Smoot endorsed the request for convoy assistance and asked approval for Nationalist air attacks on enemy gun positions on the mainland and for more aggressive actions by the Seventh Fleet, in order deliberately to provoke the enemy.¹³⁰

A JCS-State meeting on 28 August considered Smoot's recommendations. Burke proposed that the United States take over responsibility for air defense of Taiwan, thus enabling GRC forces more effectively to defend and resupply the offshore islands. If further U.S. action was needed, the United States should undertake to convoy Nationalist supply ships, starting perhaps to a distance of about 20 miles from the islands, then if necessary all the way in. Burke would also have the United States supply additional landing craft to the GRC and take all necessary steps to maintain freedom of the seas in the Strait. In the event of an air attack on the offshore islands,

he urged, the GRC should be permitted "hot pursuit." However, he thought Smoot's proposal for air bombardment of the mainland not necessary at that time.¹³¹

On 29 August Quarles, Twining, Burke, and Herter discussed Burke's recommendations with the president. Quarles thought that the United States should define three phases of possible action by Communist forces: harassment and interdiction of the offshore islands, a massive effort to seize one or more of them, and an attack on Taiwan itself. For the first phase, Quarles would limit action to support of the Nationalists without involving U.S. forces; he would also authorize GRC aircraft to engage in hot pursuit. For the second, CINCPAC should be authorized to join the battle but not to use nuclear weapons nor to extend the area of combat beyond the immediate tactical area (including airfields on the mainland). For the third, CINCPAC should seek further instructions. The president agreed with these views.

Burke then submitted a draft instruction for CINCPAC reflecting the agreements made at the State-Defense meeting. These addressed only the first of Quarles's three phases. The proposal to protect Nationalist supply convoys raised some questions. Twining feared that if a U.S. ship were sunk, the president might be charged with exceeding his authority. Eisenhower, however, had no doubt of his authority in this matter. Quarles suggested that support and protection of Nationalist supply convoys be limited to international waters. This suggestion was approved, along with Burke's other recommendations.¹³²

The JCS then directed CINCPAC to give convoy protection and escort, within international waters (i.e., outside the three-mile limit), to the extent that he considered militarily necessary. U.S. forces were to maintain the principle of freedom of the seas in the Strait by actions confined to international waters. The commander of the Taiwan Defense Command, at a time of his own choosing and after consulting with GRC authorities, was to assume responsibility for air defense of Taiwan and the Penghus, using U.S. forces as far as practicable. GRC air forces thus released would be available to defend the offshore islands and provide air cover for convoys. In case of an air attack on Quemoy or Matsu, the "inherent right of self defense" would include the right of GRC planes to engage in "hot pursuit" of attacking aircraft back to their bases. The commander, Seventh Fleet, when requested by Taiwan Defense Command, would turn over to the GRC up to 36 landing craft from U.S. amphibious lift en route. Twelve 8-inch howitzers, to strengthen counterbattery fire, were being shipped at once.

At the same time, State instructed Drumright to tell Chiang that help was on the way, but that in view of "fast breaking developments" it was not possible to express definite views on the measures proposed in his recent letter to the president. In other words, there would be no definite statement of the kind that Chiang had asked for.¹³³

Secretary of the Army Brucker, on tour in the Far East, met with Chiang on 29 and 31 August. Chiang declared that the Communist interdiction fire had made resupply and evacuation extremely hazardous. Strong retaliatory

action was essential; the restrictions on U.S. action laid down in the recent JCS message were "absolutely unacceptable" to Chiang. Brucker, after talking with Smoot, expressed the view that the situation was not as bad as Chiang portrayed and that the Nationalists were not doing enough to break the blockade. He also told Chiang that it would be "highly improper" to initiate mainland air strikes at that time. Chiang agreed to cooperate with U.S. forces, but warned that he might eventually have to act on his own.¹³⁴

Despite the lessened intensity of the firing, U.S. officials still viewed the situation as serious. On 29 August the PRC warned the Nationalist defenders of Quemoy that an invasion was imminent, and advised them to surrender. On the preceding day, Brucker, in Seoul, had warned the Communists that they would be "sorry for it" if they misinterpreted policy statements by President Eisenhower or Secretary Dulles. Ambassador Drumright cabled Washington on 30 August that the Communists clearly intended to occupy the offshore islands unless stopped by American force and that they were capable of "gradually strangling" the defenders. Admiral Felt, endorsing this conclusion, recommended extending U.S. naval and air escort into the territorial waters of Quemoy and up to the east beaches. He would interpret such orders as allowing him to "neutralize" any Communist interference.¹³⁵

As September opened, the Communists continued to fire at a reduced rate, and on 5-7 September not at all. This favorable development was somewhat offset by an announcement by the PRC that it was establishing a 12-mile limit for its territorial waters, an action that would of course incorporate Quemoy.¹³⁶

The supply situation on Quemoy at that time was not critical; the garrison was estimated to have a 30 days' supply of ammunition at a firing rate of 2,000 rounds per day and adequate stocks of other supplies. Both Drumright and Admiral Felt remained convinced that the Nationalists were not making a maximum effort to resupply Quemoy.¹³⁷

As yet, CINCPAC had not had occasion to protect Nationalist supply convoys, as the JCS had authorized. Still, officials in Washington properly looked ahead to a possible need for more drastic action. On 2 September Secretary Dulles discussed the military situation with the JCS and with the military adviser to the ASD(ISA), Lt. Gen. Clovis E. Byers, representing OSD. Dulles asked what sort of U.S. military action the JCS envisioned if necessary; Twining replied that they proposed to strike at Communist airfields and shore batteries, using small nuclear weapons. Dulles drew attention to the fact that the use of nuclear weapons had major implications for U.S. foreign policy. General Taylor warned against too ready recourse to such weapons; in his view, they should be used only in case of prolonged massive shelling or a heavy aerial bombardment. An amphibious assault, he believed, could be repelled by U.S. and Nationalist forces using conventional weapons if circumstances required.¹³⁸

On the same day Dulles asked Twining if nuclear weapons were ready

for use in the Strait. Twining answered yes and added that this was "not the place" to use conventional weapons.¹³⁹

On the following day Dulles met with McElroy, Quarles, and Twining in preparation for a meeting on 4 September with the president, then in Newport. The conferees approved a summary of the situation to be given the president. Dulles stressed the vital importance of accurate knowledge of the supply situation on Quemoy, which would determine whether it could hold out in the absence of an overt attack. Quarles believed that a massive attack would justify U.S. intervention. Dulles pointed out that the U.S. objective was to deter such an assault; the danger was that the U.S. position might not be made clear. He thought that U.S. allies would acquiesce in any firm and purposeful U.S. action.¹⁴⁰

The paper that Dulles gave the president in Newport on 4 September expressed the view that the current action was an attempt to strike at the Nationalists' most vulnerable positions in order to produce a "rollback effect," first on the offshore islands, then on Taiwan itself. The loss of Taiwan would have serious consequences throughout Asia. If the Communists were willing to accept heavy casualties, they could seize Quemoy by an amphibious assault. There would probably be no such attack if the Communists expected U.S. intervention, but a continuing heavy blockade might eventually cause collapse of morale on Quemoy.

Dulles then submitted a draft public statement intended to warn the Communists. Eisenhower decided that it should be issued by the secretary bearing presidential approval. The two men then discussed the PRC's claim of a 12-mile territorial limit, and agreed that it was unacceptable.¹⁴¹

The statement released by Dulles after the meeting warned that any attempt by the PRC to seize Taiwan or the offshore islands would be a "crude violation of the principles upon which world order is based." The president would not hesitate, if necessary, to issue a finding that the use of U.S. armed forces was appropriate under the 1955 joint resolution. In this connection, it was recognized that the protection of Quemoy and Matsu had "increasingly become related" to the defense of Taiwan. However, the door was kept open for negotiations; Communist China was urged to accept the U.S. proposal, put forth for three years in negotiations, for mutual renunciation of force except in self-defense.¹⁴²

Returning to Washington, Dulles conferred with McElroy and Twining on 5 September. Twining expressed the view that supplies on Quemoy were adequate and that damage from artillery fire had been slight, despite exaggerated Nationalist statements. He admitted, however, that the GRC was not furnishing full information about the level of supplies.¹⁴³

When Eisenhower and the secretary of state met next day, the situation had changed for the better. Chou En-lai, foreign minister of the PRC, announced that his government was prepared to resume the ambassadorial talks.¹⁴⁴

The JCS met on the morning of 6 September and approved a discussion paper authorizing emergency action in defense of Taiwan and the islands. The United States would replace supplies and ammunition lost or

expended by the Nationalists. In the event of a situation not allowing time for consultation with the president, the JCS proposed to take the following actions on behalf of the secretary of defense: (a) authorize CINCPAC to augment, from his own resources, U.S. forces engaged in the defense of Taiwan; (b) alert all U.S. forces worldwide; and (c) direct CINCPAC, using all forces that could be brought to bear, to oppose any major assault on Taiwan and to attack mainland bases. In the event of a major amphibious attack on the offshore islands, the following actions, not currently authorized, would be desirable: (a) approval of Nationalist air attacks on enemy forces and on mainland targets; (b) authorization for U.S. forces to attack with conventional weapons any major Communist forces moving against the offshore islands; and (c) approval for U.S. air support of Nationalist forces.¹⁴⁵

Meeting at lunch with the president on 6 September, Dulles, McElroy, and Twining discussed Chou's announcement. The president was firm in insisting that the offer to negotiate be accepted; this would allow the United States to seize the initiative. Twining then submitted the JCS request for additional authorizations. Eisenhower approved it all except for the unqualified request for U.S. air support of the Nationalists. He reminded Twining that the JCS had estimated that such air support would not be required unless the Communist air force attacked en masse in support of land operations, in which case he would have time to make the decision. Hence, he stipulated that U.S. air attacks against mainland targets would be ordered only upon his approval.¹⁴⁶

The White House then released a brief statement that no official word about Chou's statement had been received, but that the United States was already on record as desiring to resume the talks. The U.S. ambassador in Warsaw stood ready to meet promptly with his opposite number from the PRC.¹⁴⁷

Also on 6 September, the JCS warned Secretary McElroy that the Strait situation, coming on the heels of the Middle East crisis, had stretched U.S. forces "dangerously thin." Another crisis—say in Southeast Asia or Korea—would probably require partial mobilization. They were concerned also about public apathy in the United States and other countries, and set forth a list of initiatives to gain public support for strong action. These included a statement of the U.S. position, conveyed through diplomatic channels, to the PRC and the Soviet Union; notification to congressional leaders, allied nations, and the UN of the seriousness with which the U.S. Government viewed the situation; immediate release of FY 1959 military appropriations made by Congress; marshaling of public opinion through all possible media; and a radio and television address by the president. Attached to this list of proposals was another warning that the offshore islands must be held in order to prevent the loss of Taiwan and that if the Communists were not deterred by the threat of U.S. intervention, the United States would probably be forced to employ nuclear weapons against mainland targets.¹⁴⁸

McElroy made no formal response to this paper, and the only one of the recommendations put into effect was the proposed presidential address; how much this owed to the JCS suggestion cannot be determined. In any event, the easing of the crisis soon made the JCS proposals irrelevant.

Early on the morning of 7 September in the Far East, the first Chinese Nationalist convoy with a U.S. escort (two landing craft with a cruiser and three destroyers) left Taiwan for Quemoy. There was no interference; Communist artillery fired no shells that day, nor did nearby Communist PT boats or MIG aircraft take action. The two supply vessels landed 272 tons, but so inept were unloading operations that Admiral Smoot advised against a second try the following day.¹⁴⁹

Ignoring this advice, Chiang, who maintained personal control over the resupply operation, sent two more ships the next day. The Communists, in reply, unleashed the heaviest artillery barrage yet encountered (53,000 rounds). The ships withdrew after unloading only eight tons.¹⁵⁰

The Communists' failure to interfere with the 7 September convoy, coming on the heels of their announced willingness to resume talks in Warsaw, briefly raised a hope in Washington that the crisis might be over. Burke, after consulting the State Department, instructed CINCPAC and the Taiwan Defense Command to avoid any action that might appear provocative. So long as the Chinese Communists withheld their fire, only one U.S. destroyer should remain over the horizon.¹⁵¹

Two State-JCS messages sent to the Taiwan Defense Command and the U.S. ambassador on 8 September stressed that the GRC was expected to avoid provoking incidents or presenting the United States with a fait accompli. The United States expected full advance coordination for all GRC operations.¹⁵²

State officials began discussing the possibility of an agreement to demilitarize the offshore islands. Secretary Dulles pushed this idea over the opposition of some of his subordinates. Admiral Burke also opposed it. In memorandums to Twining on 7 and 8 September, he stressed that the United States should insist on adequate guarantees of the integrity of the islands. The resumption of heavy artillery firing on 8 September, however, ended hopes that the immediate situation had eased.¹⁵³

Unfavorable weather in the Strait prevented any resupply attempts on 9-10 September. On 11 September a convoy of four ships encountered the heaviest barrage of the entire Strait crisis—61,000 rounds. One ship was blown up, and again only eight tons of cargo made it ashore. Throughout the rest of the month the Communists continued firing every day, even when no convoys appeared.¹⁵⁴

Thus far, the usually strident voice of Khrushchev had been uncharacteristically silent. On 8 September, however, President Eisenhower received from him a long denunciation of U.S. policy in the Far East. The United States, he alleged, had raised the threat of a new world war and was seeking to retain Taiwan as a base for attacks against the PRC. The president replied in temperate fashion, pointing out that tension in the

Far East had been generated by the sudden unprovoked artillery attack on Quemoy; he urged Khrushchev to try to persuade the PRC to settle matters peaceably.¹⁵⁵

The round of meetings in Washington that had filled the first week in September abated as the Taiwan situation stabilized. The president decided on a nationwide address to be given on 11 September. On that day, in the course of a general discussion of military problems with McElroy, he asked the secretary for JCS views on the importance of the Nationalist forces on Quemoy and Matsu. McElroy replied that the JCS believed that, from military considerations alone, the islands should be vacated. Eisenhower agreed that they were a "military debit." In his forthcoming speech, he said, he would avoid any suggestion of intransigence but would make it clear that he would not yield the islands under pressure.¹⁵⁶

True to his word, when he spoke to the nation that evening, Eisenhower characterized the attack on Quemoy as part of an "ambitious plan of armed conquest" which, if successful, would undermine the entire position of the free world in the Western Pacific. If the present harassing of Quemoy developed into a "major assault" beyond the strength of the Nationalist defenders, the situation visualized in the 1955 congressional resolution would arise. The implication was plain that he would use U.S. forces, as authorized in the resolution. He expressed hope that the ambassadorial talks with Communist China would bring about a peaceful solution, or alternately that the UN might do so. Thus he believed that both appeasement and war could be averted.¹⁵⁷

In a press conference on the following day, 12 September, McElroy gave guarded replies to queries about the Strait crisis. He declined to state whether U.S. ships would return the fire if fired upon but not actually hit. Asked if the United States would forcibly resist the seizure of Quemoy, he simply referred the questioner to statements by Eisenhower and Dulles. He believed that it would be possible to keep Quemoy supplied without taking the "rather provocative" action of attacking by air the batteries on the mainland. As for the effects of the Quemoy situation on plans to reduce manpower, this was still under study, but it was probable that Army and Marine Corps strengths would remain stable for the first few months of FY 1959.¹⁵⁸

The crisis had now dragged on for some weeks, and a measure of public opposition was becoming evident toward the administration's course of action, which some feared might draw the United States into a Far Eastern war for objectives not worth the cost. This was in contrast with the Lebanese crisis, where the dispatch of Marines had generally drawn approval; it was swift, decisive, and not productive of bloodshed. To a degree, public criticism of the administration's policy followed a partisan pattern, with some prominent Democrats, notably former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Eisenhower's two-time political opponent, Adlai Stevenson, expressing opposition. But the Democratic Party as a whole was by no means united in opposition, and there

was no groundswell of public hostility; opinion polls gave ambiguous results.¹⁵⁹

Some influential columnists were critical. Walter Lippmann feared that the United States had allowed itself to become entangled with Chiang and now faced the possibility of a war with Communist China to defend Quemoy. Joseph Alsop blamed the administration for having pressured Chiang, against his wishes, to occupy Quemoy and Matsu in force and for having imposed a "one-sided cease-fire" in the Strait by restraining Chiang.¹⁶⁰

Officials in Washington remained alert to the danger of Nationalist efforts to use the United States as a catspaw. On 11 September Admiral Felt suggested to the JCS that, if the GRC proved incapable of supplying Quemoy, the next logical steps would be to authorize the Nationalist air force to attack Communist artillery positions and to provide U.S. escort into territorial waters. The JCS replied on 12 September that these steps could not be considered in view of the pending resumption of talks in Warsaw. Instead, it was up to the Nationalists to create maximum success in the resupply efforts. They considered it possible that the GRC was being "deliberately inept" in order to draw the United States into conflict with the Communists. Chiang must be made to understand that the United States could not be expected to enlarge its responsibilities to resupply Quemoy unless the Nationalists first demonstrated "real determination to see the action through to the finish."¹⁶¹

Later that day, McElroy, Assistant Secretary Sprague, Twining, and Admiral Robert L. Dennison, representing Burke, discussed the supply situation with Dulles and others from State. Twining expressed doubt that the Nationalists were exerting themselves fully; it was possible that they were trying to get the United States involved. Dulles, however, thought that the ineptitude of the Nationalists sprang from inexperience and lack of skill. All agreed that the GRC resupply capability must be improved. Various measures suggested included placing U.S. observers on supply vessels or on beaches, smaller packaging, and floating packages ashore or hauling them onto beaches with tractors. These suggestions were to be passed at once to Admiral Smoot.¹⁶²

A Nationalist convoy on 13 September unloaded only 20 tons, but another the next day delivered 166 tons, the most since 7 September. Firing had dropped off sharply since 11 September, but one vessel was struck on each day.¹⁶³

A Navy memorandum to State on 15 September warned that the supply situation on Quemoy would become critical in two to three weeks without adequate resupply. Two days later, however, a Navy reassessment concluded that supplies on hand were more than twice previous estimates. This optimistic appraisal was not immediately accepted throughout Defense or State.¹⁶⁴

A pessimistic prognosis of the supply situation on Quemoy may have led Secretary Dulles to think of other courses of action. On 16 September he asked Herter to suggest some alternatives to the continuation of support

to the GRC in occupation of the islands. Herter passed the request to Burke's office, which in turn relayed it to the JCS.¹⁶⁵

In a meeting at his home with Twining, Burke, and Sprague on 20 September, Dulles described the Strait situation as grave. He was not sure whether the Communists were preparing an overt attack or were engaging in a blockade. The activity might gradually taper off, as in the 1955 crisis, but there was no reason to be confident of this. Twining and Burke estimated that Quemoy could hold out for two months if supplied with 100 tons per day; they thought it possible to increase the daily supply to 300 tons. Dulles, just returned from the UN, reported that most member nations favored withdrawal from the offshore islands; he was inclined to agree with them but saw no way to withdraw without bringing about a collapse of the GRC. If the Strait issue came up in the UN, he would press for a resolution in favor of a cease-fire and mutual renunciation of force. Twining read a JCS paper opposing UN consideration of the issue; Dulles replied that it could not be prevented.¹⁶⁶

Meanwhile talks had opened in Warsaw between U.S. Ambassador Jacob D. Beam and his opposite number, Wang Ping-nan. In five meetings between 15 and 20 September, Beam sought a cease-fire and offered a guarantee that the offshore islands would not be exploited for attacks on the mainland. Wang, showing no disposition to be conciliatory, merely insisted on U.S. withdrawal.¹⁶⁷

At this point, Khrushchev was heard from again. In a long letter to Eisenhower on 19 September, he declared that the United States had "forcibly seized" islands belonging to "the Chinese people." Warning again of the danger of wider war, he urged that the United States withdraw its forces from the Taiwan area on pain of having them forcibly expelled by the Communists. The letter was so abusive and threatening that the embassy in Moscow returned it to the Soviet Government without comment. The president released a statement deploring the use of threats and characterizing the Soviet viewpoint as "grotesque and dangerous."¹⁶⁸

The JCS evaluated possible alternatives to the existing course of action and found none. They told McElroy on 20 September that the present system of supplying the offshore islands should continue, at least for the time being. Any modification would require increasing U.S. participation, the extent of which would depend on the Communists' reaction. With experience, they believed, the Nationalists should be able to increase the amount of tonnage delivered. The JCS conclusions went to State on 26 September with the endorsement of the assistant secretary (ISA).¹⁶⁹

The Nationalists continued, without success, to press for U.S. approval to attack the mainland by air. On 24 September McElroy, following a conference with the president, told reporters that such action by the Nationalists "is something we would not wish for." "Let's give the Warsaw talks a chance to succeed," he added. On the following day State informed Ambassador Drumright that the supply situation was not believed critical enough to justify bombing the mainland.¹⁷⁰

The situation was in fact improving. Admiral Felt told Admiral Smoot on 26 September that cooperation between the two navies had brought about an efficient system for loading supplies and for conducting convoy operations. He instructed Smoot to make an "all-out massive effort" as soon as possible, using all available shipping and air transport.¹⁷¹

These measures had their effect. From 15 through 30 September convoys landed 1,527 tons, or an average of slightly over 95 tons per day, as compared with 538 tons, averaging 67 per day, for the period 7-14 September. The maximum was 270 tons on 27 September. Deliveries included 158 small landing craft (LVTs), six 8-inch howitzers, an M-51 tank retriever, and 250 troops. Junks not operating in convoys delivered another 180 tons.¹⁷²

Aerial resupply also improved. Tonnage thus delivered totaled 128 tons through 15 September, and rose to 540 for the second half of the month, or 36 tons per day average. The United States declined Chiang's request to assist directly in the airlift, but on 25 September JCS authorized CINCPAC immediately to lend 16 C-119 aircraft to the GRC. During the first week in October aircraft delivered 1,464 tons, or 209 per day.¹⁷³

With the situation easing, officials turned to longer-range solutions to the offshore island problem. On 29 September General Twining told the president that the JCS were no longer seriously concerned about the supply crisis. With Eisenhower's approval, he proposed to have the JCS begin considering how to persuade Chiang to evacuate the islands.¹⁷⁴

In a speech on 25 September Secretary Dulles declared that the United States would accept any arrangement that, while not involving surrender to threats, would eliminate features that could be regarded as "provocative." Five days later, speaking to the press, Dulles pointed out that the United States had no commitment to defend the offshore islands or to aid the Nationalists in returning to the mainland. It was "rather foolish," he said, to have put large forces on Quemoy and Matsu, and if a cease-fire could be arranged, it would not be "wise or prudent" to keep them there. But withdrawal under fire would have a harmful impact on Nationalist China and other countries.¹⁷⁵

Communist China Backs Down

Early in the morning of 6 October, Peiping time, the Peiping radio broadcast a statement by the PRC minister of defense, Peng Teh-huai. Addressed to the inhabitants of Taiwan, the Penghus, Quemoy, and Matsu, it informed them that, out of "humanitarian considerations," the bombardment would be suspended for seven days, beginning on 6 October. During this period the Nationalists would be free to ship supplies to the islands on condition that there was no U.S. escort. The point at issue, which would have to be settled by U.S. withdrawal, was the U.S. "invasion and occupation" of Taiwan.¹⁷⁶

The announcement came after a period of several days during which

no supplies had been shipped to Quemoy, primarily owing to rough seas. At the time it was made, an especially large convoy with 500 tons of supplies was already en route to Quemoy with U.S. escort. The convoy continued on and landed its cargo without interference.¹⁷⁷

On the evening of 5 October, Burke, after consulting State, radioed Felt and Smoot to discontinue convoy escorts unless the GRC objected strenuously. The Nationalists should make a maximum effort to supply the islands, but provocative action should be avoided.¹⁷⁸ The next day Navy and State officials met and agreed, regardless of GRC opposition, to suspend U.S. convoy operations after the current convoy returned, and so notified CINCPAC and the Taiwan Defense Command.¹⁷⁹

The danger that Quemoy could be starved out had now disappeared, nor was there any possibility, practically speaking, that the Communists would mount an assault on the island. On 13 October the PRC announced the extension of the cease-fire for another two weeks. A veritable flood of supplies poured into Quemoy—40,000 tons between 6 and 20 October.¹⁸⁰

There was now an opportunity to extricate some of the Nationalist troops from the offshore islands, where they were potential hostages. On 10 October the JCS and Secretary Dulles agreed that after the bombardment had definitely quieted down Chiang might be persuaded to remove at least two-thirds of the troops on Quemoy, perhaps in return for an offer to modernize his forces. The possibility of demilitarizing the island was discussed; Dulles agreed to try to work out the political problems (meaning Chiang's objections).¹⁸¹

McElroy, at that time on a lengthy tour of the Far East, stopped over in Taiwan on 12-14 October and sounded out Chiang on the possibility of reducing the size of the Quemoy garrison. Chiang apparently was ambiguous, but Ambassador Drumright, who was present, gained the impression that he might be willing to withdraw some troops in return for a U.S. commitment to defend the offshore islands and to supply improved equipment for the troops who remained there.¹⁸²

Shortly thereafter Dulles and General Taylor traveled to Taiwan to meet with Chiang. While they were en route, on 20 October, the Communists resumed firing at Quemoy, charging that a U.S. vessel had intruded into their waters. From Alaska, Dulles consulted the president by telephone, and they agreed that he should continue his journey.¹⁸³

In a three-day meeting (21-23 October), Dulles and Chiang discussed military matters, principally Nationalist China's hope of returning to the mainland. Dulles obtained from Chiang an agreement not to use military force to achieve reunification. He pointed out that of the other three countries partially occupied by Communists—Germany, Korea, and Vietnam—the leaders of all three had publicly renounced force for that purpose.

Concerning Quemoy and Matsu, Chiang agreed to what Dulles characterized as a "more sensible" policy. Dulles recommended reducing the garrison by 15,000-20,000 men. Chiang, without committing himself

to any particular number, agreed to discuss the size of the garrison with U.S. military advisers and eventually to make some reduction.¹⁸⁴

Two days after Dulles concluded his talks, the PRC took a further step to defuse the situation. In an extraordinary broadcast on 25 October, it announced that its forces on even days would not fire at all on airfields, beaches, or wharves so long as convoys were not escorted by U.S. ships. As with other announcements, this was coupled with an appeal to the people of Taiwan to reject the U.S. alliance.¹⁸⁵

This announcement led to a reexamination of U.S. policy concerning convoys. Following consultations among Dulles, Burke and Twining, the president directed on 30 October that the United States would escort convoys only on even-numbered days, and then only if the Communists actually interfered with supply operations through sea and air action (not merely by artillery fire). If the Nationalists sailed convoys on odd days, they would be on their own. Admiral Felt had recommended that U.S. ships on occasion deliberately intrude upon the 12-mile limit claimed by the Communists, in order to demonstrate U.S. refusal to accept the limit. However, Dulles pointed out, and the president agreed, that no such demonstration was needed; the United States had made its position clear in the Warsaw talks.¹⁸⁶

In the end, these instructions proved unnecessary; the Nationalists had no difficulty in keeping Quemoy supplied, and there was no further need for U.S. vessels to escort convoys. Although the United States failed to obtain an agreement with the Communists at the Warsaw talks, the crisis simply faded away. On 27 November the JCS approved redeployment of the augmentation forces that had been deployed to the Taiwan area. By 1 December U.S. forces and operating procedures had returned to normal.¹⁸⁷

Subsequently, U.S. and GRC representatives concluded a formal agreement to reduce forces on the offshore islands. The United States agreed to supply improved equipment for the remaining forces, but this was already earmarked for the GRC and did not represent an increase. With State's concurrence, DoD approved this agreement on 9 December 1958.¹⁸⁸

The uncertainty of the Taiwan situation, coming on the heels of the dispatch of forces to Lebanon, had delayed the administration's plans to reduce service personnel strength, as called for in the 1959 budget. On 24 September McElroy obtained the president's permission to retain all four services at their current strengths (totaling almost 2,600,000) pending further study. As a result, total military personnel remained almost steady through November, when reductions were resumed. The target figure of 2,525,000 set in the budget was in fact attained in April 1959, two months before the end of the fiscal year.¹⁸⁹

Aftermath

The threats to the U.S. position in the Middle East and the Western

Pacific demonstrated the value of conventionally armed naval forces in the application of military power in graduated amounts to achieve limited objectives. Nuclear weapons were important as a potential threat, especially with regard to the Strait; indeed, on no other occasion during Eisenhower's second term was their use so seriously considered. But in these two situations, such weapons had no direct application.¹⁹⁰

Both threats were handled successfully. The United States had achieved its objectives—in the one case, to pacify Lebanon and stabilize the Middle East; in the other, to deter Communist China from seizing Quemoy or rendering it untenable to Nationalist occupation. McElroy told the Senate on 29 January 1959 that the effective U.S. response in both instances had deterred war in the Middle East and kept hostilities localized in the Far East.¹⁹¹

With the benefit of hindsight, it might be argued that the United States overreacted. The danger presented by the coup in Iraq, which triggered the decision to send Marines to Lebanon, proved less serious than at first thought; it removed a pro-Western regime but did not enhance Nasser's strength; still less did it represent an accretion of power for the Communist bloc. In the Strait, it was never clear whether the Chinese Communists had any real intention of seizing Quemoy or even of trying effectively to blockade it, as distinct from merely demonstrating its vulnerability. But U.S. policymakers had to act on the basis of the best estimates available to them at the time, and given their objectives, their decisions were rational.

Significant in both crises was the caution shown by the administration. The president and Secretary Dulles maintained careful control, applying no more force than was necessary. To a large extent, they dealt with the JCS directly rather than through the secretary of defense.

In both instances the experience had relevance for the discussion of limited war then going on within the administration as well as among the public. No clear-cut conclusions could be drawn, however. It was undeniable that both crises were met by using available forces; this could be cited in defense of the administration's budget and force decisions, which, while emphasizing strategic nuclear power, had maintained other elements of military strength also. Administration critics, however, pointed out that the tests were limited. U.S. forces met no armed opposition, forces and facilities had been severely strained, and troops earmarked for NATO had to be used. Burke told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1959 that "we were stretched pretty thin" by the two crises and that if they had occurred simultaneously, it would have been necessary to bring additional ships into commission.¹⁹²

In response to a request from Special Assistant Gray, the JCS in February 1959 completed a study of "lessons learned" from the two operations, most drawn from the longer and more complex Quemoy episode. Principal among these was a ringing justification of U.S. actions: "The firmness of purpose, positive action, and a determined stand on the part of the

United States, successfully thwarted Communist efforts toward expansion of the Sino-Soviet periphery and sphere of influence, and constituted a major deterrent on the actions of the potential aggressor." Other conclusions included the importance of comprehensive political guidance in such circumstances, the need to maintain forces and weapons sufficient to counter aggression in the degree required in each particular instance; the role of high-speed transportation facilities and strategically located base complexes; and the value of the military assistance program in producing foreign forces useful in limited war situations. From Lebanon, the JCS recognized the need for early determination of overflight and staging rights. Both episodes pointed to the importance of keeping the public informed on a timely basis.¹⁹³

In the two years after 1958, no major problems developed for the United States in the Middle East. Indeed, the overall trend of events then turned favorable for U.S. interests. Nasser's relations with his neighbors and with the Western powers improved, while those with Iraq cooled noticeably, and Nasser displayed growing mistrust of the Soviet bloc. At the same time, new sources of petroleum in North Africa rendered Western Europe somewhat less dependent on Middle East oil.¹⁹⁴

In NSC 6011, completed in June 1960, the Planning Board noted that the Middle East was presently enjoying a respite, even if temporary, from the "acute tensions" that had afflicted the area. In the final analysis, communism and Arab nationalism were essentially incompatible, and the goal of U.S. policy should be to exploit this difference. The one objective of "paramount importance" in the Middle East was continued denial of the area to Soviet domination. Other objectives were continued availability of oil, resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute, political and economic progress, and expansion of U.S. and free world influence in the area.¹⁹⁵

The JCS endorsed NSC 6011 as written. The NSC approved it without change, after a brief discussion, on 15 July 1960, and the president approved it shortly thereafter.¹⁹⁶

In the Far East, the hostility between the two Chinas continued unabated but did not flare up into major clashes. The United States maintained its support of the Chiang regime as one of the bulwarks, along with South Korea and Japan, on which its position of strength in the Far East was anchored. After 1958, attention in the Far East began to shift to Southeast Asia, where the embers smoldering since the end of the French war in Indochina showed ominous signs of bursting into flame. By the end of 1960 Indochina had joined Berlin as a major trouble spot occupying the attention of the outgoing Eisenhower administration.

CHAPTER IX

Reorganization of the Department of Defense, 1958

A movement to unify the services that began before the end of World War II culminated in the National Security Act of 1947. Essentially a compromise between the Army, which wanted a complete merger of the military departments, and the Navy, which favored the existing arrangement, the act set up a single military establishment headed by a secretary of defense but retained the existing departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹ The new structure encountered serious problems in defining and enforcing lines of authority that required enactment in August 1949 of amendments to the National Security Act. By 1953 the Korean War experience revealed other defects that pointed to the need for additional changes in Defense organization.

The year 1958 saw a thoroughgoing overhaul of the nation's defense establishment, involving both military command and civilian administration. The reorganization, much more far-reaching and fundamental than in 1953, required legislation in addition to executive action. The resulting structure remained in effect with little change for more than a quarter of a century.

Organizational Developments, 1953-1957

The inspiration and the driving force for Defense reorganization came directly from President Eisenhower. His experiences in World War II as the commander of an immense force of all services had convinced him of the need for the closest possible collaboration of the services, from high command to combat level. "There is no such thing as *separate* land, sea and air war," he wrote in June 1945, in language foreshadowing the message he was to send to Congress 13 years later.² Earlier, in 1944, when interviewed by a committee on postwar defense reorganization set up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he advocated control of the services under a single official and, at the bottom, the "greatest possible" intermingling of fighting men from different services, to promote mutual understanding.³

Given Eisenhower's views, it was perhaps surprising that, when he became president, he did not at once institute a fundamental reorganization

of the military establishment. Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, which took effect on 30 June 1953, was modest in scope. It provided the secretary of defense with an enlarged corps of assistant secretaries and staff assistants, some of whom superseded existing interservice boards and agencies. It set the JCS outside the chain of command, confining them to an advisory role, named the departmental secretaries rather than military chiefs as executive agents for the unified and specified commands, and made the JCS chairman responsible for managing the Joint Staff. The plan had been drafted by a committee headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller, who subsequently became chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization (PACGO).⁴

The 1955 Hoover Commission studied the organization of DoD and recommended various changes to improve efficiency and economy. Organizationally, the only major result of these recommendations was the merger of the offices of the assistant secretaries for research and development and for applications engineering and the establishment of the Defense Science Board.*

One recommendation by the Hoover Commission approved by Eisenhower and Wilson, though it ultimately failed of adoption, entailed uniform administration of research and development in the service departments. Only the Air Force had at that time an assistant secretary for research; the Army assigned the function to a "director," while in the Navy it was part of the responsibilities of the assistant secretary for air. The commission recommended an assistant secretary for research in each department. In 1956 the administration adopted this recommendation and sought it in conjunction with another proposed change, not mentioned by the Hoover Commission: elevation of the status of the assistant secretary of defense (ISA) to that of undersecretary, in recognition of his heavy responsibilities, particularly in connection with military assistance. The first of these could be accomplished through executive action; the second required legislation.⁵

On 16 May 1956 the president transmitted to Congress a reorganization plan to establish the departmental assistant secretaries. Six days later the chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, Carl Vinson, presumably acting at the behest of the administration, introduced a bill to upgrade the assistant secretary (ISA). Both proposals, however, died in Congress, and neither was revived thereafter.⁶

In 1956 Congress completed the task, begun in 1948, of codifying all laws relating to the military establishment (Titles 10 and 32, United States Code). In the process, the legislators inadvertently perpetuated an anomaly in the status and authority of the military chiefs of the services. The new legislation incorporated provisions of older laws that granted command authority to the chief of naval operations and the chief of staff, U.S. Air Force. These provisions were potentially in conflict with the inherent

* See Chapter I.

authority of the president, as commander in chief, to place units of these services under unified command, although the issue was never raised. No command authority was conferred on the chief of staff, U.S. Army; he remained legally an adviser to the secretary of the Army.⁷

A study of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by a management consulting firm led in 1957 to several changes in the internal organization of the JCS. Elements set up outside the Joint Staff to deal with military assistance, unconventional warfare ("subsidiary activities"), and communications-electronics were absorbed into the Joint Staff as "groups," each headed by a deputy director and responsible to an interservice committee.^{8*}

During these years the question of reorganization of the Department of Defense received attention from the interested public, though with no urgency attached. The Senate Subcommittee on the Air Force under Senator Symington, in hearings during 1956, heard testimony on the subject; its final report cited evidence that organization and administration of the department fell "far short" of meeting needs, but it made no recommendations for changes.⁹ The unofficial Air Force Association, which often reflected the views of Air Force officers, enacted a resolution in August 1956 calling for establishment of a single military service.¹⁰ Service journals and others carried occasional articles on defense organization. That most of the authors advocated changes was not surprising, since dissatisfied persons were most likely to put pen to paper. The would-be reformers generally favored tighter control of the military establishment by the secretary of defense or reorganization of the services according to combat function.¹¹

President Eisenhower continued to express his views from time to time. His dissatisfaction with the status quo focused largely on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, probably because they seemed unable to agree on a military program that would realize the expenditure reductions that he so much desired. He told Wilson on 18 May 1956 that he had held high hopes for the men he appointed in 1953, but he now believed that the system was at fault. In the same vein, he told Taylor and Radford on 24 May 1956 that if the JCS could not develop "corporate judgment" on major problems, then major changes must be made. He did not specify the nature of these.¹²

Earlier, on 14 May in a conference with Radford, the president remarked that he had about reached the conclusion that some reorganization should be undertaken the following year. He had in mind to strengthen the position of the secretary of defense and of the JCS chairman, perhaps even going so far as empowering the latter to select the military service chiefs. In his next state of the union address, he said, he intended to include a statement of the kind of military establishment that the nation should have.¹³

Conferring again with Radford on 6 June, the president remarked that he had once favored a single service but he now inclined toward a less drastic step, i.e. vesting in the secretary of defense the authority to make promotions and demotions in the services. Radford assured the president that unification

* See Chapter I, Chart 2.

in the Joint Staff was making progress. He admitted, however, that the interservice committees interposed between the Joint Staff and the JCS were a source of difficulty and suggested that they might be eliminated.¹⁴

These remarks by the president did not, of course, represent carefully developed ideas; he was simply musing out loud. Still, they indicated the direction of his thinking. At the time, the president did not pursue the matter, nor did he carry out his intention to deal with defense reorganization in his 1957 state of the union address.

Secretary Wilson did not share the views of those who favored fundamental changes. "I am certain that the department of defense is operating today at a greater efficiency than ever before," he said in a speech on 11 May 1957. "Charges of duplication and waste are grossly exaggerated and are an echo from the past." A month later, addressing the National War College, he was even more forthright:

I would like to clearly go on record with all of you that I believe the present organization of the Department of Defense is sound, incorporating as it does the separate Military Services and Military Departments in an organization which is responsive to the President, the Congress and the American people. I would caution those who recommend radical changes to advocate them only after the most careful thought and when experience has proved that they are necessary.¹⁵

Wilson had been one of the architects of the 1953 reorganization, and his views perhaps reflected that fact. They became academic, however, when he left office a few months later.

Reorganization Becomes a Major Issue

The shock administered to the national consciousness in October 1957 by the Soviet Sputnik has been described in an earlier chapter. Public officials, members of Congress, scientists, editorial writers, and ordinary citizens groped for an explanation of the fact that the United States seemed to be lagging in an emerging technology having enormous implications for the future. Blame could be laid on budgetary restraints, but one could also ask whether U.S. resources were properly organized for an era of intense technological rivalry between competing political systems. Those who answered that question in the negative cited rivalry among the services and overlapping and duplicating authority for weapons development. Some urged a "Manhattan project" or a "missile czar" to produce a coordinated weapons program.¹⁶

Thus the question of defense organization suddenly moved to a high position on the national agenda. At the same time, the accession of a new secretary of defense provided an opportunity for a fresh start. Secretary McElroy, having played no role in establishing the existing organization, might be expected to approach the subject with an open mind.

The president felt incited to action by the need and opportunity presented by these developments. On 11 October, two days after McElroy was sworn in, the president recommended that he discuss defense organization with Rockefeller's PACGO. The members of this group, the president said, were firm believers in increased unification, and their ideas might be valuable. In further discussion, the two agreed that some aspects of missile development, notably the antimissile missile, might require centralized control at the OSD level.¹⁷

The trend of the president's thinking became clearer in a conversation with General Twining on 31 October. At that time, he proposed that the Joint Staff should become truly integrated, like his staffs in Europe during World War II and at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) more recently. He suggested measures to raise the prestige of Joint Staff officers, for example temporary advancement in grade. Commenting on another matter to which he attached some importance, he remarked on the size of the public information offices of the services and suggested transferring most of this activity to OSD.¹⁸

McElroy would have preferred to postpone consideration of defense reorganization until he became more familiar with his new job.¹⁹ The president's instructions, however, left him no choice. On 30 October he told Eisenhower that he had the matter under consideration but planned to approach it slowly and carefully. The president approved, noting that the subject aroused bitterness among service advocates. When McElroy said that he did not plan to submit legislation within the next year, the president raised no objection. McElroy proposed to confer privately with Quarles and Twining on the subject; Eisenhower suggested Puerto Rico as a locale for such a meeting.²⁰

Specific proposals for reorganization developed out of discussions between the Bureau of the Budget, which had statutory responsibility for recommendations on organization of the executive branch, and PACGO. A "staff memorandum" drafted in the bureau listed changes, including a direct line of command from the president and the secretary of defense to the operational commands, which should be organized on a functional rather than a geographic basis, and a unified civilian-military staff for the secretary of defense.²¹ These crystallized into a proposal for immediate creation of two functional commands, for strategic and for tactical warfare, and a deputy for the secretary of defense who would assist the JCS in reaching an agreed strategic doctrine within the department.²²

At a breakfast meeting on 4 November, Rockefeller and Brundage, director of the BoB, discussed these ideas with the president, who generally approved them and offered some of his own. He favored enhancing the authority of the JCS chairman and full integration of the Joint Staff, eliminating the supervisory interservice committees. The JCS in their corporate capacity should serve as the secretary's staff. The president supported a unified organization for research and development and thought that all research funds should be under control of the secretary. Since McElroy

was not present, the president urged that he be given ample time to study any proposed changes. Rockefeller warned that if the administration did not soon present its own proposals, others might preempt the field.²³

Concurrently, the Security Resources Panel headed by H. Rowan Gaither was drawing up its recommendations on measures necessary for national survival. Its report pointed out that new weapons systems, cutting across traditional service lines, had created management problems difficult to resolve under existing conditions. It suggested giving more responsibility to operational commands, which should have missions appropriate to integrated weapons systems, and concentrating research and development for major integrated systems in manageable organizational units. The panel also endorsed some of the ideas already under consideration: direct command from the secretary of defense to the operational commands, a suitable staff for the secretary, and restriction of the military department training and logistics functions.²⁴

On 4 November, after his meeting with Brundage and Rockefeller, the president was briefed on the conclusions of the Gaither panel. One member, John J. McCloy, warned of a general feeling in the country that interservice rivalry was a major obstacle to defense. The president restated some of the views he had put forth earlier that day.²⁵

On the same evening, the president held a dinner at the White House for McElroy, Quarles, the JCS members, and the service secretaries, followed by what he described as "a kind of seminar" on improving the military establishment. Eisenhower urged, as he had often done before, that JCS members approach problems from a national rather than a service standpoint. Citing his successful experience with integrated staffs as allied commander in Europe, he proposed that the Joint Staff be organized along similar lines in order to enable the JCS to take over operational functions, with the staffs of the services correspondingly reduced in size. He suggested that the JCS members turn over to their deputies the executive direction of the services in order to concentrate on their joint responsibilities. Admiral Burke took exception to some of these ideas; he pointed out that, as a JCS member, he must have his own staff to advise him on joint problems. He feared that an integrated staff might sink to the status of "yes men."

The president then commented on the tendency of the services to conduct feuds in public, and suggested as a possible improvement a single consolidated public relations office for DoD. Deputy Secretary Quarles suggested that a lump-sum annual appropriation to the entire department might help, since the practice of appropriating money to individual services spurred them to appeal to public and congressional opinion.

The meeting concluded with further remarks by the president about the need for unity in the defense establishment. He proposed to have bipartisan meetings with congressional leaders during December on foreign policy and defense. It was necessary, he said, to agree on some plan that could be supported by all.²⁶

On 15 November Rockefeller and Brundage sent the president an elaboration of the ideas discussed with him on 4 November, with an indication of the steps, administrative or legislative, necessary to carry them out. They hoped that McElroy would give a "high priority" to reorganization, and suggested that he bring together an advisory committee to help him in devising a plan. As possible members of such a body, they suggested former Secretary Lovett; Admiral Radford; William C. Foster, former deputy secretary; and General Alfred M. Gruenther, USA (Ret.), former director of the Joint Staff and supreme allied commander, Europe. McElroy was quick to adopt the suggestion for a study group, which he had no doubt discussed with Rockefeller and Brundage.²⁷

The president sent word to McElroy that he considered the Rockefeller-Brundage proposals worthy of study, although he did not desire reorganization to take precedence over more urgent matters, notably the forthcoming Defense budget. He suggested two prominent retired Army generals, Lucius D. Clay and Walter Bedell Smith, as possible members of an advisory committee. Two specific steps for improvement, he added, would be to organize the Joint Staff on an integrated basis and to eliminate the service departments as executive agents for the unified and specified commands (allowing these to report directly to the secretary of defense).²⁸

The president's newly appointed science adviser, James Killian, also generally endorsed the Rockefeller-Brundage proposals. He told McElroy that the Science Advisory Committee had already gone on record that science and technology were greatly influenced by organization and had offered to take part in a study of reorganization.²⁹

The Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, which opened hearings on missile problems on 25 November, extended its inquiry into matters of organization. McElroy, testifying on 27 November, stated that he planned to devote "considerable attention" to the subject but that an area of "such really major importance" would require careful study.³⁰

JCS members testifying before the subcommittee expressed no strong views on organization. General Taylor felt that improvement was possible but had no specific recommendations. General White, admitting that JCS members were overworked, saw no ready solution and opposed any hasty changes. Admiral Burke opposed any movement toward greater centralization, as did Navy Secretary Gates, who in fact urged a step in the opposite direction—restoration of the service secretaries to NSC or Cabinet membership. No clear consensus emerged during the hearings, and the subcommittee's conclusions, released in January, merely included a general recommendation for defense reorganization without going into particulars.³¹

McElroy remained unhappy about being pushed into reorganization so soon after taking office. In a conversation with Brundage on 26 November, in which he showed himself very "testy," he complained that the matter should have been handled before Wilson went out of office. It would be at least a year, he thought, before he could pass judgment on any reorganization proposals.³² But of course he had to follow the president's wishes.

In December the president reportedly met with legislative leaders, who questioned him, according to one report, about the "organizational foul-up" that made it difficult to pinpoint responsibility for defense failures. He "sat fuming" while these questions drew "limp answers from Pentagon officials." As soon as the meeting was over, he called McElroy into his office and told him to improve matters. "You have a free hand," he said.³³

At a lower level, the Joint Chiefs of Staff started their own reorganization study. On 18 December they appointed an ad hoc committee headed by Maj. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, USA, to examine the organization and functioning of DoD and to suggest improvements.³⁴

Establishment of the Coolidge Group

When Congress assembled in January 1958, sentiment among the legislators for defense reorganization, along with other steps felt necessary to overcome the Soviets' apparent lead in missile and satellite development, quickly became evident. A desire for stronger centralized control of the defense establishment, and specifically of military research and development, commanded wide bipartisan support, and a number of bills to accomplish this end were tossed into the hopper. These were in addition to proposals for a national space agency and for a stronger federal voice in science.³⁵

The administration's reorganization plans were far from ready. However, the establishment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, made public in January, was expected to improve the administration of research and development in DoD. Some members of Congress questioned McElroy's authority to establish the new agency, but in the end the legislators accepted it.*

The advocates of increased centralization received strong support on 5 January with the release of a study prepared by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund on the military aspect of international security. One of a series of studies undertaken under the overall direction of Nelson Rockefeller, it had been drafted by a panel headed by Henry Kissinger. Not surprisingly, the report's conclusions on the subject of defense organization closely followed the proposals that Rockefeller and Brundage had discussed earlier: removing the military departments from the chain of operational command; organizing all forces into unified functional commands; designating the JCS chairman principal military advisory to the president and the secretary of defense, with control of a truly unified Joint Staff; establishing the line of operational command from the secretary of defense to the functional commanders through the JCS chairman, and of logistic command to the secretaries of the military departments; and investing the secretary of defense with full authority over all research, development, and procurement.³⁶

* See Chapter VII.



President Dwight D. Eisenhower



Charles E. Wilson,
secretary of defense,
1953-57.



Neil H. McElroy, secretary
of defense, 1957-59.


U.S. Army



Thomas S. Gates, Jr.,
under secretary of the
Navy, 1953-57; secretary
of the Navy, 1957-59;
deputy secretary of
defense, 1959; secretary
of defense, 1959-61.



Reuben B. Robertson, Jr.,
deputy secretary of
defense, 1955-57.



Donald A. Quarles,
secretary of the Air
Force, 1955-57; deputy
secretary of defense,
1957-59.



James H. Douglas, Jr.,
secretary of the Air
Force, 1957-59; deputy
secretary of defense,
1959-61.




Wilfred J. McNeil,
assistant secretary of
defense (comptroller),
1949-59.



Wilber M. Brucker,
secretary of the Army,
1955-61.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library




John Foster Dulles,
secretary of state,
1953-59.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library



Allen W. Dulles, director
of central intelligence,
1953-61.


Dwight D. Eisenhower Library



Secretary Wilson receives the report of the Cordiner Committee from the committee chairman, Ralph J. Cordiner, 8 May 1957.



Secretary McElroy with Roy W. Johnson, director of the newly established Advanced Research Projects Agency, 13 February 1958.



National Archives

U.S. citizens board a landing craft for evacuation from the Gaza Strip during the Suez crisis.



National Archives

Secretary of State Dulles addresses an emergency session of the UN General Assembly during the Suez crisis, 2 November 1956.



Aircraft used in nuclear test Redwing, June 1956.




President Eisenhower presents the Medal of Freedom to outgoing Secretary Wilson, 9 October 1957.




Paul-Henri Spaak (center), secretary general of NATO, confers at the Pentagon with Deputy Secretary Quarles and General Twining, 25 October 1957.




Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris, commander, Army Ballistic Missile Agency, and Wernher Von Braun, chief of the Guided Missile Development Division at Redstone Arsenal, inspect a model of the Army's Redstone missile, 20 January 1956.



Army Redstone missile
in flight at Patrick Air
Force Base, Florida,
23 February 1956.



Air Force Thor
missile launched at
Cape Canaveral, Florida,
October 1957.



Army Jupiter missile blasts off from Cape Canaveral in successful test of a reentry nose cone, 8 August 1957.



IRBM Evaluating Committee: William M. Holaday, special assistant for guided missiles, with Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris, USA, (left) and Maj. Gen. Benjamin A. Schriever, USAF.



Admiral Radford and Secretary Wilson meet at the Pentagon with British Minister of Defence Duncan Sandys, 28 January 1957.



Secretary McElroy with members of the Coolidge Committee on Defense Reorganization, 28 January 1958. Left to right: Deputy Secretary Quarles, Nelson Rockefeller, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Foster, Charles A. Coolidge, Secretary McElroy, General Twining, and former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Bradley and Admiral Radford.



Rudolph A. Winnacker,
OSD historian, 1949-73.



Clifford C. Furnas, assistant secretary of defense (research and development), 1955-57.



Luncheon at the Pentagon to commemorate tenth anniversary of the Department of Defense, 17 September 1957. Seated left to right: former Secretary of Defense Lovett, Secretary Wilson, Secretary-designate McElroy; standing left to right: former deputy secretaries Foster, Anderson, and Robertson; former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Bradley and Admiral Radford; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Twining; Deputy Secretary Quarles; Assistant Secretary McNeil.

The trend of opinion, however, did not flow entirely in the direction of further centralization. Sen. Richard Russell of Georgia, chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, declared that he was "not a single-department man." His House counterpart (and fellow Georgian), Carl Vinson, characterized the idea of a single chief of staff as "a road to national suicide" and defended interservice competition as healthy. His explanation for current difficulties was that the Department of Defense had grown into "a fifth service" which had become involved in operations.³⁷

Russell and Vinson expressed a point of view that was overwhelmingly prevalent among spokesmen for the Navy. Both men had served for many years on the naval affairs committees (which had been merged into armed service committees in 1946) of their respective houses, and their opinions reflected the Navy influence. Admiral Burke, expressing the Navy's viewpoint in a speech to the National Press Club on 6 January, denounced "public pressures toward centralization and authoritarianism in defense" and defended the JCS as a forum in which opinions could be harmonized or referred upward to responsible civilian authority.³⁸

Similar opinions appeared in articles in Navy journals as part of the battle for public support. Air Force spokesmen, on the other hand, unofficially advocated greater centralization, though no one in that service spoke up officially, as had Burke.³⁹

President Eisenhower determined to use his forthcoming state of the union address to announce his intention to reorganize defense. On 2 January he discussed a draft of his speech with McElroy and Quarles. Both suggested some changes in wording, whereupon the president told them to revise the text as they saw fit.⁴⁰ Five days later he outlined to legislative leaders his broad objectives. He wanted to have the JCS bring together and resolve all aspects of military matters in the same way that the NSC brought policymakers together. He felt deeply that authority should be centralized in the secretary of defense—even to the extent, if Congress would approve, of giving that official control of appointments and promotions. He was ready, he added, to fight for his views in the face of congressional opposition.⁴¹

The president delivered his address on 9 January. He listed defense reorganization as the first of a number of matters on which action was "imperative." He was not yet ready to submit specific proposals, but he set forth the principal objectives that should be accomplished: "real unity" in all principal military activities, and especially in strategic planning and control; better integration of resources, particularly with respect to new weapons; clear subordination of the military to civilian authority; simplification of the scientific and industrial effort; and an end to interservice disputes.⁴²

The president's public announcement of his intention put McElroy under some pressure. On 10 January the secretary lunched with Quarles, Foster, Rockefeller, and Radford, all of whom had agreed to serve on an advisory panel. Others who had agreed were Generals Twining and Bradley. McElroy

informed the group that he had asked Carter Burgess, former assistant secretary for manpower, personnel and reserve, to serve as his personal assistant for the study. If Burgess could not do so, McElroy would seek the services of Charles A. Coolidge, a former assistant secretary of defense who had assisted Wilson in reviewing the recommendations of the Hoover Commission.⁴³

Former Secretary Lovett had declined to serve on the panel owing to ill health. General Gruenther agreed to consult with the group on occasion but felt that he could not spare the time to become a full member.⁴⁴

On 18 January McElroy held a preliminary planning session with the group. The members set a target date of 1 April for completion of their work and agreed to meet twice weekly for the rest of the month. McElroy told the members that the president planned to meet with them frequently.⁴⁵

When Burgess proved unavailable, McElroy visited Coolidge in Boston and persuaded him to accept appointment as the secretary's personal assistant. Coolidge moved to Washington for the next few months in order to devote full time to the study. He occupied an office adjacent to McElroy's.⁴⁶

On 21 January McElroy announced the appointment of the advisory group—Foster, Rockefeller, Bradley, Radford, and Twining—and of Coolidge as special assistant. He emphasized that the group was not a "committee" and that the members would not water down their opinions to reach an agreed position. They would meet as a group for discussions but would report as individuals. Following announcement of the study group, Democratic members of Congress reportedly agreed to "hold their fire" on defense reorganization for a period of two months to allow the administration time to draw up a plan.⁴⁷

With the appointment of the Coolidge group, the JCS saw no further need for their separate reorganization study. General Wheeler's committee reported on 24 January, recommending a number of changes to speed up decisionmaking, clarify lines of authority, and improve coordination between strategic and logistic planning. The JCS took no action on the report. Twining forwarded it to McElroy on 31 January and directed the committee to suspend activities.⁴⁸

The Administration Program

By the time the Coolidge group came into being, discussions among the president, Rockefeller, Brundage, and McElroy had produced a consensus on a few broad matters. They agreed that the authority of the secretary of defense should be greatly strengthened and that there should be a direct command line from the president and the secretary of defense to the unified and specified commands (bypassing the services). It was highly unlikely that the group would challenge these agreed objectives. The president, however, stressed that he wanted them to take a "completely fresh look," with "uninhibited ideas in approaching the problem."⁴⁹

In the deliberations of the group, Coolidge served as executive director and unofficial chairman. General Randall, McElroy's military assistant, acted as secretary and Leonard Niederlehner, deputy general counsel, provided legal advice. The group met twice weekly during both January and February, usually with McElroy in attendance. However, Coolidge also kept McElroy informed of the panel's activities by means of written memorandums.⁵⁰

The group held its first meeting on 21 January. The military service chiefs and department secretaries attended and took part in a wide-ranging discussion. Most of the participants agreed on the need for improvement, but there was no attempt at this stage to draw conclusions.⁵¹

On 25 January the members met with the president, who came to the Pentagon accompanied by General Goodpaster and Bryce Harlow of the White House staff. Discussion focused primarily on problems of command as distinct from administration. The president cautioned the members that they appeared to be getting involved in details before settling basic concepts.⁵²

After hearing the views of the heads of the services and of the assistant secretaries of defense, the Coolidge group turned to outsiders, and drew up a list of more than 60 persons whose views would be sought. These included all former secretaries and deputy secretaries of defense; several former JCS members and service secretaries; three unified commanders (CINCLANT, CINCPAC, and CINCONAD), as well as CINCSAC; military "elder statesmen"; business executives, mostly with military experience or defense connections; and prominent members of Congress such as Vinson, Russell, and Symington. McElroy approved the list and cleared it with the president. Some of those chosen were interviewed by a panel member (usually Coolidge), some appeared before the panel, and others responded with written comments.⁵³

The panel paid special attention to the organization of research and development. Killian contributed his views, as did another member of the President's Science Advisory Committee, James B. Fisk, as well as members of the Defense Science Board (DSB). Later, on 13 March, McElroy, Quarles, and Coolidge met with the DSB in executive session. The DSB strongly favored centralized control of research at the deputy secretary of defense level.⁵⁴

Members of the Bureau of the Budget were consulted regarding the handling of appropriations. They pointed out that the budget structure did not parallel either command and management channels or financial management controls. The only solution seemed to be to transfer all appropriations to the secretary of defense, either continuing the existing structure or merging all funds into cost categories. Brundage discussed the matter with the Coolidge panel and Assistant Secretary McNeil on 5 February. Rather than seeking a lump-sum appropriation to the secretary of defense, Brundage suggested appropriations to a number of accounts with authority to transfer funds among them. McElroy was skeptical of the advantages of this change, and the matter was left unresolved for the moment.⁵⁵

While the Coolidge panel was at work, the House Committee on Government Operations held hearings between 15 January and 12 February on research and development. Those witnesses who went into the military aspects of the subject advocated clearer definition of authority to speed up decisions. The principal witness in this regard, Clifford Furnas, former assistant secretary for research and development, called for a deputy secretary for research empowered with full authority.⁵⁶

At another series of hearings held by Vinson's Armed Services Committee between 13 January and 25 February, McElroy and Twining testified at the outset, followed by the military and civilian heads of the services and officials in charge of missile programs. The OSD comptroller came in specifically for criticism for allegedly having held up funds for approved projects.⁵⁷

At the conclusion of the hearings, Vinson and two of his committee colleagues introduced their own reorganization bill, beating the administration to the punch by almost two months. Their bill eliminated 14 of the 29 existing under secretaries and assistant secretaries in OSD and the service departments in order to remove the "administrative confusion" that delayed decisions. It fixed a ceiling on civilian employment in OSD and restored the service secretaries to membership on the NSC. In a deliberate slap at McNeil, the authors of the bill inserted a provision that the comptroller "shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, or judgment over the military justification for programs and requirements of the military departments."⁵⁸

Certain other provisions of the bill seemed more likely to be acceptable to the administration. Thus it would give the JCS specific statutory authority for some of the functions they were already exercising, such as assignment of forces to unified commands. It would also empower the chiefs to delegate administrative duties to their vice chiefs. McElroy, having no desire for a confrontation with the powerful chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, characterized this and other draft bills introduced into Congress as "very constructive" proposals.⁵⁹

On 21 February McElroy, Coolidge, and the panel members, having completed the task of canvassing their informants, flew to Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico. There they spent the weekend sifting through the recommendations and drawing conclusions.⁶⁰

The conferees agreed on a number of measures that were clearly in line with the president's thinking: increased power for the secretary of defense; a stronger role for the JCS chairman, giving him control over the Joint Staff; elimination of executive agents from the line of command, with the JCS becoming the secretary's staff in the exercise of command powers; and an enlarged and integrated Joint Staff. They also agreed in opposing establishment of a single service.

Exactly how far to go in strengthening the secretary's authority, and how to do so, were matters on which the panel members remained uncertain. They favored downgrading the service secretaries to under, or

deputy, secretaries of defense, but recognized that any such proposal would be fiercely controversial. In the matter of research and development, it seemed clear that the secretary should control some major projects and must be able to insure that projects cutting across service missions were not neglected. But how to achieve these objectives—whether, for example, to assign the function to an under secretary of defense—was a matter requiring further study.

Similar uncertainty surrounded the handling of appropriations, the conferees probably recognizing that it was questionable how much change Congress would accept. They agreed that the secretary needed more flexibility in the handling of funds, but gave no consideration, apparently, to asking for a single lump-sum appropriation to the secretary. As an alternative they considered making appropriations to the eight major categories of expenditures, leaving the secretary free to transfer funds between services within each category. But if, in addition, appropriations were made by service as well as by category, there would be no flexibility and the results would be symbolic only.

The conferees agreed that OSD should take over part of the responsibilities of the military services for public information and for legislative liaison. They proposed to retain the former function under an assistant secretary, but suggested that the number of assistant secretaries might otherwise be reduced.

While recognizing the dual-hat status of JCS members as a handicap, the panel was uncertain how to remove it. Some favored a change to a single chief of staff, others less drastic measures such as transferring some service responsibilities from the chiefs to their vice chiefs. There seemed no need for any change in the status of unified commanders except to make certain that they possessed full operational control over all their assigned forces; unified commanders, they had found, had no desire for administrative control.⁶¹

On 27 February, after returning to Washington, McElroy and Coolidge briefed the president on the work of the group. The president took no exception to any of their proposals. The most important point, he said, was to establish the power of the secretary of defense to take all necessary action.⁶²

McElroy and Coolidge went over some final points with the president on 12 March. The panel had agreed that JCS members should be separated from command of the services. Eisenhower did not object but suggested that, for the sake of prestige, they should retain a few powers over their services. As for the service secretaries, the president thought it well to retain the status quo unless Congress showed a disposition to hamstring the secretary of defense, in which case, in order to make his authority clear, it would be well to convert them to under secretaries of defense. Evidently well satisfied with the work of the group, the president asked McElroy to provide him with a statement of principles and objectives in reorganization to be sent to Congress in advance of legislation.⁶³

The drafting of a presidential message to Congress had in fact begun as early as 19 February, undertaken by Coolidge along with McElroy's two assistants, Randall and Oliver Gale, assisted by personnel from the general counsel's office and the Bureau of the Budget. The White House was kept informed through Bryce Harlow of the president's staff. McElroy was consulted throughout, and he and Coolidge settled some points at issue. The loose rein allowed them was indicated by the fact that they felt free to introduce changes even in matters of particular interest to the president. Final decisions would be announced by the president in his message to Congress.⁶⁴

By 21 March Coolidge had ready what he considered a near-final draft. It set forth objectives and went into some detail on methods of attaining them. Thus, to eliminate overlapping roles and missions, the secretary would be empowered by law to adjust these as necessary. An even more sweeping provision would vest in the secretary of defense all the statutory powers and functions of the service secretaries, who would then receive these back by delegation. Appropriations for research and development for all elements of DoD would be made to the secretary of defense and would be under the control of an under secretary, who would supersede the existing assistant secretary for research and engineering. Congress would be asked to appropriate funds by cost category and by service and to allow some transfer of funds between categories. The number of assistant secretaries would be reduced to six (plus the general counsel), with the health and medical function being placed under a special assistant. The assistant secretaries would have power to "issue authoritative instructions" for carrying out the policies of the secretary of defense. The latter would review the legislative liaison activities of the services and strengthen his supervision over them.

The draft incorporated the proposals on which agreement had earlier been reached: to shorten the line of command, to enhance the status of the JCS chairman, and to enlarge the Joint Staff (the president would ask for removal of all restrictions on the strength of that body). It proposed, however, that the JCS would retain their "dual hats," being empowered to delegate responsibilities as necessary to their immediate subordinates. Promotion of officers to three- and four-star rank would be made on advice from the JCS and recommendation of the secretary of defense. The secretary should be authorized to transfer individual officers between services, with their consent, a provision intended to apply primarily to technical specialists whose abilities might be better used by some other service.⁶⁵

The AFPC discussed this draft on 25 March. The service secretaries objected to the proposal to vest all legal authority in the secretary of defense. McElroy admitted that this was more extreme than he had intended and agreed to work out alternative language to achieve the same goal, i.e., to strengthen and clarify the secretary's authority. Some also objected to the authority proposed for the assistant secretaries of defense; the members agreed that they should be authorized merely to "give instructions." It was

also agreed to retain three assistant secretaries for each military department; the original draft, in touching on the organization of these departments, would have allowed them only two.⁶⁶

Following the meeting, Coolidge, McElroy, and Quarles revised the draft message. They eliminated the proposal to vest all powers in the secretary of defense, replacing it with a recommendation for elimination of the requirement that the military departments be "separately administered" and for removal of all other "statutory clouds" upon the secretary's authority. Before it went to the White House, Rockefeller reviewed it and criticized it as a "weak watered down" version of the consensus reached by the Coolidge group, aimed at placating the services. "Well," rejoined McElroy, "the President will use what he wants and eliminate what he doesn't want."⁶⁷

In the White House, the draft underwent a complete rewrite. No changes were made in substance except to convert the title of the under secretary for research and development to "director of defense research and engineering" and to insert a provision that service public information activities would be reviewed. Right up to the final moment, McElroy, Coolidge, and members of the panel reviewed drafts and consulted with the White House staff on the final version.⁶⁸

On 1 April 1958 McElroy and Coolidge described their proposals to a group of legislative leaders, who apparently expressed no strong objection. The president, who also attended, indicated that he was not particularly concerned with details so long as the secretary of defense was given the authority that he needed. On the same day, McElroy met separately with Vinson, presumably to discuss the difference in approach between his and the president's proposals.⁶⁹

The text of the president's message, thoroughly reworked, went to Congress on 3 April. It opened with an affirmation of the principles underlying his recommendations:

First, separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service. The accomplishment of this result is the basic function of the Secretary of Defense, advised and assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and operating under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief.

Additionally, Secretary of Defense authority, especially in respect to the development of new weapons, must be clear and direct, and flexible in the management of funds. Prompt decisions and elimination of wasteful activity must be primary goals.

The president briefly reviewed the history of U.S. defense organization, pointing out that steps toward closer coordination had been accompanied by predictions of dire consequences which had not occurred. The fears thus engendered had led to excessive restraints on the authority of the secretary of defense. He then set forth six broad objectives, each with prescriptions for action, as follows:

1. We must organize our fighting forces into operational commands that are truly unified, each assigned a mission in full accord with our over-all military objectives.

This lesson, the president said, he had learned from experience during World War II. He intended that, with exceptions personally approved by him, all operational forces were to be organized into unified commands. Moreover, unified commanders must have unquestioned authority over their component commands; any legal restrictions on their authority should be repealed. He emphasized, however, that he was not proposing to merge or abolish the services.

2. We must clear command channels so that orders will proceed directly to unified commands from the Commander-in-Chief and Secretary of Defense.

The existing chain of command, running through the service secretaries and military chiefs, was "cumbersome and unreliable in time of peace and not usable in time of war." (The president did not mention that he himself had instigated that chain of command in 1953.) He had already directed the secretary of defense to discontinue the use of military departments as executive agents. He asked repeal of any statutes vesting responsibility for military operations in any official other than the secretary of defense.

3. We must strengthen the military staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in order to provide the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of Defense with the professional assistance they need for strategic planning and for operational direction of the unified commands.

This objective would require changes in the duties and organization of the JCS, but they should continue as currently constituted. However, in keeping with the change in operational channels, the JCS would in the future serve as the staff assisting the secretary of defense in exercising direction over the unified commands, issuing orders under the authority of and in the name of the secretary. The function of the JCS was to advise and assist the secretary; they were to perform no duties independently of the secretary's direction.

To provide a larger and stronger Joint Staff, the president was directing the secretary of defense to add to it an integrated operations division,

also to discontinue the interservice committees inserted between the JCS and the Joint Staff. He asked Congress to raise or remove the statutory limit of 210 officers for the Joint Staff.

The president proposed legislation to authorize each chief of a military service to delegate "major portions" of his service responsibilities. The secretary of defense would then require JCS members to make use of this authorization. Finally, to correct any misunderstanding of JCS procedures, the president asked repeal of the legal provision that the chairman was to have no vote.

4. We must continue the three military departments as agencies within the Department of Defense to administer a wide range of functions.

Relieved of direct responsibility for military operations, the service secretaries could better discharge their primary administrative, training, and logistics functions. Their responsibilities would remain heavy, but it should be possible to eliminate one or two of the existing assistant secretaries of the departments.

5. We must reorganize the research and development function of the Department in order to make the best use of our scientific and technological resources.

The secretary should be given "complete and unchallengeable" control over organization and funds for research and development. He must have full authority to prevent duplication and to centralize selected projects under his direct control. The president proposed to create a position of director of defense research and engineering, ranking immediately after the departmental secretaries and above the assistant secretaries of defense. This official would, with the approval of the secretary of defense, eliminate unpromising or duplicative research programs and initiate new programs to cover gaps.

6. We must remove all doubts as to the full authority of the Secretary of Defense.

The secretary of defense, as the president pointed out, was responsible for directing the largest single activity in the nation, but his authority had been circumscribed in ways that increased his burdens. Several areas of activity needed attention in this connection. First, Eisenhower urged that appropriations be made so as to provide the secretary with "adequate authority and flexibility." He did not specify how this should be done. He had, however, directed that DoD budgets for 1960 and thereafter be prepared in a form to accomplish those ends.

Second, existing legislation was "inconsistent and confusing" in simultaneously giving the secretary "direction, authority and control" over

the entire department while requiring the service departments to be "separately administered." He proposed elimination of the requirement for separate administration and removal of any equivocation concerning the secretary's authority to transfer, reassign, abolish, or consolidate functions of the department.

To administer the department, the secretary and deputy secretary would require, in addition to the new director of defense research and engineering, seven assistant secretaries of defense plus a general counsel of equivalent rank. These would be empowered to give instructions for carrying out approved policies, subject to the right of appeal by service secretaries to the secretary of defense. To accelerate decisionmaking, the secretary of defense would "critically review" operating methods of the staffs in OSD as well as the interdepartmental committee structure.

The president proposed that one of the assistant secretaries of defense would have charge of legislative liaison (in place of the assistant then charged with the responsibility). He had directed the secretary of defense to review legislative liaison and public affairs activities and, without impeding the flow of information to Congress or the public, to strengthen supervision over them.

Finally, the president would in future consider officers for nomination to the two highest ranks only on recommendation of the JCS. He also proposed to empower the secretary to transfer officers between services.

At the president's direction, the secretary of defense would shortly draft legislative proposals to carry out those items requiring legislative action. "I urge the Congress to consider them promptly," Eisenhower said, "and to cooperate fully in making these essential improvements in our defense establishment."⁷⁰

Secretary McElroy spent the morning of 3 April before a Senate subcommittee, answering questions about the administration's supplementary appropriations request for FY 1959. When he returned to the hearings in the afternoon, the president's message had been released and most of the questions he encountered dealt with reorganization. McElroy defended the president's proposals as representing a "moderate position" against more radical changes that had been suggested. He admitted, however, that the full implications of the plan would be known only when implementing legislation was available. Reaction was mixed; Senator Bridges feared that unification was being pushed too far, while Symington felt that the proposals did not go far enough.⁷¹

In the late afternoon, McElroy explained the reorganization plan at a press conference. When asked about the president's statements that he had directed the secretary to take certain actions, McElroy replied that he had seen no directives on any of the subjects involved.⁷²

Congressional reaction to the president's plan (which one editorial called a "real blockbuster") was prompt and largely critical. Particular attention focused on the president's rather vague words about appropriations, which some interpreted as implying that a lump sum should be provided

the secretary of defense and distributed at his whim. Others questioned the right of the president to alter the chain of command by executive order. Rep. F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana predicted that the plan would never get out of the House Armed Services Committee, of which he was a member. Overall, the reaction disappointed Eisenhower, who had hoped that a plan drawn up by a nonpartisan group of distinguished men would command "overwhelming support" in Congress.⁷³

Among spokesmen for the military services, opinion quickly hardened along predictable lines. A check of opinion in the Pentagon made by a reporter immediately after release of the message showed that Army and Air Force officers generally supported the president's plan, while Navy officers were dubious. This early impression was soon borne out. The executive committee of the Navy League, a civilian organization containing many high-ranking naval officers, saw the plan as leading to a "national general staff." On the other hand, General Carl A. Spaatz urged the American Legion, the nation's largest veterans' organization, to support the plan, and the national security committee of the Legion did in fact enact a supporting resolution. In New York, Secretary Brucker endorsed the plan in a press conference on 10 April. By 12 April a reporter could write that the Air Force was emerging as the "chief military champion" of the plan. The United States Chamber of Commerce also announced its support and offered to supply testimony in Congress.⁷⁴

Secretary McElroy inadvertently handed the critics an additional issue on 10 April, when he defended the plan before the National Press Club. Asked about the extent to which military officers could express disagreement with the plan without becoming insubordinate, McElroy, who had anticipated this question, had prepared a written reply, which he read to the group:

I can see no excuse for military or civilian members of the Defense organization undertaking to make public speeches in their official capacities in opposition to the program of their Commander-in-Chief to strengthen the nation's defenses.

On the other hand, officials of the Department are required, when testifying before Congress, to give their personal judgments and opinions when asked for them. Certainly I would expect each Department witness to answer such questions frankly and fully in the light of his professional knowledge and experience and with consideration of his position as a member of the defense organization which is commanded by the President.

I would think that if a man of integrity and conscience felt so strongly opposed to the basic policies and programs of his organization that he could not effectively discharge his responsibilities, he would so advise his superiors. I know that's what I would do.

This statement was promptly dubbed a "gag order" in an editorial.⁷⁵

Eisenhower was already moving to disarm opponents. He recognized that Navy officials would probably lead the opposition and that they had the ear of Congressman Vinson. On 8 April he invited Secretary Gates and Admiral Burke to the White House to discuss his plan. The two Navy spokesmen fully accepted the proposals for unified strategic planning and direction, for strengthening the authority of the secretary of defense, and for centralizing research and development. They expressed concern about attitudes lower down, particularly among the Marines, who were "emotional." They were worried about the situation they would face when called to testify. The president thought they would have no difficulty, since they supported the basic objectives of the plan; it was simply a matter of "not getting rattled." He was able to allay their fears about the effect of the plan on the services; these would continue to be administered by their own secretaries, who would retain major responsibilities.⁷⁶

Two days later Eisenhower met with Sen. John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, who had earlier introduced a strong unification bill of his own. Cooper told the president that from 25 to 30 senators were willing to support him if reassured on the matters of the secretary's control over appropriations and the status of the service secretaries. Eisenhower satisfied him on both these matters.⁷⁷

The president's determination to push his plan was evident. Asked at a press conference on 8 April if he intended to "stage a real hard fight" for it, he replied, "That's right." When informed that some "very powerful men" in Congress had announced their opposition, the president waxed eloquent:

I don't care how strong they are or how numerous they are. Here is something for the United States. Here is something that is necessary.

I would get onto the air as often as the television companies would let me on. I would keep it up until I would have the United States understanding that it is their pocketbook, first of all; more than that, it is their safety. . . .

It just happens I have got a little bit more experience in military organization and the directing of unified forces than anyone else in the active list. There are others that possibly are more experienced, but they are no longer in the active scene.

The things I am trying to get over are the things that the United States needs.⁷⁸

These emphatic words apparently had some effect on Congress, where, in fact, the initial hostility was softening as members studied more carefully the message of 3 April and realized that the proposals were less radical than they had at first thought. Even Congressman Hebert conceded that they might be approved.⁷⁹

The Legislative Package

As the president made clear in his message, he was already taking action on his own authority, as commander in chief of the armed forces, to carry out some of the features of his plan. The fate of the rest of it would in large measure depend on the details of the legislation sent to Congress.

Drafting legislation to carry out the president's wishes required a joint effort of DoD General Counsel Robert Dechert and officials of the White House. Already Niederlehner and Robert W. Berry of Dechert's office had begun discussions with members of the president's staff, notably Harlow.⁸⁰ As a result of this preliminary work, Gerald D. Morgan, special counsel to the president, sent a draft bill to Dechert on 3 April, following release of the president's message, with instructions to revise it as he thought necessary. Working rapidly, Dechert had a version ready the next day. It would drop the "separately administered" provision; authorize the secretary of defense to transfer or abolish functions, reporting the fact to Congress in doing so; and transfer to the secretary all functions with respect to research and development in DoD. It would establish in DoD an office of director of defense research and engineering, reduce the number of assistant secretaries of defense to seven (including the general counsel), and establish three assistant secretaries in each service department. The JCS chairman would be empowered to manage the Joint Staff and to select its director, and there would be no limit on the strength of the Joint Staff. Service chiefs would have authority to delegate duties to their vice chiefs. The command authority of the chief of naval operations and the Air Force chief of staff would be removed.⁸¹

The bill, revised by a group consisting of Dechert, Niederlehner, Berry, and representatives of the service departments and General Twining's office, went through six versions, the last of which Dechert sent to Morgan on 10 April; on the same day McElroy forwarded it to the BoB for review. On 11 April Dechert and Quarles discussed it at the White House with members of the president's staff. This resulted in another version which Quarles (in the absence of McElroy, who was attending a NATO meeting in Paris) discussed with the AFPC on 15 April. Later that day, Quarles met with Eisenhower, who settled several points at issue. The final bill was ready by 16 April.⁸²

As compared with Dechert's first draft circulated on 4 April, the bill that went to Congress was longer and more explicit. It would reaffirm the declaration of policy in the existing law, dropping the phrase "separately administered" but retaining the statement of intent to maintain separate services and not to establish a single chief of staff or an armed forces general staff. The secretary's power to transfer or abolish functions was declared subject to this policy, thereby forbidding him to abolish any of the services. The draft also provided that, before any transfer of functions took place, the armed services committees of Congress must be notified 30 days in advance. It repealed the existing permission for

service secretaries or JCS members, after notifying the secretary of defense, to submit recommendations to Congress, and the requirement for semiannual reports to the president and Congress from the secretary of defense and the service secretaries; instead, annual reports would be required from the secretary of defense only.

Eisenhower sent the bill to Congress on 16 April, with a letter to Speaker Sam Rayburn urging its approval and with a detailed analysis indicating the changes that would be introduced by the new legislation. In the letter, the president drew attention to the fact that the bill said nothing about appropriation of funds. The objective of flexibility that had been proclaimed in his message of 3 April, the president said, could be met by a change in the format for the 1960 budget, which he had already directed.⁸³

On the same day, Eisenhower held a press conference and answered questions about the reorganization plan. Asked what he proposed to do about military officers who could not publicly support it, he drew a distinction between congressional testimony and public speeches. Anyone appearing before a congressional committee had an "absolute duty" to express his real convictions, but speeches that amounted to "propagandizing" would be another matter, though not necessarily justifying expulsion from the service. Quarles made a similar distinction between these two types of statements in a briefing for the press.⁸⁴

The Plan Before Congress

The president's bill faced an uncertain future. On the day it was sent to Congress, Representative Vinson assailed its tendency toward a "Prussian-type supreme high command" and called it an "open invitation to the concept of the man-on-horseback."⁸⁵ Eisenhower struck back in a speech the next day; he ridiculed "partisans and traditionalists" who had always opposed changes in Defense, and pointed out that few people who spoke of a "Prussian general staff" knew what it was.⁸⁶

Republicans in both houses of Congress generally rallied to the president's support. But Senator Bridges, a member of the president's party, predicted that the plan would be "watered down considerably" before being passed. A public opinion poll, completed before 16 April and released shortly thereafter, showed that members of Congress who had opinions on the reorganization plan favored it by a 2-1 margin, but half the members were still undecided. Opinion among the public was less favorable, with a slight majority in opposition among those who had made up their minds.⁸⁷

White House and OSD officials undertook to rally support, arranging luncheons and briefing sessions with representatives of veterans organizations and other prominent groups such as the United States Chamber of Commerce.⁸⁸ The president addressed a personal appeal to a number of his acquaintances who held high positions in business.⁸⁹ Secretary McElroy, before leaving for the NATO meeting in Paris, defended the plan in an

interview for a news magazine, then edited the text of the interview and cabled it back from Paris so that it could be published promptly.⁹⁰

Before the bill went to Congress, Harlow set up a group with himself as chairman and consisting of Coolidge (with Randall as his alternate), Oliver Gale, and other DoD officials. They undertook to provide material justifying the plan to witnesses testifying before Congress, as well as for release to the public. Gale in turn established a subcommittee made up of representatives from the services and the JCS to compile information.⁹¹

On the day before the House Armed Services Committee hearings on 22 April, McElroy, now returned from Europe, discussed with Eisenhower his appearance before the committee. McElroy thought that Vinson might be softening his position somewhat; he had sent McElroy a copy of the opening statement he proposed to make, which seemed quite objective, and some questions he proposed to ask concerning freedom of military officers to testify. The president saw no need to take reprisals against those who opposed the reorganization plan in congressional testimony, so long as they did not voluntarily speak out in public.⁹²

The hearings opened on schedule at 10:00 a.m. on 22 April. Vinson, in his opening statement, recognized a need for reorganization. "We are all convinced," he said, "that certain changes must be made in the Department of Defense. The basic structure is, in my opinion, sound—but it can certainly be improved."⁹³

McElroy appeared as the first witness, accompanied by Coolidge. He submitted a prepared statement in which he described the reorganization plan as a logical step beyond that of 1953, made necessary by subsequent developments, primarily missiles. He stressed the importance of unified command, which, he said, "constitutes the heart and soul of the President's program of reorganization." In the "stepped-up tempo of modern warfare," a clear and direct line of command, from the president to the combat forces, was essential.⁹⁴

Questioning then began. Vinson's first query dealt with McElroy's speech of 11 April to the National Press Club. McElroy made it clear that he expected witnesses to answer questions fully and fearlessly, but that officers would be expected to support any final decisions. Rep. Leslie Arends asked McElroy whether he had doubts concerning his authority under existing law. McElroy pointed out that the provision for separate administration of the service departments potentially conflicted with the "direction, authority, and control" of the secretary over the entire department. In some instances, he said, this confusing language had been used as an excuse for not fully working toward common objectives. Coolidge characterized the situation with the apt phrase "sand in the gearbox."⁹⁵

The tone of the questioning indicated that many members of the committee remained to be convinced of the need to enhance the secretary's authority. Vinson terminated the hearing at noon in order to allow McElroy to provide written answers to the questions he had submitted.

The challenging tone in which Vinson phrased these questions clearly indicated his skepticism about the reorganization plan.⁹⁶

When the hearings reopened the next day, McElroy asked for and was given several days to reply to Vinson's questions. He and Twining remained on the stand through 25 April. McElroy gave an impressive performance, maintaining complete courtesy while giving full and frank answers to sometimes hostile questions. As expected, fears of a "Prussian general staff" soon surfaced; Twining promised to put in the record a definition of the phrase. The questioning touched on Gale's information working group, which a newspaper columnist had suggested amounted to a "propaganda bureau" set up by a secret directive. McElroy replied that there was no such directive and that the information compiled by the group would be available to the public.⁹⁷

During the questioning, McElroy was driven to admit that the bill would grant him more authority than he intended to use. He had been advised by his lawyers that to provide the authority he wanted demanded language that was unnecessarily broad. Several times he repeated that he would be willing to accept substitute language if it would accomplish the same purpose. He also said that "our feet are not in concrete" on the matter of repealing the right of service heads to appeal to Congress.⁹⁸

On 24 April Coolidge met with Reps. Vinson, Kilday, Arends, and the committee staff to discuss possible alternatives in the language of the bill. The congressmen suggested that the phrase "separately administered" be eliminated for procurement but retained for other functions. It was agreed that Niederlehner would consult with the committee staff to consider revisions. Coolidge, reporting this conference to McElroy, thought it encouraging; it showed that the committee members were beginning to realize that the plan was not as objectionable as they had at first thought and that they would probably give the president most of what he wanted.⁹⁹

McElroy's expressed willingness to accept changes in phraseology gave rise to rumors that the administration was preparing to retreat on the plan. Eisenhower, then vacationing in Augusta, Georgia, read a report to that effect in the local paper. After conferring by telephone with McElroy, he dictated a statement to White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty, who released it on 26 April. The statement declared that, while McElroy properly had not insisted on "rigid adherence to words and phraseology," his testimony had in no way implied any substantive changes, and that both he and the president were agreed that "there can be no compromises on—or retreat from—the essentials of this legislation." Hagerty also read a statement by McElroy affirming that there would be "no retreat" from the president's objectives.¹⁰⁰

Returning to Washington on Monday, 28 April, Eisenhower met with McElroy, who again assured him that he had held firmly to the objective of the plan in his testimony. The two men agreed that individuals testifying on the plan before Congress would be completely free to express their

opinions, but that "their future retention would depend on their loyalty to the success of the plan and to programs and policies undertaken thereunder after it became law."¹⁰¹

The hearings resumed on 28 April with Twining as chief witness. His testimony focused primarily on those aspects of the plan relating to the JCS and the chain of command. He attempted to lay to rest the bogey of the "Prussian general staff." Contrary to what was often thought, he pointed out, neither Prussia nor Germany ever had the kind of all-powerful armed forces general staff that critics feared. The German general staff was an army staff pure and simple, and functioned quite efficiently in that capacity. He did not, however, succeed in allaying all alarm on those aspects of the bill relating to the Joint Staff. Vinson pressed the charge that the administration was asking for a "blank check" for the size of the Joint Staff. Twining indicated that he would not object to establishing some sort of limit, replacing the excessively restrictive figure of 210.¹⁰²

Twining was followed on 29 April by General Taylor, who was in sympathy with the reorganization but agreed that it should be critically examined. During the questioning, the committee counsel read into the record a long attack on the plan by H. Struve Hensel, former DoD general counsel. Hensel charged that the plan would create two parallel chains of command, for operations and for support, and would confer on the JCS chairman a stature that would greatly weaken civilian control.¹⁰³

Admiral Burke, appearing in the afternoon, opened with a prepared statement endorsing the objectives of the reorganization but stressed that any legislation should be carefully drafted to preclude misinterpretation. This hint of dissatisfaction with the draft bill was borne out in subsequent questioning. Burke told the committee that during the drafting of the plan he had expressed apprehensions—not all of which had been eliminated—that the bill might make it possible in the future to go further than was intended, even eliminating major elements of the services. He also warned against expanding the Joint Staff to a point that would enable it to delve into operations. The congressmen praised Burke for his frankness.¹⁰⁴

On 1 May Vinson placed in the record the written answers that McElroy had submitted to his questions. They provided careful and reasoned justification for the proposed legislation and made it clear that the bill would not create a single chief of staff or make possible a merger of the services. The replies, drafted by Gale's task force in collaboration with Coolidge, Twining, and others, had been cleared by McElroy with the White House.¹⁰⁵

The committee then questioned General Pate, the commandant of the Marine Corps, who went beyond Burke in indicating dissatisfaction with the bill. He gave it faint praise by endorsing a few provisions such as central control of research and development and transfer of officers among services. He saw no need for any legislation affecting unified commands,

which he believed were already operating satisfactorily. He viewed with "real apprehension" the proposal to allow the secretary to transfer or abolish functions, which would enable some future secretary to strip the Marine Corps of its combat functions and reduce it to a ceremonial unit. His testimony was welcome to opponents of the legislation. "The Marines, through you, have administered the coup de grace to the unnecessary violent language in this bill," said Representative Hebert.¹⁰⁶

General White, who followed Pate on 2 May, fully supported the draft bill and had no objection to changes in language so long as they did not impair the objectives. On 5 May Bradley and Radford, former JCS chairmen, added their endorsement of the bill. Radford's position indicated how far he had divorced himself from the prevailing attitudes of his former service.¹⁰⁷

On 6 May the committee questioned Assistant Secretary McNeil, whose endorsement of the legislation was unqualified but restrained; he evidently did not feel strongly about it. Most of the subsequent questioning dealt with allegations that McNeil had abused his powers by withholding funds from the services. McNeil denied that he had ever exercised "supervision, control or judgment" over military justification for departmental programs (as would be forbidden him under Vinson's bill). His function, he said, was to review all programs on an overall basis and, where related programs were out of step, call the fact to the attention of the secretary of defense or the cognizant service secretary. His office, he pointed out, was the only place in the Pentagon where some 3,000 different service programs came together.¹⁰⁸

In his testimony on 8 May, General Counsel Dechert defended with a lawyer's skill the exact language of the bill. His firmness and his refusal to be pinned down to simple answers for complex questions irritated some committee members. He was followed by Assistant Secretary Murray Snyder, who explained actions under way to review public affairs activities in DoD, as the president had directed.¹⁰⁹

The last witness, on 12 May, Assistant Secretary Sprague, in an opening statement described the operations of his office and stressed his responsibility for formulating policy relating to politico-military affairs, particularly the military assistance program. He cited the operations of ISA and its relationship with other elements in DoD as the kind of unified management that the president was seeking. Although the implication was that the bill would not make much difference to his office, he made it clear that he supported the reorganization plan.¹¹⁰

By that time it appeared that congressional opinion was lining up solidly behind most of the president's proposals. Even the House Armed Services Committee had dropped much of its hostility. The administration's efforts to mobilize grass-roots sentiment had proved effective, as General Twining remarked to the president on 12 May.¹¹¹

An eloquent speech by Rep. Clarence Cannon of Missouri, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, was important in rallying

Democratic support for the bill. Cannon praised the president's military judgment, warned of the consequences of disunity, and urged passage of the legislation as written. Indeed, he saw the issue in apocalyptic terms. "This is not an academic discussion," he said. "A thousand years of civilization weigh in the balance."¹¹²

After the hearings closed on 12 May, the Armed Services Committee drafted its own bill which incorporated most of the provisions sought by the president. It differed, however, in several important matters. It would drop the "separately administered" phrase, but would require that the service departments be "separately organized" and that the secretary of defense exercise his direction and control through the service secretaries. The provision to allow the secretary of defense to transfer or abolish functions was dealt with in a somewhat complicated manner. For "major combatant functions" there would be a 60-day waiting period, during which Congress might block the transfer by a concurrent resolution; moreover, the secretary of defense would be required to consult the JCS, and a function would be defined as "major" whenever one or more members of the JCS disagreed with the proposed transfer, so that each JCS member had a veto. Other functions might be transferred as provided in the administration bill, with a 30-day waiting period. The bill retained the right of JCS members and service secretaries to appeal to Congress, after first informing the secretary of defense. A limit of 400 officers was placed on the Joint Staff, which was authorized to organize and operate along conventional staff lines, but it was forbidden to organize as an overall armed forces general staff or to have executive authority.¹¹³

Eisenhower, after reading the committee's draft bill, wrote to Vinson that it represented "constructive efforts" to correct the main deficiencies and "seems to deal positively with every major problem I presented to the Congress." Nevertheless he saw a need for two important changes. Harlow, who delivered this letter to Vinson in person, explained the objections to the requirement that control be exercised through departmental secretaries and to limitations on the transfer of functions. At the same time, McElroy issued a statement praising the bill but declaring his intention to suggest some amendments.¹¹⁴

In spite of the president's letter, Vinson's committee on 22 May reported out a bill containing the objectionable features. The "fundamental issue," declared the committee's report, "was how to clarify the powers of the Secretary of Defense over his Department without prescribing that Congress abdicate or renounce its constitutional responsibilities relating to the national security. The committee believes it has resolved this issue." The requirement that control be exercised through departmental secretaries was considered necessary to establish a "clear line of civilian command"; the restriction on the transfer of combat functions was necessary to preserve congressional responsibility for the armed forces.

The committee also inserted into its bill a paragraph dealing with unified and specified commands, citing McElroy's statement that emphasis

on these commands was the "heart and soul" of the president's program. The president, through the secretary of defense and with the advice and assistance of the JCS, would be required to establish such commands and to determine their force structure. Forces assigned to these commands were to be under the "full operational control" of the commander, but would be administered by the military departments.¹¹⁵

The bill did not contain an amendment that had been suggested by Rep. John W. McCormack too late to be considered by the committee. This would authorize the secretary of defense to establish common supply activities. On 16 May Vinson asked McElroy to comment on the amendment. Dechert recommended against any such provision on the grounds that OSD had always taken the position that it already had such authority; statutory authorization in this instance would actually strengthen the hand of those who doubted the secretary's authority in other fields. Nevertheless McElroy replied to Vinson on 23 May that he favored the proposal, though he had some reservations regarding the specific language.¹¹⁶

Discussing the bill with McElroy on 26 May, Eisenhower reaffirmed his opposition to the two provisions to which he had already taken exception and added a third, the right of appeal to Congress by service heads. It was unlikely that such a right would ever be exercised, but he considered it psychologically unsound.¹¹⁷

After another conference with McElroy two days later, the president issued a public statement indicating the three provisions of the committee's bill to which he took exception, characterizing each with a pithy phrase. The requirement to exercise control through the service secretaries was a "legalized bottleneck"; the provision for transfer of functions, allowing each JCS member a veto, was "everyone's out of step but me"; and the right of appeal to Congress was "legalized insubordination." The president urged deletion of these provisions.¹¹⁸

At a press conference on 29 May, a reporter cited McElroy's "feet in concrete" statement during his congressional testimony and asked if he agreed with the president's criticism of the right of appeal. McElroy replied that he was in "complete accord with the President" and that the phrase "legalized insubordination" was justifiable. But, he added, the right never had been used and probably never would be; its importance was psychological rather than substantive.¹¹⁹

With the legislation before the House, the administration continued lobbying for its support. Postmaster General Arthur E. Summerfield wrote to more than 500 of his friends urging them to get in touch with Congress. Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson wrote to some 1,200 executives and supervisors in his corporation and to various associations.¹²⁰

Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks sought the help of former Secretary Wilson in a letter on 5 June, but drew a blank. Wilson replied that he was staying out of the controversy, since he had not been asked to testify; he was sure McElroy would eventually get a "good bill."

In fact, he could not endorse all the details of the legislation, although he favored its objectives.¹²¹

Outside the government, both proponents and opponents were similarly busy. The Air Force Association and the Association of the United States Army lined up with the president, as did former President Hoover and Charles R. Hook, chairman of a committee of members of the Hoover Commission. The Navy League continued its opposition, and a former Marine Corps commandant, Clifton B. Cates, in a letter to World War II combat correspondents, urged them to fight the president's entire plan. Hanson Baldwin of the *New York Times* also joined the opponents.¹²²

The reorganization bill came up for a vote in the House on 12 June. Administration supporters sought to have the bill amended as the president desired but lost on a vote that closely followed party lines. However, the House accepted McCormack's amendment authorizing single-manager operations. The final vote in favor of the bill was 402 to 1.¹²³

The battle now shifted to the Senate, where, as initially in the House, several prominent members appeared hostile or critical. Senator Russell, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, announced that he would accept no reorganization plan that would curtail the constitutional authority of Congress over defense matters. Sen. Mike Mansfield of Montana, assistant Democratic leader, charged that the administration was displaying a "remarkable lack of understanding" of congressional authority, and both he and Sen. Henry M. Jackson criticized the effort to remove the service chiefs' right to appeal to Congress.¹²⁴

McElroy, Twining, and Coolidge were the first witnesses when the Senate Armed Services Committee began hearings on 17 June. McElroy's opening statement focused on the three features of the House legislation considered undesirable. All three, he said, "are in essence different manifestations of the same major flaw," emphasizing "disunity and separatism." He asked that the House bill be revised accordingly. In subsequent questioning on 17-18 June, it became evident that Russell had not been won over by the secretary's arguments.¹²⁵

On 19 June the committee began interrogating JCS members, starting with General White, who supported the changes sought by the president. Admiral Burke went through the House bill point by point, indicating his approval of it. He did not specifically comment on the president's proposed amendments, nor did the committee draw him out on those matters. But it was clear that he was willing to take the legislation as written.¹²⁶

The ensuing controversy over Burke's testimony must have surprised the admiral, who had been very circumspect in his remarks. "Burke Opposes President on Altering Pentagon Bill," proclaimed the *New York Times*. Hanson Baldwin helped to fan the flames of controversy by alleging that McElroy had told the JCS and the service secretaries that "active," not merely "passive," support of the president was expected when they testified before the Senate.¹²⁷

In a press conference at Quantico on 21 June, reporters asked McElroy about Burke's testimony. McElroy, in an unusual public display of anger, replied that Burke had a right to his views and that his relationship with the admiral had not changed. But, he added, "I am disappointed in him, regard it as regrettable. I think he's a fine officer. I am sorry he's mistaken in this respect." He denied having tried to bring pressure on any prospective witnesses, though he admitted that there had been general discussions in which the strength of the president's feelings had been made clear.¹²⁸

The following day McElroy issued a statement intended to soften the impact of his words. He denied that they constituted a rebuke. "The Secretary can be disappointed, and he can regret parts of an officer's testimony without it being anything more than that," concluded the statement.¹²⁹

On 23 June McElroy sent Russell a transcript of his remarks at the press conference and telephoned an explanation. Russell was unappeased; he suspended plans to interrogate the two remaining JCS members, Taylor and Pate, until he could be assured that they could testify in "complete candor" without being threatened. McElroy's remarks, he said, constituted "startling proof of the necessity for retaining the law assuring Congress of the right to receive the unbiased professional judgment of our military leaders."¹³⁰

The president met with legislative leaders on 24 June and assured them that there would be no reprisals for any testimony given during the hearings. Republican Senators Knowland of California and Saltonstall of Massachusetts warned him that he would not get all the changes he was asking for in the bill. Eisenhower indicated that if he could secure the more important points, concerning administration of the service departments and power to transfer or abolish functions, he might be willing to yield on the right of appeal; even concerning the other two, he might accept alternate language.¹³¹

On the same day McElroy conferred again by telephone with Russell, who indicated that he would be satisfied with a letter pledging that no reprisals would be taken. McElroy thereupon wrote him as follows:

It is my conviction that officials of the Department, when testifying before Congress, should give their personal judgments and opinions when asked for them. With consideration of his position as a member of the Defense organization each Department witness would be expected to answer such questions frankly and honestly in the light of his professional knowledge and experience.

As I have stated in testifying before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, there should not, in my opinion, be any question of retaliation or penalty for such testimony. As I also have stated, once decisions have been taken on matters covered by a witness' testimony, I would expect the witness to perform under them without any question or reservation.

There is nothing in this position which would keep me from being disappointed or regretful when an official of the Department does not support fully the recommendations of the President. My honest statement of disappointment in an informal press conference certainly does not, in my mind, constitute a rebuke or an indication of possible reprisal.¹³²

Russell at once accepted these assurances and announced that he was prepared to resume testimony from JCS members.¹³³ Meanwhile the committee spent three days (25 to 27 June) hearing a large number of other witnesses. Ferdinand Eberstadt, former government official and associate of Secretary of Defense Forrestal, opposed even the House bill, as did representatives of the reserve associations of the Marine Corps and the Navy. Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, USA (Ret.), a member of the National Defense Committee of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supported the House bill with the president's changes, as did the American Legion in a statement submitted in lieu of testimony. Gov. Milward L. Simpson of Wyoming, on behalf of the National Guard, urged amendment of the bill to protect the National Guard Bureau from transfer or abolition. A representative of the American Medical Association asked that the position of assistant secretary of defense (health and medical) be retained.¹³⁴

On 1-2 July the committee recalled McElroy to allow an opportunity for questioning by Senator Symington, whose other commitments had prevented him from taking part in earlier hearings. McElroy told the senators that the right of appeal to Congress was less important than the other two changes that the president was seeking in the House bill. He himself would be "receptive" to the idea of yielding on this point if the other two were approved, although of course he could not speak for the president. He assured the senators that he had no intention of abolishing the National Guard Bureau and that Simpson's proposed amendment was unnecessary.¹³⁵

On 3 July the committee heard Taylor and Pate, whose testimony reflected the views they had expressed before the House. Hearings concluded on 9 July with three witnesses. Admiral Robert B. Carney, Burke's predecessor as chief of naval operations, opposed any change in the status quo. General Spaatz and Admiral Radford supported the president, except that Radford suggested allowing a right of appeal only to JCS members; to allow the same right to service secretaries would invite members of the president's "personal political family" to take issue with him.¹³⁶

The committee then began drafting its version of a reorganization bill, working with administration officials in an attempt to reach agreement. McElroy left on an inspection trip to the Pacific on 11 July and delegated to Dechert the responsibility for negotiating with the Senate committee. Others involved in the discussions were Coolidge, Quarles, and Harlow.¹³⁷

The principal issue that arose in these discussions was the secretary's right to transfer functions. No one objected, apparently, to removing the House provision allowing individual JCS members a veto. Russell at first

proposed to allow 30 days to the armed services committees of Congress to object, then an additional 30 days for Congress to prevent the action by resolution. In subsequent discussions, however, Russell insisted to McElroy (before the latter left on his trip) that a single house of Congress have power of veto. Both McElroy and the president were absolutely opposed to any such provision, a fact that Harlow made clear to the committee.¹³⁸

Overriding the president on this matter, the committee on 17 July reported out a bill granting either house of Congress a 40-day period to block action, in addition to the 30 days granted the armed services committees. However, it would specifically authorize the secretary of defense to assign or reassign to the services the responsibility for development and operational use of new weapons. The bill dropped the objectionable requirement that the secretary of defense control the service departments through their secretaries. The right to appeal to Congress was granted to JCS members but not to service secretaries. Assistant secretaries of defense would be authorized to issue orders to military departments only if they had been specifically delegated such authority by the secretary of defense. The McCormack amendment authorizing single-manager plans was included. The National Guard Bureau was accorded a statutory basis, but with no special provisions forbidding its transfer or abolition.¹³⁹

The Senate passed this bill unanimously on 18 July, perhaps inspired in part by the crisis in Lebanon. The administration decided against any effort to have it amended. Senators Bridges and Saltonstall told the GOP Policy Committee on 16 July that in their judgment the bill would be satisfactory to the administration.¹⁴⁰

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958

The House-Senate conference committee reported out a bill on 23 July practically identical with the one approved by the Senate, except that it restored to the service secretaries the right of appeal to Congress. The president at once issued a statement in which he congratulated the two committee chairmen, Vinson and Russell, and their colleagues. "Except in relatively minor respects," read the statement, "the bill adequately meets every recommendation I submitted to the Congress on this subject." On 24 July both houses of Congress approved the bill without change.¹⁴¹

The president signed the new law on 6 August. Earlier, McElroy had sent him a statement, drafted in Dechert's office, to be issued in connection with the signing, summarizing the major provisions of the act and indicating what it was expected to accomplish. Eisenhower did not use it; his brief statement simply declared that the law "represents a major advance in our organization for defense" and that he was sure everyone would cooperate in assuring its execution.¹⁴²

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, the first major legislation

affecting DoD in nine years, marked a further step in the process of centralization and unification begun by the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendments. Its provisions may be briefly recapitulated: strengthening the authority of the secretary of defense, giving him clear-cut authority over the service departments; enhancing the status of the JCS chairman (dropping the provision that he was to have no vote) and enlarging the Joint Staff; providing a statutory basis for the unified and specified commands; and regulating the internal organization of DoD by specifying the number of assistant secretaries and creating the position of director of defense research and engineering. As the president said, it gave him essentially what he had asked for. The two issues on which the president had lost—the procedure for transferring functions and the right of appeal of JCS members and service secretaries to Congress—while important, involved matters that were not likely to occur often.

Reorganization in Action

The new law and the president's message of 3 April together constituted the entire reorganization plan. Months before passage of the law many of the objectives outlined by the president in his message could be put into effect by his oral orders, such as abolition of the executive agent system and internal reorganization of the JCS. On 7 April McElroy assured Eisenhower that all actions that could be accomplished administratively were being carried out.¹⁴³

An early order of business was to institute the president's new procedure for the promotion of senior officers. On 25 April McElroy directed that promotion to three- and four-star rank be made only on recommendation of the secretary of defense rather than of the service secretaries. He also stipulated that promotion beyond the rank of colonel (or Navy captain) be made only after completion of a tour of duty with a joint or interallied staff.¹⁴⁴

The president's message had called for a "critical review" of DoD internal organization and procedures. To assist him in this process, McElroy sought the services of General Joseph T. McNarney, USAF (Ret.), who had been General Marshall's deputy chief of staff in World War II and subsequently advised Secretary Johnson on management problems. McNarney declined but suggested in his stead General Nelson. Nelson had studied public administration at Harvard University and had published a careful analytical history of the War Department General Staff; in addition, he had had extensive business experience since leaving the Army. The president announced Nelson's selection on 6 May.¹⁴⁵

An important part of the review of DoD procedures, specifically requested by the president, attacked the cumbersome structure of departmental committees. McElroy began on 1 May with a sweeping directive abolishing all existing committees effective 1 July 1958 unless

they could be justified on the basis of a demonstrated need. In their place, informal working relationships were to be means of coordination. The directive exempted bodies established by law (such as the Armed Forces Policy Council, the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Reserve Forces Policy Board) and JCS committees, which were the subject of separate action.¹⁴⁶

After receiving replies from the sponsoring agencies of the various committees, McElroy on 27 June issued a list of 133 to be dissolved. They included the DoD Anti-Ballistic Missile Committee, large numbers of working groups on technical specifications, and a variety of miscellaneous bodies. Sponsoring agencies were directed to review the functions assigned to the discontinued committees and arrange to have them performed by an existing staff or organization.¹⁴⁷

Those committees rejustified for continuation received further study. On 13 August McElroy issued a second directive listing additional committees to be dissolved. Ultimately, of some 300 DoD committees, 199 were abolished.¹⁴⁸

The Staff Council was the subject of separate action. A memorandum by Quarles on 30 June 1958 announced that it did not meet the criteria for continuance and that coordination among staff agencies would henceforth be accomplished by staff meetings convened as necessary.¹⁴⁹

The New JCS Role

Internal reorganization of the JCS could also begin on the president's orders. On 7 April General Twining, acting on oral instructions from McElroy, instructed the director of the Joint Staff, Maj. Gen. Oliver S. Picher, USAF, to recommend changes that would reflect the president's wishes.¹⁵⁰

Picher submitted his recommendations on 22 April. He proposed to organize the Joint Staff along conventional staff lines with numbered "directorates." Those designated J-2, J-4, J-5, and J-6 would replace existing groups responsible for intelligence, logistics, plans, and communications-electronics, respectively. J-1 would take over personnel functions currently assigned to the logistics group. J-3 (operations) would be a completely new entity, necessitated by the new responsibilities of the JCS stemming from the abolition of the executive agent system. There would also be an unnumbered directorate for military assistance. The services would continue to participate in joint actions, and the service operational staffs would continue to function.¹⁵¹

The director's plan encountered prolonged opposition from Admiral Burke and General Pate on the grounds that it would convert the Joint Staff into the kind of supreme general staff that they feared. They proposed instead that a Joint Operations Group simply be added to the existing Joint Staff. They ultimately withdrew their opposition after

Picher revised his plan to strengthen service participation in Joint Staff actions and after the new Defense Reorganization Act specifically provided for the Joint Staff to operate along conventional staff lines. On 13 August the JCS approved the reorganization, and Twining ordered it into effect on 15 August.¹⁵²

Earlier, on 7 June, after informing McElroy, Twining abolished the joint JCS committees that supervised the Joint Staff groups. He retained the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, redesignating it a council.¹⁵³

With the Joint Staff reorganized, the JCS could assume staff direction of the unified and specified commands. On 2 August Quarles approved a schedule for the transfer of staff functions from the departmental executive agents to the JCS, beginning with USEUCOM on 15 September. A directive issued by McElroy on 12 September made each department responsible for providing administrative and logistic support for the commands for which it had formerly served as executive agent.¹⁵⁴

The reorganization plan involved no change in the structure of unified and specified commands, but the Unified Command Plan had to be rewritten, since it was based on the executive agent system. A revised version approved by the JCS on 28 August instructed the commanders to communicate directly with the JCS on matters concerning strategic and logistic planning, direction of assigned forces, and conduct of combat operations. For "uniservice matters," they were authorized to communicate directly with service chiefs. In rewriting the plan, the JCS listed the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) as a unified command, thereby abolishing its somewhat anomalous classification as a "joint" command. McElroy and Twining presented the new plan to the president, who approved it.¹⁵⁵

The law authorized military service chiefs to delegate some of their service responsibilities to their deputies. The president had made it clear that he expected them to make use of this authorization. Admiral Burke was the first to make such a formal delegation; he acted on 28 July, before the law was passed. General Taylor and General White followed suit some weeks later. White had originally made his delegation orally but was informed by Quarles that the law required it to be in writing.¹⁵⁶

A provision in the law specified that forces assigned to unified or specified commands were to be under the "full operational command" of the commander. During hearings, the House committee had drawn from Twining a statement that a definition of "operational command" would be desirable. The committee thereupon inserted a definition into its report, but not in the legislation.¹⁵⁷

Several months later, on 16 January 1959, McElroy asked the JCS to recommend a definition of operational command. The JCS thereupon submitted a definition that was very close to the House committee version: "Those functions of command over assigned forces involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, the over-all control of assigned resources, and the full authoritative direction

necessary to accomplish the mission.”¹⁵⁸ McElroy sent this to Goodpaster on 28 January for presidential approval, with an opinion by Dechert that the definition was “entirely proper as a matter of law.” The president approved it on 30 January.¹⁵⁹

Not a part of the reorganization, but in line with general improvement in operating procedures, was a regularization of contact between the JCS and the president. On 21 April 1958, during a discussion of various aspects of reorganization, McElroy told the president of Twining’s feeling that the JCS did not get to see the chief executive often enough; they considered themselves at a disadvantage in this regard as compared with representatives of the Department of State. The president expressed willingness to see any or all JCS members at any time, and Goodpaster affirmed that there had never been an instance when a JCS request for access to the president had been denied. There followed immediately a presidential invitation to the JCS to breakfast three days later. The subject came up in another conference on 28 April, when the president, at McElroy’s suggestion, agreed to schedule regular weekly conferences with the JCS. McElroy himself preferred to keep his meetings with the president on an unscheduled basis.¹⁶⁰

Relationships within DOD: Directives 5100.1 and 5158.1

Two basic directives issued by Wilson, in 1953 and 1954 respectively, specified general guidance for the military establishment under the National Security Act (as amended by Reorganization Plan No. 6). Directive 5100.1 set forth functions of the armed forces and the JCS (the “Key West Agreement”), and 5158.1 prescribed methods of operation of the JCS and their relationship with other OSD staff agencies. Both had to be brought into line with the 1958 reorganization act. The process of revising them proved unexpectedly difficult and time-consuming; functions and responsibilities had to be stated with the utmost precision to reflect the letter and intent of the legislation and of the president’s message of 3 April.

In revising these directives, McElroy left to Quarles the major responsibility for supervising the process, relying on the latter’s superior knowledge of the inner workings of the Pentagon. However, Randall, from McElroy’s office, also played a prominent role. Quarles and Randall drew heavily on the services of OSD Historian Rudolph A. Winnacker, who had served in that position since it was instituted in 1949. Winnacker was uniquely qualified by virtue of his position and experience, his careful study of the written records of OSD since its establishment, and his insight into problems of organization and management.¹⁶¹

Winnacker worked with personnel of Dechert’s office in drafting a revision of the “functions” directive (5100.1) in August 1958. This made a minimum of changes, mainly in the treatment of general principles of the operation of DoD as a whole. Service roles and missions were not at issue.¹⁶²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff meanwhile worked up their own revision of 5100.1, based on an assumption that they would be delegated functions beyond the rather limited purview of "strategic direction" and "guidance for the operational control of forces," as stated in the existing version. The JCS revision authorized them to "direct operations" by unified and specified commands, and to "assign," "promulgate," or "approve" policies, whereas Winnacker's draft (following the original) limited them to making recommendations. The JCS version also contained a rather lengthy statement of their responsibility for military assistance.¹⁶³

A revised draft of 8 September, presumably written under Winnacker's direction, represented a compromise between the two versions, though closer to Winnacker's. Sections had been added setting forth the mission of DoD and the functions of the unified and specified commands.¹⁶⁴ Randall then established a working group consisting of Winnacker, Robert W. Berry of the general counsel's office, and Capt. William G. Holman, USN, of the JCS to revise the draft into a form suitable to be circulated for comment.¹⁶⁵

Whether the JCS should be considered an element of OSD, along with the assistant secretaries, became an important issue. The subject came up at a staff meeting on 30 September. McNeil believed that they should; Quarles, however, saw these two groups as constituting different staffs, military and civilian respectively, for the secretary of defense.¹⁶⁶

The revised draft, circulated by Winnacker's group on 1 October, listed the components of OSD as the JCS, the assistant secretaries, the general counsel, and the new director of defense research and engineering. An interpretive comment accompanying the draft pointed out that inclusion of the JCS in OSD was a debatable point and remained to be settled.¹⁶⁷

In preparation for a discussion of this issue, Winnacker set forth for Quarles the reasons for and against considering the JCS a part of OSD. Affirmative reasons included the fact that directive 5158.1 referred to the JCS and "other staff agencies" of OSD; that the president's message of 3 April considered them part of the military staff of OSD; and that various organization charts and other documents approved by the secretary of defense depicted the JCS in OSD. Moreover, placing them in OSD would facilitate cooperation with other elements. On the other hand, Winnacker recognized that the JCS, as military advisers, had a special status, which would become especially prominent in wartime and perhaps should be recognized in peacetime. He concluded that the secretary was free to place the JCS anywhere he wished in the DoD structure; however, if they were to be outside OSD, both directives, 5100.1 and 5158.1, must be revised and it might be necessary to ask the White House to clarify the president's message.¹⁶⁸

Still another draft of 5100.1 received tentative approval at a staff meeting on 31 October, with Quarles presiding, subject to the comments of the JCS, which had not been received, and with the understanding

that the issue of the position of the JCS would be brought to McElroy's attention for decision. McElroy was then away from Washington; Quarles told the AFPC on 22 October that he was expected back around 5 November, and it was agreed to hold a special meeting on that date to discuss the draft of 5100.1.¹⁶⁹

The JCS had meanwhile sent Secretary McElroy's office a proposed new version of the "relationship" directive (5158.1). They dropped the word "other" from its title, thereby making clear that they did not consider themselves one of the staff elements of OSD. Regarding JCS-OSD coordination, the JCS proposed to stipulate that "directives and requests" to the JCS or their chairman must be approved by the secretary or deputy secretary of defense. Otherwise, there was little change from the existing version.¹⁷⁰ Winnacker and Quarles revised the JCS draft, retaining the requirement that "directives" must have secretarial approval, but empowering others in OSD to make "requests." This version was approved, with minor changes, on 31 October.¹⁷¹

In preparation for AFPC discussion of the two draft directives, the JCS sent McElroy their comments on 5 November. They proposed some changes in 5100.1 to harmonize with the recent legislation. Thus they urged a statement that each military department was to be "separately organized," as the law required, and that authority to issue orders to military departments must be delegated in writing. Moreover, they believed, such authority should be limited to assistant secretaries and not extended to assistants to the secretary. They proposed a clear statement that the JCS were in the "chain of operational command" to the unified and specified commands. They recommended inclusion of a statement of their responsibilities with respect to the military assistance program. Regarding 5158.1, they preferred their original stipulation that both directives and requests must be approved by the secretary; delegation of such authority to other officials, in their view, exceeded the intent of the law.¹⁷²

McElroy attended the AFPC meeting on 5 November and took an active role in the discussion, since major decisions now had to be made. Most attention centered on the "functions" directive. The participants first debated the organizational position of the JCS. Quarles recommended that they be excluded from OSD; Dechert pointed out that adoption of that view would require a change in the language of appropriations acts for OSD. McElroy did not rule on this issue; he left it for the president.

Concerning the issuance of orders to military departments, McElroy expressed the opinion, in which Dechert concurred, that the language of the law did not preclude him from delegating such authority to his assistants, as well as to assistant secretaries. He agreed, however, that this delegation should be in writing. The JCS won some concessions on other points. The statement that they were in the chain of operational command was included, along with their version of their responsibilities for military assistance.

In the statement of service functions (largely restated from the original version), a minor change in wording recommended by the JCS gave rise to some controversy. The Air Force had responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping forces for the strategic air mission. The JCS proposed to state that this responsibility applied only to forces of the Air Force itself; this would bring the passage into conformity with responsibilities assigned other services. When Air Force Secretary Douglas questioned this proposed change, Quarles justified it as necessitated by the prospective rise of Polaris as a strategic weapon. General White at once charged that this interpretation represented a substantive change in mission, since previously only the Air Force had provided forces for SAC; the understanding had been, he pointed out, that no changes would be made in roles and missions in rewriting 5100.1. Quarles rejoined that the question of making Polaris a part of SAC was not at issue, and McElroy ruled in favor of the JCS amendment.

The "relationship" directive presented less difficulty. On the principal issue, authority to place requirements on the JCS, a compromise was reached. "Orders and directives" were to require approval by the secretary or deputy secretary of defense; "requests" might be made by other OSD officials in accordance with authority specifically delegated by the secretary.¹⁷³

After AFPC approval, both directives were sent to Harlow, who cleared them subject to a decision by the White House on the organizational position of the JCS. Harlow wanted this issue discussed further in OSD before he referred it to the president.¹⁷⁴

Both sides now staked out their positions on this pointed issue. The JCS held it administratively and functionally unsound to equate the JCS with the staff offices in OSD. They were responsible not only to the secretary of defense but also to the National Security Council and the president. Moreover, their duties were prescribed by law, and they enjoyed certain legal rights not granted OSD civilian officials, such as the right to present recommendations to Congress on their own initiative. The special training and competence required of JCS members, the prestige of the JCS, and the history of JCS development all set them apart as something other than "merely another staff office" in OSD.¹⁷⁵

The opposing position, as set forth by Winnacker, held that the secretary possessed full authority over the Department of Defense, of which the JCS were a part. Though the law reserved the right of the president to deal directly with the JCS, it vested no special powers or authority in them not subject to the "direction, authority, and control" of the secretary. Admittedly there existed practical reasons for excluding the JCS from OSD, such as their different function (to provide military advice rather than to help the secretary exercise civilian control of the military establishment) and the heavy responsibilities that they would carry in wartime. Winnacker concluded that the issue was entirely a matter of administrative discretion: "In summary, the eventual location of the JCS depends on whether the President and the Secretary want to emphasize

by organizational relationships the need for comprehensive, integrated staff work, or want to look upon the JCS as the source of advice and assistance purely from the military point of view—to be fitted subsequently into broader national requirements.”¹⁷⁶

This conclusion received full support from Dechert. OSD, he pointed out, had no statutory existence, and the secretary had full authority to designate, for the sake of efficient management, those entities that would be included. The question was not whether the JCS should be placed in OSD but whether they should be removed therefrom, since heretofore they had invariably been included.¹⁷⁷

Before directive 5100.1 went to the president for decision, still another issue came to the fore. Douglas proposed an amendment to clarify responsibilities for budgeting, stating the responsibility of military departments for preparing their budgets, but also making clear that these were to be based on estimates of requirements prepared by major service commanders, including those of specified commands and of component commands under unified commands. Unified commands would submit their own recommendations both to the secretary of defense, through the JCS, and to the appropriate military departments. Winnacker, commenting on this proposal, thought that these matters could be dealt with in the Unified Command Plan.¹⁷⁸

Discussing the two draft directives before the AFPC on 16 December, Quarles told the members that he believed the president wanted the JCS included in OSD; however, he would ask the president to allow the JCS to be heard before settling the question. Douglas's proposed amendment on budgetary responsibilities, he added, remained to be reviewed by OSD, JCS, and the services. The following day Quarles told a staff meeting that he had been surprised at the extent of feeling “across the river” on the matter of the position of the JCS. The president feared that removing them from OSD would emphasize their separateness and appear as a radical change.¹⁷⁹

Before the directives went to the president for final decision, Quarles inserted in 5100.1 a shorter version of Douglas's proposed amendment on budget responsibility. It would state merely that military departments would prepare and submit their budgets to the secretary of defense based in part upon advice received from commanders of forces assigned to unified and specified commands.¹⁸⁰

At a conference with the president on 22 December, McElroy apparently left the discussion entirely to Quarles. The JCS members attended, along with Harlow and Gordon Gray. Quarles, introducing the key issue, indicated that he had changed his mind, perhaps in deference to the president's views; he now believed that the JCS should be included in OSD. In reply to a question from the president, however, Quarles admitted that the matter was largely one of semantics, since both JCS and OSD were elements under the secretary of defense. Twining then expressed the JCS opposition, basing it largely on a desire to avoid being made subservient to the

assistant secretaries. The president recognized their concern on this point but expressed the view that they were the secretary's military staff and that a staff should be organized as the superior desired. General Taylor, presumably speaking for his colleagues, then showed the president a proposed organization chart indicating the dual responsibility of the JCS; it depicted OSD and the JCS in separate organizational boxes under the secretary of defense, with a separate line connecting the JCS to the president. Eisenhower was willing to accept this arrangement so long as the direct responsibility of the JCS to the secretary was made clear. Also, he wanted a "dotted line" joining JCS and OSD to indicate close coordination. He did not object to a second dotted line running from the JCS to the president. He acknowledged the special responsibilities of the JCS and promised that he would always be willing to consult directly with any service chief.

Thus did the president settle the issue. Whether the JCS were considered in or out of OSD was evidently of little concern in his mind; what was important was to establish the JCS subordination to the secretary of defense. In fact, the president stated that this was one of several matters that he wished to insure in his last two years in office, together with recognition that the JCS comprised a single group (rather than a mere collection of service chiefs) and amalgamation of the Joint Staff into a truly unified organization.

Most of the rest of the discussion concerned the paragraph on budgeting, the intent of which was questioned by Harlow. Quarles explained that the proposed procedure was that the unified commanders would transmit their military requirements to the JCS, while the services would make logistic requests through JCS to the secretary of defense. Harlow objected that this would set up separate channels by allowing the component commanders to go directly to the services. It was finally agreed to add a statement making it clear that logistic requirements stated by component commanders must be in agreement with the requirements of the unified commanders.¹⁸¹

It remained only to revise the directive to reflect the president's decisions and obtain final clearance from the White House for the revised version. With these tasks accomplished, McElroy issued both directives—5100.1 on roles and missions and 5158.1 on relationships—on 31 December 1958. Together they filled in the details of the broad organizational framework established by the president's orders and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.¹⁸²

Rechartering the Assistant Secretaries

The new law allowing assistant secretaries to issue orders to military departments only if authorized to do so in writing made it necessary to revise their charters to make certain that each incorporated the necessary

authorization. At the same time, the process of revision offered an opportunity to update and make more uniform the original charters, which had been issued over a period of several years. In the process, Quarles again played a major role.

The law limited DoD to seven assistant secretaries (exclusive of the general counsel). At the time it was passed, there were eight. One of these, for research and engineering, would be replaced by a director, bringing the total within the legal limit. McElroy's original intention to abolish the position of assistant secretary (health and medical), reassigning the rank to the legislative liaison function, was laid aside, perhaps because of congressional opposition.

Charter revision began on 26 September 1958 when J. Robert Loftis, head of the administrative services division in McElroy's office, relayed McElroy's instructions that each assistant secretary (and assistant to the secretary) review his charter and suggest any necessary changes. After receiving the suggested revisions, Loftis's office prepared a charter for each activity. With one exception (that of the general counsel), each was written in a standard concisely worded format. The brief charter for the general counsel (only two paragraphs in length) required only rewording to refer to the new legislation. Loftis forwarded the draft charters to Quarles on 6 December.¹⁸³

Two of the draft charters—those for ISA and public affairs—presented special difficulties that delayed them. The others were circulated for comment within OSD and to the service secretaries. Acting Secretary Franke of the Navy raised the only important criticism. He took exception to a provision authorizing assistant secretaries to approve or disapprove service programs in their areas of responsibility. This, he believed, contravened the law, which made the service secretaries directly responsible to the secretary of defense. Accordingly, the provision was dropped when Loftis's office revised the charters.¹⁸⁴

When the AFPC discussed the charters on 5 January 1959, Secretary Brucker raised another objection. He questioned whether the assistants to the secretary (as distinct from the assistant secretaries) could legally be authorized to issue instructions. The council approved the charters subject to a determination of this matter. Following the meeting, Dechert rendered an opinion that, unless specifically prohibited by law, the secretary of defense had "complete authority" to delegate to officers, agencies, or organizational entities of DoD any function vested in him. The 1958 Reorganization Act limited this authority only to the extent of requiring that the delegation to assistant secretaries be made in writing.¹⁸⁵

Charters for the assistant secretaries for (1) manpower, personnel and reserve, (2) supply and logistics, (3) properties and installations, and (4) health and medical, and for the comptroller, were issued on 7 January 1959, along with those for assistants to the secretary for atomic energy and for special operations. All authorized the issuance of instructions and "one-time directive-type memoranda" for carrying out policies approved

by the secretary, also the review and evaluation (but not approval or disapproval) of service programs. The new general counsel charter was issued at the same time.¹⁸⁶

Rewriting the charter for the assistant secretary for international security affairs proved more difficult owing to the complexity of his responsibilities and his relationships with the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ISA and JCS shared responsibility for the military assistance program. The practice had been for ISA to use the executive agents as a channel of transmission for directives to the military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) and the unified commands to which they were attached. This practice could no longer be followed after the executive agent system was discontinued. On 14 August Twining and Assistant Secretary Sprague signed a joint memorandum instituting a new procedure. All directives and communications from ISA to unified or specified commands, military departments, or MAAGs that pertained to military assistance and had "strategic or military operational implications" would be coordinated with the Joint Staff; likewise all JCS directives and communications pertaining to military assistance would be coordinated with ISA. Both would furnish each other with copies of messages and communications from the unified commands and other field agencies.¹⁸⁷

A revised draft charter granted ISA fairly broad powers. It would authorize ISA to "plan, develop and supervise" the administration of the MAP; to "supervise" the activities of the MAAGs; to "supervise and coordinate" relations between DoD and State; and to "negotiate and monitor" agreements with foreign governments concerning military matters. This wording went somewhat beyond the authority granted ISA in its existing charter. The draft also, like others prepared at the same time, granted authority to approve or disapprove departmental programs. Based on a draft prepared in ISA which was even more sweeping, it proposed to make ISA responsible for "direction and supervision" of all DoD activities in the field of NSC affairs.¹⁸⁸

Following discussions with Quarles and McElroy, some of these statements were toned down. ISA was to "develop and coordinate" policies relating to the MAP and "supervise" its administration; to "coordinate" relations with State; and to "develop and coordinate" DoD policies with respect to negotiating and monitoring agreements with other countries. Also, as with other ASD charters, the right to approve programs had been dropped.¹⁸⁹

In sending this version to Quarles (who was out of the country at the time), Sprague's successor, Assistant Secretary Irwin, expressed belief that it was in some ways more restrictive than the existing charter, which made ISA responsible for "establishment" of policies and procedures relating to international politico-military affairs and to the MAP and for "general supervision" of DoD activities in the field of NSC affairs. Moreover, this wording, he believed, accurately reflected actual practice. Quarles wired back agreeing to the word "establish," but preferring "monitor and coordinate" rather than "supervise" in connection with NSC affairs.¹⁹⁰

In subsequent discussion, the service secretaries took exception to the word "establish." Eventually a compromise was reached; ISA would "establish . . . positions, plans and procedures" pertaining to the MAP, but would "develop and coordinate . . . positions, policies, plans and procedures" for politico-military affairs generally.* In that form, the charter appeared on 27 February 1959, with the addition of a statement recommended by the JCS that directives from ISA to unified and specified commands must be coordinated with the JCS in accordance with the Twining-Sprague agreement of 14 August 1958.¹⁹¹

For the assistant secretary for public affairs, the first draft charter, in December 1958, clearly stated the responsibilities of that official for overall supervision of public information activities in DoD, a position in line with the president's desire for stronger central control of such activities. Assistant Secretary Snyder did not concur in this draft; he interpreted it as introducing substantive and unwanted changes, apparently fearing that it might jeopardize his relationships with the press and with Congress.¹⁹² The final version, issued on 27 February 1959, came closer to the existing charter in its statement of functions. It authorized the assistant secretary for public affairs to communicate directly with the unified and specified commands, consulting and coordinating with the military departments and the JCS; this accorded with a directive issued by McElroy on 20 November 1958.¹⁹³


The two assistants to the secretary of defense, for atomic energy and for special operations, also received new charters.¹⁹⁴ At the same time, Quarles, at the instigation of the assistant for special operations, General Graves B. Erskine, took the opportunity to establish a Collateral Activities Coordinating Group (CACG), representing all DoD elements having responsibilities for covert operations. It would operate below the level of the highly sensitive NSC 5412 group. Erskine had been advocating such a group for some time, apparently at the urging of his deputy, Col. Edward G. Lansdale. Quarles chaired the new body, but for all intents and purposes it operated out of Erskine's office. Its title was borrowed from Erskine's new charter, which made him responsible for coordinating actions with agencies having "collateral or related functions in the field of his assigned responsibility." The CACG would assume some importance in 1960 with respect to Indochina.¹⁹⁵

The Director of Defense Research and Engineering

A final task connected with the reorganization was to establish the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (ODDR&E), one proposed by the president and authorized by the law to strengthen

* It is not clear whether the omission of the word "policies" in connection with the MAP was intentional.

CHART 4 OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1959



the secretary's control over military research and development. A charter for the new office could hardly be written until the position had been filled and the incumbent could be consulted. The administration encountered some delay in finding a suitable candidate. Some men of stature, when approached, rejected the position, fearing that it would not carry sufficient authority and would encounter obstacles from the services. Indeed, one news story early in November 1958 quoted "Pentagon sources" to the effect that the entire effort to establish a unified military research organization was "moribund."¹⁹⁶


At length a candidate was found: Herbert F. York, chief scientist for ARPA. His appointment was announced on 24 December. In his new position, York would outrank his former superior, Roy W. Johnson, director of ARPA.¹⁹⁷

A draft of a charter for DDR&E, completed before York's appointment was announced, was derived from the reorganization law, the president's message of 3 April, and the charter of the assistant secretary for research and engineering, whose office would be superseded by the new position. The draft provided that the DDR&E would supervise all research and engineering activities in DoD; recommend a program of research and development to meet military requirements; recommend the assignment or reassignment of responsibility for the development of weapons; direct and control research activities that the secretary of defense considered to require centralized management; and recommend steps to provide for a more efficient and economical administration of research. The director was empowered to conduct research through contracts with private organizations, through the military departments, or directly by using DoD employees, and to exercise administrative direction of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group. He was enjoined to consult with the JCS on the interaction of research and development with strategy.¹⁹⁸

After York assumed office, he took part in discussions during which the draft was put into final form. No major issues seem to have surfaced during these discussions, probably because the law and the president had clearly stated the powers that the DDR&E should have. The Army and the Air Force recommended that the directive specify the relationship of the new director to ARPA and to the director of guided missiles; this recommendation, however, was rejected and the relationship was left for later determination. At York's suggestion, a provision indicating the responsibility of the DDR&E for coordinating scientific collaboration with other countries was inserted. McElroy issued the charter on 10 February 1959. It abolished the office of the assistant secretary for research and engineering and transferred its personnel and functions to the office of the DDR&E.¹⁹⁹

The charter of the Armed Forces Policy Council had to be changed because of the establishment of the DDR&E, who had been granted statutory membership in the council. On 2 January 1959 Quarles issued new charters for AFPC and for the Joint Secretaries, adding the DDR&E to both.

CHART 5
JCS ORGANIZATION
 15 JANUARY 1959



In so doing, he sanctioned the practice (now well-established) of circulating written agenda for meetings and records of decisions (advices of action) of both bodies.²⁰⁰

Summary

The organization of OSD resulting from the 1958 legislative enactment is shown in Chart 4. Chart 5 similarly shows the new organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a body no longer included in OSD, according to the revised DoD directive 5100.1.

The reorganization was accompanied by expansion. The combined personnel strength of OSD and JCS as of 30 June 1959 was 2,773: 1,704 civilian and 1,069 military (Table 4 below), an increase of some 23 percent over the total of 2,176 on 30 September 1957 (see Chapter I, Table 2). The increase occurred largely because of the expansion of the Joint Staff and the establishment of the office of DDR&E, which was appreciably larger than the office of the assistant secretary formerly charged with the same function.

TABLE 4
Civilian Employees and Assigned Military Personnel,
Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 June 1959

	Civilian	Military
Office of the Secretary	144	46
Director of Defense Research and Engineering	203	80
Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs)	206	97
Assistant Secretary (Comptroller)	165	3
Assistant Secretary (Supply and Logistics)	186	14
Assistant Secretary (Properties and Installations)	61	—
Assistant Secretary (Manpower, Personnel and Reserve)	84	46
Assistant Secretary (Health and Medical)	11	8
Assistant Secretary (Public Affairs)	78	57
General Counsel	58	—
Assistant to the Secretary (Special Operations)	13	6
Assistant to the Secretary (Atomic Energy)	13	16
Assistant to the Secretary (Legislative Affairs)	9	7
Special Programs	31	13
Joint Chiefs of Staff	303	594
Advanced Research Projects Agency	48	13
Standing Group, North Atlantic Treaty Organization	42	69
Court of Military Appeals	41	—
Interdepartmental Activities	8	—
Total	1,704	1,069

Source: *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1958, to June 30, 1959*, Table 11.

The 1958 reorganization was to go down as the most important development occurring under McElroy. Although the initiative came from the president, it became McElroy's and Quarles's task to see that the president's wishes were carried out. McElroy himself, in his last press conference on 1 December 1959, remarked that the 1958 reorganization had accomplished two major results: the substitution of the JCS for the departmental executive agents in directing the combat commands and the creation of the position of DDR&E.²⁰¹

The key features of the reorganization bore a marked resemblance to the recommendations laid before President Eisenhower by Rockefeller and Brundage in November 1957. From the outset, the president seems to have had a clear idea of what he wanted in the way of reorganization. Insofar as this involved a change in the command structure—putting the JCS in the chain of command in place of the service departments—it amounted to a direct reversal of the 1953 reorganization. Just when the president determined that this change was necessary is not indicated by available evidence.

Though the president kept his general objectives in view at all times, he did not thrust his ideas upon Secretary McElroy. To fill in the details of what he wanted, he employed a favorite device—a council of outside advisers able to approach the subject from a nonpartisan viewpoint. The president used these advisers skillfully, encouraging them to develop their own ideas while at the same time providing general guidance.

Throughout the evolution of the reorganization plan, the president's long military experience and the careful thought that he had devoted to defense problems were evident. It is difficult to conceive of any other field of governmental activity in which the former General Eisenhower would have involved himself so intimately.

Neither McElroy nor his successor, Gates, in the time remaining to them, was inclined to push to the limit the additional authority granted the secretary of defense in 1958. Nor was there occasion to test the revised command structure, since the last two years of the Eisenhower administration were peaceful. It fell to Gates's successor, under a new administration, to make full use of his powers as civilian head of the department and, in a new war, to play to the hilt his role as *de facto* deputy commander in chief of the armed forces, with the JCS as his staff.

CHAPTER X

Policy, Strategy, and the Budget, FY 1960

The Shadow of Sputnik

The FY 1960 budget, the first to be completed under the revised DoD organization instituted in 1958, was also the first budget tackled after the launching of the Soviet Sputniks. Consequently, it unfolded against a background of deepening national concern over trends in weapon technology. The United States and the Soviet Union appeared to be in a neck-and-neck race to develop weapons that were potentially crucial for national survival.

In this ongoing competition, it was difficult to know who was ahead at any given moment, but the United States during the first half of 1958 achieved some gratifying successes that helped to retrieve the nation's damaged prestige. After the launching of the first Explorer satellite on 31 January, there followed a Vanguard satellite and two more Explorers, only one successful. Another Explorer, on 26 July, gave the United States the lead in numbers of satellites aloft, even though the Soviets had launched a third Sputnik on 15 May. But the huge payload (2,900 pounds) carried by the newest Soviet entry attested to the commanding lead enjoyed by the USSR in missile thrust capacity. The difference was underlined when the Air Force failed in an attempt to put a rocket in orbit around the moon.¹

In another field of military technology, the United States demonstrated a commanding lead when two nuclear-powered submarines succeeded in transiting the North Pole under water. This was a significant accomplishment in its own right and demonstrated that the northernmost coast of the Soviet Union was vulnerable to offshore submarine operations.²

On the national scene, the recession that had begun in 1957 continued into 1958, though an upturn began about the middle of the year. The drop in tax receipts resulting from the recession was blamed for the fact that the fiscal year ended on 30 June 1958 with a federal deficit of \$2.8 billion. Defense expenditures accounted in part for this adverse balance; for FY 1958, they totaled \$39.062 billion, somewhat above the target of \$38.670 billion that had been set in October 1957.³

For the only time in his career as secretary, McElroy bore the full responsibility for preparing a defense budget—that for 1960. By the beginning of 1958 he had settled firmly into his new position. Throughout most of the year he continued to work with the team he inherited from his predecessor. In July Charles C. Finucane, former under secretary of the Army, was appointed assistant secretary of defense for manpower, personnel and reserve, replacing William H. Francis, who had died unexpectedly some weeks earlier. In October Mansfield D. Sprague left the important post of assistant secretary for international security affairs, to be succeeded by his deputy, John N. Irwin. At the end of October Paul D. Foote, assistant secretary for research and engineering, left office, his position abolished in the 1958 reorganization; the new post of director of defense research and engineering was filled on 30 December by Herbert F. York.⁴

Outside the Pentagon, several changes of importance to DoD took place in the upper ranks of the Eisenhower administration. In March 1958 Percival Brundage left the Bureau of the Budget, unregretted by OSD officials; his replacement was Maurice H. Stans.⁵ Four months later Gordon Gray, director of defense mobilization and former assistant secretary of defense (ISA), succeeded Robert Cutler as the president's special assistant for national security affairs.⁶ In September, in a development that drew national attention, the president's chief of staff, Sherman Adams, resigned after some weeks of controversy involving questionable relationships with prominent individuals outside the government. His successor, Maj. Gen. Wilton B. Persons, USA (Ret.), was a former military associate of the president and head of legislative liaison for the White House.⁷

NSC 5810/1

The annual reexamination of national security policy, which began in February 1958, proved unusually protracted. The issue of limited war as an element in national strategy, fought out in 1957 in connection with NSC 5707/8, erupted with renewed intensity. General Taylor again appeared as the principal advocate within the JCS and the NSC for a restructured military establishment giving more weight to surface forces. To a greater degree than in previous years, he was supported by his naval colleague, Admiral Burke. Burke's position reflected the emergence among Navy officers of a school of thought that urged a new strategic concept—one that, in the post-Sputnik age, would recognize the growing likelihood of "brushfire" wars and the corresponding need for some de-emphasis in preparations for a nuclear war.⁸

DoD had primary responsibility for reviewing and, if necessary, redrafting those paragraphs of NSC 5707/8 dealing with military matters.⁹ The ad hoc DoD committee established in 1956 and 1957 to coordinate recommendations was not reactivated. Instead, recommendations for

changes in NSC 5707/8 went to Sprague, as DoD member of the Planning Board, or to the JCS adviser on that body.

During the review process, the Army and Navy recommended revisions to recognize the lessening likelihood of nuclear war and the need for a flexible strategy that would permit application of varying degrees of force in any situation. They also proposed to delete from NSC 5707/8 the definition of "limited war" as conflicts occurring only in "less developed areas," thus opening the possibility that limited war might occur in Western Europe.¹⁰ As a result, the issue of limited war gave rise to lively discussion in the board. Sprague urged postponement of any decision pending completion of the forthcoming limited war study.¹¹

In the course of the debates, Army and Navy advocates acquired a powerful ally in the State Department. Secretary Dulles had already begun to question the wisdom of massive retaliation, or at least of an excessive reliance on that concept.* He now expressed growing misgivings, based on his judgment as to the effects a nuclear stalemate would have on America's allies. On 1 April Dulles took his concerns to the president. He did not go so far as to suggest that massive retaliation be abandoned entirely—to do so would send the wrong signal to friend and foe alike—but he thought that U.S. planners must learn to defend the nation by means short of "wholesale obliteration" of the Soviet Union. Eisenhower admitted that the administration had not fully considered the consequences of the New Look and that its strategic concept did not adequately consider the possibilities of limited war. He could only suggest that the matter deserved further study.¹²

Accordingly, Dulles met in the Pentagon on 7 April with Quarles, Sprague, the service secretaries, and the JCS. He warned that it was State's "considered opinion" that the NATO alliance could be held together for no more than another year or two on the basis of the existing strategic concept. Were there, he asked, developments that would make possible an "area defense" based on tactical nuclear weapons? McElroy admitted that there was no concept specifying the precise conditions under which tactical nuclear weapons would be used. General Taylor stressed the need for small nuclear weapons. When General White declared that the United States was already building a great number of such weapons, Dulles rejoined that a tactical doctrine for their use was of the utmost importance in view of the grave responsibility involved in launching a nuclear war and the possibility that responsible officials might shrink from using them. He stressed that the matters at issue were too important to be handled at the staff level.¹³

The president's national security adviser, Robert Cutler, had attended the 7 April meeting. Afterward, he gave McElroy his views on strategy, which were in line with those he had expressed a year earlier. He argued that general war was now so destructive that it was obsolete as a means

* See Chapter VI.

of obtaining national objectives. In his view, the United States should adjust its military planning to a policy of retaliation rather than initial attack. The resources thus saved by limiting the number of nuclear weapons could be devoted to preparation for limited war. Cutler had been prodded by Capt. John H. Morse, USN, the AEC observer on the NSC Planning Board. Morse was pushing for "clean" nuclear weapons that would be usable in meeting Soviet aggression short of all-out war.¹⁴

The views of Cutler and the State Department were evident in a draft policy statement, NSC 5810, which the Planning Board circulated on 15 April 1958. This took note of growing uncertainty among other nations as to the willingness of the United States to use its nuclear capability. A new paragraph recommended that the nuclear stockpile include a variety of sizes and yields of weapons, including "clean" ones, to provide "flexible and selective capabilities" for general or limited war.

The portions of NSC 5707/8 that had occasioned most of the discussion in the Planning Board were paragraphs 14, which set forth the need to maintain a secure retaliatory force, and 15, dealing with limited war. The board, unable to agree on the matters treated in these paragraphs, had simply repeated them verbatim as paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810. Spokesmen for DoD, JCS, State, Treasury, and BoB had wished to defer consideration of the limited war paragraph until completion of the study of that subject.¹⁵

When the board discussed NSC 5810, Cutler had submitted his own draft of paragraph 14, which essentially reflected the Army-Navy view. It would recognize the increasing importance of maintaining a military capacity that would allow resort to either all-out retaliation or limited hostilities, depending on the situation. Also, it omitted any definition of limited war. Cutler proposed to submit this paragraph to the NSC on 1 May, when NSC 5810 was scheduled for discussion.¹⁶

Within DoD, there now began what might be described as a struggle for the mind of McElroy in preparation for the 1 May NSC meeting. One of the first to make his views known, Twining, recommended strongly that the secretary support paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810 as written. The United States, he believed, already possessed adequate forces for limited war; what was needed was the "political will" to use them. He regarded as dangerous the expression "mutual deterrence." Since the United States had no expansionist aims, it was not being deterred from any course of action.¹⁷

Inevitably the Joint Chiefs of Staff split on the question. Taylor, Pate, and Burke favored the Cutler draft and proposed other changes in NSC 5810 to recognize even more explicitly the growing danger of limited war. White approved NSC 5810 as written except for paragraph 14, on which he believed action should be postponed until completion of the limited war study. Twining, in forwarding the conclusions of his colleagues, urged immediate approval of paragraph 14, believing sufficient information was already available to make a decision.¹⁸

Secretaries Brucker and Gates upheld the positions taken by the military chiefs of their services. Sprague recommended that McElroy support paragraph 14 as written pending the results of the study.¹⁹

The council meeting of 1 May failed to settle the issue. After Cutler spoke in favor of his redraft, McElroy warned that increased limited war capabilities would require either a larger budget or reductions in retaliatory forces. Taylor, speaking also for Burke and Pate, upheld the majority JCS view and was rebutted by White and Twining.

President Eisenhower, on the basis of convictions that he had often expressed, could be expected to come out against any increased emphasis on limited war. If anyone in the NSC could have changed his mind, it would have been Dulles. To the disappointment of the limited war advocates, however, Dulles's expression of his views was lukewarm and general. He warned that time was running out on massive retaliation and that the United States should prepare to fight defensive wars not involving the total defeat of the enemy. He did not, however, recommend adoption of Cutler's draft of paragraph 14; he said only that he wanted to study the matter further and discuss it with McElroy.

In the end, the council decided to retain paragraphs 13 and 14 as written, pending further study by DoD. The members then adopted NSC 5810 with minor revisions; the president subsequently approved it as NSC 5810/1.²⁰

The issue of limited war had thus been thrown back into the lap of Secretary McElroy, who in turn called on the JCS to reconsider it. The JCS members drafted new papers in which they attempted, though unsuccessfully, to meet one another's position. Thus Taylor stressed that he did not propose to weaken the deterrent forces or to enlarge the budget. Stronger limited war forces could be had, in his opinion, by eliminating unnecessary duplication in weapons systems. In taking up this theme, Burke warned that it was possible to have a superfluity of retaliatory forces. Both Taylor and Burke argued that widening the range of U.S. military capabilities (and thus the range of possible U.S. action) would help convey to other countries, friendly and otherwise, a stronger impression of national resolve. Both also argued that national policy papers were ambiguous and should provide clear direction. Taylor, following this thought more explicitly, ended his argument with a Biblical quotation that was later to provide the title for his book: "For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?"

White urged full budgetary support of SAC but was willing to have the JCS make a general study of military capabilities, including those for limited war, and then come up with balanced force recommendations across the board. This, he judged, was also Taylor's view. "In fact," wrote White, "what we need to do is blow General Taylor's trumpet with a slightly different pitch—but it ought to be approximately the trumpet as we now have."²¹

JSOP-61, JSOP-62

The JCS were in effect being asked to agree on the general outlines of a force structure adaptable to either general or limited conflict. The problem was already on their agenda in connection with the drafting of a joint strategic objectives plan (JSOP), which had become an annual exercise. Disagreement on forces had thus far defeated their efforts to approve such a plan; had it existed, it would have fulfilled the purpose sought by White.

The most recent effort to draw up a JSOP, with a target date of 1 July 1961, had been laid aside in August 1957. Four months later, during the preparation of the FY 1959 budget, the president ruled that tentative planning for FY 1960 and FY 1961 should assume a continuation during those years of the personnel strength of 2,525,000 approved for the end of 1959, with a 5 percent margin either way.* With this guidance from higher authority, the JCS reached agreement on the most nearly satisfactory mix of forces for 1 July 1961. They settled on 15 Army divisions, 397 combat vessels, and 101 Air Force wings as of the target date, assumed as M-day. These numbers came very close to those in the FY 1959 budget. Expansion goals, to be reached 6 months after mobilization, were 42 divisions, 633 vessels, and 140 wings. The plan would authorize the services to base their mobilization plans on these forces, projected to M+36 months to assure a mobilization base that would fully support them in combat.

The strategic concept adopted in the JSOP had presented no problem, since it had already been approved by Secretary Wilson in March 1957.[†] Under this concept, forces would be deployed in "strategic forward areas" around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc, ready to act promptly in event of aggression. General war, should it occur, was envisioned as consisting of two phases, the first (comparatively short) marked by an intensive nuclear exchange, the second, indeterminate in length, involving a continuation of nuclear operations probably at lower intensity. The duration of this second phase and the ultimate strategy to be adopted would depend largely on the relative advantage achieved in the initial phase. The plan set forth in general terms the wartime military tasks for accomplishment in each area of the globe.

The JCS forwarded the plan (JSOP-61) to McElroy on 9 January 1958. The agreed force tabulations, they informed him, although the most suitable that could be developed in consonance with the decisions of higher authority, were "inadequate in certain respects" and would "involve risks to the successful support of U.S. national policy and strategy."²²

In an AFPC meeting on 11 February, McNeil praised JSOP-61 as "the best job the JCS have ever done in this area." Twining asked that it be approved for planning purposes, and McElroy agreed. Later Quarles formally instructed the services to use JSOP-61 for strategic and mobilization

* See Chapter VII.

[†] See Chapter VI.

planning, subject to certain reservations: Provision of materiel for the forces to be mobilized by M+6 should be selective, owing to the high rate of obsolescence of modern weapons; the JCS should evaluate the planned Army expansion to 42 divisions; no requirements would be recognized for forces to be mobilized after M+6.²³

The successor, JSOP-62, was already in preparation. In the AFPC on 11 February, McElroy asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to advise him of the guidelines for preparation of JSOP-62 so that he might furnish any additional guidance needed.²⁴ Replying for the JCS on 17 March, Taylor informed the secretary that JSOP would use the same basic undertakings and plan of action as JSOP-61, with the same level of overseas deployment. Force tabs for 1 July 1962 would "stem from" the FY 1959 force structure and would be held to those considered "reasonably adequate and reasonably attainable in the light of circumstances which can be predicted today"—presumably meaning foreseeable budget restrictions. Due consideration would be given to the deficiencies in the JSOP-61 forces.²⁵

Tentative guidance drafted by McNeil's office would have imposed further restrictions. Personnel strengths would at no time before 1 July 1962 exceed the limits in the 1959 budget; obligational authority and expenditures for FYs 1960 through 1962 would remain approximately the same as in 1959. These limitations would have virtually completed the conversion of the JSOP into a "capabilities" plan—one designed to make use of available forces instead of providing guidance for future force development. By that time, however, JSOP-62 was so near completion that additional instructions would have delayed it. Quarles accordingly authorized the JCS to complete the plan on the basis of their original assumptions. He added, however, that Secretary McElroy, after reviewing it, might request further studies to make the plan more useful in preparing the FY 1960 budget.²⁶

Once again the JCS failed to agree on the force tabs. On 6 June they sent the secretary a plan in which they simply listed the forces proposed individually by each service, with comments by service chiefs. Each one argued, in effect, that the forces of the other services were excessive because they failed to take into account developments in weapon technology that would make reductions possible. Even the spokesmen for the surface forces split; Taylor and Burke each cited the other as proposing forces that were partly duplicated by those of the Air Force. The forces recommended by the services would add up to \$54.9 billion in new obligational authority for FY 1960 and \$57.4 billion in 1961. Such forces, as the JCS admitted, were not "reasonably attainable." They therefore asked that the secretary approve the rest of the JSOP for planning purposes and furnish them with an estimate of probable DoD budgets for 1960 and 1961 so that they might reconsider the force tabs.²⁷

McElroy, keenly disappointed in JSOP-62, made his disgust evident in the AFPC on 10 June. He had hoped it would help provide the basis for the FY 1960 budget but found it no help at all. The force tabs were simply unilateral estimates. He complained of civilians being forced to make

decisions that should be made by military men. If JSOPs were to be prepared in the future (and he doubted their value), they should be for use by the services rather than the secretary of defense. The discussion moved to the general subject of budgetary guidance. General Taylor thought that the budgets should be planned on a basis of missions rather than by service: for example, retaliation, continental defense, antisubmarine warfare, and the like. McElroy agreed, but the subject was not pursued, Admiral Burke objecting that naval vessels, with multiple capabilities, could not be segregated by mission.

Quarles put his finger on the real difficulty: there simply was "no logical solution" to the budget problem. "Military solutions to our dilemma are beyond our means," he said, according to the official record of the meeting. "It requires judgment on risks to be taken." McElroy agreed but reiterated his need for military guidance. He concluded by saying (according to Burke) that he "didn't ever want to see a JSOP any more." He would let the JCS decide how they could best present the guidance he needed, which should include force levels related to missions.²⁸

McElroy's concluding remark to the AFPC was not taken literally, if indeed he intended it to be. Brig. Gen. Whisenand of Twining's office told McElroy's special assistant, R. Eugene Livesay, that Twining planned to go ahead with JSOP-63, to be prepared along the lines desired by McElroy.²⁹

The Limited War Issue Settled

Resolution of the question of the place of limited war in national policy awaited the outcome of the study of limited war undertaken several months earlier. This resulted from one of the highest priority recommendations of the Gaither panel: that both U.S. and allied forces for limited military operations be augmented, also that a study be undertaken to develop doctrine for use of nuclear weapons in such operations.*

This recommendation, along with others, had been referred to the secretary of defense, who in turn passed it to the JCS. In their comments on the panel's report in December 1957, the JCS approved the proposed force augmentation but stipulated that it be related to the overall force posture needed to meet general war. As for the study of limited war proposed by the panel, they believed that it should be made within DoD.³⁰

This latter recommendation drew dissent from Sprague, who, with the concurrence of the State Department, recommended that the study be done under the auspices of the NSC.³¹ In the end, this was the decision. Following a discussion of the Gaither report (devoted chiefly to the question of shelter construction) on 16 January, the NSC agreed that a DoD plan for a study of capabilities of forces for limited military operations should be submitted by 15 March 1958.³²

* See Chapter VII.

Secretary Dulles had hoped for quicker action, as he told the NSC on 22 January. At the same time, he raised other objections. He pointed out that the Gaither panel had specifically recommended enlarging "forces" for limited military operations, by no means the same as merely augmenting the "capabilities" of existing forces. Furthermore, he urged that the State Department be brought into the study from the beginning, because of its interest in conventionally equipped forces able to "show the flag" in threatened areas. It would not suffice merely to allow State to comment on the plan after its completion, when DoD views had already crystallized. Dulles won his point; the president agreed that State should participate in drafting the plan.

Dulles then raised a final objection. DoD appeared to be approaching the subject in a manner that indicated prejudgment against the Gaither recommendation. The terms of reference for the study should be broad enough to allow consideration of enlarging forces. The president again approved, although he held it more important to augment capabilities than to enlarge forces.³³

Terms of reference for the study, drawn up by a committee representing State, Defense, and the JCS, were sent to the NSC on 5 March 1958. The problem, as stated, was "to examine U.S. and allied capabilities for limited military operations for the present to 1 July 1961." Such operations were defined as "any armed conflict short of an overt engagement of U.S. and USSR armed forces which has been directed by or concurred in by competent political authority." The study would examine the most likely situations that might involve the United States, and would consider capabilities for action both with and without the use of nuclear weapons.³⁴

Despite Dulles's expressed views, the terms of reference spoke entirely of "capabilities" rather than forces. Perhaps the provision for conclusions regarding their "adequacy" satisfied State's requirements. At any rate, when the NSC discussed the terms on 20 March, Dulles raised no objection and they were approved with minor changes.³⁵

The study, completed on 29 May, considered hypothetical operations in 12 areas of the globe: 6 in the Far East, 4 in the Middle East, and 2 in Eastern Europe (Berlin and Yugoslavia). The key conclusion gave no comfort to those seeking a change in national policy: "The United States has the capability to deal successfully with situations requiring limited military operations." This conclusion was qualified by a finding that in some situations, selective use of low-yield nuclear weapons would be necessary. "No military tasks were found to be unique to limited military operations," but certain tasks might require a "greater degree of emphasis and a higher priority" than they might in a general war. Initial response to a local conflict would have to come from forces deployed in or near the area involved; hence it would be necessary to maintain current overseas deployments.³⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after reviewing the study, stressed its limitations, based as it was on hypothetical situations. They warned McElroy

against regarding it as a "conclusive basis" for the development of limited war forces.³⁷

McElroy and other DoD officials discussed the study with Dulles on 17 June. The secretary of state noted the overall finding that the United States was in "reasonably good shape" to wage limited war in the 12 areas considered. His principal concern, however, remained Western Europe. Agreeing that there was little chance of limited war there, he again warned that NATO countries evinced growing concern whether the United States would be willing to go to general war, especially if the Soviet Union had an ICBM capability and the United States did not. Dulles thought that the United States must develop some "new concepts" instead of merely reiterating existing policy.³⁸

On the same day, probably following the conference, McElroy and Dulles signed a memorandum transmitting the limited war study to the NSC. They drew attention to its conclusions and recommended that CIA initiate studies of possible international reactions to U.S. use of nuclear weapons in limited operations; they also called for greater efforts to clarify to friendly nations U.S. intentions concerning the use of such weapons.³⁹ The council, after discussing the study on 26 June, referred the Dulles-McElroy memorandum to the two departments for possible revisions of NSC 5810/1 and for further study and recommendations.⁴⁰

Assistant Secretary Sprague concluded from the study that U.S. and allied forces were able to cope with a variety of limited war situations and that priority in military preparations must continue to go to deterring all-out war. Hence, paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1 should be adopted without change. Discussing the matter in the AFPC, McElroy was inclined to agree with Sprague. Any revision of the policy statement implying a change in policy would, if it became known, have serious consequences, in his view. Quarles, Douglas, and White thought the wording of the paragraphs flexible enough to allow for changes in emphasis. Taylor made the contrary argument. Burke and Pate indicated that they had not changed their views, but they did not express themselves strongly, probably because they had already done so. It was agreed that both positions would be presented to the NSC.⁴¹

McElroy's formally expressed position to the NSC followed Sprague's recommendations. He wrote:

As a result of the review by the Department of Defense of the military aspects of Basic Policy, it is concluded that there have been no recent developments which change fundamentally the major undertakings for which the military should be prepared. The major threat to the security of the United States continues, and will continue in the foreseeable future, to reside in the capability of the Soviet Union to precipitate and wage general nuclear war against the United States. Therefore, the highest priority in our military effort must continue to be given to the deterrent to all-out nuclear war.

The DoD, he continued, would insure that the deterrent was adequate but not excessive. He cited the limited war study as evidence of U.S. capability to cope with a wide variety of limited war situations and promised efforts toward continuing improvement. He was convinced that war with the Soviet Union could not be limited in operations or objectives; any implication that the United States might seek such limitations would "involve a dangerous weakening of our deterrent position." He considered that NSC 5810/1 provided adequate guidance for force structure development and recommended adoption of the existing paragraphs 13 and 14. McElroy sent a copy of this letter to Secretary Dulles, suggesting that the two of them seek to reach a common position.⁴²

Dulles believed that "much work still remains to be done" before the two departments could agree on the final disposition of paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1. He suggested to McElroy that a decision be deferred pending a joint study of a possible new strategic concept. He believed that a more flexible alternative would be needed within the next few years. "Therefore," he concluded, "I believe planning should now start for the weapons systems and doctrines which will be needed to support such a change."⁴³

In preparation for final discussion of paragraphs 13 and 14 at an NSC meeting on 24 July, Sprague outlined for McElroy the reasons for supporting them as written. If Dulles pressed for a joint study of a revised strategic concept, Sprague wrote, McElroy should agree provided the terms of reference did not prejudge the results. General Twining forwarded to the NSC the views of the JCS members and reaffirmed his already expressed position.⁴⁴

Any doubt that the president and council would accept the two paragraphs as written evaporated when Dulles capitulated. He wrote the president on 23 July that he would concur in McElroy's recommendation to retain them as written. He still believed that the existing strategic concept was "rapidly outliving its usefulness," but since McElroy had agreed to further study of the matter, he would not "air my misgivings on this sensitive subject before the Council."⁴⁵

Thus the council's decision on 24 July 1958 was a foregone conclusion, with McElroy and Twining urging acceptance of NSC 5810/1 and Dulles acquiescing. The president at first ruled that final action on the two paragraphs be deferred for further study; meanwhile DoD was to prepare the FY 1960 budget on the basis of the present wording. Several days later, reviewing the draft record of NSC action with Gordon Gray, Cutler's replacement, he approved the paragraphs with the understanding that they would be kept under "continuing review" pending the next annual revision of basic policy.⁴⁶

Coincidentally, by this time the crisis in Lebanon had evoked a U.S. military response in a situation far short of general war. There soon followed the threat in the Taiwan Strait that, for a time, suggested that U.S. forces might become involved in hostilities with those of Communist China in

defense of the islands of Quemoy and Matsu.* The interdepartmental limited war study had indeed considered the possibility of conflict over those islands, concluding that U.S. air and naval forces, operating in conjunction with those of Nationalist China, could prevent the Communists from capturing them.⁴⁷

Neither situation tested U.S. capability for limited military operations, since no hostilities occurred. Nonetheless partisans on both sides of the issue cited them: on the one hand, both crises were dealt with using available forces; on the other hand, U.S. forces had to be withdrawn from NATO and no hostilities were involved. McElroy saw them as evidence of the adequacy of U.S. capabilities; he told the Senate in January 1959 that the effective U.S. responses had deterred war in the Middle East and kept hostilities restrained in the Far East.⁴⁸ In any case, the issue resurfaced in the 1959 policy review. But for the moment, the important point was that NSC 5810/1 provided no basis for a change of budgetary emphasis.

The FY 1960 Budget: Preliminary

The budget for FY 1960, the last fiscal year that would begin and end during his administration, held special concern for President Eisenhower. His determination to insure a balanced budget was stronger than ever.⁴⁹ He and his newly installed budget director, Maurice Stans, clearly had their work cut out for them. As Stans told the Cabinet on 18 April 1958, even assuming recovery of the economy, the prospective deficit for 1959 amounted to \$9.2 billion—a figure that in fact proved far too low. For 1960, Stans foresaw a deficit of \$4.5 billion.⁵⁰

In a discussion with the president on 28 April, McElroy estimated a need for about \$42 billion in NOA and \$41.5 billion in expenditures. For Stans, these figures were too high; he suggested cutting expenditures to \$40 billion, and offered to submit specific proposals for reductions.⁵¹

When it came time to begin work on the budget, McElroy, after failing, as already noted, to obtain guidance from the JSOP, decided to consult with department heads to establish tentative fiscal and personnel limits for submission to the president. He rejected the alternative of starting with military requirements and then squeezing them down. He told the AFPC on 24 June that he contemplated a military strength of approximately 2.4 million.⁵²

The following day McElroy asked the JCS to recommend a distribution of the 2.4 million personnel. The JCS opposed the adoption of this figure, because it would mean a reduction of approximately 5 percent from the 2.525 million limit for 1959. They attempted without success to agree on a distribution. Generals Taylor and White recommended applying the five percent cut to each service. Admiral Burke and General

*Regarding the Lebanon and Taiwan crises, see Chapter VIII.

Pate proposed a larger cut for the Army, with the difference being applied to their services. General Twining, in forwarding his colleagues' views, told the secretary that he did not completely agree with either proposal and wished to discuss the matter further. McElroy apparently made no formal reply.⁵³

After further discussions with the service secretaries, McElroy settled on a basic expenditure of \$41.25 billion. The service department allocation (in approximately the same proportion as in 1959) was as follows, in billions:

Army	\$ 9.100
Navy	\$11.700
Air Force	\$19.000
OSD and Interservice	\$ 1.450
Total	\$41.250

To provide a measure of flexibility, new obligational authority should exceed expenditures by about \$500 million. McElroy also proposed to include a \$500 million contingency sum and ask the departments to submit supplemental plans for using this additional money. At the same time, he tentatively approved the 2.4 million strength total, reducing each service proportionately, with the following results:⁵⁴

Army	825,000
Navy	600,000
Marine Corps	167,000
Air Force	808,000
Total	2,400,000

Departing from Wilson's practice, McElroy did not issue formal instructions, but the budget allocations given above were close to those adopted by the services for their initial budget requests.

Public Opinion: Rise of the "Missile Gap"

However much the administration might strive to hold the budget in line, it could be foreseen that general concern over trends in relative U.S. and Soviet strength would exert upward pressure. Congress was already at work to increase the 1959 budget and ended up by forcing on the administration some \$300 million more than had been requested, with much higher amounts for weapons procurement and personnel strength.*

Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, already emerging as a leading champion of a stronger military establishment, recalled his Preparedness

* See Chapter VI.

Investigating Subcommittee into session on 24 July 1958 to question McElroy, Quarles, and Twining on progress made in meeting the subcommittee's earlier recommendations. Johnson expressed disappointment that the Department of Defense seemed to lack a "feeling of grim urgency," to which McElroy replied that "a feeling of urgency does now exist."⁵⁵

Whether or not "grimness" was appropriate was a matter of opinion. A survey of the military balance reported in mid-1958 by Hanson W. Baldwin found no immediate cause for alarm. The United States was well ahead of the USSR on balance, Baldwin concluded; its advantages in manned aircraft, sea power, and numbers of atomic weapons outweighed the Soviets' lead in ground troops and submarines and their slight edge in long-range missile development. But he saw danger in the future unless the United States intensified its efforts in the areas in which it was lagging.⁵⁶

In the minds of many, the basic danger was public complacency. Walter Lippmann, the dean of American newspaper columnists, attributed the Soviets' missile lead to a "lack of seriousness in American national purposes." A well-known military analyst, Albert Wohlstetter of the Rand Corporation, writing in a journal widely read by public opinion "elites," warned that the difficulties of deterring nuclear war were being underestimated; deterrence depended on making the right policy choices, and he was by no means certain that this would be done.⁵⁷

Some economists challenged the administration's conviction, basic to its national security policy, that current budgets were close to a maximum that, if exceeded, would bring economic ruin. They believed that the nation could and should spend whatever seemed militarily necessary; expenditure of from 10 to 15 percent, or even more, of the gross national product for military purposes was perfectly feasible. Since the gross national product was then running some \$440 billion per annum, it followed that a Defense budget of \$66 billion—more than 50 percent above the current figure—would not be excessive.⁵⁸

If, indeed, there existed a threat to the well-established U.S. economic supremacy, it appeared to lie in the Soviets' much higher current rate of economic growth. Evidence suggested that this amounted to over six percent annually—approximately double that of the United States. Allen Dulles, director of central intelligence, called this situation "the most serious challenge this country has ever faced in time of peace."⁵⁹

Increasingly, however, attention began to focus on the question of superiority in long-range missiles, which were clearly the strategic weapons of the future. The Soviets had seized an early lead in this race with their successful missile tests before Sputnik. Who could doubt that they would exploit this edge to the utmost? Thus arose a controversy that was to agitate the public for several years and influence the outcome of the 1960 presidential election.⁶⁰

At the beginning of 1958, the best estimates available to the administration judged that the Soviets might have an initial operational capability (IOC) of 10 prototype ICBMs between late 1958 and early 1960, with

100 more between mid-1959 and late 1960, and 500 between mid-1960 and 1962. These were based on estimates of Soviet production capacity, which, it was assumed, would be exploited as rapidly as possible to produce first-generation weapons. Since the United States did not expect to deploy as many as 100 ICBMs before 1962, these estimates, if they had been made public, would have given substance to the charge by a former administration official that the Soviets were as much as two years ahead of the United States in this branch of weapons development.⁶¹

On 30 July columnist Joseph Alsop, who was to play a leading role in the controversy, gave his own estimates of future Soviet ICBM strength. He credited them with 500 by the end of 1960, 1,500 by 1962, and 2,000 by 1963. Alsop spoke of a "gap" covering the years 1960 through 1963 which, he wrote, caused Pentagon officials to "shudder." Another columnist, retired Brig. Gen. Thomas Phillips, on 13 August, quoted "military experts in the Pentagon" to the effect that within 2 to 4 years the Soviets would have 20 times as many missiles of all ranges (intermediate and intercontinental) as the United States. The following day, in what was to prove a portent of the presidential election two years later, Sen. John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts assailed the administration for allowing a "missile lag" or "gap" to develop.⁶²

About the same time, there appeared the memoirs of Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, USA (Ret.), a distinguished combat veteran of World War II and, until his retirement in 1958, chief of research and development for the Department of the Army.⁶³ Gavin's book reflected his frustration as an officer in a service that was constantly being whittled down. He warned that as a result of errors in judgment the United States was entering a period of "missile lag" during which it would be exposed to Soviet blackmail. The book received much attention through the publication of excerpts from it in a mass-circulation magazine.⁶⁴

Senator Symington of Missouri, one of the most persistent critics of the administration's defense policies, entered the contest with a denial of the accuracy of the Soviet missile estimates produced by CIA. Symington, a former secretary of the Air Force, drew his information from Col. Tom G. Lanphier, USAF (Ret.), an official of the Convair Corporation, who maintained contacts with people in the CIA, AEC, and the service intelligence components. According to Symington, the Soviets during 1957 had conducted from 45 to 60 test firings of ICBMs—far more than the 6 to date attributed to them by the CIA. It followed, therefore, that the CIA was seriously underestimating the numbers of Soviet missiles. The president gave Symington a hearing on 29 August but remained unconvinced that the CIA was off the mark.⁶⁵

Administration spokesmen questioned the existence of a "missile gap" and defended their decisions. Eisenhower, asked about the matter on 27 August, declared that his administration (in contrast to that of his predecessor) had given missile development the highest priority and that existing missile programs were "not only adequate, but really are generous."

If any "gap" existed, it would be filled by U.S. strength and manned aircraft. This latter point was to become the administration's standing defense: that the United States was well ahead in overall strength and that relative numbers of missiles were therefore irrelevant.⁶⁶

In defending its estimates of probable Soviet ICBM deployments, the administration was at a disadvantage because it could not disclose all its sources of information. The most important of these was probably the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, which, since July 1956, CIA pilots had flown at high altitudes over the USSR. The extraordinarily detailed photography provided by these flights enabled administration officials accurately to appraise Soviet preparations, or the lack thereof, for imminent large-scale ICBM deployment. The U-2 remained a carefully guarded secret until 1960, when one was shot down by the Soviets, with unfortunate consequences.⁶⁷

The "missile gap" charge was assiduously exploited by the Democratic Party in the congressional elections in November 1958. The president tried to turn the charge around, blaming the previous Democratic administration and citing the high priority given missile development since he took office. Thanks to his actions, he said, the gap was rapidly being closed.⁶⁸

As the campaign was reaching its climax during October, McElroy was out of the country on a five-week tour of defense installations around the world. On 7 October Eisenhower wrote to him in Seoul to suggest that he curtail his trip and return home to take part in the campaign, since accusations against the defense program seemed to be having some effect. McElroy replied that it would be unwise to break off his trip abruptly; foreign officials regarded it as of "extraordinary importance" in view of the lingering tension over the recent Taiwan Strait crisis. Eisenhower accepted his judgment, and McElroy continued his trip until 5 November.⁶⁹

For whatever reasons, the outcome of the election was disastrous for the president's party; the Republicans suffered their worst congressional defeat since 1936. The Democrats strengthened their hold on Congress, ending up with large majorities in both houses.⁷⁰ Anxiety over the missile gap, and about defense in general, certainly played some part in this result, though the extent of its influence is uncertain. In any event, it could be expected that the president's budget would encounter even greater difficulty in the forthcoming session of Congress.

The FY 1960 Budget: Final

Early in October, with McElroy out of the country, the service departments submitted their budget requests, based on the following financial estimates (in billions):

	<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>NOA</u>
Army	\$ 9.3	\$10.2
Navy	11.6	11.2
Air Force	19.2	19.6
Total	\$40.1	\$41.0

The Army proposed to maintain through 1960 its approved FY 1959 strength of 14 divisions, with a slight increase in personnel to 880,000. General Taylor warned that under this budget the Army could not meet its basic missions or overcome the lag in modernizing its equipment. Even if the Army received the entire \$500 million in additional expenditures, the deficiencies would be only partially remedied.⁷¹

The Navy likewise proclaimed its budget to be inadequate. It would provide a fleet of 874 ships and finance construction of a second nuclear-powered carrier. An additional \$500 million in expenditures, if granted, would provide the down payment for some additional Polaris submarines and other vessels.⁷²

The Air Force submission envisioned a decrease from 105 to 102 wings and, more alarmingly, severe adverse consequences for modernization. Procurement of B-52 aircraft would end in 1959 and production of B-58s would be curtailed. Air defense would suffer from reductions in procurement of fighter aircraft and the Bomarc air defense missile.⁷³

Unlike the other services, the Air Force did not put in a claim for the entire \$500 million additional. Its addendum budget called for \$365 million in FY 1960 expenditures, though this was part of a program covering several years which would require additional obligational authority. The program would provide three more squadrons of B-52s (to replace two wings of obsolescent B-47s), additional Minuteman missiles in 1963 and 1964, and improved continental air defense facilities.⁷⁴

Except for the Army, the services proposed to maintain through 1960 their approved FY 1959 end strengths. They had thus ignored McElroy's tentative plan to reduce to a total of 2.4 million. McElroy raised no objection; he had evidently abandoned this plan, since in the end he approved continuation of the 1959 strengths almost without change.

To the \$40.1 billion in expenditures for the services, there was added a preliminary estimate of \$1.5 billion for programs and activities under OSD. The service add-on requests came to another \$1.365 billion in expenditures. Corresponding totals for new obligational authority were \$42.6 billion for the basic and \$5 billion for the supplemental budget. In subsequent discussions, additional items not in any of the budgets, notably missiles for air defense, brought the NOA total to \$48.5 billion by November.⁷⁵

In McElroy's absence, Quarles and McNeil, with representatives of BoB, reviewed the service submissions. Final discussions with McElroy took place on 26 November.⁷⁶ The secretary tentatively approved \$41.6 billion in expenditures and \$41.5 billion in new obligational authority. In addition,

\$1 billion would be allocated from surplus 1959 appropriations and \$340 million in transfers from stock funds, making a total budget of almost \$42.9 billion in NOA. These figures were presented to the AFPC the same day.⁷⁷

The BoB still held firm on a limit of \$40 billion for both expenditures and new obligational authority.⁷⁸ The president, who would have to make the decision, was vacationing in Augusta, Georgia. In preparation for McElroy's meeting with the president, McNeil drafted a memorandum adopting an unusual line of justification for the DoD budget. Shifting the argument from military to civilian considerations, he warned that to reduce military expenditures to \$40 billion (well below the expected level for 1959) would have harmful effects on the national economy, which had not yet fully recovered from the recession.⁷⁹

McElroy, Quarles, McNeil, and Twining met with Eisenhower and Stans in Augusta on 28 November. McElroy presented his draft budget, which strongly emphasized retaliatory capability, providing for procurement of additional B-52s but slowing of B-58 production. It raised objectives for the liquid-fueled ICBMs, Titan and Atlas, from 13 to 20 squadrons with the addition of 7 more of the former. From 1959 appropriations would come funds for three more Polaris submarines (in addition to six already underway) and new appropriations would be provided for long lead-time items for three more. The Thor/Jupiter program was reduced from 12 to 8 squadrons. The Navy's Regulus (an air-breathing surface-to-surface missile) had been canceled as unnecessary in view of the impending advent of Polaris. Army materiel programs had been cut back in order to maintain manpower at current levels.

The budget also included money for a second nuclear attack carrier. Under the Navy's program, as the secretary reminded the president, such a vessel scheduled for FY 1959 had been postponed. General Twining characterized this as one of the "more questionable" items in the budget, though he admitted that carriers were "useful in cold war situations."

Gordon Gray spoke for Secretary Dulles, who did not attend the meeting, but had informed Gray of his views. Dulles disclaimed expert knowledge of the Defense budget, but he nevertheless pointed out the importance of conventionally armed surface forces in the Lebanon and Taiwan Strait crises; he hoped that no decisions would be made that would cripple this capability. McElroy added that carriers had been particularly valuable in both situations. The president, however, remained skeptical and again decided to defer the nuclear carrier.

Stans then argued for a Defense budget of \$40 billion in both expenditures and new obligational authority (including \$1 billion in FY 1959 funds), in order to keep the overall budget to \$76 billion, which represented the most optimistic revenue estimate for FY 1960. While he appreciated the reductions that McElroy had made, he did not believe that they went far enough.

The ensuing discussion dealt with the budget in general terms and led to no specific decisions. The president again held forth on the

importance of economy. Unless the budget was balanced sooner or later, he said, defense procurement "will avail nothing." McElroy responded to this implied criticism by pointing out the risks he had taken, notably the downgrading of continental air defense. Such broad policy judgments he felt qualified to make, but he hesitated to "second-guess" scientists in their own field of competence. The only decision taken was to continue the discussion of the "philosophy" of defense budgeting at a "stag dinner" at the White House on 3 December. Meanwhile OSD officials would review the budget with an eye to further reductions.⁸⁰

The dinner meeting, attended by an array of civilian and military officials, dealt largely with the relations between defense and the economy. General Taylor and the president disagreed over the responsibility of military men to weigh military against economic considerations. Admiral Burke thought that additional taxes, if necessary to pay for an adequate defense, would be fully justified. This "philosophical" discussion provided no decision on the specific question at issue, namely, the size of the budget.⁸¹

Earlier, McElroy had shaved the expenditure figure to \$41.265 billion.⁸² Probably at the same time, he reduced the appropriations request to \$40.776 billion, mostly at the expense of the Navy. A large part of this reduction apparently came from the abandonment of the nuclear carrier, for which a conventionally powered one was to be substituted, with Burke's acquiescence.⁸³ Meanwhile Stans lowered the pressure somewhat. He told the president on 3 December that, while he still favored a \$40 billion expenditure limit, it appeared that the budget could be balanced at a figure up to \$40.8 billion. The president instructed General Persons to discuss the matter with McElroy.⁸⁴

McElroy referred the budget to the JCS for review in connection with an NSC meeting on 6 December.⁸⁵ The JCS considered the matter on 5 December and agreed that \$41.265 billion in expenditures was "fully justified and necessary," adding that each member had reservations about cutbacks in some of his own programs. A figure of \$40.8 billion (which Stans had indicated as acceptable) would bring force levels and modernization below the danger point. Whether or not a lesser reduction, to \$41.165 billion, was acceptable was a matter of disagreement among the members.⁸⁶

When the NSC met on 6 December, McElroy and his staff presented a budget containing \$40.776 billion in appropriations for 1960 and \$41.170 billion in expenditures. Not surprisingly, Stans, with the support of Treasury Secretary Anderson, objected, pointing out that a cut of only one percent would bring the expenditure figure below his \$40.8 billion target. The services, led by the Navy, "refused to give one inch," and the discussion became "long and bloody," as Eisenhower's secretary, Ann Whitman, wrote after hearing his account of the meeting. McElroy defended the budget as the best that could be devised. The president eventually approved the overall military program but directed that the budget "follow the regular budgetary process" to make certain that all possible economies were effected.⁸⁷

Subsequently the president approved certain specific recommendations concerning missile programs that McElroy had included in his budget. These included increasing ICBM squadrons to 20 (11 Titan, 9 Atlas), construction of 4 more Polaris submarines with FY 1959 funds and lead-time procurement actions for 3 more in FY 1960, and reduction of IRBM squadrons to 8 (5 Thor, 3 Jupiter), though 2 more might be added if NATO so required.⁸⁸

In final adjustments, the appropriations request was raised to \$40.850 billion and the expenditure estimate trimmed to \$40.945 billion, which, as it turned out, enabled the budget to be balanced by a very narrow margin. "Effective" obligational authority (including surplus 1959 appropriations and stock fund transfers) totaled \$42.2 billion. The budget would support an army of 14 divisions, 864 ships, and 102 wings. Personnel strengths would remain the same as the 1959 figures except for a reduction of 5,000 in the Air Force, which was losing three wings. McElroy submitted this budget to Stans on 6 January 1959 and obtained his approval.⁸⁹

The revised budget in effect voided the statement that the JCS had signed on 9 December 1958 attesting the necessity of a \$41.165 billion budget. Accordingly, at the request of McElroy and after some discussion whether it was necessary, on 19 January 1959 the chairman and all four of the service chiefs signed the following statement (identical with the earlier one except for the amount involved):

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the FY 1960 proposed expenditure figure of \$40,945,000,000 is adequate to provide for the essential programs necessary for the defense of the nation for the period under consideration. They find no serious gaps in the key elements of the budget in its present form, but all have reservations with respect to the funding of some segments of their respective Service programs.⁹⁰

For the final preparation and presentation of the budget, McElroy and McNeil adopted a new structure that emphasized functional rather than individual service responsibilities. This change was in keeping with the 1958 DoD reorganization. President Eisenhower, in his reorganization message to Congress on 3 April 1958, had told the legislators that he had directed preparation of the budget in a form that would give the secretary maximum flexibility in discharging his responsibilities.⁹¹

The new budget format followed several months of discussions among representatives of OSD, BoB, and congressional appropriations committees. An initial proposal by McNeil to have appropriations made to the secretary of defense by functional category without regard to service departments was approved by Stans but subsequently dropped as likely to be unacceptable to Congress. The format finally adopted grouped funds into five broad categories: military personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; research, development, test, and evaluation; and military

construction. Service totals were also presented, but were given less emphasis. At the same time, the internal appropriation structures of the services were rationalized and simplified.⁹²

The president sent the 1960 budget to Congress on 19 January 1959. For the government as a whole, he forecast \$77.1 billion in receipts and \$77.0 billion in expenditures, leaving a bare margin of \$100 million. For DoD, the president requested \$40.850 billion in new obligational authority, to which would be added \$340 million from stock and industrial funds and \$697 million from surplus 1959 appropriations (plus \$275 million in projected recoveries from prior years). Of the appropriation, \$39.287 billion was requested at once; the remaining \$1.563 billion was to be transmitted later. The expenditure forecast for DoD of \$40.945 billion had a breakdown as follows, in billions:⁹³

	NOA	Expenditures
Army	\$ 9.357	\$ 9.264
Navy	11.370	11.596
Air Force	18.682	18.675
OSD	1.441	1.410
Total	\$40.850	\$40.945

The functional breakdown of the NOA request, according to the newly adopted format, was:⁹⁴

Military personnel	\$11.625
Operation and maintenance	10.512
Procurement	13.348
Research, development, test and evaluation	3.772
Military construction	1.563
Revolving and management funds	.030
Total	\$40.850

The president asked Congress to repeal the mandatory minimum strengths enacted in 1958 for Army Reserve components. He again proposed to reduce the Army National Guard to 360,000 and the Army Reserve to 270,000 in regular paid status.⁹⁵ As usual, he highlighted some milestones in weapons modernization expected to take place during fiscal or calendar 1960. The last B-36 would be retired; a twelfth wing of B-52 bombers would become operational; the Atlas ICBM, the B-58, and the Hound Dog air-to-surface missile would enter service; the first Polaris submarine would be commissioned.⁹⁶

Aware that his budget faced an uncertain future in Congress, the president sought to head off the kind of congressional revolt that had forced unwanted money upon DoD in 1958. In his state of the union message on 9 January, he stressed the need for "balance and perspective" in defense planning. "We must guard against feverish building of vast armaments to meet glibly predicted moments of so-called 'maximum peril,'" he said. "The threat we face is not sporadic or dated: It is continuous." He had

“personally” participated in developing the Defense budget, which aimed at both a “sensible posture of defense” and “increased efficiency and avoidance of waste.” Later in his speech, he hinted at possible tax reduction as a reward for fiscal prudence. The secretary of the treasury, he said, would present proposals at the proper time to revise the tax structure so as to “enhance incentives.”⁹⁷

Missiles and Other Worries

President Eisenhower was well advised to try to seize the initiative and forestall demands for larger military spending. Even before his budget reached Congress, there were prospects of a confrontation with that body. Concern over the missile gap, which seemed to have declined by the end of 1958, rose to a new peak just about the time the budget was submitted.⁹⁸

The latest stir probably owed much to another Soviet feat announced on 3 January 1959 and quickly confirmed by U.S. sources—the launching of a rocket toward the moon. Though it narrowly failed to find its mark, that the missile left the earth’s gravitational field was sufficiently impressive, especially in contrast with the earlier U.S. failures to reach the moon. A week after the Soviet announcement, the House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration released a report urging a “bold and dynamic” plan to overcome the Soviets’ “distinct lead” in space technology.⁹⁹

On 16 January, testifying before a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, McElroy and Twining made some statements that inadvertently strengthened the administration’s critics. They gave a generally reassuring picture of U.S. strength but admitted that the Soviets would probably outstrip the United States in long-range missiles in the near future. Twining reaffirmed earlier estimates of 10 Soviet ICBMs in 1959, 100 a year later, and 500 by 1962 or possibly 1961. In contrast, according to Twining, the United States had programmed only 90 Atlas and Titan ICBMs by 1962 and 200 (plus 50 Minuteman) by June 1963. It appeared, then, that the Soviets would have at least twice as many missiles (500 against 250) by 1963. Senator Kennedy suggested that if the Soviets could increase from 100 to 500 by 1962 they could produce 1,000 by 1963. Twining responded that there was no assurance that the Soviets would build to capacity.¹⁰⁰

Information, accurate or otherwise, about what McElroy and Twining had said soon leaked out. A columnist writing on 22 January 1959 alleged that they had told the Foreign Relations Committee that by 1962 the Soviets would have 1,000 ICBMs and the United States only 300.¹⁰¹ The figure of 1,000, which had been mentioned by Senator Kennedy, was now credited to McElroy; whether the error was made by the columnist or by his informant is unknown. On the same day at a press conference,

McElroy was asked about the prospect of a missile gap. One questioner spoke of 300 Soviet ICBMs by 1960 (a figure not mentioned by McElroy, at least not before the Foreign Relations Committee). McElroy declined to go into detail but replied that there was "no positive evidence" that the Soviets would have ICBMs in operation before the United States. He pointed out that a predicted "bomber gap" had not occurred, apparently because the Soviets decided not to press ahead with maximum production.¹⁰²

On 27 January McElroy attended a dinner at which a number of prominent news reporters were present. During a discussion of world events, McElroy admitted that the Soviets might, in the next few years, achieve a numerical superiority of two or even three to one in ICBMs. His hearers, according to Oliver Gale (who was present), were "shocked and horrified" at this statement. Gale quickly informed them that the information was classified, but the statement inevitably leaked out.¹⁰³

These developments gave rise to an assertion in some quarters that McElroy had predicted that the Soviets might soon enjoy a three to one edge in intercontinental missiles.¹⁰⁴ It does not appear that he ever made such a bald statement. McElroy himself was never asked about the matter; Gates, queried about it in 1960 after he became secretary of defense, could not be certain.¹⁰⁵

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev helped to keep the pot boiling when he announced on 27 January that Soviet ICBMs were now in "mass production," or, according to an alternate translation, "serial production." The president, commenting on this ambiguous statement on 28 January, observed that he did not "know exactly what Mr. Khrushchev has in mind," and added that the U.S. missile program was proceeding as rapidly as possible. Twining ridiculed the statement, pointing out that the United States was already putting serial numbers on its ICBMs. But if it were true, it would explain why there had been so few Soviet missile tests: They had proved successful and the missile had promptly gone into production. Using U.S. production rates as a basis of comparison, Joseph Alsop calculated that the Soviets could produce 300 ICBMs by the end of 1959.¹⁰⁶

In the midst of the controversy, the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee opened hearings on 23 January, with McElroy and Twining testifying over a four-day period. The testimony was general and ranged across the entire budget. The question of missiles came up early. McElroy assured the congressmen that the administration intended to maintain overall military superiority, but not necessarily to match the Soviets missile for missile.¹⁰⁷

Shortly thereafter, on 29-30 January, Senator Johnson's Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee held two days of hearings in conjunction with the newly established Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. McElroy sought to reassure the senators by invoking the support of the JCS, who, he said, despite reservations had pronounced the budget adequate. This statement was confirmed by JCS members themselves when they testified. It served to pique senatorial curiosity;

one subcommittee member wondered "how by four inadequacies, we reach one adequacy." McElroy promised to have the JCS members spell out their reservations in writing. He also declassified and released the JCS memorandum.¹⁰⁸

At the beginning of February, McElroy and Twining spent much of a five-day period in briefing the House Armed Services Committee on the nation's military posture. They were questioned on missiles, manpower, and other matters. McElroy denied the charge that intelligence on Soviet progress had been "tailored" to the administration's budgetary purposes.¹⁰⁹

The committee appearances represented a considerable drain on McElroy's time and energy. By 7 February he and Twining had spent 38 hours before 6 investigative bodies.¹¹⁰ Still to come were the Senate Appropriations Committee and, though McElroy did not know it, the House Committee on Science and Astronautics. In all his congressional appearances so far, McElroy had handled himself skillfully and had avoided the kind of gaffes that had plagued Wilson.¹¹¹

The House Appropriations Subcommittee had by then begun taking testimony from representatives of the services. A novel feature of these hearings was the appearance of a number of high-ranking field commanders. They included General Lauris Norstad, supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR) and United States commander in chief, Europe (USCINCEUR); the commanders in chief of the Atlantic Command, the Strategic Air Command, and the North American Air Defense Command (the Joint U.S.-Canadian command for defense of the continent); and three service field commanders, those of the U.S. Fifth Army (based in the continental United States), U.S. Army Europe, and the Air Force's Tactical Air Command. Their appearance reflected the enhanced stature enjoyed by the field commands under the 1958 reorganization.¹¹²

The military and civilian chiefs of the services loyally testified to their support of the overall budget. Congressional questioning, however, quickly revealed that each service had initially asked for more than it received and retained reservations about its own budget.¹¹³

The House Committee on Science and Astronautics meanwhile was conducting its own investigation into the missile program. The committee paid particular attention to the revelation that the Army had sought money for production facilities for the Nike-Zeus antimissile missile but had been allowed funds only for continued research and development. McElroy, questioned on the subject on 2 March, replied that he had acted on the basis of the best available scientific advice that it would be premature to "freeze" the design of Nike-Zeus at that stage.¹¹⁴

Also hanging over the hearings was potential crisis over Berlin, precipitated by Khrushchev. In November 1958 he had denounced alleged Western violations of the 1945 Potsdam Agreement pertaining to Berlin and Germany. He threatened, after a six-month period, to turn over to the East German Government the powers hitherto exercised by the Soviet Union in Berlin. Thus the Western countries, if they wished to remain

in Berlin, would be forced to deal with the puppet "German Democratic Republic," which they had hitherto refused to recognize. Khrushchev's threat had the appearance of a six-month ultimatum that would expire on 27 May 1959. As the hearings progressed during 1959, Berlin increasingly rivaled the missile controversy as a source of unease.*

This rising tension over Berlin cast doubt on the advisability of completing the Army manpower reductions scheduled by the administration for FY 1959 (i.e., by 30 June). It also suggested the possibility of preparatory actions, notably putting the Strategic Air Command on air alert, a step recommended by General Thomas S. Power, CINCSAC, in his appearance before the House Appropriations Committee.¹¹⁵ McElroy, however, rejected these actions. In a press conference on 5 March devoted mainly to Berlin, he stated that the personnel reduction would go forward as planned, including the disbanding of one of the four divisions in the Strategic Army Corps; that no air alert had been undertaken because the JCS considered it unnecessary; and that there were no plans to increase the budget.¹¹⁶

On 8 March the military service chiefs furnished the Johnson subcommittee the memorandums setting forth their reservations concerning the 1960 budget. Taylor's, the most detailed, expressed reservations concerning the amount of money allotted for Army modernization (\$1.19 billion, less than the annual cost of replacement); the personnel strength allowed the Army, which had necessitated incorporation of foreign nationals into combat and support units in Europe and in Korea; and failure to authorize production of Nike-Zeus or procurement of surface-to-air missiles in sufficient numbers to meet JCS recommendations. Burke was concerned over modernization and procurement of ships, aircraft, and missiles; antisubmarine warfare capabilities; and Polaris procurement. Pate had reservations over Marine Corps personnel strength, also naval air and amphibious capabilities. General White favored faster replacement of B-47s, accelerated development of the nuclear-powered aircraft, and additional Bomarc air defense missiles. If he had misgivings about the rate of ICBM procurement, he did not mention them.¹¹⁷

Senator Johnson at once recalled the subcommittee into session to hear further testimony from the JCS. His original intention was to call them as a body. Whether it was legal to do so was doubtful; by law, the JCS were advisers to the president, the NSC, and the secretary of defense, but not to Congress. Eisenhower discussed the issue with Twining, who already had it under study by legal counsel in the JCS organization. The president cautioned the chairman to remind his colleagues that the JCS were "a tool and not a policy-making body," with no responsibility for "high-level political decisions." In the end, a possible legal crisis was averted. The service chiefs testified individually on separate days; Twining did not appear at all.¹¹⁸

The three days of hearings gave the service chiefs an opportunity to discuss their reservations in more detail. They were questioned at length

* The Berlin situation is described in Chapter XVIII.

about the relation of the budget to the Berlin crisis. The overall effect was to furnish more ammunition for the critics of the budget, who now included members of both parties. McElroy's attempt to call the JCS to his support had thus backfired.¹¹⁹

McElroy had become the principal focus of public criticism and apparently experienced some strain. In February he took a vacation, his first since assuming office.¹²⁰ By the spring, a well-informed defense reporter would refer to him as "embattled," noting that the "general aura of good feeling" surrounding his appointment had vanished.¹²¹

McElroy's known intention to leave office in the near future provided a basis for additional criticism. It seemed that he would be leaving just as he had mastered his job, and the same would necessarily be true of his successor, who would have little more than a year in office before Eisenhower's term expired. The president, asked on 4 March about McElroy's possible departure, told reporters that McElroy had from the beginning set a time limit on his service, and went on to pay him a tribute. "I have been absolutely satisfied with Mr. McElroy's performance," he said. "I think he has learned his job quickly, and I think he has acted like a statesman and a very splendid public servant."¹²² Such public praise from the president had never been the lot of McElroy's predecessor. It helped to dispel a rumor, already denied by Oliver Gale, that McElroy and the president were at odds.¹²³

McElroy himself, asked about his possible departure on 5 March, admitted that there were "certain personal factors" urging him to leave before the president finished his term of office. However, he expected to remain long enough to set up the "principles" of the 1961 budget. When a questioner asked how his plans squared with DoD efforts to promote continuity in office, he evaded the question by pointing out that he would have served longer than any previous secretary except Wilson.¹²⁴

McElroy's policy of standing firm on the budget was, of course, that of the president, who publicly backed up his secretary. On 25 February Eisenhower frankly told reporters that he considered himself better qualified than his critics to judge the proper level of spending. On 11 March he took the opportunity to lecture a reporter on the importance of maintaining a steady course, undeterred by crises such as Sputnik, Quemoy-Matsu, or Berlin.¹²⁵

The president restated his views on 16 March in a radio and television address on "security in the free world." He spoke first on Berlin, assuring the nation that the United States, though willing to negotiate, would never surrender its rights. Then, turning to defense in general, he categorically denied that national security had been subordinated to a balanced budget; that defenses were, or would be, inadequate to meet Communist threats; or that the armed forces needed more manpower. As for missiles, there was "no defense field to which we are devoting more talent, skill, and money," he said. He believed that "the American people want, are entitled to, can indefinitely pay for, and now have and will continue to have a modern, effective and adequate military establishment."¹²⁶

The Administration Wins a Victory

The president's opponents in Congress were by no means convinced by his words. Their first opportunity to demonstrate their disagreement came in connection with the supplementary FY 1959 appropriations request, which had been sent to the legislators in two increments wrapped up into a single legislative package providing funds for a number of agencies. The Senate, in approving the bill, added riders (over McElroy's protest) requiring that Army and Marine Corps strength be maintained at 900,000 and 200,000 respectively. However, these provisions were omitted from the final legislation passed on 14 May, which provided \$275.8 million for DoD.¹²⁷

On 28 May the House Appropriations Committee reported out a bill that provided \$38.9 billion in new obligational authority, plus \$421 million in fund transfers. The Army would be given additional money for weapons modernization, for the Nike-Zeus antimissile missile, and for maintenance of the National Guard and the Army Reserve at 400,000 and 300,000, respectively (although these strengths were not made obligatory). Money for Bomarc would be reduced; the committee believed that the relation between that weapon and Nike-Hercules needed further study. On the other hand, it added extra money to accelerate Minuteman and to provide eight more Atlas squadrons. The attack carrier was dropped; most of the money thus saved would go to antisubmarine ships and aircraft.

A special effort had been made to ascertain the facts on the missile gap. "The Committee feels that a missile gap exists," declared the report, "and does not wish to see it widened." Partly for this reason, the bill contained language authorizing the president, if he felt it necessary, to incur a deficiency in funds to maintain an airborne alert.¹²⁸ The House accepted the committee's bill without change on 3 June.¹²⁹

The Senate Appropriations Committee had begun hearings on the budget on 4 May. The proceedings were interrupted when Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles died suddenly early on the morning of 8 May 1959. Out of respect for Quarles's memory, the committee recessed for a day. When hearings resumed, there arose a question about the role of the BoB in shaping the defense budget. As a result, Lyndon Johnson once more recalled the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee for two days of hearings (20 May and 17 June) to investigate the question. BoB director Stans and William F. Schaub, chief of the Military Division of BoB, described in detail their participation in the budget process, emphasizing that they were advisers to the president and the secretary of defense and did not make decisions.¹³⁰

Following House passage of the appropriations bill, McElroy sought to persuade the Senate to restore some of the items deleted, also to delete the extra money for the Army Reserve and National Guard and for Atlas and Minuteman. He stressed the attack carrier. "No one item in the entire

1960 defense program received more attention," he said. When Senator Chavez, the chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, asked for JCS views on the subject, McElroy could not recall them. Later, he wrote Chavez that the JCS had not considered the carrier specifically but had judged the service budgets adequate for essential programs.¹³¹

In the end, the Senate approved \$39.6 billion, more than \$700 million above the House figure. The Senate not only restored the attack carrier but provided money for nuclear propulsion. Its bill provided funds for the extra Army Reserve-National Guard strength and for a Marine Corps of 200,000 and included language making these strengths mandatory. A requirement for a regular Army of 900,000 had been considered but rejected. Part of the Bomarc money was restored. The House additions for Atlas and Minuteman were retained, but the secretary was left free to use these funds for such ballistic missiles as he judged most promising.¹³²

Both houses of Congress had provided extra money for the Army Reserve and National Guard, but only the Senate had made the strength figures mandatory. In letters to the House and Senate subcommittees on 17 July, McElroy asked that the restrictive provision of the Senate bill be dropped and that the extra money for the Marine Corps be eliminated.¹³³

The final bill voted by Congress on 4 August, and signed by the president two weeks later, provided \$39.2 billion—\$58 million less than the original budget request. The breakdown was as follows:

<u>By service</u>	
Army	\$ 9,375,805,000
Navy	11,006,503,000
Air Force	17,472,706,000
OSD and Interservice	1,373,225,000
Total	<u>\$39,228,239,000</u>
<u>By function</u>	
Military personnel	\$11,638,324,000
Operation and maintenance	10,437,367,000
Procurement	13,336,013,000
Research, development, test and evaluation	3,816,535,000
Total	<u>\$39,228,239,000</u>

An additional \$430 million for personnel was authorized to be transferred from revolving stock and industrial funds. Despite McElroy's plea, the bill set a minimum strength of 400,000 for the Army National Guard. No minimum was specified for the Army Reserve; it had been dropped on the basis of assurances given to the House-Senate conference committee by the "executive branch" that the strength of 300,000 would be retained. The largest single increase over the administration's request was in the Army's procurement appropriation, which received \$1.4 billion instead of \$1 billion. The Navy's shipbuilding appropriation had been cut from \$1.5 billion to \$1.3 billion; the conference committee had agreed

that \$35 million of this would be for long lead-time items for an attack carrier, but there was no such requirement in the law. The Air Force received \$2.5 billion for missile procurement (compared with \$2.6 billion requested), again with no instruction on how it was to be spent; in addition, the secretary of defense was authorized to transfer \$150 million to missile programs. The optional airborne alert, allowing the president if necessary to incur unprogrammed expenses, had been retained.¹³⁴

The administration's \$1.563 billion construction request went to Congress on 26 March 1959. As usual, most of the money (\$915 million) would go to the Air Force for construction of operating sites for Atlas, Titan, and Bomarc, test and launching facilities for Minuteman, and air defense installations. For the Army and Navy the sums were \$372 million and \$253 million respectively. Of the total, 62 percent was for facilities to support new weapons. Congress, however, cut the total to \$1.364 billion, with all the services sharply reduced, as shown below:¹³⁵

Army	\$ 306,851,300
Navy	213,092,400
Air Force	797,272,500
OSD and Interservice	46,745,000
Total	<u>\$1,363,961,200</u>

During Senate consideration of the construction legislation, an irrelevant provision crept in over the protests of the administration. Military construction projects were subject to prior "authorization" by Congress, before money was actually appropriated. Authorizing legislation was handled by the two Armed Service Committees. Over the past few years, the Senate committee in particular had cast a critical eye on proposals to acquire land and construct facilities for air defense weapons. The committee singled out apparent instances of duplication between the Army and Air Force, involving Nike-Ajax and Talos in 1956 and Nike-Hercules and Bomarc in 1958. In reporting out the authorization bill for 1960, the committee inserted a provision, known as the "Russell amendment" after the committee chairman, that after 1959 no money could be appropriated for any aircraft or missile until such appropriation had first been authorized. OSD officials judged the Russell amendment unnecessary and time-wasting, but Congress included it in the final bill, broadening it to include naval vessels. The effective date was postponed to 31 December 1960, but in the meantime, the secretary of defense was required to furnish Congress, by 31 January 1960, "complete and detailed information" on the kinds and numbers of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels being procured or proposed for procurement. The effect, as Gates pointed out to the AFPC, would be to change the way the department did business with the four congressional committees concerned, Armed Services and Appropriations.¹³⁶ Indeed, this happened over the years as Congress greatly broadened the scope of its authorization authority.

The total provided by Congress for all military purposes, including construction, amounted to \$40.592 billion—only slightly below the \$40.850 requested. The administration had been forced to accept some changes in program, and its hands were still tied where the National Guard was concerned. Unlike the preceding year, however, Congress had not forced large unwanted amounts of procurement money on an unwilling secretary of defense and president. This result could be partly attributed to the defusing of the Berlin crisis. The six-month Soviet Berlin “ultimatum” had come and gone, and the two sides continued to talk with each other instead of shooting. For the administration, therefore, firmness had paid off in dealing with Congress as with the Soviets. There was to be no “feverish building of vast armaments” against which the president had warned on 9 January. But in the minds of the public and of Congress—among those not privy to the administration’s accurate information—there still remained grave questions about relative U.S. and Soviet progress in deploying a militarily significant force of intercontinental missiles. The “missile gap” was to bedevil President Eisenhower until the end of his term.

CHAPTER XI

Policy, Strategy, and the Budget, FY 1961

A Changing Cast of Characters

The budget for FY 1961 was the last to be drafted under the supervision of Secretary McElroy. His departure shortly before the end of 1959 forced the administration to bring in its third secretary of defense in little more than two years.

McElroy's announced intention to resign was at first thrown into some doubt by the sudden death of Deputy Secretary Quarles on 8 May 1959. Quarles had in fact been rumored as McElroy's possible successor. McElroy himself had seemed to confirm this rumor several weeks earlier when, in answer to a question, he declared that it was a "good practice" to develop executive material from within an organization. On learning of Quarles's death, he told newsmen that Quarles had been "extraordinarily well-qualified to assume the reins" as secretary. He also announced that he was reconsidering his plan to leave.¹

Quarles had moved up to the deputy secretaryship from his position as secretary of the Air Force. If the ranks of the service secretaries were to be tapped for a replacement, there was an obvious choice. It was unlikely that a second Air Force appointee would be chosen at once, and Secretary of the Army Brucker would hardly be considered in view of his intense identification with the interests of his service. There remained Thomas S. Gates, Jr., the secretary of the Navy; with six years' successive service as under secretary and secretary, he would in any case have been a leading candidate. From within the department, Gates's only rival was Assistant Secretary McNeil, who was probably judged too valuable in his position as comptroller. One outside candidate was briefly considered: Dillon Anderson, former special assistant to the president for national security affairs, now working in private business. However, as McElroy told the president, Anderson's lack of executive and managerial experience cast doubt on his ability to step up to the secretaryship.²

One obstacle to Gates's appointment existed. He had already announced his resignation, to become effective in June, and Under Secretary William B. Franke had been designated as his successor.³ Nonetheless, on the day

following Quarles's death, the president, undoubtedly with McElroy's assent, offered Gates the position. He demurred at first, having completed all his preparations for departure, but after considering it over a weekend he agreed to accept the appointment.⁴ Before it was announced, the rumormongers were busy as usual and ranged far afield. Those mentioned included William C. Foster, deputy secretary of defense under Truman; Henry Cabot Lodge, ambassador to the United Nations; and William F. Knowland, a prominent former senator from California.⁵

Gates's appointment was announced on 18 May.⁶ On the following day, McElroy conferred upon him plenary authority to exercise the powers of the secretary.⁷ He took the oath of office on 8 June, along with Franke, who was sworn in as secretary of the Navy. Franke had served as a special assistant to Secretary Lovett in the Truman administration, then became assistant secretary of the Navy in 1954, succeeding Gates as under secretary in 1957.⁸

In a meeting with the OSD staff on 25 May 1959, Gates laid out the course of action that he proposed to follow, foreshadowing the approach he was later to take as secretary. Not having Quarles's technical competence, he said, he would delegate to his subordinates many of the details that Quarles had handled himself. He intended to concentrate on JCS "splits" and other key issues, including the forthcoming revision of national policy.⁹

Already the question of replacing or reappointing most of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had come up. The terms of office of all of the four full members—General Taylor, Admiral Burke, General White, and General Twining—were due to expire in mid-1959. The first two were completing four years in office; it would be normal for them to move out, but Burke was so highly thought of that he was soon to be offered an unprecedented third term as CNO. Twining had served as chairman only two years and, under what had become accepted custom, could expect reappointment, as could General White, chief of staff of the Air Force. The term of office of General Pate of the Marine Corps would not expire until 31 December 1959.*

Taylor had become controversial because of his outspoken advocacy within the administration of a change of strategic policy. For that reason, it was unlikely that he, like Burke, would be offered a third term; no previous Army chief of staff had served six years in peacetime. His abilities, however, were recognized. Twining suggested to the president on 9 February that Taylor be appointed to the Army command in Europe in order that he might succeed General Lauris Norstad, USAF, as supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR). Norstad himself favored Taylor as his replacement, according to Twining. The president disagreed and suggested some other possibilities for the European command, including Vice Chief of Staff General Lyman L. Lemnitzer. When Twining

* Taylor's term of office ran from 30 June, White's from 1 July, those of Twining and Burke from 15 and 17 August respectively.

observed that the Army had slated Lemnitzer to become chief of staff, Eisenhower replied that Lemnitzer should be groomed to replace Twining as JCS chairman.¹⁰

In the end, the president, perhaps at McElroy's urging, was won over to the European appointment for Taylor, with the understanding that he would succeed as SACEUR. Taylor, however, preferred to retire. Reporting this fact to the president on 6 March, McElroy recommended Lemnitzer as the next Army chief of staff. He added that Twining, who was not in the best of health, had agreed to stay on as JCS chairman for another year.¹¹ Taylor's departure was unregretted by the president. "Good" was his only comment when McElroy remarked on 9 March that Taylor was being allowed to "move on."¹²

Writing to the president on 11 March, McElroy formally proposed to name Lemnitzer as chief of staff after Taylor and to retain Twining, Burke, and White. A replacement for General Pate would be considered later. Eisenhower approved and the appointments were announced on 18 March.¹³

Soon afterward, Twining became ill and had to undergo major surgery.¹⁴ Normal JCS practice called for one of the other members to serve temporarily as chairman, but since Twining's absence promised to be lengthy, it seemed advisable to fill the vacancy with an interim replacement. One was already at hand in the person of Twining's predecessor, Admiral Radford, who had maintained a residence in Washington and continued to serve as an informal adviser to McElroy. In a letter to Radford on 13 March, McElroy observed that he had found Radford's advice "extremely helpful" and hoped that their arrangement (which had been approved by the president and by Twining) might continue.¹⁵

When Twining underwent the surgeon's knife on 12 May, President Eisenhower suggested that Radford be recalled to duty to serve as acting JCS chairman. However, such action might require formal Senate confirmation, and McElroy preferred to have Radford serve in the capacity of a "special adviser." The president agreed and Radford took Twining's place informally, attending at least one NSC meeting (that of 9 July 1959). Twining returned to duty on 27 July.¹⁶

Several months later, a tower of strength in OSD was lost with the departure of Assistant Secretary McNeil, who announced his resignation, effective 1 November, to accept a responsible position in private business.¹⁷ Assistant Secretary (MP&R) Charles C. Finucane was offered the position as comptroller but turned it down as too demanding. At the suggestion of McNeil, the appointment went to Franklin B. Lincoln, a practicing lawyer in New York who had been a former associate of McNeil in the Navy Department. Lincoln took office on 2 December 1959.¹⁸

Much earlier in the year, the president's Cabinet had lost its most prominent member, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, a man of formidable international stature. On 9 February Dulles took leave of absence for what was expected to be relatively minor surgery. Under Secretary Christian

A. Herter, Jr., a former governor of Massachusetts and congressman from that state, became acting secretary. Unfortunately, Dulles's ailment turned out to be malignant, and on 15 April, while still in Walter Reed Hospital, he submitted his resignation. Herter was at once named his successor and was sworn in on 22 April. Dulles continued to serve the president as a special consultant until his death on 24 May 1959.¹⁹

As secretary of state, Herter was able to provide continuity, but he lacked Dulles's worldwide prestige and had not as great a grasp of military matters.²⁰ McElroy and others in OSD regretted Dulles's absence; they respected him for his knowledge of defense matters and his recognition of the military dimension of national security. Dulles had maintained close contact with the JCS chairmen, Radford and Twining, and had met frequently with the JCS as a body. In recent months, his recognition of the limitations of "massive retaliation" had encouraged those in DoD (notably Taylor and Burke) who advocated a policy emphasizing preparation for limited war.²¹

A few days after Dulles's death, the president's science adviser, James Killian, announced his resignation, effective in July. His replacement was announced the same day: George B. Kistiakowsky, professor of chemistry at Harvard University and a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC).²² The change was seen as an improvement by McElroy. At a lunch with Gates and Kistiakowsky on 18 August, McElroy "welcomed unconditionally our meddling in military affairs," as Kistiakowsky later wrote, so long as OSD was kept fully informed—a practice, the secretary added, that had not always been followed by Killian.²³

During all these changes, McElroy stayed on. He finally left office on 1 December 1959, after the budget was practically completed. His resignation and replacement are described in greater detail below.

Strategy at Issue: State vs. Defense

None of these significant changes in incumbency affected the outcome of the annual process of policy reexamination in 1959. The principal issue, as in previous years, related to the importance of limited war as against general war in national planning. Military service positions remained the same as in earlier years, and again the president determined the outcome in accord with views he had often expressed.

A novel feature of policy reexamination in 1959, not used since 1953, was the employment of outside consultants to advise the NSC Planning Board. A group of 20 was selected by Gordon Gray, with the approval of the president and after consultation with McElroy and other officials. Membership included William H. Draper, Jr., and the other members of his committee that had recently examined the military assistance program, plus other individuals of comparable stature and acquaintance with public affairs. The board held four meetings with this body to obtain their views before drafting a revision of NSC 5810/1.²⁴

The services took early action to make known their desires for changes in NSC 5810/1. The president, in approving that document, had directed that paragraphs 13 and 14, dealing respectively with the kinds of forces that the United States should maintain and with those needed for local aggression, be kept under continuing study, thus implying that they were subject to reconsideration. The Army and Navy again sought changes that would recognize the increasing likelihood of limited war, citing the 1958 crises in Lebanon and Taiwan as situations in which the United States had limited both its objectives and its commitment of force. They noted that the definition of limited aggression as occurring only in "less developed areas" would commit the United States to initiate all-out war if any military action proved necessary in the developing Berlin crisis. The Army and Navy also proposed to amend paragraph 10 of NSC 5810/1, which set forth policy regarding nuclear weapons, by deleting the statement that such weapons would be considered conventional "from a military point of view" and stating that the United States would be prepared to fight limited war with or without them. The proposals and supporting rationales submitted by these two services were so similar that they had obviously been concerted by their respective staff officers.²⁵

The Air Force took its stand on NSC 5810/1 as written. On 13 January 1959 Secretary Douglas urged McElroy to oppose any revision of that document. When it became clear that the president desired a review, the Air Force went on record as supporting without change the entire military strategy section of NSC 5810/1.²⁶

Secretary Dulles had also been heard from. "I believe the time has come," he wrote to McElroy on 24 January 1959, "for our two Departments to undertake the joint study of our strategic concept which you and I have discussed on several occasions in the past." As a basis for discussion, he forwarded a paper drafted by State's policy planning staff setting forth a concept of military strategy for the 1960s. The paper recognized the need not only for a relatively invulnerable strategic force, but also for a force able to deal quickly with limited aggression anywhere, possessing nuclear capabilities but able to fight effectively without using them.²⁷

Dulles's letter coincided with proposals then underway for a broad series of studies bearing on U.S. strategy, as described below. McElroy at first tended to oppose the suggested interdepartmental consultations in the expectation that these studies would serve the same purpose. Following a plea from Acting Secretary Herter, however, he agreed to bilateral discussions.²⁸ Accordingly, Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin and Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning Gerard C. Smith were directed to meet and discuss the matters raised in Dulles's letter, focusing particularly on paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810.²⁹

During their discussions, Smith gave Irwin a draft State Department paper on "Foreign Policy Requirements Bearing upon US Strategy." Like Dulles's earlier "concept" paper, this recommended a secure retaliatory force as well as one suitable for limited war. The latter, it was stated, was of

increasing importance, since the growth of Soviet nuclear capability cast increasing doubts that the United States would use its own strategic force in any situation short of immediate danger to its own vital security interests.³⁰

The State Department also furnished the Planning Board with a draft revision of paragraphs 10 and 14 of NSC 5810/1 identical in substance, and nearly so in wording, with Army and Navy proposals for alteration of these paragraphs.³¹ State's views alarmed Twining, who warned McElroy that "State Department pressures, augmented by some unilateral Service pressures," were working toward a dangerous revision of policy. If accepted, these views would mean either a higher budget and force levels or a lower strategic nuclear capability.³²

Irwin and Smith failed to agree on revision of paragraphs 13 and 14. Gray so informed the president on 18 May, adding that McElroy was "resisting any full review of these paragraphs in any event." Therefore, he had agreed with McElroy that the two secretaries should discuss them with the president.³³

The Foreign Ministers Conference on the German question, which opened in Geneva on 11 May 1959, afforded an opportunity for discussion of policy issues by McElroy and Herter. Both attended the conference along with Irwin and Smith. In a meeting in Geneva on 23 May, McElroy defended the adequacy of existing limited war capabilities, pointing out that the 1958 study of that subject had concluded that the United States could handle two limited war situations at a time. Smith rejoined that the study had assumed use of nuclear weapons by the United States but not by its opponents. Challenging the statement in paragraph 10 of NSC 5810/1 that nuclear weapons should be considered conventional, Smith observed that in the Lebanon and Taiwan Strait crises, the decision had been made not to use them. In the end, McElroy seemed to be swayed by State's arguments. When Herter expressed the hope of developing forces that would make an automatic nuclear reaction unnecessary, McElroy agreed and suggested a change in paragraph 14 to "clarify" this point. Later, he admitted that the strategic concept might have to be amended if State had a "fundamental" line of thought on the subject.³⁴

In Washington, the Planning Board circulated a draft revision of NSC 5810/1 on 25 May, then a longer semifinal version on 3 June. Both included, as alternatives, State's proposed revisions of paragraphs 10 and 14, suggesting that the United States be prepared to fight a limited war without nuclear weapons and to limit its application of force in case of limited aggression in order to minimize the danger of expanding hostilities. The State proposals had the concurrence of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.³⁵

On 5 June, still in Geneva, McElroy and Irwin again discussed the issues with Herter and Smith. Herter offered a redraft of paragraph 10, which he felt was the proper place to make changes, rather than paragraph 14. McElroy expressed some sympathy with the redraft but feared that it might lead to larger budgets if limited wars were to be fought without nuclear

weapons. The conferees reached no agreement, and the matter remained for the NSC to determine.³⁶

The "Four Studies"

While the NSC policy machinery was being set in motion, a parallel process was launched that was intended to produce broad studies of military capabilities in several vital areas. These studies would fall midway in scope between national policy formulation and the specific planning of military force levels for budgetary purposes.

The impetus for these studies derived from a proposal for a determination of strategic targeting policy, a matter becoming urgent with the rise of intercontinental missiles. The proposal grew out of an annual report rendered to the NSC by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC), set up in 1954 to report on the "net" capability of the Soviet Union to inflict damage on the United States. Originally this body had only two members, the JCS chairman (who served as chairman) and the director of central intelligence. Later it was enlarged to include the director of OCDM, the chairman of the AEC, and two other officials. The NESC also acquired a staff of its own, headed in 1959 by Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Hickey, USA (Ret.).³⁷

The NESC submitted its annual evaluation to the NSC on 20 November 1958. At the close of the presentation, the president asked for an appraisal of the deterrent effects of alternative retaliatory efforts directed toward purely military targets or a combination of military and industrial targets. He directed McElroy, Twining, and Gray to determine the best means of accomplishing the appraisal.³⁸

Gray discussed the matter in a meeting at the Pentagon with McElroy, Twining, and Quarles on 6 February 1959. Earlier, the JCS had been given the assignment to draft terms of reference but, hopelessly split on targeting policy, they were unable to do so, and Twining had undertaken to prepare the terms of reference himself. Gray set this matter aside for the moment. He suggested that the appraisal requested by the president become part of a larger group of studies aimed at getting better control of the budget. It might be helpful to McElroy, Gray thought, to have a few key problems debated in special meetings of the NSC, since it appeared impossible for the JCS to agree. McElroy objected to discussions in what had come to be considered "normal" NSC meetings, attended by officials over and above the statutory members. It was tentatively agreed that a suitable forum might consist of the president, vice president, secretaries of state, defense, and treasury, and the science adviser, with General Goodpaster and Major Eisenhower as observers. McElroy explicitly wanted to exclude the director of the Bureau of the Budget and other ad hoc NSC participants.

As for the substance of the discussions, Gray suggested the following topics: strategic nuclear requirements and capabilities, including the targeting study directed by the president; continental defense; antisubmarine warfare;

and the role of ground forces, including strategic concepts of limited and local war. McElroy indicated some reluctance about this fourth area, since the matter of limited war had already been settled, but added that he would not object if there were some way to make certain that any decisions would stick.

McElroy preferred to assign the studies to the JCS. If they disagreed, so much the better; the president could "make decisions with a clear understanding of the issues." Gray agreed. It was decided that Gray would draft a written directive to carry out the studies, after which deadline dates and other details could be discussed. For the president's targeting study, Twining and McElroy were to agree on terms of reference which would be submitted to Gray to determine whether they should go to the president. The staff of the NESC would make the study.³⁹

The president approved Gray's draft directive and agreed that the studies should be assigned to the JCS. As a forum for discussion, the president approved attendance of the following officials, besides himself: the vice president, the secretaries of defense and state, the JCS chairman, the science adviser, Gray, Goodpastor, Major Eisenhower, and the executive secretary of the NSC (James S. Lay). He saw no reason for attendance of the director of central intelligence, but, at Gray's suggestion, agreed that that official should be invited for discussion of strategic targeting.⁴⁰

Gray accordingly forwarded the directive to McElroy on 18 February 1959. The contents of the four studies were defined as follows:

- (1) Strategic nuclear striking force requirements and capabilities, including the "optimum mix" both of weapons systems and of targets.
- (2) Continental defense against aircraft and missiles (excluding antisubmarine warfare).
- (3) Control of the seas, with particular reference to antisubmarine warfare.
- (4) Tactical forces and requirements for tactical weapons systems.⁴¹

On 19 February Twining forwarded to Gray the terms of reference for the targeting study, which he and McElroy had agreed on. The NESC staff would prepare the study and the JCS would review it before submission to the president. The following day, presumably with Gray's approval, Twining forwarded the terms of reference to General Hickey of the NESC staff, fixing a deadline of 31 October 1959 for completing the study.⁴²

Twining also drew up a schedule for presentation of the results of the "four studies" (as they came to be called). The JCS already had in progress a study of continental defense, the results to be available by approximately 15 August. The strategic forces study was to be completed by 1 December, assuming the NESC completed its targeting work on schedule. For the last two studies, Twining proposed deadlines of 15 to 20 March 1959 and 15 April 1959, respectively. The president accepted this schedule reluctantly, hoping for earlier completion dates.⁴³

In the end, none of the studies met the schedule. The continental defense study, intended for earliest completion, was delayed by a sharp and lengthy disagreement between McElroy and Gray. McElroy took the position that the JCS Master Air Defense Plan, presented to the president on 9 June and to Congress shortly thereafter, should serve the purpose. When Gray disagreed, McElroy suggested that the addition of studies in progress on Nike-Zeus and on the Air Force program for an advanced fighter aircraft (the F-108), being made in connection with the 1961 budget, would provide any additional information needed. Gray replied that the president wanted continental defense studied as a whole, not piecemeal. Eventually, in September, Gray took the matter to the president, recommending, in view of McElroy's "extreme reluctance," that the continental defense study be suspended until after that on the nuclear striking force, which McElroy expected would deal with the question of the force's survival. The president agreed, but it appears that the continental defense study was never undertaken.⁴⁴

Of the remaining three, the strategic force study was presented to the president on 15 January 1960; it contributed to Gates's decision on strategic targeting, which is described elsewhere. The findings on control of the seas, submitted on 1 April 1960, do not appear to have influenced policy. The study of tactical forces evolved into one on limited war, which was regarded as an update of the 1958 study and submitted to the NSC on 6 October 1960. Thus none of the studies contributed to the discussion of national policy in 1959 or to the formulation of the 1961 budget.

NSC 5906/1

The Planning Board completed the final redraft of NSC 5810/1, designated NSC 5906, on 8 June 1959 without attempting to resolve the issues in dispute between State and Defense. It had merely set forth the alternative versions of the paragraphs in question.⁴⁵

The JCS expressed split views, as usual. Taylor, Pate, and Burke supported the changes proposed by State. They also proposed to insert in paragraph 15 of NSC 5906 (paragraph 13 of NSC 5810/1, renumbered) language intended to provide criteria against which the adequacy of deterrent and continental defense forces could be appraised. White saw no change in the international situation justifying any alteration in the military paragraphs of NSC 5810/1. Primary dependence on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, and their "selective use" in conflict, was the only course of action compatible with economic well-being and the preservation of fundamental American values. Moreover, in his view, the capability of forces available for limited war had been demonstrated.⁴⁶

Twining was hospitalized and did not take part in this action, but his views, set forth in a memorandum drafted by his office, indicated support of the military section of NSC 5810/1 as written and questioned the proposed

role of civilian officials (Irwin and Smith) in attempting to revise it. Twining's special assistant, Brig. Gen. James F. Whisenand, USAF, forwarded this memorandum to McElroy on 23 June with assurances that Twining had seen it shortly before he went to the hospital and that it accurately reflected his views.⁴⁷

Secretary Brucker threw in his weight on the side of General Taylor, supporting the changes sought by State. An "evident, adequate, and flexible capability" for operations short of general war, together with an acceptable doctrine for its use, was increasingly important. It would require changes in the allocation of resources, which in turn would require a new statement of policy.⁴⁸

The AFPC thrashed out the various positions at some length on 23 June. McElroy opposed any change in wording, because it would be construed as a change in policy. He remained firm in his conviction that the policy as presently written left room for necessary adjustments in force planning.⁴⁹

The NSC began discussion of NSC 5906 on 25 June, but did not consider the military section.⁵⁰ A week later Eisenhower discussed the matters at issue with McElroy, Herter, Gates, Gray, Gerard Smith, and Radford. Herter explained his desire for changes in the language in NSC 5810/1, implying that any hostilities involving U.S. and Soviet forces would necessarily constitute general war. He did not object to theater commanders having custody of nuclear weapons, but did not wish their use to be automatic. McElroy pointed out that the United States would be unable to "sit in on sizable limited warfare" if the forces were developed without the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used. Radford warned that the decision on use of nuclear weapons could not be left to the State Department. McElroy feared that any change in the wording of NSC 5810/1 would open the way to widespread changes in military programs. The president stressed that nuclear weapons must be available wherever sizable U.S. forces were stationed, with the question of their use to be decided later. He did not, however, pronounce any final decisions.⁵¹

For the NSC meeting on 9 July, at which the military portion of NSC 5906 was to be discussed, Eisenhower, at McElroy's request, authorized Radford to attend.⁵² Twining's views had been made clear on numerous occasions, but taking no chances, his office prepared a new statement, cleared it with him by telephone, and sent it to Gray.⁵³

Discussion in the council on 9 July focused primarily on paragraph 12 of NSC 5906 (paragraph 10 of NSC 5810/1), which had contained the statement that nuclear weapons would be considered conventional from a military viewpoint. Gray submitted a redraft of the first part of the paragraph intended to meet State's objections without actually changing policy. It read as follows:

It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to

use them when required to meet the nation's war objectives. Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. All deployed organized units will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.

Herter tentatively accepted this redraft, subject to consideration of it in relation to other paragraphs. In the ensuing discussion, McElroy observed that the question of the relation between conventional and nuclear weapons was "a budgetary problem rather than a policy problem." The president was "not quite ready to put all our eggs in the nuclear basket"; he thought the present policy and programs were "pretty good," a statement endorsed by Admiral Radford, who agreed with Twining in opposing any change in policy. After further debate, McElroy asked for more time to study Gray's redraft. The council agreed and deferred action on paragraph 12.⁵⁴

After studying Gray's version, McElroy judged it acceptable subject to a statement (to be made a part of the NSC record of action) that it was to be interpreted as a clarification rather than a change in policy. He also stipulated a rather complicated "understanding" of its applicability as follows: The first sentence applied to both general and limited war. The second covered limited war in areas where the "main Communist power" would not be used: Africa, Central and South America, and the Caribbean. The use of nuclear weapons would be "neither militarily necessary nor politically appropriate" in those areas. Elsewhere (e.g., the Middle East and South or Southeast Asia), whether to use nuclear weapons in a limited war would depend on circumstances, "including the involvement of main Communist power." Where such power was "clearly involved," as in hostilities in mainland China or Korea, it was anticipated that nuclear weapons would be used. The possibility of limited war in Europe involving large U.S. and Soviet forces was excluded; situations such as hostile local actions, incursions, or infiltrations were provided for by NATO's political directive and strategic concept. The third sentence was interpreted to mean that in all contingencies, deployed U.S. combat units would possess a nuclear capability, and designated major commanders would be prepared to use it. The Planning Board approved McElroy's proposed statement on 17 July but took no action on the "understanding."⁵⁵

The Army and Navy registered their support of Gray's redraft and urged changes in paragraphs 15 and 16 of NSC 5906 (paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1) to reflect their long-standing views. The Army also took issue with McElroy's statement that the new paragraph 12 was not to be interpreted as a change in policy, since that was precisely what the Army had been seeking.⁵⁶

After further discussion, the Planning Board adopted Gray's redraft of

paragraph 12, proposing to state in a footnote (instead of in the record of action) that it was not to be considered a change in policy. The board approved without change paragraph 13 of NSC 5810/1 (now paragraph 15 of NSC 5906). Paragraph 16 (old paragraph 14) was extensively amended, with an introductory sentence that planning for forces to oppose local aggression would be based on a "flexible and selective capability," including nuclear capability for use when authorized by the president; this came from State's alternative version of the paragraph and represented the only concession to that department's views. Local aggression it now defined as "conflicts occurring outside the NATO area." Drawing on McElroy's stipulations regarding paragraph 12, the board included a statement that conflicts in the NATO area involving sizable U.S.-Soviet forces would not be construed as local aggression and that lesser actions there were covered under NATO directives.⁵⁷

Brucker recommended that McElroy accept paragraph 12, which he believed was "clear and explicit" as written, without the explanatory note. Moreover, the interpretation would "introduce rigidity in our planning," since it would prejudge the situations in which the United States might employ nuclear weapons. General Lemnitzer, who had succeeded Taylor as Army chief of staff, took the same position, but the JCS took no stand on the matter and sent no written views to the secretary. The "understanding" of Assistant Secretary Irwin's office was that the JCS accepted the draft of paragraph 12 and that all except Lemnitzer accepted the interpretive note.⁵⁸

Meeting on 30 July, the president and the council adopted the draft of paragraph 12 with the interpretive footnote and approved the Planning Board's version of paragraph 16. They also deleted from paragraph 10, which set forth deterrence of general war as the central aim of U.S. policy, a definition of general war as one "in which the survival of the United States is at stake." The rest of the paper was then approved, and the final version was circulated on 5 August as NSC 5906/1.⁵⁹

Thus ended the most prolonged policy discussion since 1953—and, as in earlier years, with defeat for those seeking a redirection of military strategy. As matters turned out, NSC 5906/1 was the last basic policy directive produced by the Eisenhower administration. The advocates of "flexible response," therefore, would have to await the coming of a new administration to have any hope of success.

Mobilization Policy Revised

Mobilization planning also underwent reexamination in 1959. As originally adopted, NSC 5906/1 made no change in the mobilization policy approved in 1957. At that time Secretary Wilson had ruled that in mobilization planning M-day would precede D-day by six months. Thus it was assumed that the United States would enjoy the luxury of six months of full mobilization before war broke out. Assistant Secretary McGuire told the NSC on

18 December 1958, in a report on the status of the mobilization base, that this assumption was being restudied. Also under investigation was the possibility of incorporating expected bomb damage into mobilization planning.⁶⁰

In a draft memorandum for Twining on 19 February 1959, intended to guide the services' logistic planning, Quarles laid down the assumption that total forces would not exceed those scheduled for mobilization by M+2 months in JSOP-61. The JCS protested that this ruling was at variance with NSC 5810/1 and also with JSOP-61, which used the M+6 factor. They proposed that the services compute their requirements on the basis of JSOP-61 supplemented by logistic guidance issued a year earlier for the FY 1959-60 cycle. Quarles agreed.⁶¹

Since mobilization policy was already under study, the Planning Board, in drafting NSC 5906, simply incorporated intact the relevant portion of NSC 5810/1. On 20 June the JCS asked the secretary of defense to note their understanding that this portion would be the subject of separate NSC action in which JCS views, then in preparation, would be considered.⁶²

The OSD reexamination of mobilization policy, presumably carried out by McGuire's office after consultation with the JCS, went well beyond what the president had ordered the previous 18 December. Deputy Secretary Gates forwarded to the JCS on 29 July a proposed radically new policy that omitted all reference to "mobilization." Instead, there was now to be a "military logistics base," designed to provide for the requirements of cold war, limited war, or general war, with consideration allowed for attrition resulting from nuclear attack. It made no mention of a specific M-day or D-day. Clearly, here was a policy for the nuclear age, in which cataclysmic war might erupt with little or no warning.⁶³

The JCS approved the proposed new policy subject to minor revisions intended to simplify and clarify the text of the proposal. The NSC and the president approved it in October 1959 for incorporation in NSC 5906/1.⁶⁴

The new policy embraced planning for cold war and for combating local aggression, specifying that these would allow for personnel and materiel to ensure the maintenance of an acceptable general war posture. This statement was presumably what Gray had in mind when he told the president that Defense and the JCS had accepted the necessity for separate analyses of the needs of general and local war. Previously the JCS had taken the position that preparation for general war would also serve to meet the needs of limited war.⁶⁵

The prolonged discussion of mobilization policy delayed revision of the JSOP. The JCS had completed JSOP-62 in 1958; Quarles approved it on 31 March 1959, except for the force tables, personnel strengths, and mobilization concept.⁶⁶ On 8 April Quarles requested the JCS not to submit JSOP-63 until mobilization policy had been settled. The JCS began work on it in August, and on 30 October Gates directed them to submit it as soon as possible. Disagreements, however, delayed completion until January 1960.⁶⁷

Formulating the Budget

The outcome of the lengthy policy debate had given no comfort to those who hoped for a redirection of U.S. military policy. The prospect remained that the budget for FY 1961 would continue to emphasize strategic weaponry.

Preparation of the budget began on 11 March 1959, when McElroy, Quarles, and McNeil met with Stans and Schaub of BoB. Stans warned that 1961 expenditures could be held to the 1960 level only by program adjustments so severe as to raise issues of national policy. McElroy wished to advance the budget schedule, probably because of his plans to leave the government soon. Stans agreed that it would be possible to move it up by a month or so, with the final budget being presented to the NSC by early November. They agreed that, as a first step, the 1960 budget would be projected through 1963 to highlight the costliest programs.

McElroy felt strongly about his responsibility for developing the military program. He welcomed close relations with BoB in preparing the budget, but believed that any issues arising in the process should be decided within DoD. His responsibilities for national security, in his view, put his department in a different position from the other departments, for whom BoB normally made decisions on programs and dollars. Stans was reasonable; he raised no immediate objection but reserved his position. His principal responsibility, which McElroy did not question, was to refer differences of opinion to the president.

An innovation to be introduced in the 1961 budget provided that appropriations for military assistance would be made to the Department of Defense. The president wished this change, according to Stans, and McElroy enthusiastically concurred.⁶⁸

Another new feature of the impending budget was that it would be the first to be prepared after the 1958 DoD reorganization. The revised "roles and missions" directive issued in December 1958, as a part of the reorganization, gave an enhanced role to unified and specified commanders and the commanders of service components assigned thereto. In accord with the directive, the service chiefs instructed component commanders to advise their departments of their major force requirements, keeping the unified commanders informed. The latter would review these requirements for compliance with their own plans and programs.⁶⁹

The projection of programs through 1963, carried out by McNeil's staff and BoB (an exercise dubbed "Spring Fever"), bore out Stans's worst predictions. They forecast for 1961 expenditures of about \$44.5 billion and new obligational authority (NOA) of \$47.8 billion, rising to \$49 billion and \$50 billion, respectively, by 1963. Initial review brought the 1961 figures down to a little under \$43.2 billion in expenditures and \$44.4 billion in NOA.⁷⁰

That these amounts would be wholly unacceptable was evident from the president's remarks at a Cabinet meeting on 5 June 1959. In picturesque language, he held forth on the importance of defense economy, harking

back to the austerity of pre-World War II days. The military establishment, he said, had never recovered from the "intoxication" of that conflict, plus a "couple of extra drinks for Korea." It had for a long time, he continued (switching metaphors), been "putting on a Cadillac operation instead of a model T." The president thus held up the parsimoniousness of the 1920s and 1930s as an example to be emulated, although two years before, when Congress seemed in danger of sharply reducing the budget, he had cited it as a grave danger to be avoided.⁷¹

If anything could have intensified the president's insistence on economy, it was the announcement at the end of FY 1959 that the federal government had incurred a deficit of some \$12.5 billion, the largest in peacetime history—almost 3 times as great as the previous record of \$4.4 billion in FY 1936.⁷²

During the conference of DoD officials at Quantico in June 1959, McElroy and the service secretaries worked out a complicated formula for computing budget targets, based on the total NOA money in the 1960 budget plus a portion of that for procurement, research and development, and construction. The services were to submit their budget requests, based on these guidelines, by 1 September, with supporting data by 15 September. The targets thus set follow (in billions):⁷³

	Basic Budget		Addendum	
	NOA	Exp	NOA	Exp
Army	\$ 9.5	\$ 9.3	\$10.3	\$ 9.5
Navy	11.2	11.5	12.3	11.8
Air Force	18.0	18.3	19.6	18.9
OSD	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6
Total	\$40.1	\$40.6	\$43.8	\$41.8

On 30 June McElroy described to the president his approach to the budget. In order to hold spending to current levels, he said, he was focusing attention on the budget categories most readily subject to reduction, as contrasted with the less flexible categories of personnel and operations. He proposed to hold personnel strengths at about their current level, leaving the services free, if they desired, to reduce manpower in order to increase funds for procurement. The president characterized McElroy's approach as "excellent," and went on to deliver one of the little homilies of which he was fond, this one on the role of the secretary of defense. McElroy, he said, "is not merely the boss of the Armed Services. He is the representative of the President in doing the things the President needs or wants done in tailoring our Defense establishment to our overall national situation and specifically to world conditions."⁷⁴

McElroy's decision on manpower was made official in a memorandum to the services on 29 July by Assistant Secretary Finucane. He directed them to observe the limits prescribed for FY 1960: Army, 870,000; Navy, 630,000; Marine Corps, 175,000; Air Force, 845,000; total, 2,520,000.⁷⁵

Meanwhile the JCS were initiating action that was to lead them to appreciably greater than usual participation in the budget. The initiative came from Taylor, still actively seeking to establish criteria to determine force sufficiency as a basis for the budget. In February 1959 he proposed that the JCS draw up criteria for forces classified by the following major categories: atomic retaliatory, forward deployed, strategic reserve, air defense, and those for maintaining essential sea communications. These should be submitted to the secretary of defense for approval, after which the Chiefs would draft recommendations on the size and type of forces within each category.⁷⁶

The JCS did not adopt Taylor's proposal but instead approved a suggestion by Twining intended to indicate to the secretary of defense the areas of agreement and disagreement on major forces. Twining pointed out that the JCS usually agreed on the major force composition of the services, with disagreements on major weapons systems amounting to perhaps 10-20 percent of the total budget. He proposed that the JCS take "extraordinary action" to send the secretary their recommendations as a basis for the budget. Under this procedure, each service would draw up force proposals for itself and for the other services projected through FY 1963, using essentially the currently approved strengths and NOA figures based on a five percent annual increase over the preceding year's budget. The JCS would reconcile the differences insofar as possible and forward their conclusions—disagreements as well as agreements—to the secretary. This exercise, in Twining's view, would satisfy the JCS responsibility for providing strategic guidance.⁷⁷

The services sent their submissions to the Joint Staff (Joint Programs Office), which completed its analysis on 26 May. The results must have disappointed Twining; the disagreements were wide-ranging and fundamental. The Army, stressing forward deployed forces, proposed a modest increase in the number of divisions (to 15) but a large step-up in procurement for modernization. The Navy, viewing worldwide U.S. commitments requiring readiness for action around the globe, sought additional ships as well as a larger Polaris program. Both would cut back strategic bombers as missiles became available. For the Air Force, deterrence of general war was the overriding priority, to be met by increased procurement of B-52 and B-58 aircraft as well as a large investment in a new supersonic heavy bomber (the B-70), accompanied by sharp reductions in surface forces.⁷⁸

There was, of course, a sharp divergence in the manner in which the services proposed to divide up the \$41.4 billion budget. The following table shows the respective services' recommendations for FY 1961, in billions:⁷⁹

	<u>Army View</u>	<u>Navy/USMC View</u>	<u>Air Force View</u>
For Army	\$13.9 (34%)	\$ 9.2 (22%)	\$ 8.3 (20%)
For Navy	11.1 (27%)	18.0 (44%)	9.7 (24%)
For Air Force	16.4 (39%)	14.1 (34%)	23.4 (56%)

Faced with this fundamental disagreement, the JCS could only forward to McElroy the service views, together with the analysis prepared by the Joint Staff. In their memorandum of transmittal on 8 June, they pointed out that the analysis had been undertaken while a number of fundamental issues remained under study, such as basic national security policy and air defense. "When these issues are resolved the areas of agreement undoubtedly will be increased," they declared.⁸⁰

The JCS exercise thus served no purpose except to highlight issues among the services. In any event, McElroy virtually ignored it. In a conference with the JCS on 1 July, he explained the budget guidelines adopted at Quantico. At the request of the JCS, he agreed to allow them two weeks to review the service budgets after a preliminary review in OSD. Also, McNeil's office would supply advance information on some of the major issues, thus effectively extending the period of time allowed for JCS review. It was evident that the JCS were thinking of the situation of the previous year, when they had been hurried into giving an appraisal of the budget at a few days' notice.

McElroy considered that this meeting with the JCS disposed of the JCS memorandum of 8 June. General Randall informed the Joint Staff director that no further action would be taken on it.⁸¹

The service budget requests (together with that of OSD) went forward early in September. All conformed to the secretary's guidelines; in fact, the Air Force basic NOA figure was some \$2 billion lower, in order to stay within the expenditure limitation. The rounded amounts were as follows (in billions):⁸²

	<u>New Obligational Authority</u>		<u>Expenditure</u>	
	<u>Basic</u>	<u>Addendum</u>	<u>Basic</u>	<u>Addendum</u>
Army	\$ 9.6	\$10.3	\$ 9.3	\$ 9.5
Navy	11.2	12.3	11.5	11.8
Air Force	15.5	16.6	18.3	18.9
OSD	1.4	1.6	1.4	1.6
Total	\$37.7	\$40.8	\$40.5	\$41.8

In the eyes of department officials, all the service budgets fell dangerously near a minimum, even allowing for the extra money provided by the addendum. Thus the Army would make no progress toward modernization; procurement would be insufficient to replace losses. Minimal requirements for surface-to-air missiles could not be met under the basic budget. The Nike-Zeus program would continue, but on a research and development basis only. Reserve and National Guard strength would be reduced to 630,000, as had been proposed in previous budgets.⁸³

The Navy's basic budget called for construction of 15 ships, including a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, an insufficient number to keep the fleet up to strength. The addendum budget would provide 10 additional ASW vessels. The Polaris program would continue to expand, with two ships

fully funded and advance procurement for two more under the basic budget, and four in each category under the addendum. The Marine Corps would be deficient in both personnel and equipment.⁸⁴

The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps had based their planning on the personnel strengths laid down by Finucane on 29 July. The Air Force actually proposed a reduction in strength—to 800,000 under the basic budget and 825,000 under the addendum; the number of wings would be 82 and 88 respectively. The reduction in wings would primarily affect tactical forces, a fact that raised alarming implications for NATO. Both budgets would require cancellation of further production of the B-58, as well as of several training aircraft, with adverse impact on industry. Both would also require abandonment of the proposed F-108, an advanced fighter aircraft with a planned speed of over 2,000 miles per hour. On the other hand, development of the B-70 would continue; even the basic budget proposed \$456 million to procure the aircraft, looking toward having 1 wing in service by 1965.

Over and above the basic and addendum budgets, the Air Force submitted a third one, referred to as "minimum essential." It called for \$18.4 billion in new obligational authority and \$19.3 billion in expenditures, and used the manpower and force figures of the addendum budget (825,000 personnel and 88 wings), but would authorize additional aircraft procurement, notably 36 B-58s to complete a projected 3-wing program. The Air Force regarded even this higher budget as involving "substantial risk."⁸⁵

There was little prospect that the president would listen to pleas for less austere budgets, as shown by his state of mind in a discussion with McElroy on 16 September. His concern for economy took an unusual turn. Rising interest rates on short-term government securities had stirred the president's ever-present fear of inflation. Expenditures for the current fiscal year were running ahead of estimates, and any admission of an expected deficit would "blow the top" off the money market. He therefore renewed his exhortations to McElroy to strive to reduce personnel. McElroy replied that Defense was cutting its expenditures both at home and abroad. He thought it possible to hold to the current rate of spending but that to go below would be "murder." As he pointed out, a level budget actually involved reductions, because of increasing costs and also because of reductions in credits from sales to the mutual security program.⁸⁶

The service budgets received the usual searching review from the staffs of the comptroller's office and BoB, aided for the first time by Director of Defense Research and Engineering Herbert F. York and by the president's science adviser, Kistiakowsky. During much of this time, McElroy was absent, as he had been in 1958, on an inspection trip, this time to the Far East and Pacific. On his return, McNeil informed him on 21 October of the results of the first review.⁸⁷

This review resulted in estimates of \$38.3 billion in new obligational authority and \$40.7 billion in expenditures. A number of major issues,

however, remained unresolved: the strength of the Air Force, the status of Nike-Zeus, continuing production of the B-58, and the size of the Army National Guard and Reserve.⁸⁸

At the same time, Gates referred the service submissions to Assistant Secretary (ISA) Irwin. His reply focused on the Air Force budget, which proposed a sharp reduction in forces available for NATO, making it impossible for the United States to meet its commitments under the existing NATO plan (MC 70). Irwin considered this situation unacceptable and recommended cuts elsewhere in the Air Force budget. He also suggested a reassessment of NATO's future needs as a basis for decisions on weapons and forces. This, of course, would be a matter for the longer term and did not immediately affect the current budget.⁸⁹

By the beginning of November, contrary to McElroy's hope, the budget remained far from completion. On 3 November McElroy told the president that the JCS genuinely feared for the adequacy of the nation's defense and that there was real danger of having to reduce the U.S. commitment to NATO. Two days later, the president summoned McElroy to his office to discuss the budget further. He thought, and McElroy agreed, that it would be harmful to impose a sudden reduction in U.S. forces in Europe. Eisenhower admitted that the budget might have to be increased.⁹⁰

McElroy and his advisers discussed budget issues on 7 November during a cruise on the Potomac River aboard the Navy yacht *Sequoia*. Those accompanying the secretary included Gates, Twining, York, McNeil, who returned for the occasion, and John M. Sprague, acting comptroller after McNeil's departure. No service chiefs, military or civilian, were present. McElroy asked Twining to obtain JCS views on a number of issues, some rather broad, such as the role of the Tactical Air Command and the possible development of a single close-support aircraft to be used by all services. Other issues included the requirement for the B-70, the advisability of canceling the B-58, the proper mix of ICBMs, and the means of developing an airborne alert capability.⁹¹

Following the trip, McElroy tentatively approved the following budget for submission to the president (in billions):⁹²

	NOA	Expenditure
Army	\$ 9.7	\$ 9.4
Navy	12.0	11.8
Air Force	17.2	18.6
OSD	1.6	1.5
Total	\$40.5	\$41.3

This budget would support an Army of 14 divisions, approximately 805 ships, and 88 Air Force wings. Manpower would total 2,485,000, with the Navy losing 15,000 and the Air Force 20,000. Only 32 tactical air squadrons would be available to meet NATO commitments, 14 fewer than required. Expenditures for procurement would total \$13.9 billion, some \$750 million less than in 1960; the decline in aircraft procurement money

amounted to \$1 billion, making it necessary to terminate the production of the B-58 and to cancel the F-108.⁹³ Money was provided for aircraft components and training to provide a partial "off the shelf" airborne alert. The estimated \$3.5 billion expenditure for research and development, plus some \$2.4 billion in development money in other appropriations, would suffice to continue development of Nike-Zeus and the B-70, but there would be no procurement of either.

The objective for land-based ICBMs—27 squadrons (13 Atlas, 14 Titan)—represented a significant increase over the previous goal of 20. Acceleration of Minuteman production made possible a goal of three operational squadrons by June 1963. Three Polaris submarines would be financed, with long lead-time procurement for three more. The nuclear aircraft carrier was also included. The Army's reserve strength would go down to 630,000.⁹⁴

Twining asked his colleagues to comment on the military programs to be supported under the tentative budget. These would be needed to enable the secretary to prepare a final budget to be discussed with the president on 16 November.⁹⁵

The JCS thereupon approved a brief statement limited to an overall risk appraisal. The threat to the United States from the Soviet bloc had not diminished, according to this statement, and the present margin of relative military capabilities was so narrow that any further reduction in U.S. strength would "place the United States in a vulnerable position." The JCS recognized that many considerations other than purely military entered into the determination of the budget. However, "there are risks involved in this proposed budget because of the increase in enemy capabilities, rising costs, and the decrease in our relative military capability." They presented these views to McElroy in a meeting with him on 14 November.⁹⁶

The Final Budget

McElroy submitted this budget to the president in Augusta, Georgia, on 16 November, in a conference attended also by Gates, Twining, Gray, Kistiakowsky, and Stans and Schaub from the BoB. The secretary summarized the budget, then introduced for discussion the issues involved, starting with the proposed withdrawal of 14 air squadrons from Europe, which he described as politically easier than withdrawing ground forces. The president viewed any sudden withdrawal of this magnitude as a breach of faith and directed McElroy to revise the budget to avoid it. He then raised the issue of the budget of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, suggesting that British and French naval strength could pick up the slack if U.S. ships were withdrawn; however, he admitted that it would be impracticable to withdraw the ships in 1961. He added that the State Department should prepare the way for an ultimate reduction in U.S. forces in Europe.

Concerning the reserve strength of the Army, McElroy proposed a reduction to 630,000 but added that Lemnitzer had asked that the reduction

be postponed for a year. The Army had just completed a reorganization on the basis of a 700,000 figure, and training plans would be disrupted by the reduction. The president, however, insisted on the 630,000 maximum.

The proposed budget would force the Navy to withdraw part of its forces operating as seaward extensions of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line; McElroy had left it to the Navy to determine which forces could most readily be spared. The president doubted the value of the DEW line in the approaching age of long-range missiles. McElroy thought that it would soon be possible to abandon either the DEW line or the more southerly backup warning line through central Canada.

At this point, Stans objected that the budget was being considered piecemeal and asked for a chance to look at it on an overall basis. The president, in what Kistiakowsky described as "a rather sharp lecture," replied that McElroy had already made such an examination and that neither Stans nor the president could make decisions on certain budget details. McElroy added that representatives of BoB kept in constant touch with Defense.

The president approved the increase in Atlas missile squadrons to 13, but would not approve more than 11 Titan squadrons until a better propellant for that missile was assured. He accepted, with some reluctance, the proposal to construct three more Polaris submarines and an attack aircraft carrier, but he stipulated that the latter should be conventionally powered. In doing so he overruled Stans, who wanted the carrier postponed for a year, and ignored Gates's warning that Congress would not approve a conventionally powered vessel.

The budget contained no money for procurement of B-58 aircraft, the only available supersonic bomber. The Air Force wished to complete a three-wing force and retain it for approximately five years until it could be replaced by the B-70. The president thought that the B-70 would be rendered obsolete by missiles before it became operational. McElroy defended it as possibly useful for civilian purposes, but the president had no desire to spend military funds for a civilian aircraft. McElroy, Kistiakowsky, and Twining pointed out that the B-70 was the only supersonic plane under development now that the F-108 had been canceled. Eisenhower finally agreed to allow a limited amount of research on the B-70 to continue. He also approved inclusion of money for production of B-58s.

Stans, seeking to have the last word, pointed out that the decisions made thus far would not lead to substantial reductions. He suggested several possible economies, notably the immediate elimination of one of the early warning lines. McElroy agreed to take another look. The president concluded by warning of another swing of the pendulum toward extreme austerity unless budgets were balanced within the next five years. He asked McElroy to review the budget to make it "a little leaner and tougher," in Goodpaster's words.⁹⁷

On his return to Washington, McElroy met with the JCS and the service secretaries and told them that he was satisfied with the president's treatment of the budget. Twining quoted the president as having said

that the United States was maintaining too high a state of readiness around the world. McElroy surprisingly attributed this statement to the influence of Khrushchev, who had recently visited the United States and had met at some length with the president. He thought the president should be watched for other evidence of Khrushchev's influence. "We've got a job to do here," he said.⁹⁸

On the following day, the president called McElroy long distance and discussed space projects. The secretary remarked that, as directed, he was screening the budget for possible reductions. The president instructed him to "use a razor and not a dull knife."⁹⁹

The JCS members made their pilgrimage to Augusta on 18 November. The president introduced the topics he wished to discuss, beginning with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. He criticized the European countries for their dependence on the United States but admitted there could be no sudden withdrawal and asked Burke to study the matter. A lengthy discussion of the strength of the Army Reserve and National Guard followed. Lemnitzer asked for a delay in reductions, noting his difficulty in obtaining the agreement of the politically influential leaders of those 2 organizations to a strength of 700,000. Eisenhower, however, remained firm in holding to the 630,000 goal. In the course of the discussion, he spoke of the importance of reaching a meeting of the minds on this and other issues and of having decisions firmly supported by each service chief. He was willing to meet with the JCS whenever they so desired and suggested regular meetings.

The president and General White then debated the question of the B-70, the one arguing that it would be superseded by missiles before it could become widely available, the other that it was premature to abandon manned aircraft, which could be gotten aloft to await orders, while missiles could not be recalled after launch. White said that he would "beg" that the B-70 be carried as a "bare minimum" research and development program at a level of \$200 million. The president asked the other JCS members for their views. Twining and Pate favored continuing the B-70, as did Lemnitzer, though he was "appalled" at the idea of spending \$200 million for the purpose. Burke opposed it altogether. The president finally agreed to take another look at the question.

The discussion then became general, with the president indicating a need for further steps toward unification. He pointed out that the Chiefs were still upholding individual service positions. He would like, he said, to see them agree on "some basis of principles" and then assign them to the Joint Staff with complete freedom to translate the agreement into programs. In conclusion, he repeated his invitation to the JCS members to call on him whenever they so desired.¹⁰⁰

Later that day, in a telephone conversation with McElroy, the president revealed his reaction to the meeting with the JCS. The conversation had been friendly even when disagreements occurred. He spoke warmly of Burke, who, he said, had "stood with him all the way."¹⁰¹

Last of all, the service secretaries were given their innings on 21 November, and went over much of the same ground with the president as the JCS had done. Douglas and York expressed support of the B-70; Eisenhower, however, remained noncommittal. Franke and York agreed that there was no need for a nuclear aircraft carrier but pointed to the difficulty of obtaining congressional approval for a conventional one. The president still held to the ceiling of 630,000 for the Army Reserve, although Brucker warned that some members of Congress already stood against any reduction in the current strength.¹⁰²

Despite Stans's desire for a smaller military budget, the meetings in Augusta resulted in a slightly higher one—\$40.747 billion in NOA plus \$335 million from prior year balances, and \$41.2 billion in expenditures. The principal reason for the increase was the B-58 procurement, for which an extra \$1 billion had been added, though most of this amount had been offset by cuts elsewhere. Force goals for the Navy and the Air Force had been increased to 817 ships and 91 wings respectively, the Air Force having been allotted 3 extra tactical wings to avoid reductions in NATO commitments. A sum of \$74 million had been approved for development of the B-70, looking toward 2 prototype aircraft scheduled to fly by the end of 1963. Nike-Zeus received \$312 million for continuing development; no provision was made to use the \$137 million appropriated earlier by Congress to begin production. Personnel strength had been increased to 2,489,000 with the allocation of an additional 4,000 for the Navy, producing the following figures:¹⁰³

Army	870,000
Navy	619,000
Marine Corps	175,000
Air Force	825,000
Total	2,489,000

The NSC, as usual, gave rather perfunctory approval to the budget and program on 25 November, agreeing that they were consistent with policy objectives. The president expressed hope for a further cut of another \$200 million.¹⁰⁴

Final discussions with BoB resulted in a budget of \$40.577 billion in NOA and \$350 million in stock fund transfers.¹⁰⁵ This was the budget that Eisenhower submitted to Congress on 18 January 1960. Meanwhile, at an NSC meeting on 7 January, the president formally approved the program of 13 Atlas and 14 Titan squadrons, also the Polaris program in the FY 1961 budget.¹⁰⁶

The 1961 budget was unique in the extent of JCS participation in its formulation. As Secretary Gates told the House Appropriations Subcommittee:

This year a particular effort was made to assure that all the principal officials of the Department of Defense—the Service Secretaries, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, and the Chiefs of Staff, both

in their individual capacities and in their corporate capacity as the Joint Chiefs of Staff—participated in the review of the annual program and budget. The staff of the JCS was furnished various evaluations, analyses, and data by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to facilitate the examination of the budget by the JCS from a military point of view.

We also had the benefit this year of the active participation of the new Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering established by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.¹⁰⁷

Twining told Senator Johnson's subcommittee that "this year, I think, really for the first time, we concentrated in this budget more on programs without worrying about the ultimate end cost of the budget or the service budgets." Similarly, Gates said at an AFPC meeting that the budget approach had been by weapons systems instead of by service; the resulting percentage distribution of funds among the services was about the same as in previous years, but the fact was merely accidental.¹⁰⁸

But however careful the attempt to match programs to military requirements, the 1961 budget became a subject of public controversy even before it became final. Service dissatisfaction with the trend of budget discussions occasioned an unusually full spate of newspaper stories detailing the trend of developments. Attentive readers learned what were the principal budget items at issue: tactical air support of NATO, Nike-Zeus, a nuclear-powered carrier, the B-70, Polaris, and Army modernization. They learned also that for most of these programs the services had received considerably less than they had sought.¹⁰⁹ When the budget became firm, well-informed critics charged that it had been held to an arbitrary limit by "stretching out" programs to a dangerous degree.¹¹⁰

The critics received a powerful reinforcement in the person of General Taylor, whose retirement gave him freedom to voice in public the argument for "flexible response" that he had been making in the JCS and NSC. By early November—less than five months after he left office—Taylor had in manuscript, ready for publication, a book setting forth his views.¹¹¹ The appearance a few weeks later of a magazine article by Taylor, which included considerable information about discussions taking place within the executive branch, particularly infuriated President Eisenhower, since he regarded the discussions as privileged.¹¹²

Gates Replaces McElroy

With the budget essentially completed, McElroy felt that he could in good conscience leave the government, having fulfilled his promise of a two-year commitment. His plans had been disrupted by Quarles's death and then by Twining's illness; he told reporters on 18 June 1959 that for the present he had laid aside his intention of resigning.¹¹³ Three months

later, however, he had made up his mind. He told the president on 16 September that in view of his wife's declining health he considered it imperative to leave Washington soon after the budget was completed. The president expressed disappointment at losing McElroy's "strength and support" but felt that he had no choice but to accept the resignation. McElroy suggested Gates as his successor; the president asked that Gates be given increasing responsibility to see how he would handle it.¹¹⁴

McElroy's impending departure soon became common knowledge, along with the expectation that Gates would replace him. After further discussions, the date of 1 December was fixed for the change.¹¹⁵ This date allowed McElroy to supervise the entire budget process except for the final adjustments with BoB. He planned to resume his business career with Procter and Gamble rather than retire.

On the morning of the appointed day, McElroy met with the NSC for the last time and, like Wilson, received from the president the Medal of Freedom. In the afternoon, he held his final press conference and answered a number of questions about accomplishments during his tenure of office, notably the rapid development of missiles and the reorganization of the department.¹¹⁶

McElroy's departure did not carry the same impact as that of Wilson, since he had not been in office long enough to become a fixture on the Washington scene. Even so, he had served for almost 26 months—longer than any of his predecessors except Wilson. As a secretary, he was somewhat in Wilson's mold, being primarily an administrator.¹¹⁷ McElroy concentrated on relationships with Congress and the public to a greater degree than Wilson, leaving internal matters largely to his two deputies, Quarles and Gates.¹¹⁸ His relations with the JCS had not been particularly close. General Taylor later recalled that he had suggested informal conferences with McElroy, but that McElroy "never gave the Chiefs any real opportunity as a body for serious discussion of basic issues" and, like Wilson, preferred to receive JCS advice indirectly, through formal documents or from the chairman or the deputy secretary.¹¹⁹

Again like Wilson, McElroy left with his reputation somewhat tarnished. The "superb promise" of his first year, as one well-informed reporter called it, had not been matched by his second; moreover, the circumstances of his departure reportedly "vexed and embarrassed" the president.¹²⁰ Eisenhower's science adviser, Killian, received the impression that McElroy shrank from the difficulties of his position and that this was one reason why he devoted so much time to congressional and public relations; also that the amount of time he spent in travel was "embarrassing if not annoying" for the president.¹²¹ Another reporter's pithy judgment was that McElroy "never really got with it so far as defense policy and government are concerned." Walter Lippmann, writing some months before McElroy actually left, thought that his impending departure after such a short tenure "raises a serious question about the prevailing standards of public service." And one particularly severe critic saw McElroy as putting his own

interests above those of the nation and wondered why he took the job in the first place.¹²²

McElroy's deputy, Gates, was his logical successor; there is no evidence that anyone else was given consideration. Unlike Wilson and McElroy, but like some earlier secretaries (Forrestal, Marshall, and Lovett), Gates had a background that had given him considerable on-the-job training. Appointed on 1 December, he took office the next day. At that time, he promised reporters that he would encourage more frequent contacts with the press by the service secretaries, a practice that McElroy had discouraged.¹²³

To replace Gates as deputy secretary, the president seriously considered his special assistant, Gordon Gray, but eventually decided that he needed Gray in his present position. Instead, he accepted Gates's choice of Air Force Secretary James H. Douglas. Eisenhower was not entirely happy with Douglas, but the alternative was to bring in someone from outside government, which he did not wish to do. Like Gates, Douglas had served successively as under secretary and secretary of his service, and was a close personal friend of Gates.¹²⁴

Douglas was succeeded in the Air Force by the under secretary, Dudley C. Sharp. Both men took the oath of office on 11 December.¹²⁵ Since Congress was not in session, their appointments, as well as that of Gates, were on an interim basis and subject to later confirmation.

Reception of the Budget

The new leadership of DoD was already in place when Eisenhower submitted the 1961 budget to Congress on 18 January 1960. He called for a total of \$79.4 billion in NOA and forecast a comfortable surplus of \$4.2 billion, with receipts of \$84.0 billion and expenditures of \$79.8 billion. The \$40.577 billion requested for the military functions of DoD totaled as follows:

	<u>By Service</u>
Army	\$ 9.546
Navy	12.013
Air Force	17.737
OSD and Interservice	1.281
Total	<u>\$40.577</u>

	<u>By Appropriation Category</u>
Military Personnel	\$11.837
Operation and maintenance	10.527
Procurement	13.085
Research, development, test and evaluation	3.910
Military construction	1.188
Revolving and management funds	.030
Total	<u>\$40.577</u>

An additional \$350 million in obligational authority would come from stock funds. The expenditure estimate was \$40.995 billion.*¹²⁶

Besides setting out force goals—14 divisions, 817 ships, and 91 wings—the president, as usual, highlighted the progress being made in weapons deployment. Atlas was already operational; two Polaris submarines were expected to become operational during calendar 1960, and Titan in 1961. These, together with manned bombers, carrier aircraft, intermediate-range missiles, and tactical aircraft deployed abroad effectively ensured the nation's ability to retaliate. Dispersal of SAC aircraft and construction of alert facilities were substantially completed; a "large portion" of SAC aircraft could get off the ground with 15 minutes' warning time. The first segment of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) was expected to be in operation in a year or so. For an active missile defense, development of Nike-Zeus would continue; this was "one of the most difficult undertakings ever attempted by this country," according to the president.¹²⁷

Before the budget reached Congress, indications abounded that it would be at least as controversial as the preceding one. Concern about the missile gap was unabated; the Democrats, in firm control of Congress, were increasingly critical of the administration's defense policies; and finally, the approaching 1960 election was beginning to cast its shadow. The president defended the budget in an interview on 13 January. He had, he pointed out, spent his entire life in defense, "and I know more about it than almost anybody, I think, that is in the country. . . ." He believed that defense had been "handled well and efficiently" in the budget, and he was "not in the slightest degree disturbed" by the possibility that U.S. missile inferiority might place the nation at a disadvantage in forthcoming talks with Khrushchev.¹²⁸

When the House opened hearings on the budget on 13 January, Gates and Twining, the first witnesses, tried to disarm critics with assurances of its adequacy. They went so far as to elicit a measure of skeptical backlash on the part of some members of the House Appropriations Subcommittee. "In my long period of service on the committee," said George Mahon, the chairman, after Twining had finished, "this is the most enthusiastic and rosy and reassuring presentation that we have ever had." Both Gates and Twining, however, denied any intent to encourage complacency.¹²⁹

The hearings quickly focused on the status of the two sides' missile forces. After Herbert York admitted that the United States lagged behind the Soviet Union in numbers of ICBMs (though not in the status of their development), Gates volunteered the following statement:

*The \$40.577 billion in NOA included \$24 million for retired pay, proposed for later transmission. Deducting this amount, together with the \$30 million in revolving and management funds and the \$1.188 billion for military construction (which would be the subject of separate congressional action), the amount being sought for military purposes was \$39.335 billion. This was the figure used in news stories comparing congressional action with the administration request.

Heretofore, we have been giving you intelligence figures that dealt with the theoretical Soviet capability. This is the first time that we have had an intelligence estimate that says, "This is what the Soviet Union probably will do." Therefore, the great divergence, based on figures that have been testified to in years past, narrows because we talked before about a different set of comparisons—ones that were based on Soviet capabilities. This present one is an intelligence estimate on what we believe he probably will do, not what he is capable of doing.¹³⁰

Gates's words were not well chosen. The administration had firm evidence, based largely on U-2 overflights of the USSR, of what the Soviets were (and were not) doing.¹³¹ But his statement could easily be misinterpreted as an admission that the administration was basing its plans on conjectures as to what the notoriously secretive Soviet leaders intended to do.

When the secretary was asked on 21 January what evidence was available to downgrade the Soviet threat, his reply was even more unfortunate. This year's intelligence estimate, he said, had been made "on the basis of what the Soviet Union probably would do as opposed to former estimates which were made on what they were capable of doing. This is a different set of rules, so to speak." Asked why "we dare" to base estimates on intentions rather than capabilities, Gates declined to answer. However, he denied a charge by Senator Russell that the new estimates were inspired by politics.¹³²

An administration that changed the "rules" to make a potential enemy appear less formidable (as Gates seemed to have implied) became fair game for criticism. Senator Johnson on 25 January charged the administration with "leaping at straws to find an excuse for not going as far and as fast as we can to assure the security of this nation and the free world."¹³³ Senator Symington—like Johnson, a potential presidential candidate—delivered an especially sharp attack on 27 January, charging that the administration had "juggled" intelligence data in order to balance the budget.¹³⁴ Columnist Joseph Alsop, his pen ever at the ready, launched a series of six articles in which he assailed McElroy for "conveniently" lowering missile estimates and urged accelerated production of ICBMs, plus a full airborne alert for SAC.¹³⁵

Testimony on 25 January before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, which was investigating the space program, afforded Gates an opportunity to clarify his statements. He denied any "abrupt shift" in methods of intelligence appraisal. What was involved was a "refinement" that "hopefully gives us better intelligence."¹³⁶ Two days later, in a speech prepared for a group of Republican leaders in Portland, Oregon, in which he vigorously defended the administration's record on national security, Gates included a statement that "during the past year we have continued to acquire information about the status of the Soviet ICBM Program," but admitted that the Soviets "might enjoy at times a moderate numerical superiority" in missiles, peaking in 1962.¹³⁷

Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles also sought to allay the effects of Gates's injudicious statements. Speaking in New York on 26 January, he pointed out that early estimates of probable Soviet missile production were necessarily based primarily on capabilities, but "as more facts are available, we estimate their probable programming, sometimes referred to as intentions."¹³⁸

The president added his defense of Gates, who, he said, had been misinterpreted. "Frankly, what is really happening is that we have better estimates than we had in the past in this field," he told reporters on 26 January. He reminded them of the "bomber gap" of a few years before, which had evaporated when better information became available. Any supposed conflict between intentions and capabilities, he added, was fallacious; both must be considered in drawing up intelligence estimates.¹³⁹

By now the moment was approaching when, according to earlier estimates, the Soviets might deploy a force capable of decisive surprise attack. In November 1957 the CIA had forecast a Soviet armory of 100 ICBMs by late 1960 and 500 between mid-1960 and 1962. A new estimate a month later saw the 100-missile force as possibly available by mid-1959.¹⁴⁰ But two years had now passed, and it was clear that the worst case had not materialized. In August 1959 an ad hoc panel appointed by CIA reported that an initial Soviet capability (10 missiles or so) was "imminent," but shifted to "late 1960 or later" the date of an "effective force" of 100 missiles. The number might reach 400-500 by late 1962. But, continued the report, "the Panel no longer believes that this latter capability will be obtained in two years after IOC, as the evidence is now firm that the Soviets are not engaged in a 'crash' program."¹⁴¹

It was now clear, moreover, that there was a more significant statistic than raw numbers of existing missiles. Between missiles in factories and those that had been laboriously hoisted into firing position at completed bases a significant chronological "gap" existed. Hence, new estimates drafted in late 1959 included for the first time numbers of Soviet missiles on launchers. Owing to disputes among various agencies, the estimates were not formally disseminated until 9 February 1960, but the figures were of course available earlier to Gates and other officials. In the end, agreement among intelligence analysts proved impossible, and the estimates appeared with varying numbers. CIA's estimate was 140-200 ICBMs on launchers by mid-1961. Within that range, the Army and Navy leaned toward the lower figure; other agencies—Air Force, State, and Joint Staff—toward the higher. Assuming that production would substantially level off during the next few years, CIA estimated 250-350 on launchers by mid-1962 and 350-450 by mid-1963. The Air Force estimated 385 and 640, respectively, for those two years.¹⁴²

Inevitably, these figures leaked to the public, though in somewhat inaccurate form. A magazine article early in February 1960 forecast Soviet missile strength at 250 in 1962 and 400-500 in 1963, apparently confusing the CIA and Air Force estimates.¹⁴³

Two speeches by the commander of SAC, General Thomas S. Power, helped to inflame the controversy. He asserted that some 300 missiles, of which only half need be of intercontinental range, would suffice to destroy the approximately 100 installations from which the United States could launch its strategic weapons. He urged an air alert for SAC, "expeditious development" of the B-70, and integration of Polaris with other strategic weapons (by implication, under Air Force command). These widely held Air Force views influenced congressional action on the budget.¹⁴⁴

Gates Is Confirmed

In the midst of these developments, the question of Gates's confirmation as secretary of defense came before the Senate. On 21 January the Armed Services Committee unanimously approved Gates's nomination, also those of Douglas, Sharp, and Franklin B. Lincoln, McNeil's successor as comptroller.¹⁴⁵ On 25 January Senator Johnson announced that the Senate was postponing action on Gates because several senators had asked first to be heard.¹⁴⁶ The next day Johnson informed the Senate that one senator had asked that the nomination be held up until he could obtain "certain information" but that the senator had since obtained the information and had withdrawn any objection. "I know Mr. Gates, and have respect and regard for him," continued Johnson, "and wish him well in this new assignment." Then, without objection, it was announced that all four nominations were confirmed. On 26 January 1960 Gates officially became the nation's seventh secretary of defense.¹⁴⁷

Congressional Hearings

The House took testimony from the top service officials between 18 and 29 January, starting with the Navy. Secretary Franke praised the budget as providing the best balance that he had seen in his six years' experience. Admiral Burke also gave his full support, though he warned that the Navy would be "smaller and more thinly spread" in 1961 and admitted that he was worried about future capabilities, since "each year we are slipping a little bit." The newly appointed commandant of the Marine Corps, General David M. Shoup, viewed the budget as a "sound national investment," but pointed out that the personnel limit of 175,000 would deprive the Corps of any reserve strength after initial deployment.¹⁴⁸

Air Force officials also used the tepid and somewhat ambiguous word "balance" in praising the budget. For Secretary Sharp, it balanced the maintenance of current forces (at a "minimum acceptable level") against future improvement. General White declared that it represented the "best balance possible" with due regard to the contributions of other services. Under questioning, he said that if he had "a few billion more," he would add more

ICBMs and B-58s. "Not having them," he concluded, "I am satisfied that the program we have will do."¹⁴⁹

Secretary Brucker, echoing his colleagues, described the budget as "balanced" and "designed to support an Army as effective, modern and mobile as the resources will allow." General Lemnitzer added that it represented the "optimum utilization" of the resources provided the Army. Lemnitzer's testimony indicated that, unlike Taylor, he fitted the president's conception of a "team" player. A continuation of present budgetary trends, he said, would not jeopardize national security. "The Commander in Chief thinks not," he added, "and weighing all the various projects and programs which he must consider, this particular budget is what he considers to be a reasonable defense budget." Asked whether he felt that retaliatory capability had been overemphasized in the budget, Lemnitzer replied that this view had in fact been the Army's position but that "the situation is changing somewhat in that respect"; programs now underway would provide the Army with better equipment in future years. Under questioning, however, Brucker and Lemnitzer admitted to concern about the rate of modernization of Army equipment and the adequacy of airlift capability.¹⁵⁰

Brucker, in fact, allowed himself to be drawn out in a manner characteristic of the attitude that had on occasion caused friction with his superiors. Asked for his views on the allocation of the budget among the services, he gave a lengthy reply in which he aired the effects of several years of frustration:

It is my very definite feeling from repeated year-by-year discussions on the Army budget. . . that the allocations to the Army have not been of the amount that ought to have been made to it on the basis of its needs and roles and missions.

I have the feeling that the massive retaliatory strike has been an obsession for years. As a matter of fact, some of the statements that were made in connection with discussions we had on the Army budget, if they were revealed on the record here now, after these 3 or 4 years after they happened, would simply amaze you. There was a feeling that the Army was not necessary. . . . Year after year money was taken out of our budget after you granted it. . . . The money was taken out to the tune of a couple hundred million dollars a year and moved over to the other services on the ground that the Army did not need it. . . .

So I approach this, I suppose—and I hope I am not a little too partisan in the Army, I grant that I am—I approach it on the basis that when money has been subtracted after the appropriation has been made and the fiscal year started . . . and after the Congress has decided what it should be, I think my answer is that the allocation has not been upon the basis that I believe it should have been made.¹⁵¹

The Senate opened budget hearings unusually early, on 1 February. Gates, the first witness, was challenged on his House testimony on Soviet missile strength and on Power's alarming estimate of the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces. He replied that the United States now had "better and more refined intelligence" and that the "diversified form of retaliatory capability" possessed by the United States was safe enough to avoid tempting the Soviets to launch a surprise strike.¹⁵²

Senator Johnson had meanwhile recalled his Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee into joint session with the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. As in 1959, the hearings provoked headlines, but they also added to the confusion over intelligence estimates. On 29 January CIA Director Dulles briefed the senators, apparently presenting the Soviet missile estimates that were shortly to be disseminated in a national intelligence estimate (NIE), although they were not made public. The administration's critics at once declared their views vindicated, since even the less alarming predictions favored by CIA conceded the Soviets an advantage for the immediate future.¹⁵³

Open hearings by the two committees began on 2 February. The first witness, General Power, questioned about the vulnerability of SAC in the light of his speeches, affirmed that the next few years (until the Minuteman missile became available in quantity) were critical and stressed the importance of a full airborne alert for SAC. On the following day the Air Force intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. James H. Walsh, explained his disagreement with CIA's missile estimates, although the discussion did nothing to enlighten the public, since the actual figures remained classified. The military chiefs of the services then testified in turn, each having opportunity to indicate those aspects of the 1961 budget with which he was not entirely satisfied. General Taylor also appeared and amplified the views stated in his recent book.¹⁵⁴

These witnesses were followed on 9 February by General Twining, who defended the administration's military program. However, in the course of his testimony, he presented Soviet missile estimates that did not agree with those given earlier by Dulles. Twining testified that he had not seen the CIA figures until after Dulles presented them to the two committees on 29 January. The senators were understandably confused. "This is a very involved matter," remarked Sen. John Stennis of Mississippi, in an understatement. The committee recalled Dulles in an effort to clear up matters.¹⁵⁵

After a recess of more than a month, the committee held a final session on 16 March to hear Gates. He opened with a prepared statement in which he denied the existence of a Soviet "crash" missile program. He declined, however, to be drawn into an appraisal of relative missile numbers. It was finally agreed to discuss this issue further in executive session. The hearing then turned to various aspects of the 1961 budget, with Gates defending its adequacy.¹⁵⁶

These hearings helped to keep national attention focused on the "missile gap" and on defense in general. A public opinion poll released on 1 March

1960 showed a significant rise since the preceding October in the percentage of Americans for whom the state of military preparedness was the most important problem facing the nation. Significantly, a plurality now felt that the Democratic rather than the Republican Party could better handle this issue.¹⁵⁷

Before the end of February, yet another senatorial forum for administration critics had come into existence. A Senate resolution in July 1959 had authorized the Senate Committee on Government Operations to investigate the effectiveness of existing organizations and procedures for formulating and executing an "integrated national policy" in the ongoing contest with world communism. The resolution was adopted after consultation with the president, who promised full cooperation. To conduct the investigation, the Committee on Government Operations established a Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, chaired by Sen. Henry M. Jackson. The subcommittee's first witness, on 23 February 1960, Robert A. Lovett, former secretary of defense, expressed the view that the threat confronting the nation required a greater effort than was currently being made and indicated his willingness to accept a higher tax burden, if necessary, to pay for a larger national defense. On the next day Robert C. Sprague, formerly of the Gaither panel, warned that Soviet economic growth was outstripping that of the United States, ridiculed the notion that an increase in spending would "bankrupt" the nation, and criticized the setting of expenditure ceilings for the military budget. Newspaper reports emphasized these criticisms of administration policy by well-informed former officials.¹⁵⁸

Gates, by now feeling somewhat beleaguered by the volume of criticism, which he regarded as ill-informed and unjustified, established on 17 February a special task force to respond. "It is a matter of concern," he wrote to the service secretaries, "that the confidence of the nation in its defenses is being hurt by a substantial body of misinformation and misrepresentation carried in the press and television regarding the state of our defenses and the soundness of our military programs." He directed each secretary to appoint two members to serve on the task force, which would gather facts and make them available to those wanting "an accurate understanding of our defense situation." Brig. Gen. James D. Hittle, USMC, assistant to the secretary of defense for legislative affairs, was named director of the new body; Oliver Gale, who had stayed on as Gates's special assistant after McElroy left, was general supervisor. The services of the task force would be available to "Democrats and Republicans, friendly and unfriendly journalists." The press immediately dubbed the unit a "truth squad."¹⁵⁹

Gale seized on an unexpected opportunity to attempt to influence public opinion in favor of the budget. He received a letter from former assistant secretary of defense Carter Burgess, now a prominent industrialist. Burgess wrote that many businessmen were confused about defense and asked a number of specific questions about U.S. military capability. Gale referred the letter to Gates, who left it to him to prepare an answer. Gale did so and, since Gates was absent at the time, sent the letter himself,

over his own signature, to Burgess and a number of other prominent business leaders. The letter asserted that "we are clearly ahead of the Soviets today in total military strength" and concluded with the assurance that "at no time in the foreseeable future will the Soviets be able to launch an attack upon us without receiving in return a blow of unbearable proportions." To document these statements, Gale went into considerable detail about the status of U.S. forces, present and planned.¹⁶⁰

Released to the public, the letter became something of an overnight sensation. Some service spokesmen, behind a cloak of anonymity, assailed it as giving too optimistic a picture of the military situation, also for some of its specific statements, such as that a large-scale airborne alert was not needed. Criticism also focused on a statement in the letter that it represented "the combined thinking of the Secretary of Defense and his principal military and scientific advisers." Gates, asked about the letter, admitted that he had not read it until some time after he returned to Washington, but judged it "useful," although, he added, if he had written it, he might not have "put exactly the same emphasis on it."¹⁶¹

Still another element of the budget came under scrutiny when on 8 March 1960 a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee opened six weeks of hearings on the adequacy of military airlift, inspired by concerns that emerged during the annual military posture briefing. After concluding its hearings, the subcommittee reported that the existing fleet of military transport aircraft was approaching obsolescence. The members endorsed the modest \$50 million allotted in the FY 1961 budget to develop a new transport; meanwhile they urged immediate procurement of improved aircraft already available.¹⁶²

Budget Revision

As in previous years, the administration continued to keep the defense budget under review after it had gone to Congress. "We will not hesitate to come back to the Congress for additional funds at any time we feel such funds are required," said Gates to the Johnson subcommittee on 16 March. Earlier, Gates had intimated to the appropriations subcommittees the possibility of asking more funds, mentioning specifically Polaris and Minuteman as programs that might merit extra money if technical developments seemed promising.¹⁶³

Specific proposals for revising the FY 1961 budget emerged from Gates's discussions with York and Kistiakowsky in March 1960. They involved enlarging the Polaris program, accelerating the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System to bring a second radar station into operation in Alaska by early 1961, and expanding the ICBM force by increasing the number of missiles in each squadron. Gates presented these suggestions to the president on 18 March, proposing to recapture part of their cost by reprogramming; he would cut back on Bomarc and on the construction of SAGE (Semiautomatic

Ground Environment) centers designed as part of the original continental defense system.¹⁶⁴

Insofar as these recommendations concerned the Air Force, they accorded with a study conducted by that service to bring continental defense into line with the master plan adopted in June 1959. The findings of the study led to proposals, concurred in by the JCS, to reduce defensive programs and apply the savings primarily to offensive forces.¹⁶⁵

Gates was at that time in Europe and unable formally to approve the changes. Over the opposition of BoB, the president authorized DoD to submit the Air Force proposals to Congress at once. He also asked for a "quick study" of the costs of long lead-time items for six or nine additional Polaris submarines.¹⁶⁶

General White and his assistants accordingly described the Air Force program to the House subcommittee on 24 March. Money from Bomarc and the SAGE supercombat centers would be diverted to Atlas missiles and BMEWS, also to expanded production facilities for Minuteman and improvements in fighter aircraft. The net savings for FY 1961 would be \$123.7 million.¹⁶⁷

In Gates's absence, Eisenhower discussed the Polaris program directly with Burke. He suggested, and Burke agreed, that money might be found by postponing construction of other submarines. Burke then met with BoB officials and tentatively agreed on full funding for an additional Polaris submarine in the 1961 budget, with advance procurement for three others.¹⁶⁸

Back in Washington, Gates discussed the accelerated missile programs with the JCS, then met with the president on 6 April. He proposed, no doubt on the basis of his discussions with the JCS, to fund two more Polaris vessels in FY 1961, with advance procurement for three more. These would be in addition to the three in each category already in the 1961 budget (resulting in what was termed a "five and six" program). The president rejected this in favor of a "three and nine" program, meaning simply advance procurement for six more vessels, although Gates warned that this would postpone until 1964 the enlargement of the fleet. It was agreed to fund part of the added cost by eliminating 2 of the 3 nuclear-powered attack (non-Polaris) submarines in the 1961 budget and using \$25-30 million of the money saved by Air Force reprogramming. The possibility of extending the range of the Polaris missile, from 1,500 to 2,500 miles, was also discussed. The president gave this a low priority but thought the Navy ought to "try to scratch up" some money for the purpose.¹⁶⁹

Losing no time, Gates appeared before Mahon's subcommittee the same day and presented the changes approved by the president. To the Senate, the changes were transmitted by letter. Mahon's immediate reaction was that these steps fell short of what was needed. Their net effect was to reduce the original NOA request to \$40.434 billion, or \$39.246 billion exclusive of construction.¹⁷⁰

Final Action

The bill reported out by the Appropriations Committee on 29 April, and approved by the House on 5 May, provided \$39.3 billion for military programs exclusive of construction—slightly more than the administration had requested. It provided sizable additional amounts for antisubmarine warfare (principally for four nuclear-powered attack submarines), for a “five by seven” Polaris program, for additional MATS aircraft, for Army modernization, and for two additional squadrons of fighter aircraft (F-106s) to replace Bomarc, for which all procurement money was deleted. Lesser amounts provided for an airborne alert (larger than the administration had envisioned), for maintenance of the Army National Guard and Reserve at their existing strengths, for a mobile capability for Minuteman, and for accelerated development of orbiting reconnaissance satellites. Reductions included \$293 million in the attack aircraft carrier program, 3 percent (totaling \$400.5 million) from each procurement appropriation, and various administrative curtailments, including one designed to force a 10 percent cut in civilian manpower in OSD and in the military departments. The Appropriations Committee’s report criticized the practice of budgeting on the basis of an expenditure ceiling allegedly imposed by BoB; this, said the committee, was a wasteful practice that stretched out the development of weapons systems, causing many to be obsolete before they became available.¹⁷¹

The Senate, following a plea by Deputy Secretary Douglas to its Appropriations Committee, restored some money, notably that for the aircraft carrier, and rescinded the across-the-board cut in procurement. The Senate also retained most of the House additions and provided more money for the B-70 and for Army modernization. It made the 700,000 Army reserve strength mandatory and provided funds to increase the Marine Corps to 200,000. The resulting bill added up to \$40.5 billion.¹⁷²

When the bill went to conference committee, Gates asked that the mandatory language regarding Army reserve strength be deleted, also the extra money for the Marine Corps. He was willing to accept part of the addition for airlift modernization. Otherwise, he urged the committee members to uphold the administration’s program.¹⁷³

Gates’s requests were only partly reflected in the final law, signed by the president on 7 July 1960. It provided \$39,996,608,000 for all military purposes other than construction, allocated as follows:

Army	\$ 9,537,985,000
Navy	12,109,892,000
Air Force	17,157,756,000
OSD and Interservice	1,190,975,000
Total	\$39,996,608,000

The bill also authorized \$365.5 million in transfer authority, all for personnel. It retained the mandatory strength of 400,000 for the National

Guard but dropped any minimum requirement for the Army Reserve on administration assurances that an average strength of 300,000 would be maintained. The extra Marine Corps personnel money was deleted. A sum of \$100 million was included for procurement of F-106 aircraft, with the understanding (reached in the conference committee) that if additional fighters proved unnecessary, the money was to be available only for the B-70. The bill established a separate appropriation category for modernization of transport aircraft, indicating the importance attached to this task.¹⁷⁴

Hearings on appropriations for military construction began on 21 March, with Assistant Secretaries Lincoln and Floyd S. Bryant (Properties and Installations) testifying on behalf of the administration's \$1.2 billion program.¹⁷⁵ The final bill, approved on 11 July, reduced the total to slightly under \$1 billion, although it increased the amounts for National Guard and Army reserve construction. Almost two-thirds of the total went to the Air Force, as shown in the following table:¹⁷⁶

Army	\$181,985,000
Navy	166,519,000
Air Force	627,351,000
OSD and Interservice	19,000,000
Total	\$994,855,000

Together the two bills provided \$40.991 billion, almost \$600 million above the administration's request; the reduction of \$193 million in construction money partly offset the additional \$775 million provided for other purposes.

Normally the administration's procedure would have been to hold most of the extra money in reserve, to be spent as future developments dictated or applied to the next year's budget. This time the decision was to use a large part of it at once in view of events that had fueled an increase in international tension. These included the breakup of the Paris summit meeting in May 1960; the Soviet termination of arms control talks on 27 June 1960, followed a few days later by the shooting down of a U.S. RB-47 aircraft that allegedly violated Soviet airspace; and the Soviet willingness to support the regime of Fidel Castro in Cuba and anti-Western dissidents in the Congo. Also alarming was a slippage in readiness of the Atlas intercontinental missile.¹⁷⁷

Meeting with the JCS on 14 July, Gates directed them to prepare a list of measures to enhance military capability, keeping within "reasonable" expenditures. He specifically suggested additional aircraft alert measures and deployment of another attack carrier, presumably to the Mediterranean or the Pacific. Herter, thinking along similar lines, suggested to the president that, for psychological reasons, he request additional defense money from Congress. The president told him to discuss the subject with Gates.¹⁷⁸

Gates then drew up proposals to deploy two more carriers, to improve SAC readiness, to retain three wings of B-47s scheduled to be phased out in FY 1961, to expand the B-70 and reconnaissance satellite programs, to increase production of the Army's new M-60 tank, and to fund additional

Polaris submarines while developing a 2,500-mile Polaris missile by 1965. These measures would require no new money; they would be funded by reprogramming or by drawing upon the additional money being considered by Congress. The president approved these and announced some of them to Congress on 6 August, when that body reconvened after a recess for the two nominating conventions.¹⁷⁹

Not all the extra money would be used. There was no need for additional F-106s, since the administration had received substantially all it had requested for air defense. Nor was it planned to use the extra appropriation for nuclear attack submarines, in view of the growing Polaris program and the fact that contracts for those vessels in the 1960 program had just been let. Gates informed congressional leaders of these decisions on 9 August.¹⁸⁰

A reduction in administrative personnel in DoD was already under way. Douglas instructed each OSD activity to reduce by a minimum of six percent the numbers of military and civilian personnel planned for 30 June 1961. The service departments were to reduce by five percent. The JCS asked exemption from the requirement on the grounds that they should not be considered an "administrative-type" headquarters, but they were overruled.¹⁸¹

Thus ended the struggle over President Eisenhower's last complete budget. The additional money that Congress had forced upon an unwilling administration was the most since 1956—which, perhaps not by coincidence, was also an election year. The legislators had also sought to enforce specific changes in weapon development and procurement. Here, as in previous years, they could succeed only to the extent that the administration was willing to acquiesce. Congress, unable to agree on any single coherent strategy to present as an alternative, and largely restrained (like the administration) by fear of a deficit, in the final analysis did not have the power to force a change in the strategic policy of the administration.¹⁸²

CHAPTER XII

Missiles, Satellites, and Space, 1958-1960

By the middle of 1958 the major U.S. missile projects appeared well on their way to success. The technology for launching large-scale rockets precisely aimed toward specific targets had essentially been mastered; henceforth it was a matter of incorporating improvements in range, accuracy, and ease of handling. It could be foreseen that the first generation of long-range missiles, using liquid fuel, would in the near future give way to safer and more rapid-firing solid-fuel weapons. At the same time, powerful rocket engines were becoming available in sufficient quantities for launching satellites beyond the earth's atmosphere. Outer space would soon be open to scientific exploration as well as to exploitation for military purposes such as reconnaissance and communications.

Effects of the 1958 Reorganization

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 altered the machinery through which the secretary of defense administered missile and satellite programs. The newly created director of defense research and engineering (DDR&E), ranking just below the deputy secretary, provided an office for central control over all weapons development. The position was filled by Herbert F. York, formerly chief scientist of ARPA.

York's charter as DDR&E, issued on 10 February 1959, authorized him to recommend an integrated program of research and development to meet military requirements; to review programs of the military departments and other DoD agencies; to recommend assignment of responsibility for development of new weapons; and to direct and control research and engineering activities deemed by the secretary to require centralized management. He was authorized to conduct research either directly or through other organizations—the military departments or, under contract, institutions outside the government.¹

The charter gave York administrative direction of the Weapons Systems

Evaluation Group. He also became responsible for the Defense Science Board (DSB). A revised DSB charter issued in November 1959 confirmed the authority of the DDR&E over the board; it also enlarged the board slightly and provided for a vice chairman as well as a chairman, both to be selected by the DDR&E.²

Taking over the office of the former assistant secretary for research and engineering, York retained its basic organization along functional lines, with "directors" for technical fields. His principal innovation was to establish "assistant directors" for various classes of weapons systems to review projects and ensure consonance between technical developments and military requirements.³

There existed at first some confusion in the relation between York's new office, ODDR&E, and ARPA. The former was the overall directing authority, the latter the instrumentality for conducting research that cut across service responsibilities. ARPA thus bore the same relation to ODDR&E as did the research organizations of the military departments. McElroy made this relationship clear on 17 March 1959 in a directive specifying that ARPA's projects, like those of the services, would be subject to the "supervision and coordination" of DDR&E. Administratively, however, ARPA remained outside ODDR&E, reporting directly to the secretary of defense.⁴

ARPA's most important responsibilities centered on the various satellite projects—for reconnaissance, navigation, communications, and the like—that proliferated in 1958 and 1959. These constituted the major DoD contribution to the overall national program of space research. York directed on 11 June 1959 that projects utilizing the "space environment" would, with minor exceptions, come under ARPA.⁵

Before the end of 1959 these satellite projects had reached a point where they could be turned over to the services designated to operate them. ARPA thus lost a major part of its responsibility. Shortly thereafter it gave up its position as an independent agency within DoD and was placed under DDR&E. By that time Johnson had resigned as ARPA's director. His replacement, announced on 8 December 1959, Brig. Gen. A. W. Betts, USA, had served as deputy director of guided missiles as well as York's military assistant in ODDR&E.⁶

The establishment of ODDR&E rendered superfluous the position of director of guided missiles. McElroy abolished it on 8 April 1959. William M. Holaday, the incumbent director, resumed his former title of special assistant for guided missiles, responsible for advising the secretary on the transition of missiles from development to operational status. He continued to chair the OSD Ballistic Missiles Committee (BMC) until 1 July 1959, when he yielded that position to the deputy secretary of defense.⁷

The management of missile programs was the subject of six weeks of investigation by the House Committee on Government Operations in February and March 1959. A subcommittee chaired by Rep. Chet Holifield of California questioned Quarles, Holaday, Johnson, York, and others, delving especially into the question of missile disputes between the

services. The Thor-Jupiter controversy loomed large in this connection. Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris, head of the Army's missile program, testified that he had difficulty in obtaining from the Air Force full information needed to adapt the Jupiter for operation by that service. He backed up his testimony with written evidence of unsuccessful requests for information and documents from the Air Force.⁸

After the House committee completed hearings, the Army-Air Force dispute resumed during an investigation of the space program by the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, which began on 24 March. Medaris's opposite number in the Air Force, Lt. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, insisted that he had taken "every reasonable action" to insure coordination between the services. Medaris stood by his assertions. Information from the Air Force, he declared, had not always been furnished on a timely basis, and the few requests that, by Schriever's admission, had been refused included some of the most vital information.⁹

The House committee's consideration of Army-Air Force missile disputes gave an unexpected turn to its conclusions. In its report, issued on 2 September 1959, the committee recommended that the two services be merged into one, as they had been before 1947. There seemed no other way to harmonize the missile efforts of the two services as long as they were separate.¹⁰

This startling suggestion found no support in OSD. In written comments furnished the House committee between December 1959 and February 1960, Gates, Douglas, Brucker, and Lemnitzer expressed their opposition. Steps had already been taken, they emphasized, to minimize service friction in missile and space programs. The committee did not pursue the matter.¹¹

Land-based Strategic Missiles

The "big four" of land-based missiles—the intermediate-range Thor and Jupiter and the intercontinental Atlas and Titan—were approaching operational status by 1958. The first two had been successfully flight-tested in 1957. Atlas did not make a full-range flight until November 1958, and Titan until still later (February 1960). Nevertheless, plans already under way provided for deploying all four, Thor and Jupiter in Europe and Alaska and Atlas and Titan within the contiguous United States. Together with Polaris, these projects enjoyed the highest national priority.¹²

The force objectives for ICBMs, approved in connection with the FY 1959 budget, called for 9 squadrons of Atlas and 4 of Titan—a total of 13. An Air Force proposal for 11 Titan squadrons had not been approved by OSD. The 11-squadron Titan goal was reaffirmed in the FY 1959 development plan that the Air Force submitted to the OSD Ballistic Missiles Committee on 12 June 1958. The plan also envisioned improvements for Atlas, beginning with the third squadron, including partial hardening and

dispersal of missile launchers in three complexes of three each (instead of a single complex of nine launchers), so as to present three targets for attack instead of one. The BMC approved most of the plan on 13 August but withheld approval of the 11-squadron Titan force.¹³

The BMC was reluctant to endorse a larger Titan program because the missile's scheduled operational date lagged that of Atlas by two full years (July 1961 as contrasted with June 1959), and because of the progress of the solid-fuel Minuteman. Under these conditions, was it advisable even to complete four Titan squadrons? On 14 August 1958 Holaday asked the Air Force to examine the possibility of substituting Atlas for Titan.¹⁴

The Air Force study of this matter, assisted by OSD and the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), lasted three months. The argument for replacing Titan with Atlas boiled down to the savings made possible by eliminating an entire weapon system. On the other hand, retention of Titan would provide a broader missile production base (allowing a more rapid force buildup if circumstances required) and would preserve the advantages of competition at a time when neither missile was fully proven. Moreover, Titan was preferable to Atlas in some respects; its performance characteristics were superior and, being stored in underground silos, it could more easily be protected from overblast.¹⁵

The arguments in favor of Titan carried the day. On 13 November 1958 the Air Force restated its proposal for 11 Titan squadrons. The OSD BMC approved this recommendation shortly thereafter.¹⁶ McElroy included the 11-squadron figure in the FY 1960 budget that he presented to the president on 28 November 1958. The total ICBM force goal thus rose to 20 squadrons, including the 9 Atlas units already approved.¹⁷

The NSC and the president formally approved the budget on 6 December. Later, in approving the record of action of this NSC meeting, the president specifically directed that the record show approval of the 20-squadron program.¹⁸

Minuteman was meanwhile proceeding apace. Congress voted extra funds in FY 1959 to speed up its development. Using all available funds, plus money reprogrammed from other projects (to a total of \$210 million), the Air Force in August 1958 proposed a plan for FY 1962 that would produce missiles excess to research and development beginning in April 1962. These could be deployed to provide a limited operational capability.¹⁹

Holaday referred the plan to the JCS, meanwhile imposing a ceiling of approximately \$100 million on the program. He asked Secretary Douglas to submit a revised plan. Holaday himself favored a slower approach. The Ballistic Missiles Scientific Advisory Committee had warned him that Minuteman might fail to meet its technical objectives on such short notice. Also, proceeding on such a hasty schedule might foreclose promising alternatives, such as use of storable (noncryogenic) liquid propellants.²⁰

The JCS reply was delayed for some months by a service dispute. The Navy contended that Polaris was superior to Minuteman and could

meet the need for a solid-fueled ICBM.²¹ During the interim the Air Force recommended that Minuteman be given the highest national priority rating, and on 8 November Holaday asked the JCS to advise him on this matter.²²

The Air Force Minuteman plan had been previously submitted to the OSD BMC as a matter of course, although there was at that time no formal requirement to do so. On 20 October Quarles formally notified Douglas that, in view of the importance of Minuteman and its close relationship with other ballistic missile programs, all development plans for Minuteman were to be submitted to the BMC.²³

On 22 November Air Force representatives appeared before Quarles and Holaday, not to submit a revised development plan (which was not yet ready), but to gain approval for Minuteman as a weapon system rather than merely a development program. Holaday granted this approval on 8 December, noting that it did not constitute authorization for any commitments other than planning.²⁴

Partly on the basis of the encouraging results of this 22 November meeting, Air Force officials, in revising the Minuteman plan, proposed to raise the ceiling to \$184 million. The increased funds would avert a slip-page in development and make it possible to meet the deployment goal set for the end of FY 1963. The OSD BMC approved this revised plan on 11 December, noting that at the current stage of development July 1963 could not be established as a firm deployment date.²⁵

The FY 1960 budget had meanwhile gone to Congress. The administration allotted \$260 million for continued research and development of Minuteman, but no money for production facilities.²⁶

On 19 February 1959 the JCS resubmitted their long-delayed reply to Holaday's request for recommendations regarding Minuteman. They concluded that it was impracticable to fix a specific year as critical, but that Minuteman was required "as soon as possible without a crash program." Therefore, Minuteman should receive the highest priority rating in DoD (though they did not recommend a high national priority). The decision to begin production should be made when warranted by development progress, in accord with established DoD procedures; at that time, the JCS should be informed so that they could recommend force goals.²⁷

By this time hearings on the FY 1960 budget were in full swing. They took place against a background of rising concern about a "missile gap" that would give the Soviets a numerical advantage in ICBMs within a few years. During House hearings, Representative Mahon asked Douglas how the United States could have a "crash" or "semicrash" program "to more or less keep us in the contest numberwise with our competitors." Douglas replied that "matching missile for missile" was not necessary for deterrence.²⁸

The Air Force had already prepared contingency plans in anticipation of a congressional request for an expanded missile program. Assuming that the Soviets would deploy 500 missiles by 1962, there seemed no way

of matching them merely by increasing production of Atlas and Titan. The only hope for filling the gap lay in producing and deploying a missile known as Thoric, a weapon-carrying version of a modified Thor (known as Thor-Able, using second- and third-stage rockets from Vanguard) which the Air Force had developed for long-range test flights.²⁹

In reply to a request from McElroy for a specific proposal to accelerate the missile force, the Air Force on 14 April proposed a goal of 29 squadrons (17 Atlas, 12 Titan) plus 150 Minuteman missiles, all to be achieved by June 1963. This would give a total of 440 missiles, 60 fewer than the estimated Soviet force; the deficit would be filled by creating Thoric squadrons, but only if "politically necessary." The plan would require a decision to begin production of Minuteman between October 1959 and April 1960. The cost would be \$3.725 billion during FYs 1960-63, plus an additional \$757 million for Thoric.³⁰

OSD took no immediate action on this proposal, nor does it appear that deployment of Thoric ever received serious consideration. However, the OSD BMC discussed the Minuteman portion of the proposal and approved it in principle on 13 May 1959, a decision confirmed by Holaday on 1 June. The BMC also recommended asking the JCS to propose force levels and production rates for Minuteman, assuming that a decision on production could be made between October 1959 and April 1960. Gates relayed this request to the JCS on 29 June.³¹

The Air Force proposal of 14 April went forward to the House Appropriations Committee, where its influence was immediate. On 28 April the committee reported out a bill providing for acceleration of Minuteman and for 8 more Atlas squadrons, making a total of 17. The House approved this extra money, as did the Senate, despite McElroy's objection. The final legislation retained the increase but contained no instructions on how it was to be spent. The fiscal year ended with the 20-squadron Atlas/Titan objective still in force, and with no approved Minuteman force objectives.*

Earlier in 1959 the Air Force had proposed further improvements for both Atlas and Titan. Launchers would be dispersed in 9 sites instead of 3 (a so-called "1x9" configuration instead of "3x3"). For Titan, beginning with the seventh squadron, the changes included all-inertial (as distinct from radio-inertial) guidance not subject to jamming; introduction of a noncryogenic liquid propellant; and arrangements to launch the missiles directly from silos, without first having to elevate them to ground level.³²

The Titan improvements had been endorsed by the Ballistic Missiles Scientific Advisory Committee and by a panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee (chaired by Kistiakowsky, soon to become the science adviser) that surveyed the ballistic missile program in April 1959. The OSD BMC noted them on 1 May but took no action pending submission of a

* See Chapter X.

development plan for FY 1960. On 4 June York, asserting his authority in this field for the first time, asked for and received full information about the proposed changes in Titan.³³

Minuteman was also undergoing improvement in design, in this instance through the development of a mobile version, to be placed on railroad cars and moved about by train. In part, the Air Force felt impelled toward this step by criticism from Navy officials, who contrasted the rigidity of the original Minuteman with the mobility of Polaris. General Power, CINCSAC, was particularly insistent on the need for a mobile Minuteman. The PSAC Ballistic Missiles Panel, in a report on 22 April, endorsed the SAC requirement for mobility of 10 percent of the Minuteman force.³⁴

The concept for the mobile Minuteman envisioned trains of 11 to 15 cars, each train carrying 3 to 5 missiles. These would range back and forth on tracks in the northwestern reaches of the country. Plans for mounting Minuteman on barges or trucks were also considered but discarded.³⁵

By the middle of 1959 the question of a national priority rating for Minuteman had come to the fore. When the OSD BMC discussed the subject on 13 May, it interpreted the JCS memorandum of 19 February as a recommendation for the highest national priority for Minuteman. However, the members postponed action, fearing the impact that such a rating would have on other programs. There would in fact be competition with Polaris and Nike-Zeus for materials and skilled personnel, as Assistant Secretary McGuire told the BMC on 29 June.³⁶

After considering the matter, the BMC recommended that the research and development phase of Minuteman receive the highest priority, subject to a careful monitoring of possible conflicts by McGuire's office. The question of a similar priority for Minuteman production was deferred pending further progress of the program and determination of force levels.³⁷

McElroy accordingly proposed to the NSC that Minuteman receive the highest priority, without drawing a distinction between its research and production phases. At the same time he proposed dropping Thor and Jupiter from the priority list, since they were well along in production. Also, the general priority listing for antiballistic missile defense should be replaced by a specific listing of the two elements of the system under development, namely, Nike-Zeus and BMEWS. The president and the NSC approved these recommendations on 18 August, stipulating that the priority for Nike-Zeus applied only to research and development.³⁸

By this time the first U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile, Atlas, was approaching operational status. The first successful full-range test flight on 28 November 1958 was followed on 18 December by Project SCORE, when an Atlas boosted a "talking satellite" into orbit. The first Atlas operational complex was completed in January 1959 at Vandenberg AFB, the second at the same location in July. The Air Force set 30 June 1959 as the date for the initial operational capability of Atlas.³⁹

This target date was not met. A run of unsuccessful flight tests necessitated a postponement. Following the last one on 6 June, the Air Force suspended the Atlas flight test program and hastily assembled a panel of scientific advisers who, in a two-day meeting (17-18 June 1959), reviewed the program and found reason for confidence. Recent failures, they concluded, were of the type to be expected in such a complex weapon, and appropriate action had already been taken to correct flaws.⁴⁰

Four successful flight tests, two in July and two in August, vindicated the judgment of the scientists. On 31 August the Air Force Research and Development Command turned over to the Strategic Air Command the first operational complex of three launchers at Vandenberg AFB. On the following day, 1 September, the Air Force pronounced the Atlas operational.⁴¹

The president had meanwhile become concerned about the rising costs of missile bases. The PSAC Ballistic Missiles Panel had cited this as a problem calling for serious study. Titan bases were particularly expensive, principally owing to the need to provide storage facilities for fuel. In the NSC on 13 May, the president directed that everything possible be done to reduce costs of liquid-fueled missiles, especially of their bases.⁴²

McElroy directed Holaday to form a working group to review cost increases associated with the switch from completely "soft" to fully hardened and dispersed installations (which, according to his information, had doubled construction costs). He did not question the need for this change, but wanted a review of elements contributing to the cost increase—for example, the requirement for a 15-minute reaction time, which had been established for the "soft" configuration.⁴³

Reporting on 20 November, a working group established by Brig. Gen. Betts concluded that the cost problem stemmed from the tight time schedules associated with "crash" aspects of the ICBM program, coupled with long lead times dictated by the complexity of the weapons. Often design decisions had to be made before test results became available. The group did not favor a return to "soft" installations, but suggested reducing the dispersal distance for fully hardened missiles (then 18 miles) to 9 miles for Atlas and 6 for the silo-launched Titan.⁴⁴

It followed from the study that not much could be done to reduce the cost of missile installations. The report apparently never went to the president, although Kistiakowsky briefed him on its findings on 4 August while the study was in progress. The president thought it might be better to design cheaper and less complex missiles. Two weeks later, to the NSC, he repeated his exhortation that all efforts be made to hold down base costs.⁴⁵

The Air Force reviewed ICBM force goals in the latter part of 1959 in connection with budgeting for 1961, raising objectives for Atlas and Titan from 26 to 28 squadrons, with an IOC for Minuteman by June 1962. The Atlas squadrons, beginning with the fifth, would use the 1x9 dispersal configuration; the last 8 Titan squadrons would be of the improved

type (now known as Titan II), with storable liquid fuel and in-silo launch. The Air Force then came up with still another plan (known as the "K" program) for 27 squadrons (13 Atlas, 14 Titan), proposing to submit a formal development plan on that basis.⁴⁶

Pending submission of this plan, York on 3 November, acting on advice from the BMC, consented to the improvements in Atlas and Titan. He made it clear, however, that the currently approved 20-squadron level remained in effect.⁴⁷

Proposals to enlarge the Titan force came at an inopportune time, since the missile was then encountering the sort of difficulties that had earlier plagued Atlas. The first successful test firing of a Titan on 6 February 1959 was followed by three others over the next three months. There ensued two unsuccessful attempts in August, plus several serious accidents. Once again the Air Force investigated and concluded that the design of the missile was sound. The problems had to do with ground support and launching facilities and with organization and execution of test procedures, these latter difficulties in turn stemming partly from managerial problems. The contractor (Martin Company) instituted personnel changes to correct the situation.⁴⁸

With the approach of budget deadlines, McElroy referred the 27-squadron plan to Kistiakowsky, who approved it after discussing it with York. McElroy then incorporated it in the 1961 budget which he submitted to the president on 16 November. The president readily approved the larger goal for Atlas but demurred over Titan, having heard of its difficulties. Kistiakowsky characterized it as superior to Atlas in design and engineering but added that it was a "management mess." Eisenhower decided to approve the Titan increase in principle but to withhold announcement of the three additional squadrons until the storable liquid propellant was considered fully proven.⁴⁹

On 4 January 1960 Gates, now secretary, formally recommended the 27-squadron program to the NSC. The last of the Atlas squadrons would be operational by December 1962, Titan by February 1964. The NSC endorsed this request and the president approved it on 13 January. These objectives—13 Atlas and 14 Titan squadrons—remained in effect through 1960. The OSD BMC approved a development plan for FY 1961 on that basis on 17 February 1960.⁵⁰

The Minuteman program also went through a period of uncertainty and frequent changes in 1959-60. On 12 October 1959 the JCS submitted their views on Minuteman force levels and buildup rates, in accord with Gates's previous request of 29 June. They reaffirmed their earlier view that Minuteman was required as soon as possible without a "crash" program. They disagreed, however, on specific numbers for the program. General Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke believed that facilities to produce 50 missiles during the first year would provide an adequate production base—one that, judging by experience, could increase production to 200 missiles the next year. Establishing force levels at that time appeared

premature, but they judged that a total force of 300-500 missiles would be appropriate. General White recommended 150 operational missiles by the end of FY 1963; this number would make economical use of 1 production facility, which would then be available to meet additional requirements. He also endorsed the Air Force objective of approximately 800 missiles by the end of FY 1964.

General Twining, in forwarding these views to McElroy, agreed with Lemnitzer and Burke that it was too early to determine force levels, since these would be affected by the matter of target selection then under study by the JCS and OSD. In the interim, he endorsed the Air Force first-year plan, which would provide a flexible production capacity.⁵¹

To meet the IOC target date of 1962 for Minuteman, as the Air Force desired, production must begin soon. On 28 October the Air Force submitted to OSD BMC a proposal to proceed at once using FY 1960 funds, with site selection, design, and construction of a production facility with a capability of 30 missiles per month. The BMC approved the proposed facility, specifying that this action did not constitute approval for production of missiles for operational deployment. The committee also agreed that no additional production facilities would be approved unless force levels requiring a higher production rate were sanctioned by the secretary of defense and the NSC. York transmitted this decision to the Air Force on 5 November 1959.⁵²

The Air Force announced on 27 November 1959 that production facilities for the first stage Minuteman would be constructed near Ogden and Brigham City, Utah. In December the Air Force selected Malmstrom AFB, Montana, as the support base for the first Minuteman wing and Hill AFB, Utah, as the support base for the first mobile squadron. On 25 March 1960 it announced that three Minuteman squadrons would be housed at Malmstrom, with construction scheduled to begin in January 1961.⁵³

In the FY 1961 budget, the Minuteman program followed the plan submitted by the Air Force in August 1959, with an IOC beginning in mid-1962. Money was provided to begin production of the missile in operational quantities and for construction of base facilities.⁵⁴

The Air Force continued to press hard for bigger missile programs. In a new plan submitted to OSD BMC on 12 January 1960, it affirmed a goal of 150 missiles by end FY 1963, with 400 by the end of December 1963. A proposed second production facility would double output to 60 per month. The OSD BMC authorized production commitments as needed to achieve the FY 1963 goal of 150 missiles but withheld action on other parts of the plan.⁵⁵ Deputy Secretary Douglas informed the Air Force of this decision on 25 March. At the same time, he asked Gray to obtain formal presidential authorization for the Minuteman force goals sought by the Air Force.⁵⁶

The NSC accordingly discussed the matter on 1 April. Douglas, in recommending the Air Force plan, said that, if successful, it would

close the so-called "missile gap." There were no firm plans, he added, beyond 400 missiles by the end of December 1963, although a figure of 800 had been mentioned. The president clearly regarded this latter number as beyond the bounds of reason. "Why don't we go completely crazy and plan on a force of 10,000?" he asked in "obvious disgust," according to Kistiakowsky. Nevertheless he approved the plan, though he added that he wished to keep in close touch with the Minuteman program, since the missile had not yet been fully tested.⁵⁷

Congress meanwhile was thinking in terms of a still larger and faster missile buildup. During budget hearings, Mahon's subcommittee asked for and received from the Air Force information on the cost of accelerating the production of all three land-based ICBMs.⁵⁸

On the other hand, some legislators, aware of the problems encountered by Titan, questioned the spending of money to upgrade that missile. They revived an idea rejected earlier by the administration, namely, to replace Titan with Atlas. Gates and other officials pointed out that such a step would mean throwing away the entire investment in Titan (some \$1.7 billion) and would forfeit its advantages over Atlas; Congress allowed the matter to drop.⁵⁹

The Air Force, however, continued to examine possibilities of speeding up the missile force. A revised Air Force program presented to the House in March 1960, with the approval of Gates and the president, provided for expansion of the proposed Minuteman production facility and increasing the last 6 Atlas squadrons from 9 to 12 missiles and launchers. These changes, plus improvements in ballistic missile defense, would be offset by reductions in defense against conventional aircraft. In the end, Congress accepted the administration budget, including the revisions, but added money to accelerate the mobile Minuteman program.⁶⁰

The only ICBM squadron in operational status, the Atlas unit at Vandenberg AFB, had gone into operation on 1 September 1959. The Air Force schedule called for the next three Atlas squadrons to become operational between March and November 1960 and for Titan squadrons to be activated beginning in January 1961; the entire Atlas and Titan force would be in place by June 1963.⁶¹

This schedule suffered disruptions from delays in base construction that became acute in the summer of 1960. The difficulty began with a four-month steel strike in 1959. Subsequently other developments, some of which could not have been foreseen, contributed further to a lag. The inherent difficulty of construction had been underestimated, and was compounded by frequent program changes and attempts to speed up the process. Other contributing causes of delay included jurisdictional strikes at construction sites; managerial inefficiency by some contractors and subcontractors; and division of responsibility between the Army Corps of Engineers, which was responsible for construction, and the Air Force. By July 1960 schedules for 8 of the first 9 Atlas squadrons had slipped by as much as 4-6 months.⁶²

Secretary Gates moved swiftly to prevent further slippage and to recover lost ground. On 29 July he presided over a meeting with representatives of some 50 contracting firms. He listened to their suggestions for improving design and procedures and exhorted them to do their utmost to overcome the delays. Discussions between Army and Air Force officials clarified responsibilities, and the Army set up a new headquarters for missile base construction that took over the responsibility formerly scattered among engineer districts. On 30 July Gates announced that the program would be back on schedule by January 1961.⁶³

For the 1962 budget, the Air Force sought to increase the output of Atlas missiles, then being produced at a rate of 10 per month. It estimated that it had need for a minimum of 12 per month for weapons requirements and 14 to provide for space boosters and targets for the Nike-Zeus antimissile system. The OSD BMC, however, authorized only 12 per month.⁶⁴

For Minuteman, a development plan submitted by the Air Force in August 1960 called for 1,525 missiles by the end of FY 1965 and a production rate of 60 per month. The first fixed-base squadron would become operational in February 1962 and the first mobile squadron four months later. By the end of FY 1963 there would be 150 operational missiles (120 fixed, 30 mobile). The BMC approved most of the plan but vetoed the increase in production capacity.⁶⁵

In November 1960, in submitting a deployment schedule for Minuteman, the Air Force again sought to increase the production rate. The BMC again refused but approved a goal of 540 missiles (450 fixed, 90 mobile) by mid-1964, plus a construction program for the second, third, and fourth Minuteman wings (9 squadrons).⁶⁶

The goal of 540 Minuteman missiles received formal approval from the NSC in January 1961, as part of the process of updating policy decisions (including those relating to missiles) in connection with the impending change of administration. NSC 6108, approved by the council on 18 January, listed the objective for each long-range missile program and stressed the urgency. "There would be the gravest repercussions on the national security and on the cohesion of the Free World," asserted the document, "should the USSR achieve an operational capability with the ICBM substantially in advance of the United States."⁶⁷

In sending the 1962 budget to Congress, the president announced that it would substantially complete procurement of Atlas and initiate the first major procurement of Minuteman. Most of the 27-squadron Atlas-Titan force would be operational by the end of FY 1962, and Minuteman would enter the arsenal during the same calendar year.⁶⁸

Thus at the end of 1960 the United States had ready for action only the nine Atlas missiles and their launchers at Vandenberg AFB, though these were soon to be joined by other Atlases and Titans. Minuteman, waiting in the wings, had not yet been flight tested; it would soon render liquid-fueled missiles obsolete. A smaller version (Midgetman), weighing

only 10,000 pounds, was being developed by the Air Force under the direction of ODDR&E.⁶⁹

Had general war erupted in 1960, the United States would have had to rely principally on its fleet of bombers, with little assistance from land-based ballistic missiles. One other intercontinental missile, however, was available by then—Snark, the lumbering aerodynamic (or “cruise”) missile, begun well before Atlas but now relegated to obsolescence by technological progress. In October 1957 Snark became the first U.S. missile to complete a flight of intercontinental range (5,000 miles), although it took more than 8 hours to do so.⁷⁰

In December 1957 the Air Force planned a single Snark wing with two squadrons. Activated in January 1959, the wing performed test operations at Patrick AFB, Florida, then moved to its permanent location at Presque Isle AFB, Maine, in July 1959. Snark was declared operational in March 1960. However, President Kennedy discontinued it soon after assuming office.⁷¹

The IRBM, like the ICBM, made the transition from development to operational status before the end of 1960. The size of the IRBM program, however, was steadily whittled down. In April 1958 the NSC set a goal of 12 squadrons (9 Thor, 3 Jupiter).⁷² For the FY 1960 budget, McElroy proposed, and the president agreed, to reduce the objective to 8 squadrons (5 Thor, 3 Jupiter), for which production commitments had already been made, with the understanding that 2 more squadrons might be added if NATO requested them within the next few months and if military aid funds were available.⁷³ The extra requirements did not materialize, and in October 1959 OSD approved the cancellation of one of the Thor squadrons. Earlier, in August 1959, at McElroy's request, the NSC dropped Thor and Jupiter from the priority list.⁷⁴

At first, when it had in prospect a 16-squadron IRBM force, the Air Force proposed to deploy 2 of the squadrons to Alaska. Later, it abandoned this proposal and the ultimate seven-squadron force was committed to NATO—four Thors to the United Kingdom, two Jupiters to Italy, and one to Turkey. By the end of 1960 the Thor squadrons had been installed and turned over to the Royal Air Force. The Jupiter squadrons in Italy were under construction; that for Turkey was under discussion.⁷⁵

To supplement the land-based strategic force the Air Force sought missiles designed for launching from long-range bombers, thereby extending the range and penetrating power of these aircraft. The first such weapon, begun in 1957, was GAM-77, later called Hound Dog. An aerodynamic missile with a 500-mile range, its target date for operational status was 1961, but improvements in Soviet air defenses made it necessary to advance the deadline. Early in 1958, as part of a supplemental FY 1959 budget request, the JCS included GAM-77 among the projects recommended for acceleration, and McElroy approved \$91 million for the purpose. Hound Dog became operational in May 1960.⁷⁶

A more advanced such weapon, GAM-87, or Skybolt, projected to have

twice the range of Hound Dog, began in 1958 as an Air Force research project. When ODDR&E reviewed the project in 1959, it withheld full funding until the JCS could be consulted about the need for the weapon. The JCS split, the Army and Navy chiefs desiring more information before deciding, but OSD budgeted a modest \$80 million for FY 1961. After further reviews by ODDR&E and PSAC, the JCS agreed in December 1959 that research should continue, but the weapon should not be placed in production until it had been proven. Two months later OSD approved Skybolt as a weapon system and granted additional research funds. Meanwhile the British had become interested in Skybolt, which had been designed to be compatible with British bombers, and in 1960 their desire to obtain it became entangled with the issue of U.S. bases in Britain for Polaris submarines. Nonetheless, doubts persisted about the effectiveness of the system and the need for it given the availability of other strategic weapons, and OSD allotted no funds for it in the 1962 budget. At the end of 1960 Skybolt remained under development, with a possible target date of 1964 or 1965.⁷⁷

Polaris

The submarine-launched Polaris weapon system proved to be one of the outstanding accomplishments of U.S. technology. As its success unfolded, the administration steadily enlarged the objectives, though not to the extent desired by Navy officials, who regarded Polaris as an invulnerable deterrent.

The Polaris submarine construction program began in 1957 when the administration requested money in the FY 1959 budget to construct three vessels. The IOC target date had been advanced to early 1960, although it would require reducing the range of the missile from 1,500 to 1,200 miles. Two more submarines were sought in the supplemental FY 1959 budget request sent to Congress early in 1958. Congress inserted money for four more, but the administration did not at once plan to spend the extra funds, and the officially approved program as of the end of FY 1958 was five vessels.⁷⁸

In July 1958 the director of the Polaris program, Admiral Raborn, asked the OSD BMC to release funds to contract for long lead-time components for the four additional submarines authorized by Congress. He pointed out that the components could be used for other nuclear submarines if the Polaris vessels were not built. The BMC approved the request with the stipulation that its action did not constitute a commitment to increase the number of authorized ships.⁷⁹

Subsequently, in developing the FY 1960 budget, McElroy tentatively approved the release of funds on 1 January 1959 for construction of a sixth Polaris submarine and for three more on 1 July 1959. He also authorized funds for long lead-time procurement for three additional

vessels. This would make a total of 12 vessels authorized. Holaday, from whom McElroy had asked an evaluation of the Polaris program, wanted a faster rate of progress. He urged release of construction funds for two in January 1959 and four more in July. McElroy, however, did not adopt his recommendations.⁸⁰ The president approved McElroy's 12-ship program, though with some reluctance, since the proposal to increase land-based ICBM squadrons from 13 to 20 came at the same time, and he felt that the United States might be overinsuring itself.⁸¹

For the first 5 missile submarines the Navy converted hulls already under construction. The next 4 would be of an improved type, larger (410 feet versus 382 feet in length), designed as missile submarines from the outset, and capable of quieter operation and deeper submergence. The Navy announcement of the planned construction of these four vessels on 31 December 1958 referred to FBM (fleet ballistic missile) submarines as "ships," a term more appropriate, in view of their size, than the traditional designation of submarines as "boats."⁸²

Likewise it was deemed undignified to name these powerful underwater vessels, with firepower far transcending that of all previous submarines, after fish, as had been customary. President Eisenhower himself made the decision to name them after famous Americans, beginning, appropriately, with George Washington.⁸³

The progress of Polaris doomed another weapon, Regulus II, a cruise missile designed for both submarines and surface ships, then nearing operational status. Much slower than Polaris (with a speed of Mach 2 as compared with Mach 15), Regulus had a range limited to 1,000 miles. In formulating the 1960 budget, McElroy canceled Regulus II and the president acquiesced in the decision.⁸⁴

The Navy continued to raise its sights. Already, in quick succession, Navy officials had submitted a plan to have 11 submarines ready for sea by the end of 1962, then 15 in 1962, and 27 by the end of 1963. McElroy took no action.⁸⁵

Navy Department officials had ambitious goals for the ultimate Polaris force. An early objective, set in 1957, asked for 39 ships to be constructed over a 5-year period. In August 1959 Budget Director Stans was told that the goal was 45, of which 29 would be deployed at all times. This figure of 45 subsequently gained wide circulation. In an NSC meeting on 25 July 1960, the president remarked that he had heard that the final objective was 40 vessels; Admiral Burke replied that it was 50. Such figures, used by the Navy for planning purposes, had no official standing.⁸⁶

The first FBM submarine, the USS *George Washington* (SSBN-598), was launched at Groton, Connecticut, on 9 June 1959 and commissioned six months later. Three more, named respectively for Patrick Henry, Theodore Roosevelt, and Robert E. Lee, followed before the end of 1959. All these vessels carried the 1,200-mile missile (later designated A-1). The 1,500-mile A-2 was scheduled to go into service with the eighth ship.⁸⁷

For FY 1961, the Navy submitted a "basic" budget request for

construction of two vessels and advance procurement for two more. The "addendum" request would raise these numbers to four each. An augmented program, designated as "essential" by the Navy, would allow construction of 9 and long lead-time procurement for 12, but it apparently received little or no consideration. McElroy and Gates compromised and, as in the previous budget, approved a "three and three" program. It would raise the total authorization to 15, with 12 fully funded. The president and the NSC approved this program on 7 January 1960.⁸⁸

Gates told the House Appropriations Committee that the administration intended to continue its "three a year" program until the entire Polaris system had been fully tested. If it proved out sooner than expected, a larger program would be considered. Burke, even more specific, told the Senate Appropriations Committee that "we expect to come to the Congress with a supplemental request for additional POLARIS submarines and perhaps for POLARIS in surface ships before this Congress adjourns."⁸⁹

Indicating the fluid state of the program, Secretary Franke told Gates on 7 March 1960 that the deployment dates of the last 7 FBM ships under construction could be advanced by periods ranging up to 14 weeks. The extra money could be obtained by reprogramming, though it would later have to be replaced through appropriations; otherwise some other Navy ships would have to be canceled. On 25 March Acting Secretary Douglas approved the accelerated deployment dates.⁹⁰ A more sweeping change, proposed by Franke on 8 March, would increase to 6 or perhaps to 9 the number of submarines to be fully funded in 1961 and initiate development of a missile with a range of up to 2,500 nautical miles, as had been recommended by the BMC Scientific Advisory Committee.⁹¹

Without committing himself to any of these proposals, Gates discussed with the president on 18 March 1960 the general question of speeding up Polaris. The president pointed out that there had still been no operational test of the missile; for that reason, he was reluctant to approve a larger program. Gates replied that an underwater test firing was scheduled for August, but that he would like to take some action before then. The extended-range missile, he added, was desirable but, in his view, had a lower priority than ship construction. The president suggested long lead-time procurement for 12 vessels. Subsequently, on 23 March, Eisenhower directed OSD to make a "quick study" of the cost of long lead time items for six or nine ships, with the money possibly to be raised through reprogramming.⁹²

The president's final decision, reached in a meeting with Gates on 6 April, favored a "three and nine" program—three vessels fully funded (already provided in the 1961 budget) and advance procurement for nine more. He also approved extension of the range of the Polaris missile to 2,500 miles, provided that the Navy funded it through reprogramming.⁹³

Congress again had its own ideas; the legislators rejected the "three and nine" program in favor of "five and seven," i.e., they wanted construction started on five instead of three vessels. Gates apparently intended

from the outset to make full use of the added money provided by Congress. The Bureau of the Budget, however, allotted funds for advance procurement for only five vessels, thus producing a "five and five" program. Gates recommended going ahead with this program as one of the measures he proposed to the president in July 1960 to strengthen U.S. defenses.⁹⁴

Gates's hand was strengthened when, on 20 July 1960, two Polaris missiles fired from underwater by the *George Washington* landed on target 1,150 miles away.⁹⁵ The president, his caution fully satisfied by this spectacularly successful test, enthusiastically approved the five and five program. He informed Congress on 8 August that five Polaris submarines would be started in FY 1961.⁹⁶

The 5 and 5 program meant a total authorization of 19 ships (14 under construction, 5 subject to advance procurement). It thus superseded the 15-ship program approved by the NSC in January 1960. The council approved the 19-ship program on 5 October 1960.⁹⁷

Now fully convinced of the value of Polaris, the administration included in the FY 1962 budget another five and five program—advance procurement for five vessels and full funding for the same number, i.e., the five authorized for long lead-time procurement in the previous year's budget. Thus, the total objective as the Eisenhower administration went out of office had grown to 24 Polaris submarines.⁹⁸

The 2,500-mile missile (A-3, as it was later designated) became the subject of separate action. On 18 July 1960 Douglas, in his capacity as chairman of the OSD BMC, authorized funds for the Navy to begin advance planning. Gates cleared with York a Navy proposal for a full-scale research and development program and obtained the approval of the president, who announced it to Congress on 8 August, without mentioning the actual range of the missile.⁹⁹

The equipment of appropriate surface ships with Polaris missiles, under study for some time, gained new importance from the cancellation of Regulus II, which had been scheduled for such ship installation. On 6 April 1959 then-Secretary of the Navy Gates informed McElroy that the Navy had selected five guided-missile cruisers for Polaris installation. The first, to begin immediately, would be the USS *Columbus* (CG 12); the second would be the USS *Long Beach* (CGN 9), one of the first two surface ships (along with the carrier *Enterprise*) to use nuclear propulsion. Money would come from reprogramming, and the president and committees of Congress would be informed "in accord with existing procedures." Shortly thereafter Gates indicated that Polaris installations would proceed concurrently in the two cruisers.¹⁰⁰

Gates evidently did not consider it necessary to obtain advance approval from higher authority for these steps. However, a memorandum from McNeil to the Navy in September 1958 had specified that advance approval was required for any reprogramming actions exceeding \$6 million. On 7 April 1959, therefore, the Navy Department asked McNeil's office to approve reprogramming for the *Columbus* installation. Thus the

matter came to the attention of McElroy, who sought the advice of the JCS on the proposed installation.¹⁰¹

Before the JCS could reply, a copy of Gates's memorandum of 6 April found its way, through BoB channels, to the president's special assistant, Gray. He telephoned Quarles and informed him that the proposed surface ship installation would violate the president's instructions that any changes in the "operational capability" of missiles must have presidential approval. Quarles replied that this approval would be sought "in the NSC context." The following day Quarles in turn called Gray to inquire how he had obtained the memorandum, adding that the matter had caused "great consternation" in DoD. Gray declined to reveal his sources over the telephone. Reporting this incident to the president on 22 April, Gray remarked that it seemed to have struck an "open nerve" in DoD. The president expressed concern at "devious efforts" to sidestep established procedures and instructed Gray to make certain that the directive regarding missile capabilities was enforced.¹⁰²

The JCS split over the advisability of the proposed surface ship installation. Burke favored it; Taylor and White wanted further study of its cost and relationship to other strategic systems.¹⁰³

Gates (now deputy secretary of defense) discussed the matter with Admiral Radford, who was substituting for the ailing General Twining. They agreed that conversion of surface ships to Polaris was desirable but favored a smaller initial program than the Navy had proposed. Gates and Burke urged McElroy to allow the Navy to proceed with the installation on one or two ships so that the system could be evaluated. McElroy, however, turned down the plan entirely, and so informed the JCS on 17 June 1959. Like Taylor and White, he believed the system should be evaluated further.¹⁰⁴

The matter remained in abeyance for some months. In March 1960 Navy Secretary Franke recommended installation of Polaris on at least one surface ship, with funds coming from the 1961 budget. Gates, however, took no action, and on 17 October 1960 Franke again raised the issue. He told Gates that the question of installation of Polaris in the *Long Beach* was still pending; apparently he regarded McElroy's earlier decision as applying only to the *Columbus*. He forwarded a memorandum from Burke arguing the value of thus arming a surface ship—converting it into a single ship task force.¹⁰⁵

The acting DDR&E, John H. Rubel, concluded, on the basis of a Navy briefing, that there appeared to be no major technical obstacles but that the proposal had both tactical and strategic implications and suggested that the JCS evaluate it. The JCS accordingly restudied the matter and reached the same conclusions as before: Burke favored the proposal, White and Lemnitzer opposed it. Nevertheless Gates overruled the majority. On 5 January 1961, with the approval of the president, he authorized the Navy to install Polaris missiles on the *Long Beach* provided the funds came from reprogramming. McElroy's earlier directive, disapproving the proposal in general, remained in effect; this single exception,

wrote Gates, was intended to review the potential of the surface ship Polaris.¹⁰⁶

The Eisenhower administration, about to go out of office, could bequeath to its successor a ballistic missile submarine program that had become operational. On 15 November 1960 the *George Washington*, armed with its full complement of 16 missiles, slipped out of the navy yard at Charleston, South Carolina, and took up patrol duties in the Atlantic—more than 6 months ahead of the accelerated target date of June 1961 set by the Navy in 1957, and over 2 years earlier than the initial objective of January 1963. A sister ship, *Patrick Henry*, joined it on patrol on 30 December.¹⁰⁷

The nation now had a seaborne deterrent to add to its small but growing arsenal of land-based missiles. As the *George Washington* went to sea, President Eisenhower hailed the event. "Roving and hidden under the seas," he declared, "with 16 thermonuclear missiles apiece, the *George Washington* and her following sisterships possess a power and relative invulnerability which will make suicidal any attempt by an aggressor to attack the free world by surprise."¹⁰⁸

The Antimissile Missile

However "suicidal" it might be for an aggressor to think of hurling missiles at the United States, the possibility that such an event might one day occur could not be ignored. The search for an effective defense against ballistic missiles had been given the highest priority. Under the assignment of responsibility made by McElroy in January 1958, the Army was developing its Nike-Zeus antimissile missile, with associated tracking and guidance radars; the Air Force was to design and construct the long-range radars for a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). Research into more advanced methods of detection fell to ARPA. A steering group headed by Hector R. Skifter monitored the overall effort.*

Between 1958 and 1960 the history of the antimissile program dealt largely with the Army's effort to push Nike-Zeus into production, against the opposition of those in OSD who considered such a step premature. The first effort came during preparation of the FY 1960 budget. The Army proposed to include \$875 million (later increased to slightly over \$1 billion), looking toward an objective of 58 Nike-Zeus batteries at a total cost of some \$7 billion. Skifter's steering group cut this to \$708 million for 29 batteries. Quarles referred the group's report to the JCS, who split on the question of beginning production. Taylor favored it; the other members believed that Nike-Zeus should be limited to research at that time. Holaday sided with the JCS majority, but he proposed \$40 million to prepare for production, plus \$300 million for research. McElroy

*See Chapter VII.

allotted only the latter item, and in November 1958 the president upheld him, remarking that too much money had been wasted by going prematurely into production.¹⁰⁹

Congress, however, showed great interest in Nike-Zeus. The House Appropriations Committee drew from several Army officials a statement that, in their opinion, the time had come to initiate production of the missile. The House accordingly included an extra \$200 million in procurement money to accelerate the Nike-Zeus program or to modernize Army ground equipment.¹¹⁰

The role of Nike-Zeus was then undergoing review as part of the discussion of the general problem of continental defense. On 4 March 1959 Killian gave the president a report by a panel of the Science Advisory Committee on the question of defense in the missile age. The study concluded that Nike-Zeus could not become effective before 1964 at the earliest; hence passive measures like dispersal, hardening of bases, and improved warning and reaction time seemed more promising than active missile defense.¹¹¹

In a later and more detailed study summarized for the president on 3 June, the PSAC concluded that an active antiballistic missile system could at best serve to protect hardened sites such as missile or bomber bases. Even for this limited purpose, it would not likely become available until 1964-65—long after Soviet ICBMs had become a serious threat. Moreover, the Nike-Zeus system was extremely complex and could probably be confused by sophisticated decoys. Nevertheless the study concluded that Nike-Zeus should go forward, both for the limited protection it would provide and for its possible eventual applicability toward more advanced systems.¹¹²

The master plan for continental air defense submitted to McElroy by the JCS on 2 June 1959 placed major emphasis on the threat from manned aircraft. Taylor included in his recommendations a proposal to begin phasing in Nike-Zeus in FY 1964, with 58 batteries to be deployed by 1967. He denied that the system was as expensive as some had alleged, asserting that it could be paid for largely by savings produced by eliminating the Air Force Bomarc B missile. Burke and White again favored deferring production pending further tests. In their overall comments, the JCS drew attention to this disagreement and noted that CINCNORAD had recommended immediate authorization, out of FY 1960 funds, of at least \$150 million for preproduction procurement and tooling.¹¹³

The object of preproduction would be to develop methods of mass producing the enormous numbers of transistors and other components needed for Nike-Zeus. York told the secretary of defense on 21 March 1959 that with an expenditure of \$150 million to \$200 million for this purpose in FY 1960, delaying a decision on production until the following year would have little effect on the long term.¹¹⁴

The president accepted the weight of majority opinion and continued Nike-Zeus on a limited basis. In ruling on the continental defense master

plan on 9 June 1959, he directed that \$137 million of the extra money voted by the House be used for that purpose. McElroy informed the Senate on 17 June that the administration would accept the \$200 million extra in Army procurement funds, and it was included in the final legislation.¹¹⁵

In drawing up the FY 1961 budget, the administration pushed back still further the beginning of production of Nike-Zeus, thus obviating the need for preproduction in 1961. The decision apparently stemmed from the recommendation of a study group, chaired by Kistiakowsky and Skifter, that Nike-Zeus continue on a research basis at least through 1962. On 1 December 1959 McElroy informed the Army that the \$137 million tentatively allocated for preproduction would not be made available. CINCNORAD General Laurence S. Kuter, USAF, appealed in vain to have this decision reversed; he considered that NORAD had an urgent need for an antimissile weapon.¹¹⁶

The 1961 budget included \$287 million in research money for Nike-Zeus, plus \$15 million for construction of test facilities. "After the most painstaking review," York told the House Appropriations Committee, "it was decided to press forward as rapidly as practicable with the research, development, test and evaluation of this system but not to place it into production." He stressed its complexity and estimated the cost at \$15 billion—over twice the earlier figure.¹¹⁷

Officials of the Department of the Army reacted strongly to the decision to postpone production. Secretary Brucker reportedly instructed his subordinates that, regardless of the DoD decision, the Army position would be to advocate commitment to production immediately. Brucker himself seems to have considered mounting a direct challenge in Congress to the decision. Richard S. Morse, director of research and development for the Department of the Army, told Kistiakowsky that he had witnessed Brucker suggesting leading questions to Democratic senators to bring out his position on Nike-Zeus.¹¹⁸

In the end, however, Brucker decided against challenging the decision, and his conduct during the hearings was irreproachable. He assured the House Appropriations Committee that "the Army is going to follow exactly and to the letter what has been decided" about Nike-Zeus. To the Senate committee, Brucker promised that research would be pushed "to the limit of our ability" but said nothing about production. Lemnitzer went a bit further; he told the House committee that he thought it a mistake not to go ahead with production, and followed up this statement with testimony off the record. In Senate hearings, he cited Nike-Zeus as an area of the budget where he "would have a reservation," but quickly added, "I support this budget."¹¹⁹

By early 1960 Nike-Zeus was nearly ready for tests against moving targets. The Army proposed to test it first against IRBMs, then work up to trials against the faster ICBMs. The OSD BMC approved an Army proposal to launch 30 Jupiter missiles from Johnston Island to the vicinity

of Kwajalein. Both of these islands lay within the area of the Pacific Missile Range, which was managed by the Navy. Quarles approved on 12 February 1960 a cooperative Army-Navy agreement covering details of the test program. The Army began constructing launching facilities on Johnston Island.¹²⁰

In April 1960 York, in the interest of economy, proposed a cutback in the test program. Eliminating testing against IRBMs and substituting ICBMs launched by the Air Force from Vandenberg AFB would save \$75 million, principally by obviating the need to complete the launch facilities on Johnston Island. Brucker disputed this estimate and objected strongly to an arrangement that would leave the Army dependent on the Air Force for controlling test firings. Moreover, he believed Nike-Zeus should be tested against all types of targets, IRBMs as well as ICBMs. York contended that if Nike-Zeus succeeded against ICBMs it could certainly be made effective against IRBMs, but that the reverse was not necessarily true.¹²¹

For assistance in resolving this dispute, Gates turned to Kistiakowsky, who organized an ad hoc panel of the PSAC. Reporting on 26 May 1960, the panel agreed entirely with York. Kistiakowsky endorsed its conclusions, but admitted that his knowledge of the subject was limited. Later, Comptroller Lincoln presented data confirming the projected savings under York's amended plan.¹²²

Reluctant on his own to force an adverse decision upon Brucker, Gates referred the matter to the president, who was at that moment in Seoul, with Kistiakowsky, on a Far Eastern tour. Gates cabled Kistiakowsky and received in reply a presidential decision in favor of York.¹²³

Gates accordingly directed the Department of the Army to procure, through the Air Force, an initial complement of 18 Atlas vehicles for test purposes, and the Air Force to modify at least 2 launch stands at Vandenberg to fire target missiles. An Army-Air Force agreement to carry out this directive was signed on 22 September 1960 and approved by Gates on 28 October.¹²⁴

With the test program not yet ready to begin, there appeared little likelihood that the administration would authorize production of Nike-Zeus in FY 1962, despite further Army efforts in that direction. The Army established a committee headed by Morse which recommended beginning production, and General Kuter again concurred in this recommendation. The budget that went to Congress included money for continued development. Nevertheless the Army continued to push for production; on 4 January 1961 Gates asked the advice of the JCS on the matter, but the administration left office before the JCS replied.¹²⁵

The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System meanwhile proceeded under Air Force direction. It was to consist of three stations equipped with radars for scanning, tracking, and verifying targets. Thule, Greenland, was selected for the site of the first installation. For the second, the Air Force chose a former air base at Clear, near Fairbanks, in central Alaska. The third,

originally planned for Scotland, was eventually located at Fylingdales Moor, Yorkshire, England. The British Government approved the location, and the two countries announced a formal agreement on 17 February 1960.¹²⁶

Construction of the Greenland station began in 1958, and it went into limited operation in September 1960. Earlier, the Air Force had reprogrammed money in the 1961 budget to advance the construction of the stations in Alaska and England, expected to begin operation in 1961 and 1963 respectively.¹²⁷

Satellites

The U.S. satellite program had begun in 1955 with Vanguard, a Navy project intended to serve scientific purposes. The program lagged, however, and was overtaken by the Army's Explorer I satellite, launched on 31 January 1958. By that time all the services had developed a number of satellite projects. The first task given ARPA on its establishment early in 1958 was to coordinate these separate projects into a national satellite program.

The program drafted by ARPA called for launching of the 5 remaining Vanguard vehicles plus 15 others for research purposes, including 5 lunar probes and 6 to detect the effects of high-altitude nuclear explosions, all during 1958 and 1959. The largest part of the program, however, involved 32 reconnaissance satellites to be launched by the Air Force. First would come launches in 1958 to test various components, followed eventually by tests of visual and electronic (ferret) reconnaissance satellites.

This aspect of the program attracted discussion in the NSC when Quarles presented it on 31 July 1958. The president approved it for planning purposes, subject to specific authorization before the launch of satellites capable of reconnaissance over the USSR.¹²⁸

In the ensuing months, the program expanded and the various types of satellites acquired descriptive names. Thus the Air Force general test satellites became Discoverer. The reconnaissance satellite program became Sentry, which in turn split into SAMOS (an acronym for satellite and missile observation system, referring to visual and electronic satellites) and MIDAS (missile detection alarm system), intended to provide very early warning of missile launchings. The Army continued the Explorer series; its reflecting satellite became Beacon. Air Force lunar probes were named Pioneer. Transit was a satellite to provide navigation data, undertaken by the Navy in 1958 under the direction of ARPA.¹²⁹

One project not on ARPA's original schedule, accomplished before the end of 1958, derived from the success of Atlas. ARPA conceived a plan to launch into orbit a stripped-down Atlas carrying approximately 100 pounds of communications equipment to test the potential of using satellites for communications. The PSAC endorsed the proposal, and on 7 August Quarles submitted it to the president for approval. The risk

was high, Quarles warned, since only one launching was contemplated, but it seemed worth taking.¹³⁰

The president approved the project, named SCORE (for "signal communications orbital relay experiment"). The improvised satellite orbited successfully from Cape Canaveral on 18 December 1958. During the planning of the project, a brilliant public relations feature was added—one that the Soviets had not thought of. Why not, it was suggested, seize the opportunity to broadcast to the world, from the satellite, a message from the president of the United States? A startled world accordingly heard from the skies the president's voice recorded on tape. "Through this unique means," proclaimed Eisenhower, "I convey to you and to all mankind America's wish for peace on earth and good will toward men everywhere."¹³¹

Project SCORE was followed by a program (NOTUS) for a family of satellite repeaters to provide a global military communications system.¹³² It was the only success the United States had in orbiting a satellite during the last half of 1958, after the three Explorers and one Vanguard launched earlier in the year. Several intended lunar probes plunged deep into space and recorded important scientific data, although none reached the vicinity of the moon. Various other launchings failed.¹³³

During 1959 the record improved somewhat. The United States successfully launched 11 satellites, the most notable being Pioneer IV, which passed within 37,000 miles of the moon and went into permanent solar orbit. Though none of these had immediate military applications, they demonstrated the growing maturity of the U.S. satellite and space probe effort. Against the successes had to be set eight failures, including the first Transit satellite and another lunar probe. And the Soviets, with the advantage of enormously powerful boosters, continued to upstage the United States with three Lunik moon probes. The first, on 2 January 1959, preceded Pioneer IV in achieving a solar orbit; the second, on 13 September, became the first man-made object to land on the moon; the third, launched on 4 October, orbited the moon and transmitted photographs of that body's far side, reentering the earth's atmosphere several months later.¹³⁴

The progress of satellite technology required a revision of the list of missile and satellite priorities that the NSC and the president had approved in January 1958. This list accorded the highest priority to the scientific satellite program (consisting of Vanguard and Explorer, or Jupiter C, as the NSC called it) and other satellites of "key" importance, as determined by the secretary of defense.¹³⁵ In March 1959 McElroy, with the concurrence of the JCS, recommended to the National Aeronautics and Space Council that the scientific satellite program be dropped and three others listed: Sentry and Discoverer, military satellites, and Mercury, the manned satellite for which the National Aeronautics and Space Administration had primary responsibility. The council approved this recommendation on 27 April, and it then went to the NSC, where the president approved it on 13 May 1959.¹³⁶

Throughout 1958 satellite programs remained under the direction of ARPA, but early in the following year it became necessary to consider transferring full responsibility to the services that would eventually operate the satellites. Air Force representatives suggested to the AFPC on 26 February 1959 that their service be assigned responsibility for the reconnaissance satellites. On 5 May 1959 the Air Force made this request in writing, following up three days later with a similar request for MIDAS.¹³⁷

The director of ARPA thought it too early to make such assignments. Premature insertion of "roles and missions" questions, he believed, had a tendency to prejudice the outcome of research. McElroy agreed in part. He did not accede to the Air Force request for an immediate assignment of responsibility; however, on 29 May 1959 he asked the JCS to designate the commands that should be given responsibility for the systems for satellite reconnaissance and detection, also for the navigation satellite.¹³⁸

The Air Force request brought to a head another intense interservice struggle, this one concerning responsibilities for operations in space—a matter of considerable future importance for all the services. Some Army and Navy partisans saw in the Air Force request an attempt to seize domination of this new military dimension. The Joint Chiefs of Staff returned a temporizing reply to McElroy on 25 June to the effect that they already had under study the question of the military direction and logistic support of space operations.¹³⁹

On 24 July the JCS, unable to agree, submitted a split report. Lemnitzer and Burke recommended establishment of a joint military astronautical command, responsible to the JCS, to exercise military direction and coordination over operational space systems and supporting activities. For the present, this should resemble a joint task force rather than a unified command, since no combatants were involved. For logistic support and management, they proposed that the Navy be responsible for the navigation and detection systems, the Air Force for the interim satellite early warning system, and the Army for the first phase of a satellite reconnaissance system.

White recommended the assignment of satellites and other space systems to existing unified and specified commands on the basis of function and mission. For example, those systems falling into the strategic area, such as reconnaissance (SAMOS), should be assigned to CINCSAC; those designed for defensive functions, such as early warning and satellite detection, should be assigned to CINCNORAD. Support for these systems should be the responsibility of the services; General White would assign to the Air Force a larger share of this responsibility than would his colleagues.¹⁴⁰

McElroy rejected both of these conflicting recommendations and instead proposed to assign responsibility to individual services. After discussion with the JCS, he drafted a memorandum along this line which Goodpaster cleared with the White House. The president approved it after being assured that McElroy's plan would avoid service duplication and

that ARPA would continue to be responsible for advanced research and development of satellite systems.¹⁴¹

On 18 September 1959 McElroy issued his assignment of service responsibilities. The Air Force would develop, produce, and launch space boosters, with payloads for space and satellite systems to be developed by the departments, which would reimburse the Air Force as necessary. Payload responsibilities were assigned as follows: satellite early warning and reconnaissance systems (MIDAS and SAMOS), Air Force; satellite navigation system, Navy; communications system (NOTUS), Army. Before assuming responsibility for a program, the appropriate department would submit detailed plans for the system, including relationships with the unified and specified commands and other agencies.¹⁴²

This directive was transmitted to the service departments on 23 September. At the same time, York and Johnson (director of ARPA) announced it at a press conference. Since the Air Force acquired the most prominent role, the press interpreted the directive as a clear victory for that service, as did some partisans of both the Air Force and the Army.¹⁴³

The Air Force moved quickly to take over MIDAS and SAMOS. On 17 November Quarles approved their transfer, as well as Discoverer, the general satellite research program. Discoverer had also become the vehicle for a photographic intelligence program (Corona) under CIA auspices; it was ultimately to replace the U-2 program.¹⁴⁴

Other transfers were delayed. On 29 February 1960 the Army requested transfer of the communication satellite program, but Secretary Gates held it up because the program remained under technical review by ODDR&E and JCS. By that time it had split into two programs, Advent, to provide instantaneous communications, and Courier, to receive and store messages for later transmission. After further delay, Brucker renewed the request, and Acting Secretary Douglas approved on 15 September. Earlier, in May 1960, the Transit program had been shifted to the Navy. York's office continued to monitor the technical aspects of all these programs.¹⁴⁵

Responsibility for tracking objects in space remained a matter of dispute between the services. It was related to management of missile test ranges, since these would perforce accomplish part of the function of tracking missiles and satellites once they were aloft. McElroy appointed Walker L. Cisler, a utility company executive, to head an OSD-NASA study of the best method of organizing and managing test ranges and tracking stations. Reporting on 30 November 1959, Cisler recommended a central office to manage all such facilities—those of both DoD and NASA—headed by an executive director reporting directly to the secretary of defense.¹⁴⁶

McElroy left office immediately thereafter, and it fell to Gates to act on Cisler's somewhat controversial recommendations. There was no objection to central control of tracking facilities, but who should exercise it? York strongly objected to being cut out of the picture. Some believed that the JCS should have the function. Cisler, recalled to discuss the matter with OSD officials, reaffirmed his recommendation for a director immediately

under the secretary of defense, pointing out that the responsibilities would be broad, involving research, operations, and tracking.¹⁴⁷

Gates decided to establish in ODDR&E an assistant director for ranges and space ground support to serve as principal adviser and staff assistant to DDR&E for "ground environment support" of research and development of missile programs and of all space programs. His directive, issued on 7 April 1960, used careful wording to make clear that the new official's authority would be limited to coordinating DoD and NASA proposals and making recommendations to DDR&E to insure efficient operation of tracking stations and eliminate duplication.¹⁴⁸

About the same time, the proposal for a joint astronautics command resurfaced. Burke raised it again when the Air Force submitted operational plans to the JCS for MIDAS, SAMOS, and Discoverer. White took alarm at Burke's action and urged Gates to reaffirm McElroy's rejection. On 16 June 1960, Gates responded with a memorandum declaring that a joint organization for control over operational space systems did not appear necessary or desirable.¹⁴⁹

The year 1960 saw further progress in space technology with launchings of 28 satellites and 2 space probes. Among the 17 successes were a MIDAS satellite on 24 May; a Pioneer placed in solar orbit (11 March); a single launching on 22 June which orbited 2 vehicles, 1 a Transit navigation satellite, the other to observe solar radiation; Discoverer XIII, on 10 August, from which a capsule was recovered in the ocean the following day, representing the first recovery of a man-made object from space; and Discoverer XIV on 19 August, with the capsule being recovered in the air. NASA was very much in the picture by this time, having taken over some of ARPA's planned projects; its Pioneer established a record by broadcasting from 22 million miles out in space, then went into solar orbit. To observe worldwide weather phenomena, NASA also launched two satellites designated TIROS (television infrared observation satellite).¹⁵⁰

August 1960 marked a high point for the U.S. space program. It saw, in addition to the two Discoverers, Echo I, the first passive communications satellite, and two flights by the X-15 experimental aircraft which established speed and altitude records for manned aircraft, as well as successful test flights of Atlas, Titan, and Bomarc. These came only a few weeks after the underwater Polaris launching on 20 July, already described. A new day seemed to be dawning for U.S. space technology. The press seized upon these events as evidence that the United States was catching up with or surpassing the Soviets.¹⁵¹

Still, the Soviets continued to demonstrate superiority in some respects. During 1960 they launched three "spacecrafts," enormous vehicles weighing over five tons. The first of these carried a pressurized cabin with a dummy pilot, the second experimental plants and animals to test the effects of space. Both of these orbited successfully; the third reentered the atmosphere and burned up after only one day.¹⁵²

Of the U.S. satellites approaching operational status by the beginning

of 1960, the most important for military purposes was MIDAS, which could increase by a small but vitally important margin the warning time of a missile attack on the United States. The revised FY 1961 budget sent to Congress by the Air Force in March 1960 included funds to accelerate the development of MIDAS and to increase the number of launchings of Discoverer satellites, which provided essential technical data for both MIDAS and SAMOS.¹⁵³

With the collapse of the U-2 program in May 1960, these satellites assumed new prominence, since the United States suddenly lost a key source of intelligence from behind the Iron Curtain. The general nature of the administration's proposed "spy in the sky" satellites had by now become known. In approving the FY 1961 budget, Congress added \$50 million to be available for MIDAS, also for Discoverer and the mobile Minuteman.¹⁵⁴

Reconnaissance by satellites was less provocative than aircraft overflights. The Soviets, by launching the first Sputnik, had set a precedent for the principle of free flight in space regardless of national boundaries. In the NSC on 24 May 1960, Secretary of State Herter urged rapid development of reconnaissance satellites, pointing out that Khrushchev, in the abortive summit conference in Paris, had stated that it was a matter of indifference to him how many satellites flew over Soviet territory or how many photographs they took. Douglas suggested a supplemental appropriation request for SAMOS. The president asked Kistiakowsky and York to consider expediting the program. Afterward, he approved a record of action stating that SAMOS should be reviewed for acceleration but not on a "crash" basis.¹⁵⁵

Kistiakowsky concluded that there was no clear basis for a supplemental request, since the program was in a state of flux. However, a modest request of \$30 million might be "very helpful" if applied toward obtaining useful intelligence as soon as possible, rather than toward long-range improvement of operational facilities.¹⁵⁶

Earlier, Kistiakowsky had told the president that SAMOS and the related Discoverer projects were not progressing as rapidly as they should. Eisenhower at once instructed Goodpaster to prepare a directive for a careful review of the SAMOS program by an ad hoc group to cover both the military requirements for the system and the concepts on which it was based. The group, to be set up jointly by Kistiakowsky and Gates, would "advise" the president rather than "report to" him; this was to avoid possible requests from Congress to see the findings of the group, as had occurred with the Gaither report. Pending this review, the president said, he would approve no more money for SAMOS. He issued this directive on 10 June 1960 in the form of a letter to Gates.¹⁵⁷

Gates and Kistiakowsky presented their findings at a special NSC meeting on 25 August 1960. They recommended a very high priority for SAMOS and revision of the program to emphasize high resolution photography and recovery of film, rather than data recovery through electronic readout. It should be placed under the sort of high-level

centralized management that had proved successful with ballistic missiles, with a general officer of the Air Force in charge, responsible directly to the secretary of the Air Force, and with boards of scientific advisers at both the secretarial and operational levels. The president promptly approved all these recommendations, apparently with little discussion.¹⁵⁸

On 15 September Douglas directed the secretary of the Air Force to assume responsibility for the program, reporting directly to the secretary of defense. A management structure would be established that would insure direct contact between the director of the program and the secretary of the Air Force. The ODDR&E would serve as the principal staff agency to assist the deputy secretary of defense with the program. The organization thus established eventually received the name of National Reconnaissance Office. It operated under very tight security restrictions; its existence remained unknown to the public until inadvertently revealed in 1973 in congressional documents.¹⁵⁹

With the first SAMOS test launching scheduled for October 1960, administration officials worried lest, despite Khrushchev's earlier disclaimer, the Soviet Union might protest (or otherwise react to) overflights by reconnaissance satellites. What to say about the contents of the vehicle was thus an important question, which Gates discussed with the president on 6 October. The president directed that any public statement should be in a low key and should describe SAMOS as carrying "photographic and related equipment." This phrase was accordingly used in the guarded briefing on the launching given by Air Force officers. This took place on 11 October but, unfortunately, the satellite failed to go into orbit.¹⁶⁰

One aspect of satellite technology involved detection and identification of the growing number of objects orbiting the earth. In 1958 ARPA undertook to develop a system for tracking objects in space and feeding the data into a surveillance and control center. By 1960 the system, known as Project Shepherd, consisted of a space surveillance (SPASUR) detection fence under construction by the Navy, running from east to west, and an interim National Space Surveillance Control Center (SPACETRACK) developed by the Air Force at Bedford, Massachusetts. Information from SPASUR and from other sources, including tracking stations operated by NASA, would go to SPACETRACK, which would compute orbits and catalog space vehicles.¹⁶¹

As a result of a review of the program by ODDR&E and JCS, Gates on 10 October directed the JCS to assign operational "command" of the system to CINCONAD and operational "control" to CINCNORAD. The distinction was of course a very fine one, implying that CINCONAD retained legal jurisdiction over the system while CINCNORAD determined its operational use. At the same time, Gates transferred responsibility for SPACETRACK from ARPA to the Air Force. The overall project was entitled SPADATS (space detection and tracking system).¹⁶²

Lastly, if satellites had a military value, would it not be desirable to develop the capability to intercept and destroy those launched by

other countries for hostile purposes? Efforts in this direction began as part of a broader project for a “maneuverable or recoverable space vehicle” (abbreviated MRS-V). Such devices, not “frozen” in fixed orbits, could maneuver along-side other satellites for various purposes—maintenance, rescue, ferrying operations, and not least, interception and destruction. In August 1959 the Air Force submitted a proposal for a vehicle that would go into orbit, target satellites, inspect them with photographic and electronic equipment, and feed the data to ground stations. A “kill” capability might be added later, but this was a highly sensitive point, since the United States was committed to peaceful use of space. The project was known as SAINT (for satellite interceptor).¹⁶³

The importance of the project became evident in December 1959 when a space object was detected but could not be readily identified (it was eventually determined to be a piece of debris from a Discoverer). In June 1960 ODDR&E approved SAINT as a research project to be financed by reprogramming. The Air Force allocated \$6 million for the purpose. Two months later ODDR&E approved a development program looking toward an operational date of 1967 at a cost of almost \$1.3 billion.¹⁶⁴

The administration gave only lukewarm support to SAINT. Deputy Secretary Douglas told Gray that no “urgent requirement” existed for a satellite interceptor; no evidence had been seen that the Soviets were developing satellites either for reconnaissance or for carrying weapons. Kistiakowsky pointed out that reconnaissance satellites were more useful to the United States than to the Soviet Union, which could obtain an abundance of information about free world countries through easier methods. In a somewhat more farfetched argument, Kistiakowsky suggested that the Soviets might shoot down one of their own satellites on their own territory, then accuse the United States of doing so and thus provide themselves with an excuse for attacking U.S. satellites. Twining thought the project unnecessary, since research in progress on missile defense would be applicable to the development of an antisatellite weapon. The administration included the project in the budget for 1962, but allocated only \$26 million—\$5 million less than the Air Force had asked.¹⁶⁵

OSD and NASA

The satellite projects just described constituted the major DoD contribution to the national program for exploring and using space to which Congress and the president committed the nation in 1958—a commitment embodied in the National Aeronautics and Space Act, signed by the president on 29 July 1958. The act established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and an advisory council chaired by the president, as well as a civilian-military liaison committee between NASA and DoD. The closest possible collaboration was necessary between the military space program and that administered by NASA, which

aimed at scientific research and general advancement of the techniques of exploring beyond the earth's atmosphere.*

Policy to guide the space program evolved along with the legislation. Earlier in January 1957, in discussing Vanguard, the NSC directed the Planning Board to submit a report on requirements for a continuing program of space exploration. This report, never completed, was superseded by another ordered by the president on 6 February 1958, after the success of the first Explorer satellite. The president directed Killian to report on U.S. objectives with respect to space exploration and science.¹⁶⁶

Killian formed a panel of the PSAC to draft the report, which he presented to the NSC on 6 March. It set forth a well-reasoned outline of a 15-year program of space development and exploration, including both military and scientific aspects, with cost estimates. Much impressed with the report, the president ordered it released, in modified form, under the title "Introduction to Outer Space." Subsequently this report, along with another on space organization already in preparation by Killian and others, played a role in the establishment of NASA.¹⁶⁷

Meanwhile Assistant Secretary Sprague had circulated within OSD a proposed outline of a policy paper relating to space. The objectives of a space program, in his view, should include development of military applications of space technology, maintaining the primacy of the free world in space, and cooperation between the United States and its allies. After receiving comments from OSD officials, Sprague forwarded his amended outline to Cutler on 26 March, suggesting that it be referred to the Planning Board.¹⁶⁸

The result, after some weeks of discussion, was NSC 5814/1, a "preliminary" policy on outer space, drafted by an ad hoc committee chaired by a representative of Killian's office and including members from the Defense and State Departments, the National Science Foundation, and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. As approved by the president on 18 August 1958, NSC 5814/1 set forth the following objectives to be achieved at the "earliest possible time": develop and exploit space capabilities for scientific, military, and political purposes and establish the United States as a "recognized leader" in this field; achieve international cooperation in space (consistent with U.S. security) for peaceful purposes and with allies for military purposes; and utilize the potential of outer space to assist in "opening up" the Soviet Union, through both improved intelligence and programs for scientific cooperation.¹⁶⁹

The wording of NSC 5814/1 reflected a compromise between the JCS and BoB. The former sought stronger statements on the importance of U.S. primacy in outer space, the latter feared a commitment to large new expenditures. Thus an early draft proposed a military capability sufficient to assure overall U.S. superiority to the Soviet Union in space weaponry. In the wording finally adopted, Secretary Dulles stood with BoB, believing that

* As used here, "space" is synonymous with "outer space" as defined in NSC 5814/1, i.e. the region beginning at the upper limit of "air space" or the earth's atmosphere. For the establishment of NASA, see Chapter VII.

the United States should not base its program on estimates of what other countries were doing. Elsewhere NSC 5814/1 used what Stans called "flamboyant" language that, in his view, overstated the case for space exploration. The final NSC action "noted" Stans's objections to these passages.¹⁷⁰

By the time the policy directive was approved, the new National Aeronautics and Space Administration was taking shape. On the recommendation of Killian, President Eisenhower selected Thomas Keith Glennan, president of the Case Institute of Technology in Cleveland, Ohio, for the position of administrator of NASA. Hugh L. Dryden, director of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, was chosen as Glennan's deputy. The Senate confirmed both appointments on 15 August, and the two men were sworn in on 19 August.¹⁷¹ The nucleus of the new agency came from NACA, which was absorbed into NASA. NASA officially began operating on 1 October 1958.¹⁷²

The National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC) met for the first time on 24 September 1958 at the White House. McElroy, Johnson, and York represented DoD. The council discussed the composition of the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee (CMLC). Glennan and McElroy agreed that the committee should consist of nine members (four each from DoD and NASA plus a chairman). It was agreed that Glennan and McElroy would draft terms of reference for the CMLC and would nominate a chairman to be appointed by the president.¹⁷³

Terms of reference, drafted under the direction of Quarles and judged acceptable by the AFPC on 22 October 1958, specified that the CMLC would provide a channel for advice, consultation, and exchange of information between the two member agencies and would keep one another fully informed of their activities.¹⁷⁴ To chair the committee, Quarles recommended Holaday, with the understanding that he would continue as director of guided missiles until that function passed to DDR&E. Glennan and McElroy endorsed the nomination. On recommendation of the NASC, the president approved Holaday's appointment as well as the terms of reference. DoD members of the CMLC, selected by Quarles, included Johnson as the OSD member plus one from each service department. With the abolition of the position of director of guided missiles on 8 April 1959, Holaday became the special assistant to the secretary for guided missiles.¹⁷⁵

Even before the establishment of NASA, a general line of demarcation between civilian and military space activities had been worked out between ARPA and NACA. In accord with this general agreement, NASA assumed responsibility for the Vanguard program, for several lunar probes and satellite projects scheduled to be carried out by the Army and the Air Force for ARPA, and for a proposed single-chamber engine with a million pounds of thrust being developed by the Air Force. Funds and facilities for these projects were transferred by executive order from DoD to NASA on 1 October 1958. The president took this action under a provision of the National Aeronautics and Space Act authorizing him to make such transfers on his own authority, without prior congressional approval, until 31 December 1958.¹⁷⁶

The largest and most important single group of space technology facilities within DoD belonged to the Army. They included the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) at Pasadena, California, operated by the California Institute of Technology under contract with the Army. In 1958 these had been placed under the newly established Army Ordnance Missile Command (AOMC). In keeping with the Army's "arsenal" concept, these facilities possessed complete capability to design, manufacture, and launch large vehicles as well as their payloads. Without them, NASA would have to develop its own facilities or else, like the Air Force, depend largely on contractors.¹⁷⁷

Glennan sought to acquire the most important portion of ABMA (the Development Operations Division headed by Wernher Von Braun) and the entire JPL. He approached McElroy and Quarles, who raised no objection to a transfer of these facilities to NASA. At the same time Killian obtained the president's informal approval.¹⁷⁸

McElroy did not order the transfer on his own initiative or pursue the subject officially with the president. Instead, Quarles referred Glennan to Army Secretary Brucker, who at once reacted angrily to any suggestion of disrupting the successful Von Braun team. Glennan then drafted a formal written request, addressed to McElroy, explaining that it would be in the national interest to provide NASA as soon as possible with a capability to develop and operate large space vehicles. He discussed this with Brucker in a second meeting, but again the only result was an acrimonious confrontation. Glennan concluded that further discussion with Brucker would be futile; the matter must go to the president.¹⁷⁹

The Army's position, on which Brucker took his stand, was that the transfer of the Development Operations Division of ABMA and of the JPL would dangerously impair the Army's capability to meet its weapons requirements. Moreover, personnel of those organizations opposed the transfer, and a serious morale problem would result if it were forced upon them. The Army recommended the alternative of making its facilities available to NASA while retaining them intact.¹⁸⁰

Brucker and General Medaris, head of AOMC, sought to postpone the transfer at least until the end of the year, after which all such transfers would have to be submitted to Congress. With Brucker's support, Medaris deliberately "leaked" word of the proposal to a friendly reporter, Mark S. Watson of the *Baltimore Sun*. Watson promptly published stories on the subject that reflected the Army viewpoint. Thus the proposed transfer became a matter of public knowledge.¹⁸¹

McElroy meanwhile had referred the matter to Holaday and Johnson, who recommended on 28 October that OSD interpose no objection to the transfer provided that arrangements could be made to complete Army missile programs under way and to use the transferred personnel and facilities for space tracking and surveillance.¹⁸²

In a meeting with Glennan and Quarles on 30 October, the president

indicated that he favored the transfer. He pronounced himself "completely nonplussed" by Army opposition, which he attributed to a "spirit of bureaucracy" prevailing over considerations of national interest. He hoped to settle the matter before the end of the year, when his transfer authority would expire.¹⁸³

By that time Brucker, recognizing the impossibility of "stonewalling" the proposal, had offered Glennan half a loaf. He was willing to transfer JPL to NASA, subject to an understanding that NASA would manage it through the Department of the Army as executive agent. He also offered to make the facilities of ABMA available to NASA and to allow NASA to establish a liaison group at Redstone. Brucker's concessions reflected the different status of JPL and ABMA—the one under contract, the other an integral part of the Army—as well as the fact that at least some scientists at JPL were inclined to favor transfer of control to a civilian institution.¹⁸⁴

Glennan's first reaction was that this offer was not enough. He so informed Quarles on 31 October. In further discussion, however, Glennan appeared to be open to a compromise—perhaps one that would allow NASA to assume responsibility for the space program at ABMA, with Von Braun participating in its management.¹⁸⁵

These were the lines along which the issue was settled. Brucker agreed to work out a compromise and suggested General Lemnitzer, then vice chief of staff, to negotiate with NASA officials. An agreement emerged in discussions in which Quarles represented OSD. JPL would be transferred to NASA, with the Army retaining technical direction of specific military projects. ABMA would remain under control of the Department of the Army, but a portion of its capacity would be made available to work on projects for NASA, which would install at ABMA its own technical operations group.¹⁸⁶

Formal agreements for transferring JPL and establishing the relationship between NASA and AOMC were signed by Brucker and Glennan on 3 December. McElroy at once presented them to the president, who approved them, though indicating his belief that ABMA should have been transferred along with JPL. In fact, the issue of ABMA's status had only been postponed.¹⁸⁷

Aside from friction over ABMA, NASA and Defense quickly established a pattern of cooperation. Two noteworthy areas in which the agencies worked together were the development of booster rockets for space vehicles (largely modifications of Thor, Atlas, and other missiles) and development of a satellite surveillance and tracking system using both NASA and DoD facilities. ARPA, which exercised responsibility for all military space projects, became NASA's principal collaborator in Defense; however, NASA also worked directly with the services.¹⁸⁸

The network of DoD-NASA contacts became so extensive as to raise a question of the need for CMLC. The Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, investigating organization for space activities between March and May 1959, focused considerable attention on the role of

this committee. Holaday himself admitted that it might be considered "nothing more than a post office." He suggested converting it into a mechanism for pointing up disagreements, seeking to resolve them and, if unable to do so, referring them to higher authority. This would make it somewhat similar to the Military Liaison Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, which had authority to appeal to the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The Senate committee agreed and recommended that the CMLC receive full authority and responsibility for handling coordination between NASA and DoD.¹⁸⁹

Steps to give the CMLC a more active role were already under way. Holaday drafted revised terms of reference which were approved by McElroy and Glennan, then by the president on 1 July 1959. They authorized CMLC to consult directly with any elements of Defense or NASA as appropriate; to suggest areas for joint investigation by NASA and DoD; to assist in transfers of projects and facilities between the two agencies; to coordinate requirements for launch and other development test facilities; and as requested by either agency, to interpret and evaluate projects and programs of mutual interest. Also, the committee was to receive copies of all written communications between NASA and DoD.¹⁹⁰

In 1959 the question of transferring ABMA came up again, this time to be resolved in favor of NASA. It arose in connection with the status of Saturn, a massive rocket designed to produce 1.5 million pounds of thrust, using 8 engines built from Jupiter and Thor components. Begun by ABMA in 1958 under authorization from ARPA, it became the major project for Von Braun's Development Operations Division. McElroy included \$50 million for this project in ARPA's FY 1960 budget.¹⁹¹

A project of this size represented a considerable drain on ARPA's budget. York, when he entered the picture as DDR&E, proposed to cancel it. He did not believe that boosters of such magnitude were needed for military purposes. Any military need for large boosters could, he believed, be met by Titan C, a clustered-rocket modification of Titan that had been proposed by the Air Force.¹⁹²

After considerable discussion, York and Dryden set up a joint committee to discuss the future of Saturn. Meeting on 16-18 September 1959, the committee agreed that Saturn should be continued. However, they decided to consider, as an alternative to cancellation, a transfer of Saturn to NASA, along with the engineers and scientists under Von Braun presently engaged on the project.¹⁹³

York had in fact already approached Glennan about the possibility of this transfer. Glennan was receptive but, having been badly burned a year earlier, insisted that it be made clear that the initiative came from DoD. Glennan thought that if NASA took over ABMA he might wish to cancel Saturn, even though it would mean a delay of several years in the development of a large booster. Kistiakowsky also favored the transfer, while realizing that the attitude of some of ABMA's personnel might make it difficult.¹⁹⁴

By this time there had occurred a change of thinking in Army circles on the status of ABMA. According to Glennan, Lemnitzer and the Army staff (though not Brucker) believed that the Army must divest itself of this burden. They were considering, as alternatives, a transfer to a joint DoD command or to the Air Force. Medaris and Von Braun reluctantly settled on transfer to NASA as the least undesirable choice. If the Development Operations Division remained in DoD its capabilities would not be fully exploited, since in the development of major space projects the future clearly lay with NASA. If transferred to the Air Force it would probably be restricted to engineering development, since the Air Force relied on its contractors for production.¹⁹⁵

In a preliminary discussion with the president on 21 September 1959, Glennan indicated his desire to obtain about 3,000 of ABMA's 5,000 people. He would make ABMA the "space systems center" for the nation. The possibility of transferring ABMA to the Air Force was mentioned but quickly disposed of by the president after General Persons warned that the combination of the well-publicized Von Braun team plus the Air Force "propaganda machine" would make a "very expensive proposition." In the end, Glennan promised to discuss the proposed transfer with Gates.¹⁹⁶

Before agreeing to a transfer, Gates consulted the JCS, who agreed that responsibility for developing extremely large boosters should come under a single agency. They believed, however, that this agency should be DoD, which was "significantly better equipped" than NASA for the purpose. NASA's responsibilities could be met by "appropriate arrangements" with DoD.¹⁹⁷ In the AFPC on 13 October, Brucker, Lemnitzer, Douglas, and Johnson opposed the transfer. York was inclined to favor it; like the JCS, he favored centralized control of superboosters but thought it would be more economical if placed in NASA. McElroy was absent, and the members reached no consensus.¹⁹⁸

In the end, McElroy resolved to transfer to NASA the Saturn project and its associated personnel at ABMA. He and Glennan drafted a recommendation to this effect and submitted it to the president on 21 October. They proposed that NASA have sole responsibility for new space booster vehicle systems of "very high" thrust, together with control of the Development Operations Division of ABMA. The Army, McElroy said, was now out of the space business and was "well resigned" to the loss of ABMA. The president agreed to the transfer after receiving assurance that the Army would continue work on the solid-fuel Pershing, the most important of its missile projects. He recognized the need for a superbooster to catch up with the Soviet Union. McElroy and Gates feared that opponents of the transfer might appeal to Congress, which would have to act on the proposal. The president agreed with a recommendation by York on the necessity of a public announcement in view of numerous leaks of information that had already occurred.¹⁹⁹ Later that day the president released an announcement that ABMA would become part of NASA and would continue work on the superbooster, which was to be "vigorously pressed forward."²⁰⁰

Given an opportunity to comment on the draft memorandum formally recommending the transfer, the JCS proposed an alteration to state clearly a military requirement for superboosters. This change, however, did not appear in the final version signed by Glennan and Gates on 30 October and approved by the president on 2 November.²⁰¹

The Army and NASA then worked out an agreement transferring the personnel and facilities of the Development Operations Division, effective 1 July 1960, with the exception of those facilities working on Pershing, Jupiter, and Redstone. President Eisenhower formally announced the transfer on 14 January 1960.²⁰²

Both houses of Congress held hearings on the transfer, lasting a single day in each instance. Despite fears that had been expressed, no opposition appeared. Brucker and Lemnitzer indicated that they had no objection, and even Medaris testified that it was the "least bad" alternative. Congress accepted the transfer, which took place on 1 July 1960. NASA's new facilities were renamed the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center.²⁰³

For the first year the national space program operated under the "preliminary" guidelines laid down in NSC 5814/1. At the end of that time the president determined that the policy should be reviewed. At his direction, the NASC on 30 June 1959 set up an ad hoc committee, chaired by Dryden, to reexamine NSC 5814/1.²⁰⁴ The committee produced NSC 5918, dated 17 December 1959, somewhat more concise but making no radical changes in policy. It reflected the progress of technology in a recommendation that the United States proceed at the "earliest practicable time" with manned space flight, starting with recovery from orbit of a manned satellite. BoB wanted this entire passage deleted, along with another calling for "overall U.S. superiority in outer space" without necessarily requiring "supremacy in every phase of space activities"; this passage replaced the one in NSC 5814/1 stating that the United States should be "a recognized leader" in space.

Another split developed with regard to the use of space for peaceful purposes, a subject of increasing importance to discussions of arms control. NSC 5918 would continue to commit the United States to the principle that outer space was freely available for peaceful use by all. It was suggested that the United States consider maintaining the right of transit through outer space of all orbital vehicles "not equipped to inflict injury or damage." In addition, the State Department proposed a study of an international system to insure the use of space only for peaceful purposes, including the feasibility of a "positive enforcement system" and of "multi-lateral or international control of all outer space activities." Defense representatives on the drafting committee wished to include an emphatic statement that no international agreements should be reached that would result in a net disadvantage to the United States.²⁰⁵

On 12 January 1960, the NASC and NSC met jointly to discuss NSC 5918 and reconciled the disagreements. Thus a statement that the United States should achieve its objectives "at the earliest practicable time,"

opposed by BoB, was amended to "as soon as reasonably practicable." The latter phrase was used with respect to the manned space flight program, the recommendation for which was retained. The State Department proposal for study of an international enforcement system was accepted, with a statement that such a study should give "full consideration" to U.S. security interests. The president, in approving NSC 5918, directed that it be circulated as an NASC (as distinct from NSC) paper.²⁰⁶

A year's experience also provided an opportunity to appraise the workings of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. The president became convinced of a need to amend it. Whether he or others took the initiative is not indicated in available sources. Proposed changes were discussed between NASA and OSD officials and approved by the president.²⁰⁷

These changes, which the president submitted to Congress in January 1960, would clarify the responsibilities of NASA, eliminate both the NASC and the CMLC, and empower the president to assign responsibility to NASA or DoD for the development of new launch vehicles. The House approved the amendments, after Deputy Secretary Douglas testified in their favor, but the legislation died in the Senate, largely owing to the influence of Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson, who wished to leave the next president free to propose his own changes.²⁰⁸

During House hearings on the proposals, attention centered on the CMLC. Both Holaday and York explained that it had become superfluous; direct contact between officials of DoD and NASA was simpler. Douglas proposed to replace it with an Activities Coordinating Board, chaired jointly by the deputy administrator of NASA and the DDR&E and which could act with full authority. He and Glennan had already tentatively agreed to establish this body.²⁰⁹

After the Space Act amendments died in Congress, Douglas and Glennan signed an agreement establishing the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board, with York and Dryden as cochairmen. The remainder of the membership of the board consisted of chairmen of panels for launch vehicles, unmanned spacecraft, manned space flight, and other functions, plus two members at large. The board was to plan activities by NASA and DoD to avoid undesirable duplication and to make efficient utilization of resources; to coordinate activities in areas of common interest; to identify problems requiring solution; and to exchange information between NASA and DoD.²¹⁰

The CMLC remained officially in existence, since it was mandated by law, but it was allowed to expire. Holaday resigned as chairman in April 1960 and no successor was appointed.²¹¹

Man in Space: Project Mercury

The culmination of space technology would come when vehicles carrying human beings could operate freely beyond the earth's atmosphere. Such a development was foreseeable but would have to conquer

formidable obstacles. Boosters of enormous thrust would be required, along with special equipment to insure human survival in a hostile environment. Both the Air Force and NACA began serious study of manned spacecraft after World War II. The other services also undertook research, and by the time of Sputnik all three had projects involving human flight in space.²¹²

Early in 1958 the Army, building on the prestige of its first Explorer satellite, sought a quick entry into the manned space field. Army officials proposed Project Adam, in which a modified Redstone would be used to launch a man in a sealed capsule in a suborbital trajectory for a distance of some 150 miles. ARPA and NACA both judged it impracticable, and Deputy Secretary Quarles postponed it pending further study; it was subsequently dropped.²¹³

In early discussions of the responsibilities to be given NASA, the question of the man in space program was set aside. Later, some controversy arose between NASA and DoD on this matter. McElroy and Johnson discussed it with Dryden, and they agreed to refer it to the president. Largely on the advice of Killian, the president ruled in August 1958 that NASA would be responsible.²¹⁴

Initially at least, NASA would have to rely on DoD for the motive power to hurl a man into orbit. By executive agreement in September 1958, NASA and ARPA established a Joint Manned Satellite Panel. This body drew up a specific project approved by Glennan and Johnson in October.²¹⁵

Within NASA, the manned space flight program was placed under a Space Task Group established on 5 November 1958. This group took responsibility for designing an orbiting capsule to carry a human passenger, with Atlas envisioned as the booster to place the capsule into orbit. For earlier test flights, Redstone was the only reliable rocket capable of achieving orbital velocities.²¹⁶

Choice of a suitable name for the project held some importance in view of the wide attention that it seemed certain to command. Glennan and Dryden decided on 29 November 1958 that it would be named in honor of Mercury, traditional messenger of the gods, son of Zeus and grandson of Atlas in Greek mythology. Glennan publicly announced the name in Washington on 17 December.²¹⁷

Who should ride in the strange new flight devices that NASA was developing? The military services obviously possessed the largest available pool of trained pilots. President Eisenhower decided that the first space pilots should come from graduates of military test pilot schools. This decision disqualified the Army, which had no such graduates. NASA's Space Task Group winnowed through a list of over 100 possible candidates and selected 7 men—3 each from the Air Force and the Navy, 1 from the Marine Corps. On 9 April 1959 the seven fledgling astronauts were introduced to the public at a press conference in Washington.²¹⁸

To provide a regular channel of DoD support to Project Mercury, McElroy at first considered establishing a joint task force under the JCS,

similar to JTF 7 which supported nuclear testing. Eventually, however, he decided to place the function under a single individual and selected Maj. Gen. Donald N. Yates, commander of the Atlantic Missile Range.²¹⁹

Yates's appointment was announced on 10 August 1959. Responsible to the secretary through the JCS, he was to direct and control the DoD facilities and forces assigned to support project Mercury. He would prepare statements of requirements, coordinate them with ODDR&E, and submit them to the secretary. A Navy deputy would assist him with recovery operations. In April 1960, when Yates moved to Washington to become assistant DDR&E for ground support, Maj. Gen. Leighton I. Davis, USAF, relieved him, both as commander of the Missile Test Center and as liaison for Project Mercury.²²⁰

A Mercury capsule with an Atlas booster stood ready for an unmanned test flight by July 1960. Launched from Cape Canaveral on 29 July, the first flight attempt was a total failure; the missile exploded barely a minute after launch. Undaunted, on the same day NASA announced Project Apollo, to succeed Mercury, in which three men would be launched either in sustained orbit or in flight around the moon.²²¹

A second test on 21 November, using Redstone to put a capsule into suborbital flight, failed when the missile shut down at liftoff. Finally, a month later, came success. On 19 December 1960 a capsule hurled aloft by a Redstone rocket soared along a suborbital trajectory for a distance of 235 miles, landing within 18 miles of the target impact point.²²² Clearly the day of manned space flight was not far off. At the end of 1960 the world waited to see which nation, the United States or the Soviet Union, would lead the way into the new age.

Conclusion: Four Years of Effort

The years from 1956 to 1960 were the period when the long-range missile became an operational weapon. The Soviet Union had established an early lead, but the United States was in a fair position to catch up. As later evidence was to show, the two nations were nearly equal at the end of 1960 in land-based ICBMs. In shipborne missiles the United States had a clear lead. The Soviets had earlier launched submarines armed with missiles, but these were few in number and their ranges were limited to a few hundred miles.²²³ The 32 missiles borne by the *George Washington* and the *Patrick Henry* provided a convincing and highly secure deterrent.

In objects orbiting in space, the United States stood well ahead of the Soviets in numbers, if not in overall weight. As of 31 December 1960 the United States had successfully launched 31 earth satellites, of which 16 were still in orbit, plus 2 deep space probes into orbit around the sun. The Soviet Union had launched seven satellites (one remaining in orbit), one deep space probe, one lunar impact mission, and one vehicle that had orbited the moon.²²⁴

These facts represented a triumph for American science and industry. Undoubtedly even more could have been accomplished if a greater effort had been made. President Eisenhower rightly pointed out on occasion that his administration had greatly increased the pace of missile development as compared with the preceding administration. Even so, he had forfeited opportunities, as when he passed up the chance for the United States to be the first nation with an orbiting satellite. In that instance, he failed to gauge accurately the psychological effects of the first space vehicle. By and large, however, his cautious approach stemmed from his concern for the federal budget. Roy Johnson, former director of ARPA, expressed the view in 1960 that space technology for military defense "is not proceeding as rapidly as it should for lack of money."²²⁵

The programs begun during these years yielded their most impressive results in the near future. Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman missiles flowed out of the factories to give the United States a commanding lead in ICBM strength, while the Soviets, for whatever reason, failed to exploit their initial advantage. This strength was important in enabling President Eisenhower's successor, John F. Kennedy, to face down the Soviets with confidence during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. And the Mercury program, still struggling in 1960, quickly caught on, then blossomed into the more ambitious Apollo program, which, given major emphasis by the Kennedy administration, rewarded the United States in 1969 with a towering scientific triumph—the landing of astronauts on the moon.

CHAPTER XIII

Continental Air Defense

The growing threat of long-range aircraft and missiles posed an unprecedented challenge to defending the American homeland against direct attack. No longer could command of the sea suffice to insure the safety of the continental land mass. The JCS began planning to meet this new threat as early as 1948. President Truman's administration pondered the policy issues involved but went out of office just as the problem was becoming acute. In 1953, President Eisenhower had to consider this new claim on military resources even while struggling to reduce overall military expenditures. After considerable debate, Eisenhower and his advisers accepted the need to accelerate preparations for air defense but firmly rejected any thought of a "crash" program. Continental defense, along with massive retaliation, became a salient feature of the New Look.¹

State of Continental Defense in 1956

Forces allotted to continental defense were governed by plans prepared by the JCS, subject to final approval at higher level. All three major services contributed forces for the purpose, with the lion's share coming from the Air Force. The major continental defense forces and facilities existing as of 30 June 1956 are shown in the first column of Table 5.

The backbone of the air defense system consisted of 78 squadrons of fighter interceptors of 3 types (F-86, F-89, and F-94) backed up by a chain of 161 radar stations in the contiguous United States and Canada, with outlying stations in Alaska, Greenland, and Iceland, and 1 specially constructed station in shallow waters in the Atlantic (known as a "Texas tower," from its resemblance to oil-drilling rigs in the Gulf of Mexico). Of this group of stations, 33 made up the "Pine Tree" net, running near the U.S.-Canadian border and operated jointly by the USAF and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). Contiguous radar coverage out to sea was provided by special radar-equipped airborne early warning (AEW) planes operated offshore by the Air Force. For visual coverage below the minimum altitude at which radars operated, the Air Force maintained a Ground Observer Corps

TABLE 5
Continental Defense Forces, 1956-1960

	Actual 30 June 1956	Actual 30 June 1960	Programmed for June 1961 (As of 30 June 1960)
<i>ARMY</i>			
Regular Army antiaircraft battalions:			
Artillery	50	—	—
Nike-Ajax	46	30	22
Nike-Hercules	—	26	31 ³ / ₄
Missile Master fire direction system	0	5	10
<i>NAVY</i>			
Radar picket patrol vessels	18	5 ¹	12 ²
Ocean radar station "Liberty" ships	8	16	16
AEW/ASW barrier aircraft squadrons	3	4	4
Contiguous barrier (lighter than air) aircraft squadron	1	— ³	—
<i>AIR FORCE</i>			
USAF fighter interceptor squadrons	78	52	45
RCAF fighter interceptor squadrons	10	9	9
USAF interceptor missile squadrons (Bomarc)	—	5	6
USAF AEW and control squadrons	6	6	6
Radar stations—aircraft control and warning:			
Fixed CONUS	75	69	63
Fixed Canada (Pine Tree)	33	32	32
Fixed Alaska	12	18	18
Fixed Greenland	3	1	1
Fixed Iceland	2	4	2
Texas Towers	1	3	3
Semimobile (CONUS and Canada)	35	63	61
Unattended sites (gap-filler, low-altitude radars)	29	131	159
Early warning radars:			
Mid-Canada segment, early warning line	—	99	99
Distant Early Warning line (including Aleutian and Greenland extensions)	—	63	67
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System	—	— ⁴	2
Manual control centers	23	13	13
Semi-automatic ground environment system (SAGE)	—	—	—
Combat centers	—	3	3
Direction centers	—	14	20

Notes:

¹ Reflects withdrawal of vessels from DEW line seaward extension.

² Increase due to support of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom line.

³ Airships withdrawn from contiguous system on 1 July 1960.

⁴ One BMEW station went into limited operation September 1960 (see Chapter XII).

Sources: "Summary of Defensive Force for North American Defense," Part I of NSC 5720, Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1957 (Table D3), and NSC 6013, Status of National Security Program on June 30, 1960, table on p. 30.

of volunteer aircraft spotters, while a chain of low-altitude "gap-filler" radars was under construction.

Ground defenses, supplied by the Army, consisted of 50 battalions of artillery of various calibers (75, 90, and 120 mm) plus 46 battalions of Nike I missiles (or Nike-Ajax, as they were later called). The Navy furnished specially equipped vessels—destroyer escorts (DERs) or converted Liberty ships (YAGRs)—plus blimps as part of the offshore extension of the radar warning net. The Navy's antisubmarine forces also contributed to continental defense, inasmuch as the day was approaching when submarines would be able to fire long-range missiles against the North American continent. For long-range detection of submarines, using low-frequency sound waves, the Navy had begun installing a chain of stations in the Atlantic. The system, originally called LOFAR (low-frequency analysis and recording), was renamed SOSUS (sound surveillance system) in 1957.

Overall responsibility for defending the continent rested primarily with the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), established in 1954. CONAD was referred to as a "joint" rather than a "unified" command. The commander in chief, CONAD wore a second hat as commander of the Air Defense Command (ADC), the Air Force component command for CONAD. The staff of ADC served also as the CONAD staff, augmented by representation from all of the services. The other components were the Army's Antiaircraft Artillery Command (ARAACOM) and a Navy command designated NAVFORCONAD. Subordinate CONAD commands were superimposed on the ADC structure, with regional ADC commanders wearing two hats.

Responsibility for defense of Alaska and of northeastern North America belonged originally to the Alaskan Command and the Northeast Command, respectively. A revision of the Unified Command Plan in June 1956 abolished the latter and reassigned its responsibilities to CINCONAD, who was also made responsible for air defense of Alaska, although the Alaskan Command continued in existence with reduced responsibilities.²

The air defense system was still expanding to meet goals established in 1953. The major improvement provided advance warning of aircraft approaching the northern border of the United States, across the north polar regions and through Canada—the natural line of attack for aircraft approaching from the Soviet bloc. For this purpose, two radar lines were nearing completion. The more southerly of these, the Mid-Canada line, followed approximately the 55th parallel of latitude, tying in with the Pine Tree chain at both ends. The other, known as the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line, would run northward along the coast of Alaska, then east along the northern coasts of Alaska and Canada, terminating at Cape Dyer.

Both early warning lines required seaward extensions, using vessels and aircraft supplied by the Navy. In the Atlantic, the Mid-Canada line would be extended from Argentia, in Newfoundland, to the Azores, beginning in 1957. By 1960 the DEW line would stretch across to the southern tip of Greenland (Cape Farewell). Another barrier would run from Iceland via

the Faeroe Islands to the United Kingdom. In the Pacific, the land-based radar chain would extend westward along the Aleutians to Umnak, near the western tip, then southwestward to Midway. This would thrust the seaward extension some 1,000 miles or so to the west. A possible southward addition beyond Midway was under study.

Behind the early warning lines, the expanding radar control and warning net was scheduled for improvement, first with existing radars modified for higher altitude coverage and longer range (65,000 feet altitude and 25 miles respectively), then with new radars capable of 100,000 feet altitude and 250-mile range. The gap-filler network of low-altitude radars was also thickened.

The Air Force continued to upgrade its fighter interceptor force through the introduction of greatly improved aircraft of the "Century" series—F-101, F-102, F-104, and F-106—and by equipping more and more squadrons with the Falcon air-to-air guided missile. In the offing was a greatly improved missile, the MB-1, or Ding Dong (later called Genie), designed to carry a nuclear war head. The Air Force envisioned an expansion of the fighter interceptor force through FY 1957, and then a decline as it introduced a surface-to-air missile, Bomarc* (designed for "area," as distinct from "point," defense). The Army, phasing out conventional artillery in favor of the Nike-Ajax missile, expected to have the improved Nike-Hercules in the near future.

An anomaly amid the increasingly complex array of weapons systems was reliance on old fashioned manual methods of controlling and directing the air battle. Radar sighting reports, computation of tracks of hostile aircraft, and assignment of weapons all followed methods similar to those used in World War II—wholly inadequate for the electronic age. Under construction for the Air Force, an integrated electronic system known as SAGE (for Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) would use computers to compute target location and to direct weapons. Two types of SAGE installations were planned: direction centers (DCs), which would receive reports from the radar stations, and combat centers (CCs), which would direct the air battle.³

Since no array of weapons could be certain of destroying all incoming enemy bombers, the active defenses already described had to be supplemented by passive protective measures. One such step entailed dispersal of SAC bombers. Many SAC bases housing two wings of strategic bombers were so jammed with aircraft as to present highly lucrative targets. Because bases in coastal areas would not get sufficient warning time, in its construction budget for FY 1957, the Air Force included a program for building new bases in the interior of the country, the eventual goal being a separate base for each squadron of heavy and each wing of medium

* The name Bomarc was an acronym derived from the names of the two originators of the missile, Boeing Aircraft Co. and the Michigan Aeronautical Research Center of the University of Michigan.

bombers (with their associated tankers). The Air Force also studied possible use of non-SAC bases and Canadian bases for tanker refueling operations.⁴

Continental defense also involved protection of the civilian population against the effects of attack (through shelters or dispersal); this came under the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA). The Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) had responsibility to assure continuity of government and industry in the event of attack. Defense against covert attempts to smuggle weapons (nuclear, chemical, or biological) into the United States fell under the jurisdiction of two interagency bodies concerned with internal security, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Intelligence and Security.

Defense of North America obviously required close collaboration with Canada. Military cooperation with that nation had been formalized in 1940 with the creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD), consisting of military and diplomatic representatives from both Canada and the United States. The Military Cooperation Committee, established in 1946, provided the channel for direct working-level contact. Detailed planning of the early warning systems was accomplished by ad hoc study groups representing both countries. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained direct liaison with their opposite numbers, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, as did the USAF with the RCAF.⁵

Developments, 1956-1957

The objectives of the continental defense program, originally set in 1953, were subject to reexamination in each annual budget. In 1956 they existed in a state of some uncertainty, the subject of intense debate within administration circles. Two developments brought about this situation. The first, the February 1955 report of the Technological Capabilities Panel headed by James R. Killian, endorsed a number of steps already under way, such as the improvement of the contiguous radar system and the construction of the early warning lines with their seaward extensions. Some of its other recommendations had already been adopted by mid-1956, such as tying in the DEW line with the NATO warning system (through Greenland, Iceland, and the Faeroes) and pushing the Pacific extension westward, to anchor at Midway. Noting the difficulties of defense against the looming threat of ICBM attack, the report urged an immediate program of research to provide the maximum possible warning time of such attack. Regarding passive defense of the population, the Killian panelists recommended a study of the balance between two alternative methods: provision of shelters and dispersal through evacuation. These and other recommendations in the report were debated in the NSC over a period of some months.⁶

A second stimulus to debate came from intelligence warnings of a rapid growth of Soviet long-range bomber strength in the near future. A national intelligence estimate (NIE) in March 1956 indicated that, at the moment,

the United States had relatively little to fear from Soviet strategic airpower. It credited the Soviets with only 75 long-range bombers as of 1 January 1956. These were of two types: a four-engine jet, equivalent to the U.S. B-52, nicknamed Bison by U.S. intelligence; and a four-engine turboprop (Bear) having no U.S. equivalent. To these were added 310 medium-range jet bombers (Badger, analogous to the B-47) capable of one-way bombing missions. Another estimate four months later altered the figures to 65 heavy and 475 medium bombers. But both estimates agreed in forecasting a Soviet fleet of 700 long-range bombers by mid-1959, plus the same number of medium bombers, for a total fleet of 1,400. This would represent an increase of some tenfold in the heavy bomber force in three years. By contrast, Air Force program objectives, as of 30 June 1956, envisioned 538 heavy bombers by 30 June 1959, along with 1,241 mediums.⁷ These estimates were not released to the public, but inevitably information concerning them leaked out to give rise in 1956 to the widely-publicized fear of a "bomber gap."

With these trends in mind, the NSC in early 1956 had approved a policy paper calling for "accelerated" programs, military and nonmilitary, for continental defense. An estimate attached to the paper warned forthrightly that the U.S. net superiority in nuclear striking power would last only until 1958; thereafter the Soviet Union would "almost certainly" develop and maintain a capability to strike a "crippling" blow at the United States.⁸

The question of which programs should be accelerated, and by how much, came before the NSC in 1956 in connection with a proposal to revise NSC 5408, the governing directive on continental defense. The Planning Board drafted a new paper, NSC 5606, which warned of growing Soviet capabilities and set forth the essential elements of a continental defense system. A financial appendix gave cost estimates, from 1955 through 1960, for each element of the system. The total ranged from \$2.9 billion in 1955 to \$11.5 billion in 1960.⁹

The NSC debated this draft on 15 June 1956, with Vice President Nixon in the chair. The case for a faster rate of progress was forcefully argued by Robert C. Sprague, who had served the NSC as a consultant on civil defense for several years. Sprague urged advancing to 1958 the readiness dates for tactical warning systems in order to provide a minimum of protection for SAC's retaliatory force. He was supported by ODM Director Arthur S. Flemming, who also made a strong plea for a civilian shelter program to begin in FY 1958. But the decisive word was spoken by Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey. Sidestepping the question of the magnitude of the threat, Humphrey focused entirely on the cost figures. He characterized these as a "terrific jump in expenditures" and complained that they reflected the same continuing upward trend as other national security programs. The piecemeal piling of new or expanded programs on top of existing ones must cease, he declared. The president, he said, had already demanded three-year cost projections as part of the annual status reports to the NSC on national security programs.

Humphrey's verbal artillery blew away the opposition. The council deferred action on NSC 5606 pending consideration of the three-year cost projections, to be prepared and submitted by each responsible agency as soon as possible.¹⁰

On 9 August the council heard an Air Force briefing on the status of measures to reduce the vulnerability of SAC, then a joint one by the Air Force and the Navy on radar control and warning lines and their seaward extensions. Though presented "in the light of the revised estimate of Soviet nuclear capabilities," these reflected no heightened sense of urgency; projected readiness dates for the elements of each system remained as set some months earlier. No action by the council was required on any of these matters.¹¹

The three-year cost projections came before the NSC in a two-day meeting on 16-17 August 1956. Continental defense received brief attention as a part of the military program. Wilson remarked that continental defense was so new that it was "impossible to tell whether we were receiving our money's worth." Radford added that the value of the system would never be known until it was used in combat. The NSC merely noted the presentations and agreed that each responsible department and agency would review its program and estimated expenditures in the light of the discussion as part of the FY 1958 budget process.¹²

Thus the discussion of continental defense as a separate issue died away. Those who had sought a faster buildup of defense were utterly routed. NSC 5606 was removed from the NSC agenda and never approved. The decision as to the "acceleration" of continental defense was left to the budget process, during which it was subject to the same pressures as other programs to fit within the administration's budget limits.

In the 1958 budget, continental defense was treated with no particular urgency. Overall service programs initially totaling \$48 billion were cut back to \$38.5 billion.* The Bureau of the Budget exerted its influence to hold down continental defense programs, charging that the services were pushing them too far and too fast, in violation of NSC policy. BoB judged that the task of defending against a nuclear attack by manned aircraft was hopeless and would become even more so with the advent of ICBMs.¹³

The NSC discussed the overall 1958 military program on 21 December 1956, one day after hearing the annual report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee on Soviet ability to damage the United States. During the discussion, the president asked Quarles what could be done to reduce the "appalling threat" depicted by the subcommittee. Quarles suggested vaguely that "it might be wise" to increase air defense forces and enlarge the nuclear striking force.¹⁴ When the budget reached Congress, that body showed no special concern over air defense. The members accepted Wilson's judgment that continental defense was progressing as rapidly as possible under existing conditions.¹⁵

The separate 1958 construction budget carried money for SAC dispersal

* See Chapter IV.

bases and for early warning stations. DoD asked a total of \$1.930 billion, but after review by BoB this was cut to \$1.650 billion, although Wilson warned that these two programs would thereby be slowed. Congress cut the amount still further, to \$1.534 billion.¹⁶

Despite budget stringency, the continental defense system improved markedly as programs launched earlier came to fruition. During 1957 two of the early warning lines began operating: first the Mid-Canada line in April, and then a few months later the DEW line, together with the Argentia-Azores seaward extension.¹⁷ These lines provided assurance of several hours' attack warning time against bombers.

Another important advance in effectiveness came from introduction of the Genie nuclear-armed air-to-air rocket, which the Air Force began deploying to fighter interceptor bases in January 1957. Because they would be in close proximity to centers of population, Secretary Wilson felt that the public should be informed. He drafted an announcement, which was approved by the president and cleared with the Government of Canada, since the rockets would be used over that country. The Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was also informed. On 20 February 1957 Wilson announced the availability of nuclear weapons for continental air defense, starting with the air-to-air rocket. Nuclear capability would also be incorporated into surface-to-air defense systems, including Nike-Hercules and Talos.¹⁸

Accompanying these improvements came a clarification of the role and status of CONAD, which had suffered from limited and uncertain authority. CINCONAD, General Earle E. Partridge, apparently took the initiative in seeking the change. On 3 May 1956 he appeared before the AFPC, accompanied by OSD and Army representatives. They explained CONAD's problems to the council. The members directed the JCS to submit recommendations concerning CONAD's command relationships and the ASD(R&D) to report on the technical aspects of air defense control.¹⁹

Reporting on 5 June, the JCS recommended that CINCONAD give up his second hat as commander, ADC, and establish a separate headquarters with a staff large enough to permit him to exercise operational control and accomplish overall planning. He should be responsible for developing and submitting to the JCS joint plans for deployment and utilization of all forces for continental air defense, including those in the seaward extension of the contiguous radar system.

The JCS further agreed that CINCONAD should exercise operational control over all continental defense forces, but they disagreed as to the extent of this control. Four of the five members believed that it should include responsibility for determining methods for conducting the tactical air battle and authority to centralize operational control of all assigned forces, including the assignment of individual antiaircraft batteries to designated targets. General Taylor, strongly dissenting, argued that CINCONAD should "coordinate" with component commanders in determining methods. He was willing to allow CINCONAD to assign targets, providing that this

authority did not preclude local antiaircraft commanders from engaging targets of opportunity.²⁰

At issue in this disagreement were different operational concepts of antiaircraft defense. The Air Force favored close centralized control of the air defense battle; this was the purpose of the Air Force's SAGE computer network. The Army believed that the initiative must rest with individual battery commanders, under the coordination of the local antiaircraft defense commander, subject only to procedures prescribed by CINCONAD. According to the Army, the technical feasibility of centralized control was untested, but in any case it was undesirable; the radars tied into the SAGE network could never see simultaneously all the approaching targets (particularly low-flying aircraft). The Army was developing its own electronic device (Missile Master) for controlling and directing antiaircraft fire, and it seemed doubtful that SAGE and Missile Master could be integrated into a compatible system.²¹

The issue came before the AFPC on 19 June 1956. After Holaday reported that integration of SAGE and Missile Master was technically feasible, Wilson ruled in favor of the JCS majority. He then approved the JCS recommendations regarding CINCONAD's authority and organization and directed that CINCONAD's terms of reference be revised accordingly.²²

At Wilson's direction, CINCONAD drew up a proposal to integrate Missile Master with the Air Force manual control system and ultimately with SAGE. Deputy Secretary Robertson approved this in principle on 30 October 1956.²³

Wilson's directive of 26 November 1956, clarifying missile responsibilities between the Army and the Air Force, further extended the scope of CINCONAD's authority. CINCONAD had the "authority and duty for stating his operational need for new or improved weapon systems and for recommending to the Joint Chiefs of Staff all new installations of any type." Therefore, no service might plan for additional antiaircraft missile installations in support of CINCONAD's responsibilities unless these had been recommended by CINCONAD and approved by the JCS.²⁴

As already indicated, the sense of urgency surrounding continental defense, noticeable in NSC discussions in early 1956, had dissipated by the beginning of 1957. NSC's consultant on the subject, Robert Sprague, had departed, and NSC 5606, which had forced the issue in the NSC, had been laid aside. The subject of continental defense came up, however, in the annual discussion of basic national security policy. One of the papers prepared by the Planning Board to outline major issues warned of the Soviets' increasing capability to damage the United States and posed several options: whether to undertake a broad shelter program, emphasize protection of the strategic deterrent in continental defense planning, or put more stress on active defense against ICBMs. On the NSC agenda for 11 April 1957, discussion of the paper was brief, partly because the question of shelters was already under study, as described below. NSC 5707/8, the policy directive eventually approved by the president to replace NSC 5602/1, called

for “adequate” rather than “accelerated” continental defense programs and omitted the warning of a possible “crippling” blow by 1958.²⁵

Influence of the Gaither Report

The question of civil defense received separate consideration by the NSC. For FY 1958 the administration proposed a continuation of civil defense planning along existing lines, including programs for education and training, cooperation with states and localities in planning, and research on radiological defense and shelter design. In presenting this legislative program to the NSC on 20 December 1956 (immediately following the NSC presentation), FCDA representatives stressed the dangers of radioactive fallout and pronounced fallout shelters more effective than evacuation of the population.²⁶

On 4 April 1957, after reviewing a report from the Planning Board, the NSC discussed the advisability of a large-scale shelter program. The council endorsed the Planning Board's proposal to study the cost and effectiveness of various alternative programs.²⁷

The most important of these studies, assigned to the ODM Science Advisory Committee, was carried out by the Security Resources Panel under the direction of H. Rowan Gaither. In its report to the NSC on 7 November 1957,* the panel assigned highest priority to measures to cope with the immediate threat of a surprise bomber attack. These included reduction of SAC reaction time by implementing the alert concept already under study; improvement of radars to assure tactical warning at high and low altitudes; further extensions of the early warning lines to prevent “end runs”; and installation of active missile defenses at SAC bases, using Nike-Hercules or the land-based Talos. To meet the threat of ICBM attack, the panel recommended further improvement of SAC's reaction time (to an alert status of 7-22 minutes depending on base location); further dispersal of SAC aircraft, perhaps to non-SAC military bases or to commercial airfields; development of radars capable of providing early warning of missile attacks; provision of hardened shelters at SAC bases; and interim antimissile defenses at SAC bases using available weapons (Nike-Hercules or Talos) with such long-range tracking radars as were available.

Less vital in the eyes of the panel, though still important, were measures to protect cities and the population at large. The panel recommended a “massive” development program to eliminate two major weaknesses in the existing defense system, namely, the vulnerability of radars to “blinding” by electronic countermeasures and the small probability of kills against low-flying aircraft. Other recommendations entailed development and installation of area defense against ICBMs and improved antisubmarine efforts, including defense against submarine-launched missiles.

For passive defense of the civil population, the panel recommended a

* The Gaither report is also discussed in Chapter VI.

nationwide program of fallout shelters, which could save more lives for the same amount of money than any other type of defense. The cost was estimated at \$22.5 billion over a five-year period, 1959-63. Blast shelters, less effective since they must be entered before an attack, might become necessary if an adequate active defense system could not be devised. Finally, the panel recommended reevaluation of the organizational structure for civil defense, which divided responsibility between ODM, FCDA, DoD, and state and local governments.²⁸

The Gaither report came at a time when the defense budget for FY 1959 was in preparation. The budget tentatively approved by Secretary McElroy, before presentation to the president, showed no influence of the Gaither recommendations or of the alarm recently aroused by the two Soviet Sputniks. Planned under a limit of \$38 billion, as presented to the NSC on 14 November it would continue development of some continental defense programs while cutting back on others. Thus increases in Nike units were projected, along with introduction of the first Hawk low-level missiles in 1959, but introduction of Bomarc would be delayed. Base construction for SAC dispersal would continue; however, the number of fighter interceptor squadrons would drop from 78 in 1957 to 67 in 1959 as part of a general reduction of Air Force strength, which had just reached 135 wings.²⁹

Discussing the budget with the president on 11 November, McElroy mentioned several important programs that could not be fitted under the \$38 billion ceiling. These included acceleration of SAC dispersal and alert and speedup of Polaris, both as recommended by the Gaither panel, an initial operational capability for IRBMs, and pay reform proposals. The president indicated a willingness to exceed the \$38 billion limit, perhaps going as high as \$39.5 billion.³⁰

Having obtained approval for a budget "add-on," McElroy referred to the JCS the specific programs for which the services had sought more than allowed under the \$38 billion limit. The JCS recommended programs totaling \$1.499 billion, including additional dispersal bases for SAC and development of long-range radars for missile detection.³¹ McElroy ultimately decided, with the president's approval, to include these items in a \$1.26 billion supplemental budget request for FY 1958.*

On 21 December, when Deputy Secretary Quarles forwarded to the White House DoD's response to the Gaither recommendations, he was able to report that most of those relating to continental defense were in progress or at least under study. Thus SAC had 134 bombers on constant alert, able to take off within from 30 minutes to 2 hours. The number was scheduled to rise to 515 by the end of FY 1959, but a shorter response time was essential. Programs funded in the 1959 and earlier budgets would produce a 15-minute alert status for 240 bombers in FY 1960 and 465 a year later. The dispersal program, which now envisioned 53 bases by the end of FY 1961, would be completed by funds in the 1959 budget. Further dispersal

* See Chapter VI.

to non-SAC or civilian bases was under consideration. Provision of hardened shelters at SAC bases, also under study, appeared to be less cost-effective than other alert and dispersal measures.

Tactical warning would be improved by extension of the DEW line to Greenland; the FY 1959 budget included funds for five of the seven radar stations required for the purpose. The Greenland-UK barrier would begin operations in December 1960. Radar stations for the Aleutian chain, to link up with the Midway sea extension, were fully funded and scheduled for completion by 31 March 1959. No action was planned to extend the line south from Midway; the JCS had agreed that this step was less important than improving existing and planned warning lines. Funding for improved radars for the DEW line and its seaward extensions appeared in the budgets for 1959 or earlier. Early warning stations for ICBM detection would be started under the 1958 supplemental budget.

For active missile defense against bombers, 4 Nike units had already been deployed to SAC bases, and 13 more would be funded in FY 1959. SAC bases would also benefit from area defenses such as interceptor aircraft and the Bomarc system (due for deployment in 1959). Further action on anti-aircraft missiles at SAC bases awaited JCS review of the Continental Air Defense Objectives Plan (CADOP) for 1956-66, being prepared by CINCONAD. Development of active defense against ICBM attacks needed research, along with the vulnerability of radars to electronic countermeasures and the low kill probability for low-level attacking aircraft.³²

On 6 January 1958 the NSC held its first discussion of the Gaither recommendations. After Cutler summarized at length the agency responses, Killian commented that the DoD programs seemed to be lagging behind the time schedule recommended by Gaither. Quarles admitted that the DoD actions went only about halfway toward meeting the panel recommendations, but he believed that DoD had selected the most essential ones for acceleration and pointed to the tremendous costs involved in fully implementing all the recommendations.³³

A second NSC discussion, on 16 January, dealt with the Gaither recommendations regarding fallout shelters. The JCS had endorsed the proposed shelter program, but to hold down costs they urged that existing structures be modified for use as shelters as far as possible.³⁴

The FCDA took the Gaither recommendations a step further. It recommended priority for fallout protection in areas subject to high radiation hazard. Where the blast hazard was great, construction of shelters designed solely for fallout protection should be deferred pending further study. Every effort should be made to exploit multipurpose use of shelters. DoD concurred in these proposals.³⁵

Speaking to the NSC on 16 January, the new FCDA administrator, Leo A. Hoegh, urged approval of the fallout shelter program, but he received little support. Gray, the director of ODM, pointed out that various questions remained to be answered, such as how people would behave when cooped up in a shelter for two weeks or so. Allen Dulles of the CIA explained that

the Soviet shelter program was not as large or as extensive as had at first been reported. His brother, the secretary of state, expressed concern about the psychological impact of a shelter program. "Burrowing into the ground," he feared, would weaken the nation's offensive determination and suggest to allies that the nation was turning toward a "Fortress America" concept. McElroy feared that a large shelter program would divert resources from offensive military capabilities; also, the nation surely had some obligation toward the millions whose lives would not be saved by mere fallout protection. Twining pointed out that most of the nation's productive power was concentrated in cities and that urban dwellers would want protection. President Eisenhower thought that even if fallout shelters would save 50 million people, the nation would be completely destroyed and life would be insupportable; the implication was that civil defense preparations were useless, though he did not draw this conclusion. The deputy director of the BoB demonstrated that the United States could, over a five-year period, absorb the cost of Gaither's highest priority measures and still come out with a surplus, but adding the cost of shelters would produce a deficit.

After further discussion, Cutler summed up the sense of the meeting as follows: the concept of shelter was desirable but should be given further study, and a specific shelter program should be submitted to the NSC. The final record of action placed the NSC on record as opposing a nationwide program at that time; however, existing civil defense policy, based on emergency dispersal, should be modified to incorporate the concept of fallout shelter. An interdepartmental committee was to develop measures to carry out the concept, including costs and means of financing. The council also approved an extensive schedule of reports to be prepared by DoD, in consultation with Cutler and Killian, concerning the advisability of various measures recommended by the Gaither panel.³⁶

At this juncture the council resumed discussion of continental defense policy. The Planning Board drafted a new paper, NSC 5802, to replace the now-defunct NSC 5606. In this the influence of the Gaither report was evident. "Predominant emphasis should continue to be placed upon measures to strengthen our effective nuclear retaliatory power as a deterrent and to improve our active defenses, as compared with—but not to the exclusion of—passive defense measures," asserted NSC 5802. "Particular emphasis should be accorded those active and passive defense measures essential to the protection of the U.S. capability for prompt nuclear retaliation."

The paper took note of rising Soviet missile strength, warning that the Soviets might have an initial ICBM capability of as many as 10 nuclear-armed missiles during the period mid-1958 to mid-1959. Accordingly, in listing the elements of continental defense, NSC 5802 called for development of an anti-ICBM weapon "as a matter of the highest national priority."

NSC 5802 incorporated two qualifiers. In the paragraph calling for an active defense against aircraft or missiles, Killian's representative on the board wished to specify that this defense must be capable of destroying a "high percentage" of enemy aircraft or missiles; he had the support

of representatives from State, ODM, and FCDA. In connection with passive defense, the ODM member urged a statement committing the United States to hardening of essential facilities along with improving dispersal planning and reducing reaction time.³⁷

The Defense member on the board opposed both of these proposals, objecting that the "high percentage" phrase was unrealistic under existing budgetary levels. Killian's office interpreted the phrase to mean 70-100 percent of enemy aircraft and missiles; to raise the existing kill capability from an estimated 15-25 percent would require a huge increase in expenditures. As for hardening, it was impractical to require extensive shelters for both personnel and aircraft at SAC bases. The requirement in NSC 5802 for "protection of essential facilities" would allow hardening of selected facilities (such as command posts).³⁸

The Army, Air Force, and JCS supported the DoD position. While generally approving NSC 5802, the Army criticized it as overemphasizing the need to protect retaliatory capacity specifically rather than war-making capacity in general. The Army also proposed adding, as one of the objectives of continental defense, the provision of ready forces for neutralizing or expelling any enemy lodgment in North America, citing intelligence warnings that the Soviets would soon be capable of conducting airborne or amphibious operations against parts of North America. The JCS supported this amendment.³⁹

In the NSC on 13 February 1958, Killian and Gray both endorsed the "high percentage" phrase. McElroy agreed that the existing kill probability was too low but objected that DoD was not ready to implement the requirement implied in the phrase. In any event, he assured the council, DoD would strive to achieve the highest possible capability. Quarles feared that the phrase might be interpreted as requiring a doubling of air defense costs; Twining thought it might thrust DoD into a position where there was no money for anything else. The BoB representative, predictably, supported the OSD position. Vice President Nixon, chairing the meeting in the absence of Eisenhower, suggested omitting the phrase, inasmuch as all present seemed fully aware of the objective. Cutler agreed, but added that he would call the issue to the president's attention.

Killian agreed with McElroy's objection to the proposal to specify an "operational capability" for an anti-ICBM system as a matter of highest priority, and Cutler ruled that the phrase would be omitted. Gray agreed to deletion of the ODM proposal for hardening of SAC bases with the understanding that such action would not prejudice the raising of this point when the NSC further considered the Gaither recommendations.⁴⁰

The president subsequently approved all these decisions by the council, and the new directive was issued as NSC 5802/1. It clearly committed the United States to predominant emphasis on strengthening and protecting the deterrent. McElroy had not shared the Army's objection to this emphasis and had not raised the issue in the NSC. Nor had the provision for an anti-invasion force been considered.⁴¹

After disposing of NSC 5802, the NSC turned to discussion of specific measures proposed by Gaither. The first report on these measures, scheduled for 27 February 1958, would consider hardening SAC bases and providing them with interim antimissile defenses, as well as possible increases in U.S. long-range missile programs. The JCS told McElroy on 5 February that, pending the availability of Nike-Zeus, it would be feasible to provide missile defenses using modified Talos missiles at a cost of slightly over \$1 billion for 25 units. On 21 February they restated their previously expressed position to limit hardening at SAC bases to selected facilities.⁴²

Holaday informed the NSC on 27 February that 25 Talos units could be installed by FY 1962 for \$1 billion. However, an accelerated Nike-Zeus program could provide 16 batteries by the same date; these would be much more effective, but the cost would be much higher (\$3.5 billion) and production of operational units must begin at once, concurrent with prototypes. The NSC asked DoD to submit recommendations at a later meeting. As for hardening of SAC bases, Quarles restated the DoD position that the cost would be prohibitive. No one objected, and the matter was allowed to drop.⁴³

A second report from DoD to the council, dealing with SAC dispersal, antimissile defense, and antisubmarine warfare, was due on 24 April. The JCS informed McElroy on 28 March that measures being taken under the FY 1958 supplemental and FY 1959 budgets would accelerate improvement of SAC's reaction time. Further dispersal of SAC aircraft to other military and commercial airfields, they believed, should await completion of studies by SAC.⁴⁴

In their review of air defense requirements for 1956-66, the JCS gave further consideration to the proposed Talos installation at SAC bases. In a preliminary report to McElroy in April, they asserted that the expenditure of \$1 billion for 25 units (or \$600 million for 12 units, exclusive of the money needed to incorporate an antimissile capability) appeared unjustified in view of budgetary limitations; however, research and development on the antimissile capabilities of Talos should continue.⁴⁵

On the matter of the missile early warning system, Quarles reported to the council that because of rising cost estimates, DoD proposed to accelerate construction of the first station (Thule, Greenland) but temporarily to limit work on the other two to site surveys. The Greenland station alone could provide 75 percent of total coverage. The council raised no objection.

Concerning SAC dispersal, Quarles summarized progress to date but, reflecting JCS views, reported that DoD was "not much encouraged" over the possibility of further dispersal to non-SAC airfields, military or commercial. As for the alert program, SAC would have 150 aircraft on 15-minute alert by 1 July 1958. For the next 3 years, the numbers would rise to 355, 425, and 480, respectively.⁴⁶

The meeting of 24 April was the last occasion on which the NSC discussed the military recommendations in the Gaither report. The NSC decision of 16 January, as recorded in the official record of action, instructed DoD to report on other recommendations as part of the annual report on the status

of military programs as of 30 June 1958. These pertained to efforts to improve tactical warning, including modernization of radars and lengthening of seaward extensions; research and development on electronic countermeasures and defense against low-level attacks; and the possibility of further strengthening of defenses, including those against submarine-launched missiles. DoD accordingly summarized the status of these programs in the 30 June 1958 report, but there was no discussion in the NSC.⁴⁷

The question of civil defense, however, remained on the council's agenda. The interdepartmental committee established on 16 January proposed an extensive federal program of building prototype shelters plus an educational program for the public. No consensus by the council emerged, and the president gave approval only to construction of small prototype shelters, incorporation of fallout shelters in new federal buildings, and a limited educational program.⁴⁸

Shortly thereafter one of Gaither's minor recommendations regarding civil defense, to reorganize the cognizant agencies, won clear-cut approval. Through an executive reorganization plan on 24 April 1958, President Eisenhower merged the Federal Civil Defense Administration with the Office of Defense Mobilization to form the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM). Hoegh, head of FCDA, was appointed director of the new organization (with a seat on the NSC); Gray of ODM replaced Cutler as the president's special assistant.⁴⁹

The Continental Air Defense Objectives Plan (CADOP)

The administration submitted its FY 1959 appropriation request for military construction to Congress in June 1958. For use in drafting the budget request, the JCS had provided the secretary of defense with recommendations concerning deployment of anti-aircraft missile units. To the previously recommended 29 batteries (7 1/4 battalions) of Nike-Hercules, 5 Bomarc squadrons, and 2 Hawk battalions, all to be deployed in FY 1959 and FY 1960, they recommended the following additional units for the FY 1959 budget: 56 Nike-Hercules batteries to be deployed in FYs 1959 and 1960; 10 Bomarc squadrons for FY 1961 deployment; and 96 Hawk batteries (24 battalions) to be deployed in 1960 and 1961.⁵⁰

A month later the JCS completed their review of CINCONAD's Continental Air Defense Objectives Plan (CADOP) for 1956-66—a "requirements" plan pure and simple, without regard to budgetary considerations. The JCS reviewed it in the light of the conclusions of their ad hoc committee on air defense composed of senior officers under the chairmanship of Albert G. Hill of WSEG. For planning purposes and for programming guidance, they approved numbers and types of air defense weapons to be operationally installed by FY 1962, the latest date for which reasonably accurate programs could be developed. For all types of weapons, their recommendations fell well below CINCONAD's stated requirements.⁵¹

When the JCS action on CADOP came before the AFPC on 20 May, Quarles, presiding in the absence of McElroy, expressed surprise that the JCS had acted on the plan without submitting it to the secretary of defense. Twining explained that the JCS considered CADOP to be a part of the JSOP and, as such, properly a matter for their decision, with the secretary to be informed later. Quarles accepted this view; he approved for planning purposes the JCS action on CADOP, with the understanding that the secretary would review the matter as soon as JCS studies of offensive and defensive weapon systems were ready and in the light of 1960 budget discussions.⁵²

Establishment of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD)

Before 1957, cooperation with Canada in air defense was confined to planning, constructing, and operating the various early warning and control facilities. The next step—operational integration of active defense forces—followed naturally after all U.S. forces, including those in Alaska and the northeast, came under the control of CONAD.

The JCS took the initiative in bringing about joint operational control of the two nations' defenses. In December 1955 they approved it in principle and approached the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, who agreed. The matter was referred to the Canada-U.S. Military Study Group (MSG), which appointed an ad hoc group of officers to study the subject in more detail. The conclusion of this body, that integration of forces was desirable, received the endorsement of the MSG in December 1956.

The JCS forwarded these conclusions to Secretary Wilson on 7 February 1957. They had approved the proposed integration, they wrote, with the understanding that it would be limited to the continental elements of the joint air defense system, including the seaward extension of contiguous radar coverage.⁵³

After clearing the matter with the president, Wilson gave his approval on 16 March 1957. He directed the JCS to draft terms of reference for the proposed CINCADCANUS (as he termed it). He also referred the proposal to the State Department.⁵⁴

State's position, transmitted on 19 June 1957, strongly favored deferring to Canadian sensibilities. Canada should exercise command of at least one major sector of continental defense; if the integrated forces were placed under an American commander, his deputy must be a Canadian; and Canadian views should be given full consideration in determining the location of the command headquarters. These cautions were probably unnecessary for the JCS, who were in touch with their Canadian counterparts and presumably were aware of their sentiments.⁵⁵

Negotiations proceeded rapidly, and on 1 August 1957 the two governments announced the formation of an integrated headquarters in Colorado Springs, Colorado, to control the defense forces of the two nations in the continental United States, Canada, and Alaska. The command, desig-

nated North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and responsible to the chiefs of staff of both countries, came into existence the following month. CINCONAD (General Partridge) would assume a second hat as CINCNORAD.⁵⁶

The JCS drafted terms of reference and obtained Canadian concurrence. As submitted to McElroy on 2 May 1958, these assigned NORAD the mission of defending the continental United States, Canada, and Alaska. NORAD's component commands included the three U.S. operational commands under CONAD and the Canadian Air Defense Command. CINCNORAD and his deputy would be of different nationalities. CINCNORAD would exercise operational control over the Mid-Canada line and the land-based portion of the DEW line through subordinate commanders. The seaward extensions of the early warning systems would remain under the control of CINCPAC and CINCLANT, but would operate in response to the needs of CINCNORAD.⁵⁷

McElroy approved the terms of reference and obtained State's concurrence. At the same time, an exchange of notes between the United States and Canada formalized the establishment of NORAD and authorized CINCNORAD to retaliate without governmental consultation in the event of an attack on North America.⁵⁸

On 19 August 1958 President Eisenhower, at the request of Quarles, formally confirmed the appointment of General Partridge as CINCNORAD and of Air Marshal C. Roy Slemmon, RCAF, as his deputy. Both appointments had already been approved by the Canadian Government.⁵⁹

The reorganization of DoD in 1958 altered the status of CONAD and with it, NORAD. CONAD lost its anomalous status as a "joint" command and became one of the unified commands, which had received legal recognition in the 1958 legislation and authority to exercise "full operational command" over assigned forces. Armed with this authority, CINCNORAD established his own structure of subordinate commands independent of (though co-located with) those of the ADC. Four NORAD regions were established in the United States and one in Canada, the latter coterminous with the RCAF Air Defense Command, which became a component command under NORAD.⁶⁰

Expansion of Canada's Role

President Eisenhower visited Canada in July 1958 and met with Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. They agreed that the two nations should establish a committee on joint defense at Cabinet level. Membership would consist, on the American side, of the secretaries of state, defense, and treasury, with their opposite numbers in the Canadian Government. The committee held its first meeting on 15 December 1958 at the Canadian Embassy in Paris during a meeting of the North Atlantic Council.⁶¹

At a lower level, the USAF and RCAF continued to study the problems of air defense. In August 1958 they drafted a plan to strengthen Canada's defense posture by providing improved weapons and facilities and tying

the Canadian system into the SAGE network. A SAGE direction center and a combat center would be installed in the Ottawa area, together with 2 squadrons of Bomarc B missiles and 12 gap-filler low-altitude radars; also, 2 heavy radar stations (with 100,000-foot altitude capacity) would be installed as part of the Pine Tree line. Costs would be shared, with the United States paying two-thirds. Air Force Secretary Douglas informed McElroy of this tentative agreement on 19 August, after it had been informally approved by Canadian Minister of Defense George Pearkes. But, added Douglas, the program called for 33 more gap-filler radars and 5 more heavy radars.⁶²

The JCS endorsed the plan on 18 September. The DoD general counsel's office rendered an opinion that there would be no legal objection to the installation of the U.S. weapons and facilities to be operated by Canadian personnel.⁶³

The Canadian Cabinet had already approved the plan in principle, as Pearkes had informed McElroy on 15 September. At the same time, Pearkes added, the Canadian Government for economy reasons was considering cancellation of a supersonic fighter under development, the CF-105 (Arrow), in favor of relying entirely on Bomarc. Pearkes had earlier discussed this possibility by telephone with Quarles, who had expressed the view that the SAGE-Bomarc plan was more important than the CF-105.⁶⁴

Following further debate in Canada, Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced on 23 September the final decision to discontinue the Arrow. To soften the blow, he added that negotiations under way with the United States would allow Canadian industry to share in production of Bomarc.⁶⁵

Dudley C. Sharp, assistant secretary of the Air Force for materiel, took the lead in working out logistic details of the joint U.S.-Canadian plan. Of the costs, estimated at \$378 million, the United States would pay 66 percent and Canada 34 percent. The Canadians also agreed to increase the number of gap-filler radars to 45. The entire program was named CADIN (for Continental Air Defense Integration North). The DoD budget for 1960 included the U.S. share.⁶⁶

Plans to allow Canada to share in production of Bomarc and related equipment presented some difficulty owing to legislation (the "Buy American Act") giving preference to U.S. manufacturers and to the fact that each military department applied the law in a slightly different way. Quarles met with representatives of the departments and worked out a uniform policy with the guiding principle that the Bomarc production sharing program should be equitable and beneficial to both sides. But no commitment was made to give the Canadians any stated amount of business; they were to compete along with U.S. manufacturers.⁶⁷

Another Service Dispute: Nike-Hercules vs. Bomarc B

Throughout 1956 and 1957 DoD had three land-based missiles under development. The most important of these, in terms of their future, were

Nike-Hercules and Bomarc B. The third was Talos, originated by the Navy for shipboard use but being developed by the Army in a ground-based version. As compared with Nike-Hercules, Talos had a slightly longer horizontal range (100 miles instead of 80). Nike-Hercules, however, had a higher altitude range (100,000 feet as compared with 80,000); it carried a heavier payload and was further advanced than Talos. After the rejection of Talos in early 1958 as a possible interim antimissile defense system for SAC bases, there seemed no need to keep it in existence. Consequently, OSD canceled the program; the Army's production contract for the land-based Talos was terminated effective 1 May 1958.⁶⁸

Congress more than once had complained of what seemed duplication in land-based antiaircraft missiles. During hearings on the 1957 construction budget, when the Air Force was considering use of the land-based Talos, the Senate Armed Services Committee denied authorization for it, charging that it duplicated the Army's Nike-Ajax, and called on the secretary of defense to make a choice between the two.⁶⁹

Secretary Wilson's directive of 26 November 1956 attempted to disentangle responsibilities by distinguishing between "area" and "point" defense. The first, assigned to the Air Force, involved "the concept of locating defense units to intercept enemy attacks remote from and without reference to individual vital installations, industrial complexes or population centers." Point defense, the responsibility of the Army, had as its purpose "the defense of specified geographical areas, cities and vital installations." Antiaircraft missiles designed for point defense would be limited to horizontal ranges of approximately 100 nautical miles. Specifically, the Army received responsibility for Nike and the land-based Talos, the Air Force for Bomarc.⁷⁰

But it was not easy to draw a clear distinction between area and point defense. Even Wilson's directive had admitted that the two could not be defined with precision. The difficulty was becoming more pronounced as the missile age advanced. During hearings before the House Committee on Armed Services in January 1958, McElroy asked rhetorically: "Who says where a point is and who says where an area is, and who particularly says where [an] area is when something is coming along at the speed of an ICBM. . . ?"⁷¹

As Talos dropped out of the picture, the apparent rivalry between Nike-Hercules and Bomarc B grew sharper. The difficulty of distinguishing their roles was enhanced by the growing destructiveness of warheads. In September 1958 test firings of Nike-Hercules reportedly demonstrated that an entire formation of jet aircraft could have been wiped out with six missiles had they been nuclear-armed.⁷² Thus a weapon intended for "point" defense could defend a large "area"—one remote from specific installations.

During 1958 the Senate Armed Services Committee continued to pursue the subject of duplication between antiaircraft missiles. In hearings on the reorganization bill, Senator Stennis complained of the length of time that Wilson had taken to settle missile responsibilities in 1956. Was this incident, he asked McElroy, an illustration of the need for the additional

authority sought for the secretary? McElroy replied that it was "something of an illustration," although in his opinion, Wilson had already possessed sufficient authority. When General Spaatz, former Air Force chief of staff, testified, he cited duplication among the various missile systems and between them and the fighter interceptors as examples of what Sen. Richard Russell called "undue waste and extravagance." Senator Stennis noted that the military construction bill then before Congress carried money for both Nike and Bomarc and suggested that the secretary should make a choice between them.⁷³

In reporting on the construction bill, the committee cited Spaatz's testimony as evidence of duplication between defensive weapons, specifically Nike-Hercules and Bomarc. Information furnished the committee by DoD revealed plans for frequent siting of both missiles in the same area. Accordingly, the committee denied any authorization for Nike-Hercules or for Bomarc, transferring the proposed money for both to the OSD appropriation with the expectation that the secretary of defense would make a choice between the two. The final bill did not go so far, reducing by approximately 20 percent the amounts authorized for Nike-Hercules and for Bomarc.⁷⁴

At the same time, in enacting the general Defense appropriation bill, Congress inserted a requirement that the secretary of defense "determine with respect to each defended area, which missile or combination of missiles will be employed in that area." In making this determination, he might transfer to the Army or the Air Force any funds made available for defensive missile installations, reporting to Congress his use of his authority.⁷⁵

These actions, pushing Nike-Hercules and Bomarc B into direct competition, helped touch off another sharp interservice dispute. Army and Air Force partisans defended their own system while denigrating that of the other. In the argument, the Air Force seemed to have the better of it: Bomarc B was expected to have a horizontal range of 400 miles (Nike-Hercules being bound to the 100-mile limit established by Wilson); it would have a low-level capability lacking in Nike-Hercules (the Army had designed a separate missile, Hawk, for this purpose); and a Bomarc squadron required only 80 acres of ground, compared with 200 for a Nike battalion. Nike-Hercules had the principal advantage of being already operational.⁷⁶

Officials of OSD felt it necessary to intervene in the dispute. The assistant secretary for public affairs admonished officials of both departments, and McElroy told reporters on 10 September that he had "passed the word" that the feud must be stopped.⁷⁷

In NORAD's concept of operations, there was no duplication; each missile had a unique role, along with fighter interceptors. The latter would strike first at incoming aircraft, then land on northern bases (rather than returning to their initial bases) in order to clear the way for missiles. Bomarc, with its longer range, was expected to come into action first, then Nike-Hercules, with Hawk filling in as needed against low-flying aircraft.⁷⁸

The congressional reduction of funds for Nike-Hercules and Bomarc would require a revision of tentative deployment plans and a judgment as to the relative value of the two weapons. McElroy turned to the JCS for advice. Twining had already given the matter some thought. Rather than discontinuing either missile, he favored eliminating 15-20 percent of the planned sites for each, using the JCS list of 6 March 1958 as a guide to priority.⁷⁹

The JCS, after studying the question, submitted a split report on 23 October. Taylor and Burke saw a simple way of effecting the 20 percent reduction in funds: merely defer all expenditure for Bomarc B pending an evaluation of it by WSEG. General White and CONAD favored reduction of funds for each system and a deferral of Hawk construction for a year, during which time the low-level capabilities of Bomarc B could be evaluated. Twining, who had been told by the director of WSEG that a further evaluation of Bomarc would produce no information not already available, endorsed the latter view.⁸⁰

Quarles established an ad hoc group including representatives of offices in OSD and WSEG. On the recommendations of this group, over the next few months, OSD released funds for 38 Nike-Hercules batteries at 19 SAC bases and for 3 Bomarc sites. Action on three additional Nike-Hercules sites in Montana and North Dakota would await a review of Bomarc by another ad hoc group. No money for Hawk was released. Thus the views of Twining and White prevailed.⁸¹

Disposition of the remaining three Nike-Hercules sites became the subject of a dispute, with the Army and Navy members of the JCS recommending release of funds for them. General White believed they would not be needed, since Bomarc, which he considered more effective, was becoming available. The matter was eventually left to be settled as part of the continental defense "master plan," described below.⁸²

Meanwhile, in December 1958, Quarles set up an ad hoc panel under Clifford C. Furnas, former assistant secretary for research and development, to evaluate the Bomarc B. In its report, submitted in April 1959, the group concluded that the threat from Soviet manned aircraft would remain obvious enough over the next few years to justify a "major defensive effort." A maximum defense at minimum cost could be achieved by a mixed system of interceptor aircraft with Bomarc, Nike-Hercules, and Hawk missiles. The panel had confidence that Bomarc B (which had not been tested) could perform satisfactorily and that it could be deployed by March 1961 or soon thereafter, provided that its development remained confined to the present state of the art and production proceeded concurrently with flight testing. They ruled out time-consuming modifications either for Bomarc or for the SAGE system upon which it relied. Bomarc should be deployed around the perimeter of North America (rather than the interior), including deployment "well up into Canada."⁸³

By this time the FY 1960 budget had been formulated and submitted to Congress. In drawing it up, McElroy felt obliged to economize on air

defense. As he told the president, "if we must be inadequate," here was the best place, since no defense was perfect and the best hope for protection of the nation was the threat of retaliation. He therefore cut back both Nike-Hercules and Bomarc procurement below the levels recommended by NORAD. Still, as he told the House Appropriations Committee on 23 January 1959, "substantial" quantities of Nike-Hercules, Bomarc, and Hawk missiles would be procured. No additional orders for manned interceptors would be placed, but the Air Force would continue development of a greatly improved fighter, the F-108, an all-weather aircraft designed for Mach 3 flight. Money for continental defense totaled approximately \$4.3 billion—slightly less than the \$4.6 billion in FY 1959.⁸⁴

As a result of a "great leap forward" in computer technology, the SAGE program was modified after the budget was completed. The system had been designed to employ vacuum-tube computers manufactured by the IBM Corporation. By 1958, however, IBM had developed a solid-state (transistorized) computer that could handle from five to seven times as much data as the original type. The Air Force proposed to install these in Super Combat Centers (SCCs) dug from 300 to 500 feet into the earth. Since these more powerful computers could be netted directly to radar stations, some of the combat and direction centers could be eliminated. The final plan drawn up by the Air Force called for 10 SCCs (9 in the United States, 1 in Canada).⁸⁵

The Air Force submitted the SCC plan to OSD in January 1959. On 21 January York granted approval to proceed with support of the solid-state computer development, holding in abeyance the rest of the program. Five computers would be procured with FY 1960 funds.⁸⁶

During budget hearings, McElroy made it clear that he did not consider Bomarc and Nike-Hercules to be competitive. He explained CONAD's concept of air defense, under which each missile had a role along with fighter aircraft. Formerly, he admitted, the two systems had been sited so as to result in double coverage of some areas, but this duplication had been eliminated.⁸⁷

An Air Force witness supported McElroy, pointing out that Nike-Hercules and Bomarc were "compatible and complementary." Members of the House Appropriations Committee, however, were not entirely convinced that both were needed. Some seemed disposed to follow the lead of the Army's chief of research and development, Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, who questioned the value of Bomarc and pointed out that the improved version, Bomarc B, was "only a concept," whereas Nike-Hercules was already on station. Rep. Daniel J. Flood was particularly critical of Bomarc. Air Force witnesses defended it.⁸⁸

The committee's trend of thought became apparent when it sent OSD a lengthy questionnaire asking for information on Bomarc. The questions dealt with the status of the Bomarc B program, problems encountered with it, the time required for launching, and other matters. York's office supplied the information on 12 May.⁸⁹

In Senate hearings on 4 May 1959, Stennis drew McElroy's attention to the request written into the previous year's construction bill for a choice between Nike-Hercules and Bomarc B. In a somewhat rambling reply, McElroy admitted that he had not yet made a choice and went on to defend the need for both as well as for manned interceptors. The following illuminating colloquy then took place:

Stennis: I am beginning to think that the Department of Defense itself would welcome a congressional decision on this matter and then you could move on into a more positive program.

McElroy: You certainly have touched us in a place that I would call vulnerable. . . . This is one area where we have not done very well in making a decision.

As far as I am concerned, it would not bother me if you held our feet to the fire and forced us in connection with this budget.

Stennis: I appreciate your attitude tremendously, because I frankly think that is what has to be done, Mr. Secretary.

McElroy: I think it is time.⁹⁰

The president, asked about McElroy's "feet to the fire" remark at a news conference on 13 May, replied that he had not heard about it but added that making such choices was an executive responsibility. One of the major reasons why he had pushed reorganization in 1958, he said, was "to get this whole scientific field into better control."⁹¹

Stennis seized the opportunity to apply McElroy's "feet to the fire" through the Armed Services Committee, then considering military construction authorization. On 13 May the committee voted to delete some \$17 million for Nike-Hercules construction from the draft bill, and rescinded authorization granted the preceding year for construction of 58 Nike-Hercules batteries in the mainland United States and Hawaii. The committee also inserted a requirement that was to have an important long-term impact—that the armed services obtain advance authorization for procurement of aircraft and missiles, as was currently required for military construction.⁹²

The Senate Committee thus in effect favored Bomarc. In the House, sentiment was exactly the opposite. The Appropriations Committee cut \$162.7 million from the administration's request for \$362.7 million for Bomarc procurement.⁹³ The full House sustained this reduction on 3 June. Meanwhile, however, prospects for Bomarc B improved somewhat when the missile passed its first flight test at Cape Canaveral, Florida, on 27 May.⁹⁴

President Eisenhower took note of the missile dispute at an NSC meeting on 28 May, when he introduced the subject even though it was not on the agenda. He was "increasingly upset" by the vehemence of the argument and wondered why two separate missiles were needed. McElroy, as in the

recent Senatorial hearing, did not explain that the missiles were intended to serve different purposes; he merely replied that he had "given much thought to this problem."⁹⁵

This exchange was perhaps the origin of a statement, attributed to a "Senate source," that the president had told McElroy at once to settle the dispute. Senator Saltonstall was quoted as saying that the Senate would resolve the matter unless the president did so quickly. The intensity of feeling between partisans of the two services deepened. Drew Pearson predicted that the bitter fight might cost Secretary Brucker his position because of his ardent advocacy of Nike-Hercules.⁹⁶

The Master Plan for Air Defense

McElroy was already moving to settle the dispute. Meeting with the JCS on 15 May 1959, he asked them to prepare and submit for his approval a "Master Plan" for continental defense. He confirmed his instructions in writing four days later. "It is particularly urgent," he wrote, "that the ground-to-air missile portion of this Plan be prepared as soon as practicable." Holaday's office would assist in the preparation.⁹⁷

The JCS plan, submitted on 2 June, took the form of recommendations for continental defense forces for FY 1963, including interceptor aircraft as well as missiles. It incorporated the recommendations of NORAD, presented for comparison with those of the JCS.

Over the key issue—Nike-Hercules versus Bomarc—widespread disagreement prevailed. All the JCS members agreed that the old Nike-Ajax should be phased out as soon as economically feasible and that Nike-Hercules should be retained at least through FY 1963. However, recommendations as to the number of Nike-Hercules batteries for "buy-out" ranged from 26 1/4 by the Air Force to 50 by the Army. CINCNORAD recommended 44. It was also agreed to close out the Bomarc A program at the current level of five squadrons. General Taylor opposed any procurement of Bomarc B. Burke recommended 11 squadrons (or 13 if a low-altitude capability could be developed), deployed around the eastern, western, and northern peripheries of the United States. White favored 27 and Partridge (CINCNORAD) 26; both favored deploying Bomarc throughout the combat zone rather than limiting it to peripheries.

To meet the low-altitude threat, Taylor recommended 26 Hawk battalions. White opposed any deployment of Hawk within the continental United States; Burke and Partridge recommended deferring Hawk deployment pending a determination of the low-altitude capability of Bomarc B.

The JCS members agreed on reduction of the existing fighter interceptor force of 62 squadrons. The Army and Air Force recommended a 1963 objective of 44 squadrons, the Navy and NORAD 41. NORAD wished one of these squadrons to have the new F-108s (which would mean putting the plane into production well before 1963). The JCS members favored

continuing the F-108 (or some equivalent long-range supersonic aircraft) as a research project.

All agreed on the need for SAGE and associated ground environment equipment. Burke, however, believed that the revision of the SAGE system, involving solid-state computers in hardened centers, offered an opportunity to review the entire program. If Bomarc deployment were limited to peripheral regions, he pointed out, requirements for SAGE could be reduced.

The JCS extended their recommendations to antiballistic missile defense. Taylor favored immediate production of Nike-Zeus; Burke and White believed production should be deferred pending further development. CINCNORAD recommended immediate authorization, out of FY 1960 funds, of at least \$150 million for preproduction procurement and tooling.⁹⁸

While McElroy gave thought to the JCS recommendations, Secretary of the Air Force Douglas weighed in with additional arguments for White's views. Douglas pointed out that the impending shift from aircraft to missiles as the principal threat cast doubt on the wisdom of a large investment in anti-aircraft defense. Economy dictated a concentration on three types of air defense weapons: a manned interceptor, a surface-to-air missile with maximum range, speed, and all-altitude capability, and eventually an anti-ICBM missile. The conclusion, which Douglas did not point out, was that Nike-Hercules was unnecessary.⁹⁹

On 8 June Killian, who was aware of the JCS recommendations (he had undoubtedly been consulted in the matter), discussed air defense with the president. He objected to speaking of a "master plan," since the JCS recommendations omitted consideration of some essential matters such as the role of the F-108. If it were decided to deploy Bomarc along the borders, he thought, then the F-108 might be dropped, thereby saving its estimated \$5 billion cost. Also, the projected master plan should not interfere with the more comprehensive treatment of air defense proposed as part of the "four studies" program. The president remarked that it revealed weakness in the top leadership of DoD when the choice between two weapon systems came to him for resolution; such problems should be settled in the department.

Killian observed that Admiral Radford (filling in for Twining, who was in the hospital) favored massive cuts in air defense, with the savings applied to offensive forces. He noted also that estimates of the Soviet aircraft threat had been considerably reduced. Finally, he pointed out that the air defense system would not be effective until NORAD was properly organized to exercise central control. The president "strongly" agreed; this, he said, was the whole theory of unified commands—the services should simply prepare the forces, then turn them over to NORAD for operational employment.¹⁰⁰

On the following day, 9 June, McElroy presented the president with his master plan—his decisions on the JCS force level recommendations. Accompanying him were Gates, Burke, White, Lemnitzer (attending for Taylor, whom he was soon to replace), and Holaday. Others present included Budget Director Stans and Acting Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon. McElroy's

decisions fell considerably short of the maximum recommendations submitted by the JCS. He proposed to retain both Nike-Hercules and Bomarc: 31 1/2 Nike-Hercules battalions (126 batteries) deployed around cities and SAC bases, and 16 Bomarc squadrons deployed around the eastern, northern, and western borders of the United States (in addition to the 2 earmarked for Canada). There would be no deployment of Hawk missiles in fixed sites in the continental United States. Reduction of the SAGE improvement program would leave six SCCs in the United States and one in Canada. In the central United States, improvements to SAGE would be sufficient to provide only an "austere" program.

For fighter interceptors, McElroy set a goal of 44 squadrons, as recommended by Taylor and White. He approved the completion of the full BMEW system, with the three stations in Greenland, Alaska, and the United Kingdom.

McElroy estimated that this plan would save some \$1.3 billion, primarily through reduction in planned procurement of Nike-Hercules and Bomarc. Offsetting this saving, however, would be \$250 million required to upgrade SAGE, also an additional \$150 million which McElroy planned to allocate to Nike-Zeus research and development.

During the ensuing general discussion, the president did not question McElroy's proposed force goals, thereby tacitly approving them. His opening suggestion was that Bomarc along the northern border might be moved up into Canada. White and Burke feared that the Canadians would object; the president asked McElroy to sound out the Canadian defense minister on this matter. He then asked if Lemnitzer considered the plan reasonable; Lemnitzer replied yes.

In answer to a question from the president, McElroy replied that his plan represented the best decision of the Defense Department. He had been unable to get unanimous agreement, but the plan had been thoroughly discussed and he was satisfied with it for the present. Stans questioned its cost, implying that the reductions did not go far enough; he suggested that further study might lead to elimination of Bomarc. McElroy pointed out that the plan called for substantial cuts in projected Bomarc expenditures and that it would be difficult to drop Bomarc after the Canadians had adopted it in preference to interceptors.¹⁰¹

Having obtained the president's approval, McElroy disclosed the plan to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 12 June. Although not released to the public, the plan's main features became known—and controversial. Hanson Baldwin praised it for fitting each defensive weapon into an integrated complex and, more especially, for reducing the proposed size of the defense program, thereby presenting "a belated and incomplete acknowledgment that today's offense has an increasing advantage over defense." Sen. Styles Bridges thought that the plan was "as good as can be designed." Democratic members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, however, were generally critical. Senator Jackson called it a "master compromise," evidently using the phrase ironically. Senators Russell and Symington complained that it did not go far enough; whether they meant

far enough in making reductions or in providing an effective defense was not indicated. Stennis feared that it might lead to renewed pressure for a single service.¹⁰²

At his press conference on 18 June McElroy pointed out that the master plan had never been intended as a vehicle for a decision between Nike-Hercules and Bomarc. "There has not been for many months any belief on our part that it was one missile or another," he said.¹⁰³

The next day McElroy formally notified the JCS of the decisions embodied in the master plan. At the same time, Holaday instructed the secretaries of the Army and Air Force to carry them out.¹⁰⁴

The new force goals in the master plan reduced the requirements for construction money for missile sites. On 18 June McElroy informed the House and Senate Armed Services Committees that the Nike-Hercules program in the authorization bill could be reduced by \$17 million (the amount that the Senate committee had already struck out) and the Bomarc program by \$29 million. On the other hand, the House had gone too far in reducing the procurement money for Bomarc missiles in the general defense appropriation bill, and McElroy asked restoration of \$129.9 million.¹⁰⁵

The Senate committee readily assented to the requested reductions for Nike-Hercules and Bomarc construction. In reporting out a bill, the committee took credit for bringing about the master plan, but questioned whether too much reliance was being placed on defense rather than on enhancing the offensive. "Particular attention should be given," wrote the committee, "to the early completion of Bomarc sites in those localities where Nike-Hercules sites are proposed as a stopgap until Bomarc sites can be completed."¹⁰⁶

McElroy's request for restoration of Bomarc procurement money was only partially successful. The Senate, without explanation, approved \$79.9 million as part of a total of \$2.55 billion for Air Force missile procurement. The final legislation cut this to \$2.54 billion, with no mention of the portion for Bomarc.¹⁰⁷

In enacting the construction authorization, Congress wrote in a provision requiring the secretary of defense to report to the Armed Services Committees of both houses the results of a complete review of all previously authorized surface-to-air missile sites, with assurance that these were necessary. The JCS assured McElroy that all authorized SAM sites and all currently programmed air defense missiles met requirements and that they saw no need to modify or expedite any program. McElroy forwarded this information to Congress with his endorsement.¹⁰⁸

By then there had arisen a question whether the master plan for air defense met the requirement for the study of continental defense that had been agreed on as one of the "four studies." At a meeting in Gray's office on 22 June 1959, McElroy expressed the view it did so. When Killian cited matters not dealt with in the plan—the role of the F-108 and the question of hardening and dispersal of SAC bases—McElroy replied that he considered the F-108 as merely an extension of the existing fighter

interceptor force and that hardening and dispersal pertained more to the retaliatory force than to continental defense. No decision came out of the meeting.¹⁰⁹

Twining and Gates endorsed McElroy's view, but Gray wanted a broader study. He persisted even after McElroy suggested that a forthcoming review by Kistiakowsky of the Nike-Zeus program and a study of the F-108 program in connection with the FY 1961 budget could adequately supplement the master plan. Gray eventually yielded. On 14 September he recommended, and the president agreed, that in view of McElroy's reluctance to proceed with the study on continental defense, it should be suspended until after the one on strategic striking power had been concluded; then the need for a further continental defense study could be considered. The study was never made; the revision of the continental defense policy paper, undertaken by the Planning Board early in 1960, served as a substitute.¹¹⁰

The master plan furnished a basis for the continental defense portion of the 1961 budget, but force goals in the plan had to yield to fiscal stringency. Thus the programmed strength of 42 manned interceptors for FY 1963 was 2 fewer than in the master plan. The Navy also found it necessary to withdraw all radar picket escort ships from the DEW line. CINCNORAD strongly protested these reductions, but Secretary Gates overruled him. The objectives for Nike-Hercules and Bomarc—126 batteries* and 16 squadrons, respectively—remained; they were reaffirmed in NORAD's operating plan for 1961-65, which the JCS reviewed in February 1960.¹¹¹

The financial squeeze forced the Air Force to choose between the F-108 and the B-70. It opted for the latter, which was left as the only supersonic aircraft under development in the Air Force.¹¹²

In the formulation of the 1961 budget, the possibility of placing some strategic bombers on airborne alert received serious consideration for the first time. The possibility had been discussed briefly the year before; the JCS then concluded that the existing 15-minute ground alert for part of the SAC force would suffice.¹¹³ However, on 30 April 1959 the JCS directed CINCSAC to achieve a capability for airborne alert, and CINCSAC accordingly began exercises to determine its cost and feasibility. In the FY 1960 Defense Appropriation Act of 18 August 1959, Congress had authorized the secretary of defense to provide for the cost of an airborne alert if the president determined that it was necessary.¹¹⁴

In July 1959 McElroy suggested that the JCS reconsider the possibility of an air alert in view of the approaching vulnerability to missile attack. SAC officers reported that six B-52s from each wing could be maintained on air alert without requiring additional crews. A larger alert, involving one-fourth of the B-52 force, would cost between \$750 million and \$1 billion, with 25,000 extra personnel required. The increased flying

* There were nine additional batteries in Alaska and four in Greenland.

time would also generate higher requirements for spare parts and components already depleted by the test program.¹¹⁵

Following completion of tests, CINCSAC recommended immediate steps to provide a continuous alert capability beginning 1 July 1960 of 6 sorties per day per wing, at a cost of approximately \$500 million, and increasing by 1 July 1961 to 11.2 sorties at double the cost. Secretary Douglas rejected this program and at first proposed an alternative to provide a varied force on a combined ground and air alert configuration at an annual cost of \$200 million. Later, in September 1959, the Air Force proposed a better plan to provide by 1 April 1961 an "on-the-shelf" air alert capability for one-fourth of the SAC bomber force. The cost for spare parts, personnel, and operations and maintenance would be \$202.4 million in FY 1960 and \$324.9 million in 1961, plus a small increase in personnel.¹¹⁶

The JCS disagreed over this proposal. White pushed hard for it and urged funding it as an excepted expense, as authorized by the 1960 appropriation act. Lemnitzer and Burke believed that SAC had already demonstrated, through exercises, a capability for airborne alert and that it could be maintained by routine training within available Air Force resources; any additional funds allocated to the Defense budget could be used for better purposes. Twining considered the Air Force proposal "something close to the minimum effort" required, but warned that he saw no way of financing it except at the expense of other programs.¹¹⁷

The administration compromised on a lesser program, to provide spares and personnel for one-eighth of the force, again by 1 April 1961. It required \$100 million in funds reprogrammed from FY 1960 and \$85 million in FY 1961 funds. Six training sorties would be flown per day, supported from resources provided for normal flying training.¹¹⁸

Reorientation, 1959-1960

During 1958 and 1959 practically all components of the continental defense system made marked progress. The Pacific early warning system became operational along its entire length in March 1959 when the radar stations in the Aleutians from Naknek to Umnak were completed. The Greenland stations, intended to extend the DEW line to Iceland and the United Kingdom, were under construction, with operation scheduled for 1961. Improvement of the radar systems made it possible to dispense with the Ground Observer Corps in January 1959. The first Nike-Hercules battery became operational in mid-1958; 12 others were manned by 30 June 1959. And by that date, five SAGE sectors were operational, all in the northeastern United States.¹¹⁹

But while the system was maturing, the nature of the threat was changing. It seemed increasingly clear during 1957 that the massive Soviet fleet of 700 heavy bombers by mid-1959, predicted by U.S. intelligence in August 1956, was not materializing. Although intelligence sources increased the

number to 720 in an estimate released in January 1957,¹²⁰ the downward revision of these figures soon began. Allen Dulles told the NSC on 10 October 1957 that the number of Soviet heavy bombers observed by U.S. intelligence was smaller than expected; he thought it possible that the Soviets might be de-emphasizing the role of the heavy bomber.¹²¹ In ensuing months, this judgment was vindicated. The first intelligence estimate following Sputnik credited the Soviets with 90-150 heavy bombers as of mid-1957; the August 1956 estimate had forecast 220 by that date. At the same time, the prediction for mid-1960 declined to 400-600, which some members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee considered too high.¹²²

During 1958 estimates dropped further, to 100-125 heavy bombers as of mid-1958, and the number was not expected to rise above 200 by mid-1960. The actual number believed to exist as of the latter date, according to 1960 estimates, was 135. This was a far cry from the 1956 forecast (though it should be noted that strength in medium bombers was believed to be somewhat higher than expected, approximately 1,000).¹²³

The "bomber gap" had disappeared, but a "missile gap" now loomed, at least in the minds of many. Administration officials had evidence that it was unlikely to develop, but there could be no doubt that Soviet missile strength was rising. The estimated initial operating capability (IOC) for Soviet ICBMs (assuming a force of 10 prototype models) was first scheduled for 1959, then moved back to 1 January 1960. As of February 1960, some in the intelligence community believed that the Soviets might have 140-200 ICBMs on launchers by mid-1961 and 350-450 two years later. Though the Intelligence Advisory Committee debated vigorously over the accuracy of these estimates, even the lower figures signified an ability to mount a dangerous attack against the United States—perhaps the "crippling" blow forecast in NSC 5602/1.¹²⁴

To officials in OSD and elsewhere in the administration, these two trends in Soviet military preparation—de-emphasis of manned bombers and increase in long-range missiles—pointed to an obvious conclusion. Defense against conventional aircraft assumed less importance; thus Bomarc, which had not yet been deployed, could be cut back. Money thus saved could be used to accelerate early warning against missiles and to enlarge the U.S. strategic deterrent force. These conclusions underlay the revisions in the FY 1961 budget that the administration submitted to Congress in March-April 1960.*

The advisability of the Super SAGE program also came into question. A PSAC panel that reviewed continental defense in 1959 questioned the cost effectiveness of the superhardened control centers in view of the vulnerability of their associated components, radars and missile installations. Later, a DDR&E working group, headed by Hector Skifter, concluded that the Super SAGE program would not be worth its cost. Even the survivability of the centers themselves, in view of the weapons expected to

* See Chapter XI.

be available to the Soviets by 1965, was doubtful. Cancellation of the program would save \$500 million; the "soft" SAGE system could be given protection through dispersal, redundancy, and improved ECM capability, and could be completed within two years if not delayed by the Super SAGE program.¹²⁵

These recommendations were opposed by CINCNORAD General Laurence S. Kuter, who considered the original SCC program sound. Moreover, he pointed out that the CADIN program assumed the installation of a Super SAGE (not the "soft" version) in Canada. The proposed cancellation, in his view, represented "a decided step backward in our limited capability for air defense."¹²⁶

The Canadian Government agreed that the SCC plan should be retained. To eliminate it would have serious political ramifications, reflecting unfavorably on the ability of the two countries to make joint military plans. They had accepted a delay in the operational date of SAGE to take advantage of the SCC; going back to the original "soft" program would mean a further delay in SAGE operation, according to the Canadians. Reporting these views to Secretary Gates in January 1960, Secretary of the Air Force Sharp indicated his own strong support for the SCC program.¹²⁷

Nevertheless, careful study by the Air Force confirmed the conclusion that the SCC program would not be cost-effective. The overall system would be vulnerable to destruction unless not only SAGE centers but communications, airfields, and missile installations were also hardened. "You can carry this on ad infinitum and practically put the entire national wealth in this thing," said General White to the House Appropriations Committee.¹²⁸

Convinced that the SCC program must go, White so informed the JCS, who, balancing it against other high priority projects, concurred in its cancellation. Deputy Secretary Douglas then consulted Canadian Defense Minister Pearkes in March and persuaded him to accept the cancellation of the Super SAGE program, also a reduction in the Bomarc program (which would not affect the two squadrons programmed for the RCAF).¹²⁹ Assured of Canadian concurrence, Douglas formally approved the JCS recommendation to discontinue the Super SAGE program.¹³⁰

The overall reorientation program, embodied in a revision in the FY 1961 budget and involving reprogramming for FY 1960, would eliminate \$274 million from SAGE over the two years, leaving \$241 million. Bomarc, allotted \$421.5 million for FY 1961, would be cut back very sharply to \$40 million. Only eight squadrons would be deployed (all in the northeastern United States), plus two in Canada; no new orders for these missiles would be placed after April. Of the money thus saved, the largest amount would go for the Atlas and Minuteman missile programs; other sums would be allotted to accelerate the construction of ballistic missile warning stations, develop early warning and reconnaissance satellites, and improve fighter interceptors.¹³¹

To members of the House Appropriations Committee, these actions by the administration must have seemed a vindication of their earlier

skepticism about Bomarc. The committee struck out all money for Bomarc for 1961 and prior years, except a small amount for research. In its place, the committee added \$215 million for two additional F-106 squadrons, noting that these were more mobile and versatile than Bomarc and could be used in limited war. The House accepted these changes.¹³²

OSD judged these changes unacceptable. It held that Bomarc would possess a capability against low-altitude targets unmatched by interceptors; it would give an earlier capability than any substitute program; its termination would damage relations with Canada. Even if the Bomarc program were ended, it was by no means certain that the money should be diverted to the F-106; other alternatives should be considered. York and his assistant director, Jack P. Ruina, urged that the Senate be asked to restore the money for Bomarc.¹³³ Secretary Gates accordingly requested restoration of the Bomarc funds in a letter to the Senate Appropriations Committee on 12 May. Douglas and White supported the request in testimony before the committee on 18-19 May.¹³⁴

Canadian reaction to the House action was as expected. The initial administration action, in sharply cutting back Bomarc, had led to charges by opposition members of the Canadian House of Commons that Canada had not been adequately consulted and to criticism of the Canadian Government for continuing with Bomarc in the light of the drastic U.S. reduction. The action by the U.S. House of Representatives had exacerbated the situation.¹³⁵

In a meeting with President Eisenhower on 9 May, the outgoing head of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, General Charles Foulkes, observed that the discontinuance of Bomarc caused "great difficulty" for the Canadians, since they had committed themselves to it "rather completely." The president accordingly asked OSD to study the impact of the action.¹³⁶

The study, made by the Joint Staff and informally furnished OSD by General Twining's office on 25 May 1960, concluded that two F-106 squadrons (50 aircraft) would in no way provide the equivalent capability of the Bomarc B program. Approximately 200 aircraft would be needed for that purpose, with procurement and annual operating cost approximately 3 times the savings from terminating Bomarc. Canada's probable course of action was uncertain, but the CADIN program might be jeopardized, owing to its relationship to Bomarc.¹³⁷

The Senate committee not only restored the money requested for Bomarc but added another \$75 million for two additional sites in Washington and Oregon, which the administration did not desire. Gates's assistant for legislative affairs, Brig. Gen. J. D. Hittle, in a letter to Senator Saltonstall, reaffirmed the desire for the \$294 million for Bomarc but asked that the extra \$75 million be deleted. In the end, Congress restored \$244 million.¹³⁸

The changing nature of the threat seemed to call also for a revision of national policy on continental defense. On 25 November 1959 the NSC noted that the Planning Board was undertaking such a review.¹³⁹

Some OSD officials doubted that NSC 5802/1 required revision. This

was the position of the assistant DDR&E for air defense, the Air Staff, and the office of the ASD(ISA). The last-named of these three warned that any attempt to revise it would reopen the service disagreements that had previously delayed completion of NSC 5802/1.¹⁴⁰

On the other hand, the Army Staff pressed vigorously for a complete rewrite of NSC 5802/1, not a mere textual emendation. The emphasis in NSC 5802/1 on strengthening and protecting nuclear retaliatory power, in the Army view, ignored the rising threat of Soviet long-range missiles. If the deterrent failed, retaliatory forces could not prevent a "devastating" attack. Policy should stress maintenance of all elements of the defense posture to assure that the means and the will to fight would survive a nuclear exchange.¹⁴¹

The Planning Board sided with the Army and instructed its assistants to draft a revision of NSC 5802/1. The result, circulated on 29 February 1960, was not what the Army had hoped for, since it retained from NSC 5802/1 the statement that primary emphasis should be placed on the protection of nuclear retaliatory power. However, it also called for development of an effective anti-ICBM weapon system "as a matter of the highest national priority." Several members of the group favored addition of a statement urging increased attention to active and passive measures, particularly those designed to protect the populace. At the same time, at the suggestion of Kistiakowsky's representative on the Planning Board, the draft revived an old dispute by including a recommendation that the air defense system be capable of destroying a "significant percentage" of enemy aircraft or missiles.¹⁴²

The JCS, Navy, and Air Force approved the draft subject to minor changes. In dissenting, the Army charged that it "unduly" emphasized protection of the retaliatory force. The Army also sought a statement that the United States should develop "and bring into operation" an anti-ICBM weapon system. This presumably would have meant a commitment to place the Nike-Zeus system in production, as the Army had been urging for some time. The Planning Board discussed the draft on 4 March and sent it back for revision, requesting DoD to submit a report on the Nike-Zeus program in connection with NSC consideration of the proposed change in continental defense policy.¹⁴³

After hearing this discussion, the CIA representative on the board, Robert W. Komer, became convinced (as the Army had urged earlier) that a mere updating of NSC 5802/1 would be useless. Either a "whole new look" should be taken at defense in the coming missile environment or the paper should be discarded. In particular, the paper should clearly state that the rising missile threat required a different type of active defense from that for manned bombers and a reexamination of the relative values of active and passive defense. In fact, concluded Komer, the entire question of continental defense was so "clouded with uncertainty" that it might be more useful for the board to produce a discussion paper pinpointing the major issues involved.¹⁴⁴ Kistiakowsky's representative agreed that the

missile threat might call for entirely new tactics of active defense and place passive defense in a more favorable light; he submitted a complete redraft of the first 12 paragraphs of the paper.¹⁴⁵

On 18 March the board heard the DoD presentation on the Nike-Zeus program and one by OCDM on the effects of a nuclear attack on U.S. population and resources. The board then agreed that major policy issues should be presented in a discussion paper to be drafted by a working group including representatives of DoD, JCS, OCDM, Treasury, and Kistiakowsky's office, with observers from State and the NSC Staff. Hector Skifter of ODDR&E was appointed chairman.¹⁴⁶

In its initial report, submitted to the board on 3 June 1960, the Skifter group identified six issues revolving around the rising ballistic missile threat and its possible effects. This passed through several versions before the board could approve it. The Army opposed what seemed excessive emphasis on strengthening the deterrent; the Navy felt that the deterrent effect of seaborne retaliatory forces had been underrated; the Air Force thought that the vulnerability of the existing air defense system had been overstated. Kistiakowsky doubted that any effective defense system could be deployed within the next decade and favored emphasis on passive defense, drawing from the Army the charge that he was going beyond his area of competence.¹⁴⁷

During the board's discussion of the paper, a new issue arose. The paper was intended for consideration by the NSC, but Gates, expressing the JCS view, feared that discussion in the council would delve into details of programs and operations properly the responsibility of DoD. He particularly feared criticism by Kistiakowsky. Moreover, in his view, the purpose of the paper had been served, since by then a consensus had been reached on most issues. After discussing the matter with Gray, however, Gates agreed to have the paper submitted to the NSC, apparently in exchange for a promise from Gray to keep the discussion broad and not allow it to focus on specific DoD programs.¹⁴⁸

The final version of the paper, dated 14 July 1960, stated the issues as follows:

1. Should U.S. policy give increased emphasis to passive as compared with active measures for the protection of our retaliatory capability against ballistic missile attack? If so, what factors should be considered in determining the most effective passive measures. . . ?
2. Should our air defense effort be reoriented so that, following an initial ballistic missile attack, it would retain a capability to cope with follow-on manned bombers and nonballistic missiles?
3. Should the United States revise its plans for survival of the military decision-making capability and its doctrine on response to attack and warning of attack, in the light of decreased reaction

time and in view of increasing U.S. emphasis on retaliatory ballistic missile forces?

4. Should substantially increased emphasis now be given to protecting the civilian population against fallout?

5. Are existing policies that provide for the continuity of essential wartime functions of the Federal Government in need of review?

6. Is there a clear need for vigorous research and development efforts to achieve a capability to destroy orbiting satellites and space vehicles?

The paper's treatment of the issues reflected an obvious effort to be objective and comprehensive but generally emphasized the growing difficulties of active air defense in the missile age. Thus discussion of the first issue included a statement that no antiballistic missile system was likely within the next five years and cited a WSEG study that concluded (as Kistiakowsky had contended) that enlarging the ICBM force would be more cost-effective than deploying Nike-Zeus. The conclusion: there was a "clear need" to revise the existing policy that emphasized active measures to protect retaliatory capacity.¹⁴⁹

The board also prepared and circulated for comment a draft record of the action to be approved after NSC discussion. It would order the board to proceed with revision of NSC 5802/1. It would also note that DoD had in progress a reexamination of present air defense concepts and that the results would appear in the annual report to the NSC on the status of the military program as of 30 June 1960; this reexamination would take into account the need for capability to cope with follow-on attacks. The special assistant for national security affairs would consult with the president and the secretary of defense concerning a study of the survival of decision-making machinery. OCDM would review fallout shelter policy and prepare plans for continuity of government functions. Finally, the record would give an affirmative answer to the sixth issue, concerning a capability to destroy satellites, but would specify that any test of such a system should await presidential approval.¹⁵⁰

Such action by the board, in preparing and circulating a draft record of action in advance of an NSC meeting, was highly unusual. In part at least, it undoubtedly reflected the misgivings of the JCS and of Gates about having the discussion paper go to the NSC at all. The effect of the record of action, if approved, would be to insure that the studies called for by the second and third questions would be kept in channels preferred by DoD—OSD, Gray, and the president.¹⁵¹

In preparation for discussion of the paper in the NSC, Secretary Brucker placed on record the objections of the Army. He charged that it treated continental defense in isolation from the overall deterrent strategy and underrated the possibility of an effective antimissile defense. It assumed

that the sole factor affecting the initiation of nuclear war was relative security of the retaliatory forces, thus ignoring the possibility of war through miscalculation or expansion of a limited conflict. Nor had it adequately examined the problem of offensive-defensive balance to cope with the increasing Communist military threat.¹⁵²

The JCS, even more sweeping in condemning the paper, stated that it did not constitute a "valid or useful basis" for evaluating or revising policy. Moreover, four of the six questions related to military matters constantly under study by the Joint Staff and the services. They recommended that the paper not go to the NSC and that the council review NSC 5802/1 in the customary manner. Failing this, they urged that they participate in the NSC discussion or, at the least, that the secretary present their views. They also criticized the draft record of action as prejudging the issues.¹⁵³

The council discussed the issues paper on 15 September 1960. The meeting opened with a briefing by John H. Rubel, acting DDR&E. After summarizing the development of the continental defense program, Rubel addressed the first three questions in the paper, which had direct interest for DoD. Concerning active as compared with passive defense, he pointed out that the "technological facts of life" were compelling an increased emphasis on the latter, to protect not only retaliatory weapons but also communications, command installations, and the like. Increasingly the system depended on such features as dispersal, mobility, and alert capabilities.

Regarding capability to cope with follow-on attacks after an initial missile assault, Rubel explained that this already existed; some defensive capability would survive the initial attack. Extensive reorientation of the system would be economically indefensible; moreover, it was not certain that any more could be done than had been done or was planned. Air defense against enemy bombers, for example, was difficult to provide by hardening. As for the third issue, concerning survival of decision-making capability, Rubel merely noted that this was under study by DoD and JCS.¹⁵⁴

The ensuing discussion was rather general and, no doubt to the gratification of Gates and the JCS members (who were present), did not get into details of DoD responsibilities. The president drew from Rubel's presentation the conclusion that more emphasis must be given to passive defense; otherwise, while it might be possible to retaliate after an attack, "the people we are supposed to be defending would all be dead." Douglas remarked that in the past, the military services had taken a "negative attitude" toward passive defense; this was now changing, though it was not fully reflected in the existing policy statement. At the conclusion, Gray observed that the discussion had provided adequate guidance to the Planning Board in revising policy, and the president directed that OCDM consult with the Departments of Defense and State, and others as necessary, in reexamining shelter policy "on a down-to-earth basis."¹⁵⁵

Following the meeting, the president approved the draft record of action prepared earlier by the Planning Board.¹⁵⁶ This provided the board with a

mandate to proceed with revision of NSC 5802/1. The product, NSC 6022, circulated 13 December 1960, incorporated from the issues paper a statement that the threat was shifting from manned aircraft to missiles and that hence continental defense programs must be reexamined. It included, over the opposition of the JCS representative on the board, a statement that planning should recognize the uncertainty of an adequate anti-missile system during the 1960s. As in NSC 5802/1, it emphasized strengthening and protecting the nuclear deterrent. A paragraph recognizing the need for passive measures provoked disagreement. A majority desired a strong statement of the need for such measures. The JCS representative wished a clear emphasis on active defense; he was supported by Treasury and BoB representatives, who no doubt feared a commitment to an expensive passive program.

NSC 6022 also recognized a need for continuing improvement of defense against manned aircraft and nonballistic missiles. Development of an active ICBM defense must be pursued "as a matter of highest national priority." The JCS representative stood alone in wishing to specify the need for an operational AICBM capability as early as possible.

An entirely new statement in NSC 6022 recognized the need to develop "capabilities, procedures and doctrine" to secure command and control of retaliatory and defensive forces during a surprise ballistic missile attack. The United States must have an "effective and flexible response" that did not depend on survival of the seat of government. At the same time, counter-offensive forces must be launched either in response to attack or on warning of attack, with positive safeguards against acting on ambiguous information.

One aspect of passive defense was dispersal of federal facilities, military and other. NSC 5802/1 had specified that the location of new or expanded military installations lay within the "sole discretion" of the secretary of defense. However, a provision in NSC 6022, opposed by Defense and JCS, would require the secretary to consult with the director, OCDM, regarding the location of "new fixed retaliatory bases" and "major administrative headquarters."

After unanimous board agreement on the need for a civil defense program, the majority of board members believed that this should consist of a "comprehensive system of fallout shelters." The Treasury representative wished to specify that individual property owners had the primary responsibility for provision of fallout shelters. The BoB favored a brief statement of need with specific guidance to be provided separately.¹⁵⁷

Meanwhile OCDM had drafted a proposal for a program to provide fallout shelters for the entire population within five years at an estimated cost of \$890 million the first year (FY 1962) and \$4.512 billion for the five-year period, mostly to be funded through tax credits. It also proposed to spend \$30 million in 1962 for shelters in military buildings. The JCS, in reviewing the proposal, objected to this provision, fearing that it might drain funds from other military programs.¹⁵⁸

The NSC discussion of NSC 6022 on 22 December began with consideration of the possibility, which NSC 6022 judged "questionable," of

developing an effective defense against the ICBM. Lemnitzer, speaking for the JCS, objected to this statement. The JCS advocacy of an active defense, Lemnitzer admitted, stemmed in part from fear of seeing the money then being spent on active missile defense (some \$500 million annually) diverted to shelter construction. Gates, disagreeing with Lemnitzer, cited estimates that even if a properly functioning system were developed by 1969, only 20 percent of the population could be defended against missiles. Eventually, Lemnitzer withdrew his opposition to the statement with the understanding that it would not become the basis for a major shift of funds.

Regarding the balance between active and passive measures, the president approved the majority position for "increased attention" to the latter. When Stans objected, Eisenhower remarked that "we should be doing a lot more" for passive defense.

The subject of civil defense having come up, Gray called upon Hoegh to present the OCDM fallout shelter program. The president approved the five-year objective but thought the federal role should be more precisely defined. After some discussion, it was agreed that OCDM would revise its paper, in collaboration with DoD and BoB, incorporating a statement of financial implications as guidance for the incoming administration. The relevant paragraphs in NSC 6022, which had been the subject of disagreement, were to be sent back to the Planning Board for revision.

The JCS lost out on the effort to commit the United States to insure an "operational" AICBM capability by the earliest possible date. It was decided to rewrite the passage in question to remove both the wording favored by the JCS and the alternative, which would merely have called for an "attempt to develop" capability. Regarding the location of new bases and headquarters, Gates indicated willingness to consult with OCDM so long as this implied no veto power for OCDM.¹⁵⁹

Following the meeting, NSC 6022 was amended and the revised version formally approved by memorandum action of the NSC on 18 January 1961.¹⁶⁰ The action carried little weight, however; Eisenhower was about to leave office, and his successor would make his own decision whether to be bound by a previously approved policy statement.

NSC 6022 ignored two matters raised in the Planning Board issues paper. One was the capability to deal with nonnuclear attacks after the Soviets had expended their ICBMs. By decision of the council on 15 September, this subject was to be considered in the DoD status report as of 30 June 1960. Gates directed the JCS to study the subject.¹⁶¹ Their conclusion, as given in the status report, was that little action could be taken in this regard. The existing concept for air defense rested on early warning plus employment of a family of weapons to defend in depth against missile and bomber attacks. A review in the light of Soviet missile capabilities showed that this concept remained valid. However, weapon limitations would prevent full implementation of defense against ballistic missiles during the foreseeable future, and an initial missile attack would considerably reduce the capability to defend against follow-on attacks. Principal actions taken

to limit the effect of such attacks consisted essentially of measures to decentralize control of weapon systems.¹⁶²

For the other subject not considered in NSC 6022, survival of decision-making capability, Gates and Gray had the responsibility. The two had lunch with the president on 9 January 1961 and agreed that the initial study would be made in DoD. Gates accordingly assigned the responsibility jointly to ASD(MP&R) and the JCS, but the action was overtaken shortly after by the change of administration.¹⁶³

OCDM did not complete the restudy of civil defense before Eisenhower left office. However, in his final budget message sent to Congress on 16 January 1961, the president said that the federal government had "by leadership and example" implemented a national policy based on recognition of fallout shelters as the best protection for the largest number of people. Federal actions had included instruction in protective measures, surveys of existing shelters, and construction of prototypes; also, Congress had been urged to provide funds for fallout shelters in federal buildings. These activities would continue in FY 1962, and it was proposed to require shelters in certain private construction involving some form of federal assistance. All these were modest goals; the administration resisted to the last any large-scale shelter program.¹⁶⁴

Summary

The evolution of the continental defense system between 1956 and 1960 is illustrated in Table 5. Perhaps the most striking feature of this tabulation is the rapid growth of the two radar warning systems—the Mid-Canada and Distant Early Warning lines. Neither existed in 1956; four years later both were in full operation, with only the extension of the DEW line to Scotland remaining to be completed. Not shown in the table are the qualitative improvements, notably that of the fighter interceptor force, where the changeover to "Century" fighters was almost completed. This change, plus the introduction of ground-based anti-aircraft missiles much more effective than conventional artillery, provided the justification for reducing the numbers of fighter aircraft.¹⁶⁵

Still in progress was the dispersal program for SAC's retaliatory force. As of 30 June 1960, 36 heavy bomber squadrons occupied 28 bases, and 25 medium wings, 18 bases; thus the goal of 1 base per squadron or wing remained in the future. Earlier, however, on 20 May 1960, SAC reached its goal of one-third of its force on continuous 15-minute ground alert.¹⁶⁶

The JCS review of NORAD's North American Air Defense Objective Plan for FYs 1962-65 showed that the original system to protect against manned aircraft was nearly complete by the end of 1960. Force levels approved by the JCS for programming guidance, constrained by budgetary limits, showed a leveling off after FY 1962 in practically all categories of the system, both warning facilities and weapons, with a continuing decline in the strength

of the interceptor force. Although the JCS would doubtless have preferred somewhat higher levels, they judged that the approved forces "provide an effective, integrated system. . . giving a defense in depth for defense of the continental United States, Canada and Alaska against air attack."¹⁶⁷

The budget for FY 1962, which provided money to continue the expansion of SAGE, Missile Master, and the gap-filler radar system and substantially to complete the Nike-Hercules program, otherwise evidenced restraint. It included no money for Bomarc or for additional fighter interceptors. In sending the budget to Congress, the president devoted most of his message to defense against ballistic missiles. "The advent of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles in the hands of a potential adversary has confronted this Nation with a problem entirely new to its experience," he warned in a statement that could have been made about the intercontinental bomber not many years earlier. He assured the nation that work on the ground-based radar missile warning system "has been greatly accelerated and is proceeding as fast as practicable." Development of the Nike-Zeus missile for active defense against the ICBM "is proceeding under the highest national priority," he said, although funds would not be committed to production until development tests had been completed.¹⁶⁸

Whether the system as it had developed by 1960 sufficed for its purpose could not be stated, since, as Admiral Radford had remarked, only a wartime test could answer that question. In its annual status report, OSD regularly advised the NSC that U.S. defenses had improved but so had Soviet offensive capabilities, so that any net gain was questionable.¹⁶⁹ The 1960 report omitted any overall assessment of the continental defense system as such but, in evaluating capabilities for general war, considered that "a coordinated Soviet attack against our long-range nuclear retaliatory forces, our deployed land-based forces, our logistical base, and our naval forces at sea would be extremely difficult to execute with complete surprise, and only a coordinated attack with almost complete surprise could endanger our effective retaliatory power."¹⁷⁰ In the final analysis, then, defense of the nation rested on the threat of retaliation, as President Eisenhower pointed out on more than one occasion.

The progress of continental defense between 1956 and 1960 represented a continuation of the momentum established in 1953 when the program was launched. The goals set at that time and the rate of progress toward their accomplishment had to be regulated in accord with changing estimates of Soviet strength and judgment as to available resources; the demands for defensive weapons had to be balanced against those designed for offense, above all the expensive new retaliatory missiles. Responsibility for maintaining this balance belonged to OSD but in the final analysis to the president, who kept a steady hand on the tiller; he refused to be thrown off course even by the events of 1957, which, to many people, seemed to signal a quantum jump in Soviet military capabilities. Within OSD, all three secretaries of defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the president's decisions in both letter and spirit.

CHAPTER XIV

Nuclear Weapons

The achievement of nuclear fission and the subsequent use of nuclear weapons by the United States during World War II not only brought the conflict to a speedy close, but seemed to open a completely new chapter in the history of the human race. A stupendous new source of power, terrifyingly revealed by the two atomic weapons dropped on Japan in August 1945, was now, for better or worse, in the hands of humanity. For a few years after the war, the United States possessed a monopoly of this new weapon; then in 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its own nuclear fission device. Within a short time, both nations moved from nuclear fission to thermonuclear fusion weapons, which represented an increase in destructiveness of several orders of magnitude. The unparalleled fire-power represented by these awesome weapons became the focus of U.S. deterrent strategy.

Responsibilities and Organization

How to deal with this new source of power created a major problem for U.S. policymakers immediately following World War II. After considerable debate, Congress settled the question in 1946 by establishing a civilian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) responsible directly to the president. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (as amended in 1954), AEC was to consist of a chairman and four other members appointed by the president with the approval of the Senate. It was assigned ownership of all fissionable material (or "special nuclear material," as it was renamed in 1954), as well as of all facilities for the production of such material. Supervision of these facilities was the responsibility of a general manager appointed by AEC. A nine-member General Advisory Committee, appointed by the president, advised AEC on various scientific and technical matters.

The authority of AEC extended to military as well as civilian applications of atomic energy. It had authority to engage in the production of nuclear weapons, subject to the consent and direction of the president, which was to be obtained annually. Finished weapons would remain in the

custody of AEC unless the president authorized their transfer to the Department of Defense. AEC's director of military applications supervised production of weapons; the position, established by statute, was to be filled by an officer of the armed services. Responsibility for liaison between AEC and Defense belonged to a Military Liaison Committee (MLC) representing all the services.

Congress also established a Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), consisting of nine members of each house of Congress appointed by the respective presiding officers. It made continuing studies of activities of AEC and of problems relating to the development, use, and control of atomic energy. AEC was enjoined to keep the JCAE fully informed with respect to its activities. The members of the JCAE took their responsibilities with the utmost seriousness; their close and careful supervision over the entire field of nuclear energy occasionally proved a source of irritation to President Eisenhower (who once expressed doubt that the powers of the JCAE were constitutional).¹

Within OSD, matters relating to atomic energy came under the purview of a special assistant to the secretary of defense, Brig. Gen. Herbert B. Loper, USA (Ret.), appointed to the position in 1954. He also served as chairman of the MLC, which consisted of two officers from each military department; this was by decision of the secretary of defense, since the law did not stipulate the size of its membership.²

Another nonstatutory body with responsibilities in this area, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), created in 1947, served as the principal connection between the military establishment and AEC at the operational level, as the MLC did at the policy level. Beginning in 1951 AFSWP reported to the three principal military service chiefs, rather than to the JCS as a body. Its mission was to support the armed forces by providing technical, logistic, and training services relating to atomic weapons. It also supervised DoD participation in tests of nuclear weapons by AEC.³

After the reorganization of DoD in 1958, with its thrust toward centralization, the position of AFSWP as an organization responsible to the service chiefs came into question. The chief of AFSWP, Rear Adm. Edward N. Parker, proposed that it be redesignated a "command," responsible to the JCS like the unified and specified commands. The JCS desired to take it over under the title of Joint Atomic Support Agency. Deputy Secretary Quarles, however, favored an organization at secretarial level, and this view prevailed. On 1 May 1959 AFSWP was redesignated the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA), with the broad mission of advising the secretary of defense, JCS, the military services, and the unified and specified commands. It would coordinate with AEC on matters concerning research and development, production, stockpiling, and testing of nuclear weapons, and would supervise the conduct of weapons effects tests by DoD. Its chief would be appointed by the secretary of defense on recommendation of the JCS. DASA thus became the first of the "defense agencies" that were to proliferate in the succeeding decade.⁴

Weapons Custody and Dispersal

In the early days of atomic bomb production, when weapons were fabricated by hand, their retention under AEC's direct control and custody was natural. As the stockpile expanded, and particularly after the outbreak of the Korean War brought on fears of a larger conflict, a portion of the stockpile was cautiously deployed to forward areas, beginning first with nonnuclear components of weapons, leaving the atomic assemblies to be moved later if necessary. Meanwhile the question of custody of the stockpile (as distinct from its location) became an issue between Defense and AEC. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pushed for full military custody of at least a portion. AEC agreed, but working out the boundaries proved difficult.

A directive by President Eisenhower in August 1955 clarified and codified earlier decisions on custody and dispersal and enlarged DoD responsibilities. "High-yield" weapons, with explosive yields exceeding 600 kilotons (KT), would be dispersed only to SAC bases in the United States and to overseas locations (including U.S. aircraft carriers and ammunition ships) under full U.S. control. AEC would retain custody of all such weapons even after they were transferred. Responsibility for weapons of lower yields would pass to DoD.⁵

Should use of nuclear weapons become necessary, they would of course have to pass at once into military hands. On 4 April 1956 the president prescribed procedures to govern such situations. In the event of a perceived need (short of an emergency) for transfer, as determined by the secretary of defense or the JCS chairman, the secretary would ask and receive from the president authorization for transfer of custody. An emergency requiring immediate transfer could be declared by the commander of a unified or specified command, JCS, or higher authority. In that event, AEC custodians would at once release all weapons under their control to appropriate military commanders; the president would be notified, but his prior approval would not be required.⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff remained unhappy with continuing AEC custody of weapons. On 24 February 1956 they told Wilson that "dispersed high yield weapons should be under full military control in order to insure maximum operational readiness." Wilson agreed and so informed Lewis L. Strauss, chairman of AEC. As a result, AEC and AFSWP negotiated an agreement on 4 June 1956 that partially met JCS wishes. AEC custodians would be removed from naval vessels; custodial responsibility for high yield weapons would be exercised for AEC by the ships' commanding officers. The president approved this agreement on 6 August. The agreement did not apply to land bases, where AEC civilians remained as custodians. Nevertheless, as Loper noted, the agreement left AEC custody "so flimsy as to be little more than nominal." However, given AEC's strong views on "civilian control" of high-yield weapons, he considered it inadvisable to press for further concessions at that time.⁷

The number of weapons transferred was determined annually by the president, as of the beginning of each fiscal year, on recommendation

by the JCS and the secretary of defense. In July 1956, recommending a plan to become effective on 1 July 1957, JCS proposed an increase in the number of weapons dispersed. Previously, for planning purposes the JCS had allocated approximately 75 percent of nuclear weapons to military commanders, but had retained a number of these within the United States. They now proposed the transfer of the entire allocation to military custody for dispersal, leaving a reserve of 25 percent under their immediate control. Under this plan, about 40 percent of the stockpile would go outside the United States, with less than 20 percent in areas not under full U.S. control. For high-yield weapons, less than 15 percent would go overseas. The JCS also urged again that all high-yield weapons come under military custody.⁸

Commenting on this plan, Loper doubted that a 25 percent reserve in the United States would be adequate. Moreover, he noted, Admiral Radford had not participated in this JCS action and was not entirely in agreement with his colleagues' conclusions. At Loper's suggestion, Deputy Secretary Robertson requested the JCS to reconsider the matter. Robertson added that while he agreed with the chiefs concerning military custody of weapons, the president had made it clear that he did not favor an extension of military custody at that time, and Robertson accordingly did not judge it propitious to raise the issue.⁹

In subsequent discussions, however, Wilson was won over to the proposed dispersal of 75 percent of the stockpile. On 21 November he submitted the JCS plan to the president. At the same time, with Strauss's approval, he recommended that DoD be made responsible for all dispersed weapons—those at bases as well as on ships. The president orally approved these proposals on 21 November, while expressing some misgivings about such widespread dispersal. In formally confirming his decision three days later, Eisenhower forbade any further dispersal, without his specific approval, of high-yield weapons to territories not under U.S. sovereignty. Weapons stored on bases not under complete U.S. control would be subject to the same custodial arrangement as currently in effect for those on shipboard, with details to be worked out between AEC and Defense.¹⁰

Following this directive, AEC and DoD agreed on 2 February 1957 that Defense would be responsible for readiness, security, and safety of weapons released for dispersal. It would also furnish personnel, facilities, and equipment for handling and storage of the weapons. Commissioned officers designated by AEC military representatives would exercise custodial responsibilities on behalf of AEC, as on shipboard.¹¹

In their dispersal plan for FY 1959 (beginning on 1 July 1958), the JCS again proposed to retain a 25 percent reserve in the United States. Since the stockpile was growing, the remaining 75 percent, to be dispersed, was numerically larger than the preceding year. The president approved but directed that in subsequent years plans should contemplate a general leveling off in numbers of weapons dispersed, with exceptions for anti-aircraft and antisubmarine weapons.¹²

Meanwhile, on 22 May 1957 the president had issued a ruling governing the use of nuclear weapons in conflict. He authorized commanders to employ them immediately to defend their forces in retaliation against an attack when circumstances did not permit consultation with higher authority.¹³ This directive conflicted with that of 4 April 1956, which prescribed procedures for formal transfer of custody before using nuclear weapons. In the event of a surprise attack, a U.S. commander might be faced with a decision to defend his forces before competent authority had declared a defense emergency; in that event, the local AEC custodian (even though a military or naval officer) would have no authority to transfer the weapons under his control. Deputy Secretary Quarles suggested two possible solutions. First, AEC custodians might be authorized in advance to make transfer when appropriate commanders deemed it necessary to use them; however, such action would depend on functioning communications and immediate availability of custodians, neither of which conditions might obtain during a surprise attack. A simpler method would vest formal custody of all weapons, both high- and low-yield, in the secretary of defense rather than in AEC.¹⁴

AEC officials, although agreeable to Quarles's suggestion, felt it necessary first to consult JCAE. On 19 August 1958 the new AEC chairman, John A. McCone, informed the president that some JCAE members, notably Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper, considered that there was "a matter of civilian cognizance which may have considerable importance." The president took no action.¹⁵

The Joint Chiefs' dispersal plan for FY 1960, sent to McElroy on 22 September 1958, abandoned the fixed 25 percent reserve in the United States. The reserve, they believed, should simply be adequate to provide both control over military operations and flexibility to meet unforeseen contingencies. They did not raise the question of custody. However, when Quarles submitted the plan to AEC on 13 October, he repeated the suggestion that DoD be given formal custody of all dispersed weapons.¹⁶

McCone concurred in these recommendations, subject to presidential approval and review by JCAE. He stipulated further that AEC would retain its responsibility for policies and standards governing protection of restricted data, as well as its interest in weapons safety rules, which would be mutually agreed on by AEC and DoD. On 20 November 1958 Quarles submitted the dispersal plan to the president, who approved it orally on 19 December and confirmed his approval on 3 January 1959. The transfer of custody was to be implemented as soon as "appropriate arrangements" were made between AEC and DoD.¹⁷

These arrangements included the consent of JCAE, which McCone obtained on 12 January. McElroy and McCone then informed the president that arrangements had been completed and that the change would be started immediately. The president formally approved the dispersal plan on 26 February. With these steps, DoD completed its acquisition of full legal control, as well as physical custody, of dispersed nuclear weapons.¹⁸

For FY 1961 JCS recommended dispersal to additional NATO countries, in line with the administration's desire to boost the nuclear capabilities of the alliance. Gates submitted the plan on 29 October 1959; the president approved it a week later.¹⁹

By the end of 1960 only some 10 percent of the national stockpile, comprising those weapons still in the United States, remained under official custody of AEC. On 13 January 1961, after the president had approved in substance the dispersal plan for FY 1962, McCone informed him that most members of the AEC were willing to have the remainder of the stockpile transferred to DoD. The exception, Commissioner John S. Graham, also felt that too many weapons had been dispersed abroad, a view that McCone shared. The president agreed and directed that the number of weapons in Europe be reviewed. His administration expired, however, before action could be taken.²⁰

Policy Governing Use of Nuclear Weapons

The Eisenhower administration's reliance on nuclear weapons as the cornerstone of national strategy clearly implied a readiness to employ them without hesitation whenever occasion demanded. Such weapons, said Admiral Radford in 1953 (when the New Look was still evolving), had "virtually achieved conventional status within our Armed Forces."²¹

Radford spoke with some exaggeration. While unequivocally committed to the use of nuclear weapons, the president never lost sight of their special status. Thus NSC 5602/1, while stating the policy "to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States," made it clear that they would only be used, even in general war, with presidential authorization. Any advance authorization would be determined by the president.²²

What kind of advance authorization should be given? On the same day that he approved NSC 5602/1 (15 March 1956), the president asked the secretaries of state and defense and the AEC chairman to submit recommendations on this question.²³

The president's request crossed a recommendation by Wilson that the president immediately authorize use of nuclear weapons in air defense, as requested earlier by the JCS. The matter was of some urgency because the nuclear-armed MB-1 air-to-air rocket (Genie) would go into service by 1 January 1957. Aircraft thus equipped would operate over Canada, and negotiations must soon begin to obtain Canadian approval.²⁴

When the president asked Wilson to hold his request in abeyance in light of the question of a broader authorization for general use of nuclear weapons, Wilson reaffirmed the urgency of the matter. State and AEC, he wrote, both agreed that the question of air defense should be dealt with immediately. Eisenhower then approved Wilson's request and authorized State and Defense to begin negotiations with Canada. Following the

conclusion of these negotiations, and after JCAE had been informed, Wilson announced on 20 February 1957 the availability of nuclear weapons for air defense of North America. Already U.S. fighter aircraft were being equipped with the MB-1.²⁵

Study of the broader policy determination required by NSC 5602/1 took more than a year. The president finally approved the requisite document on 22 May 1957. It authorized use of nuclear weapons in the following situations:

a. For the defense of the United States, its Territories and possessions:

- (1) In the United States, its Territories and possessions, and in coastal air defense identification zones, against attack by air;
- (2) In the United States, its Territories and possessions, and in international waters adjacent thereto. . . , against attack by sea;
- (3) In the territory of friendly foreign countries near the United States, its Territories and possessions, subject to the consent of the country sovereign over the territory involved, against attack by air.

b. For the defense of United States forces in foreign territory in the event of attack on these forces by forces of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

c. For the defense of United States forces in international waters against Sino-Soviet bloc attacking forces.

The above authorizations would apply when the commander to whom appropriate authority had been delegated judged that time and circumstances did not permit a decision by the president or other higher authority. In the event of nuclear attack upon the continental United States, it was assumed that the president would have approximately the same information as DoD about the attack and the attacker. Hence, retaliation would be on order of the president unless immediate communications between him and DoD officials had become impossible. In that case, DoD could make the decision for retaliation. Nuclear weapons were not to be expended for defense against minor attack.

All the authorizations would enter into effect when implementing instructions had been worked out by Defense with the concurrence of State and approved by the president. When effective, they would supersede the authorization of 18 April 1956 regarding air defense.²⁶

Subsequent policy papers reaffirmed the intention to place primary reliance on nuclear weapons, to integrate them with other weapons, and to consider them as conventional weapons. NSC 5707/8 declared that such weapons would be used when required to achieve "national," rather

than "military" objectives. NSC 5810/1 stated a requirement for a stockpile of weapons of varying sizes and yields, including "clean" weapons (those capable of being exploded with "greatly reduced" radioactive fallout), in order to provide "flexible and selective" capabilities for either general or limited war. NSC 5906/1 envisioned situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would not be necessary or appropriate, "particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear."²⁷

Weapons Requirements

Determining requirements for nuclear weapons, a joint responsibility of DoD and AEC, involved two separate functions: anticipating the need for warheads to fit new weapon systems and estimating the total number of weapons needed. The process began with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who transmitted their weapons recommendations to the secretary of defense. If a new warhead had to be developed, the matter was to be referred to the Research and Development Coordinating Committee on Atomic Energy in the Office of the Assistant Secretary (R&D). This group included members from the services, AFSWP, and the assistant for atomic energy, with a representative from AEC. Requests to AEC to study the feasibility of a new warhead or to proceed with its development passed through the Military Liaison Committee. AFSWP provided guidance to AEC in the development and production of weapons. The assistant secretary (R&D) assigned responsibility to one of the services for the development and production of those weapon components that were the responsibility of Defense.²⁸

In programming requirements, Defense gave first priority to strategic nuclear weapons, then, as rapidly as permitted by the state of the art, those for tactical air defense and antisubmarine warfare. As of December 1956, it was estimated that numerical requirements for weapons of the first priority would be generally satisfied by 1959, but the rapidly advancing art of weapon design was expected to require almost complete replacement of the strategic stockpile between 1959 and 1961.²⁹

In January 1956 AEC estimated that the maximum rate of output of new weapon designs would be four per year over the long run. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered this rate too low. At their request, MLC and AEC restudied the matter and concluded that the situation was not as bad as AEC had at first estimated; the 4 per year would increase to 6.6 weapons per year by October 1958. These figures translated to an average of 5.8 per year between 1956 and June 1960, which, if achieved, would satisfy known DoD requirements. After June 1960 the 6.6 annual rate would also be satisfactory.³⁰

The growing array of missiles entering the U.S. arsenal created the principal need for new warheads. Between 1956 and 1960 AEC, at the request

of Defense, undertook to design warheads for the strategic missiles—Atlas, Titan, Thor, Jupiter, Polaris, and Minuteman; for Talos, Nike-Hercules, and Nike-Zeus antiaircraft weapons; for the air-to-ground Skybolt; and for the Army's tactical Redstone and Pershing. These were in addition to new weapons for bombers and other existing weapon systems.³¹

Determining numbers of weapons to be produced involved a balance between military requirements and production facilities, both projected several years ahead. Twice each year, in May and November, AEC provided Defense with estimates of quantities of nuclear materials expected to be available for the next three years and of weapons production schedules for the next year. The JCS balanced these against requirements submitted by the unified and specified commands, then drafted recommendations for the stockpile composition projected 36 months ahead. These recommendations were supposed to be available to AEC by 1 July each year but were usually late. They became the basis for recommendations from AEC to the president for annual production of nuclear material, also for the commission's annual budget. In 1955 AEC had asked for requirements projected beyond three years, but OSD officials did not consider it feasible to do so.³²

Output of fissionable material depended on the adequacy of production facilities. Estimates of production in late 1955 appeared adequate to meet requirements through 1965, according to Secretary Wilson. There was no margin of surplus, however; the entire output of fissionable material available for military purposes would be needed.³³

The JCS did not agree that existing production facilities sufficed. In September 1956, after reviewing stockpile recommendations for FY 1959 and FY 1960, and on the basis of AEC's May estimate of output, they foresaw a shortage of both plutonium and tritium and recommended a 40 percent increase in reactor facilities. Secretary Wilson rejected the JCS conclusions and sent them back for review. He believed that the military commanders had overstated their requirements; moreover, AEC's November estimate pointed to some increase.³⁴

In March 1957 AEC again raised the question of long-term stockpile guidance from Defense. The increasing scope and cost of the weapons program, the need for long-term commitments for ore procurement, and other considerations indicated a need for an estimate projected 10 years into the future, as part of the annual DoD submission due on 1 July. Writing to Loper, Strauss recognized that a detailed estimate would be infeasible, but a 10-year statement of general characteristics desired for the stockpile would be extremely valuable. Moreover, he asked that the short-term guidance, projected two and three years ahead, be extended to cover four and five years.³⁵

Wilson and Loper considered the AEC request reasonable. At Wilson's request, the JCS reviewed the matter and agreed to provide a 10-year general statement in their next annual review of stockpile requirements. They did not mention Strauss's request for four- and five-year guidance. Turning again

to the question of production facilities, they withdrew their recommendation of September 1956 for an increase, promising to comment further on the matter after AEC had reviewed their latest estimate of requirements.³⁶

This estimate, sent to Secretary Wilson on 25 October 1957, included a general statement of long-range future trends, though not specifically tied to a 10-year period. The JCS saw a need for increasing numbers of lighter-weight weapons, although increases in some high-yield weapons, notably those for use with medium- and long-range missiles, would be desirable after 1960.³⁷

Subsequent JCS recommendations concerning production facilities, if they were submitted, are not documented in available official records. Reportedly, however, the JCS in August 1957 stated a need for more plutonium. Meanwhile JCAE had come to the same conclusion. On 30 July 1957 Rep. Carl T. Durham, JCAE chairman, in reporting out the AEC authorization bill for 1958, expressed the view that future needs were being underestimated. The present bill, he noted, provided only a "modest beginning" for an expanded program.³⁸

For the 1959 budget, AEC considered requesting a major increase in production facilities for weapons material in the form of a new reactor that would also be convertible for electric power production. In a letter to Strauss on 16 April 1958, Quarles provided an interim appraisal of probable trends in weapons requirements, pending the completion of the next JCS estimate. He concluded that there existed no military need for additional reactor products.³⁹

As a result, the administration's FY 1959 authorization bill for the AEC went to Congress on 28 May 1958 without the provision for the new dual-purpose reactor.⁴⁰ Earlier, however, a subcommittee of the JCAE had held closed hearings on plutonium production. The members interrogated representatives of the military services and the JCS and drew from them a statement that production should be increased by a sizable amount.⁴¹

Hearings on the administration's authorization request gave the JCAE members their opportunity. They added \$145 million for a convertible plutonium reactor at Hanford, Washington. The final bill included this addition despite a letter from the president opposing it. OSD officials played no role in the affair.⁴²

In June 1958 Strauss renewed the request for stockpile requirements projected through 4, 5, and 10 years. JCS partially complied by submitting figures for 1 July 1962 and 1 July 1963, which Quarles relayed to AEC with the information that the question of a 10-year estimate remained under study.⁴³

Thus far none of DoD's stockpile estimates had been submitted to the White House before going to AEC, although the president had been informed of them on at least one occasion in October 1957. Eisenhower became increasingly disturbed by the magnitude of the DoD estimates. At a meeting with AEC Chairman John A. McCone in January 1959, the president remarked that Defense seemed to be seeking the "incredible" position of having enough to destroy every conceivable target all over the world, plus a three-fold reserve. He contrasted this situation with earlier years when it

had been estimated that the destruction of 70 targets in the Soviet Union would bring that nation to defeat. The president subsequently decided to meet with McElroy and Quarles to discuss the DoD requirements.⁴⁴

The meeting took place on 12 February. JCS had by then completed estimates projected to 1968, and these became the focus of the discussion. The president objected that the term "requirements" conveyed a false sense of precision. McElroy admitted that the difference between "requirements" and "estimates" was technical. At the same time, he said, DoD had sharply reduced the approved figures from those originally submitted by JCS. Quarles pointed out that the projected increase in plutonium requirements from 1963 to 1968 stemmed from growing numbers of tactical weapons, which used more plutonium. In fact, he said, DoD would like to reach the 1968 levels by 1963, but reasonable production rates required a stretchout to 1968. The president concluded with an exhortation on the dangers of fallout from the huge U.S. stockpile; McElroy assured him that DoD made every effort to hold requests to a minimum.⁴⁵

Eisenhower took no formal action at that time. On 1 May, however, Goodpaster informed OSD that the president wished to see future DoD estimates of requirements before they went to AEC.⁴⁶

In drawing up estimates in October 1959 for 1961-62, the JCS experienced considerable difficulty. Their disagreement over targeting policy, stemming in turn from a disagreement over strategy, was at that time reaching a head and influenced their views on stockpile composition—whether it should consist largely of high-yield strategic weapons, as advocated by General White, or should include larger numbers of lower-yield tactical weapons, as General Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke believed.⁴⁷

To resolve the impasse, JCS Chairman General Twining turned to the Joint Staff, which cranked in delivery capabilities as well as stated requirements and weapons production capability and came up with a compromise that fully satisfied only Twining, the other JCS members only accepting it as the best available solution. The Joint Staff made no attempt to project requirements over a 10-year period, partly because of uncertainties regarding future force levels and budgets, partly because a 10-year estimate had been furnished the preceding year.⁴⁸

On 26 October 1959 McElroy submitted these recommendations to the White House, pointing out that they would result in a stockpile approximately 15 percent short of meeting the stated requirements of the unified and specified commanders. The president approved the objectives, subject to adjustment in detail through DoD-AEC discussion and with the stipulation that the numbers of strategic aircraft weapons would be reconsidered when current studies of targeting concepts were completed.⁴⁹

Gates and McCone interpreted the president's instructions as calling for a reduction of the stockpile to reflect expected fund limitations and prospective delays in the production of certain weapons and delivery vehicles. Accordingly, on 4 January 1960 Gates submitted revised estimates that had to remain tentative, since decisions on targeting had not been made.⁵⁰

Three months later, after approval of the Hickey Net Evaluation Subcommittee targeting study, OSD officials reviewed the estimates and advocated a green light for the amended program of 4 January. Deputy Secretary Douglas so recommended to the president, who again directed Defense and AEC to adjust the program.⁵¹

Already AEC had informed OSD that for want of money, it would have to reduce the production program by some \$15 million in 1961. Perhaps more seriously, AEC could accept no new development programs in FY 1961 without offsetting reductions in those already existing. At least three weapon systems were expected to require beginning of warhead development in FY 1961—Skybolt and the improved Polaris and Titan. On 2 June 1960 Douglas informed McCone that DoD would accept the cutbacks as being beyond AEC's control. He added, however, that it would be "most unfortunate" if AEC could not undertake new warhead development, and urged that every effort be made to prosecute necessary programs, even if supplemental appropriations had to be requested.⁵²

In 1960 the JCS again disagreed over estimates for FY 1962, because of differing concepts of strategy and targeting. Douglas's military assistant, Col. Edwin Black, recommended that Douglas and Gates discuss the matter with the Joint Chiefs and put pressure on them to reach agreement.⁵³ This advice was probably followed, although the details are not recorded in available sources. In any event, in July 1960 the JCS sent Gates their estimates for FY 1962. The president gave general approval subject to further adjustment. As before, in drawing up the 1962 budget, AEC and Defense found it necessary to reduce the estimates.⁵⁴

Throughout these years, despite budgetary limits and presidential misgivings, the total output of nuclear weapons continued a spectacular rise that had begun under President Truman. During the Eisenhower years the annual increase averaged roughly 50 percent above each preceding year. Production figures may be inferred from the cumulative stockpile numbers shown in Table 6.

Nuclear Propulsion for Military Purposes

The process of nuclear fission that unleashed tremendous explosions could, if suitably controlled, be employed to furnish power for more constructive purposes. Its use to generate electricity was an early application. It could also provide a means of propulsion, beginning with ships by generating steam for motive power, thus obviating the need for vessels to encumber themselves with large supplies of combustible fuel. For underwater vessels, the advantages of nuclear power were especially noteworthy. A submarine free of dependence on airbreathing machinery could operate at high speeds with almost unlimited endurance.

Design of nuclear reactors for shipboard use was a joint project of AEC and DoD, the latter operating through the Navy Department's Bureau

TABLE 6
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 1945-1960

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Weapons</u>
1945	2
1946	9
1947	13
1948	50
1949	170
1950	299
1951	438
1952	841
1953	1,169
1954	1,703
1955	2,422
1956	3,692
1957	5,543
1958	7,345
1959	12,298
1960	18,638

Source: US DoD and DoE, "Summary of Declassified Nuclear Stockpile Information," OSD Hist.

of Ships, where the redoubtable Rear Adm. Hyman G. Rickover became the driving force behind the nuclear submarine project. The world's first nuclear-powered ship, the U.S. submarine *Nautilus*, was launched on 17 June 1955; her sister, *Seawolf*, followed a few weeks later. The technology of nuclear submarine construction was thus well advanced when the Navy decided to use these vessels for launching long-range missiles, and the first Polaris submarines were built by altering hulls already under construction. Admiral Burke told the House Appropriations Committee in February 1957 that in the future all the Navy's submarines would use nuclear propulsion.⁵⁵

Nuclear-powered surface ships developed more slowly; the costs were considerable and the advantages over conventional steam power were less obvious. The 1957 Defense budget carried funds for a nuclear-powered cruiser and for long lead-time items for an aircraft carrier. The latter vessel was fully funded in 1958, and advance funding for a second carrier was provided in 1959, together with funds to construct a nuclear-powered frigate.⁵⁶

By 1960, then, the Navy had three surface ships using nuclear power under construction: the carrier *Enterprise*, the cruiser *Long Beach*, and *Bainbridge*, a frigate. The *Enterprise* was launched on 24 September 1960; the other two remained under construction at the end of the year.⁵⁷

In the FY 1960 budget, the Navy proposed to finance a second nuclear carrier, but it had to give way to a conventionally powered

one.* This decision apparently led some in AEC to question the future of nuclear-powered surface vessels. Secretary of the Navy Franke, however, assured McCone that the Navy desired to convert the fleet to nuclear propulsion as quickly and extensively as permitted by technology and fund limitations, and consequently counted heavily on continued development of naval reactors by AEC.⁵⁸

A project that occupied considerable time and attention in OSD, although it ultimately came to naught, was the effort to apply nuclear propulsion to aircraft. The Air Force launched this project, known as ANP (aircraft nuclear propulsion), soon after World War II in cooperation with AEC. It faced the major problem of developing a reactor powerful enough to lift an aircraft equipped with the heavy shielding needed to protect the crew from radiation. By 1956 two separate approaches were being pursued, each using a different contracting firm. Objectives were an aircraft that would cruise at just below the speed of sound (mach 0.9) at 30,000 feet (later reduced to 20,000) until within range, then make a final supersonic "dash" to its target. The Air Force hoped for a ground test by 1958 and initial flight a year or so later. The Navy participated on a modest scale, aiming to develop a nuclear seaplane.⁵⁹ Total cost of the project was estimated in 1956 at some \$3 billion, most of it to come after 1960 for production of 30 aircraft.⁶⁰

In 1957 the Air Force and AEC set up a combined group, with Navy participation, to manage the program. Maj. Gen. Donald J. Keirn headed the group, while also serving as USAF assistant deputy chief of staff for nuclear systems and chief of the aircraft reactors branch of AEC.⁶¹

During the next few years the administration gave limited budgetary support to the ANP, loath to plunge ahead in view of the uncertain prospects for success. Funds allocated ranged from \$235 million in FY 1957 to \$155 million in FY 1961, divided roughly between the Air Force and AEC.⁶²

The news of Sputnik in 1957 was followed by rumors that the Soviet Union was about to launch its own nuclear aircraft. The JCAE, becoming alarmed, sought to push the administration into faster action. General Keirn's office drafted a proposal to use a modified KC-135 tanker aircraft to demonstrate nuclear flight by late 1961. The president's science advisers argued, however, that such a hasty demonstration would delay the achievement of an operationally useful aircraft, a view upheld by York when he became DDR&E.⁶³

The JCAE, convinced that the ANP was being poorly managed and insufficiently funded, held hearings on the project in July 1959. Keirn and AEC Chairman McCone testified in favor of an early flight demonstration. The JCS held the same view, although they told Secretary McElroy that it was too early to establish a firm "military requirement" for the ANP or to define a specific weapon system concept.⁶⁴

OSD refused to be swayed, and by 1960 the question was whether to

* See Chapter X.

continue seeking a usable nuclear aircraft or to cut back to a minimal research and development effort. Officials of BoB and ODDR&E strongly supported the latter alternative, believing that only one of the two proposed lines of development should be continued. The PSAC reached the same conclusion; the members saw little value in a nuclear aircraft in view of the progress of missiles and conventional aircraft. This was the administration's final decision; it left the choice between the two approaches to the new administration. Gates told the president on 5 December 1960 that he considered the program a "national disgrace"; more than a billion dollars had been spent, with no visible results. Defense and AEC, he said, were at odds, each opposing one of the two approaches; probably both were right, in Gates's view.⁶⁵

It remained for Eisenhower's successor, President Kennedy, to terminate the lagging ANP project, which he did on 28 March 1961. The AEC, as part of its general program, would continue research on a reactor applicable for flight, but work on the airframe was abandoned.⁶⁶

Related to the ANP project was an effort to harness nuclear power for rocket propulsion. This ongoing project received a stimulus from the 1957 Gaither report and the ensuing NSC decision awarding the highest possible priority to the ICBM. Earlier, on 16 April 1956, Secretary Wilson asked AEC to proceed with development of a suitable reactor for propelling an ICBM, with a goal of 1959 for reactor development and 1962 for flight testing.⁶⁷

The special assistant for guided missiles, Eger Murphree, established a committee to appraise the prospects of a nuclear-powered ICBM. Reporting in December 1956, the committee recommended development of such a weapon with a maximum range of 8,500 miles and a payload of between 25,000 and 100,000 pounds. Although these figures exceeded the expected range and payload of chemically powered ICBMs Atlas and Titan, Murphree and Wilson concluded that the advantages did not justify the cost. Rather than a project aimed specifically at ICBMs Wilson asked AEC to develop a reactor suitable for general rocket propulsion, which might have wide applications, as in propelling observation satellites or perhaps eventually in space travel.⁶⁸

The general nuclear rocket engine was known as Rover. Research on a reactor specifically suitable for missiles continued under the name Pluto. In 1960 the DoD portion of Rover was transferred to NASA; Pluto continued as a joint Air Force-AEC project. Both, however, were later canceled.⁶⁹

Testing Nuclear Weapons

As in any field of technology, improvement in the efficiency of nuclear weapons depended on experiments conducted under controlled conditions. AEC and Defense jointly carried out annual test explosions of nuclear devices at two proving grounds, one in Nevada, the other on the Pacific island of

Eniwetok. These tests, together with those conducted by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, generated a considerable amount of radioactive debris which, descending on the earth as "fallout," presented a potentially serious health hazard. By 1956 concern over this problem had reached a point where the Democratic presidential candidate, Adlai E. Stevenson, tried without success to exploit it during the election campaign. But whatever the danger, in the absence of a universal agreement to cease testing the United States saw no alternative but to continue.⁷⁰

The 1956 series of tests, codenamed Redwing, consisted of 16 firings ("shots") at Eniwetok between May and July. Plumbob, in Nevada, ran even longer (24 shots between March and October 1957) and was the most controversial thus far, drawing expressions of concern from scientists and others. Eisenhower, thrown on the defensive by these admonitions, told reporters on 5 June 1957 that he thought the fears were exaggerated and pointed to U.S. efforts to obtain an agreement to end nuclear tests. Later, he declared that the United States had succeeded in reducing radioactive fallout by at least 90 percent.⁷¹

At a meeting in Bermuda in March 1957, when the Plumbob tests were just beginning, President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan issued a statement that in the absence of an effective disarmament agreement, continued testing of nuclear weapons was essential. However, they promised to conduct tests in a manner that would minimize radiation hazards, and looked to the Soviet Union to exercise similar restraint.⁷²

The 1958 series, Hardtack, proved of particular importance as the last one conducted during the Eisenhower administration, before the self-imposed U.S. test moratorium took effect. Planning began early in 1957. The program was considered essential for tests of nuclear detonations (and the ability to detect them) at high altitudes, also for development of "clean" weapons and of warheads for IRBMs and ICBMs. The tests would take place in the Pacific and would begin in April 1958, to be completed within 14 months.⁷³

Eisenhower recognized the tests as a necessary evil while the United States, in arms control discussions, was professing readiness to suspend testing. He insisted that Hardtack be put in the best possible light. Observers from other countries must be invited (as had been done with Plumbob); the time span should be shortened, and the number of shots reduced to the minimum; and the tests must be limited to weapons having no larger yield than those tested in 1954. Doubtless in response to these instructions from the president, the 14-month test series was much abbreviated.⁷⁴

On JCS recommendation, AEC approved a limit of 75 domestic and foreign observers at the tests, 45 selected by DoD and 30 by AEC. Observers from NATO (one from each member country) were over and above the limit.⁷⁵ It was also proposed to invite foreign observers to a special demonstration of a "clean" thermonuclear bomb, in line with the offer made publicly by the president in July 1957. Invitations went to the 14

member nations of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. Only three accepted the invitation, however, and the test was canceled.⁷⁶

Plans for Hardtack encountered an obstacle when AEC determined that the two high-altitude tests planned for Eniwetok would involve a danger of eye injury to the 6,000 inhabitants of nearby atolls. The State Department vetoed evacuation of the people from these islands and rejected an alternative suggestion by the JCS to station military and civilian personnel on the islands to warn the inhabitants. Either of these alternatives, it was feared, would be misrepresented and exploited by Soviet propaganda. Accordingly, the two tests were moved to Johnston Island, at the cost of some delay and expense.⁷⁷

The two high-altitude firings would be at heights of 125,000 and 250,000 feet respectively, or not quite 25 and 50 miles. At the same time, DoD and AEC had planned later to explode nuclear devices at much higher altitudes, up to 4,000 miles, to obtain data useful for the technology of communications and long-range missiles. Suitable vehicles to reach such altitudes were expected in 12 to 18 months. However, in view of the prospect of a test ban before the end of 1958, officials of DoD and AEC, with the approval of the president, decided to conduct these tests immediately, using available equipment that could attain an altitude of some 700 kilometers (435 miles). The loss of altitude could be partially offset by conducting the tests at a high latitude, where the earth's magnetic field more closely approaches the earth. Since no existing test site appeared suitable, naval vessels in the South Atlantic would conduct the tests (codenamed Argus).⁷⁸

The Hardtack series began on 6 May 1958 and closed on 11 August. The 35 shots fired, including the 2 from Johnston Island, equaled the total of all U.S. nuclear tests in the Pacific since 1946.⁷⁹

By the time the series concluded, the prospect of a test moratorium loomed larger. On 22 August the president, citing the finding of a conference of technical experts in Geneva that violations of a test ban agreement could be detected, offered to suspend testing for one year beginning on 31 October 1958. AEC and DoD officials quickly drafted plans to extend Hardtack with additional tests at the Nevada Proving Ground. The president approved; the series (known as Hardtack II) took place during September and October, with 19 firings.⁸⁰

The Argus tests occurred between 27 August and 6 September. Three rockets, fired from an experimental guided missile launching ship in the South Atlantic, carried nuclear devices 300 miles aloft. Together with the two lower-altitude firings from Johnston Island, the Argus explosions produced a temporary "shell" of radiation that surrounded the earth and disrupted radio communications and radar.⁸¹

News of the Argus firings was not at once released to the public because the findings were expected to be particularly valuable for military purposes. Members of the JCAE learned of them during executive hearings in January 1959. Loper promised to advise the members in advance

before information about Argus was released. Owing to unfortunate circumstances, this promise was not kept, and a "flap" resulted when, on 18 March 1959, Hanson Baldwin of the *New York Times* pieced together the story and prepared to publish it. Quarles and Roy Johnson, director of ARPA, aided by White House officials, quickly drafted a brief announcement that there had been three "small" tests for scientific and military purposes. The White House released this statement shortly after midnight. The officials tried to contact Loper, but he had left his office to seek medical treatment; since he was responsible for informing the JCAE, no one else attempted to notify that body.⁸²

On the following morning, 19 March, members of the JCAE learned of Argus when both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* carried stories about it. Sen. Clinton P. Anderson and Durham at once demanded an explanation from Loper, which he duly furnished. Quarles held a press conference in which he explained why knowledge of the tests had been classified and refused to describe their purposes in detail. He promised, however, that scientific findings from Argus would be released as soon as they had been evaluated.⁸³

The U.S. moratorium on nuclear testing went into effect on 31 October 1958. Originally intended to last for a year, it extended throughout the remainder of Eisenhower's term. AEC and Defense drew up plans for a wide-ranging series of tests to be known as Vela, including both underground and high-altitude explosions, but they never took place.⁸⁴

Nuclear Accidents

Could a nuclear weapon explode as a result of an accident and thus inflict on some American city the fate of Hiroshima? On the face of it, there seemed no reason why not, at least to the lay public. In fact, the possibility was remote owing to the design of nuclear weapons. Fissionable material would not explode until a sufficient quantity came together to form a "critical mass," making it possible to build in various safety locks to prevent this from happening by accident. Reassuring estimates placed the odds against an accidental explosion at a billion or trillion to one.⁸⁵

Should a nuclear weapon explode in spite of the odds, it would bring with it another danger, besides the immediate damage inflicted. Suppose U.S. officials misinterpreted the occurrence as heralding an enemy attack and ordered instant retaliation, thus bringing about the catastrophe that U.S. deterrent policy aimed to prevent? The possibility occurred to constituents of Rep. Charles O. Porter of Oregon, who relayed their concern to OSD. Loper replied that even if an accidental explosion occurred, it would not touch off a general war; retaliation would not be so automatic as to preclude proper interpretation of what had happened.⁸⁶

From 1956 through 1960 there occurred 15 potentially dangerous mishaps involving nuclear weapons. None resulted in a nuclear detonation,

a fact that attested to the safety of weapons design. In four the high explosive portion of the weapon, used to trigger the nuclear explosion, detonated; in four other instances, radioactive contamination occurred. The accidents included several military fatalities, but only minor injuries to civilians. All but two of the events occurred within the United States. Nine resulted from accidents to aircraft on landing or takeoff. One aircraft burned on the ground and the nuclear weapon aboard was destroyed by fire; another aircraft carrying nuclear weapons material (though not actual weapons) disappeared while flying over the ocean and was presumed lost. On two occasions bombs were accidentally dropped, and twice bombs were jettisoned. In one particularly alarming instance, a nuclear-armed Bomarc missile in "ready storage" condition (permitting launch in two minutes) was destroyed by fire after a fuel tank exploded; the high explosive did not detonate but the warhead was destroyed by fire.⁸⁷

Most of these incidents could not be withheld from the public and were duly reported in the press. From time to time, Defense or AEC officials released information stressing the safety features and handling precautions designed to minimize accidents and render a nuclear explosion extremely unlikely.⁸⁸

International Cooperation

The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 established rigid controls on the dissemination of information (labeled "restricted data") concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons or fissionable material. The law had the effect of disrupting the fruitful wartime cooperation in atomic energy research among the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada that had led to the achievement of nuclear explosives in 1945. Cooperation was now limited to sharing of available supplies of uranium and some exchange of general information. The British pressed without success for wider cooperation that would advance their effort to develop weapons of their own.⁸⁹

President Eisenhower remained firmly committed to a fuller degree of cooperation with the United Kingdom and NATO in matters related to nuclear weapons. With this end in view, he pushed through a modification of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954. The new legislation authorized AEC to communicate to other nations restricted data concerning refining of source material, reactor development, and production of special nuclear material. It empowered the president to authorize DoD and AEC to cooperate with other nations or with regional defense organizations, and to communicate such restricted data as needed for development of defense plans, training of personnel in use of and defense against atomic weapons, and evaluation of nuclear capabilities of potential enemies. In no case, however, might any such cooperation involve communication of restricted data concerning the design or fabrication of atomic weapons, other than that

concerning their external characteristics, yields and effects, and systems employed in their delivery. Nor could there be cooperation with other nations until a proposed agreement specifying the terms of cooperation and incorporating security safeguards had been approved by the president and submitted to Congress, which would have 60 days to register its opposition.⁹⁰

Under the provisions of this legislation, the United States entered into agreements with the United Kingdom, NATO, Canada, and Australia to furnish information for planning and training and for evaluation of enemy capabilities. A supplementary agreement with Canada provided for exchange of information on nuclear submarine propulsion reactors. A similar proposed agreement with the United Kingdom was withdrawn in the face of opposition from JCAE. Procedures for carrying out these exchanges of information were prescribed by the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee (S-DMICC).⁹¹

The authority granted under the 1954 law was soon regarded as insufficient by the Eisenhower administration. NSC 5602/1, approved in March 1956, recommended that legislation be "progressively relaxed" to allow the integration of nuclear weapons into NATO defenses, "to the extent of enabling selected allies to be able to use them upon the outbreak of war." A year later, NSC 5707/8 declared that the United States should continue efforts to persuade allies to recognize nuclear weapons as an "integral part" of the arsenal of the free world, and should provide nonnuclear components of weapons to allies capable of using them effectively.⁹²

In July 1956 the JCS pushed for further liberalization of the law, to allow the president actually to transfer nuclear warheads to other countries during peacetime. Wilson approved and OSD officials began discussions with AEC concerning suitable changes in the legislation. The project was laid aside, however, perhaps because the president felt that the time was not yet ripe to push the issue.⁹³

In 1957 the United States and the United Kingdom resumed discussion of transferring information on nuclear submarine propulsion. The U.S. attorney general rendered an opinion that such information could be considered nonmilitary in nature, since a submarine was merely a ship that could be used for military purposes. Members of JCAE remained opposed. Moreover, friction developed between Admiral Rickover and British naval officers concerning the terms of a proposed agreement. Rickover at length suggested that it would be simpler merely to allow the British to purchase a nuclear submarine reactor from the principal U.S. contractor (Westinghouse Corporation). The British agreed, but a change in the law would be needed.⁹⁴

The British Government continued to press for close cooperation. Meeting in Washington with U.S. officials on 23-25 October 1957, Prime Minister Macmillan urged complete exchange of information on design of both fission and fusion weapons in order to save expenses of testing and make it easier for the British to design warheads to fit U.S. delivery systems. Administration officials disagreed among themselves regarding

the British proposal. Quarles and Dulles urged a favorable response; Strauss believed the United States should share with the British only such knowledge as the Soviets were believed to possess. The matter came before the president on 25 October. Strauss was willing to furnish weapons and certain information about their external characteristics, but not their "inner geometry." The president, without specifically replying to Strauss, held forth on the importance of "faith and trust" as the only means of holding an alliance together. It would be a mistake to try to lay down in advance just what the United States would or would not provide. Rather a broad general agreement should be sought, and the law should be amended accordingly.⁹⁵

The conference with Macmillan resulted in a joint "Declaration of Common Purpose," in which the president promised to seek amendments to the Atomic Energy Act to permit "close and fruitful collaboration of scientists and engineers of Great Britain, the United States, and other friendly countries."⁹⁶

Pressure from the British was not the only stimulus to the decision in favor of a change in the law. The question came up in the NSC on 17 October during a discussion of policy toward France, which led to consideration of the possibility of making nuclear weapons available to NATO. The president spoke of the need for a fuller exchange of scientific information bearing on military matters. He directed Strauss, in cooperation with DoD and State, to draft legislation to facilitate such an exchange, which would include information on nuclear technology.⁹⁷

The administration already had under discussion a proposal for a NATO "atomic stockpile"—a supply of weapons maintained in Europe under U.S. custody, to be made available to NATO commanders in event of war. It would have value both militarily and psychologically; the allies, as Dulles told Eisenhower on 22 October, were increasingly dependent on nuclear weapons but felt remote from the decisions regarding their use. There need be no change in the law as long as the warheads were kept in U.S. hands.⁹⁸

When the heads of governments of NATO nations met in Paris in December 1957, Secretary Dulles announced to the North Atlantic Council on the 16th that the United States stood prepared to participate in an arrangement whereby nuclear warheads would be deployed to Europe under U.S. custody, in accord with NATO defense plans. In case of hostilities, they would be released to appropriate NATO commanders. Obviously these commanders would require sufficient information about the characteristics of such weapons to be able to exploit them effectively. In a further step, Dulles announced that the United States would seek legislative authority to cooperate with NATO nations in the development and production of nuclear propulsion and power plants for military purposes, including submarines. The council approved the stockpile proposal and so stated in its final communiqué issued on 19 December.⁹⁹

Proposed amendments to the Atomic Energy Act were drafted by

AEC, Defense, and State, as directed by the president. They authorized transfers of the following: special nuclear materials to be manufactured into weapons by the receiving nation; nuclear propulsion and power plants for military use; design information needed for training and planning, also to enable the recipient nation to design delivery systems compatible with U.S. warheads and to improve its own nuclear weapons; and non-nuclear components of U.S. warheads. One amendment authorized the United States to enter into long-term commitments to purchase plutonium from other nations.¹⁰⁰

On 27 January 1958 Quarles and Strauss sent the president the text of the proposed legislation. On the same day, without awaiting the president's formal approval (which was promptly granted), Strauss also sent the amendments to Representative Durham, chairman of JCAE. The president had already discussed the proposed amendments informally with congressional leaders.¹⁰¹

A subcommittee of JCAE headed by Sen. John O. Pastore of Rhode Island held executive hearings on the draft bill between 29 January and 5 March. Quarles and Loper testified for OSD; McElroy did not appear, nor did members of the JCS. Strauss, the first witness, outlined the reasons for seeking the legislative changes. Quarles defended the legislation as needed to strengthen the free world. It was necessary, he said, to "assess and obtain the benefits of the capabilities of our allies" in the field of nuclear weapons. "In particular," he continued, "we must make it possible for them to utilize their military forces with maximum effectiveness using the most modern weapons and techniques."¹⁰²

Members of JCAE, by no means convinced that the legislation was desirable, feared that it would contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons. Rep. Chet Holifield of California drew from Loper the admission that, under the proposed legislation, it would be possible to furnish parts separately along with design information that would enable the recipient nation to assemble them into a nuclear weapon. For Senator Anderson, this meant that the administration, in his pithy phrase, was offering to provide "do-it-yourself kits" for nuclear weapons. Strauss and Quarles assured the committee members that the intent was to furnish equipment and information only to "improve" the nuclear capability of countries already having such—meaning, in effect, the United Kingdom.¹⁰³

The plutonium purchase plan also drew fire, some JCAE members fearing that the United States might repurchase fissionable material that it had furnished to other countries in the first place. Quarles and Loper indicated that DoD would, if necessary, accept omission of this provision. On 7 March, after the executive hearings had closed, the administration formally withdrew this provision from the draft bill.¹⁰⁴

During three days of open hearings (26-28 March), Strauss, Quarles, Loper, and others appeared again and went over much of the same ground. In the course of the proceedings, JCAE members suggested writing into the law a stipulation that information would be exchanged only with nations

that had already made "substantial progress" in developing nuclear weapons. The administration accepted this suggestion, and Strauss so informed JCAE on 28 March.¹⁰⁵

In another open session on 17 April, the JCAE heard Secretary Dulles defend the legislation, then took testimony from Thomas E. Murray, a former AEC member, now serving the JCAE as a consultant. Murray endorsed the objectives of the bill but urged rejection in its present form. It failed to address the "heart of the problem," which Murray saw as the radical distinction between large and small nuclear weapons—those with destructive power of 2 kilotons, as compared with 20 megatons. The administration would be empowered to provide information regarding all types of weapons, large and small. The problem, according to Murray, was the absence of a clear-cut military doctrine or overall strategy for the nuclear defense of the free world. Such a strategy should make the United States solely responsible for the mission of strategic deterrence. Other NATO countries would thus have no need for massive weapons; they could be given smaller ones plus information needed to manufacture such weapons for themselves.¹⁰⁶

Murray's testimony appeared potentially so damaging that Quarles called on the JCS for a rebuttal. Replying on 12 May 1958, the JCS denied that there existed no agreed strategy for free world defense. The United States and NATO had "similar, compatible, and mutually supporting" strategies that rested on use of nuclear weapons both tactically and strategically. European NATO countries should be equipped with atomic-capable delivery systems, including those using high-yield warheads. To limit transfer information to weapons of two kilotons would be utterly impractical.¹⁰⁷

Loper sent the Joint Chiefs' comments to the JCAE, adding another point that they had not raised. To provide atomic weapons to other countries or to increase the number of countries able to manufacture such weapons, as Murray had proposed, was contrary to administration policy and completely unacceptable. Convinced by these arguments, the JCAE ignored Murray's proposals in acting on the draft legislation.¹⁰⁸

General Lauris Norstad, NATO's supreme allied commander, appeared before the committee in closed session on 15 May 1958 to defend the proposed legislation. In a subsequent open letter, Norstad placed on record his views concerning the "urgent need" for it. Under existing law, he wrote, NATO forces were unable to train on a "fully realistic basis" or to develop necessary operational capability and readiness. Information regarding yields, size, and weight of weapons must be available to commanders to enable them to carry out their responsibilities.¹⁰⁹

On 20 May 1958 AEC proposed another change in the draft legislation to specifically authorize transfer of facilities having military application. This would allow the British to purchase a submarine nuclear reactor from a U.S. commercial supplier. Admiral Rickover testified before the subcommittee in favor of this provision on 28 May.¹¹⁰

JCAE reported the bill favorably, adding a provision carried over from the 1954 law giving Congress the right to block any international agreement

within 60 days. The House approved the bill on 19 June. Four days later the Senate approved it, with an amendment limiting the transfer of non-nuclear components to nations that had made substantial progress in nuclear weapons (i.e., the United Kingdom). The legislation passed with both of these amendments and became law on 2 July 1958.¹¹¹

The administration now had the authority it had sought. On 3 July, the day after the president signed the bill, the United States and Britain concluded, under the terms of the new law, an agreement that had been under discussion for some time. It provided for exchange of information concerning military reactors, development of delivery systems compatible with nuclear weapons, and design, development, and fabrication of nuclear weapons. The United States further agreed to the sale of a submarine nuclear propulsion plant.¹¹²

This agreement was supplemented by another in 1959 under which the United States would provide nonnuclear components of nuclear weapons to improve British training and readiness. The United Kingdom in turn would supply the United States with special nuclear material.¹¹³

Also in 1959, the United States reached agreements with five other NATO members. To Greece, Turkey, and the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States agreed to provide information needed for planning, training, and development of delivery systems compatible with atomic weapons. A broader agreement with Canada allowed for transfer of non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons. An agreement with France pertained only to sale of enriched uranium for use by that country in its own nuclear submarine propulsion plant.¹¹⁴

To transmit and receive the large volume of classified information expected to be exchanged under the liberalized 1958 law, Defense and AEC established a new organization, the Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group (JAIEG). On 29 October 1958 Quarles, assuming AEC concurrence, established within AFSWP the Defense element of JAIEG. JAIEG was to be staffed with personnel from the military departments and also, it was assumed, from AEC. Overall policy guidance on release of information would come from the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee.¹¹⁵

AEC approved the new group in principle, but some difficulty occurred in working out detailed procedures. An agreement between DoD and AEC was reached on 8 June 1959.¹¹⁶

In the drafting of a formal directive for the Defense element of JAIEG, the functions assigned the new group under the DoD-AEC agreement came into question: the services objected that JAIEG had been given too much responsibility, while some S-DMICC members believed that it infringed on the authority of their organization. These objections, however, were overcome; the directive appeared on 15 October 1959, incorporating without change the DoD-AEC agreement of 8 June.¹¹⁷

By the end of 1959 the administration was looking toward the possibility of another change in the law to further expand exchanges of information. NSC 5906/1, approved on 5 August, recommended that the United States

assist "selected allies" to develop and produce, through NATO, their own advanced weapon systems (without nuclear elements), while at the same time discouraging the development of separate national nuclear weapons production capabilities. It followed that the United States would have to provide its allies with actual nuclear weapons, under control arrangements to be determined. In anticipation of wider nuclear capability, the United States should consider plans for developing arrangements in NATO for determining requirements for, holding custody of, and controlling the use of nuclear weapons. All these steps would obviously require major changes in legislation.¹¹⁸

In December 1959 the president told the NSC that it should devote a substantial portion of its time during the next year (Eisenhower's final year in office) to a discussion of major national security issues. The council briefly considered a number of such topics, including the question of further sharing of nuclear weapons with allies. McCone warned the NSC on 16 December that this question would arise when Congress reconvened because the use of the Genie air-to-air missile by British forces, under emergency conditions, was being considered. JCAE had learned of this and was somewhat alarmed, according to McCone. The president directed that the Planning Board prepare a discussion paper on the implications of further nuclear sharing.¹¹⁹

To draft the paper, the board established a committee drawn from State, Defense, and AEC. At the same time, the board agreed that the study of multilateral NATO arrangements for determining requirements for and control of nuclear weapons, as recommended in NSC 5906/1, should proceed at once without awaiting completion of the new discussion paper. Some months were to elapse, however, before either of these projects was completed.¹²⁰

Also under study was the possibility of a broader range of nuclear cooperation with France, going beyond the limited agreement for the sale of uranium. In December 1959 NSC launched a study, undertaken again by State, Defense, and AEC, of the possible advantages of enhancing French capability by exchanging information, materials, and weapons. The JCS continued as the principal advocates of assisting France and other "selected" NATO countries in this fashion.¹²¹

When the council discussed U.S. force commitments to NATO on 1 August 1960, the subject of increased nuclear sharing came up. The president "launched into a vigorous statement," as Kistiakowsky noted in his diary, in favor of providing nuclear weapons to NATO allies. He was supported by Twining but not, it appears, by anyone else. Secretary of State Herter doubted that it would be possible to obtain any legislative changes in the current session of Congress; the president nevertheless wanted an effort made. He believed that he should have complete discretion in transferring nuclear weapons to other countries. "Over the silence of the members of the council," according to Kistiakowsky, he ordered State, Defense, and AEC to study the matter.¹²²

This brought to four the number of related subjects under study: NATO

multilateral arrangements, nuclear assistance to France, increased nuclear sharing with allies, and transfer of nuclear weapons. On 5 August the Planning Board decided to consider all of these in a single paper. The JCS had meanwhile taken the opportunity again to go on record with a statement that it was in the U.S. interest to assist France in developing a nuclear weapons capability. State Department officials generally opposed the JCS position.¹²³

Related to these studies in the Planning Board was the specific question of assisting two NATO nations, France and the Netherlands, to construct nuclear submarines. The Dutch Government had requested such assistance in April 1959, proposing to build two vessels as part of the requirement for four submarines laid on it by MC 70, the current NATO planning document. State and Defense favored granting the request. AEC opposed, but after some discussion agreed to the sale of a nuclear submarine reactor plus sufficient restricted data to enable the Dutch to install the reactor and operate the vessel.¹²⁴

The French request, under discussion as early as 1958, encountered two obstacles. First, the French atomic energy authority employed a number of Communists and hence could hardly be entrusted with classified U.S. information. The French Ministry of Defense had a better record in this regard and seemed more trustworthy. Early in 1959, however, France withdrew her naval forces in the Mediterranean from NATO command. Under these conditions, U.S. officials would go no further than to agree to sell enriched uranium to France, as already described, for use by the French in a submarine of their own manufacture. In 1960, however, French officials again asked assistance in constructing a nuclear submarine, having read an erroneous newspaper story to the effect that the United States had promised such aid to the Netherlands. OSD was inclined to favor the French request, especially after U.S. Navy officers visited French naval installations and judged that country to be at least 10 years behind the United States in the technology involved.¹²⁵

JCAE held hearings on the French and Dutch requests on 9 June 1960. A majority of the committee members then concluded that there was no compelling need that would justify the risks involved in broadening the spread of classified information to foreign governments. It would be simpler and quicker to construct additional U.S. submarines that could be assigned to NATO.¹²⁶ These conclusions, informally transmitted to Secretary Gates, did not settle the matter. The administration had not yet taken a position on the issue; it remained under discussion in August 1960.

One more study, broad in nature and bearing on all the issues under consideration in the council, was begun in June 1960. Secretary of State Herter asked Robert R. Bowie of Harvard University, former director of State's Policy Planning Staff, to review long-range U.S. policy toward and planning for NATO. OSD, through the assistant secretary (ISA), would cooperate in the project.*

* The Bowie study and its origin are described in Chapter XVII.

On 25 August the council engaged in a lengthy and wide-ranging debate on the issue of increased nuclear sharing. Gray had placed the subject on the agenda in order to reach a decision on seeking legislation at the current session of Congress. President Eisenhower, who had at first favored such a step, now changed his mind; it seemed clear, he said, that the current session would engage mainly in politics, and no legislation concerning nuclear sharing could be passed. The specific questions of assistance to France and the Netherlands were discussed but not settled. The president directed Gray to arrange for the preparation of a report on U.S. policy concerning nuclear weapons capabilities in the NATO area, taking into account current studies of the future of NATO, including the one undertaken by Bowie.¹²⁷

Subsequently all these questions concerning nuclear sharing with NATO in general or with specific countries merged into the broader question of overall U.S. policy toward NATO. Also under consideration was a proposal for a NATO multilateral medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force, which affected questions of nuclear weapons. A paper entitled "NATO in the 1960s" (NSC 6017) dealt with the issues. The president and council discussed this paper and reached some decisions in time for the annual meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December 1960. The North Atlantic Council took the MRBM proposal under advisement. The NSC postponed the question of bilateral nuclear assistance to France pending the outcome of the MRBM proposal. Eisenhower approved cooperation in nuclear submarine development, stipulating that any assistance in the form of submarines or of components must be through purchase by the recipient government. He ordered a reexamination of NATO stockpile procedures.¹²⁸

All these decisions were of long-range significance and would be subject to reexamination by the new administration waiting in the wings. Already, however, President Eisenhower and his advisers had laid the foundation for a NATO force fully able to handle and exploit nuclear weapons in the defense of the continent. The president's leadership toward this goal, based largely on political considerations—the need to hold the alliance together—received full support in OSD and also from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the same time, the administration carefully avoided anything that might lead to a wider spread of weapons production. At the end of 1960 the exclusive "nuclear club" consisted only of the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and a new entrant, France.

CHAPTER XV

Strategic Targeting: The Single Integrated Operational Plan

Target Selection as an Issue

The problem of target selection appeared with the birth of strategic air warfare in World War II. No longer did enemy forces alone constitute the object of attack; far behind the lines were industrial installations, transportation facilities, control centers, and other activities the destruction of which might cripple the enemy war effort. Target selection thus became an essential aspect of the intelligence and operations functions, requiring a detailed knowledge of the enemy's industrial and economic system in order to single out those vital elements most vulnerable to destruction. It remained no less essential after the war as part of the strategic planning needed to implement the policy of "containing" a potentially hostile Soviet Union. The security of the United States might depend on the ability of the newly created Strategic Air Command (SAC) to strike directly at the sources of strength of an aggressor nation.

In the unified military establishment that took shape after World War II, target selection, as a component of strategic planning, was included in the broad responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They drafted plans that set forth missions to be accomplished and indicated the classes of targets to be destroyed, leaving it to the combat commanders to translate this guidance into detailed strike plans. After several years of somewhat haphazard planning, the JCS in 1952 institutionalized their guidance in the form of a regular series of plans, of which the most important was the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), intended to go into effect immediately on the outbreak of war. An annex to this plan listed strategic targets in order of priority in three categories: those needed to blunt Soviet capability to strike at the United States, to disrupt the Soviet war-making economy, and to retard a Soviet advance into Western Europe. This balanced targeting policy, embracing both purely military and urban-industrial targets, was intended to reinforce deterrence and to insure that the Western powers would prevail if war came.

For several years after World War II, the Strategic Air Command, a specified command under the JCS, had entire responsibility for the strategic air offensive. Nuclear weapons were scarce and the entire supply was allocated to SAC as a matter of necessity. Expanding production and technological progress produced in the 1950s a much larger stockpile of smaller and more manageable weapons of both fission and fusion (thermonuclear) type. Consequently, it became possible to allocate weapons to forces of other commands for attack on targets related to their missions. In drawing up their operational plans, the commanders, notably CINCSAC, exercised a good deal of freedom in interpreting JCS guidance and in increasing their target lists. Despite expanded production of nuclear weapons, however, demand continued to press against supply; the number of known or suspected targets in the Soviet bloc grew as U.S. intelligence collection improved and as Soviet strategic forces (bombers and missiles) expanded.¹

With more than one commander responsible for delivering nuclear weapons, it became essential to coordinate their attack plans to prevent overlap or omission of targets and to insure that related strikes were properly timed. In 1952 the JCS, working through the Air Force as executive agent, established Joint Coordination Centers (JCCs) in Europe and in the Far East, staffed by representatives of the unified and specified commands. These were essentially war room facilities for adjusting operations after hostilities began. To coordinate plans in advance, the JCS instituted annual World-Wide Coordination Conferences (WWCCs) attended by representatives of the commands. The complexity of the operations limited the effectiveness of these measures in eliminating duplication of targeting and insuring mutual support. "From our experience in this area to date," wrote General Twining to Secretary McElroy in 1959, "we can derive at least one fundamental principle. This principle is that atomic operations must be pre-planned for automatic execution to the maximum extent possible and with minimum reliance on post-H-hour communications."²

As the decade of the 1950s advanced, the strategic disagreement between the Air Force and the other services extended to target planning, which related directly to overall strategy and force requirements. With the Soviet offensive arsenal expanding, the Air Force leaned increasingly toward the view that targeting should aim primarily at Soviet military installations, especially those from which direct attacks against the United States could be mounted. This was a potentially open-ended process, in which the U.S. nuclear arsenal must expand to keep up with the increasing numbers of Soviet targets. The Army and Navy, opposing what they regarded as excessive emphasis on strategic nuclear weaponry, favored a smaller arsenal aimed so as to maximize damage to the Soviet economy and society and thus exert maximum deterrent effect.

The conflicting strategies in this dispute received the convenient shorthand designations of "counterforce" and "countercity"—somewhat oversimplified terms implying extremes to which the views were seldom if ever pushed. "Counterforce" could generate endless new requirements

dependent entirely on decisions within the Soviet bloc; every new Soviet missile base must be allotted its quota of U.S. weapons. On the other hand, it presented a potential for limiting damage to the United States and enabling the nation to survive, and perhaps win, a major conflict. But this potential could be fully realized only if the United States struck first. National policy, approved by the president and the National Security Council, forbade "preventive" war, but did not necessarily preclude a "preemptive" strike if war seemed imminent.

The "countercity" strategy would limit requirements for strategic forces to what might be considered a "reasonable" maximum. It was part and parcel of ongoing Army and Navy efforts to divert resources from what they saw as excessive concentration on all-out war. At the same time, it would concede the initiative to the enemy and perhaps gamble the outcome of a conflict on the damage that could be inflicted by a possibly depleted U.S. force. And, of course, there were adherents of the view that the idea of "winning" a war was hopeless and that the only function of nuclear weapons was to deter; if they were ever actually used, they had failed of their purpose.³

Surprisingly, a clear statement of the "minimum deterrent" came in 1956 from Secretary of the Air Force Quarles. He argued for maintenance of a "mission capability"—a force sufficient to accomplish the destruction of the enemy. Such a force need not exceed the enemy's in size, since what counted was absolute, not relative strength. By the same token, one's force need not expand to keep pace with that of the enemy. In expressing this view, Quarles was not speaking for the uniformed professionals in the Air Force; rather he was articulating a rationale for the administration's decision to retard the expansion of that service in the interest of economy.⁴

The Hickey Study

Before the late 1950s the argument over targeting philosophy took place within the JCS and among the services. There was no occasion for a systematic presentation of the issues to higher authority. National policy papers approved by the NSC and the president made it clear that U.S. strategy rested firmly on full exploitation of nuclear weapons, but made no attempt to prescribe the manner in which they should be used.

From time to time, President Eisenhower himself had occasion to pronounce on the subject of targeting. His remarks indicated no clear-cut views. In 1954 he expressed preference for concentrating on military targets, while recognizing that cities and control centers must be included in the strategic attack. He also demonstrated a conviction that the proliferation of nuclear weaponry was approaching a point of diminishing returns. In discussing the Gaither report with the NSC in November 1957, he remarked that, though all military strength was relative, "we are getting

close to absolutes" when it became possible to inflict 50 percent casualties on an enemy. He made the same point more clearly a year later, in a discussion of strategic forces, with a rhetorical question: "How many times do we have to destroy Russia?"⁵

The president and the NSC kept generally informed about target planning through annual reports from the Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC), an organization set up in 1954. Its membership consisted of the chairman of the JCS, the director of central intelligence, the director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM), and the chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. Its mission was to evaluate the "net capabilities" of the Soviet Union to inflict direct injury upon the continental United States.⁶

Evaluation of the damage that the two sides could do to one another necessarily involved assumptions about the targets that each would choose. In its 1956 report, the subcommittee assumed a U.S. attack on both industrial and military targets; the 1957 study used an exclusively military target list.⁷

For the 1958 report, on recommendation of his national security adviser, Robert Cutler, the president directed that two estimates be prepared, contrasting the effects of a retaliatory attack on a large number of military targets with one against a smaller number of cities and population centers. Cutler believed that the second of these alternatives would provide fewer but more sure and effective targets, the destruction of which would paralyze the enemy.⁸

The report, rendered to the NSC on 20 November, suggested that the attack on cities would be the more effective; it would paralyze the Soviet economy and destroy Soviet offensive capability. However, further study was needed. Cutler's replacement, Gordon Gray, suggested a comparison of attacks directed toward a military target system, on the one hand, with an "optimum mix" of military and urban industrial targets, on the other. The president approved this suggestion and directed McElroy, Twining, and Gray to determine the best means of conducting the appraisal.⁹

The JCS could not agree on terms of reference for the study because of their long-held differences over targeting policy. General Twining then prepared his own draft, which was approved by McElroy and Gray. Instructions in this draft went somewhat beyond those of the president, calling for an appraisal of three rather than two target lists: (1) primarily military, (2) primarily urban-industrial, and (3) a combination of the first two. Each list would contain a minimum number of targets that must be destroyed or neutralized in order to achieve, in conjunction with other military operations, the objective of "prevailing" in general war (for which D-day was assumed as 30 June 1963). In other words, the study would not be limited to the requirements of deterrence alone. It was to be conducted by the NESC staff under the direction of Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Hickey, USA (Ret.).¹⁰

Hickey presented the findings of the study in November 1959. Though not specifically instructed to do so, he had included Chinese as well as Soviet targets on his lists. The attack on military targets was not expected substantially to damage Soviet or Chinese war-supporting industry; thus the two nations could rebuild their forces and continue the war. Similarly, a concentration on urban-industrial targets would leave the enemy nations with a residue of military forces with which they could seize neighboring nations and reestablish their war-supporting base. It followed, therefore, that exclusive concentration on either type of target might not accomplish the U.S. purpose of "prevailing." Moreover, there was some doubt about the deterrent effect of the forces required for either. However, the "optimum mix" system, and its recommended delivery force would provide an effective deterrent to general war and, should such a war occur, place the United States in a position of relative advantage, enabling it ultimately to prevail.¹¹

These conclusions were presented to the JCS on 6 November and shortly thereafter to McElroy, Gates, Gray, and the service secretaries. General Twining asked his JCS colleagues to supply him with their comments for a presentation to be given the president some time after 26 December 1959.¹²

The Hickey study (or "NSC 2009," as it was also called from the NSC action giving rise to it) thus gave little comfort to extreme adherents of either of the two targeting philosophies. Its conclusions, as far as they went, underlined the value of the balanced target planning adopted by the JCS and SAC.

What Role for Polaris?

The service disagreement over targeting became intensified by the imminent appearance of Polaris—a strategic weapon being developed by the Navy, which, under the existing roles and missions assignment, had no primary responsibility for strategic air operations. The initial target date of January 1963 for the new weapon system had by early 1958 been advanced to 1960. This acceleration required a reduction in the range of the missile from 1,500 to 1,200 miles, but even the lower range was ample to provide a strategic capability for the submarines as they lurked off Soviet coasts. Thus the new weapon system would soon have to be incorporated into the strategic targeting plan.*

Polaris was in fact something of a novelty for the Navy itself. A Navy study completed in January 1957 pointed out that Polaris was more nearly invulnerable to surprise attack than any other system under consideration. With the approval of Admiral Burke, the study recommended that Polaris be recognized as a deterrent weapon. Thus the Navy would for the first

* See Chapter XII.

time compete directly with the Air Force for strategic warfare as a primary mission. Heavy aircraft carriers, of course, had an atomic capability and a corollary strategic air mission, but their primary mission remained control of the seas.¹³

Polaris fitted in neatly with the Army-Navy view of a minimum deterrent and a stronger capability for local or limited war. A relatively small number of Polaris submarines might entirely replace the land-based deterrent. Reportedly, one naval officer in 1958 told an Air Force friend that "we've got something that's going to put you guys out of business." The Air Force in turn viewed Polaris with a jaundiced eye. Navy Secretary Gates told McElroy in February 1958 that the Air Force had given Holaday, the director of guided missiles, a presentation on Polaris "which tore it to pieces." Gates believed that the Air Force was "going all out trying to kill Polaris."¹⁴

Deputy Secretary Quarles took the initiative in determining the concept for the employment of Polaris. On 24 December 1958 he asked the JCS to give him their recommendation on the subject, together with their views as to how Polaris should fit into the structure of unified and specified commands.¹⁵

The JCS grappled with the questions for several months before submitting split views on 8 May 1959. The basic disagreement, as would be expected, was between the Air Force and the Navy. General White proposed placing all strategic weapons systems under a "Unified Strategic Command." This should comprise two components, one from the Air Force to include land-based weapons, the other consisting of the Polaris force under immediate Navy command. It should be effectively functioning by the time the first Polaris submarine became available for operational deployment.

Admiral Burke felt very strongly that Polaris should be assigned to those unified commanders exercising operational command of major naval forces: CINCLANT, CINCPAC, and USCINCEUR. Admittedly Polaris would have the primary mission of deterrence or retaliation, but the system was never intended to stand apart as a mere missile/submarine combination awaiting only a directive to fire. Polaris submarines would operate in conjunction with other naval forces, all of which must be closely coordinated. Moreover, the supporting and control facilities for Polaris were integrated within the naval organization.

Marine Commandant General Pate supported Burke's conclusions, pointing to the loss of flexibility that would ensue from placing all long-range atomic delivery forces under a single commander. General Taylor also favored assigning Polaris to existing commands, but only as an interim solution for an untried system, subject to review after Polaris attained reliable operating status.¹⁶

General Twining, hospitalized at the time, did not take part in this action. Deputy Secretary Gates discussed the matter with Twining's stand-in, Admiral Radford, whose comments are not on record. Gates then forwarded the JCS views to McElroy, indicating his agreement with Burke. After Twining returned to duty, McElroy sent the JCS paper back to him

asking that the subject be restudied. By that time the role of Polaris had become merged in a broader discussion of overall responsibility for strategic strike planning and targeting.¹⁷

Service Disagreement Comes to a Head

While the Hickey group was making its study, the question of targeting policy had been forced up to the level of the secretary of defense. McElroy himself raised the subject at a meeting of the AFPC on 28 July 1959. He had recently visited SAC and had come away with a strengthened conviction of the need for a single command over all retaliatory striking forces. This would be especially important when Polaris and other long-range missiles were added. He asked Twining to examine the question.¹⁸

McElroy expressed similar views in the NSC a few weeks later. Though he did not at once press for a unified strategic command, he favored giving SAC authority for target coordination. The president agreed, but McElroy did not pursue the matter, and it was left to his successor to take action.¹⁹

Twining set forth his views at some length on 17 August. He began with a summary of past efforts to coordinate targeting, which had achieved only limited success. Three underlying issues, in his view, called for resolution: first, and most complicated, the choice of targets. The question here was: "What constitutes an adequate deterrence and an effective counterforce if deterrence fails?" Twining set forth evenhandedly the two conflicting views about target allocation, i.e., concentration on population centers or on enemy forces. He leaned toward the latter, though he admitted that the best target system would include urban-industrial targets as well as military installations. He believed that SAC, being responsible for the strategic mission, should develop the target list, guided by an "approved targeting philosophy" (presumably to be supplied by the JCS).

A second issue involved planning the delivery of weapons against targets. Twining favored a single operational plan to guide the strategic attack, again to be developed by SAC, subject to JCS review. The development of this plan would involve a number of other questions, such as the roles of aircraft carriers and Polaris. Twining believed that Polaris should remain under Navy control until its capability had been proven, at which time a unified strategic command might be necessary. Meanwhile, however, Polaris should be fitted into the single operating plan, and a nucleus of naval officers should be added to CINCSAC's planning staff for the purpose.

In this connection, Twining pointed to the importance of testing the single operating plan through war-gaming. The Joint Staff had no war-gaming capability, and relied on other organizations such as RAND, SAC, NESC, and the services. The JCS were currently studying the best means of war-gaming to insure a capability under their control.

Finally came the question of operational control of striking forces, specifically the role of unified commanders in the nuclear offensive. In the

past these commanders had insisted that some strategic targets were so important to their missions that they themselves should have the responsibility for their neutralization or destruction. Preparation of a single national target list and operational plan, Twining noted, should clear up this matter.²⁰

To assist the JCS in reaching a decision on these issues, Twining broke them down into 18 questions, which he submitted to his colleagues on 24 August. The most important of these questions were the following:

What should be the policy for developing a national strategic target system? What categories of targets should be included in the system? What agencies should develop, review, and update the system?

Was a single integrated operational plan needed for attack on the target system? If so, what agencies should develop and review it? What should be the role of attack carriers? Was there an immediate need for a united strategic command? If it were not established, how should Polaris submarines be integrated with SAC's operational plans?

Did the JCS need policy control of an agency for war gaming operational plans? If so, what agency should perform this function?

Twining believed that they could be answered without additional time-consuming studies. He asked that his colleagues provide the secretary of defense with their answers to the most important of these questions by 15 September and to the remainder by 1 December 1959.²¹

The deadlines proved utterly unrealistic. However, on 30 September Burke, who held powerful convictions on these matters, forwarded a general statement of his views in reply to Twining's memorandum. Burke opposed a single operating plan as well as an overall strategic force command. Strategic targeting, in his view, should be the responsibility of the JCS and should be based on recommendations of the unified and specified commanders. The striking force should be large enough to cause unacceptable damage to the enemy after he had struck first; its size should not be based on estimates of expanding Soviet strength, most of which in the past had proved too high.²²

The JCS disagreed not only on Twining's questionnaire, but also on the conclusions to be drawn from the Hickey study, scheduled to be presented to the president early in 1960. In the face of his colleagues' continuing dispute, Twining drafted his own comments on the Hickey report. He prefaced them with a strongly worded description of the depth and scope of JCS disagreement on targeting policy:

Controversy in this problem area has been intense and protracted. For the past three years the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made very little progress in joint planning on almost every aspect of the strategic offensive. We have been in disagreement on the basis

for strategic targeting, on the atomic annexes of the plans of the unified and specified commanders, on guidance to field commanders for atomic planning, on the composition of the atomic stockpile, on the forces required for the strategic offensive, on revision and updating of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, on coordination of atomic strike forces, on procedural arrangements for wargaming and damage assessment, and even on our Basic National Security Policy as it affects this problem area. The Hickey study is therefore timely. It will not solve these controversies for all time—but it does provide a basis for executive decision which will allow us to proceed with our planning, at least on a year by year basis.

For Twining, the most important conclusions emerging from the Hickey study were that a target system limited to urban targets was an inadequate basis for force planning; that the existing level of strategic forces and the present and planned composition of the nuclear stockpile were “in the right ball park”; and that the “hard decisions” on target planning that had been reached in the absence of JCS agreement had been validated. Twining therefore recommended approval of the study conclusions as general planning guidance for the Joint Staff and the services.²³

When Twining discussed this draft memorandum with his colleagues, all except Lemnitzer objected to his forthright statement of JCS disagreement. He accordingly substituted a mild statement that the Hickey study would be “useful” in determining the national strategic target system and the force level required to deter or prevail in general war, and that the optimum mix system in the study was of a reasonable order of magnitude.²⁴

Twining told Gates on 22 January that he regarded the resolution of his 18 questions as essential for further planning. The Hickey study, he thought, could answer basic questions about targeting policy and should be submitted to the president as soon as possible; the remaining questions could then be settled between the secretary of defense and the JCS.²⁵

Gates and the JCS discussed the Hickey study on 30 January. Gates endorsed Twining’s suggestion that it be approved for planning purposes. Burke indicated reservations; he favored the concept of an optimum target mix, but not necessarily the one proposed in the study.²⁶

General Hickey presented his findings to the president on 12 February 1960, with Gates, the JCS, and Kistiakowsky present. Gates drew the conclusion that the optimum mix was the proper target system. Kistiakowsky found the amount of overkill in the study “appalling” and concluded that the purpose was merely to prove a need for more missiles and aircraft. The president shared his views on the problem of overkill, speaking “with some feeling,” as Kistiakowsky noted. Nevertheless he approved the study for planning purposes. When the JCS members were asked to comment, Burke, with some support from Lemnitzer, objected “fairly strongly” to the amount of overkill in the plan. After the meeting, Kistiakowsky spoke with Burke and made it clear that he shared Burke’s views.²⁷

By this time, targeting policy had become an issue delaying the completion of the JCS strategic plans—the JSOP and JSCP. In connection with the JSOP for FY 1963, preparation of which began in 1959, representatives of the Air Force and of the other services disagreed over whether the target list should emphasize military or urban-industrial targets. In the final plan sent to Gates on 8 January 1960, the JCS papered over the disagreement with a general statement that the employment of strategic offensive forces should be designed to “destroy the Sino-Soviet will and ability to wage war” while minimizing damage to the United States.²⁸

The issue proved more troublesome in connection with the JSCP, which had to be more detailed and specific than the JSOP. At issue were portions of the JSCP for 1 July 1960 concerning guidance for the unified and specified commands in employing their forces and the tasks to be assigned CINCSAC. Once more the JCS failed to agree and had to submit their split views to Gates on 14 April 1960. White took the position that Twining’s 18 questions should be answered before the JSCP could be completed. Since the JCS had not agreed on answers, he supplied his own, doing so in a manner that reaffirmed his desire for a national strategic target list and a single integrated operating plan, both to be prepared by CINCSAC. The chiefs of the other three services believed that completion of the JSCP should take precedence over the replies to the 18 questions. So far as the JSCP was concerned, they wished to state simply that the United States would retaliate against an “optimum mix target system” similar to that in the Hickey study and to assign SAC general responsibility for strategic operations but not for overall strategic targeting or operational planning. This majority view, which would allow the JSCP to be completed without being held up by the continuing JCS disagreement over the 18 questions, had Twining’s support. In a meeting with Gates on 19 April 1960, the JCS approved Twining’s views with the understanding that the questions would be resolved as a matter of priority.²⁹

The debate over “counterforce” and “countercity” targeting (or “damage limiting” and “finite deterrence,” frequently used alternative terms) had by now spread to the public. Early in 1959 Air Force Under Secretary Malcolm A. MacIntyre criticized the view that deterrence could be secured by a mere retaliatory force. General White made the same point in executive hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Both speeches were summarized in a carefully written column by Hanson Baldwin of the *New York Times*. A few weeks later Joseph Alsop assailed the minimum deterrence position as “poisonous, desperately dangerous twaddle.”³⁰

During congressional budget hearings in February 1959, Rep. Keith Thompson of Wyoming asked Secretary Douglas and General White what would be the objectives of the nuclear striking force in case of general war. Their reply was to the effect that if the United States had a measure of warning, then military targets posing a direct threat to the United States would have priority. In case of a surprise attack, however, the reduced striking force would seek to inflict the maximum damage on the enemy

country as a whole, including his residual striking force.³¹

General Taylor had given the congressional committee a brief summary of the rationale for minimum deterrence, seeing it as a simple mathematical calculation. It was possible, he said, to determine objectively the number of targets that must be attacked and the bomb tonnage required to destroy them; then the number of delivery vehicles could be computed (making allowance for losses). When this computation was made, concluded Taylor, the number of vehicles required was in the hundreds—and “we presently have thousands.”³²

Before he retired in 1959, Taylor wrote an article expressing his belief that the United States was overstressing preparation for all-out nuclear conflict. The State and Defense Departments denied him permission to publish the article on the grounds that it was controversial and out of line with national policy. However, in his memoirs published in 1960, Taylor printed the article in its entirety. About the same time, there appeared the memoirs of General Medaris, recently retired as head of the Army's missile program. He argued that current defense planning appeared to be “dedicated to the philosophy of over-kill.” Retaliatory weapons need only be numerous enough to inflict “unacceptable damage” on an aggressor; any more were superfluous.³³

General Thomas S. Power, CINCSAC, also undertook to publish his views, and like Taylor, he encountered difficulty in doing so, although his views were quite different. In his book completed in 1959, he argued, among other things, that SAC should control all strategic weapon systems, including Polaris. McElroy denied permission to publish it on the grounds that it, also, was too controversial. Power published the book several years later after he retired. In it he no longer advocated a unified strategic command, since that was a dead issue, but he criticized the theory of minimum deterrence as well as pure counterforce, advocating the maintenance of a strategic force capable of winning a war.³⁴

The service controversy over targeting strategy also found echoes in the writings of the civilian strategists who, by the late 1950s, were increasing in numbers and prominence. The advent of weapons of hitherto unimaginably destructive power created dangers that seemed to cry out for the best possible concentration of intellect on the problems involved. In the study of these problems, military experience was at a discount, since no one, whether soldiers or anyone else, had ever encountered such weapons in war. A stream of books and articles poured forth from academics, freelance writers, and professionals employed by “think tanks” like the Rand Corporation. Central to these writings was the question: How can nuclear war best be deterred, and how should it be conducted if deterrence fails? The alternative theories of damage limitation and minimum deterrence produced conflicting answers.³⁵

Among those writers who considered targeting strategy, the most widely read was Herman Kahn of the Rand Corporation, whose book *On Thermonuclear War*, published in 1960, was apparently intended to shock

readers into facing up to the conviction that nuclear war was by no means "unthinkable." Kahn denied that such a war must end in the destruction of civilized life on the planet; with proper preparations, the United States could survive. He criticized the theory of minimum deterrence and argued for a wide spectrum of capabilities. Similarly, Bernard Brodie, considered the dean of American nuclear strategists, rejected the view that the nation could be content with a "modest" retaliatory capability and asserted that the opponent's strategic forces constituted "the first and most important target system." On the other side, the world-renowned British military writer, B. H. Liddell Hart, advocated a strategic force just large enough to exert a deterrent effect, not to "pursue the now futile and obsolete aim of winning a war."³⁶

The controversy over the role of Polaris also reached the public. The time-honored practice of "leaking" information played a part here; Air Force sources released statements downgrading the system and stressing its vulnerabilities.³⁷ At the same time, the Air Force effort to bring Polaris under control of SAC became known. In January 1960 Rep. Daniel Flood told Admiral Burke that his "spy system" had informed him that the Air Force was attempting to get control of Polaris. When Burke explained that the Air Force proposed a unified strategic commander, Flood assailed the proposal as an effort to "incorporate this Polaris system of the Navy into some strategic bombardment concept of the Air Force." At Flood's invitation, Burke submitted for the record a statement of the Navy position that Polaris should remain under Navy control and that coordination of strategic target planning was a JCS function.³⁸

Hearings by the House Committee on Government Operations in March 1960 provided an opportunity for Air Force and Navy spokesmen to air their differences. Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force General LeMay, testifying on 30 March, advocated a force large enough to knock out enemy nuclear strike forces as well as cities and industrial centers. He argued for a primarily land-based deterrent, challenging Polaris with a novel argument: moving missiles to sea might weaken U.S. credibility, since an enemy might feel that the United States would be less likely to retaliate against a strike directed at sea-based targets. The following day Burke argued the case for a minimum deterrent, large enough to deliver an "unacceptable" blow against an enemy, and characterized a submarine missile system as "invulnerable."³⁹

In testimony before the House Appropriations Committee on 13 January 1960, Secretary Gates left no doubt where the administration stood in the matter of targeting strategy. "In order to maintain a valid deterrent," he said in answer to a question by Mahon, "we have to maintain a deterrent force capable of knocking out [an enemy's] military power and not just bombing his cities. What we would actually do depends on circumstances, but we are adjusting our power to a counterforce theory; or a mixture of a counterforce theory plus attacks on industrial centers and things of that character. We are not basing our requirements on just bombing Russia for retaliation purposes."⁴⁰

Gates's Decision: Integrated Operational Planning

The innovation introduced by Secretary Gates in meeting regularly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proved successful in resolving most of the split issues before the JCS. Twining told the president on 5 May 1960 that only two remained, namely, control of Polaris and targeting policy. The president suggested use of Polaris to disrupt defenses and thus clear the way for bombers; this would mean that Polaris must be tightly integrated into the overall attack plan. He did not indicate how to accomplish this crucial task.⁴¹

On the following day, the JCS, having abandoned efforts to reach agreement on the answers to the 18 questions, submitted their separate replies, which reflected views they had already expressed. Lemnitzer and Burke favored a national target system and a "strategic" (as distinct from an "operational") plan, both to be prepared by the JCS. The plan should take the form of a "mission type directive" promulgating the target list and assigning to commanders the responsibility for planning and executing attacks. Both favored assigning Polaris to the existing unified commands rather than establishing an overall strategic command. Burke advocated an exchange of staff planners between SAC and the commands having Polaris forces in order to coordinate target planning. Pate of the Marine Corps essentially agreed with Burke. White again advocated a target list and operational plan to be prepared by CINCSAC. He also urged a unified strategic command; if it were not established, the integrated operational plan would be essential as a basis for coordination.

All four members agreed that the Hickey study should provide the basis for the national target list. All likewise recognized that the JCS needed a war-gaming capability under their control and suggested the establishment of a new joint agency for the purpose.⁴²

Over the next two months, Gates met repeatedly with the JCS in a vain effort to reach agreement. By early July he had held 15 meetings with them on the subject of strategic targeting and had also conferred directly with officers of the Joint Staff. He concluded that a single operational plan was necessary but rejected a unified strategic command as leading to a single military service.⁴³

Meeting with the president on 6 July, Gates proposed to assign to SAC the responsibility for strategic targeting, since that command already possessed an organization for the purpose. The Hickey study would provide a basis for the target list. SAC was also the logical agency to prepare a single operating plan. For this purpose, SAC should act as an agent of the JCS and should be augmented with personnel from the other services. The Army and Navy chiefs were suspicious of an Air Force "power play" in the assignment of this planning function to SAC; Gates had told them that if the JCS allowed SAC to usurp their functions, it would be their own fault.

The president fully agreed with Gates's proposals. Reminiscing a bit, he remarked that disagreements over these and other issues could be traced

to the failure in 1947 to create a single military service. Gates expressed appreciation for the president's support, noting that the matter was becoming an issue in the press and must be settled soon.⁴⁴

Earlier, Gates's senior military assistant, Brig. Gen. George S. Brown, USAF, had urged him to announce his decision to the JCS at a meeting scheduled for 30 June. Gates, however, did not follow this advice. He allowed the JCS another month of discussion, apparently hoping to the end that they might reach agreement.⁴⁵

Following a final conference with officers of the Joint Staff on 4 August, Gates had his staff draft directives to implement his decision. His other military assistant, Capt. Means Johnston, Jr., USN, holding to the Navy view as expressed by Burke, took part in preparing the drafts but indicated his disagreement. He believed that a unified strategic command was being established in all but name and that it would have been "more honest" to do so openly.⁴⁶ Up to the last, it appears, Gates held his decision very closely and did not take the JCS into his confidence, doubtless fearing a leak. Burke learned of it by accident through an aide who in turn had heard of it from Air Force officers in the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group.⁴⁷

Gates announced his decision in a meeting on 10 August with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Here it is," he said, as he later recalled. "The Navy wouldn't agree on it. The others agreed." Gates presented several draft documents including directives and policy statements. These provided for the following: establishment of a National Strategic Target List (NSTL), to be prepared under the direction of CINCSAC; designation of CINCSAC as the director of strategic target planning (DSTP), responsible to the JCS, having no command authority, with a deputy from a different service and a staff drawn from all the services; development of a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for attacking the listed targets; review of both the NSTL and the SIOP by the Joint Chiefs; and general policy guidance for both the NSTL and the SIOP.

The NSTL would include a "minimum number of specific targets" needed to achieve the levels of destruction specified in the Hickey study. Damage criteria were set very high, again following Hickey's recommendations. Commanders of unified and specified commands were to participate in the preparation of the NSTL and the SIOP by providing permanent representation at the headquarters of the DSTP. They would commit forces to attack targets on the NSTL in accord with the SIOP. Any disagreements between the DSTP and the commands would be resolved by DSTP to permit completion of the SIOP, but would be drawn to the attention of the JCS when the SIOP was reviewed by them. After completion by 14 December, the NSTL and the SIOP both would undergo review at a three-day conference (14-16 December) of the secretary of defense, the JCS, and the unified and specified commanders to be held at DSTP headquarters at Offutt AFB, Nebraska.⁴⁸

JCS members were allowed to read the draft directives and take notes on them but not to retain copies, again no doubt for fear that the

contents might leak out. In the discussion that followed Gates's proposals, Lemnitzer agreed to support them. White also expressed agreement, although regretting the absence of a unified strategic command. Twining gave immediate and unqualified support.

The principal dissenter was Burke, with some support from his Marine Corps colleague, General Shoup. As Gates later remarked, Burke "nearly hit the roof." He objected that the new arrangements would give CINCSAC complete control of targeting and related matters, including generation of weapons requirements and force levels. Already the JCS control over CINCSAC was loose enough, Burke charged; for example, CINCSAC was estimating requirements based on his own intelligence rather than on national intelligence estimates. Gates rejoined that if this were true, the JCS were not doing their job. Burke agreed but added that the situation would be worse under the new arrangement, since the JCS could not possibly review the NSTL and the SIOP adequately in a three-day conference.

In further discussion, Gates warned the JCS of the possibility in the next six months of even more drastic changes affecting them: for example, proposals to separate the JCS members from their services. He defended his plans as the best that could be devised and added that he and Twining were scheduled to present them to the president the next day. Burke at once asked to attend the meeting with the president. Gates agreed, after some hesitation; he foresaw a determined effort by the Navy to undermine the new arrangements.⁴⁹

Gates, Twining, Douglas, and Burke met with the president on 11 August. Gates described his plan, then yielded the floor to Burke. Reading from a prepared statement, Burke began his remarks with an eloquent plea. "This is not a compromise," he said. "I did not ask to see you lightly, Mr. President. This is a problem of tremendous weight which will have a far-reaching effect on our military forces and the issue is more important than any in which I have been involved before."

His concern lay in three areas. First, the plan would abrogate the authority and responsibility of the JCS, who would lose control of operations in general war. It was essential that the JCS exert control directly, rather than through an intermediary, of such matters as targeting and nuclear strike operations. If the JCS and the Joint Staff did not have the capability to develop the NSTL and the SIOP, how could they review them adequately? Second, a rigid and all-embracing operating plan would hamstring the unified and specified commands, whose freedom of action constituted a major advantage of the unified command system. Third, relationships with NATO would suffer; the other NATO nations might feel impelled to create their own national nuclear capability over which the United States would have no control.

Burke urged that, at the least, the target list and operating plan be initially prepared on a trial basis, with ample time for complete and thorough review by the Joint Staff and the JCS. If the results of this process appeared

reasonable, if it could be shown that the forces of the unified commanders could operate effectively under the plan, and if there were no complications with NATO, then, said Burke, "we can all buy it."⁵⁰

There ensued a lengthy and at times heated discussion, with Burke upholding his convictions in a minority of one. Eisenhower firmly supported Gates's proposals while attempting to soothe some of Burke's concerns. Thus he granted fully that the interests of NATO must be taken into account. He sought to reduce the issue to a relatively minor one—whether an integrated operating plan should be developed in the Joint Staff or elsewhere. He was inclined to agree with Burke's suggestion to adopt the plan on a trial basis. Burke pressed this point, and a sharp exchange ensued between him and Twining, who charged that the Navy would try to subvert the plan. For 20 years, said Twining, the Navy had been completely opposed to serving under a single commander. Burke rejoined that the Navy was the only one of the services that now had all of its forces under unified command.

Deputy Secretary Douglas praised the plan as one that would eliminate duplication and overlap in targeting. Burke acknowledged the need for integrated target planning but opposed a detailed operating plan; it should suffice, in his view, merely to assign tasks to the commanders. Gates stressed that the essence of an integrated plan was pinning down details. The president agreed. The initial strike, he said, must be precisely worked out in detail to make certain that all blows were struck simultaneously.

The president could not understand why the issue aroused so much emotion. It ought to be possible for serious-minded men to reach agreement on what was best for the national interest. He thought it necessary to settle the matter before he left office. On the other hand, he did not wish to give the plan such categorical approval that a later decision to discontinue it would destroy confidence in his judgment. Accordingly, he decided that the instructions instituting the new system should be issued by the secretary of defense. At the same time, it should be understood that the results of the plan would be tested by the JCS and their conclusions reported to the secretary and the president. But, he concluded, concerning the need for a completely integrated plan for the first strike, there could be no question.⁵¹

The outcome of the meeting was not surprising, since Eisenhower had already given his support in principle to Gates's plan. Gates later considered this decision—instituting an integrated NSTL and SIOP—as the most important he made during his tenure. But in the process his relationship with some of his former Navy associates, including Burke, was almost destroyed.⁵²

For Burke the experience was a wrenching one. He later commented that he took a "pretty raw whipping, two hours worth." On another occasion, he remarked, no doubt with understatement, that "it got a little emotional at times—not all me by any means." Gates recalled, perhaps metaphorically, that Burke shook his fist at the president.⁵³

On 15 August Burke, at his own request, met with Gates and found

some common ground. He told the secretary that, although he did not agree "one damned bit" with the decision, it had been made and he and the Navy would support it to the utmost. Gates expressed confidence in the top leadership of the Navy, but feared actions at lower levels to try to undermine the plan.

Burke then said he had asked for the meeting with the president in order to make two points clear. First, the JCS, in order to discharge their responsibilities, would have to analyze the NSTL and the SIOP very thoroughly, and for that purpose must have access to all basic data involved in the preparation of these documents. Second, he wished to prevent a "snow job" by CINCSAC, who, he feared, might exploit his position as DSTP to inflate weapon requirements and budgets.

Gates agreed with Burke on both of these points. One reason for his decision, he said, had been the desire to settle the issue and thus forestall perhaps even more radical changes by a new administration. He thought the new procedure would enable the JCS for the first time to get SAC firmly under control. He recognized that CINCSAC would have to be carefully watched. He had already been disturbed by the alarmist speeches made by the outspoken General Power. He intended to speak to Power in "very harsh terms" and to lay down the law as to how he expected the system to work.⁵⁴

It may have reassured Burke that the deputy DSTP was to be chosen from his service. Any alternative could have had little chance of consideration; in any case, the Army expressly disclaimed interest in the position. With the approval of Secretary of the Navy Franke, Burke selected Rear Adm. Edward N. Parker, chief of the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA). Rear Adm. Raborn was also considered but was ruled out because of his close identification with the Polaris project and the fear of creating an implication that Polaris was being placed under SAC.⁵⁵

To discuss implementation of his and the president's decisions, Gates summoned the unified and specified commanders to a conference in Washington on 17 August.⁵⁶ Meanwhile the JCS reviewed Gates's draft directives. They told him on 16 August that they considered these adequate with minor revisions; they would suggest final versions after the conference. Gates immediately issued a directive to the chairman instituting the NSTL and SIOP and establishing the positions of director and deputy director of strategic target planning, also the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff.⁵⁷

Meeting with the unified and specified commanders on 17 August, Gates outlined the proposed targeting and planning system. General Norstad, SACEUR, expressed some misgivings; his position in the new arrangement was unclear, since the forces under his command were committed to NATO and thus not subject to disposal by the United States. Burke was able to obtain some clarifications and understandings of matters that he considered important. General Power assured him of free communication with Admiral Parker. It was agreed that the DSTP would on request provide full

information and raw data to service chiefs and unified commanders. Minor disagreements arising in the preparation of the NSTL or SIOP would be resolved by the DSTP; major ones would be referred to the JCS. The DSTP would use intelligence from all sources but would look to national intelligence primarily; if he disagreed with it, he would call the matter to the attention of the JCS. Finally, the SIOP would be war-gamed by others as well as by CINCSAC.⁵⁸

Following the conference, Gates announced to the press that General Power, as director of strategic target planning, would prepare plans for integrating the strategic force of missiles and bombers. Press accounts of the conference and the decision contained no hint of dissension or dissatisfaction. One story asserted that the unified and specified commanders, as well as the JCS, supported the new plan "wholeheartedly."⁵⁹

On 19 August the JCS formally appointed General Power director of the Target Planning Staff, promulgated the national targeting and attack policy, and issued the necessary instructions to the unified and specified commands. The deadline for completion of the SIOP and NSTL and for the reviewing conference at SAC headquarters had now been moved up to early December.⁶⁰

On the same day Admiral Burke formally notified naval component commanders of Gates's decisions. His message concluded as follows:

I have been permitted to express my opinions freely at all echelons. The decisions have now been made and the Navy will support them fully. I have stated and will continue to state this officially as well as unofficially.

It is essential that every Naval Officer involved in any way in this program exert every effort to insure that this system works and that it results in the best NSTL and SIOP possible to provide.⁶¹

Burke also took pains to assure members of Congress of his full support of the decisions. His loyalty was warmly commended by Secretary Gates.⁶²

In thus supporting both the spirit and the letter of a decision that had gone against him, Burke was of course acting in full accord with military ethics, but he had another motive as well. He wanted to make certain that the new arrangement worked out as Gates had said he expected it to do, with the JCS exercising closer control over SAC than before. "We've got to make this thing work . . . just exactly the way Mr. Gates expects it to work," he told his deputies on 18 August. With this end in view, he selected the most able naval officers for assignment to the target planning staff.⁶³

The First SIOP

On 23 August General Power notified the JCS that the Directorate of Strategic Target Planning was established and operating. Four days later he

sent the JCS an outline of the organization of what he called the "Joint Strategic Target Planning Agency" under his direction. It consisted of a staff made up of the deputy DSTP and a representative from each service; a policy committee chaired by the deputy and including representatives of the services and of the unified and specified commands; and two working divisions charged respectively with preparing the NSTL and the SIOP. A liaison group from the JCS would be attached to the director's office. The JCS approved this organization on 1 September.⁶⁴

The initial manpower allocation for the new body included 83 billets drawn from SAC and 7 from other elements of the Air Force, as compared with 13 from the Navy and 6 from the Army and Marine Corps. Later it expanded to 219 from SAC, 8 from the Air Force, 29 from the Navy, and 11 from the other services. This heavy preponderance in favor of SAC and the Air Force displeased Burke, who had envisioned a roughly equal division between the Air Force and the other three services collectively. He did not protest the matter, however.⁶⁵

The title tentatively chosen for the planning group was approved by the JCS, but not by Gates. He told the JCS that he had *not* intended to establish a new "agency," with all the administrative actions that would require. The JCS accordingly changed the title to Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS).⁶⁶

Development of the NSTL and the SIOP very early took a direction that seemed to justify Burke's fears that they would be used to inflate requirements. Over the protests of the Navy members of the policy committee, Power decided that the SIOP should be a "capabilities" plan, aimed at making full use of all available weapons, as distinct from a plan that proceeded from objectives to requirements. He had support for this position from the head of the JCS Liaison Group, Brig. Gen. B. E. Spivy, who believed that Power's decision accorded with Gates's intent.

Related to this matter was the interpretation of the policy laid down by the JCS that the NSTL should consist of a "minimum" number of targets. Navy representatives in the JSTPS, with some support from those of the Army, interpreted this to mean a finite list of targets, similar to that in the Hickey study, large enough to accomplish the objectives set forth in the policy statement under the criteria established by the JCS. Power interpreted the word "minimum" to mean in effect a floor under the number of targets, with no upper limit. Under Power's guidance, the JSTPS adopted more demanding criteria—as high as 97 percent probability of damage for some targets, which of course required larger numbers of weapons.⁶⁷

Burke kept in touch with these developments through Admiral Parker and the Navy representative on the policy committee. Early in November he decided to visit SAC Headquarters "to see what cooks and who cooks it," as he expressed it in a message to naval component commanders. In a quick one-day trip on 5 November, Burke found himself "well shepherded" with no opportunity to talk with Navy officers alone. However, he observed

that these officers considered the effort to be truly joint and the best that could be accomplished. He left Offutt convinced that the wisest course of action, when the NSTL and SIOP came before the JCS, would be to approve them subject to future improvement.⁶⁸

Meanwhile, however, Burke's fears had reached the ears of the president's science adviser, Kistiakowsky. The president himself had suggested that Kistiakowsky involve himself in the planning of the NSTL and the SIOP. Kistiakowsky had no desire to do so; he considered this a military rather than a technical matter and was aware of the intense interservice feelings involved.⁶⁹

In September 1960 the president's naval aide, Capt. Evan P. Aurand, who of course kept in touch with Burke, suggested that Kistiakowsky investigate the validity of the method used by DSTP to determine warhead yield requirements for specific targets. Kistiakowsky replied that it would be improper for him to take any action unless the secretary or the president so requested.⁷⁰

The president's assistant, Gordon Gray, then took a hand in the matter. On 5 October he passed along to the president a report received by Burke from "one of his flag officers" (presumably Parker) that Power had openly expressed a hope that the JCS would not get too deeply involved in the NSTL and the SIOP, since they had little to contribute. The president responded that he would not be surprised at any of Power's statements. He suggested that Gray propose in the NSC that Kistiakowsky undertake periodic inspections at Offutt. When Gray demurred on the grounds that the matter was a Defense responsibility, the president agreed to bring up the subject himself in the NSC.⁷¹

Accordingly, when the NSC met the next day, the president suggested to Gates that Kistiakowsky visit Offutt to review the activity there. Gates, with a "most pained" expression on his face (according to Kistiakowsky), replied that he expected soon to receive full information through a briefing by General Power in the Pentagon. The president nevertheless insisted that Kistiakowsky make the trip. He also instructed the new JCS chairman, General Lemnitzer, to make certain that the JCS were kept fully informed about the development of the NSTL and the SIOP.⁷²

On 17 October 1960 Power and his deputy, Parker, briefed Gates on the progress of NSTL and the SIOP. Kistiakowsky, who was present, thought that the briefing deliberately stressed "sweetness and light" and downplayed service disagreements. The next day Gates's aide, General Brown, told Kistiakowsky that Gates was worried about how the SIOP might affect force levels and now favored the trip by Kistiakowsky.⁷³

The president's directive to Kistiakowsky, dated 19 October, asked for observations on the "methodology, procedures and criteria" being used by the JSTPS in developing the target list and operations plan. The secretary of defense would see that Kistiakowsky and his associates were given all necessary assistance.⁷⁴

Lemnitzer was also watching the situation closely, as he assured the

president on 11 October. He planned to send the director of the Joint Staff, Maj. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, USA, to visit Omaha in the near future; also, he himself had a "hot line" to Power and Parker. Several weeks later he reported to Eisenhower his conclusion that it would be necessary to review carefully the stated requirements for targeting in order to keep force levels from becoming inflated.⁷⁵

Kistiakowsky flew to Offutt AFB on the evening of 2 November 1960, accompanied by George W. Rathjens, a member of the PSAC, and H. E. Scoville, director of CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence. When the party landed, Power sent a colonel to greet them, although according to protocol he should have met them himself since Kistiakowsky held the equivalent of Cabinet rank. This act of calculated discourtesy was presumably intended to downgrade the importance and prestige of the party. At a cocktail party the following evening, Kistiakowsky heard the representative of USCINCEUR complain "bitterly" that he and other representatives of the commands "were being pushed around and simply told what they had to do."⁷⁶

Briefings for the group began on 3 November and continued for two more days. At the outset, Power objected when Rathjens and Scoville began to take notes on the briefings. Kistiakowsky insisted on their right to do so and finally won his point, without having to produce his presidential directive, which he kept in his pocket as a "last reserve." He did agree that notes would be taken only on matters of procedure and method, not on substance.⁷⁷

The visitors learned that the SIOP would entail a strike by the entire U.S. nuclear striking force and a retaliatory strike by an "alert force" assumed to be surviving after a surprise Soviet attack. The target list covered the entire Sino-Soviet bloc, and even the list for the alert force was appreciably larger than that for the Hickey study. To achieve operational simplicity, each weapon carrier would aim for the same target in either strike, so that even the retaliatory strike had a largely "counterforce" character.

Kistiakowsky's findings left no doubt that there was much "overkill" in the plan, which used blast effect as the only criterion of damage and ignored other destructive effects, such as fire and radioactive fallout. As a result, weapons requirements ran extremely high. For example, four large weapons were allotted to one target that, on the basis of experience in World War II, could be destroyed by a single smaller bomb.⁷⁸

After returning to the Pentagon, Kistiakowsky informally presented his findings to Gates, Douglas, and Lemnitzer on 10 November. He told his hearers that the SIOP was about as sound as could be hoped for, but warned that weapons requirements were excessive. Gates and Douglas agreed and suggested that damage criteria might be revised.⁷⁹

Gates's inclination to agree with Kistiakowsky appears to have been strengthened by a second briefing given by Power at the Pentagon on 22 November. The secretary suggested that, without delaying approval of the plan, further studies be made of computer techniques to supplement human judgment in selecting delivery systems, of weapons effects other

than blast damage, and of damage criteria, especially those governing destruction of urban floor space.⁸⁰

Reporting his findings to Eisenhower on 25 November, Kistiakowsky told the president that the SIOP should be accepted as the best that could be expected under the circumstances. For the future, however, he recommended that the directives and procedures governing the SIOP and the NSTL be reviewed and amended where necessary. The president observed that the plan as outlined to him did not appear to make the most effective use of resources. To reduce overkill, he suggested that the Polaris force be held back for use as a reserve against targets missed on the first round. Ranging into more general matters, he remarked that the war envisioned in the plan made no sense; the aim should be to deter the enemy by making him realize that the United States could destroy him under any circumstances. Apparently the president was gravitating toward the "minimum deterrent" theory. He took no action, however, to delay the current SIOP or to order its revision, thereby tacitly accepting Kistiakowsky's recommendation that it be approved.⁸¹

The final SIOP (though not yet the NSTP) was ready for review by the beginning of December. At a conference at Offutt AFB on 1-2 December, Gates, the JCS, and the unified and specified commanders heard a comprehensive briefing on the plan from Power and the JSTPS. In the ensuing discussion, apparently no serious objection to its acceptance emerged; Burke had already made up his mind to accept it, and the representatives of the commands agreed that the integrated plan was an improvement over previous coordination arrangements. The conferees generally agreed, however, that some changes would be needed in the future, specifically in the damage and assurance criteria, which seemed excessive.⁸²

At the conclusion of the meeting, Gates cleared with Eisenhower by telephone a short statement that a plan drafted by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff had been approved, giving no details. He announced this at an impromptu press conference on 2 December. He did not dwell on the significance of the plan, and the reporters showed more interest in other subjects, such as possible further reorganization of the Defense Department or the prospect that Gates might accept a position in the forthcoming administration of President-elect Kennedy.⁸³

On 9 December, after some further discussion of the SIOP and of the NSTL (which was now available), the JCS informed Gates that they had approved both and had established 1 April 1961 as the effective date of the plan, which they designated SIOP-62. They would send both documents to the commands and the services for use in preparing implementing plans.⁸⁴

At the same time, the JCS considered the question of war-gaming the SIOP but could not agree on the procedure to be used, obviously a matter of considerable importance. Burke was adamant that the war-gaming be done by the JCS. Power had already decided on war-gaming the SIOP at SAC even if the JCS ordered it done elsewhere.⁸⁵

The JCS reported their disagreement on this matter on 9 December. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps members wanted the SIOP war-gamed in Washington, using computer resources available there. General White argued that the war game should be conducted at Offutt because the DSTP and the JSTPS were familiar with the plan. Lemnitzer agreed but insisted that the JCS exert very close supervision and control; otherwise the process would be comparable to allowing a soldier to inspect himself. All the JCS members agreed, however, that in the long run, they needed their own war-gaming agency. Gates concurred and allotted manpower and funds for the purpose. Several months later the JCS established in the Joint Staff a Joint War Games Control Group, which would supervise the war-gaming of the SIOP by the DSTP.⁸⁶

Another controversy that arose with the completion of the SIOP and the NSTL concerned the composition of the JSTPS. To revise and update these two documents, after they had been completed, was a considerably less demanding task than preparing them in the first place. General Power therefore proposed to reduce the strength of the JSTPS by about half, retaining at the same time its internal composition and its domination by Air Force officers. Army and Navy representatives objected; they believed that the NSTL division of the JSTPS should be a true "joint" organization with equal representation among the services and that the SIOP division should be staffed in proportion to the service forces committed to the plan. The question was under discussion in DSTP headquarters in January 1961. Gates took no action; his successor, Robert S. McNamara, settled the matter by overruling Power.⁸⁷

On 12 January 1961 Goodpaster, at Eisenhower's behest, sent Gates a copy of Kistiakowsky's report of his trip to Omaha. Gates had been briefed by Kistiakowsky, but he was not present at the full report given the president on 25 November. On 20 January, his last day in office, Gates passed along the report to Lemnitzer, recommending careful study of it by the JCS and General Power. Specifically, he felt that planning needed refinement to provide for various conditions of warning and that the damage criteria should be reevaluated.⁸⁸

The institution of the SIOP and NSTP was a major step in the direction of centralized control over the military establishment. The logic of nuclear strategy dictated that any strike against the Soviet Union must consist of a single massive blow, precisely controlled and timed, to inflict the maximum damage upon enemy forces and resources. As General Twining had said, "atomic operations must be preplanned for automatic execution." From a practical standpoint, the coalescence of separate plans into a single document, subject to periodic review by the secretary of defense, greatly simplified the secretary's task in directly influencing strategy, a circumstance that Gates's successors were to exploit to advantage.

CHAPTER XVI

Western Europe, 1956-1958

The United States and the North Atlantic Alliance

The outcome of World War II left the once prosperous nations of Western Europe in a shattered condition. On the continent, if not in Britain, postwar economic wreckage and social dislocation seemed to offer a ripe field for exploitation by a Communist movement directed from Moscow by the dictatorship of Josef Stalin. For a time there seemed the danger that some Western nations, notably France and Italy, might actually pass under the control of Communist governments, thus possibly adding their resources to those of the expanding Soviet empire.¹

The threat of internal Communist seizure of power receded as Western Europe, aided by U.S. assistance furnished under the Marshall Plan, regained its economic equilibrium. But the fear remained of an overt attack by the powerful armies of the Soviet bloc. To meet this danger, France, the United Kingdom, and the three Benelux countries formed in 1948 a mutual defense organization called the Western Union. A year later, largely through U.S. efforts, this became the nucleus of a larger defensive alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Besides the five countries of the Western Union, NATO included the United States and Canada; three Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland; and two nations of southern Europe, Portugal and Italy. Greece and Turkey joined in 1952 and West Germany, just beginning rearmament, in 1955. Thus by 1956 the 15 members embraced most of Europe west of the Iron Curtain. Of the Western European nations outside the bloc, Sweden, Switzerland, and Eire preferred to retain their traditional neutrality. The only other one, Spain, remained something of an outcast because its dictator, Francisco Franco, had sympathized with the Axis powers in World War II.²

The member nations of NATO established both political and military machinery to give effect to their joint efforts. The governing body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), sat permanently in Paris with representatives from each member country. Its regular sessions were supplemented twice each year by special meetings attended by ministers of defense, foreign

affairs, and finance. The secretary general, NATO's highest ranking official, chaired the NAC. The senior military authority of NATO, responsible to the council, was the Military Committee (MC), composed of the chiefs of staff of the member countries (excluding Iceland which had no military forces). Between their formal meetings, the chiefs were represented by delegates who sat in permanent session, as with the NAC. The executive agent of the MC, the Standing Group (SG), represented the Western Big Three—the United States, United Kingdom, and France.³

Organization of an international military force, composed of land, sea, and air units contributed by member nations, began in 1951 under a newly appointed supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR). By 1956 SACEUR commanded NATO land forces through regional commands for Northern, Central, and Southern Europe, and naval and air forces through functional deputies. Coequal with SACEUR was a separate commander for the Atlantic (SACLANT), a position held by a U.S. admiral. Both SACEUR and SACLANT reported to the NAC through the Standing Group and the Military Committee. A separate command for the English Channel (CINCHAN), jointly held by an admiral and an air marshal, both British, reported to the Standing Group through a Channel Committee. In the Mediterranean, the picture was somewhat complicated; there a Mediterranean Command, subordinate to SACEUR, did not include all NATO naval forces in that theater.⁴

Although Spain remained outside NATO, the United States under a bilateral agreement received the right to station air and naval forces in that country in return for military assistance. This arrangement gave added depth to the Western defensive position, with the Pyrenees furnishing a possible last-ditch line of defense on the continent.⁵

If Soviet bloc armies attacked, SACEUR would conduct the defense, backed up by the U.S. Strategic Air Command operating from bases in the United States and elsewhere. SACEUR prepared plans based on strategic guidance provided by the NAC, which relied on the advice of the Military Committee. The governing strategic document in 1956, MC 48, assumed that a future war would be decided in a short time by a violent exchange of nuclear weapons, and drew the conclusion that NATO's preparations should emphasize combat-ready forces in being. It was NATO's equivalent of the Eisenhower administration's "New Look."⁶

The first SACEUR, General Eisenhower, was followed in succession by two of his old Army colleagues, Generals Matthew B. Ridgway and Alfred M. Gruenther. On 20 November 1956 the position went for the first time to a U.S. Air Force officer, General Lauris Norstad. He was to prove a forceful and innovative SACEUR, ably combining the required military and diplomatic skills. He worked closely with the statesmen of the continental countries. His contacts with British officials were less close, partly no doubt because his office was in Paris, partly because the "special relationship" between the United States and the United Kingdom led to more direct contacts between the two countries. Norstad also dealt freely and directly

with officials in Washington, where his counsels were heard with respect. President Eisenhower considered him as a replacement for Admiral Radford in the position of JCS chairman, but concluded that he was too valuable as SACEUR.⁷

NATO Strategy and Force Levels, 1956-1957

From the inception of NATO, its military authorities encountered difficulty in persuading member governments to provide forces deemed necessary to cope with the prospective foe. European nations, like the United States, found themselves caught in a squeeze between military requirements and budgetary pressures.

Force objectives for NATO were determined each year through a process known as the "annual review." This began with broad guidance laid down by the NAC. The International Staff (operating under the secretary general) then circulated a questionnaire to member governments requesting information about forces they expected to make available, while NATO commanders submitted estimates of their requirements. These were collated by the International Staff and by the council's Annual Review

TABLE 7
NATO Force Goals, 1954-1956
M-day (D-day)

	Assumed as basis for MC 48	Firm 1955	Firm 1956
<i>Army divisions</i>			
U.S.	5 ² / ₃	5 ² / ₃	5 ¹ / ₃
Other	<u>53</u>	<u>38 ¹/₃</u>	<u>36</u>
Total	58 ² / ₃	44	41 ¹ / ₃
<i>Naval vessels</i>			
U.S.	426	428	389
Other	<u>771</u>	<u>626</u>	<u>646</u>
Total	1,197	1,054	1,035
<i>Aircraft</i>			
U.S.	1,628	1,630	1,630
Other	<u>7,182</u>	<u>5,294</u>	<u>5,216</u>
Total	8,810	6,924	6,846
<i>Ultimate (post-D-day) Division Goals</i>	126	116	115 ¹ / ₃

Source: K. W. Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, Tables 6, 7, and 8, 257-61. M-day and D-day tended to be used interchangeably in NATO parlance, the former in connection with Army forces, the latter with others.

Committee, which drafted recommendations for "firm" force goals for the immediately following calendar year, along with "provisional" and "planning" goals, respectively, for each of the ensuing two years. The council, of course, had the right of final approval of these objectives. There was no guarantee that the member nations would be able or willing to meet the objectives assigned them.⁸

MC 48 had assumed a force of $58 \frac{2}{3}$ divisions on M-day, rising to a total of 126 by full mobilization.⁹ The gap between hope and reality is shown in Table 7, which contrasts the objectives in MC 48 with the "firm" goals for 1955 and 1956 approved by the NAC in December 1954 and 1955, respectively.

Part of this gap resulted from the inclusion of West German forces in the MC 48 goals. These assumed a German contribution of 12 divisions, 164 ships, and 1,326 aircraft by the end of 1956.¹⁰ Since Germany was just beginning to rearm in 1955, it was not possible to include German forces in "firm" goals at that time.

Faced with these difficulties, NATO planners in 1956 turned to a review of strategy in the hope of finding one that could be carried out with smaller forces. There were grounds for such a review anyhow in the fast-changing atmosphere of military technology. President Eisenhower told the NSC in May 1956 that he regarded present NATO strategic concepts as "completely outmoded" and "making no sense in the light of recent weapons developments and Soviet strategy."¹¹

The annual review for 1956, designed to elicit goals to be approved by the NAC in December, had already gotten underway with the circulation of the regular questionnaire from the International Staff. The JCS drafted a reply in which they listed the following forces available:

Army (divisions):

8 $\frac{1}{3}$	(including 5 $\frac{1}{3}$ already in Europe) first-echelon, available on M-day
9	second-echelon available sometime thereafter
<u>17 $\frac{1}{3}$</u>	

Navy (ships):

386 on D-day, 749 by D+180

Air Force (squadrons):

Combat	
Fighter-bomber	33
Fighter	13
Reconnaissance	8
Light bomber	<u>9</u>
	63
Transport	<u>12</u>
Total squadrons	75
Total aircraft	1,630

All these forces were projected through 1959, thus providing a basis for the "provisional" and "planning" goals for 1958 and 1959, respectively, as well as the "firm" goals for 1957.¹²

These forces would enable the United States to meet its NATO commitments for 1957. The British, however, foresaw difficulties in meeting theirs. In June 1956 the British Government suggested to the United States that a special NAC ministerial meeting be held to launch a review of strategy in the hope of reducing forces. Secretary Dulles believed a special NAC meeting unnecessary, but after talking with the president, he agreed to hold bilateral talks with the British on the subject.¹³

In preparation for these talks, Dulles, Wilson, Radford, and General Gruenther (SACEUR) discussed NATO's requirements on 13 August. Wilson favored a review that might lead to a reduction of U.S. personnel in Europe. The conferees agreed that withdrawal of entire divisions at that time would be unwise, but that it might be possible to draw down as many as 50,000 troops from combat units and service forces.¹⁴

Following the meeting, Dulles, Wilson, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson drafted a memorandum for the president suggesting a U.S. position on talks with the British and the North Atlantic Council that opposed withdrawal of divisions from Europe at that time, but favored a "streamlining" of forces. At the same time, other nations should be urged increasingly to assume a greater share of responsibility for the conventional ready forces on the continent that constituted NATO's "shield." The British had already submitted a draft directive calling for a revision of NATO's strategy that would apparently place almost total reliance on nuclear retaliation. This was too rigid, according to the memorandum, and the British should be so informed. NATO should possess sufficient conventional ground forces to meet, for example, a local attack by one of the Soviet satellites. The president approved this position on 2 October.¹⁵

Dulles upheld the position in a meeting with British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd on 7 October. He stressed the importance of a flexible strategy for NATO, drawing from Lloyd an assurance that the British had no desire to impose excessive rigidity. Following this conversation, the British revised their draft directive and submitted it to the NAC, which approved it to go before the ministerial session in December.¹⁶

The Standing Group was already at work on a strategic concept to replace MC 48. It apparently made little change, envisioning an initial intensive phase of nuclear operations (not over one month), with a subsequent phase of indeterminate length. The JCS, reviewing the SG draft, recommended reference to an initial phase of "comparatively short duration," with no attempt to stipulate its length, and proposed a number of changes for clarity and completeness. Neither this strategy paper (MC 14/2) nor a companion document on implementing measures (MC 48/2) could receive final approval by the SG until after the NAC had approved the political directive.¹⁷

That directive, approved by the NAC on 13 December, proved broad in

nature and hardly furnished the basis for any important reorientation of strategy. It stressed the importance of a fully effective nuclear force for both defense against and deterrence of a major Soviet attack and of shield forces able to operate effectively with either nuclear or conventional weapons.¹⁸

Approving "firm" force goals for the ensuing calendar year, the council raised the M-day ground force objective to 48 divisions, including 5 1/3 from the United States. Most of the increase would come from an expected contingent of 5 2/3 divisions from the Federal Republic of Germany. Slight increases from other countries would be partially offset by a decline in French forces, which were being drawn upon to cope with the rebellion raging in Algeria. Sharp reductions in naval and air objectives were projected (to 990 vessels and 6,626 aircraft), the U.S. share being 396 and 1,630, respectively.¹⁹

Following the meeting, the Standing Group redrafted its strategy paper (MC 14/2) to insure conformity with the political directive. The group retained the one-month estimate for the initial phase and spoke of a subsequent period of "limited operations leading to termination of hostilities." The JCS, when they reviewed the draft, preferred to speak of "military" (rather than "limited") operations—a compromise resulting from a dispute between the Air Force and the other services over the probable importance of the post-nuclear phase.²⁰

The Standing Group accepted the change from "limited" to "military" but insisted on retaining the 30-day estimate for the initial phase. The final version, approved by the NAC on 9 May 1957, set forth what had to be done to prepare for general war if it should be forced upon NATO. The tasks included insuring the capability to carry out a nuclear offensive; developing the ability to use NATO forces for defense, counting on the use of nuclear weapons from the outset; and preparing for a period of reorganization and assembly of residual resources for the second phase.²¹

The accompanying list of measures to implement the strategic concept (MC 48/2) included maintenance of fully effective retaliatory forces; development of a shield force deployed as far forward as possible; protection and maintenance of air and sea communications; observation of the principle of centralized direction and decentralized execution of operations; development of an effective air defense system; maintenance of logistic systems capable of supporting both limited and general war, but based primarily on D-day force levels; and maintenance of a degree of flexibility to enable NATO forces to act promptly with or without recourse to nuclear weapons.²²

MC 14/2 and MC 48/2 provided criteria by which to judge the adequacy of the forces proposed for the 1957 annual review. As recommended by the JCS, firm goals for 1958 would remain at 17 1/3 first- and second-echelon divisions, 384 naval vessels, and 1,555 aircraft in 72 squadrons (3 fighter-bomber squadrons having been dropped from the preceding year's goals), of which 58 would be in place in Europe. The JCS

pronounced these figures in consonance with MC 14/2 and MC 48/2, and OSD approved them.²³

Before these JCS proposals could be transmitted to NATO, they were thrown into question by the need to start a new wave of economy. During the FY 1959 Defense budget process, the service personnel ceiling, initially fixed at 2.7 million (a reduction of over 100,000), was reduced further to 2,608,000, and the president set a limit of \$38 billion on expenditures for both FY 1958 and FY 1959. In October 1957 Wilson asked the JCS to review NATO force objectives in the light of these reductions.²⁴

The JCS replied that while the number of Army divisions would remain the same, one division would lose two of its five battle groups. The Navy would cut 11 vessels, reducing the total to 373. The Air Force, juggling its plans, would actually increase to 76 the number of squadrons earmarked for NATO. However, the number of aircraft would drop to 1,473, and only 44 of the 76 squadrons would be stationed in Europe. General Norstad feared that these adjustments would reduce U.S. forces below the stated requirements of SACEUR and SACLANF. He believed that NATO should be consulted.²⁵

Norstad told McElroy and other OSD officials during a trip to Washington in November that the proposed reductions were unacceptable. Bowing to the inevitability of a cut of some 11,600 in Army strength, he urged that it be taken from support units. McElroy agreed that USCINCEUR should study this possibility. Furthermore, any reduction below SACEUR's requirement for number of air units in place would be limited to transport (troop carrier) squadrons.²⁶

The situation was eased by the crisis caused by the two Soviet Sputnik launches in October and November. These spurred the administration into providing more money for defense, most for missiles and other hardware but some for personnel. This made it possible to avoid any reduction in manpower overseas and to meet Norstad's Air Force requirements at least through 1958.²⁷

The question of the nine second-echelon Army divisions, listed as an Army commitment for NATO, also came up for discussion. Earlier, on 6 June 1957, the president had suggested their elimination, along with the M-day divisions (three Army and two Marine) stationed in the United States. He asked that Dulles discuss the question with Norstad.²⁸

When queried, Norstad admitted that the M-day divisions in the United States had lower priority than those in Europe. He doubted that they could reach Europe in time to influence the "critical phase" of operations, but they might be of subsequent value. As for the second-echelon divisions, they had an appreciably lower priority. Whether to maintain them was largely a matter for national determination, but if they continued in existence, they should remain committed to NATO.²⁹

Dulles and Quarles accordingly recommended to the president that any reductions in the NATO commitment should come first from these second-echelon forces. The JCS pointed out that removing them from the NATO commitment would not reduce costs, since they would remain in

the Army structure. The matter became academic when the president ruled against any reduction in U.S. divisions committed to NATO. He later agreed that the nine divisions should remain committed to NATO as long as there were valid national reasons for maintaining them in the force structure.³⁰

Force Goals Revised: MC 70

The review of NATO strategy begun in 1956, which produced MC 14/2 and MC 48/2, was completed in 1958 with a third document setting forth the minimum forces needed to implement the revised strategic concept. This document, MC 70, had its inception in 1957, when SACEUR, SACLANT, and CINCHAN submitted estimates of their requirements. The Standing Group worked these into a comprehensive report covering the years 1958 through 1963. In January 1958 it went for review to the member nations.³¹

The JCS concluded that the U.S. force tabulations in MC 70 accorded with service programs through 1 July 1961 and appeared to be "reasonable prognostications thereafter." As for the forces listed for other countries, the United States should take the position that these were militarily desirable, but that the approval of MC 70 by the United States did not commit it to provide equipment for those forces; this remained a matter for determination in connection with the Military Assistance Program.³²

The discussion of MC 70 now became involved with that of JSOP-61, then awaiting approval. Comptroller McNeil, reviewing the JCS comments, disagreed that the U.S. forces listed in MC 70 squared with service programs. This, he wrote, "does not reflect the views expressed by the Secretary of Defense in connection with the approval of JSOP-61 for planning purposes." McNeil also objected to the continuing requirement for the nine second-echelon divisions.³³ He feared that MC 70 would in effect freeze U.S. forces at their existing levels and foreclose the possibility of reductions. Apparently McElroy, in giving oral approval to JSOP-61, had spoken of a need to reduce forces.³⁴

McNeil's cautionary statements influenced an AFPC discussion of MC 70 on 4 March 1958. Quarles stressed that the United States should not provide forces in excess of NATO requirements. The nine second-echelon divisions were in such a category, being maintained by the United States for national purposes, and the fact should be clearly indicated in MC 70. Otherwise, other NATO countries might seek to follow suit and provide forces in excess of NATO requirements (for which, presumably, the United States would be expected to supply materiel through MAP). The AFPC agreed that the United States should approve MC 70 with the stipulation that the forces listed were not to be used to justify U.S. forces in excess of JSOP-61 or subsequent JSOPs.³⁵

In Paris, the Military Committee approved MC 70 on 13 March and the NAC followed suit on 9 May 1958. The force goals thus established for planning purposes are shown in Table 8.³⁶

The ground force goals in MC 70 assumed a German contribution of 5 2/3 divisions in 1958, rising to 12 by 1961. This accounted for the M-day goals in MC 70 being higher than the "firm" goals set earlier for 1955 and 1956 (Table 7 above). The ultimate objective (M-day plus first- and second-echelon forces) totaled just over 80 divisions for 1958 and almost 89 by 1963. However, the latter figure fell short of requirements by 3 2/3 divisions (although MC 70 was supposed to represent "minimum essential" forces).

TABLE 8
M-day Force Requirements in MC 70

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
<i>Army divisions</i>						
U.S.	5	5	5	5	5	5
Other	43	46	49	50	50	50
Total	48	51	54	55	55	55
Ground nuclear delivery units	40	58	85	112	132	135
<i>Navy ships</i>						
U.S.	228					272
Other	401		(not given)			474
Total	629					746
<i>Air Force (Squadrons/aircraft)</i>						
In Place						
U.S.	49/1054	47/1004	46/979	43/931	43/931	43/931
Other	174/3647	184/3800	190/3863	199/4011	199/3962	198/3871
Total	223/4701	231/4804	236/4842	242/4942	242/4893	241/4802
Not In Place						
U.S. only	32/534	25/432	23/396	23/396	23/396	23/396
Grand Total	255/5235	256/5236	259/5238	265/5338	265/5289	264/5198

The objectives for naval and air forces had also been scaled back. Any savings resulting from reductions in conventional forces, however, could be expected to be largely offset by increases in missile and nuclear delivery units, as shown in the table. On the whole, those who hoped that MC 70 would lead to immediate economy in military spending must have been disappointed.

The basis of MC 70—the NATO commanders' estimates of requirements—had taken no account of the launching of Sputnik in October 1957 or of the decision by the council in December 1957 to strengthen NATO's nuclear capability, as described below. Nevertheless the Military Committee, after considering these new developments, decided that the NATO strategic concept remained valid.

The discussion portion of MC 70 indicated clearly the role of NATO's "shield" forces—to contain and repel any lesser aggression and, in case of a

major attack, to hold until the nuclear counterattack had taken effect. It was important that there be no "gaps or soft spots" in that portion of NATO's forces. The introduction of IRBMs and nuclear missiles into the shield forces would materially aid NATO's deterrent power.

The force goals in MC 70 became the benchmark of the 1958 annual review. The JCS, in drafting the proposed U.S. reply, promised almost exactly the M-day forces in MC 70: 8 1/3 first-echelon Army divisions, 235 naval vessels, and 47 squadrons (1,004 aircraft) in place, plus 23-25 squadrons in the United States. The number of divisions planned for 1959 would remain the same through 1960 and 1961, although the type of division (infantry, armored, or airborne) might vary. Air Force goals for 1960 and 1961 would drop to 46 and 43 squadrons respectively. The JCS noted qualitative improvements under way or in the offing, including conversion of fighter units to the "Century" series of aircraft and of missile squadrons from Matador to Mace, which had better guidance and greater range.³⁷

McNeil objected that the JCS had "gratuitously" included the nine second-echelon divisions. Furthermore, the assurance that the number of Army divisions in NATO would remain unchanged through 1961 would make it difficult for the United States to make subsequent reductions. As a result, this assurance was deleted from the final U.S. reply.³⁸

For the moment, therefore, the United States would have no difficulty in meeting the goals set by NATO, but the likelihood in the future seemed doubtful. Quarles warned the NSC in December 1958 that "down the road further" the United States would fall "substantially short" of MC 70 goals, and other nations even more so. It would be necessary to seek a "political meeting of the minds" in NATO in order to meet military requirements.³⁹

The NATO Atomic Stockpile

"SHAPE planning since 1954," wrote General Gruenther to Assistant Secretary of Defense Gray in October 1956, "has been based on the assumption that NATO forces will be provided an integrated, NATO-wide nuclear delivery capability on an evolutionary basis."⁴⁰ The provision of such a capacity became increasingly important as the Soviet nuclear arsenal expanded.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 allowed the United States to make agreements with other countries, or with regional defense organizations, to supply information necessary for the following purposes: development of defense plans, training of personnel in the use of nuclear weapons, evaluation of nuclear capabilities of potential enemies, and development of compatible delivery systems. In June 1955 the United States entered into an agreement with NATO to supply such information. Transmission of information concerning the design or fabrication of weapons was forbidden.⁴¹

The growing importance of an integrated nuclear capability for NATO had been recognized in NSC 5602/1, which recommended relaxation of the Atomic Energy Act to permit the "progressive integration" of nuclear

weapons into NATO defenses, so that "selected allies" might use them immediately upon the outbreak of war. Presumably this objective would involve the supply of at least limited information on weapons design. The recommendation was to bear fruit two years later in the 1958 amendment to the act. Meanwhile, under an agreement that became effective in March 1956, the United States, United Kingdom, and France agreed to share with other NATO members their experience in adapting military organization and tactics to nuclear warfare.⁴²

The first nuclear capability in support of NATO involved only U.S. weapon systems. In 1952 the Air Force deployed B-45 bombers, equipped to operate with atomic bombs, to the United Kingdom. The following year the Army sent to the continent of Europe 280 mm cannon, Corporal missiles, and Honest John rockets, all of which could discharge nuclear as well as conventional ordnance. When the occupation of Austria ended in 1955, a part of the occupation force (some 5,000 men) moved to Italy and became the Southern European Task Force (SETAF), armed with Corporal missiles. Secretary Wilson characterized this as "the first specialized ground atomic force designed for use in support of NATO operations."⁴³

In 1957, to meet Norstad's expressed requirement for nuclear-capable forces to defend the Turkish straits, the Army proposed to organize two atomic support commands, similar to SETAF, for deployment to Greece and Turkey. The Army's budget for FY 1958 envisioned five such commands ultimately. This plan, however, gave way to one for supplying Honest Johns directly to Greece, Turkey, and other allied countries. Matador and Corporal missiles, both nuclear-capable, were also supplied to the allies.⁴⁴

Nuclear warheads for these weapon systems, by law, had to remain in U.S. hands. Each year the United States allocated nuclear weapons on the basis of requirements stated by SACEUR, who in turn distributed them to regional commanders. Positioned by EUCOM and in the custody of U.S. special weapons organizations, these weapons would be released to appropriate delivery forces on the outbreak of war.⁴⁵

For the British, under a different arrangement, nuclear weapons would be supplied directly to the RAF for coordinated U.S.-British air strikes. Although stored at British airfields, as on the continent they would remain under U.S. custody until released by presidential authority in an emergency. This agreement early in 1957 between Secretary Wilson and British Minister of Defence Duncan Sandys received the approval of President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan at Bermuda in March 1957.⁴⁶

It was natural that the European NATO countries did not want indefinitely to depend on nuclear weapons under U.S. control. In October 1956 General Gruenther warned OSD that "certain nations wish to have their own integrated atomic delivery forces" and might not be satisfied to depend entirely on the United States for this "critical support." Norstad, who succeeded Gruenther a few weeks later, would push strongly for a policy to make NATO a "fourth nuclear power."⁴⁷

The revision of basic national security policy in 1957 provided an occasion for considering expansion of the allies' nuclear role. The NSC Planning Board suggested providing nuclear weapons and warheads to allied countries, or alternatively, a sharing of custody and delivery capability under a NATO command. These would require a change in the law. The council agreed with Admiral Radford and AEC Chairman Strauss that it was not desirable to change the law at that time. The final policy directive (NSC 5707/8) merely stated that the United States would continue to provide advanced weapon systems, including nuclear weapon systems without their nuclear elements.⁴⁸

The first NATO ally to propose a new arrangement for handling nuclear weapons was France. The subject arose in April 1957, when the United States was seeking agreement for introduction and storage of U.S. nuclear weapons in France. French representatives proposed that NATO establish a "common stockpile" of nuclear weapons. French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau followed up this suggestion at the NAC ministerial meeting in May. He told Secretary Dulles that France would seek a formula allowing integration of nuclear weapons into French forces to compensate for the risk in allowing French territory to be used for storage of such weapons. Pineau thought that putting the weapons under control of SACEUR might obviate the legal difficulties of such a proposal. Dulles agreed to discuss the matter further.⁴⁹

In a letter to Wilson on 2 July, Dulles set forth his thoughts on the stockpile proposal. Opposing any attempt to amend the Atomic Energy Act at that time, he suggested that the United States go as far as possible within the existing law to assure allies that U.S. nuclear warheads would be readily available in case of hostilities. The United States (and perhaps to a lesser extent the United Kingdom) might maintain nuclear weapons at appropriate sites. These would be designated a "NATO atomic stockpile," but would remain under U.S. and British custody and control to be released only upon agreement in the NAC or in event of sudden hostilities when directed by SACEUR. Since the NAC acted only unanimously and SACEUR was a U.S. officer, requirements for U.S. control would be satisfied, Dulles noted, yet political benefits would accrue from giving the project "as much of a NATO flavor as possible." Dulles believed that these arrangements would be approved by Norstad, who had expressed vigorous support for the French proposal.⁵⁰

The JCS expressed strong reservations about a "Common Atomic Stockpile." They feared that it might prevent U.S. unilateral use of the weapons and imply a commitment to furnish an atomic capability to NATO nations. Many of the objectives of the proposal were already attainable under existing procedures, the JCS declared. Provision of a nuclear capability should be predicated on each nation's ability and willingness to use and maintain the necessary weapon systems and on the granting of atomic storage rights to the United States. To these ends, bilateral arrangements should be negotiated on a country-by-country basis.⁵¹

Instead of sending these conclusions to Dulles, Wilson wrote him that the stockpile proposal raised a number of questions that should be discussed between the departments. Dulles accordingly discussed the proposal with OSD officials on 5 September. He pointed out the anomaly of the United States training personnel of other countries to use nuclear weapons while withholding the weapons themselves. Following this meeting, Assistant Secretary Irwin asked the JCS to reconsider the matter in time for forthcoming discussions with NATO's secretary general, Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, who planned to visit Washington in the near future.⁵²

In reply, the JCS reaffirmed their opposition to the term "NATO Common Atomic Stockpile." They agreed, however, that political advantages might accrue from a better understanding within NATO of the procedures that could be established under existing law to provide nuclear weapons for NATO and offered to prepare a draft of such procedures to be used in bilateral negotiations for storage sites.⁵³

President Eisenhower did not follow this advice in his meeting with Spaak on 25 October, when in effect he endorsed Dulles's proposal for a stockpile under SACEUR. Dulles told Spaak that he recognized a growing allied demand for assurance that modern weapons would be available and would be used to defend NATO. He promised that the United States would try to present a suitable formula for their use at the December council meeting.⁵⁴

A few days later, the president met with Norstad, who remained in favor of the stockpile. After returning to Europe, Norstad sent the president his views on this and other matters before NATO. He thought that some formula might be devised whereby weapons furnished by the United States could be made available to NATO commanders "as authorized and directed by NATO."⁵⁵

One advantage of the stockpile proposal was that it might be used as an incentive to discourage the growth of independent nuclear capabilities and thus to halt or retard the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The opportunity arose in October 1957 when the NSC reviewed policy toward France, which aspired to become a nuclear power and was pursuing its program in that field; this disturbed some administration officials. The NSC agreed that the United States should seek to dissuade France from producing nuclear weapons and should explore the possibility of having nuclear weapons located so that, when the president directed, they could be rapidly turned over to NATO forces, including French components. The council thus gave a vote of confidence to the stockpile proposal and to the general objective of enhancing NATO's nuclear capabilities.⁵⁶

On 7 November 1957 Irwin asked the JCS to recommend procedures that could be established under existing law to provide nuclear weapons for NATO, as they had earlier offered to do. These would constitute the U.S. position at a meeting of NATO heads of government that would take place at the time of the December NAC session.⁵⁷

In their reply, the JCS made few if any concessions to the stockpile

proposal. They simply proposed to extend to other NATO forces (SACLANT and the Canadian and U.S. forces utilized in defense of North America, which was a NATO mission) the system used to allocate nuclear weapons to SACEUR. This extension would generate requirements "which must be shared by national authorities concerned." The weapons would remain under the custody of U.S. personnel. Other NATO nations would provide facilities for additional storage sites and assure their external security. These proposals had been reviewed and approved by General Norstad.⁵⁸

McElroy told Dulles that the JCS proposal would provide an effective means under existing law for establishment of an atomic capability within NATO forces. He intended to implement it in DoD. If the 1954 Atomic Energy Act were to be amended (a matter already under discussion within the administration), the system envisaged by the JCS would be reviewed.⁵⁹

Meanwhile the world had learned of the launch of the two Soviet Sputniks in October and November 1957. These events had a galvanizing effect on NATO's plans and programs, as they did on those of the United States. The NAC meeting in December 1957, the first after Sputnik, thus became an important turning point for NATO.

Nevertheless the offer that Dulles made to the NAC on 16 December was modest and did not go beyond what the JCS had recommended. He said:

The United States is prepared, if this Council so wishes, to participate in a NATO atomic stockpile. Within this stockpile system, nuclear warheads would be deployed under United States custody in accordance with NATO defensive planning and in agreement with the nations directly concerned. In the event of hostilities, nuclear warheads would be released to the appropriate NATO Supreme Allied Commander for employment by nuclear-capable NATO forces.

We believe that this arrangement meets NATO military requirements and insures that nuclear weapons can be employed promptly when needed.

Dulles touched on a number of other matters related to the stockpile proposal. He informed the council that the United States was prepared to make available IRBMs (which could carry nuclear warheads) to the allies. He endorsed a coordinated program of development and production of missiles and other modern weapons, such as Norstad had already suggested, and announced the administration's intention to seek legal authority to cooperate with other nations in the development of nuclear propulsion for submarines.⁶⁰

How far Dulles's stockpile offer represented an advance on the existing commitment for supporting NATO with nuclear weapons was not clear. It would presumably lead to a wider distribution of weapons, and their designation as a "NATO" atomic stockpile would provide some

psychological reassurance. Dulles said nothing, however, about allowing NATO to authorize use of the weapons, as Norstad had suggested. In any event, the other NATO members appeared satisfied, for the moment at least. The final communiqué released after the meeting announced that NATO would "establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defense of the Alliance in case of need."⁶¹

SACEUR determined that some 63 storage sites would be necessary, manned by 2,750 U.S. personnel, many of whom, even without the NATO stockpile, would be needed to support the additional U.S. nuclear delivery units and weapons that would be required. The next step would be to discuss further details with major subordinate NATO commands and with appropriate allied authorities, as well as to establish funding for facilities to be provided under the NATO infrastructure program.⁶²

The Eisenhower administration's May 1958 statement of national security policy (NSC 5810/1) looked toward further development of NATO's nuclear capacity, in keeping with Dulles's offer at the 1957 NAC meeting. The paper declared that the United States should continue to provide to selected allies nuclear weapons systems with the nuclear elements readily available, though necessarily under U.S. control. The United States should also assist allies to develop and produce "in concert, through NATO," their own advanced weapons systems (without nuclear elements). However, development of separate national nuclear capabilities should be discouraged. Finally, the United States should consider the long-term development of a NATO nuclear weapons authority "to determine requirements for, hold custody of, and control the use of nuclear weapons."⁶³

Very soon thereafter it became evident that the newly installed government of Charles de Gaulle in France looked with disfavor on the NATO stockpile idea. De Gaulle wanted a share in actual control of the warheads and was even more determined than his predecessors to make France into a fourth nuclear power. In order to head off this development, Acting Secretary of State Herter suggested in August 1958 that State, Defense, and AEC study the feasibility of a NATO nuclear authority, as mentioned in NSC 5810.⁶⁴

Accordingly, an interagency committee, with a chairman from the State Department and with ISA representing DoD, undertook to conduct the study. It held at least one meeting but apparently became moribund thereafter.⁶⁵ The study was never completed, and the issues of shared control of nuclear weapons and of French nuclear development contributed significantly to the widening breach between France and the other NATO countries in 1959 and 1960.

IRBMs for NATO

Secretary Dulles's offer in December 1957 to make IRBMs available to NATO came after the United States had already committed itself to supply

such missiles to the United Kingdom. The matter had been under discussion between the two nations for some time, beginning in 1956.

The IRBM, with its range of 1,500 miles, could be regarded as either a strategic or a tactical weapon. Both the Army and the Air Force had such missiles under development, designated Jupiter and Thor, respectively.* Use of the IRBM as a strategic weapon required deploying it close enough to strike targets in the Soviet bloc; this necessity dictated siting the weapon in other countries and possibly Alaska. In March 1956 the Air Force recommended beginning negotiations for basing IRBMs in the United Kingdom, Germany, Libya, Turkey, and several Far Eastern countries. A few weeks later the JCS listed for Secretary Wilson the most desirable locations: Turkey, Norway, the United Kingdom, Japan, Okinawa, and France. Less important were Pakistan, Greece, Crete, Iran, Taiwan, Denmark, West Germany, the Philippines, Spain, Italy, and Libya.⁶⁶

The United Kingdom appeared on both lists; unsurprising in view of the "special relationship" with that nation, it became the first choice. The British were developing a missile known as Blue Streak with a 2,000-mile range, but it was not expected to be ready before 1964. In July 1956 Air Force Secretary Quarles visited London and raised with British officials (who were receptive) the possible deployment of six or eight Thor bases on British soil to fill the gap until Blue Streak was ready.⁶⁷

In a discussion in the AFPC on 29 August, Air Force representatives proposed to establish bases in Britain for eight squadrons of Thors at a cost of some \$12 million per squadron. Army Secretary Brucker "heatedly" denied that Thor would be ready before his service's Jupiter, and recommended the latter. He opposed beginning negotiations with the British at once, fearing that to do so would prejudice the choice of the missile. Admiral Radford, reluctant to spend large sums on fixed sites, advocated simply turning the missiles over to the British, allowing them to prepare their own bases and supply the operating forces. The council postponed a decision while the special assistant for guided missiles, Eger Murphree, evaluated the relative merits of the Air Force and Army proposals.⁶⁸

In an interim report on 18 September, Murphree pointed out that Thor could be fired much more rapidly from its fixed bases than could Jupiter from mobile locations. In any case, he said, talks with the British should begin at once, since some sort of base rights would be needed for either missile. Radford's suggestion of British ownership of the missiles could be part of these discussions.⁶⁹

Robertson directed that formal negotiations with the British be postponed while Murphree's office further studied the relative advantages of fixed and mobile bases. However, the possibility of supplying missiles directly could be explored informally with the British at an "appropriate time." Concurrently, OSD officials would discuss the base proposal with the secretary of state and the president.⁷⁰

* The development of these missiles is described in Chapter VII.

During the ensuing weeks the matter was deferred, as the British received confusing signals from Washington. Robertson visited London in October 1956 and told Ambassador Winthrop W. Aldrich that the United States had abandoned the idea of placing IRBM bases in Britain as too costly, although he made it clear to British officials that the issue remained under discussion.⁷¹ The Suez crisis, which burst upon the scene at the time, probably contributed to further delay. After it passed, the president, eager to repair the damage to the "special relationship," saw an agreement on IRBMs as an opportunity to do so.

Discussion of the subject resumed at the NAC meeting in December 1956, when Wilson met with Anthony Head, British minister of defence. The two agreed to hold a conference in Washington in January to consider the IRBM proposal and other aspects of Anglo-American military collaboration. Head was shortly replaced by Duncan Sandys, but plans for the Washington meeting were not affected.⁷²

Air Force projections, as outlined to the NSC on 11 January 1957, envisioned an emergency Thor capability (six missiles) in Britain by February 1958 and four squadrons by 1960. This was too hasty for the State Department; it proposed that initial discussions deal only with the emergency capability, since more time was needed to consider the whole question of IRBM deployment. Wilson, however, favored beginning negotiations at once in order to obtain an initial capability as soon as possible. Moreover, he feared that with the passage of time British interest in U.S. IRBMs would diminish owing to their investment in Blue Streak.⁷³

The JCS supported Wilson. They recommended that IRBMs be provided the British at the "earliest practicable date" and that Wilson discuss the matter with Sandys during his forthcoming visit.⁷⁴

On the eve of the visit, Wilson told the president that the best way to establish an early IOC for the IRBM would be to deploy it to the United Kingdom. Production schedules, training requirements, and construction lead times would limit the number of operational squadrons there to four by mid-1960, with the first to be operational by July 1959.⁷⁵

Wilson did not press the president for a decision, and he and other DoD representatives went into the talks with Sandys without a definite position. Air Force plans called for deployment of the first squadron to the United Kingdom in April 1959, with an IOC three months later, and deployment of the other three between August 1959 and April 1960. All four would be turned over to British control by the end of December 1960. The JCS endorsed this plan as part of the U.S. position for the Sandys talks.⁷⁶

Sandys's visit to Washington lasted from 23 January through 1 February. Discussions ranged across a full range of topics, including IRBM basing, British financial troubles, and a possible reduction in the British NATO commitment.⁷⁷ In their first meeting with Sandys, Wilson and Quarles gave a broad idea of what the United States had in mind for missile deployment, but, as Wilson remarked, they were merely "thinking out loud." The British were thus left in some ignorance.⁷⁸

During subsequent discussions conducted largely by Quarles and other Air Force officials, the British pressed for a definite commitment, which the U.S. delegates could not give. In a meeting on 29 January, Quarles explained that his object was to set forth a "technical and practical" framework that could provide the basis for a definitive program. Sandys offered to have his advisers draft a summary of the discussions to be wired to London at once, so that he could obtain a preliminary reaction. Quarles agreed, but stressed that final arrangements must be made through diplomatic channels.⁷⁹

On 31 January the British submitted a draft proposal incorporating the four-squadron plan. The next day Robertson took it to the president, who rejected it. Eisenhower wanted a final decision withheld until his approaching meeting with Prime Minister Macmillan in Bermuda. Sandys did, however, take back one definite agreement. In a letter dated 1 February, Wilson promised that when an accord was reached on IRBM deployment, the United States would make available nuclear warheads on the same basis as for British aircraft.⁸⁰

After the British left, Robertson informed State that the position of DoD was clear: It was in the U.S. interest to establish as soon as possible an emergency IRBM capability in the United Kingdom, followed by the deployment of four squadrons on the basis of ultimate transfer of responsibility to the British. Since the British delegation had reacted favorably to this concept, it seemed advisable to prepare for an affirmative response at Bermuda so that the program could go ahead as soon as possible.⁸¹

Seeking to settle on a definite position by the time of the conference, OSD and State officials agreed that it would be unwise to place all the U.S. IRBM capability in British hands. A portion should remain under U.S. control to assure some influence over British use of the weapons and to avoid any suggestion of a bilateral U.S.-British deal to bypass NATO. Hence, initially, only the first two squadrons should be handed over to the British. It should also be agreed that the weapons transferred to the United Kingdom would be deployed only in that country to be used solely against the Soviet bloc in general war and against jointly determined targets. State and Defense recommended to Eisenhower that he adopt this position at Bermuda.⁸²

On the eve of the Bermuda conference, Wilson, Robertson, Quarles, and Radford met with Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy and with Lewis Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, to iron out various matters related to the transfer of IRBMs. They reached agreement that the missiles, minus nose cones and warheads, could be turned over to the British on the terms previously discussed, i.e., two squadrons to come under British control immediately, the others to stay in U.S. hands for the time being. Warheads for the missiles would remain under U.S. control, although stored in Britain. This was the proposal to be put to Macmillan.⁸³

In Bermuda on 22 March, just before his first meeting with Macmillan, Eisenhower reviewed the IRBM issue with Robertson and Quarles (Wilson

did not attend). Quarles told the president that the missiles were already scheduled for production. They agreed, however, that there would be no production for use (as distinct from testing), and no commitment to the British, until the weapon was clearly successful.⁸⁴

Macmillan and the British delegation then joined the Americans. Eisenhower assented in principle to a turnover of the weapon and proposed a public statement to this effect. Macmillan pressed for acceptance of the four-squadron plan; the president agreed only to discussions at the working level. The question of paying for the missiles came up. Possibilities included direct military aid, revival of the "lend-lease" plan used during World War II, or use of funds left over from "Plan K," a postwar arrangement by which the United States had financed production of British bombers.⁸⁵

Robertson, Quarles, and Murphy then met with Richard Powell, one of Sandys's advisers, to discuss the deployment. They agreed to proceed in three phases, beginning with a few missiles by mid-1958, then two full squadrons by July 1959 (manned by U.S. personnel until the British could take over), and the final two squadrons by July 1960, manned from the beginning by the British.⁸⁶

The final agreement, approved by the president and sent to Sandys on 18 April 1957, opted for Plan K funding. Deployment would take place as rapidly as possible, but no target dates were mentioned. The missiles would be deployed only in the United Kingdom unless mutually agreed otherwise. The two countries would coordinate operational use of the missiles and selection of targets.⁸⁷

There had still been no choice between the two missiles, Thor and Jupiter. In either case, however, deployment would take place under Air Force auspices. On 29 May Wilson authorized the Air Force to begin discussions with British service representatives on selection of sites for the missiles and warheads.⁸⁸

Not until 11 June did the British respond to the U.S. draft agreement. Sandys pronounced it acceptable but pointed to matters that required further discussion. These included details of funding; confirmation of assurance (given orally by Wilson) that the United States intended to pursue extension of the range of the IRBM to 2,000 nautical miles; provision of spares; assurances to the British regarding base siting and operational use of the missiles; and provision for review of the agreement after a specified period.⁸⁹

Settlement of these matters occupied some weeks. A sharp rise in cost estimates, from an original total of \$101 million (for both countries) to \$234 million, complicated the funding problem. In the course of the discussions, the objective of an emergency capability in 1958 was dropped, but it was still hoped to deploy the first squadron by July 1959. By mid-September 1957 all four sites had been selected, but other details remained to be worked out. As Quarles noted, actual preparation of bases could not begin until a choice was made between Thor and Jupiter, since the base requirements of the two were slightly different.⁹⁰

By this time another claimant for U.S. IRBMs had appeared. On 11 July 1957 General Paul Ely, chief of the French Defense Staff, discussed military needs with Admiral Radford. Alluding to the agreement reached in principle between the United States and the United Kingdom, Ely asked if France could obtain, by purchase if necessary, a similar weapon of perhaps 3,000-kilometer range. Radford suggested that the matter be taken up at the ministerial-secretarial level. Afterwards, Radford told Wilson that he had the "definite impression" that the French intended to push forward on this issue.⁹¹

Radford was right, although the French did not seem to be in a hurry. Two months later French Ambassador Hervé Alphand delivered a note to the U.S. Government asking for talks on the subject of IRBMs for France. With the concurrence of State, ISA referred the matter to the JCS.⁹²

At this juncture came the news of the Soviet Sputnik, which, among its other effects, shook the allies' faith in U.S. technical superiority. It became important to provide the NATO countries with weapons to relieve their feeling of defenselessness.*

Dulles told the president on 22 October that U.S. alliances were "approaching a somewhat precarious state." Prompt action was necessary on the proposed NATO atomic stockpile, on which, he said, the Department of Defense had been dragging its feet. Also, the IRBM agreement with the United Kingdom should be quickly concluded and then extended to other countries. He suggested a meeting of heads of government at the December NAC meeting.⁹³

A further stimulus to IRBM deployment came from the report of the Gaither panel in November 1957. This recommended every effort to have a "significant number" of IRBMs operational overseas by late 1958—a sharp contrast with the current goal of one squadron by mid-1959. The report did not suggest where the missiles should go.⁹⁴

General Norstad also began pushing strongly for deployment of IRBMs to the NATO area. In a letter to Eisenhower on 7 November, he noted that the question of missiles for the alliance should be dealt with "as a matter of some urgency." He suggested as a first step an announcement that the United States would make available Thor or Jupiter missiles to NATO in late 1958 or 1959 and that the United Kingdom and France would receive the initial allotment. The arrangement should be "a NATO activity rather than a series of bilateral arrangements." A second step, which Norstad considered even more important, would offer information to enable NATO to produce its own second-generation IRBM—perhaps Polaris, which, he thought, could probably be manufactured in Europe about as quickly as in the United States. The last step would establish a NATO agency to develop a third-generation missile.⁹⁵

Norstad discussed his ideas in Washington with McElroy and Quarles on 14 November. He compared the situation to the circumstances leading

* For Sputnik and the U.S. reaction to it, see Chapters V and VI.

to the creation of NATO and to the outbreak of the Korean War. Immediate measures were necessary; long-range promises would have little value. Norstad thought that the NAC should determine allocation of IRBMs after the United Kingdom and France. Quarles favored bilateral negotiations directly with the countries concerned; Norstad thought these should follow the initial allocation by the council. The conferees agreed on the importance of a presidential announcement of missile availability.⁹⁶

Writing to Dulles concerning the Norstad plan, McElroy thought it practicable to begin IRBM deployment during FY 1959—perhaps even as early as December 1958—and to accelerate a buildup to 13 squadrons for NATO (including the 4 promised the British) by the end of FY 1962. However, to reach these goals would require additional funds. McElroy suggested that the United States announce to the NAC the availability of specific numbers of IRBM units. After council approval, SACEUR would recommend deployments and locations, and the United States would undertake the necessary bilateral negotiations.⁹⁷

These proposals had not been formally submitted to the JCS, but had been cleared with Twining, who pronounced them “workable.” He had referred them to the JCS, already studying the IRBM problem in connection with the French request.⁹⁸

The JCS strongly endorsed that request on 14 November 1957. An agreement in principle to furnish IRBMs to France, they believed, would help to counteract the psychological effect of recent Soviet achievements. Indeed, such agreements should be made with any NATO nations determined by the NATO military authorities to be capable of using the missiles. But, they cautioned, France should not receive missiles at the expense of the United Kingdom. Quarles concurred in these views and forwarded them to Dulles.⁹⁹

The FY 1959 budget was now taking final shape, and the question of accelerating missile production became a lively issue. Meeting with the president on 22 November, McElroy won Eisenhower’s somewhat reluctant approval to add \$573 million for missile projects to the tentatively approved budget. This would probably make it possible to deploy a squadron in the United Kingdom before the end of December 1958 and would provide a basis for expanding the ultimate goal to 16 squadrons. Later that day, the program was presented to the NSC. Dulles thought it important to be able to announce at the December NAC meeting that the United States could make available to NATO one squadron of IRBMs (in addition to those committed to the United Kingdom) by the end of 1959—probably the earliest date that NATO would be ready to receive them.¹⁰⁰

The political importance of deploying missiles to the continent of Europe had caused a reversal in the roles of Defense and State: the latter now became the primary driving force, with Defense trying to brake the process somewhat. Eisenhower told Dulles on 22 November that he had been told that State was “pressing Defense to put missiles into Europe on an accelerated basis.” Dulles agreed that this should be done. On the same

day, McElroy told the president that he thought it unnecessary to "race to conclude further agreements," and that Defense would urge State "not to press us too hard."¹⁰¹

The JCS in particular worried that matters were being rushed. They told McElroy on 22 November that the activity in connection with preparation of position papers for the December NAC meeting was "somewhat precipitous, if not slightly frantic." They feared commitments that would adversely affect U.S. force structure and capability for unilateral action or lead to excessive dependence on the allies. Secretary Dulles responded tersely that "our objectives can be jeopardized as much by inadequate commitments as by excessive commitments." However, Dulles recognized the danger of pressing other countries too hard and publicly stated that the United States would not try to force its missiles on any country.¹⁰²

McElroy's long-awaited decision on the choice between Thor and Jupiter, announced on 27 November, ordered production of both and their deployment under Air Force command. He approved a deployment schedule calling for one squadron of each by the end of December 1958 and four of each by the first quarter of 1960.¹⁰³

On the same day, McElroy told a Senate subcommittee that use of the double production capacity would make it possible to deploy IRBMs to the United Kingdom by the end of 1958. Deployment elsewhere would follow as soon as arrangements could be made. Earlier, on 20 November, McElroy told a House appropriations subcommittee that the United States was considering deploying missiles to places outside of Britain, in Europe and possibly elsewhere.¹⁰⁴

McElroy had already asked the JCS to update their missile site recommendations. On 29 November the JCS proposed sending available squadrons, over and above those promised Britain, to Turkey, Alaska, Okinawa, and France, in order of priority. Other possible locations (not in order of priority) included Italy, Greece, Taiwan, Spain, and West Germany; also Norway, Denmark, Pakistan, and Japan if political objections in those countries could be overcome.¹⁰⁵

The U.S.-British IRBM talks moved closer to conclusion when representatives of the British Ministry of Defence visited Washington on 23-25 November. U.S. officials accepted a British proposal for a review of the agreement after five years and agreed to accept British representatives at bases under U.S. control. By the end of the meeting a final accord awaited only settlement of minor details.¹⁰⁶

Dulles told the NAC on 16 December that the United States stood ready to make IRBMs available for deployment "in accordance with the plans of SACEUR," subject to the agreement of each country with SACEUR and with the United States. He linked the offer to the proposed NATO nuclear stockpile, of which the IRBM warheads would constitute a part. The response was mixed, and no commitments were made. Nevertheless the council accepted the offer.¹⁰⁷

In bilateral meetings outside the council sessions, France received a

favorable reply to its request for IRBMs. Following a meeting on 18 December between McElroy and French Minister of Defense Jacques Chaban-Delmas, a working group was formed to discuss specific details, with Sprague of ISA heading the U.S. delegation. The French stressed that their government must have a role in the decision to use the IRBM. It was agreed that McElroy and Chaban-Delmas would meet again in a month or two to draft an agreement.¹⁰⁸

During the NAC meeting, Italian Minister of Defense Paolo Taviani approached McElroy with a request to station IRBMs in his country. McElroy replied that the request should be discussed with SACEUR; if he approved, bilateral negotiations between the two countries would be initiated.¹⁰⁹

After the meeting, the U.S.-British IRBM agreement moved ahead. A last-minute hitch developed when the British requested a provision in the agreement that, from the outset, the weapons would be manned and operated by British personnel. Prime Minister Macmillan raised the issue with Eisenhower, who referred the matter to State and Defense; Dulles and Quarles agreed to accept the amendment sought by the British.¹¹⁰

The basic agreement, concluded through an exchange of notes on 22 February 1958 between Under Secretary of State Herter and British Ambassador Caccia, provided that the United States would supply an "agreed number" of IRBMs plus training assistance. Launching of the missiles would be a matter for joint decision. Details spelled out in a working-level technical agreement on 26 June specified the number of squadrons (four), with deployment dates ranging from 31 December 1958 to 31 March 1960. Delivery of missiles to the United Kingdom began in September 1958; by the end of the year seven were in place.¹¹¹

The question of IRBM deployments to overseas areas remained the subject of discussion for some months. The JCS had recommended giving first priority to Turkey. The State Department disagreed and proposed to put France at the top of the list, owing to the importance of that nation to NATO.¹¹²

The JCS had, in fact, modified their earlier view. Noting the reaction to the U.S. missile offer at the December NAC meeting, they doubted that agreements with NATO countries could be reached by the time the missiles became available. Hence, they recommended deployment to Libya, in expectation of a prompt bilateral agreement with that government.¹¹³

When the last-minute delay developed in the agreement with the United Kingdom, Defense and State officials met on 12 February 1958 to determine what to do if British deployment plans were canceled or delayed. The Air Force was now tentatively planning three squadrons for France and one for Italy, presumably on the premise that preliminary discussions with these countries had already begun. It was agreed that discussions with France should proceed "energetically," through channels to be determined by State. Talks should also begin with Italy unless the impending elections there (scheduled for May) dictated postponement. Quarles also approved a suggestion by Twining to make

plans for a two-squadron missile complex (IRBMs or ICBMs or both) in Alaska.¹¹⁴

Following the meeting, Quarles asked the JCS to supply contingency plans to fill the gap if deployments in either Britain or France fell through. The JCS recommended that any squadrons thus made available be reprogrammed to other NATO nations, then to Alaska, Spain, Libya, and Okinawa in that order. These recommendations, submitted on 28 March, proved unnecessary; the agreement with Britain had already been signed, and negotiations with France dragged on so long that ample time was available to consider alternatives.¹¹⁵

On 4 April Quarles laid down responsibilities for IRBM deployments to NATO countries. State and DoD would have overall responsibility for negotiations to be conducted by the "country team" with the assistance of liaison personnel from the Air Force. The Air Force would negotiate technical agreements at service levels, program IRBMs for the Military Assistance Program, and train foreign nationals. Any IRBM squadrons deployed to NATO countries other than the United Kingdom would come under the operational control of SACEUR in peace and war.¹¹⁶

State advised OSD to defer discussions with Italy until after elections there. Greece was also to hold elections soon, and State indicated any proposed missile agreement would probably be exploited by leftist elements. Libya was not a possibility; no government in that country could accept U.S. missiles and remain in office. In Spain, the Franco government had at first seemed receptive, but now had second thoughts out of fear that missile bases would make neighboring Spanish cities vulnerable to attack. The Republic of China would probably welcome IRBM forces on Taiwan. West Germany could be expected to react negatively at first but might become more amenable with the passage of time. Norway, Denmark, Pakistan, and Japan were ruled out for political reasons.¹¹⁷

Discussions with France meanwhile proceeded. On 17 February Sprague told French Ambassador Alphand and a visiting French military inspection team that if an agreement could be reached by 15 April, a squadron could be deployed by the end of December. The agreement should not be tied to other subjects such as the NATO atomic stockpile or exchange of nuclear information. The ambassador agreed.¹¹⁸

Following discussions with General Ely, Norstad on 19 March informally submitted a draft agreement to French authorities. Two weeks later State reported that formal negotiations were expected to begin shortly. Already trouble loomed on the horizon from the shaky political situation in France, with unrest stemming from the long-drawn-out war in Algeria. Nevertheless, by the end of April plans were moving ahead to send an Air Force team to France to begin technical discussions with the French Air Force.¹¹⁹

Reexamination of the ultimate goals of the U.S. IRBM program in April 1958 led to a review of the deployment program. The Air Force pushed for 16 squadrons, as the Gaither panel had recommended. Quarles, fearing that "we might be going too fast in the IRBM program," approved only

12 squadrons: 9 Thor (including the 4 for the United Kingdom) and 3 Jupiter, these latter to be earmarked for France. Of the Thor squadrons, one each should go to Turkey, Alaska, and either Okinawa or the Near East. A target date of December 1958 was set for an IOC in France, with a full squadron by the following February. It was hoped to have the first squadron in Italy deployed by July 1959, with another a year later, and a squadron for Alaska by the summer of 1960. The NSC approved the 12-squadron goal but did not act on the deployment plan.¹²⁰

An Air Force technical team went to France and held discussions with their French opposite numbers on 12-15 May. They agreed on a deployment schedule for the three Jupiter squadrons to be completed by February 1960, but disagreed on two points: U.S. manning of the initial squadron and the extent of SACEUR's control.¹²¹

Just at this juncture, the French political crisis came to a head; the Cabinet was overthrown and replaced by an emergency regime headed by General Charles de Gaulle, the World War II hero. The consequences of this development for the IRBM negotiations and for other aspects of France's relations with its NATO allies are described below. The proposed IRBM agreement quickly became a casualty of the political change. By July 1958 Norstad had given up hope of an agreement with France and was looking toward one with Italy as soon as possible, with an ultimate goal of three squadrons there. Moreover, he believed that by September it might be possible to conclude an agreement with Greece. This would clear the way to installing missiles in Turkey, whose relations with Greece were growing increasingly acrimonious as a result of a dispute over the island of Cyprus, a British colonial possession with a mixed Greek-Turkish population. It would be politically impossible to offer missiles to only one of the two countries.¹²²

In August Norstad obtained approval from Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani for deployment of missiles, the squadrons to be manned for the first two years by U.S. personnel under a nominal Italian command responsible to SACEUR. However, a hitch developed over financing. The Italians felt it only fair that the United States pay part of the cost, since missiles in their country would contribute to overall Western defense. The State Department took the position that the United States should be reimbursed, either by Italy or by the NATO infrastructure program, for the cost of constructing the bases. Norstad, sympathizing with the Italians, recommended that construction costs be paid by NATO or borne fully by the United States. He warned that the same problem would probably arise with respect to Turkey and Greece.¹²³

The delay in reaching agreement with Italy, following the collapse of French negotiations, led to a reexamination of deployment schedules. Quarles told Twining on 20 October that he hoped an agreement with Italy for two Jupiter squadrons would come soon. SACEUR had expressed a requirement for 10 squadrons; DoD was currently using, for planning purposes, a schedule calling for 9 squadrons (4 in Britain, 2 in Italy, 2 elsewhere in

NATO, and 1 unassigned). However, production had been authorized for only eight (five Thor and three Jupiter). Quarles asked that the JCS reassess the deployment schedule and the requirement for 12 squadrons established earlier.¹²⁴

The JCS, in reply, recommended cutting back to eight squadrons. Nor did they recommend Italy as a priority location. Besides the four United Kingdom squadrons, they proposed one each for Turkey, Okinawa, and Alaska, and one for the NATO area, dependent on the conclusion of successful negotiations.¹²⁵

Norstad accepted the JCS eight-squadron recommendation but in effect asked for the entire allotment; he wanted one or two in Italy and one each in Greece and Turkey. He thought that the Italians would eventually come around on the matter of funding, but they would definitely require some assistance. He would take the initiative in negotiations with Greece and Turkey. France was definitely out; he did not propose to discuss the matter further with French authorities.¹²⁶

The eight-squadron goal was adopted for the 1960 budget. McElroy told the president on 28 November that four would go to the United Kingdom and one to Okinawa; the location of the others had not been determined. Eisenhower asked why the United States spent "billions" on missile systems for deployment in allied countries before determining whether they were desired. Quarles reminded the president that the State Department had requested a high priority for the IRBM and added that State was unhappy about the reduction to 8 squadrons, preferring to meet Norstad's full requirement of 10. This latter goal could be met by financing two additional squadrons through the Military Assistance Program if the countries involved desired them.¹²⁷

At this moment there occurred a minor "flap" between State and Defense on the matter of IRBM deployment in Europe. In a press conference on 13 November, McElroy, discussing the FY 1961 budget, suggested that IRBM programs (specifically Thor/Jupiter) might be cut back now that the ICBM was approaching readiness. "The further you go down the road toward an operational capability of the ICBM," he said, "the less interesting it is for us to deploy additional ones of the IRBM's . . ." Long-range missiles, he added, could be based in the United States, entirely under U.S. control and farther removed from Soviet striking forces.¹²⁸

A press story condensed McElroy's somewhat rambling and general remarks into a categorical statement that a reduced IRBM missile deployment was under consideration. This was potentially alarming for U.S. allies, and the State Department accordingly took it upon itself to put out an interpretation. McElroy's statements, according to State's press release, indicated no "departure from over-all U.S. defense strategy." There was "no lessening" of the intention of basing Thors and Jupiters in Europe.¹²⁹

McElroy, offended by what he considered State's interference in the affairs of his department, telephoned Dulles on 17 November, protesting that such interference was "strange." Dulles replied that the action was taken

while he was out of town and agreed that "it never should have happened."¹³⁰ The incident attested to State's extreme sensitivity to European opinion.

By the end of the year, deployment plans had changed again. Of the four squadrons left after meeting the British commitment, two were earmarked for Italy; the other two would be used to meet NATO requirements if SACEUR's negotiations succeeded. An agreement with Italy awaited only the settlement of some financial details.¹³¹

Coordinated Missile Production

As noted earlier, Norstad had envisioned European deployment of U.S. missiles as a temporary measure, to be followed successively by European production of a second-generation missile based on U.S. technical knowledge and a third-generation weapon developed entirely by NATO. Thus would the cohesion of the alliance be strengthened and its weapons production ability enhanced.

In suggesting joint production, Norstad was not breaking entirely new ground. The success of NATO's "Common Infrastructure Program" served as a dramatic example of what might be accomplished. Under this program, the Production and Logistics Division of NATO's International Staff supervised construction by member nations of bases, fuel storage facilities, communications installations, and other supporting works, with costs shared according to formulas approved by the NAC. At first the three major Western countries—the United States, United Kingdom, and France—carried the largest share of the costs, but by the end of the decade Germany was contributing more than any other European nation.¹³²

A few statistics illustrate the success of the program. In 1949 NATO had 15 airfields available for use. A decade later 140 additional airfields had been constructed or improved. During the same period, more than 25,000 miles of communication lines were added to existing civilian networks and almost 5,000 miles of fuel pipelines were laid.¹³³

NATO was slower to adopt the principle of shared weapons production. The first multinational weapons project within NATO, the G-91 Lightweight Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft produced in Italy and West Germany, began in 1954. A second, inaugurated in 1957, was a maritime patrol aircraft produced by Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and West Germany under a multinational consortium with financial assistance from the United States.¹³⁴

The United States supported these projects, and others on a bilateral basis, through the Mutual Weapons Development Program (MWDP), established under an amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1954. A Mutual Weapons Development Team, consisting of a director and representatives from each military department, was installed in Paris to manage the program. The team recommended projects to be undertaken and methods of sharing costs. End products were to be shared among all member nations.

As of January 1959, the United States had signed some 180 project agreements with participating countries.¹³⁵

The MWDP fitted in with the policy of OSD to encourage coordinated production of weapons in Europe for NATO forces while phasing down U.S. grant aid. It was administered by OSD with funding through the Military Assistance Program. By mid-1960 the United States had helped finance more than 200 MWDP projects in the amount of \$217 million, which represented about one-third of the total cost of the projects.¹³⁶

In another U.S. initiative, Secretary Wilson announced the "sample weapons program" at the December 1956 NAC ministerial meeting. Under this program, NATO nations were offered samples of United States weapons and production skills, provided they satisfied U.S. security requirements and were willing to share information with other countries. Short-lived, the program apparently accomplished little.¹³⁷

The next step derived from NATO's rising requirements for weapons, combined with the increasing cost of supplying them through U.S. military assistance. No single nation presented requirements large enough to justify investment in production facilities. "We were confronted with a choice," said William M. Leffingwell, OSD deputy director for military assistance, "between providing the necessary weapons from the United States at the expense of the American taxpayer, or making an all-out effort to foster coordinated production and procurement in Europe."¹³⁸

Not surprisingly, DoD chose the latter course. In 1957 Wilson approved assistance to NATO countries to establish a production base for modern weapons. U.S. officials in NATO prepared a list of seven tactical missiles considered most suitable for coordinated European production. All were U.S. weapons, although it was envisioned that missiles of European origin might eventually be included.¹³⁹

These plans were already in existence when Dulles, as earlier described, proposed to the NAC the establishment of a "coordinated program" of development and production of modern weapons, including IRBMs. The NAC appointed Ernest Meili, NATO's assistant secretary general for production and logistics and the senior U.S. civilian representative on the secretary general's staff, to coordinate the production program. Beginning in January 1958, Meili met informally with representatives of several European nations to discuss possible projects. At the same time, representatives of France, Italy, and Germany began meeting to discuss establishing a consortium to provide advanced weapons.¹⁴⁰

Through Meili's efforts, five companies—in the Low Countries, West Germany, France, and Italy—agreed in 1959 jointly to manufacture the Hawk, a low-altitude surface-to-air missile developed by the U.S. Army. Later the same year, companies in eight NATO nations agreed to manufacture the Navy's air-to-air Sidewinder missile. But neither of these projects yielded any finished products until several years later.¹⁴¹

Joint production of missiles that had already been designed and fully tested by the United States was of course much simpler than production

of a wholly new weapon. Norstad wanted a second-generation IRBM, meaning one that used solid fuel and was therefore more manageable and quicker to fire. No such weapon existed in 1957. The nearest was Polaris, which was on the horizon; hence Norstad had suggested it. But Polaris, although it used solid fuel, was designed for launching at sea and would have to be modified for land-based use. As time went on, other possibilities appeared: Redstone, an Army tactical missile, and Minuteman, being developed by the Air Force for intercontinental use. They too, however, would require modification. The choice of a missile as the basis for a European design, the amount and kind of U.S. assistance in modifying it, and the disposition of the finished weapons, whether exclusively for NATO or for individual countries—these matters consumed months of discussion, which ultimately proved fruitless.

Norstad's prediction in November 1957 that Polaris could be produced in Europe "just about as fast as it can in the United States" proved far wide of the mark. In a meeting in Washington on 18 January 1958, Norstad himself told Defense and State that the NATO countries were having "quite an argument over this." The Germans, French, and Italians, all planning second generation missiles, considered the United Kingdom a competitor. Nevertheless, he recommended pursuing the effort to develop a NATO missile.¹⁴²

The British Ministry of Defence in April expressed its fear that a solid-propellant IRBM might indeed compete with its liquid-fueled Blue Streak and questioned the ability of Europe to support two such complex systems. It recommended use of the Blue Streak adapted for storable fuel, but agreed with a suggestion by Sprague for appointment of a committee under Meili to oversee NATO's part in the production of an IRBM.¹⁴³ As envisioned by U.S. officials, the missile would follow the design of Polaris. When approved by NATO and accepted by the United States, it would become a MWDP project, with the Air Force as executive agent. Deputy Secretary Quarles took overall charge of the project.¹⁴⁴

One possible obstacle to using Polaris, pointed out by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Garrison Norton, was that its design was based on advanced and highly classified technology. Personnel security in some European industrial plants was weak, and design information might be compromised if released to permit Europeans to produce a similar missile. Quarles agreed that there might be aspects of Polaris that could not be released to other countries.¹⁴⁵

Quarles found himself in partial disagreement with Holaday, the director of guided missiles, who believed that only by using Polaris could the NATO project yield an operational missile before 1965. A chosen prime contractor in NATO, Holaday thought, could develop ground support equipment with U.S. technical assistance; ultimately this contractor might develop the capability to produce improved Polaris missiles under the MWDP program.¹⁴⁶

For Quarles, it did not appear feasible for Europeans to produce a

"Chinese copy" of Polaris, owing to technical difficulties such as differences in measurements, production methods, and the like. Thor and Jupiter could fill the gap while NATO was designing and producing its own missile. Moreover, if the United States supplied Polaris, it would probably have to do so at its own expense. Nor could Quarles see any justification for the United States to develop a land-based solid-propellant IRBM.

Quarles decided that the United States would proceed through channels with Meili to establish a NATO project. It would be up to the NATO countries to decide on a program for the 1963-66 period. U.S. assistance, through the MWDP, would include release of technical information, clearance of U.S. firms to collaborate with those in Europe, and, through grant aid, specialized material for the research and development phase (but not for production). State approved these "ground rules" for the project.¹⁴⁷

Meili had already drawn up his own proposal. It, too, would use Polaris, and envisioned four stages. First, the Europeans would design and produce ground equipment to adapt Polaris to land use. Second, the United States would provide an initial installment of Polaris missiles. Third, there would be a coordinated program to assist NATO countries in adapting surface ships and submarines to use Polaris. Fourth, if the demand were great enough, a European production program for Polaris (preferably an advanced version) would be started. These proposals would provide NATO with both a land-based and a sea-based missile capability.¹⁴⁸

Both Norstad and the U.S. permanent representative to NATO, W. Randolph Burgess, supported Meili's proposal. Interpreting U.S. proposals, as thus far made known to them, as a decision to withhold equipment and production knowledge, they contended that European countries would view such action as violating the promises made by Dulles and Eisenhower at the December NAC meeting and as a step away from the principle of interdependence. Echoing these sentiments, State asked Defense to bring its position more into line with Meili's proposal.¹⁴⁹

Quarles replied that although DoD did not propose to provide NATO with missiles manufactured in the United States, it would release all pertinent information (subject to legal limitations) needed by NATO to develop and produce a solid-propellant IRBM. In a note to Under Secretary of State Dillon, he explained, "We have never felt that there should be a solid propellant program in which U.S. manufactured missiles should be deployed in Europe." The object of the December meeting was to establish a NATO competence to produce a missile meeting European requirements. There would be no objection to NATO's use of Polaris so long as the United States was not required to furnish its own missiles.¹⁵⁰

Meeting in Washington with British Defence Minister Sandys in September 1958, McElroy and Quarles slightly modified the U.S. position. They agreed that a "Chinese copy" of a missile might be useful for NATO. Besides Polaris, Redstone and Minuteman would be considered as possible alternatives.¹⁵¹

Early in November a combined services team headed by Holaday went

to Europe to brief NATO officials on the characteristics of these three missiles. Holaday outlined three possible approaches for the European nations:

- (1) To purchase missiles produced in the United States and develop the launch equipment themselves. This would achieve an operable system by 1960-61 at an estimated cost (including the missiles) of \$200 million.
- (2) To manufacture a "Chinese copy" of a U.S. missile with ground support equipment at a cost of some \$500 million over a five-year period.
- (3) To design a completely indigenous weapon system drawing on U.S. know-how, requiring 8-10 years and around \$1 billion.¹⁵²

Norstad favored a "marriage" of Holaday's first and third suggestions, as did most of the officials who attended the briefings. A modest beginning along the lines of the first alternative would not obviate the concurrent initiation of a long-range program to develop an advanced European missile. The defense adviser in the office of USRO, John Haskell, pointed out another advantage of beginning in this fashion. If the United States supplied missiles at the outset, they would automatically come under restrictions on use and resale like other weapons thus furnished. In other words, the United States could insure that the missiles went to NATO and not to individual countries for their national programs.¹⁵³

At the end of 1958, the United States had made its position reasonably clear; any further proposals must come from the Europeans. During a visit to Europe in January 1959, Quarles modified the position slightly. He told Meili that while he continued to believe that the Europeans should produce their own solid-fuel IRBM, he might, depending on availability of funds, agree to some development support through MWDP and later support of production through the MAP. But any substantial support must wait until European production proposals, command structure, and deployment plans were firm.¹⁵⁴

De Gaulle Enters the Picture

The political crisis that boiled up in France in early 1958 stemmed from the long and indecisive rebellion in the French colony of Algeria. It had begun in 1954 and there seemed no end in sight. The ineffectual governments of the Fourth Republic had failed to put down the revolt. In May 1958 extremists among the French community in Algeria, supported by right-wing elements in France, including high-level military leaders, acted to avert the loss of Algeria to French control. They launched a revolutionary movement aimed at bringing back into power General Charles de Gaulle, France's hero of World War II and first postwar political

leader. The weak government in Paris capitulated. On 1 June 1958, de Gaulle was sworn into office as premier by a vote of the National Assembly, with emergency powers to rule by decree.¹⁵⁵

Charles de Gaulle was the man who had refused to accept as final the German conquest of France in 1940. Fleeing to London, he launched the Free French movement which rallied opposition to the occupation of France. When the Nazis were eventually driven from France, de Gaulle became provisional president. He resigned in 1946 and lived in retirement for the next 12 years, uttering occasional delphic pronouncements on the issues facing his country.¹⁵⁶

De Gaulle's accession seemed likely to prove a mixed blessing for France's allies. The prospect of a stable government under a strong leader, replacing the endless succession of prime ministers under the Fourth Republic, was naturally welcome. And as a man whose anti-Communist credentials were impeccable (he had helped to thwart efforts by the French Communist Party to seize power in postwar France), de Gaulle could be expected to support the overall Western policy of "containment." On the other hand, during World War II his rigidity and his inflexible devotion to the prestige of France had made him a prickly ally for Britain and the United States. Moreover, in 1954 he had used his influence to thwart the effort to create a unified army through the European Defense Community, which failed owing to French rejection.

President Eisenhower, who had a wide acquaintance with world leaders, had known General de Gaulle since World War II and was well aware of his beliefs and attitudes. De Gaulle's "unfavorable stance toward certain Western problems," according to Eisenhower, "was caused by an unwavering and understandable purpose: restoring the prestige of France." Eisenhower hoped that by "renewing old associations" and revealing "sympathetic understanding," he might induce de Gaulle to be more flexible.¹⁵⁷

Secretary McElroy, publicly at least, expected no difficulty in working with de Gaulle. He saw no need for "any change from our previous confidence in NATO as the support of our defense position in Western Europe." The fact that de Gaulle would rule "with some authority" should make it easier to obtain "decisive action from the French Government in support of common programs."¹⁵⁸

On 3 June the French permanent representative in the NAC told Norstad that there would be "no major or drastic changes in French policies." France would for a time be preoccupied with the Algerian question and constitutional reform. For that reason, he suggested that Norstad postpone his normal courtesy call on de Gaulle as the new head of government. Norstad agreed, but pointed out that he must have a "yes or no answer" very soon to the IRBM question. If none were forthcoming by 1 July, he would have to turn elsewhere. The French representative thought that the decision could be reached by then, but added that it was related to other matters like nuclear cooperation.¹⁵⁹

The State Department opposed Norstad's self-imposed deadline of

1 July. France had apparently viewed IRBM deployment as more valuable to the United States than to itself, and pressure on the issue might be exploited by the French to demand aid in developing nuclear weapons. Hence State recommended that Norstad ignore the IRBM in his early talks with de Gaulle. Norstad acceded to State's wishes. However, he advised OSD that although he did not know the "top level attitude" of the French Government on the IRBM, there was considerable enthusiasm for it at the "intermediate level." He had let it be known informally that, for practical reasons, the first continental IRBM squadron must go to some other country unless "positive progress" occurred soon.¹⁶⁰

Not until 24 June did Norstad get to meet with de Gaulle. He found de Gaulle more reasonable than he had been led to expect. The French leader strongly emphasized his support of NATO and declared himself favorable in principle to establishing atomic stockpiles and installing IRBM units in France. However, the French Government wished to define clearly the conditions under which the IRBM would be employed and to participate in decisions regarding its use. When Norstad pointed out that these decisions would rest with NAC, de Gaulle questioned the adequacy of such an arrangement. As for the nuclear stockpile, he added, France must also have a voice in its control.¹⁶¹

Dulles decided on a personal conference with de Gaulle. In anticipation of such a meeting, to take place in July, French Ambassador Alphand called on Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague. Alphand asked about the status of the IRBM project; Sprague replied that the United States was on record as favoring an agreement and that the matter was now up to de Gaulle. Deployment of IRBMs, Sprague added, should be determined on the basis of requirements and not tied to such other considerations as nuclear cooperation or location of nuclear weapons. Alphand said that France would seek a bilateral agreement for a joint U.S.-French decision to launch the missiles. Sprague could only reply that this "raised the most difficult question as to how an alliance goes to war."¹⁶²

Just before leaving for his meeting with de Gaulle, Dulles met with the president and Quarles. Dulles thought it important to demonstrate U.S. support for de Gaulle, who might be "all that stands between France and chaos." However, there was a limit to how far the United States could go. Regarding France's desire to become a nuclear power, Dulles said he had found Defense willing to go considerably further in supplying U.S. support than he was himself. However, he added, the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy wished to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to France. CIA Director Allen Dulles warned that France would become a nuclear power whether the United States liked it or not. The president remarked that he had always favored furnishing nuclear weapons to U.S. allies. Secretary Dulles and Quarles agreed that in minor ways the United States might offer to help under the existing law. It was agreed that the proposal advanced by de Gaulle for a "triumvirate" of the Western Big Three was completely unacceptable.¹⁶³

In Paris, Dulles met with de Gaulle on 5 July. "We covered the waterfront," he wired the president, "and although some differences of viewpoint emerged, there was no sharpness at any point." Dulles told the French leader that the United States sought means, within the limits of the law, to make nuclear weapons available to NATO. The United States stood ready to provide training in these weapons to French forces and to assist France in building a nuclear submarine reactor. Moreover, the United States favored a "broad concept" to preclude each NATO nation from feeling that it must develop an independent nuclear military program. On the subject of tripartitism, Dulles said that it was inevitable that great powers must play a dominant role in the world, but they must do so discreetly in order to avoid arousing resentment; the role could not be formalized.

De Gaulle agreed with the last point. However, he declared it essential that France play a greater part in NATO and in the world. France, he said, was determined to produce its own nuclear weapons regardless of the time and effort involved. He did not, however, press for U.S. assistance. He insisted that nuclear weapons for NATO, if stored in France, must be under French supervision. He believed also that NATO should expand its geographical limits to embrace North Africa and the Middle East, with command correspondingly reorganized.¹⁶⁴

During the next two months, discussions with the French lagged. Meanwhile, however, the 1958 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act opened the possibility of some cooperation with France in the development of nuclear weapons. OSD, AEC, and State agreed that the matter should be explored. The principal difficulty was the fear that classified information furnished France might be compromised. Hence the first step would be to examine French security arrangements to ascertain if they were satisfactory, obviously a matter to be handled with the utmost circumspection.¹⁶⁵

On 17 September de Gaulle dropped a bombshell. In a letter to President Eisenhower, he formalized his request for tripartite consultations on worldwide politico-military problems. Claiming for France the status of a worldwide power, along with the United States and United Kingdom, he argued that NATO, with its narrow geographic focus, was hopelessly outdated. He set forth his views of what should replace NATO, or at least supplement it:

It appears necessary. . . that on the level of world policy and strategy there be set up an organization composed of: the United States, Great Britain and France. It would be up to this organization. . . to take joint decisions on political questions affecting world security and. . . to establish and if necessary, to put into effect strategic plans of action, notably with regard to the employment of nuclear weapons. It would then be possible to foresee and organize eventual theaters of operations subordinated to the general organization (such as the Arctic, the Atlantic, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean), which could if necessary be subdivided into subordinate theaters.

The French Government, continued de Gaulle, "considers such a security organization indispensable," and "subordinates to it as of now all development of its present participation in NATO." He suggested that his plan be discussed immediately in Washington.¹⁶⁶ De Gaulle's message had the unmistakable imprint of handwriting on the wall.

The letter clearly signified that France intended to "freeze" all discussion of issues such as IRBM deployment and the atomic stockpile, holding them hostage, so to speak, to the demand for a "troika." In a meeting with Norstad on 8 October, the new French permanent representative to the NAC took the line that these issues would be quickly settled if progress were made in carrying out General de Gaulle's ideas about the French role in NATO. He blamed U.S. rigidity for the failure to reach agreement on the storage of nuclear weapons in France. Norstad rejoined that units in France under his command had no ready access to the nuclear weapons they required. As for IRBMs, said Norstad, he would say no more about the matter; the French themselves must decide whether they wished to proceed. Later the same day, Norstad upheld this position with French Minister of Defense Pierre Guillaumat.¹⁶⁷

A reply to de Gaulle's letter required decision at the highest level, involving also the British Government. British officials shared U.S. opposition to any formal tripartite arrangement but were willing to have informal three-power discussions of world problems. OSD was apparently not formally consulted in the drafting of a reply, but State officials informally conferred with ISA on the possibility of accommodating de Gaulle by enlarging the role of the NATO Standing Group.¹⁶⁸

Eisenhower's letter of reply on 20 October sought to meet de Gaulle's objectives while rejecting, as tactfully as possible, any formal three-power arrangement. He agreed that the threat to the free world was global and that policies must be adapted accordingly. To a large extent, however, this was already being done through NATO, SEATO, and various multilateral and bilateral arrangements. Also, consultation in NATO did indeed extend "well beyond the confines of the European area."

The president then set forth his objection to de Gaulle's proposal, namely, its probable effect on other allies. "[O]ur present procedures for organizing the defense of the Free World clearly require the willing cooperation of many other nations, both within and outside NATO," he wrote. "We cannot afford to adopt any system which would give to our other allies, or other free world countries, the impression that basic decisions affecting their own vital interest are being made without their participation." He recognized, however, that any alliance, to be useful, must constantly change. "I am quite prepared," he concluded, "to explore this aspect of the matter in appropriate ways."¹⁶⁹

The JCS had obtained a copy of de Gaulle's letter from the White House. On 30 October, acting apparently on their own initiative, they sent comments to Secretary McElroy to be considered in connection with preparation of a U.S. position in talks with de Gaulle. They concluded that

de Gaulle's proposal would constrain U.S. freedom in determining and carrying out policy. Moreover, the reaction from allied and neutral nations would adversely affect the U.S. worldwide defense posture. However, in order to demonstrate sympathy with de Gaulle, the United States should not reject his proposal "bluntly or directly." Instead, talks should be held to clarify the proposal and possibly to discuss alternatives. The U.S. position for these talks should recognize that de Gaulle would not accept the status quo and that there should be "increased liaison and consultation." ISA and State approved these recommendations.¹⁷⁰

Tripartite talks to explore de Gaulle's proposal, below the level of heads of government, took place in Washington on 4 and 10 December between Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy and the two ambassadors, Caccia of the United Kingdom and Alphand of France. They were inconclusive, dealing mostly with organization and an agenda for future meetings.¹⁷¹

French intransigence on NATO military matters had now become even more marked. France opposed a plan for an integrated NATO air defense as well as infrastructure projects required to implement the NATO atomic stockpile program. Norstad was convinced that the French attitude was attributable partly to a "spirit of nationalism," partly to a determination to push for acceptance of de Gaulle's proposals.¹⁷²

In mid-December at the NAC meeting, Dulles took the opportunity for a second meeting with de Gaulle. The discussion dealt largely with Berlin. De Gaulle expressed full support for a policy of firmness on this issue. He had no intention, he said, of trying to exploit the Berlin situation to advance his ideas on revitalizing the alliance. He expressed unhappiness over the failure of the United States to support France in the United Nations, notably on the question of Algeria. France, he said, would not "break" NATO, but would not add to her present contribution. Hence, under present conditions, France could not agree to IRBM bases or nuclear storage rights on French soil or to an integrated European air defense. Dulles could only suggest a further expansion of tripartite talks.¹⁷³

The first and principal item of business before the NAC in its December 1958 session was Berlin. This seemed to be approaching a danger point as a result of the Soviets' threat to abrogate unilaterally the postwar agreements governing the status of the city. At the close of its meeting, the NAC issued a special declaration that no state had the right to withdraw unilaterally from its international agreements and that the Soviets could not deprive the other parties of their rights or get rid of their own obligations.¹⁷⁴

Other issues were not neglected by the council. McElroy, addressing the body, stressed the need for other NATO countries to pick up a larger share of the defense effort. In a veiled threat, he warned that the administration's ability to justify future military assistance to Europe "will depend in large measure on the degree to which the Congress is convinced that our NATO partners are making every effort to carry their own equitable share of the defense effort." Moreover, U.S. aid would perforce go

increasingly toward financing new weapons rather than to maintenance of conventional forces.

McElroy also sought to advance, in a general way, the cooperative missile effort. "We continue strongly to support the concept of coordinated European production under the guidance of NATO," he said. "We shall continue to assist this development in the light of specific proposals originated by our European allies."¹⁷⁵

An important aspect of NATO's modernization was the integrated air defense that Norstad was seeking. The Military Committee debated at length a paper on the subject (MC 54/1); the French representative reluctantly allowed it to go forward to the council with a strong statement by SACEUR that there was no air defense for any individual country "except as a part of the whole." When the council discussed it in December, the French permanent representative stood alone in opposing it. He approved the idea in principle but wanted it studied further. There was no need for immediate action, he said, since the hardware for the system was not yet available. More ominously for the future, he added that the proposed regional air defense organization raised "political questions." The matter was laid aside for the time being.¹⁷⁶

The year thus closed with a large measure of uncertainty hanging over the future relationship between France and the rest of NATO. The advent of de Gaulle as a powerful force in European and world affairs foreshadowed the growing estrangement of France from NATO and the loosening of its military ties to the Alliance.

CHAPTER XVII

Western Europe, 1959-1960

During the last two years of the decade, the nations of the Western alliance found themselves increasingly squeezed between rising weapons costs and budget limits, jeopardizing the hope of attaining the force goals set forth in MC 70. Force modernization progressed, notably with the installation of U.S. intermediate-range missiles, but efforts toward cooperative missile production fell by the wayside. A proposal to establish a multilateral missile force, using existing weapons supplied by the United States, was barely underway by the end of 1960. At the same time the increasing tendency of France to go its own way cast a shadow of uncertainty over the prospects for a unified Western defense.

Force Level Trends

Through 1958 the United States had been able to promise forces that essentially met the goals established by NATO. The increasing difficulty of doing so in 1959 and 1960 affected primarily the Air Force. Although that service had generally been favored by the Eisenhower administration in budgeting, it found itself forced to pay the price for having earlier given high priority to NATO commitments.

Initial JCS recommendations for the 1959 annual review, submitted on 20 June 1959, were almost identical with those for the preceding year: 8 1/3 first echelon Army divisions (plus 9 in the second echelon), 248 naval vessels, and 47 air squadrons in Europe, with 23-25 in the United States. These forces would, as the JCS wrote, "basically meet the requirements for U.S. forces set forth in MC 70."¹

The JCS recommendations soon ran afoul of preliminary budget planning which gave the Air Force a target of \$18 billion in new obligational authority (NOA) for its "basic" budget, with a possible addendum of \$1.6 billion. Corresponding expenditure figures were \$18.3 billion and \$18.9 billion, respectively.² Even under the higher of these budget proposals, the number of air squadrons in Europe would drop to 32, 14 squadrons fewer than the 46 tentatively promised for 1960. Either of the 2 lower

budgets would require a reduction of 21 squadrons. "This situation is unacceptable from a foreign policy point of view," wrote Assistant Secretary Irwin. It would place the U.S. delegation in an untenable position at the December NAC meeting and might seriously weaken U.S. strength at the projected summit meeting with the Soviets already under discussion.³

In Washington on 4 November, Norstad vigorously protested the proposed Air Force cuts. When Eisenhower spoke of a need eventually to reduce U.S. forces in NATO, Norstad rejoined that the only way to do so was through some sort of arms control agreement with the Soviet bloc.⁴

Secretary Herter, also unhappy, asked McElroy whether the United States should renege on its commitment to keep 46 squadrons in Europe through 1960. It was clear that the question must go to the president for decision. Meanwhile McElroy tentatively approved \$17.2 billion in NOA and \$18.6 billion in expenditures for the Air Force.⁵

The question now became entangled with consideration of long-range policy toward the alliance. The first statement of NATO and related European regional problems since 1954 came up for discussion before the NSC on 26 March 1959. The president, however, ordered consideration of the subject postponed; the time was not ripe, he said, to discuss long-range policy toward NATO.⁶

The project lay dormant until October 1959, when it was revived at the request of the president. The State Department agreed to prepare a new draft for Planning Board consideration. In a briefing paper prepared for board discussion, ISA pointed to the possible repercussions of the FY 1961 budget in requiring reductions in NATO forces and the difficulty of examining long-range policy until the extent of these reductions could be determined.⁷

The State Department draft for the Planning Board provided no basis for any immediate reduction in U.S. NATO forces. Rather, it argued that NATO must build up to MC 70 force levels; only thereafter might it be possible to reapportion national contributions to the NATO shield. The Europeans would interpret any abrupt reduction of U.S. forces as a shift toward a "Fortress America" concept.⁸

The Air Force had by now readjusted resources against commitments and believed that it could reduce its shortfall in NATO forces to 8 instead of 14 squadrons. In preparation for NSC discussion of the State Department draft, Assistant Secretary Sprague suggested to McElroy that the Air Force again look to see if it could squeeze out money to support eight more squadrons in Europe.⁹

When the NSC discussed the State draft on 11 November 1959, McElroy took a cautious and somewhat ambiguous position. A level budget of \$41 billion required reduction in troop strength if forces were to be equipped with modern weapons. Overseas deployments were "extravagant" compared with keeping forces in the United States. However, he believed that the United States should maintain an "adequate" number of troops in Europe—perhaps two divisions. He agreed that now was no time to announce a reduction in ground forces.

McElroy said nothing about Air Force deployment, and the focus of discussion shifted to the Army. Director of the Budget Stans argued that \$200 million could be saved by bringing home 2 U.S. divisions, or \$400 million if the divisions were eliminated. If the NSC endorsed the conclusions in the paper before it, Stans felt that this decision would affect budgets for the next several years.

The president settled the matter. Despite his anxiety over the budget, he did not believe that any major reductions could be made during the current year, and probably not in the next year. However, he added, "we must not drift." He directed State and Defense to prepare an analysis of U.S. policy toward future roles and contributions of each NATO member as a basis for discussion with other governments.¹⁰

The NSC meeting produced no guidance concerning the Air Force commitment to NATO. The question was decided when McElroy discussed the budget with the president on 16 November. The proposed Air Force reduction, McElroy said, had become an issue between Defense and State, with the latter opposing it. McElroy cited the action of the French Government in refusing to allow storage of nuclear warheads in France, which provided additional justification for removing the Air Force squadrons from Europe. Twining added that the Air Force wished to withdraw them but that Norstad was "vehemently opposed." The president decided against any immediate reduction in Air Force strength, but ruled that no NATO commitments for any future year (including those for the annual review) were to be made without prior discussion in the NSC.¹¹

The Air Force received a final allotment for FY 1961 of \$17.7 billion in NOA. This sufficed for a total of 91 wings, instead of the 88 originally envisioned when budget planning began, and would enable the Air Force to meet its full MC 70 commitment of 46 squadrons for 1960.¹²

But the problem recurred the next year. On 14 June 1960 Secretary of the Air Force Sharp, looking ahead to the approaching 1960 annual review, warned Secretary Gates of a prospective shortfall of 8 tactical squadrons (159 aircraft) for NATO in 1962 and 1963. Since FY 1958, Sharp pointed out, the Air Force had absorbed reductions of 10 SAC wings, 27 air defense squadrons, and 22 tactical wings, while the NATO commitment had remained largely untouched. Moreover, MC 70 was already, in effect, under review, so that its goals were in doubt. For that reason, General White had suggested to the JCS modification of the 1960 annual review to delete the "provisional" and "planning" goals projected two and three years ahead (i.e., for 1962 and 1963). Limiting the 1960 Annual Review Questionnaire (ARQ) goals for 1961, Sharp wrote, would make it possible to postpone force reductions until after the study of roles and forces in NATO directed by the president on 11 November 1959 (which had not yet seen the light of day).¹³

White's suggestion to his JCS colleagues, that force projection for the 1960 annual review be limited to a single year, found no support. The other service chiefs considered it a binding requirement to submit proposals for

1962 and 1963, in accord with established NATO practice. The chairman, General Twining, thought that any attempt to alter procedures at that time would be "disruptive to NATO and politically unattainable." He recommended to Gates that the reply to the 1960 ARQ indicate 1962 and 1963 forces in brackets, presenting both the MC 70 requirements and the forces actually programmed.¹⁴

Gates directed the JCS to follow Twining's advice. At the same time, he wrote Herter recalling the president's instruction during the previous year's budget discussions that steps be taken to prepare the NATO allies for possible reduction of U.S. forces in Europe.¹⁵

The JCS recommendations for the 1960 annual review indicated that the Army and Navy would have little difficulty in meeting their basic MC 70 commitments. The Army would maintain 8 1/3 divisions through 1963. The Navy proposed 250 vessels in 1961, decreasing only slightly to 248 two years later, although there would be shortages in some types of ships, notably cruisers. The Air Force, however, could promise only 41 squadrons in 1961 and 33 in each of the next 2 years, against an MC 70 requirement of 43 in each year. The 1961 shortfall would consist of two transport squadrons, but in 1962 and 1963 the Air Force would drop two more transport and six fighter-bomber squadrons.¹⁶

In preparation for NSC discussion of these recommendations, Sharp gave Deputy Secretary Douglas a memorandum detailing the qualitative improvements that had been instituted, or would be by 1963, and arguing that the allies should carry more of the burden. To avoid the cutback of 6 fighter-bomber squadrons in 1962 and 1963, Sharp indicated, would require \$83 million extra and 6,000 more personnel in FYs 1963 and 1964.¹⁷

The council's review of NATO force levels on 1 August centered largely on the prospective shortfall of fighter-bomber squadrons. The members reached no decision; the discussion drifted off into other matters.¹⁸ OSD subsequently persuaded State that the proposed 1961 reduction was acceptable and that adjustments would reduce the shortfall to seven squadrons (five strike/attack plus two transport). On 20 August Gates wrote to Herter urging him to accept the resulting force.¹⁹

An AFPC meeting on 2 September, which Herter attended, considered the Air Force commitment along with the relationship of the FY 1962 budget (then in preparation) to foreign policy. White declared that the Air Force had reduced personnel and units to the limit. The NATO commitment had been regarded as "sacrosanct" while reductions were made elsewhere. Herter replied that, given the current political situation in NATO, he was "nervous about rocking the boat unilaterally." If the United States cut its forces, other countries would follow suit. He saw no solution except a complete review of MC 70. Twining responded that this was already in progress but probably would not be completed until the following spring. Army Chief of Staff Lemnitzer added that, in view of increasing Soviet strength, the result might be higher rather than lower force requirements. The meeting reached no decision.²⁰

Irwin suggested a compromise by which the Air Force would retain in Europe its full MC 70 complement of 21 strike squadrons but withdraw 3 squadrons of all-weather fighters. This would make a total of 36 squadrons, leaving a shortfall of 7. Gates agreed to consider this if the Air Force approved. Irwin then discussed it with Sharp and White, who accepted it with the condition that they be authorized to withdraw an additional all-weather fighter squadron then in Iceland.²¹

In the end, this proposal was actually improved upon. The Air Force was able to promise 42 squadrons for 1961 and 37 for the next 2 years. In each case the total would include five transport squadrons and five all-weather fighter squadrons. Overall capability would gain strength from introduction of improved aircraft (the C-130 transport and the reconnaissance version of the F-105), expansion of the Hawk missile force, and the expected availability of reconnaissance satellites. Thus at the end of 1960 the United States could maintain that it was essentially meeting the overall objectives of MC 70.²²

Extension of IRBM Deployment

At the beginning of 1959, with the deployment of Thor missiles to the United Kingdom well underway, there was also a prospect that Jupiters would soon be in place on the continent. McElroy told a press conference on 22 January that although no agreement with Italy had been signed, all questions had in effect been resolved. He spoke too soon; just at that moment Prime Minister Fanfani fell from office, to be replaced by a caretaker appointee. McElroy urged Dulles to have the agreement signed as soon as possible, lest it become necessary to begin negotiations again with a new government.²³

Fanfani's successor, Antonio Segni, tried to extract last-minute concessions. Arguing that Italy, by accepting IRBM bases, was making a greater contribution than any other continental NATO country and was also inviting Soviet attack, he asked that Italy's voice be heard in the "inner councils" of the West through participation in meetings between the Western Big Three and the Soviet Union. He also wanted "most favored nation" status with respect to custody and control of nuclear warheads. U.S. negotiators replied that, in the NAC, the United States had already proposed greater Italian participation, with little support from other countries. As for nuclear weapons, that was a matter governed by U.S. law, but if a different situation arose in the future, the United States would consider new arrangements with Italy. The Italians accepted these replies and signed an agreement on 26 March 1959 for basing two Jupiter squadrons in that country. Both squadrons were to be fully manned during 1960, the first initially by U.S. personnel, the second by Italian.²⁴

Negotiations with Greece and Turkey began in January 1959. Norstad offered a Thor squadron to each country, subject to formal negotiations at

governmental level. However, the State Department objected to an agreement with Turkey. In a conference with Quarles and other OSD officials on 6 February, Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy expressed fear of excessive numbers of U.S. personnel near Izmir and Adana, where there were already U.S. bases; he also saw a danger that the "Turkish temperament" might lead to unauthorized launchings. OSD officials replied that the location of the weapons was a matter for Turkish approval and that there were adequate controls on launchings. State estimated the cost of the deployment at up to \$120 million per squadron; Quarles thought this too high, but in any case, he did not think that cost should be the controlling consideration.²⁵

State's assistant secretary for policy planning, Gerard C. Smith, charged that the IRBM was of "dubious value" on technical grounds, though this was obviously a matter outside his competence. He proposed to have the weapon evaluated jointly by State, Defense, and Killian's office. McElroy criticized this suggestion, however, and State did not pursue it. McElroy saw no financial or technical reasons for not proceeding with deployments to both Greece and Turkey.²⁶

While State and Defense discussed funding, the Turks displayed eagerness to obtain the missiles. Turkey's permanent representative on the NATO Military Committee told General Twining that his government feared that the delay signified a change of U.S. policy. Twining reassured him on that point and urged McElroy to take the "strongest possible action" to obtain State's concurrence to begin negotiations.²⁷

The FY 1960 budget contained no money for construction of missile bases in Turkey or Greece. Under Secretary of State Dillon recommended to Herter that the program be started without designation of a specific source of funding. In the end, this was the course of action adopted—to begin negotiations and leave for the future the question of funding. Dillon suggested to OSD officials that the Greek and Turkish squadrons might be declared "surplus" and thus acquired at no cost to the mutual security program; the Air Force could then replace the lost funds through the regular appropriation procedure. Quarles and Irwin feared that this idea would be all too popular with the Bureau of the Budget, which might seize on it as an excuse to reduce future appropriations. However, they expressed willingness to consider it if necessary.²⁸

On 24 April Norstad received authorization to open formal negotiations with both Greece and Turkey. He was not to submit a draft agreement, since the terms would be subject to future modification.²⁹

Talks with Turkey advanced rapidly. By mid-September the Turks had accepted without change a draft agreement proposed by the United States. It was signed on 28 October 1959, with the site of the installation left for later determination. The squadron, initially manned by USAF personnel, would begin deploying to Turkey during the third quarter of FY 1961.³⁰

Negotiations with Greece ran into unexpected obstacles. That nation had become involved in a three-way dispute, involving Turkey and the United Kingdom, over the status of Cyprus. The issue was formally settled in February

1959 with an agreement that Cyprus would become independent a year later. Still, Greek military authorities told Norstad that internal problems must be resolved before Greece could accept IRBM deployments.³¹

Greece's apparent reluctance to accept U.S. missiles, along with the possibility of a strong Soviet reaction, aroused some concern in the mind of President Eisenhower. He wrote to McElroy on 3 June that the Soviets had publicly objected to the deployment of IRBMs in Greece. When the United States had offered missiles to NATO in December 1957, the president recalled, "we made our position absolutely clear that we would not try to induce any NATO nation to accept IRBMs for deployment in its territory." He posed some pointed questions for McElroy about plans, costs, personnel, and advantages to be gained.³²

McElroy replied that the plan for stationing a Jupiter squadron in Greece by the end of 1960 would require 1,000-1,500 troops above the current level of 1,650. He admitted that the Greeks did not initiate the request for the weapons. The advantage of deployment McElroy explained as follows:

Greece will provide IRBM coverage of many targets which cannot be reached by the U.K. Thor force. Further, it will provide another portion of the missile system with which we hope to ring the Soviet bloc. In this connection, the USAF does not consider that Greek bases are any more exposed than those being planned in the U.K., Italy, and Turkey. The relative smallness of Greece should not have any significant bearing on the achievement of proper base dispersion within the country.

Moreover, Greece appeared to be the only possible location in NATO for the third Jupiter squadron. The State Department supported the proposal as necessary to meet NATO requirements. The additional money required amounted to \$22 million in FY 1960 and around \$33 million annually for the next three years, to be provided from defense support, economic aid, and MAP. McElroy concluded by reminding the president that the deployment of IRBMs to Greece had been recommended by the JCS "as a matter of high priority."³³

Still not satisfied, the president, talking to Dillon on 16 June 1959, anticipated the problem that President Kennedy actually faced in the fall of 1962. Suppose Mexico or Cuba had been penetrated by the Communists and began receiving arms from them, he asked Dillon. The United States would take a grave view of any such step and would possibly resort to offensive military action. Perhaps, Eisenhower suggested, the United States might offer to withhold missiles from Greece as part of a deal with the Soviets.³⁴

The next day Eisenhower called in McElroy, Dillon, and Gray to express his reservations about putting IRBMs in "flank" areas like Greece, where the Soviets might view them as provocative and where they would be hard to defend. McElroy pointed out in reply that the offer of U.S. missiles to

the Western Europeans came as a response to Soviet threats to "obliterate" the region. Dillon cautioned against backing down under Soviet threats, but was agreeable to bargaining with the Soviets on the issue of missiles in Greece.³⁵

Evidently persuaded by these arguments, the president concurred that it would be acceptable to apply cautious pressure on the Greek Government. The State Department sent a rather ambiguous message, stating that the United States had no wish to press for an early decision on IRBMs if such action would be "embarrassing" to Greece, but that it was important to maintain a "firm position" in the face of Communist threats.³⁶

The Greeks apparently made no reply, and as the weeks passed Norstad decided that it would be simpler, cheaper, and just as effective to locate two squadrons in Turkey. After all, the offer to the Greeks had been made primarily to avoid offending them if missiles were placed in Turkey. With State-Defense approval, therefore, Norstad told the Greek Government that alternative deployment plans would be adopted unless Greece replied favorably within two weeks. Greece's foreign minister replied that the Cyprus issue must first be settled. On 14 September the Greek representative in the NAC formally advised Norstad that his government could not respond favorably within the two-week deadline and that Greece would not object to a second squadron in Turkey. Thus Greece was written off the list of prospective IRBM recipients.³⁷

The location of the putative eighth squadron was in fact becoming academic, since budgetary pressures suggested that it might never see the light of day. On 19 September Irwin asked Norstad's advice regarding possible cancellation of the squadron—a step that would save an estimated \$90-110 million in MAP costs.³⁸

In reply, Norstad recapitulated the major purposes of the IRBM program as he saw them: to maintain U.S. technical superiority in weapons, to fill the gap between the manned bomber and the ICBM, and to improve the deterrent capability of the free world. He felt that the IRBM deployment was achieving these objectives "with effectiveness and economy." Nevertheless, in view of the potential cost of the squadron (approximately one-quarter of the total annual MAP for Europe), he was constrained to vote for cancellation.³⁹

There now remained only the question of whether to cancel the fifth Thor or the third Jupiter squadron. BoB supported cancellation of the fifth Thor squadron, as did Gates and the president. Thus the IRBM program closed out at seven squadrons: four Thors, all allocated to the United Kingdom, plus two Jupiters for Italy and one for Turkey.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, installation of the Thor squadrons in Britain had proceeded on schedule. The first missile for operational inventory arrived by air in the United Kingdom in August 1958, and a full squadron inventory of 15 missiles by the end of the year. Facilities for the first squadron had been completed by April 1959. By the end of that year three of the four squadrons had been turned over to the Royal Air Force, and the British Government

had declared the system operational. All four squadrons were in place a year later.⁴¹

On the continent, the Italian Air Force took control of the first two launch positions in July and October 1960. By the end of the year 24 missiles and all ground support equipment had arrived in Italy. For Turkey, technical arrangements for deployment were completed in June 1960, with the IOC scheduled for May 1962.⁴²

The Jupiter deployment in Italy soon caused the administration to have second thoughts. AEC Chairman McCone, after a trip to Europe, told the president on 13 January 1961 that the missiles were being emplaced in "the heart of the Communist area" of Italy; moreover, they were so vulnerable that a high-powered rifle could knock them out. Gates agreed that Jupiter was of declining value and that its deployment was more symbolic than useful; still, to renege on the missile agreements would be politically difficult. Lemnitzer thought that since the missiles were already in Italy they should be left there, for a while at least. The president concurred.⁴³

Both Thor and Jupiter—cumbersome and slow-firing, dependent on unstable and dangerous liquid fuel—were in fact approaching obsolescence by the time they were in place. They never played a major role in U.S. strategy, except to the extent that they may have contributed to the deterrent or provided a measure of reassurance to the Europeans. The Thor complexes in Britain were phased out in 1963. The Jupiter bases in Italy and Turkey figured briefly in the international crisis of October 1962, when the Soviets sought to have them withdrawn in exchange for removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. By the end of the following year, they had been removed.⁴⁴

Should NATO Produce Its Own Missile?

The possibility that the NATO allies might manufacture their own intermediate-range missiles, as suggested by Norstad, had been under discussion since December 1957. The idea had been accepted in principle, but the details remained to be worked out.

In a meeting with Norstad in Washington in February 1959, Quarles indicated that the United States was awaiting a detailed proposal from the European working group set up under Assistant Secretary General Meili. Since the United States had no plans for a land-based solid-fuel missile with the necessary range, it would have to limit aid to provision of technical information and perhaps special components.* The United States might also consider "buying into" the European program through offshore procurement. But the U.S. financial commitment should be limited (perhaps \$50-100 million). Norstad generally agreed, except that in his view U.S. aid might run as high as \$200 million—enough to provide some completed missiles.⁴⁵

* A land-based version of Polaris had been under consideration since 1958, but it was not actively pursued. See Chapter VII.

When Quarles asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a military assessment of the NATO missile issue, they replied that NATO had a requirement for a second generation IRBM. They wanted no limitations on the military characteristics of the weapon (such as range or warhead weight) that might preclude attainment of an early operational capability. U.S. support should be limited to technical assistance conditioned upon commitments by NATO nations to provide launching sites and to introduce the missiles into their NATO (not their national) forces. The present U.S. policy of US/SACEUR control of warheads should hold firm.⁴⁶

The unexpected death of Quarles in May interrupted discussion of the proposal. Another delay resulted from diplomatic considerations, including plans for a conference of Big Four foreign ministers in Geneva to discuss arms control.⁴⁷

The proposal drafted by the Meili group called for NATO to establish a modest requirement (perhaps 100 missiles) to be assigned to SACEUR's operational control. Military characteristics of the missile would be established jointly by NATO and individual countries. The United States would agree that, after NATO's requirements had been met, the participating countries would be free to engage in subsequent production to satisfy national needs. If U.S. warheads were needed, they would be under U.S. control. Meili had discussed this proposal with French officials, who agreed to participate.

Meili brought his proposal to Washington in May 1959, just in time to discuss it with Quarles before his death. Quarles pronounced it "constructive" and encouraged Meili to pursue it further.⁴⁸

On receiving the Meili plan, the State Department asked USRO for an evaluation. USRO, in turn, asked Defense and State for guidance, which they could not give until they had worked out an agreed position, a process that was to require many weeks of discussion.⁴⁹

Meanwhile the Meili working group tentatively agreed on the following operational requirements for the proposed missile: range, 700-2,500 nautical miles; warhead yield, 0.5 megatons; maximum reaction time, 5 minutes; availability date, 1965, or 1968 at the latest. These features did not accord with the views of Norstad. He wanted an IRBM by 1963 with a range of 1,500 miles; he would not pay a premium in terms of either time or money for a longer range.⁵⁰

The Meili group's requirements created a problem in Washington; they would necessitate a wholly new missile, which could not be made available by 1963. A working group from ISA, DDR&E, and JCS considered the problem and saw only two alternatives. The first, which seemed the only way to meet the 1963 date, would furnish U.S. Polaris missiles and technical assistance, including tooling to permit the NATO countries either to proceed with follow-on manufacture of a version of Polaris or to produce a European missile meeting the Meili group's requirements. The second would accept the Meili requirements rather than those of SACEUR and make available technical information, contingent on

assurance that IRBMs produced by NATO would go first to meet NATO requirements.

The ad hoc group also ranged into certain questions of nuclear weapons policy related to the missile issue. They noted that the United Kingdom, France, and Germany were already informally discussing the development of second-generation IRBMs. However, the warhead for any such missile would be unwieldy and inefficient (weighing perhaps 3,000 pounds), unless the United States furnished assistance. This implied that the United States should do so in order to enable the Europeans to achieve a smaller and handier warhead. The group pointed out that U.S. nuclear and missile technology were wasting assets, since Britain and France would soon be able to produce their own weapons; hence the United States should use its leverage, while it lasted, to promote cooperation rather than separate missile developments.⁵¹

On 4 August Robert H. Knight of ISA sent these views to the JCS, asking their advice on a choice between the two alternatives. Underlying that choice, he pointed out, lurked the "fourth country" atomic weapons problem. Producing a second-generation IRBM for NATO would be greatly simplified if the United States changed its policy to allow assistance to selected allies able to produce nuclear weapons.⁵²

These complex questions occupied the JCS for more than two months. Meanwhile OSD and State sought to reach agreement on the Meili proposal. Meeting with State officials on 25 September, Irwin posed three alternatives. First was the Meili plan, requiring U.S. aid for a long-term European program (8-10 years) under which the first increment of IRBMs would be assigned to NATO, with subsequent production available for national requirements, at a cost to the Europeans of between \$500 million and \$1 billion depending on the amount of U.S. assistance. The second alternative would be to sell or give Polaris missiles to meet SACEUR's 1963 deadline, with the Europeans producing ground support equipment. No cost figures were given for this alternative. The third represented a variation on the first two. The United States would provide 30-50 Polaris missiles and technical assistance at a cost of some \$100 million. Remaining requirements, both NATO and national, would be met from European production. The cost to the Europeans of achieving an initial operational capability would be \$400-500 million exclusive of production cost. This program would also meet the 1963 deadline, assuming European production of Polaris without significant modification. Irwin did not indicate a preference among these three; he merely asked that State approve U.S. technical assistance for the NATO program. Dillon agreed to make every effort to reach an early decision.⁵³

Norstad favored Polaris as the only suitable missile certain to be available by 1963. The majority of fixed targets for Allied Command, Europe fell within a range of 800-900 nautical miles. From that standpoint, Pershing might be acceptable, but Norstad saw no reason to settle for it when a 1,500-mile missile would be available in the same time period.⁵⁴

Norstad also proposed a change in nomenclature. He would use the term "mid-range" missile to avoid the negative connotation of "IRBM" (apparently an allusion to the controversy engendered in some countries by the proposed Thor and Jupiter deployments). Moreover, it would help to distinguish the weapon from others. OSD approved the name change in January 1960, after it had been in common use for some time.⁵⁵

On 13 October 1959 SACEUR stated a formal requirement for a weapon with a range between 300 and 1,500 nautical miles and a warhead with a yield ranging between one kiloton and one megaton. The availability date of 1963 was of "paramount importance"; if necessary to meet it, a weapon with a shorter range would be acceptable if its range could later be extended. SACEUR would deploy the weapon in agreement with the nations directly concerned. He gave no estimate of the number of missiles required.⁵⁶

Two days later the JCS, replying to the ISA memorandum of 4 August, submitted their recommendations on various missile questions. As between the two alternative ways of meeting SACEUR's requirements, the JCS recommended the first, namely, furnishing missiles and aiding production of ground support equipment. Such an offer should be subject to certain stipulations: that the program not adversely affect U.S. programs; that NATO requirements be met before those of individual nations; that missiles be deployed in accord with NATO defense plans; and that representatives of participating nations, including the United States, evaluate U.S. solid-fuel missiles to determine the one most suitable.

The JCS believed that the United States should continue its general policy of seeking to discourage development of unilateral, nationally controlled nuclear weapons. They were willing to make an exception for France so long as the French program was in accord with NATO objectives.⁵⁷

With the December NAC meeting now approaching, the United States needed to have a proposal to present at that time. In a letter to Deputy Under Secretary of State Livingston T. Merchant on 25 November, the deputy secretary of defense set forth what became known as the "Gates plan," a distillation of various proposals that had been discussed earlier. In his letter, Gates recommended that the United States offer to supply 50 Polaris missiles through the military assistance program to meet the 1963 deadline. The Europeans would also purchase components to manufacture 30 more by 1965 and, with U.S. assistance, would manufacture ground environment and launch equipment. All 80 of these missiles would be assigned to SACEUR. U.S. cost estimates amounted to \$50 million for the missiles plus \$47.5 million in technical assistance for assembly of components. The remainder of SACEUR's requirements would come from a European production program.

Gates urged that State concur in time for presentation to the NAC in December. He acknowledged that by supplying missiles and components, the United States would be giving the Europeans the knowledge later to produce identical missiles on their own. But they would attain such

knowledge eventually, he contended, and the United States would retain some leverage if they did so with U.S. help.⁵⁸

Time did not permit State to reach a firm position on the Gates plan. Herter decided that the administration should simply tell the European NATO countries that the United States would meet the president's commitment made two years earlier and that it was "very close" to making a specific proposal. When the NAC met in December, therefore, Gates referred only briefly to the MRBM project, stating that it was "under intensive review" and that "high priority studies soon will be completed."⁵⁹

On 16 January 1960, State, in a letter from Dillon, in effect turned thumbs down on the Gates plan. State wished to limit U.S. participation in the MRBM program to the proposed \$47.5 million in technical assistance. If complete missiles were to be furnished the Europeans, they should simply be sold. Nor should the United States furnish technical or facilities assistance beyond that needed to meet SACEUR's requirements. However, if Norstad rejected these proposals, State was ready to explore other ideas.⁶⁰

The JCS had not been asked for an evaluation of the Gates plan, but their comments on SACEUR's formally stated missile requirements, furnished on 8 January 1960, bore on the ongoing discussion between Defense and State. General Lemnitzer, Admiral Burke, and General Shoup supported SACEUR's requirements, which they doubted could be fulfilled by a single missile system. General White found the requirements excessive and not achievable by 1963. He believed that the United States should select the missile to be provided NATO and determine the scope and cost of the program. His choice was Pershing, which did not yet have sufficient range, though this could be extended. Twining recommended approval of SACEUR's requirements; this would not commit the United States to any specific numbers or types of missiles.⁶¹

Gates sided with the JCS majority and approved SACEUR's statement of requirements. The next step was to choose between Polaris and Pershing. On 30 January Gates and JCS agreed to consult DDR&E about the feasibility of increasing the range of Pershing by 1963; if the prospects did not seem bright, then Polaris would be chosen.⁶²

The consultation with DDR&E apparently led to a conclusion that Polaris, Pershing, or Minuteman would be acceptable and that the choice should be left to NATO. Meanwhile, France, seeking to become the leader of any NATO MRBM consortium (or, if necessary, to "go it alone"), had organized an industrial firm that undertook negotiations with U.S. firms engaged in missile production. Such action was unacceptable to both State and Defense. ISA notified the contractors concerned to cease contacts with the French firm until the necessary political decisions had been made. To terminate any sales competition, ISA recommended, and Gates agreed, that the United States should settle on Polaris, confining future discussions to that missile.⁶³

Gates then proposed to the JCS that the United States make a definite offer to NATO on the basis of his plan of 25 November, using Polaris.

It should be predicated on the following conditions: the Europeans would develop and produce ground environment equipment; missiles would be deployed in accordance with SACEUR's plans; NATO requirements would be fulfilled before missiles were produced for national needs; and national missiles would be developed by agreement among the members of the producing consortium. The JCS endorsed this proposal, except that they refused to specify the use of Polaris; rather the Europeans should be allowed to choose the missile. They stipulated a further condition, namely, retention of warheads for the missiles in U.S. custody until released in accord with NATO plans, or by agreement between the United States and the country concerned.⁶⁴

After OSD and State discussed the Gates plan, Irwin orally gave Merchant the official DoD reply to Dillon's letter of 16 January 1960. In essence, this reaffirmed the Gates plan with certain conditions, including deployment of the missiles as determined by SACEUR. State in turn refused to budge from the 16 January proposal: to limit participation to \$47.5 million in technical assistance, aimed only at satisfying SACEUR's requirements. The deadlock seemed absolute.⁶⁵

State never made entirely clear the reasons for rejecting the Gates plan. The added cost—\$50 million in grant aid to supply Polaris missiles—was trifling considered against the total cost of the U.S. aid program. Apparently State officials wished to concentrate exclusively on meeting SACEUR's requirements, fearing anything that in their view might inadvertently encourage independent national missile programs.

The NATO defense ministers were to meet in Paris at the end of March and the beginning of April. On the eve of a State-Defense meeting to settle on a plan before then, Merchant posed the issue for Herter. "Our purpose," he wrote frankly, "is to make the least attractive offer to our European partners which will still honorably fulfill the president's undertaking. We would hope for its rejection and press for an early decision, so that in the event of rejection we can lay our production and financing plans so as to meet Norstad's requirement from U.S. production of the Polaris."⁶⁶

Further State-Defense discussions resulted in a compromise that offered NATO two alternatives. Under the first, the United States would sell the European countries Polaris missiles, to be under SACEUR's control, and would also consider deploying U.S. missile units to Europe. All missiles would be under the control of SACEUR. The European countries would produce launching equipment, with the United States furnishing technical assistance and possibly providing some components on a sales basis. State preferred this alternative, since it would meet SACEUR's requirement earlier and more cheaply than any other plan.

If NATO found this proposal unacceptable, an alternative would provide grant technical assistance, amounting to some \$20-25 million, and sell production facilities valued at \$25 million for manufacture of missiles and ground equipment. The NATO countries would agree in advance that production facilities set up under the program would be used solely to

meet SACEUR's requirements; also that deployment would be determined by SACEUR and that nuclear components would be stored in accord with NATO nuclear stockpile agreements.⁶⁷

Just before the defense ministers meeting in Paris, Gates and Irwin discussed the alternative U.S. proposals with the French and British ministers of defense. France's Pierre Messmer preferred the second alternative. British minister Harold Watkinson favored the first, but at the urging of Gates and Irwin he agreed not to reject the second.⁶⁸

From Paris, Gates essayed a last-minute effort to make the second alternative sound less negative. He telephoned Herter with a proposal to say that European production facilities would be devoted to meeting SACEUR's requirements "fully and first," instead of "solely." Gates felt strongly about this change, in which Ambassador Houghton concurred. Herter objected to the word "first," on the grounds that its inclusion would imply the right of Europeans to manufacture the missile on their own. Gates agreed to drop it.⁶⁹

Gates made the formal proposal to his fellow defense ministers at a closed session on 1 April. Messmer, the first to comment, reserved a final position but stated that France preferred the original Meili proposals. Watkinson favored alternative one, but wanted time to study the matter. The ministers postponed action pending consultation by Secretary General Spaak with member governments.⁷⁰

Spaak sounded out NATO nations and concluded that neither of Gates's options would be accepted by NATO. In June Spaak visited Washington and suggested selling a limited number of Polaris missiles to France in order to induce that nation to participate in the NATO program (even though he had no guarantee that de Gaulle would accept). Spaak found Defense less rigid than State. Gates, striving to show flexibility, pointed out that under the first alternative, there would be no objection to selling missiles to France after NATO's requirements had been met. Gates thought that Spaak's recommendations deserved serious consideration if they would substantially increase the likelihood of a NATO MRBM program and gain concessions from France.⁷¹ Norstad, however, disagreed with Spaak, strenuously opposing national missile efforts. Spaak's concession, he thought, might result in the breakup of the alliance.⁷²

In early July, after Spaak had returned to Europe, State notified him that the Gates plan would not be modified and asked him to postpone discussion of it because the United States wished more time to study "certain technical matters" affecting deployment. Spaak agreed but wrote to Herter that NATO was at a "crucial point." He feared "that Europe will not succeed in building its atomic force, that France will continue alone along the expensive road it has taken, and that the political cohesion of the Alliance will greatly suffer."⁷³

Spaak's prediction proved correct. The MRBM remained on Washington's agenda but was not pursued. De Gaulle made no effort to seek agreement; he had given up hope of doing so until after the forthcoming U.S. election.⁷⁴

Army Secretary Brucker meanwhile had sought to convince Gates that an extended-range Pershing, being lighter and more mobile, would be more suitable for NATO. Gates replied that the decision in favor of Polaris had already been made. Nevertheless, Douglas asked the JCS for a comprehensive study of worldwide MRBM requirements to determine the most suitable missile. Replying on 29 September, the JCS affirmed a requirement for a third generation MRBM adaptable for both land and sea deployment, with a range of up to 1,200 miles (or 1,500 if possible), to be available by 1965 at the latest. Provision of Polaris in 1963 would temporarily meet SACEUR's requirements, but this new weapon (which would also meet requirements of CINCPAC and CINCAL) was needed as soon as possible. A staff study by DDR&E confirmed that a new missile, if given liberal funding, could be produced by 1965; also that the extended-range Pershing would not be available by 1963.⁷⁵

These findings reinforced the decision in favor of Polaris, which continued as the focus of discussion of NATO's requirements. However, the MRBM project faded out of consideration and was eventually abandoned. The months of delay in getting it started had their effect. It had from the beginning been a U.S. initiative for which the Europeans showed no particular enthusiasm. By 1960 the progress of technology had brought to the fore what seemed a simpler and more promising alternative.

The Multilateral Force

The MRBM project had envisioned a missile jointly manufactured by the European Allies from a U.S. design. If Polaris were to be used, an extensive redesign would be necessary to adapt it for firing on land. As the submarine-based Polaris moved off the drawing board and became a reality, an alternative naturally presented itself. Why not use Polaris as it was, placing the submarines at the disposal of SACEUR, and perhaps having the European nations furnish crews for the vessels? This thought gave birth to the proposal for a NATO multilateral force (MLF), which became the subject of several years' discussion in NATO.*

A suggestion along this line had been offered as early as May 1957 by Sen. Henry M. Jackson of Washington. Looking ahead to the day when Polaris would be operational, Jackson stressed the importance of a mobile, concealed deterrent force that would have both military and political value.⁷⁶ Jackson's suggestion bore no immediate fruit, but it fitted the concept of a nuclear deterrent force controlled by NATO, which by 1960 had become the subject of discussion in the United Kingdom. Such a force would be more economical

* The expression "multilateral force" was not generally used in 1960; its first occurrence appears to have been in Herter's speech to the NAC on 16 December 1960 (see below). Until then, the proposed missile submarine force was usually referred to as a "NATO MRBM force." However, this phrase invites obvious confusion with the proposal described in the preceding section for a jointly manufactured missile.

than an independent British deterrent and might arrest the drift toward development of separate national deterrents.⁷⁷

The suggestion for a NATO deterrent force was picked up by the British Government. In February 1960 the British listed it as one of the matters on which they desired bilateral talks. The request caught U.S. officials unprepared. ISA recommended that if the subject came up during the talks, the United States should reply that it was not prepared to discuss the matter. Nor had SACEUR given it much consideration. Norstad thought there was no pressure within the alliance to move in this direction, but he was keeping an open mind on the issue.⁷⁸

At the talks in Washington in March 1960 the British, despite their earlier views, showed themselves lukewarm on the proposed NATO deterrent. Ambassador Caccia doubted that NATO required such a force. But, pressed by Merchant, he admitted that the United States and United Kingdom might have to consider a NATO strategic deterrent if the situation in NATO became "desperate." There the subject was temporarily dropped.⁷⁹

The first definitive proposal on the subject came from Ambassador W. Randolph Burgess, the U.S. permanent representative in the NAC. In a message on 27 March, he recommended establishment of a NATO nuclear strike force that would absorb as much as possible of the capabilities of Britain and France, with a substantial contribution from the United States. Such a force would have as its objectives to strengthen the overall deterrent, block a separate German strategic nuclear effort, and draw France back into the alliance. It would be specified that all the warheads would be provided through a NATO stockpile; that the force could not be used, nor elements withdrawn, for national purposes; and that in event of all-out Soviet nuclear attack, the force could be used by SACEUR without consulting NATO political authorities.⁸⁰

State officials seized on Burgess's suggestion and developed it further, proposing that the U.S. contribution to such a force consist of Polaris submarines deployed in the NATO area and possibly SAC forces in the United Kingdom. It would be an amplification of, rather than a substitute for, the NATO MRBM program under discussion. Multilateral control of the force was envisioned as a possibility. Over the next few weeks, State officials sought to get the idea accepted at departmental level before submitting it officially to Defense. They mentioned it to Irwin, who seemed favorably disposed.⁸¹

The idea of waterborne missiles seemed more appealing as the prospect of a land-based NATO MRBM force dwindled. Assistant Secretary of State Gerard Smith envisioned "cheap US missile-carrying surface or submersible vessels" stationed in international waters off Europe. An alternative would be a genuinely multinational Polaris force. "Mixed crews on individual vessels would seem practicable," Smith wrote, "in view of the small number of persons involved. Certainly the units could be of mixed nationality." Thus Smith, it appears, was the first to suggest what was later to be called "mixed manning" of vessels assigned to NATO.⁸²

A suggestion by the Rand Corporation for use of submersible barges was given the "deep six" owing to cost and doubtful technical feasibility. The Navy preferred submarines or merchant vessels, in that order; both were available and could be converted at reasonable cost. Another DoD study found that 300 missiles could be deployed to Europe, part of them in merchant ships, the rest on road- or rail-mobile units, at an estimated cost of \$817 million between 1960 and 1965.⁸³

Norstad had already been converted to belief in a ship-launched missile force. "From the military point of view," he told Irwin in a message on 8 July 1960, "a seaborne deployment of MRBMs offers certain advantages for some part of our proposed force." Specifically, he thought there would be an advantage in deploying the Polaris missile initially in the environment for which it was designed. MC 70 had already estimated a requirement for 10 missile submarines. He did not, however, wish to rely exclusively on seaborne deployment, preferring a mix of land- and sea-based missiles.⁸⁴

Up to this point the discussion of a seaborne NATO missile contingent had remained vague and unfocused. The man who offered it as a specific proposal was General Twining. At a State-Defense meeting on 2 August 1960, Twining suggested the commitment of five Polaris submarines to NATO to supply at least a part of SACEUR's first increment of missiles. Norstad, who was present, endorsed the idea so long as the submarines would be truly under his control. Irwin felt that the proposed European MRBM program should first be settled. Norstad agreed; it would be unfortunate, he said, if the assignment of Polaris submarines to NATO provided the Europeans an easy "out" from a cooperative missile development program.⁸⁵

Twining's proposal soon won ready acceptance. How he hit upon the precise number of five submarines is not clear. Probably it was because the total complement of missiles in such a force would be 80 (16 per submarine), the number stipulated in the Gates plan.

Twining did not borrow his proposal from the Navy. After the meeting on 2 August, he discussed it, apparently for the first time, with Burke (who had not been at the meeting), adding the suggestion that the submarines in question might be manned by British, French, or Italian crews. State Department officials, according to Twining, had "jumped at" this idea; no doubt they had already heard it from Assistant Secretary Smith.⁸⁶

The JCS discussed Twining's suggestion with Norstad on 3 August. Lemnitzer was cautious, citing the concern already expressed by Irwin and Norstad that it might play into the hands of those who opposed the land-based NATO MRBM. Precisely for this reason, Norstad said, the submarine offer should be tied in with an agreement by the Europeans eventually to supply their own missile.⁸⁷

At the request of ISA, the Joint Chiefs considered how to provide the submarines for SACEUR—whether by diversion from the current Polaris program or by increasing production. Offering no conclusions, the JCS recommended that the decision be made within the context of JSOP-66.⁸⁸

Secretary Gates modified Twining's proposal. Concerned about cost, he would furnish the submarines to individual countries (France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Italy) on a five-year loan basis, to remain under NATO command. An alternative suggested by Burke would furnish the submarines on a 50-50 cost-sharing basis, the vessels to remain with the European countries indefinitely.⁸⁹

Twining's proposal had not thus far been discussed with the State Department. State had under way at that time a study of the future of NATO by Robert R. Bowie of Harvard University, former director of State's Policy Planning Staff. By August 1960 his report was nearing final form. It would provide a major stimulus to the idea of a multilateral force.

Not unnaturally, Bowie devoted the greater part of his study to the military problems facing NATO. One of his recommendations called for a separate NATO strategic force under the command of SACEUR—preferably one based on ships. Recognizing the advantages of Polaris, Bowie proposed that to provide an interim NATO deterrent the United States deploy Polaris submarines, with U.S. crews under full control of SACEUR in peace and war. Whether Bowie borrowed this idea from Twining, or vice versa, is not known; most probably it emerged in the course of interagency discussions as the Bowie study advanced.

Bowie conceived that the NATO submarine force would fire its missiles (1) on direct order from SACEUR in event of a large-scale nuclear attack; (2) as the NAC might direct in other circumstances; (3) as the United States decided, in the absence of a decision by SACEUR or the council. The number of submarines might reach as many as 12 or 14 by the mid-1960s. If desired, merchant vessels or conventional submarines might be substituted. Warheads would remain under U.S. custody during peacetime.

This interim force, in Bowie's thinking, would eventually be replaced by a NATO deterrent force (NADET), a multinational submarine fleet with common financing and ownership and with mixed crews so that no individual country could withdraw ships. Employment of the force might be directed by SACEUR, under advance authorization to deal with nuclear attack, or by NAC decision in other contingencies, as with the interim force. Bowie envisioned these ships as a substitute for the land-based MRBM force under discussion. They would be less conspicuous, he wrote, and hence more politically acceptable—"out of sight and out of mind."⁹⁰

Bowie transmitted his report to Secretary Herter on 21 August 1960. Five days earlier he had discussed his conclusions with the president. He stressed that under his proposal, the submarines offered to NATO for the interim force would be committed irrevocably. Noncommittal at the time, the president later told the NSC that Bowie's ideas deserved "serious consideration."⁹¹

In another conference with the president on 12 September, Bowie, along with Norstad, discussed the general question of NATO nuclear capability. Norstad proposed that the United States turn over an agreed number of warheads, with title passing to NATO, under custody of U.S. personnel who,

it would be understood, would respond to NATO direction. The United States would retain a veto power over use of these weapons through its membership in the NAC. This concept differed from Bowie's, which would assign the weapons to NATO but have the United States retain the unilateral right to fire them.

As for the proposed submarine force, Eisenhower thought that it would be several years before the United States had enough Polaris vessels to spare any for NATO. Bowie replied that they need not be assigned at once; the need was to "lay out a program now." He suggested that the president put forth the plan for a multilateral force and "throw his weight completely against any acceptance of the national approach."⁹²

On the following day, Norstad and Bowie met with Gates, Douglas, Irwin, and the JCS. They agreed on the need for a multilateral force, beginning with Polaris submarines, that would be over and above the proposals for a European MRBM. Norstad insisted on the need for some land-based missiles also; the Europeans would demand them. He explained his concept of the use of nuclear weapons, under which they would be turned over to NATO but would remain in U.S. custody. When Douglas asked how NATO would exercise its control over these weapons, Norstad admitted that the reply "could never be very clear," but that it should be possible "to proceed under multilateral control with about the same flexibility as can be obtained under existing arrangements."⁹³

Aided by State officials, Bowie drafted a specific proposal to implement his recommendations: assignment of five Polaris submarines to NATO by 1963 and another five to seven by early 1965, none to be withdrawn without NAC consent until a successor force was established. This force would be organized, owned, and controlled on a multinational basis, with multinational crews. These proposals were intended to supersede the MRBM offer (or rather two alternative offers) presented to the NATO defense ministers in April.⁹⁴

At a 14 September meeting, Bowie, Gates, and Herter accepted the need to meet SACEUR's initial requirements (approximately 80 missiles), but they differed over the proportion between sea-based and land-based and the exact nature of the control arrangements. Differing understandings of what had been agreed on led to an interdepartmental tussle that was to persist for some weeks.⁹⁵

The difference of views emerged clearly when Irwin and State representative Foy Kohler sought to prepare a joint paper on the proposal to implement the Bowie recommendations. Their paper, containing split views, went to Gates on 27 September. Both agreed on an offer of five Polaris submarines, for use under the three conditions specified by Bowie: on order from SACEUR, by direction of the NAC, or unilaterally by the United States. Defense, however, reserved its position on the last provision. They further agreed that other NATO governments should contribute an additional 100 MRBMs. These would become part of a permanent force, organized on the basis of multilateral ownership and control. State wished

to specify multilateral manning as well; ISA, although willing to accept this "to the degree considered operationally feasible by SACEUR," thought that practical and political difficulties would render it impossible. State proposed that the subsequent European contribution to the permanent force should be seaborne, in submarines or surface ships. ISA wished this question left open in view of Norstad's stated requirement for a mixture of land- and sea-based missiles.

The paper specified that NATO should undertake "additional vigorous measures to strengthen its other forces." State had wished to insert specific reference to NATO's conventional "shield" forces, a matter on which Bowie's report had laid considerable emphasis. In Irwin's view, this would amount to a prejudgment in favor of that portion of Bowie's report before it had been considered by either State or Defense. Further, it would have raised the entire question of a limited war in Europe in a document "wholly inappropriate for proposing a new NATO strategy."⁹⁶

Although the ISA position in the paper supposedly reflected Gates's views, Gates reacted negatively. According to one source, Gates was inclined to limit the entire proposal to an offer of five submarines, without multilateral "trimmings." Such an offer represented a considerable sacrifice, which Gates was willing to make, but not at the price spelled out in the paper.⁹⁷

Irwin sent a copy of the paper to Norstad, who pronounced it "very good," while leaning toward the ISA position on the disputed issues. However, he proposed the term "MRBM strike force" instead of "NATO deterrent force," in order to make the proposal more palatable to the Europeans by implying that it was simply a part of the normal process of updating weapons.⁹⁸

In preparation for an appeal to the president, State and Defense drafted position papers on the matters in contention. These revealed a deep-seated difference in outlook and also a tendency to attribute extreme views to each other. The Defense paper, prepared by ISA, charged that State sought to slip through a change in NATO strategy by earmarking the MRBM force "as a new element tacitly agreed by the U.S. as a NATO permanent strategic deterrent force." As evidence for this charge, it cited State's proposal for multilateral "ownership" (although Irwin had accepted that word in the 27 September draft) and for mixed manning, also State's suggested title, "Missile Deterrent Force." ISA feared that if State's views prevailed, "other far-reaching modifications in NATO strategy will probably be set in train." ISA had no objection to a review of NATO strategy if done properly; indeed, this was being accomplished in the long-range studies of NATO being carried out by State, Defense, and the NAC. A major objective of the program, according to ISA, was "to stimulate other NATO nations to make their fair contribution to a modernized NATO force." This view perhaps underlay State's feeling that the version supported by Defense would tend to enhance separate national missile programs.

The ISA views were shared by the JCS and by SACEUR, who, according to the ISA draft, "is apprehensive of confining these new weapons to a strategic role." ISA believed that they should be considered part of the "shield" forces,

replacing tactical aircraft, and not committed rigidly to a strategic role.⁹⁹

State's view of the basic issue was set forth in a memorandum from Assistant Secretary Smith to Under Secretary Merchant:

1. Do we want to create a truly multilateral NATO missile force, with which we could—if we wished—eventually engage in multilateral nuclear sharing? Or

2. Do we want to create national (including German) MRBM forces committed to SACEUR, in order to beef up NATO's tactical missile capabilities as quickly as possible?

Smith urged presentation of the matter in these terms at the outset to the president, who had already shown that he leaned toward the multilateral view. If the questions were considered piecemeal, they might be resolved on narrow technical grounds and State might lose.¹⁰⁰

State's position was clearly influenced by the Bowie report, which stressed the importance of a conventionally equipped shield force. Hence State wanted the (nuclear-armed) MRBM force to be considered part of the strategic deterrent and labeled as such. The title of the proposed force thus assumed considerable importance. ISA envisioned it as a replacement for tactical aircraft and thus a part of the process of updating the shield force, though available also for strategic use. At issue was the extent to which NATO should prepare for large-scale conventional action.¹⁰¹

Gates and Merchant submitted the matter to the president on 3 October. Gates, opening the discussion, recalled that the MRBM proposal made earlier to NATO had never been acted upon. Also, he noted that NATO had strategy under review in connection with the study of its long-range future. Pending the results of such study, the present question simply concerned a weapons matter. Merchant did not take issue with this statement, which had the effect of focusing the discussion narrowly on the specific proposal at hand: to create an interim force by turning over five U.S. Polaris submarines, to be followed by creation of a permanent NATO force, presumably by procurement of Polaris missiles. The president approved this proposal, and discussion shifted to the question of mixed manning. Eisenhower foresaw various practical problems of training, leadership, and discipline; Gates cited others involving national psychology and religious differences. However, Gates thought it possible to have "a few riders of various nationalities" on each submarine. He recognized State's fear that national crews might withdraw their vessels on orders of their individual government, but added that such action would mean the end of NATO. On this understanding, Merchant accepted the position favored by Defense, that manning should be mixed only to the extent considered feasible by SACEUR.

The president directed that planning proceed "on an urgent basis." The next step, he observed, would be to take up the proposal with Spaak, then with Congress, which would have to approve at least the second stage. As

for financing, he suggested that Defense might budget for two additional Polaris submarines in FY 1962. The meeting then adjourned and Gates, Irwin, and Merchant assembled in Goodpaster's office to iron out remaining differences in the wording of the proposal.¹⁰²

On the same day, presumably after the meeting with the president, Dillon presented the proposal to Spaak, who was then in Washington. Spaak foresaw problems with NATO "ownership" of the weapons and found it difficult to envisage the procedure for a NATO decision to use them. Meeting with Gates the next day, Spaak again spoke of problems in implementation; Gates replied that the proposal was "far from being in final form." Spaak had met with the Standing Group the preceding day and found that the French and British members of that body seemed to think that the choice of the missile remained in doubt. Gates, "with some heat," replied that as far as the United States was concerned, the question had been settled in favor of Polaris.¹⁰³

During October the JCS twice expressed their views on the multilateral force, first in a paper dealing with nuclear sharing. They affirmed their conviction (as they had on other occasions) that the United States should assist France to develop a nuclear weapons capability. They set forth acceptable arrangements within NATO for the custody and control of nuclear weapons, including their release to and employment by national forces committed to NATO in accordance with NAC-approved procedures. Addressing the proposed MLF, they considered mixed manning of ships impracticable. Multilateral ownership might be feasible if it meant that each nation would own a number of multilaterally financed MRBMs. "Common" ownership of the force would seriously reduce its effectiveness and lead to a divisive debate over how to use it.¹⁰⁴

Subsequently the JCS reviewed the proposal drafted by State and Defense after the 3 October meeting with the president. They disagreed decidedly. General White believed that provisions in the draft providing for use of the force by order of SACEUR were inconsistent with the recently expressed JCS recommendations on the use of nuclear weapons in NATO; none of his colleagues agreed. White also wanted a statement inserted that mixed manning was impracticable and might lead the allies to ask that the concept be extended to U.S. forces committed to NATO. The draft provided that the subsequent MRBM force would consist of Polaris missiles, probably to be deployed at sea. White and Army Chief of Staff General George H. Decker objected that this ignored SACEUR's need for a land-based missile. Burke favored the paragraph as written, pointing out that Polaris was already available and could if necessary be configured for land deployment. Chairman Lemnitzer expressed no views.¹⁰⁵

The JCS, as Irwin observed to Gates, appeared to be thinking of a grouping of separate national forces under NATO control—a view "completely at odds with that of the State Department." Irwin believed that the United States should maintain a veto over the use of the interim force, but should agree to advance delegation of authority to SACEUR to use the permanent

force. But here, as Irwin admitted, a constitutional question arose: could the president delegate prior authority to SACEUR to expend U.S. weapons?¹⁰⁶

In a discussion in Gates's office on 20 October, OSD officials agreed that the United States would for the time being retain a veto over the use of weapons committed to NATO but that in the future (presumably after the permanent MRBM force came into being), they might be used without a veto. Subject to this stipulation, NATO-committed weapons might be used on order of SACEUR in accord with procedures approved by NAC, or by the United States in self-defense. These conditions of use of the interim force appeared in the Bowie report and in the State-Defense draft of the MRBM proposal following the 3 October meeting.¹⁰⁷

At a meeting with Herter on 4 November, Gates and Douglas proposed a major change in the draft agreement on the multilateral force. They would now eliminate the three conditions under which the interim force might be used, since these would require congressional action and would in effect involve a loss of U.S. control over the interim force with no quid pro quo. Defense believed that existing command procedures should apply to the interim force; the five submarines committed to NATO should be on the same basis as the Sixth Fleet. State at first wished to retain the provision for use on SACEUR's order; this would allay possible European doubts regarding a U.S. response to an attack. After further consideration, however, Herter agreed to place the interim submarine force on a basis with the Sixth Fleet. There remained points of difference between the two departments, notably over the question of a U.S. veto over use of the force. Some of Herter's advisers (but not Herter himself) opposed presentation of the proposal at the December NAC meeting; they wished to wait until Congress and the newly elected administration could be consulted. Irwin, on learning of this attitude in the State Department, expressed great annoyance to Gates. The points raised by State to justify the delay, he wrote, had already been "thoroughly understood and discussed." State, he believed, sought to delay a decision on the MRBM proposal so that it could be submitted to the incoming Kennedy administration.¹⁰⁸

Gates told Herter on 16 November that the United States must take some specific action at the December meeting. He urged presentation of the full proposal for an interim force of five submarines and subsequent development of a permanent force. Herter thought that the United States should make the offer general, without going into detail. How could a specific offer be presented without assurance that it represented the position of the incoming administration? Gates rejoined that President-elect Kennedy would in any case not give his approval and that the United States would be "neglecting our duty" by failing to present a proposal.¹⁰⁹

Following the meeting, representatives of Defense, State, and AEC redrafted the proposal in preparation for an NSC meeting to be held the following day. They still disagreed on the organization of the permanent multilateral force. State wished this developed on the basis of "multilateral ownership, financing and control" (as stated in the version approved by the president

on 3 October). Defense favored multilateral "control," with the question of ownership and financing left for later. Norstad, consulted by cable, cast his vote for the State position.¹¹⁰

During the NSC meeting on 17 November in Augusta, Georgia, the MRBM proposal entered into discussion of the overall subject of "NATO in the 1960s." En route, Gates, Herter, and AEC Chairman McCone had discussed the nature of the proposal to be made to the North Atlantic Council. At the meeting Herter quickly yielded; it "would not hurt his feelings," he said, to make a firm offer. The State Department version of the redrafted proposal was approved with a notation that the United States would not participate in the multilateral financing of the permanent MRBM force; also with amendments making it clear that any European procurement of missiles would be by sale and that European countries were expected to take parallel measures to strengthen their forces.

Budget Director Stans raised questions about the cost of the MRBM force. Gates estimated this at approximately \$750 million for the five submarines and their missiles. Stans urged that the proposal be conditioned on reduction of other NATO requirements. Irwin replied that since NATO had no defense against enemy missiles, it was urgent that the United States supply offensive missiles as soon as possible; failure to do so would "fracture the alliance."¹¹¹

After the meeting, Stans, ever persistent, proposed that the record of action specify that the commitment of five submarines be contingent upon actions by other nations to strengthen their defenses. The president tentatively agreed, but others objected, and the matter went before the council again on 1 December. The Stans amendment of the MLF proposal was rejected, but the question of the presentation to the NAC was reopened. Dillon, just returned from Europe, reported that British officials with whom he had talked opposed the submission of a detailed proposal, as had Burgess and Norstad. Dillon therefore felt that it should go forward merely as a "concept." Herter should make the offer of five submarines, to be used under current procedures governing national forces made available to NATO, and would express the "hope" that NATO would consider an additional force of 100 missiles, with U.S. assistance. Dillon had talked with the chairman of the congressional JCAE, Rep. Chet Holifield, who had approved this idea.

Gates was not at this meeting. Dillon had already obtained Gates's consent to his revised approach, but Irwin felt that Gates should be consulted regarding any changes in the agreement made at the 17 November meeting. At Stans's suggestion, Irwin agreed to discuss with State officials new wording to smooth over the difficulty.¹¹²

Not surprisingly, this informal meeting produced no result, since the disagreement went beyond phraseology. "We have now reached another impasse with State," Irwin reported to Gates. State believed that the only firm proposal to be made to the NAC would be the offer of five submarines, with no link between these and a European contribution. Consequently,

Irwin doubted that the latter would ever materialize. The proposal for a permanent force had been diluted to a mere "concept" for future consideration, with little incentive for the Europeans to establish it.¹¹³

In the end, Gates and Herter agreed on a statement for presentation to the NAC that would use the word "concept." They confirmed this at an NSC meeting on 8 December. Stans held out for conditioning the submarine offer on improvement in European forces, but the president overruled him.¹¹⁴

The groundwork for the presentation to NATO had already been laid. Herter and Gates separately discussed the matter with Spaak in Washington in late November. Spaak, who favored the proposal, compared the multilateral force to the old European Defense Community treaty. Dillon and Irwin toured Europe and briefed France, Britain, and West Germany.¹¹⁵ State and Defense shared the responsibility for informing key members of Congress. McCone discussed the proposal directly with JCAE members; he also formally notified the chairman, Sen. Clinton P. Anderson.¹¹⁶

Herter's final statement to the ministerial session of the NAC on 16 December gained the approval of Secretaries Gates and Anderson (Treasury) and the president. Addressing NATO's requirements for mid-range ballistic missiles, Herter said:

We suggest that the Alliance consider creation of a special kind of force to operate this weapons system. As we conceive it, such a force would be truly multilateral, with multilateral ownership, financing and control, and would include mixed manning to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR.

A suitable formula to govern decision on use would have to be developed. . . .

As an initial step, and to meet SACEUR's MRBM requirements for 1963, my Government offers to commit to NATO before the end of 1963—as an interim MRBM force—five Polaris submarines having a combined capability of firing eighty missiles. During this interim phase, these submarines would operate in accordance with existing procedures. . . . In taking this step, we would expect that other members of NATO would be prepared to contribute approximately 100 missiles to meet SACEUR's MRBM requirements through 1964, under the multilateral concept which I have already indicated. The U.S. would be prepared to facilitate NATO procurement by sale of Polaris missiles and of the necessary equipment and vehicles for deployment in such a multilateral force. It would seem desirable that this force be deployed at sea. Our concept contemplates that the five U.S. Polaris submarines would be a contribution to the multilateral force upon its establishment and that there would be made available under U.S. custody nuclear warheads for the Polaris missiles.

Decisions on NATO MRBM requirements beyond 1964 and how such requirements should be met should be considered subsequently, taking into account the prospect for new weapons and conclusions reached in the process of NATO long-term planning.¹¹⁷

State had thus won its objective. The multilateral seaborne force had been pared down to the five submarines, with the subsequent permanent force relegated to an indefinite future. SACEUR's requirement for land-based MRBMs seemed to have vanished, given the "desirability" that the permanent force be sea-based.

Clearly the United States had no intention of pushing for immediate adoption of the "concept." "There was very little discussion of it," Herter told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a few weeks later, "because we did not want any discussion of it until we had an opportunity for having it looked at much more thoroughly, both by our allies and by the incoming administration."¹¹⁸

The European nations could hardly be expected to embrace the "concept" eagerly, since a new U.S. administration, which might have its own ideas, was about to step onto the stage. The communiqué after the NAC meeting stated that the council took note of the proposed multilateral force and instructed the permanent representatives to study it and "related matters" in detail.¹¹⁹

Herter's statement that the United States would "expect" other members of NATO to contribute 100 additional missiles did not suggest such action as a necessary condition of the offer of the submarines. After the meeting, however, State officials told the JCAE that the two actions were in fact linked. Herter had underscored this point during discussion of the final communiqué, when he said that the offer of 5 submarines and the European contribution of 100 missiles constituted a single "package." In Paris, however, Norstad and Burgess continued to believe that the initial five submarines would be committed to NATO regardless of whether a multilateral force came into being or the additional missiles were provided by the Europeans.¹²⁰

The vagueness of the U.S. offer reflected the difficulty of Defense and State in agreeing on its details. If U.S. officials were uncertain about its terms, their European counterparts were even more so. News stories from Paris stressed their confusion. As one reporter wrote:

By mixing up a promise, a plea and a warning, wrapped up like a program (which it is in no position to deliver) the Administration has left the NATO allies of the United States with only one clear thought: the hope that the painful transition period during which the Eisenhower Administration leaves office and the Kennedy Administration arrays its foreign policy objectives will be as brief as possible.¹²¹

Skybolt, Polaris, and the United Kingdom

In relations between the United States and other countries concerning nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom held a separate place. That nation had already produced its own independent nuclear force, and had thus achieved "substantial progress" within the meaning of the 1958 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act. Any measures that improved the British deterrent would enhance the overall power of the Western alliance.

During 1960 the United States considered the possibility of equipping British long-range bombers with a U.S. air-to-surface missile, Skybolt. The matter became entangled with a proposal to base U.S. Polaris submarines in Britain, where they would have easy access to the northern approaches to the Soviet Union. The discussion of these two issues occasioned a measure of confusion in U.S.-British relations not seen since the Suez crisis four years earlier.¹²²

The U.S. Air Force began developing Skybolt in 1958 with a view to extending the effective range of SAC bombers. From the beginning the weapon was designed to be compatible with British aircraft.* The British Ministry of Defence had particular interest in Skybolt as a substitute for their Blue Streak missile. This had encountered difficulties and was tentatively abandoned in February 1960. A few days later, the British inquired about the possibility of acquiring Skybolt by 1965. They also indicated interest in acquiring Polaris missiles and perhaps the submarines as well. Their request for these weapons grew out of discussion of a broad range of issues in 1959, which the British proposed to resume in March 1960. In that spirit, the British indicated that they had under consideration a U.S. request for berthing facilities in Scotland for Polaris submarines.¹²³

The possibility of berthing Polaris in the United Kingdom had been discussed informally in 1959 by officials of the U.S. Navy and the British Admiralty. The latter advised "most confidentially" that Prime Minister Macmillan looked favorably on the project. In January 1960 Gates formally asked British Minister of Defence Harold Watkinson for permission to station Polaris tenders in the Gare Loch in the Clyde estuary of Scotland. This location was suggested because the initial patrol area for Polaris submarines was to be the Norwegian and North Seas.¹²⁴

The JCS, commenting on the British request for Skybolt and Polaris, wanted to drive a hard bargain. They advised Gates that provision of either weapon should be conditioned on British participation in the proposal to develop a NATO medium-range missile. ISA took an approach in keeping with that of the JCS, opposing any commitment to provide either Skybolt or Polaris at that time, for fear of prejudicing the NATO MRBM program. State agreed with this position.¹²⁵

British officials discussed their request at a meeting in Washington in March 1960 with Irwin and Merchant. The U.S. representatives stressed the linkage of Skybolt and Polaris with the NATO MRBM program; the

* See Chapter XII.

British sought to keep them separate. The talks concluded with no U.S. commitment.¹²⁶

At the end of March, Prime Minister Macmillan came to Washington for talks with the president. Macmillan had proposed the meeting primarily to discuss Soviet proposals for nuclear test suspension. The Skybolt-Polaris question was added to the agenda at British request.¹²⁷

In preparations for the meeting, State and Defense disagreed over what was to be said regarding Skybolt and Polaris. Defense proposed to hold to the position maintained in the earlier talks, that the United States would not provide either Polaris or Skybolt until the NATO MRBM question was settled. State officials softened their stand; they adopted the position that while Polaris had a direct connection with the MRBM program, Skybolt did not. If it became available, there seemed no reason why Skybolt could not be sold to the British, though without public announcement, since other NATO allies might react unfavorably if a Skybolt deal became known.¹²⁸

Deputy Secretary Douglas represented OSD during the Macmillan visit, since Gates and Irwin were attending a defense ministers meeting in Paris. State officials persuaded Douglas to accept their view that Skybolt could be sold to the British. In return, State agreed that the president should be informed of the Defense reservations on Skybolt.¹²⁹

Macmillan met with the president at Camp David on 28 March. The Skybolt-Polaris question came up for discussion that afternoon, when the two leaders took a drive to Eisenhower's Gettysburg farm. No aides were present during their discussion.¹³⁰

On the same evening the British gave the U.S. delegation a draft memorandum based on Macmillan's recollection of the conversation. In it Macmillan thanked Eisenhower for being willing to provide "whatever appears to be the better alternative system, either Skybolt or Polaris or a combination of these." However, he made no mention of Polaris berthing facilities. The prime minister also submitted the text of a proposed announcement to Parliament that Blue Streak was being canceled and that the United States would sell the British a "suitable vehicle" in its place.¹³¹

Macmillan's memorandum did not agree with what U.S. officials believed were the president's intentions. The following day Dillon and other State officials discussed a response to Macmillan. Douglas was apparently not involved in these discussions, although he had been at Camp David. Dillon drafted a new memorandum, embodying the U.S. understanding of the substance of the previous day's discussion, which the president approved; it was then given to the British.¹³²

The president's memorandum was in three parts. First, it gave the United Kingdom assurance of U.S. willingness to provide Skybolt missiles on a reimbursable basis "in 1965 or thereafter," subject to completion of the Skybolt development program. No conditions would be attached except a "general understanding" with respect to NATO and funding through military assistance. In the second part, Eisenhower told Macmillan that a bilateral agreement to provide Polaris missiles did not seem appropriate

until the question of the NATO MRBM force had been settled. The last part consisted of a single sentence: "We welcome the assurance that, in the same spirit of cooperation, the UK would be agreeable in principle to making the necessary arrangements for US Polaris tenders in Scottish ports."¹³³

Later the same day, the British responded with a revision of Macmillan's memorandum that still failed to satisfy State Department officials. Following consultations, British Ambassador Caccia produced another version which, after review by Secretary Herter and the president, was accepted. It made no mention of Polaris, merely expressing gratitude for U.S. willingness to provide either Skybolt or "a mobile MRBM system in the light of such decisions as may be reached in the discussion under way in NATO." Nor was anything said about granting submarine facilities in Scotland.¹³⁴

There were now two different memorandums, in effect a "gentleman's agreement." The Americans had seen and approved of the one from Macmillan, but the British had not committed themselves to any sort of approval of that from Eisenhower. They differed in emphasis and left room for varying interpretations. Thus the British version failed to mention Polaris facilities, while at the same time stressing U.S. willingness to provide Skybolt and ignoring any doubts of its eventual success. It does not appear that any OSD officials took part in the discussions of 28-29 March that led to this exchange of notes.

Macmillan felt that he had obtained a commitment to obtain both Polaris and Skybolt. On that basis, the British Government made a final decision to cancel Blue Streak.¹³⁵

Shortly after Macmillan left Washington, Gates, in Paris, asked British Defence Minister Harold Watkinson why the British were not interested in the Hound Dog air-to-surface missile, which was already available. Watkinson replied that the British already had their equivalent of Hound Dog and that they sought Skybolt in order to extend indefinitely the life of their bomber force. The question of ports in Scotland came up. "The arrangements on this seem to be satisfactory," Gates recorded, "and I thanked him [Watkinson] for his help." He did not indicate the nature of these "arrangements."¹³⁶

The "gentleman's agreement" at Camp David soon gave rise to disagreement. The British asked that there be no mention of military assistance in the president's memorandum, since if Skybolt were obtained through that program it could be used only in support of NATO. State officials agreed with the British, inasmuch as the U.S. intention had been to provide Skybolt unconditionally, and the president approved.¹³⁷

Defence Minister Watkinson announced to Parliament the cancellation of Blue Streak on 13 April 1960. Another vehicle—perhaps Skybolt—would be chosen, he promised, to carry a British warhead.¹³⁸

Having given up Blue Streak, the British redoubled their efforts to obtain Polaris as the basis for their independent deterrent. A visit by Watkinson provided the opportunity to pursue this goal. In January 1960 Gates had invited Watkinson to visit Washington in the spring. Watkinson accepted,

giving assurance that he would simply seek to establish contacts and obtain information, not to "buy or sell anything or to negotiate." The visit would begin on 30 May; Watkinson would be accompanied by Admiral of the Fleet Lord Louis Mountbatten, chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee.¹³⁹

It was something of a surprise, then, when Mountbatten and Watkinson on arrival broached with Admiral Burke the possibility of obtaining one or two Polaris submarines under a lend-lease arrangement. This would make it easier for the British public and Parliament to accept the berthing of U.S. submarines in Scotland, they explained. Burke was sympathetic, but pointed out that any such arrangement would require congressional approval.¹⁴⁰

Before meeting with Watkinson, Gates had learned, presumably from Burke, about the request for two submarines. He telephoned Goodpaster to warn him that the British might introduce the subject. Goodpaster relayed the information to Herter, who viewed the British position as logical: "We asked for use of the harbor and the British want to get what they can in return."¹⁴¹

Watkinson met with Gates on 1 June. The first subject discussed related to the proposed Polaris base in Scotland. Watkinson explained that Macmillan feared adverse public reaction. There was growing sentiment in the United Kingdom for nuclear disarmament, fueled by the breakdown of the Paris summit conference a few weeks earlier. The difficulty would be moderated if the project could be presented to the British public as a joint one and perhaps also if the site could be moved from Gare Loch, which was near a heavily populated area. Gates thought that there would be no difficulty in setting up the base jointly, and he was willing to consider removing it to a more remote location, even though to do so would cost more. In an attempt to turn British interest in Polaris to U.S. advantage, Gates held out the possibility that British cooperation in the NATO MRBM project might permit some joint U.S.-U.K. venture on Polaris "within the NATO framework." The talks then recessed to allow Watkinson to visit the facilities in California where Skybolt was being developed.¹⁴²

During the interim, State officials laid plans for the next round of talks. Burke thought it important to station a tender in the United Kingdom by mid-autumn; hence the British should be pressed for an agreement on the basis of Macmillan's assurances to the president. A floating dry-dock would also be desirable, but its movement could be delayed for a year. The officials agreed that Polaris submarines should be offered the British only as part of the NATO MRBM program, to be subject to control by both SACEUR and SACLANT. If the British tried to obtain Polaris on any other basis, as a quid pro quo for the tender arrangement, the United States would hold out the possibility of shifting its European Polaris base to West Germany.¹⁴³

When Gates and Watkinson resumed their talks on 6 June, Watkinson reaffirmed the need for berthing facilities to be presented as a "joint" operation. This was not, he said, an attempt to "extract a couple of Polaris

submarines"; rather it was a political necessity for the British Government. In the same spirit, Gates replied that the United States was "not trying to swap a Skybolt memorandum for the facilities in the Clyde."

The two men agreed that Britain, as part of its participation in the NATO MRBM program, would acquire as soon as possible two nuclear submarines, each carrying 16 Polaris missiles. To do so would require cooperation from the United States, including congressional approval for a submarine purchase. This cooperation would facilitate the Eisenhower-Macmillan agreement for Polaris facilities in the Clyde, since these would be used by both navies. If the British could announce the grant of submarine facilities by 30 June, the United States would make plans to place a tender in the Clyde by the end of the year. Otherwise, it would be necessary to seek facilities elsewhere.

On the subject of Skybolt, Gates and Watkinson agreed that the United States would make "every reasonable effort" to insure completion of the missile and its compatibility with British V-bombers. In turn, the British would place an order for "about one hundred" of the weapons.¹⁴⁴

The British, while pressing for an agreement to formalize the understanding on Skybolt, sought also a commitment for delivery of Skybolt by 1964. U.S. officials, given the "problematical" nature of Skybolt, favored informal technical arrangements and doubted that Skybolt could be ready for delivery before 1965.¹⁴⁵

The Polaris berthing question was meanwhile under discussion. In a letter to the president on 24 June, Macmillan reported that the British Cabinet had approved the proposed facilities but the plan faced an uncertain reception from the British public. It seemed more likely of approval if certain conditions were met. First, in place of Gare Loch, he suggested Loch Linnhe, farther north and in a less populous area of Scotland. Second, the project should be presented as a joint enterprise and as a quid pro quo for Polaris submarines. Third, the United Kingdom should have a veto on the launching of missiles within approximately 100 miles of British shores by any U.S. submarine berthed in Scotland. Finally, with reference to the NATO MRBM proposal, it seemed doubtful that the British, with their limited resources, could make much of a contribution, except possibly through their acquisition of Polaris.¹⁴⁶

Macmillan's conditions met with general disapproval. The Navy opposed the change of site to Loch Linnhe, which lacked the facilities available in the Clyde area. ISA considered the idea of a joint venture unacceptable unless something was said about NATO; moreover, to allow a British veto over the firing of missiles outside British territorial waters would establish a dangerous precedent. State opposed any public statement that the British enjoyed an option to purchase Polaris submarines; any hint of a bilateral deal would jeopardize the NATO MRBM program. Finally, State pointed out that at Camp David no conditions had been attached to the grant of berthing facilities.¹⁴⁷

In another exchange of letters between the two leaders, the president

won Macmillan's agreement to reconsider Gare Loch, but the missile launching issue remained unsettled. Eisenhower agreed to prior British consent for launchings from British waters, but to extend dual control beyond those limits would raise a number of problems. He stressed the need for a prompt decision on the NATO MRBM program and heartily supported the Watkinson-Gates agreement that British acquisition of Polaris submarines would constitute a contribution to NATO.¹⁴⁸

Macmillan agreed to have "our technical people" work out a mutually satisfactory location on the Clyde for the submarine tender. He believed also that an acceptable coordinating procedure for missile firings could be devised. He sought to evade the U.S. insistence on linking provision of Polaris submarines to the MRBM proposal. For technical and financial reasons the British could not have their own Polaris submarines in operation much before 1970, he said, so that the relationship between them and the NATO MRBM force was not a current problem. He suggested that Ambassador Caccia discuss the entire question of Polaris with U.S. officials. The president agreed.¹⁴⁹

The British meanwhile had suggested, through their Joint Services Mission, an alternate site on the Clyde estuary, namely Holy Loch, quite near to Gare Loch. The U.S. Navy pronounced this acceptable.¹⁵⁰

An ISA-State negotiating team met with Caccia on 16 August. The conferees quickly disposed of the base question by agreeing that the choice between Gare Loch and Holy Loch would be made through service-to-service discussions. Caccia reported that the British could not undertake their Polaris submarine program before late 1960, but that this would not affect British participation in the NATO MRBM program. A sticking point, on which no agreement was reached, involved control over missile firing. The optimum for the British would be "full and timely" bilateral consultations on the use of submarines anywhere. The U.S. negotiators rejoined that the United States had already promised NATO to consult, if possible, on the use of nuclear weapons anywhere, but this promise had never been published, and it was not desirable to make it public just then in the context of Polaris arrangements with Britain. More specifically, as the U.S. team pointed out, President Eisenhower had given assurances to then-Foreign Minister Anthony Eden in 1953.

Another disagreement involved U.S. aid to the British Polaris project. The United States, while willing to have a public announcement that technical contacts between the two countries on Polaris would continue, felt that any such statement should relate the matter to NATO. Caccia pointed out that this amounted to asking the British to do something that Americans were not prepared to do, since U.S. Polaris submarines would not be assigned to NATO. The Americans replied that they had developed the Polaris entirely outside the NATO context.¹⁵¹

The conferees then recessed. During the interim, a working-level group discussed a technical agreement on Skybolt. The U.S. side had prepared a draft, which the British (abandoning their preference for a high-level

agreement) wished to sign at once. The U.S. representatives, however, withheld signature pending agreement on Polaris berthing facilities.¹⁵²

Immediately thereafter, State representatives reversed their position and recommended signing the Skybolt agreement without reference to Polaris. They pointed out that the United States had rejected an opportunity to tie Skybolt to Polaris during the Gates-Watkinson talks, and intransigence now might adversely affect the Polaris negotiations. ISA opposed signature on the ground that U.S. openness on Skybolt, during the Gates-Watkinson talks, had not led to British concessions on the MRBM program or the Polaris facilities. Gates agreed to withhold signature of the Skybolt agreement for 10 days. He did not feel, however, that the United States could insist on a rigid *quid pro quo*; rather the United States should take a positive approach, asking for reciprocal British concessions.¹⁵³

When negotiations on Polaris by a working-level group resumed, the U.S. representatives agreed that the United States should assist if the British decided to purchase or build their own Polaris system within the framework of an existing NATO program. With some reluctance, they agreed to a public announcement on this point. On the matter of control, however, the United States was not prepared to go beyond the assurance given Eden in 1953 and would not allow it to be publicized.¹⁵⁴

After consulting London, Caccia informed U.S. negotiators that his government still insisted on an announcement to placate public opinion. He proposed a statement that the United States would use its "best endeavors" to consult with the United Kingdom and other allies regarding the use of Polaris missiles and of nuclear weapons generally.¹⁵⁵

The JCS recommended to Gates on 15 September that the United States stand firm in opposing any announcement implying bilateral control of operations in international waters. An appropriate reply, they suggested, would be to turn the tables on the British: it would be no more appropriate for the United Kingdom to impose such restrictions on U.S. vessels than for the United States to do the same to the British.¹⁵⁶

Gates strongly endorsed the JCS position. He told Herter that Defense was prepared, if necessary, to make alternative berthing arrangements for Polaris. The State Department, less rigid, suggested a general announcement by the president that it was long-standing U.S. policy to consult with allies in any emergency requiring the use of nuclear weapons.¹⁵⁷

Meanwhile the United States made a concession on Skybolt by signing the technical-financial agreement without complete assurances on Polaris. The agreement spelled out many of the arrangements desired by the British but made it clear that Skybolt was purely a research and development program, with production not yet authorized. There was no assurance of completion; the Air Force would only make "every reasonable effort" to assure its success.¹⁵⁸

On 27 September Macmillan, in New York to attend a UN meeting, saw Eisenhower and gave him a draft announcement covering several matters.

It would confirm the offer of Polaris facilities in the Holy Loch. As for the matter of consultation, the draft read as follows:

The launching of Polaris missiles at any time from United States submarines in United Kingdom territorial waters would be a matter of joint decision between the two governments. The launching of missiles by United States submarines outside United Kingdom territorial waters is in the same category as the use of nuclear weapons generally. The United States Government will use their best endeavours to consult with their British and other allies as regards the use of Polaris missiles as well as about the use of nuclear weapons generally.¹⁵⁹

This statement was directly at variance with the Defense position. Macmillan, intentionally or not, misled the president; he said that agreement had already been reached on the draft. As a result, the president approved it. When informed that Macmillan's statement was in error, however, he withdrew his approval.¹⁶⁰

A few weeks later, the British yielded. Macmillan promised Eisenhower that in his statement to Parliament on berthing facilities, he would simply ignore the control issue. If queried on the subject, he would reply that the British would rely on "general understandings and close relationships" with the United States. He would prefer not to mention the NATO MRBM project in connection with Polaris berthing. Eisenhower thanked Macmillan and reaffirmed the pledge he had given Eden in 1953 that the United States would take "every possible step" to consult with allies in an emergency.¹⁶¹

In speaking to Parliament on 1 November, however, Macmillan departed from the script. He told his hearers that wherever the U.S. Polaris submarines might be, he was "perfectly satisfied" that no decision to use the missile would be taken without the "fullest possible previous consultation."¹⁶²

This statement violated Macmillan's pledge and created some alarm in Washington. The British Foreign Office issued a statement that Macmillan's announcement, if read in its entirety, would clear up any misunderstanding, and that the prime minister had not "guaranteed" consultation. ISA regarded this as no improvement, but it appeared to satisfy the secretary of state and the president. Herter told the British ambassador that neither he nor the president had been "worried" by the prime minister's statement.¹⁶³ After all, the difference between "every possible step" and "fullest possible previous consultation" was not great.

Shortly thereafter came the British turn to become alarmed, this time over the prospect that Skybolt might be canceled. In OSD planning for the FY 1962 budget, Skybolt became a natural target for economy, since its success was uncertain. On a visit to London in October 1960, Douglas told Watkinson of Gates's "very serious" concern about the Skybolt program, the costs of which were mounting. But when Watkinson spoke of the "tremendous importance" of the program to the United Kingdom, Douglas reassured him that it was not about to be canceled.¹⁶⁴

Not fully convinced, Watkinson sent his science adviser, Sir Solly Zuckerman, to Washington with a letter asking Gates to discuss the subject with the "utmost frankness." Zuckerman talked with Gates and other OSD officials, also with Kistiakowsky, the president's science adviser. He concluded that U.S. officials regarded Skybolt as "no more than a very costly R&D programme in which they had little faith."¹⁶⁵

Warned by Zuckerman's reports from Washington, Watkinson appealed to Macmillan, who wrote Eisenhower expressing concern that the Skybolt program might be reconsidered. State and ISA drafted replies to Macmillan, each containing an assurance that the United States had "no present intention" of canceling the project. In the end, the president sent a rather vague reply, submitted by Herter, which said only that "we are still proceeding" with the understandings reached on Skybolt.¹⁶⁶

Gates had wanted to add to the president's letter a statement that the report carried back by Zuckerman "represents our best and latest ideas." He was too late; the letter had gone out. Gates had, however, asked Zuckerman to warn Watkinson not to "overplay the hand."¹⁶⁷

In London in December 1960, en route to the NATO ministerial meeting, Gates told Watkinson that Skybolt was being slowed down but not discontinued. That the weapon could be produced at a justifiable cost when compared with other systems seemed less than certain. Watkinson was disconcerted; the prime minister considered Skybolt part of the bargain for the Polaris facilities in the Clyde. But he acknowledged that the British had always understood that the future of Skybolt, as a research project, was uncertain.¹⁶⁸

On 21 December the Air Force announced that although funds for Skybolt had been reduced the weapon was expected to be available by 1964. The embassy in London thought this statement contradicted what Gates had told Watkinson. The State Department replied that there was no inconsistency between the two; both were compatible with a target date of 1964.¹⁶⁹

There the matter rested at the end of the year. The United States had obtained a promise of Polaris submarine facilities in Britain. The British believed that they had a firm commitment on Skybolt, but that weapon did not yet exist and faced an uncertain future. Skybolt was to cause more trouble a few years later, when the United States canceled it.

Relations with France

By the beginning of 1959 the French Government under Charles de Gaulle had begun to make clear its determination to go its own way. In the months that followed, this became manifest in a number of actions that had ominous implications for the Atlantic alliance.

One such action involved naval command in the Mediterranean, which de Gaulle viewed as imposing a kind of second-class status on France. The

complicated situation there derived primarily from differing U.S. and British conceptions of the strategic role of the Mediterranean. There were two commanders in the area, both responsible to SACEUR. The Commander in Chief, Southern Command (CINCSOUTH), a U.S. officer, commanded land and air forces as well as the U.S. Sixth Fleet, the principal U.S. naval force in the Mediterranean. The Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Mediterranean (CINCAFMED), a British officer, commanded British, French, Italian, and Greek units (with a few from the United States); his principal responsibility was to maintain the Mediterranean line of communications. In time of peace, both U.S. and British naval forces remained under national command except during training exercises. A 1954 resolution of the NAC provided that forces placed at the disposal of NATO were not to be used or redeployed without SACEUR's consent, but specifically exempted U.S. and British forces in the Mediterranean. This resolution was effectively nullified a year later by another allowing any NATO government unilaterally to withdraw units in an emergency, merely notifying the appropriate NATO commander. Practically speaking, therefore, the French fleet was fully responsive to national command, but this did not appease de Gaulle.¹⁷⁰

Early in 1959 French Ambassador Hervé Alphand told Secretary Dulles that de Gaulle wished French naval forces in the Mediterranean to have the same freedom as the U.S. Sixth Fleet. France must control its line of communications with North Africa. Withdrawal of the French Navy from NATO control, he promised, would not impair cooperation with NATO. Dulles replied that while the United States was willing to consider modifications in NATO's command structure, the matter was one for consideration by the alliance as a whole. He repeated this statement in person to de Gaulle in a meeting in Paris on 6 February.¹⁷¹

De Gaulle ignored Dulles's views and acted unilaterally. On 6 March 1959 France formally notified the NAC that it would resume control, in time of war, over its naval forces in the Mediterranean. It would, however, cooperate in implementing NATO plans so long as these did not involve conflict with the national mission.¹⁷²

Quarles and Twining briefed the president on the French action on 12 March. Eisenhower observed that the major difficulty in dealing with de Gaulle was that people did not understand him. "General de Gaulle is not by nature a reasonable man," explained the president, "when he is dealing in such terms as Glory, Honor, and France." He himself had for some time favored placing U.S. naval forces in NATO on the same basis as others. "However," he continued, "the fat is now in the fire and we must see what can be done in the light of the existing situation." He feared that "we may be witnessing a beginning of a crumbling of NATO in this French action."¹⁷³

Fortunately the president's fear proved unfounded. The French action had no immediate impact, since it did not affect NATO's peacetime command structure. Later, France established a new command for the Mediterranean-Algeria-Sahara area. The commander would wear two hats, one for his national command, the other for NATO. With French agreement, Norstad directed

CINCAFMED to work out a *modus vivendi* with the new command.¹⁷⁴

Another problem ensued from France's continuing refusal to allow storage of nuclear weapons on French soil. Accordingly, the nine squadrons (three wings) of F-100 fighter aircraft based in France had no ready access to the weapons they would need in an emergency. By October 1958 Norstad was seriously considering relocating these squadrons to Germany or the United Kingdom.¹⁷⁵

During the first few months of 1959, it seemed that the French might be more cooperative. French Minister of Defense Pierre Guillaumat and Prime Minister Michel Debré appeared sympathetic to the U.S. request for nuclear weapons storage, and Debré promised to make a final effort to persuade de Gaulle to change his mind. On 9 May Herter, speaking for State and Defense, gave Norstad contingent authority to begin redeploying the squadrons subject to the outcome of Debré's intervention.¹⁷⁶

When de Gaulle eventually proved unyielding, Norstad, with State's approval, began his interim relocation plan. Expanding a practice he had already begun for aircraft rotation, he temporarily moved two aircraft from each squadron to what he called "strip-alert" in Germany. For long-term redeployment, Norstad proposed to move two of the three fighter wings to Britain and one to Germany, at the same time shifting three reconnaissance squadrons from Germany to the United Kingdom to avoid overloading the German airfields. These movements would be carried out over a six-month period.¹⁷⁷

On 24 June Norstad requested JCS permission to begin carrying out his long-term plan. After extensive coordination in Washington and authorization from the British and West German Governments, on 8 July the JCS authorized Norstad to proceed.¹⁷⁸

Meeting with the NATO Military Committee on 10 December 1959, General Twining gave vent to the frustration of U.S. military men as they watched growing obstacles to their efforts to strengthen Europe's defense. At a special session of the chiefs of staff, Twining spoke of "countries responsible for the lack of progress in certain critical areas," which, he said, "are weakening the entire defense of NATO and are thereby increasing the possibility of war." There was little doubt which country was "responsible," even though Twining spoke in the plural. The specific matters that he mentioned involved redeployment of French forces from Europe (meaning to Algeria), lack of progress in arranging for storage of nuclear weapons and in development of a unified air defense, and the unilateral action regarding the French fleet.

Twining went on to say:

I know that these are all difficult problems, and I feel that the military authorities of the governments concerned would change some of these circumstances if they were permitted. My only positive suggestion would be that you military representatives insure that your political superiors are aware of the seriousness with which the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff view these problems. Our

resources are not unlimited, and, from a military viewpoint, we have a right to expect a maximum return on all defense efforts which we undertake. I recommend that you keep working on these problems vigorously and that you attempt to establish an understanding that, under certain circumstances, political judgments of governments should be modified or changed on the basis of military realities.¹⁷⁹

In essence, Twining was simply counseling his professional colleagues to be more persuasive in advising their political superiors. And, of course, he was speaking within a closed circle of military men. But his unusually pointed remarks perhaps made it inevitable that news of them should leak out, with unfortunate results. A Paris newspaper made it a lead story with "three column banner caps." The *New York Times* reported that Twining had "dropped a diplomatic bombshell," pointing to France (and, by implication, to de Gaulle) as the major offender.¹⁸⁰

Even within his immediate audience, Twining's remarks caused a "considerable sensation," as Ambassador Houghton reported. Some officers on the SHAPE staff were "uneasy" at the suggestion that they should seek to have political judgments modified on the basis of military considerations. On the whole, however, military men in NATO agreed with Twining, considering the statement overdue. Even some French officers expressed agreement.¹⁸¹

At the ministerial meeting of the council on 16 December, Guillaumat charged that Twining had gone beyond the terms of reference of the Military Committee, which was supposed to confine itself to the military consequences of government policies. The French Government, he added, could not accept the implications of the statement. Spaak suggested the matter be considered closed for the time being.¹⁸² As a result, it was allowed to drop.

Gates had the last word on the subject. "We do not," he told the council, "support the concept of the military putting pressure on the political area of government. However, my government endorses the military substance of the speech made by General Twining and feels that it is within the competence, right and responsibility of its military to comment on these military effects of political decisions."¹⁸³

Gates had not cleared this statement in advance with the president, who arrived in Paris shortly thereafter for a meeting with de Gaulle. Gates informed him of his statement to the NAC and urged that if de Gaulle brought up the subject, Twining should be supported.¹⁸⁴

Later, Gates told Eisenhower that the French appeared to be following a "calculated policy of non-cooperation in defense matters." Guillaumat had told him that military discussions in the council were useless, since the French position was determined at a higher level. Ambassador Alphant had made similar statements to Irwin in Washington. Bringing about French cooperation, Gates thought, could come only through discussions between Eisenhower and de Gaulle "in the frankest terms."¹⁸⁵

The ministerial meeting devoted considerable attention to the question of air defense, a matter held over from 1958. The reason, as Norstad wrote Eisenhower, was not that this was the only or even the most urgent military problem, but because it was a "symbol of the principle of collective security." In these discussions, France was clearly isolated, with other delegations strongly supporting the principle of unified air defense.¹⁸⁶

The president took up the question in his meeting with de Gaulle. Drawing on his World War II experience, he stressed the need for single control of all air defense forces—a matter that was now even more vital as a result of faster weapons and a reduced time element. De Gaulle insisted that the "defense of France is a French responsibility." At Eisenhower's request, however, he agreed to discuss the matter with Norstad.¹⁸⁷

The discussion took place on 31 January 1960. De Gaulle asked that France have the same status as the British fighter force, which was under SHAPE but could not be transferred outside the United Kingdom without British approval. Norstad replied that to provide this status to the French force made no military sense; it would "split the battle in the middle." If politically necessary, however, he would accept it and defend it before the Military Committee. He would place the French air defense command directly under SHAPE and separate it from the forward area in Germany.¹⁸⁸

Norstad worked out details of the arrangement with French officials and sent a formal agreement to the French Government on 5 March. Nevertheless, de Gaulle rejected it as insufficient, even though he had earlier accepted it in principle. He proposed to establish under SACEUR an air defense system along the Franco-German boundary, leaving France entirely responsible for most of its own air space. The French air defense command would make "cooperative arrangements" with SACEUR.¹⁸⁹

Norstad considered this militarily unacceptable, but, as before, he was willing to bow to political realities. On receipt of a formal French statement, he would submit it to the NAC, which could then formally approve the air defense paper (MC 54/1) and enable planners to proceed. In other words, as Norstad said, he was prepared to integrate air defense among the other NATO countries, leaving an "empty chair" for France.¹⁹⁰

Prime Minister Debré accepted this compromise. The Military Committee approved MC 54/1 on 22 November and sent it on to the NAC, where it was apparently approved and disappeared from NATO's agenda.¹⁹¹

Increased Nuclear Sharing?

Disagreements with France inside NATO, while irritating, stopped short of diplomatic estrangement. So long as France remained a major partner in NATO, it was appropriate for the United States to help strengthen French defenses. Still, the changed situation after de Gaulle's accession called for a reexamination of policy toward that country. In the process arose the

question of aiding France's nuclear weapons program, an issue that had relevance to the larger question of NATO's nuclear position.

To discourage proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities remained U.S. policy, reaffirmed on 5 August 1959 in NSC 5906/1. However, by that time the Atomic Energy Act had been relaxed. Consequently, NSC 5906/1 recommended that, when the president determined that it was in the U.S. interest, the United States should enhance the nuclear weapons capability of selected allies by providing information, materials, or weapons, under control arrangements to be determined. This provision went beyond anything in previous policy directives and implied the possibility of sharing weapons design information with nations that had achieved "substantial progress" in nuclear weaponry, as authorized by the 1958 law. The development of a NATO nuclear weapons authority to determine requirements for, hold custody of, and control the use of nuclear weapons, a matter proposed in the 1958 directive (NSC 5810/1), was now recommended "urgently."¹⁹²

Two days earlier, the Planning Board completed a new policy paper for France (NSC 5910). This stressed the importance of France in the alliance and urged efforts to meet de Gaulle's major objectives: nuclear cooperation, tripartite planning, and support for French policies in Africa, particularly regarding Algeria. The board recommended that the United States consider providing France with nuclear weapons or information, in accord with NSC 5906/1. Later the board amended this with a proposal first to try to satisfy French aspirations through some form of multilateral European authority, such as proposed in NSC 5906/1; if this proved infeasible, then a bilateral Franco-U.S. agreement should be considered.¹⁹³

This proposal immediately became a focus of discussion. The JCS adviser on the board wished to amend it to provide for concurrent consideration of the two steps, a multilateral authority and an agreement with France. The JCS supported this change, but the Defense member of the board opposed it, and NSC 5910 went before the NSC on 18 August with the matter unsettled.¹⁹⁴

The discussion of NSC 5910 in the NSC focused primarily on French policy in Algeria, where de Gaulle was now seeking a political settlement. The council took no action on nuclear sharing and postponed decision on NSC 5910 pending a forthcoming visit by Eisenhower with de Gaulle.¹⁹⁵

In the interim, the State Department referred the question to USRO, explaining that the administration was aiming towards multilateral control of nuclear weapons in Europe within a NATO framework. This might involve transfer of custody of weapons, and possibly design information, to a group including all or some NATO countries.¹⁹⁶

The reply from Frederick Nolting of USRO, which had Norstad's concurrence, declared that any control arrangement should involve NATO as a whole. To give custody to individual countries on a bilateral basis would lessen confidence in the United States and weaken the alliance. There seemed no way, therefore, in which the United States could advance proposals

directly responsive to French wishes. Instead, Nolting and Norstad suggested steps to improve the NATO stockpile system. The United States should turn over to NATO those weapons needed for NATO military plans and promise not to withdraw them at any time during the life of the North Atlantic Treaty. Information on the size and composition of the stockpile should be made available to NATO authorities. Authorization to use the weapons would derive from the alliance, thereby eliminating double U.S. control (i.e., unilaterally and as a NATO member). Such a plan, Nolting thought, might partially meet French desires and would be welcomed by other NATO members.¹⁹⁷

With the president's meeting with de Gaulle scheduled for early September, there remained no time to work out a position on nuclear sharing for presentation to the French leader. Consequently, their discussions, on 2 and 3 September, dealt principally with diplomatic questions—Algeria and tripartite planning. The talks were cordial but yielded no agreement. Both Gates and Herter accompanied the president, and Gates sat in on a discussion of political matters between Herter and Prime Minister Debré.¹⁹⁸

Following the president's return, the Planning Board revised NSC 5910, recommending discreet U.S. support of de Gaulle's plan for a settlement in Algeria, which had now been made public. The split over nuclear sharing—whether first to try to satisfy France through a multilateral authority, or to proceed concurrently with both multilateral and bilateral arrangements—remained. The JCS wanted the entire paragraph redrafted to give more emphasis to an arrangement with France, arguing that nuclear assistance to France accorded with U.S. interest.¹⁹⁹

When the NSC resumed discussion of NSC 5910 on 29 October 1959, it took up first the question of nuclear cooperation. Twining stressed the general concern of the JCS that the United States do more to help allies achieve a nuclear capability. Gates preferred a multilateral authority, partly because he doubted that Congress would approve an agreement with France. The council's decision, drafted by Gray after the meeting, provided that the United States should "urgently" proceed with the study of NATO nuclear arrangements called for by NSC 5906/1 and seek French support "at an appropriate time"; likewise the question of an agreement with France should be studied. The implication was that the two subjects should be studied concurrently; on that point, the JCS had prevailed.²⁰⁰

To these two studies, the NSC on 16 December added a third, to deal with the "implications" of nuclear sharing with the allies. This was distinct from the study of possible nuclear arrangements with NATO. The Planning Board assigned it to a working group chaired by State with members from Defense and AEC, instructing the group to consider the "pros and cons" of nuclear sharing together with desirable changes in legislation.²⁰¹

In connection with these studies, the JCS on 26 January 1960 told Gates that nuclear assistance to France would be in the U.S. interest if France would accept certain conditions. The weapons must remain in U.S.

physical custody during peacetime and must be furnished through NATO channels for use by French NATO forces. If France agreed, the United States should go further and offer to provide information and materials needed for demonstration and testing. It would not, however, be in the U.S. interest to assist France in building up a production capacity.

The JCS also addressed the question of NATO control of nuclear weapons. The major NATO commanders, in their view, should continue to determine requirements. During conditions short of war, nations furnishing nuclear weapons should maintain control through national custodial units. The United States, United Kingdom, and France should agree on the conditions under which the weapons would be made available to NATO forces.²⁰²

France signaled its entry into the "nuclear club" on 13 February 1960 by exploding its first nuclear device at a test site in Algeria. A second test followed on 1 April. Still, these successes did not immediately alter the situation. As Herter pointed out, a single explosion did not "automatically entitle France to a sharing of atomic secrets." Even after the second test, Gates doubted that France had demonstrated an ability to produce nuclear weapons, which required "a very high level of technical competence as well as a great deal of money."²⁰³

Gates's assistant for atomic energy, Herbert Loper, saw no reason to change existing arrangements. Sharing information on design and production of nuclear weapons was in no way necessary to enable the allies to use those weapons. He favored a stockpile of weapons under NATO control, with relaxation of requirements for U.S. physical custody in advance of an actual attack; this could be done using the president's power as commander in chief, without requiring new legislation.²⁰⁴

Loper's views were similar to those of the State Department, which specifically opposed nuclear cooperation with France. The president was planning another meeting with de Gaulle. State believed that if the question of nuclear sharing came up at that time, the president should insist on the wisdom of the stockpile policy. Loper endorsed this position.²⁰⁵

Because State's views differed from those expressed earlier by the JCS, Gates asked the JCS to comment on them. In reply, the JCS affirmed that it was in the U.S. interest to assist France and other selected NATO members to achieve a nuclear capability by providing information, material, and/or weapons. However, France should not be given preferential treatment; at the least, concurrent action should be taken with the United Kingdom and Canada. Any allied country, before receiving assistance, should agree to certain actions such as storage of nuclear weapons in its territory. And support of France's national nuclear aspirations must be "regulated carefully" to avoid encouraging a capability apart from the NATO structure.²⁰⁶

Twining considered that these JCS views would provide a basis for the president's conversations with de Gaulle. However, he did not believe they would satisfy the NSC directive for a study of French nuclear cooperation, which required further analysis.²⁰⁷

Twining himself (despite the critical views he had expressed toward the de Gaulle government) ardently favored helping France. Writing some years later, he thought the United States had made a great mistake in not doing so. His reasons were mainly political. France "is really the cradle of freedom of the individual"; France had helped the United States gain independence and was the only major European nation with which the United States had never come to blows. He attributed France's intransigence on various NATO issues to the U.S. "failure to play ball on the 'two-way street'" on the issue of nuclear cooperation. Twining's successor, Lemnitzer, also strongly held this view.²⁰⁸

Eisenhower's meeting with de Gaulle in April apparently did not cover the subject of nuclear cooperation. A month later, however, after the short-lived summit meeting in Paris, Gates conferred with the new French minister of armed forces, Pierre Messmer. Messmer expressed a grievance because a Dutch request for a nuclear submarine seemed to be receiving a more sympathetic hearing in Washington than a similar French request, to which Gates replied that both requests were being held up by congressional considerations.²⁰⁹

By the middle of 1960 the Planning Board had not yet produced the studies on nuclear cooperation assigned to it the previous December. One reason, apparently, was inability to agree. Kistiakowsky heard that a board meeting on 26 July, at which the subject of nuclear sharing was discussed, was the "most violent ever," with State and AEC opposing any change in the law.²¹⁰

The question of nuclear sharing came up in the NSC on 1 August in connection with a discussion of force commitments to NATO. The president unequivocally favored transferring nuclear weapons and suggested seeking the necessary legislative authority immediately. He was supported by Twining, but Herter doubted that congressional action could be secured at that time. The discussion drifted off into other subjects, but at the end the president directed preparation of draft legislation for submission to Congress. "This will be the end of NATO," whispered Gerard Smith to Kistiakowsky.²¹¹

On the following day, Norstad, again in Washington, told Douglas, Herter, and Twining that he found the present stockpile arrangements satisfactory. He strongly opposed sharing weapons; the United States, he felt, had a "deep moral responsibility" not to encourage proliferation.²¹² On 3 August Norstad spoke in the same vein to Eisenhower and opposed any legislative changes. His words apparently had an effect on the president and Gray; when Gray wrote the record of action of the meeting of 1 August and the president approved it, it contained no mention of drafting legislation. Instead, it directed State, Defense, and AEC to study the advantages and disadvantages of nuclear sharing and of multilateral arrangements with NATO and to submit recommendations concerning the "nature and timing" of requisite legislation.²¹³

Gray's record of action also directed prompt completion of the several

studies underway: on a multilateral NATO nuclear authority, on nuclear aid to France, and on the advantages of nuclear sharing. The Planning Board subsequently decided to combine these into one.²¹⁴

The JCS remained firmly in favor of nuclear assistance to France, the lack of which, they told Gates on 4 August, was a major reason for France's noncooperative attitude on various NATO matters. They believed that France had made "substantial progress" in nuclear weapons and cited de Gaulle's "impressive" support for the United States at the Paris summit meeting. In view of these considerations, it would be "propitious" to encourage "further unity of purpose and cooperative effort" between the United States and France.²¹⁵

Loper, who had by now changed his mind, recommended that the United States send technical specialists to France to assess that nation's nuclear program. If they found that France had in fact made "substantial progress" in developing nuclear weapons, cooperation with that nation could be placed on the same basis as with the United Kingdom. Otherwise, legislation would be required. Time would not permit immediate revision of the Atomic Energy Act; hence preparations should be made to submit the proposal to the next session of Congress.²¹⁶

On 23 August the Planning Board's interdepartmental working group completed its study of "The Pros and Cons of Increased Nuclear Sharing with Allies." It dealt with several separate issues, most of which involved disagreements. On the first, the question of authorizing the president to make nuclear weapons available to allies, State and AEC agreed that there was no need for such authorization and that the disadvantages outweighed the advantages. Defense urged preparation of authorizing legislation at once for submission to Congress in January. State and AEC also opposed empowering the president to seek creation of multilateral nuclear arrangements for NATO. Defense recognized the absence of widespread pressure in NATO for any such step but believed that the United States should support it if it appeared to be in the national interest.

Regarding nuclear submarine cooperation, State and Defense agreed that the United States should at once be willing to negotiate an agreement with the Netherlands and defer action on the French request pending resolution of other issues with that country. AEC felt that it should first be determined whether an agreement with the Netherlands was "feasible."

As for the advisability of increased nuclear sharing in general, the group agreed that other countries would soon acquire a weapons capability. State and AEC believed that the United States might best maintain influence by associating itself with other countries' efforts. Defense favored a forthright statement that the United States should assist "selected allies" to achieve nuclear capabilities as soon as possible. Specifically with reference to France, Defense saw more reason than the other two agencies to provide assistance, but all doubted whether such aid would improve French cooperation.

There was no disagreement on multilateral sharing with NATO. Except for France, NATO members appeared satisfied with the stockpile concept

and with measures taken to implement it. Hence, the question should be considered only if support for it began to materialize among European NATO members.²¹⁷

The NSC scheduled discussion of this paper for 25 August. On the preceding day, Gates tried to smooth over the disagreements in a meeting with Dillon and McCone. Gates confessed that he had changed his mind on the subject of nuclear cooperation with France; he had first been in favor of it on the basis of JCS arguments but had later been swayed by Norstad's intense opposition. He thought that the paper reflected little or no difference between State and Defense, an assertion challenged at once by McCone and Dillon.²¹⁸

In the NSC on 25 August, the president remarked that he no longer believed it possible to get legislation passed during the current session of Congress. Gates presented the differing positions of the JCS and Norstad on nuclear assistance to France, which he considered the key to the question of nuclear sharing in general. He urged that a decision be reached within two months. Twining restated the JCS conviction that France should receive technical advice; he dismissed Norstad's objections as "largely emotional in nature."

The president decided in favor of yet another study, this one on U.S. policy toward nuclear weapons capabilities in the NATO area, including France. This should take into consideration the Bowie report and a joint State-Defense report on the future of NATO called for by a decision of the council on 14 April 1960. Thus the question of nuclear sharing became bound up with that of U.S.-NATO relations in general.²¹⁹


Long-Range Planning

At the December 1959 NAC meeting, Secretary Herter recommended that the council undertake planning for a "decade of peace with security." The council accordingly approved a study covering the next 10 years on NATO objectives in the political, military, scientific, and economic realms.²²⁰

The Bowie report was intended as a contribution to this long-range NATO study. State meant it as a departmental exercise but welcomed participation (on an individual basis) by other departments. Bowie's appointment to head the study was made by the department and confirmed by the president in April 1960.²²¹

Gates authorized Bowie's study group to have access to appropriate agencies and individuals of DoD to obtain information and opinions, with the understanding that these were not to be construed as representing official views of DoD. Col H. A. Twitchell of OASD(ISA) served as liaison officer with Bowie.²²²

Bowie formally submitted his lengthy study to Herter on 21 August. It found NATO "subject to a gathering ferment of doubts and disagreement," rooted in a "weakening consensus on the nature of the Soviet threat" and



General Maxwell D.
Taylor, Army chief of
staff, 1955-59.



Admiral Arleigh A. Burke,
chief of naval operations,
1955-61.



Required Reading



'Looks Good to Me—Without Rose-Colored Glasses!'




National Archives


General Lauris Norstad, USAF,
Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe, 1956-62.



John N. Irwin II, assistant secretary of defense (international
security affairs), 1958-61.



The first four chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Lemnitzer, General Twining, Admiral Radford, General Bradley.



Secretary Gates meets at the Pentagon with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and unified and specified commanders, 17 August 1960.




Secretary Gates presides over a meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council, 4 October 1960. Left to right: General White, Secretary of the Air Force Sharp, General Decker, Secretary of the Army Brucker, Deputy Secretary of Defense Douglas, Secretary Gates, Secretary of the Navy Franke, Admiral Burke, General Lemnitzer, General Shoup, and John H. Rubel, deputy director of defense research and engineering.



Secretary McElroy with Mrs. John E. Hurley, newly appointed head of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), 14 October 1957.




Admiral Louis Mountbatten, chairman of the British Chiefs of Staff, meets in the Pentagon with General Twining and Secretary McElroy, 31 August 1959.




First full-scale model of Air Force Minuteman missile, used to check out ground support equipment.

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
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USS *Enterprise*, the Navy's first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, being launched at Newport News, Virginia, 24 September 1960.




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Air Force B-52 aircraft, with Hound Dog air-to-surface missiles.




U.S. Air Force

B-58 Hustler, the first supersonic bomber.




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U-2 reconnaissance aircraft (with Air Force insignia).



National Archives

Air Force Titan missile launched at Cape Canaveral, 3 April 1959.




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Air Force Atlas missile launched at Cape Canaveral, 12 August 1960.




U.S. Army

Early test model of the
Army's Nike-Zeus
antimissile missile,
16 December 1959.



National Archives

Air Force Bomarc
interceptor missiles
at Cape Canaveral,
27 June 1959.



U.S. Navy

U.S. Marines landing in Lebanon, 16 July 1958.



Deputy Secretary Quarles and T. Keith Glennan, newly appointed administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, announce the transfer of DoD space-related activities to NASA, 1 October 1958.



Frank D. Newbury, assistant secretary of defense (applications engineering), 1953-57, and assistant secretary of defense (research and development), 1957, is presented the Meritorious Civilian Service Award by Secretary of Defense Wilson. General Counsel Robert Dechert looks on.



Maj. Gen. Carey Randall, USMC (ret.), military assistant to the secretary of defense, receives the Distinguished Service Medal from Secretary Gates as former Secretary McElroy looks on, 15 February 1960.



Herbert F. York, director of defense research and engineering, at a press conference, 7 April 1960.



Secretary of State Herter, Secretary of the Treasury Anderson, and Secretary of Defense Gates en route to a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris, 12 December 1959.



U.S. Navy

First Polaris missile fired from USS *George Washington*, 20 July 1960.

in a "declining confidence in the existing strategy of the Alliance." This strategy reflected a period when the United States enjoyed a clear nuclear superiority, but its credibility was declining with the growth of Soviet nuclear and missile capability. No longer could the United States employ nuclear weapons while remaining relatively unscathed. The "soaring costs of general war" cast doubt on threats to unleash it against limited Soviet aggression, for example, in connection with Berlin. Tactical nuclear defense was not a solution; Soviet nuclear plenty had rendered such a strategy "costly in peacetime and self-defeating in wartime," since it would result in the destruction of much of Western Europe, the area it was intended to defend.

It followed that NATO must revise its strategy and forces to meet the conditions of the 1960s. The shield forces must have stronger conventional capabilities to lessen NATO's increasingly precarious dependence on a nuclear response to nonnuclear aggression. Also, Europe must be reassured that effective strategic power would be available in a crisis. Bowie argued that his proposals for reaching these two interdependent objectives must be judged as a single package.

Bowie defined (admittedly imprecisely) an adequate nonnuclear defense as one that could contain any Soviet conventional attack for "a sufficient time for the wider risks to become clear." Such a defense would require reversal of some current trends in weapons design (for example, tactical aircraft almost exclusively for nuclear warfare). The report did not, however, deny the need for some tactical nuclear weapons.

Recognizing that his proposal for a stronger shield force would involve significant added costs, Bowie did not present any specific figures. He contended, however, that his proposals fell "within the economic capability of an Alliance whose income—especially in Europe—has risen at such a rapid rate in recent years."

Bowie's prescription for enhancing the strategic deterrent has already been described: an interim missile force using Polaris submarines provided by the United States, to be followed by a permanent force with multinationally owned vessels manned by mixed crews, with nuclear warheads under U.S. control. Bowie firmly opposed any sharing of information to help France or other countries develop their own nuclear deterrents. Proliferation was not inevitable "unless we made it so."²²³

The Bowie report never reached the NSC for discussion. It was, however, widely circulated and quite influential. DoD had a mixed reaction to it. Gates, "very much impressed," thought it represented the "first reasonable approach" he had seen to the problem of reduced confidence in the concept of massive retaliation. (Gates had perhaps forgotten that General Taylor had argued along the same lines several years earlier.) Burke found a "great deal in it which is sound." Acknowledging opposition in the Joint Staff and elsewhere to the mere idea of such a report, Burke nevertheless urged his subordinates to "support those things which are sound even if they are written by Mr. Bowie."²²⁴

Some at lower levels took a less favorable view. The director of ISA's European Region, Maj. Gen. Frederic H. Miller, USAF, felt that Bowie was proposing a "rather substantial" change in strategy. Charles H. Shuff, the Defense representative to NATO, doubted that it would be possible to build up NATO's conventional strength to the degree advocated by Bowie and disputed Bowie's assertion that independent national deterrents would disrupt NATO.²²⁵

Parallel to the Bowie study was the State-Defense report on the future of NATO, directed by the NSC on 14 April 1960. As a contribution to this, the Joint Staff prepared an appraisal of how NATO should develop during the 1960s. It stressed the need for a "forward strategy" to insure retention of maximum territory and for a balanced mixture of conventional and nuclear weapons. The Joint Staff judged the current strategy directive (NSC 14/2) adequate; it provided flexibility that would allow changes in emphasis to reflect changing needs.²²⁶

ISA drafted a somewhat broader study, which came to some of the same conclusions, namely the need for both nuclear and nonnuclear forces. Regarding the supply and control of nuclear warheads, ISA judged the current stockpile system adequate to meet NATO needs, but foresaw that it might have to be modified to satisfy European concerns, perhaps through a promise that warheads in U.S. custody would be made available on request from SACEUR or SACLANT.²²⁷

Irwin sent this study to the JCS on 23 September, noting its intended use as a contribution to the joint State-Defense report on the future of NATO. He particularly wanted JCS comment on the adequacy of the study in connection with (a) the level of nuclear and nonnuclear weapons capability for appropriate NATO shield forces, and (b) the purpose of NATO MRBMs, whether as a theater commander's weapon to defend Europe or a strategic force that SACEUR could target against strategic objectives in the USSR, or as a combination of both.²²⁸

After reviewing the study, the JCS agreed that the shield forces must be adequate to contain a nonnuclear attack long enough to force the Soviets to withdraw or face general war. All of the chiefs except General White favored an explicit statement that these forces should be able to accomplish their mission "without resort to nuclear weapons." As for the MRBM force, they agreed on its use against a combination of targets, both in support of the immediate defense of Europe and as a strategic weapon.²²⁹

Earlier, the JCS had severely criticized the Planning Board study of 23 August on the pros and cons of nuclear sharing, stating their belief that the specific objective should be to maximize the degree of influence that the United States could exert over the proliferation of independent nuclear capabilities. As for the control of nuclear warheads in NATO, the Joint Chiefs restated their conviction that these should remain under national custody but should be automatically released when requested by SACEUR or SACLANT.²³⁰

Subsequently the JCS gave Secretary Gates their views on changes that should be made, if political necessity required, in the handling of nuclear weapons in the NATO stockpile. SACEUR and SACLANT should continue to determine requirements; other countries as well as the United States should contribute weapons, formally pledging not to withdraw them; information on the content of the stockpile should be made available to NATO; weapons should remain in custody of national personnel, to be released under procedures set by the NAC. These were an elaboration of the views expressed by the JCS on 26 January and were similar to the recommendations submitted earlier by Nolting and Norstad. However, the Joint Chiefs would not go so far as to give up the right of independent action in the use of nuclear weapons; this must be "zealously retained."

The JCS recommended that the study of NATO nuclear weapon capabilities, directed by the president on 25 August 1960, consider bilateral assistance to allies as well as multilateral custodial arrangements. The question of nuclear sharing could not, in their view, be resolved exclusively through multinational arrangements. For example, special arrangements with France were necessary owing to that nation's key position.²³¹

The number of papers, studies, and reports, completed or in progress, bearing on various matters connected with NATO had by now reached bewildering proportions. The Planning Board reduced the number somewhat on 5 October when the members decided to wrap up the Bowie study, the one on NATO nuclear capabilities, and the joint State-Defense study of the future of NATO into a single report for the NSC. This was the origin of what became NSC 6017.²³²

On 11 October the AFPC discussed the future of NATO in the light of the Bowie study. Several members of the council expressed concern that a piecemeal approach, with the various planning papers considered individually, could lead to an unintended revision of strategy. Gates noted that Army forces now had a fully tactical nuclear capability, and "you cannot disintegrate them." It was not possible to "recreate a nonnuclear Army." Lemnitzer agreed that one could not shift back and forth between nuclear and conventional capabilities "like turning [a] knob on a TV set."²³³

From Paris, Norstad, joined by Burgess and Houghton, wired Washington that many in Europe, notably Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany, felt unhappy with stockpile arrangements. There was no assurance that the weapons in the stockpile would remain there, nor did Europeans feel that they had the same authority as the United States in making them available when needed. Even the prospective NATO MRBM force, giving Europeans somewhat greater voice in the use of nuclear weapons, would not provide complete satisfaction.²³⁴

McCone favored a nuclear stockpile to which all those member nations able to contribute would do so. Such an arrangement might satisfy de Gaulle, since he would be able to make a contribution to NATO consistent with French prestige. The president instructed McCone to work out a plan, with

the concurrence of State and Defense, for a NATO stockpile that might be acceptable to de Gaulle. This should be submitted to the JCAE as soon as possible and then to the next session of Congress.²³⁵

The Planning Board's study of the future of NATO, entitled "NATO in the 1960s" (NSC 6017) and completed on 8 November, took for granted the continuing need for NATO in the face of unrelenting Soviet hostility. NATO's military planning must meet two objectives: deterring Soviet bloc aggression and, failing, that, defending all NATO territory as far forward as possible. There must be no reductions in the effectiveness of U.S. forces in Europe. Even the forces in the MRBM proposal, if submitted to the NAC in December as planned, could not substitute for the maintenance of strong U.S. forces in forward areas.

Within this area of agreement in NSC 6017, however, the usual differences of opinion between State and Defense appeared. Thus State, while supporting the two objectives of planning, wished to insert in NSC 6017 a warning that they might prove incompatible; preparations for a forward defense, if based on nuclear weapons, might divert funds from conventional forces and produce dependence on nuclear weapons that might stimulate neutralist sentiment in Europe. Hence State wished to specify the need for shield forces with adequate conventional capacity. Defense wished to speak merely of a need for a "flexibility of response," without referring specifically to nonnuclear forces.

To meet Europe's rising demand for a greater voice in the control of nuclear weapons, NSC 6017 recommended that the United States submit a proposal that would lend a "more truly multilateral character" to the stockpile. Specifically, NSC 6017 recommended a plan that combined the suggestions of both the JCS and Norstad. NATO commanders would determine requirements; the United States and other countries would contribute weapons, pledging not to withdraw them; national custodial units would be responsive to NATO authority. Weapons would be available for use as approved by the NAC, also by order of SACEUR or SACLANT (State) or "in accordance with existing procedures" (Defense). Pending the outcome of such a proposal, the United States should not assist in developing independent national nuclear capabilities.

Regarding nuclear submarines, the present policy authorizing negotiation of agreements was satisfactory, NSC 6017 concluded. The United States should inform the Netherlands, France, and Italy of its willingness to open negotiations on the understanding that any vessel built with U.S. aid would be committed to NATO. Consideration of a German request should be deferred.²³⁶

ISA reviewed NSC 6017 and found that it fell somewhat short of a "definitive long-range appraisal," but that the military portions seemed generally adequate. The Air Force and ISA strongly opposed State's call for an increase in conventional shield forces; the Army and Navy, however, favored the State position. The services reaffirmed these views when the JCS submitted their comments. The OSD comptroller criticized the

paper as being in conflict with efforts to solve the balance of payments problem, since it said nothing about reducing U.S. forces in NATO.²³⁷

The Planning Board approved NSC 6017 without change and sent it to the NSC. It became the occasion for the special NSC meeting of 17 November 1960, described earlier.²³⁸

The State-Defense disagreement in NSC 6017 over the equipping of the shield forces assumed cardinal importance, centering on whether NATO should prepare for a prolonged conventional war. In preparation for discussion in the NSC, Irwin consulted Norstad, setting forth a carefully worded statement of the underlying views of the two departments.²³⁹

Norstad found the State position "militarily unacceptable." State's proposal to build up the conventional shield forces would alarm the Europeans and detract from the effectiveness of the deterrent—just the opposite of the effects claimed by State. Still, Norstad's position resembled that of State in one respect. He would maintain a clear-cut distinction between conventional and nuclear war, with the latter entered into on the basis of considered judgment at a high level rather than as the automatic response of a battlefield commander dependent on tactical nuclear weapons.²⁴⁰

Just before the NSC meeting, McCone proposed that the United States offer to sell France a specified annual amount of enriched uranium on the condition that France place an equivalent amount in nuclear weapons in the NATO stockpile, participate fully in the stockpile as a NATO member, and stop the construction of its uranium diffusion plant, thereby freeing resources for other NATO purposes. At a State-Defense meeting on 16 November, Douglas suggested that this proposal might be presented to the NAC in connection with the MRBM proposal. Herter strongly opposed it as a probable invitation to demands for similar arrangements from other countries, notably Germany. It was agreed to put the matter on the agenda for the NSC meeting the following day.²⁴¹

When the NSC met in Augusta on 17 November, the discussion of NSC 6017 focused on individual issues rather than on the paper as a whole. At the outset Gray asked and obtained unanimous consent to the proposition that the United States should undertake a commitment to maintain in Europe, under U.S. custody, those nuclear weapons required for approved NATO military plans. The members then turned to the MRBM proposal, approving a permanent multilateral force as described above.

The matter of custody and control of nuclear weapons drew relatively little attention. McCone stressed the inadequacy of existing procedures, which, hampered by U.S. law, prevented a rapid response in an emergency. The council agreed that his office, with OSD and the JCS, would review those procedures and suggest any necessary legislative changes.

The president favored McCone's proposal for bilateral nuclear aid to France. However, he wanted first to know the outcome of the MRBM proposal. Herter opposed the McCone plan; Gates thought that the conditions attached to it might induce France to accept the MRBM proposal. The president directed McCone to study his plan further.

The question of nuclear submarine cooperation revealed a sharp split between Gates and McCone. Gates favored it, though strictly on a sales basis. McCone objected that it would involve disclosure of sensitive information. This position, in Eisenhower's view, made "second class countries" of the allies, since the United States would refuse to trust them with information already in the possession of the Soviet Union. The United States had delayed the French request, he noted, only because of France's action with regard to the Mediterranean fleet. However, he ruled that there must be no grant aid involved.

The major issues in NSC 6017 had now been settled, with the important exception of the strategic basis of the shield force. On Gray's recommendation, the president directed the referral of the remainder of NSC 6017 to the Planning Board, with particular reference to "studies looking toward long-term plans to reduce U.S. forces and expenditures in Europe."²⁴²

The council did not consider the question of a NATO nuclear authority, which would give the European nations a stronger voice in the decision to use the weapons. Norstad continued to advocate some arrangement along that line. On 21 November 1960, addressing the annual conference of NATO parliamentarians in Paris, he called for a "basic pool of atomic weapons," in the control of which all member nations would have an equal voice. Such an arrangement would make NATO a "fourth atomic power." Norstad's suggestions had no effect on discussions in Washington, although Herter referred to them in his speech to the NAC on 16 December.²⁴³

In this speech Herter dealt with multilateral control in the context of the MRBM proposal, which he said would represent a "major step" in the direction of shared nuclear authority, and would not preclude exploration of further developments in that direction. He gave firm assurance that the United States would maintain nuclear weapons in the stockpile. The MRBM force, he pointed out, could serve a double purpose: It could be allocated targets by SACEUR in conjunction with other retaliatory forces and at the same time accomplish a modernization of tactical forces. Otherwise, Herter did not go into the question of strategy.

The strengthening of shield forces, according to Herter, had as much importance as the requirements for MRBMs. Here he openly chided his foreign colleagues:

We believe that most of the other members of the Alliance now have ample economic and military potential to provide more fully for NATO defense. I can speak frankly here since my Government, in spite of having to carry tremendous financial and technical burdens in other areas vital to Alliance defense, is substantially meeting its MC-70 requirements.

I urge that each of your governments consider, in the course of our long range planning, what increased contribution it can make to this goal, not only in amount, but also in quality, with all that this involves in the way of training, supporting facilities, supplies and reserves.²⁴⁴

None of these statements, of course, required any action on the part of the NAC. The members "welcomed" the assurance regarding U.S. nuclear weapons and agreed on the importance of strengthening the shield forces.²⁴⁵

The NSC disposed of the question of stronger conventional forces for the shield in a brief discussion on 22 December. Although the principal disagreement, as usual, involved State and Defense, Treasury and Budget entered the fray, seeking a review of strategy to find one that could be implemented with smaller forces. The president rejoined that such an exercise was not strategy at all; it merely amounted to trying to get other countries to follow U.S. wishes. Regarding State's call for more conventional forces, he thought this worth considering, because "we may be surprised by the way hostilities develop." Gates said that Defense planning rested on the assumption, repeatedly reaffirmed by the NSC, that a limited war in the NATO area was impossible. After some further discussion, Gray summed up the consensus of the meeting as being opposed to any change in basic NATO strategy. The president approved, and the record of action so stated.²⁴⁶

It was hardly to be expected that the Eisenhower administration, with barely a month left in office, would undertake any major revision of NATO strategy. The entire study of long-range planning for NATO had turned out to be something of an anticlimax. The more important decisions—the MRBM force and nuclear submarine cooperation—had been made on a piecemeal basis without reference to the elaborate long-range studies. Other decisions, such as multilateral control of nuclear weapons and collaboration with France, had been postponed.

NATO at the End of 1960

Eleven years after the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Western alliance seemed to be on a firm foundation. Although France's cooperation left something to be desired, de Gaulle himself had renounced any intention to undermine NATO, and his formal withdrawal still lay some years in the future.

The U.S. commitment to NATO was genuine and unquestioning, repeatedly set forth in papers approved by the NSC. The president, a dedicated "Europeanist," was convinced that the fortunes of Western Europe and of the United States were inseparable in light of the continuing Soviet threat. NATO's forces indispensably supplemented those of the United States as part of the "containment" policy. For an administration concerned with economy, support of NATO forces represented a way of minimizing the drain of defense expenditures while maintaining and enhancing the military capabilities of both the United States and its European allies.

At the same time, the president regarded the commitment of U.S. ground forces in Europe as temporary and looked forward to the time when they could be withdrawn, leaving ground defense entirely to the Europeans. The hope of withdrawing forces derived from a desire for economy,

since overseas forces were more expensive than those at home. But the opportunity to withdraw troops from Europe had not yet arrived.

NATO's strategy, like that of the United States, hinged on prompt use of nuclear weapons in a general war. Hence a major objective of U.S. policy looked toward strengthening NATO's nuclear capability, including the means of delivery of such weapons. The objective was sought in several ways: the establishment of IRBM bases in Britain and on the continent, the offer of a NATO nuclear stockpile and of Polaris submarines to NATO, and the search for Polaris bases in Britain, some thousands of miles closer to Soviet territory than bases in the United States. The results of these steps were uneven, but by the end of 1960 NATO was well on the way to modernizing its forces to bring them into the missile age.

A major advocate of modernizing NATO's forces, Norstad apparently originated the idea of joint missile production. Beyond this relatively long-term goal, Norstad strove for missiles on or within range of the continent, under his control, as soon as possible and by 1963 at the latest. Hence his support of OSD's proposals to provide NATO with Polaris, the only suitable missile that would be available by the deadline.

The goal of strengthening NATO was fully shared by OSD and State, but they frequently disagreed over specific measures. State, more sensitive to political and diplomatic considerations, sought to steer NATO in the direction of a "flexible response" strategy, relying more heavily on conventional weapons, a position previously expressed by Secretary Dulles in 1957 when he warned of the approach of nuclear parity. Although State's views drew support in the military establishment from spokesmen for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, they were never adopted at higher levels in OSD. President Eisenhower, firmly committed to nuclear strategy, gave them little consideration, and it remained for his successor to adopt "flexible response" as a goal.

As for the European members of NATO, conscious of their nearness to the Soviet Union and their vulnerability to becoming the main arena of combat in the event of war, their ambivalence towards the strategic initiatives advanced by the United States was plain. Their support of the nuclear umbrella was counterbalanced by a fear of nuclear weapons that inclined them towards a lesser view of the Soviet threat than the United States held and toward a neutralism that sometimes alarmed the American leaders. At the same time, the high cost of conventional military forces disposed them to be more accepting of nuclear weapons than they would have preferred. Caught on the horns of this dilemma in a period of great political and technological change, the European members of NATO engaged in a continuing dialogue with the United States over almost every aspect of the alliance. The resolution of the issues that divided the two sides was inevitably compromise that generally left both parties less than satisfied.

CHAPTER XVIII

The Problem of Berlin

In their deliberations over the problems of missiles, nuclear weapons, and command and control arrangements during the last two years of the Eisenhower administration, the United States and its NATO allies always had to take into account the crisis over the status of Berlin. From late 1958 this was the most dangerous situation that faced the Eisenhower administration during its eight years in office. At stake the United States had the credibility of its guarantee to West Germany and of its entire position in Western Europe, commitments that administration officials believed worth defending even if the cost might ultimately be global nuclear war.¹

Two Germanys, Two Berlins

The crushing defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 left the entire country under occupation by U.S., British, French, and Soviet troops. At the outset of the occupation, the four powers attempted to rule the country through joint administration, but this soon failed; the wartime alliance broke up and the two sides pursued their own ends in Germany and Europe. Little more than four years after the war's end, two separate governments had emerged in Germany: the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), formed by merger of the three Western occupation zones, with a democratically elected government, and the so-called German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Soviet zone ruled by a rigid dictatorship wholly subservient to Moscow. Thus a division originally intended to be temporary hardened into what looked to be a permanent arrangement.²

The Soviets were quick to equip their German satellite with armed forces, initially disguised as "police," and the GDR became a member of the Warsaw Pact alliance of Communist nations. Rearmament of West Germany went more slowly, owing mainly to strong opposition from France. By 1955, however, the FRG had become a member of NATO and was well on the way to establishing armed forces of its own.³

Like the rest of Germany, the city of Berlin, the prewar capital, was divided into 4 occupation zones, but wartime diplomacy had left the entire

city within the Soviet zone of Germany, separated from Western occupation territory by a distance of some 110 miles. Through inadvertence, the Western powers failed to secure from the Soviets written guarantees of access to West Berlin through Soviet-occupied territory. Working-level agreements authorized the Western powers to use 1 highway and 1 rail line between Berlin and Hanover, plus 3 air corridors, each 20 miles wide, connecting with the 3 Western zones in Germany.⁴


The vulnerability of the Western position in Berlin became starkly apparent in 1948 when the Soviets severed rail and highway access between West Berlin and the rest of Germany. This blatant attempt to drive the Western Big Three from Berlin was defeated by a hastily mounted air transport operation. U.S. and British aircraft kept Berlin adequately supplied through the ensuing winter. In 1949 the Soviets abandoned their "blockade," although they and their East German allies subjected Western traffic to occasional minor harassment.

Berlin still remained under nominal four-power occupation even after the establishment of two separate Germanys. The four-power "kommandatura" established in 1945 to govern Berlin continued in existence, but had long since ceased to function. East Berlin was established as the capital of the GDR. The Western nations combined their Berlin occupation zones into one, with an elected mayor.⁵

United States policymakers were, of course, fully aware that the exposed Western position in Berlin, surrounded on all sides by superior forces of the Soviet Union and the GDR, was completely indefensible. "Short of direct military attack," admitted a policy paper approved by the NSC and the president in January 1954, "the USSR has the capability of making the Western position in Berlin untenable by restricting Western access to the city." Should such an event occur, U.S. security interests would require "immediate and forceful action," even at the risk of general war. Specifically, the United States would warn Moscow of its intention to use force if necessary to defend its rights in Berlin. At the outset, limited military force would be used to make the Soviets reveal their intentions and to attempt to reopen ground access. If such a force encountered determined opposition, no additional local troops would be committed; the resort would be to general war. No provision was made for another airlift to defeat a blockade of highway and rail access.

If Soviet forces attacked Berlin, the United States would act on the assumption that general war was imminent. The NSC considered in 1957 the possibility that GDR forces alone might attack the city and agreed that it might or might not be treated in the same manner as a Soviet attack, depending on a decision to be made at the time.⁶

The United States commander in chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), who also commanded NATO forces under the title of supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR) had responsibility for preparation of plans to carry out this policy. Plans drawn up by USCINCEUR called for use of a reinforced platoon as a probe to determine Soviet intentions. To reopen



Occupation Sectors in Berlin

ground access, a force of a size and composition to be determined at the time would attempt to transit the autobahn between Berlin and West Germany and overcome resistance "to the extent feasible." If it encountered greatly superior force, it would withdraw. The JCS approved these plans in May 1956. A related plan provided for a limited airlift, sufficient to prevent depletion of stockpiles built up in Berlin, but not on the scale of the 1948-49 operation.⁷

Plans prepared by USCINCEUR were unilateral. Progress in tripartite planning with the United Kingdom and France, the other two occupying powers in West Berlin, lagged because of the reluctance of those two nations; they were inclined to favor reliance on a new airlift to counter a new blockade. Early in 1957, however, staffs of the three powers completed a study of the military implications of measures contemplated in U.S. policy. They concluded that it would be feasible to employ limited force in response to interference with highway and air routes, but not with rail lines or waterways. Perhaps in response to this conclusion, USCINCEUR dropped a proposal for a limited probe by rail, initially part of his contingency plans. Railways, after all, could be easily blocked or the trains rerouted by using switches.⁸

As a major issue in the Cold War, the status of Berlin and Germany figured prominently in the unending diplomatic wrangles between the two rival blocs, since both sides understood that the fate of Europe was closely bound up with the disposition of the largest country in Europe outside of the Soviet Union. In 1955 at the Geneva summit conference, the powers agreed that Germany should be unified through free elections. Almost immediately, however, the Soviets violated the "spirit of Geneva" by giving full diplomatic recognition to the GDR, with the right to control civilian traffic to and from Berlin. The Western powers continued to hold the Soviet Union responsible for fulfillment of all agreements regarding the city.⁹

A letter from Premier Bulganin of the Soviet Union to President Eisenhower on 10 December 1957 touched off a new round of discussion on the status of Germany and Berlin. Perhaps seeking to head off plans to establish a stockpile of nuclear weapons for NATO, Bulganin made various proposals for arms control, most notably exclusion of all nuclear weapons from both Germanys. Eisenhower replied with a reminder of the unkept Geneva agreement. A volley of diplomatic exchanges ensued, with the Soviets insisting that German reunification must come about through discussions between the two Germanys themselves. In September 1958 the Soviets proposed a four-power commission to consider a German peace treaty, also a meeting of East and West German delegates to discuss "confederation." The U.S. reply of 30 September insisted on the prior establishment of a government that reflected the will of the German people; nevertheless it expressed willingness to discuss the proposed four-power commission.¹⁰

Earlier, in November 1956, there had been a new round of harassment of traffic between Berlin and the West, perhaps inspired by the Communists'

need to demonstrate their power in the face of unrest in Poland and Hungary. Soviet officers began checking the credentials of individual passengers traveling by military vehicles. The United States accepted this procedure under protest. In April 1957 the Soviets presented the allied commanders with a list of specific criteria to which travelers must conform. Again Western officials protested, but after seven months of discussion they agreed to show travel orders and identity documents of official travelers.¹¹

On 15 January 1958 Soviet authorities detained all U.S. military trains between Berlin and West Germany. Three days later the wife of the U.S. commander in Berlin (USCOB), on a shopping trip to East Berlin, was detained for several hours by East German police. The resulting protest drew the reply that the matter lay between the United States and the GDR. This was typical of other incidents in which the Soviets sought to force more contacts with East German officials, apparently in order to gain *de facto* recognition for the GDR. Thus the U.S. commander in Berlin received a similar reply when he protested the action of East German police in invading the U.S. sector in search of deserters from the GDR army. On 23 June a truck convoy was denied entrance to the East German autobahn on the grounds that documentation was insufficient, although standard procedures had been followed.¹²

These and similar annoyances served (as they were no doubt intended) to demonstrate the precariousness of the Western position in Berlin. But none of them, individually or collectively, amounted to an overt threat to that position. Hence the NSC saw no need for any new departure when it discussed Germany and Berlin early in 1958 and reaffirmed the existing policy.¹³

The Crisis of November 1958

The situation changed abruptly in November 1958 when Khrushchev mounted a direct challenge to the entire Western position in Berlin. Why he did so at that time remains unclear. For whatever reason, he decided the time had come to terminate the nominal four-power occupation of Berlin and to force the issue of formal recognition of the GDR. How far would he go in pursuing these objectives? The peace of the world hung on the answer.

Speaking in Moscow on 10 November, Khrushchev assailed the revival of "militarism" in West Germany and alleged that the Western powers had violated the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 governing postwar Germany. The time had come, he said, to renounce what was left of the occupation regime in Berlin and to create a "normal situation" in the capital of the GDR. The Soviet Union would turn over to the "sovereign" GDR such functions as it still exercised in Berlin; the Western powers should reach agreement with the GDR on all matters concerning the city. He added a warning that any attack on the GDR would be regarded as an attack on the Soviet Union itself.¹⁴

Khrushchev's implication that the Western powers' rights in Berlin derived solely from the Potsdam Agreement was juridically incorrect. Their position rested on their rights as the victorious powers in World War II and as defined in other agreements, notably that of 5 June 1945 on zones of occupation in Germany.¹⁵


More disturbing than this false allegation was the statement of future Soviet intentions. If the Soviets did bow out and turn over all their responsibilities to the GDR, the Western powers would be forced to accord virtual recognition to a regime that they regarded as forcibly imposed on East Germany by Soviet power and thus devoid of legitimacy.¹⁶

Before the United States could react to Khrushchev's speech, another incident of harassment occurred in Berlin. On 14 November three U.S. military vehicles headed toward West Germany were detained at the Soviets' Babelsberg checkpoint. Soviet personnel demanded the right to inspect the vehicles and, when this was denied, refused to allow the vehicles either to proceed on their way or to return to West Berlin. The U.S. political adviser in Berlin, Findlay Burns, protested to Soviet authorities that this action was "intolerable." The U.S. commander in Berlin, Maj. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, quickly drew up a plan to extricate the vehicles and personnel by force, but the Soviets released them before the plan could be approved at higher echelons.¹⁷

General Lauris Norstad, USCINCEUR, told Washington on 15 November that he intended to have the U.S. commander in Berlin dispatch a convoy to Helmstedt in the near future. He asked authority to have USCOB extricate personnel and equipment by minimum force if they were detained and not promptly released after protest. The JCS, after discussion with State, withheld approval pending receipt of further details of the incident of 14 November. These were duly furnished, but the request was not approved. Secretary Dulles told the president on 18 November that the situation in Berlin had eased; the "rather extreme" actions advocated by Norstad and the JCS had been moderated by a better understanding of the facts. The president agreed with Dulles on the need for allied consensus before the United States took any action that might lead to hostilities.¹⁸

The JCS had not, however, abandoned the idea of using force to extricate U.S. convoys. General Twining told a JCS-State meeting on 21 November that the JCS had drafted instructions to CINCUSAREUR for this purpose but that McElroy had refused to approve them at that time. Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy indicated that State did not favor extricating convoys by force. Rather, the United States should warn the Soviets in advance, then equip its convoys with enough force to push through to their destination. Such action in 1948, in his view, would have forced the Soviets to back down and cancel their blockade. Twining thought this proposal worth considering. The conferees agreed that an airlift should be a last resort. They decided to turn these matters over to a State-Defense working group being formed to review the entire Berlin situation.¹⁹

This group, chaired by Foy Kohler, deputy assistant secretary of state



Authorized Access Routes to Berlin from the FRG

for European affairs, included representatives from ISA and the Joint Staff. In five days of meetings (21-26 November), the members discussed possible reactions ranging from negotiations with the Soviets on the entire German question to the use of force to maintain access to Berlin and a "miniature" airlift sufficient to supply military garrisons in Berlin. Representatives of the United Kingdom and France attended the first meeting. The members approved working papers to be submitted to Secretary Dulles for discussion with the president.²⁰

Norstad believed that if the Soviets surrendered their control functions to the East Germans the United States should at once warn the Soviet Government that it would not allow GDR officials to impede the exercise of any U.S. rights and would take military action if necessary. So long as checkpoints remained under Soviet control—to the extent of even one Soviet representative on whom responsibility could be fixed—the United States should continue to operate military convoys as in the past. But if checkpoints were turned over completely to GDR control, the United States should promptly force the issue by sending a test convoy, supported by "appropriate force."²¹

The JCS fully endorsed Norstad's views and urged McElroy to seek concurrence from State. With McElroy's approval, they instructed USCINCEUR to continue to operate convoys as before so long as checkpoints remained under Soviet control.²²

In a press conference on 26 November 1958, Dulles told reporters that the three major Western powers were in "basic agreement" on the Berlin situation. The Soviet Union had an obligation to allow "normal access to and egress from Berlin." The United States would not deal with the East Germans in any manner that involved acceptance of the GDR as a substitute for the Soviet Union. It might, however, accept them as "agents" of the Soviets.²³

Existing instructions governing the movement of U.S. military traffic allowed a minimum of contact with GDR personnel. If a train or highway convoy was stopped by an East German official, the U.S. officer in charge was to demand transit as a matter of right. If refused, he would ask to see a Soviet officer, to whom normal documentation would be shown. If this second request was refused, the officer would, under oral protest, produce the necessary documentation. If passage continued to be refused, USCINCEUR would be informed by radio, and the vehicles would return to the point of origin.²⁴

On 27 November the Soviet Government took a step that dramatically escalated the crisis. The Soviets handed the three Western powers a long note in which they asserted that Berlin had become a "dangerous center of contradiction between the Great Powers." The note reviewed the history of the Berlin problem from the Soviet point of view, according to which the Western powers were guilty of violating all the agreements on Germany. The only one still being carried out pertained to the quadripartite status of Berlin. The Western powers were making use of their position in West

Berlin to turn it into a "state within a state" and to use it as a center of subversive activity against the Communist bloc. Accordingly, the Soviet Government served notice that it regarded as null and void all the agreements relating to four-power control of Berlin. At an "appropriate time," the Soviet Government would enter into negotiations with the GDR with a view to transferring to the latter the functions then being performed by Soviet authorities under the above-mentioned agreements.

As for Berlin, the best solution, according to the Soviet note, would be its reunification and absorption into the GDR. But, foreseeing Western objections, the Soviets proposed conversion of West Berlin into a "free city" under its own government. In what they evidently intended as a generous concession to their opponents, the Soviets recognized that some time would be needed to agree on this proposal. Hence they promised to make no change in existing procedures governing military traffic for "half a year." If this period was not utilized to reach an "adequate agreement," the Soviet Union would conclude a treaty with the GDR—which, "like any other independent state, must fully deal with questions concerning its space," exercising its sovereignty "on land, on water, and in the air." At the same time, contacts between Soviet officials and those of the Western powers on questions concerning Berlin would terminate.²⁵

The threats made by Khrushchev in his speech of 10 November had thus been formally confirmed in writing. Moreover, the ominous reference to "half a year" for reaching an agreement sounded, to Western ears at least, very much like a six-month ultimatum.

The new situation called for a review of plans. Kohler's working group met on 1 December, reviewed the previously approved papers, and found no need for major revision. The members agreed that the idea of a four-power conference on Berlin should be pursued further. The forthcoming meeting of Western foreign ministers in Paris, in advance of the regular NATO ministerial meeting, would provide an opportunity to discuss the idea with the allies.²⁶

Quarles warned on 9 December that the announced delay of "half a year" in the Soviet note would not preclude the Soviets from undertaking some "surprise move" any time it suited their purposes. To be prepared, the United States should ensure revision of the contingency plans for Berlin travel to eliminate all dealings with GDR officials at railway and highway checkpoints. Like Norstad, he believed that the United States should inform the Soviets that it would not deal with GDR personnel and should seize the initiative by proposing a four-power conference on Germany. And like Twining, Quarles believed that an airlift should be a last resort.²⁷

In a meeting with the president on 11 December, Under Secretary of State Herter pointed out that in view of the Soviet note, the Western powers could no longer even countenance accepting East Germans as Soviet "agents" and dealing with them on a purely local level. Moreover, Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany had reacted "violently" against the idea. In a

discussion of the use of a "token" force to challenge any new blockage of access, General Taylor, representing the JCS, explained the impossibility of determining in advance the kind of force needed to smoke out Soviet intentions. The JCS, he added, had plans if necessary to go to a "garrison" airlift, sufficient only to supply the troops in Berlin.

Eisenhower favored an approach to Khrushchev that would stress the (assumed) Soviet desire to avoid war and would seek an overall German settlement, at the same time warning against denial of U.S. rights in Berlin. He directed immediate talks with the French, British, and West German Governments to work out a common approach.²⁸

The North Atlantic Council meeting in Paris later in the month afforded an opportunity for the Western powers to set forth their position in general terms. On 14 December the foreign ministers of the three major countries, plus West Germany, jointly reaffirmed their determination to maintain their rights with respect to Berlin, including that of free access. Two days later the NAC fully endorsed this declaration and added that the Soviet denunciation of interallied agreements on Berlin "can in no way deprive the other parties of their rights or relieve the Soviet Union of its obligations." The Berlin question, declared the NAC, "can only be settled in the framework of an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on Germany as a whole."²⁹

A four-power working group (the Western Big Three plus the FRG) then drafted a reply to the Soviet note of 27 November. This, delivered on 31 December, made it clear that the Western powers would not surrender their position in Berlin. It expressed willingness to discuss ending the occupation of Berlin, but only as part of the overall German problem and not "under menace or ultimatum."³⁰

The Soviets responded to this step with a draft of a peace treaty with Germany, sent to the Western powers on 10 January 1959. At the same time, the Soviets dismissed the idea of four-power negotiations on German unification; this was a matter for discussion between the two German states. And the problem of European security was distinct from that of Berlin.³¹

French and British representatives met in Washington on 5 January 1959 with Murphy of State, Irwin of Defense, and other U.S. officials to discuss the use of limited force to reopen ground access to Berlin if necessary. Reluctant to commit themselves to this course of action, the British believed that other possibilities, notably an airlift, should be considered. The U.S. officials strongly opposed an airlift. No decision was reached on this point; the conferees approved a British suggestion for a "timetable of actions" to demonstrate Western resolve and readiness.³²

The JCS drafted a list of possible actions, beginning with immediate minor steps such as strengthening of guards at checkpoints and on trains, and leading to national mobilization and a forcible attempt to reopen surface access by 28 May, when the Soviets' deadline would have expired. For a test application of limited force, if needed, the Chiefs recommended that a small motor convoy with a platoon-sized combat escort push through opposition until stopped by force. If the convoy was cut off, a reinforced

division should follow, with full recognition that this step might lead to further major operations. Hence it should be accompanied by preparation for general war, although whether or not to undertake such a conflict would be a matter for decision at the time. The United States should be prepared to act alone if not supported by allies.

In sending this list to McElroy, the JCS stressed that both the USSR and the allies "must be convinced of our willingness to use whatever degree of force may be necessary" It was of the "utmost importance" to reach allied agreement upon a course of action including the use of limited force "to show our firm determination to maintain our rights of surface access to Berlin."³³

The JCS went over this list in detail with Murphy and other State officials on 14 January, before it had been approved by McElroy. Twining felt it important that the State Department understand the "military requirements of the situation." The meeting indicated that JCS and State officials were thinking along the same lines.³⁴

McElroy approved the list and forwarded it to Dulles, recognizing that, for political or other reasons, it might not be feasible to follow the schedule. The first step, in his view, had to be a firm political decision based on the principles that the United States would meet a challenge to surface access by military action on the ground (instead of evading the issue by resorting to another airlift); would be prepared to follow up initial actions with increasing measures of military force; and would accept the risk of general war.³⁵

Of more immediate importance than a possible new surface blockade, which might or might not eventually occur, the question of replacement of GDR for Soviet personnel seemed a virtual certainty in the light of the Soviet note of 27 November. The president discussed the question with his advisers on 29 January 1959 in one of the last major meetings attended by Secretary Dulles. In Eisenhower's view, allowing the Soviets to hand over their rights to the GDR would mean virtual recognition of that government. Minor concessions might start the United States on a "slippery slope" toward full GDR control over traffic to and from Berlin. On the other hand, as the president remarked, it would not be easy to explain to the public a decision to risk war over such a matter as the nationality of an official who stamped documents. On balance, however, the conferees agreed that the United States should refuse to accept substitution of East German for Soviet personnel. Showing identifying documents to GDR personnel to establish the military nature of a convoy would not be construed as such acquiescence; however, U.S. drivers would not permit GDR personnel to stamp their identification papers or to search their vehicles.

Turning to the question of immediate actions, Dulles recommended quiet military preparations that would be detectable by Soviet intelligence without alarming the public. However, he disapproved of the JCS proposal to prepare for large-scale use of force. Rather, the United States should send a convoy accompanied by a single armed vehicle; if obstructed, it

should return to its point of departure, and transit would be suspended while the United States sought to mobilize world opinion against the Soviet Union. The question of further military pressure would be a matter for later decision. This "double-barreled" approach, as Dulles called it, contrasted with the JCS proposal to move quickly from a platoon-sized convoy escort to a division. As the president remarked, even a division would be inadequate to force passage. Twining defended the JCS viewpoint. If the United States was unwilling to risk general war in this instance, he said, it might as well get out of Europe. Dulles agreed that risk of war was sometimes necessary but thought that in this situation peace initiatives should be given a chance to work.

The president approved Dulles's approach, including his suggestion for unobtrusive preparatory measures. He also approved Dulles's proposal to begin discussions with the Soviets by mid-April. The object, he said, was to allow Khrushchev the opportunity to withdraw from his stated position without loss of face.³⁶

There was already some evidence of Soviet retreat from the original position, or at least from the interpretation placed on it by the Western powers. Deputy Soviet Premier Anastas Mikoyan visited the United States in January. In his public remarks, he repeatedly implied that the six-month deadline applied to the beginning of negotiations, not to the conclusion of an agreement. He restated this point after he returned to Moscow.³⁷

As Dulles had recommended, the JCS drafted a list of preparatory measures to impress the Soviets without exciting public alarm. These included steps to improve readiness and visibility of military forces as well as the use of covert channels to inform the Soviets that the Western powers were reviewing their defense plans. Norstad was already putting some of these into effect.³⁸

Little or no sentiment existed among U.S. officials in favor of another airlift as a response to stoppage of surface traffic. The question had been touched on in the meeting of 29 January; Dulles pointed out that the civilian population could be fed in that manner but that West Berlin's thriving economy could not be supported. Still, as McElroy told Twining on 5 January, although DoD would not consider an airlift as a preferred course of action, it would be well to prepare for it by a study of the technical problems that might be encountered, particularly the ability of the Soviets to jam U.S. communications and navigational aids. Twining replied that these matters were already under study, with due caution to avoid taking any actions that might mislead the Soviets into thinking that the United States was seriously preparing for another airlift.³⁹

The somewhat placatory line put forth by Mikoyan did not signify the end of friction on the Berlin traffic routes. On 2 February Soviet military authorities at the western end of the autobahn held up a U.S. military convoy, demanding the right to board the trucks and inspect their contents. The vehicles remained impounded for over two days while the United States dispatched protests at successively higher echelons. Finally,

after a protest by the embassy in Moscow, the convoy was released without inspection.⁴⁰

Early in February Dulles left Washington to visit London, Paris, and Bonn to formulate a common policy on Berlin. He apparently found little difficulty in reaching a meeting of the minds. All three countries, as Dulles stated on his return, had agreed that it would be unacceptable for East Germany to take over Soviet responsibilities toward Berlin and that their position in West Berlin must be preserved. They had also agreed on holding a foreign ministers meeting to discuss Germany and European security. The proposal for such a meeting, drafted by a four-power working group set up in Washington on 4 February, was transmitted to the Soviet Union in a note of 16 February.⁴¹

Along more substantive lines, the Western Big Three agreed on a general course of action if access to Berlin were blocked. They would send trucks accompanied by an armed vehicle. If this probe faced obstruction, the Western powers would suspend surface traffic while they sought to mobilize world opinion against the Soviets and intensified military preparations. This, of course, was Dulles's "double track" approach.⁴²

On 2 March the Soviets replied to the Western note of 16 February. They expressed a preference for a meeting "at the highest level," but, if the Western powers were not yet ready for one, they were willing to take part in a foreign ministers meeting, possibly in Vienna or Geneva.⁴³

The agreement to begin negotiations in the near future relieved some of the urgency of the situation. It remained only to determine the time and place for the talks.

Looking Toward a Foreign Ministers Meeting

To prepare for the meeting, State set up a working group chaired by a representative of Kohler's office, with members also from ISA and JCS, to provide input for the four-power group that was moving from Washington to Paris.⁴⁴ At a special session of the NSC on 5 March 1959 devoted entirely to Berlin, Herter posed the basic question: Was the United States prepared to use force to reopen access to Berlin even at the risk of general war? The president, without giving a direct answer, stated merely that the use of force would necessitate support from the allies. The conferees agreed on the need for favorable public opinion. Eisenhower approved a suggestion by Gordon Gray that the fact of the meeting be released to the press in order to indicate the importance of the Berlin situation.⁴⁵

On the following day, the president, with Herter and McElroy, met with the ranking leaders of the House and Senate, then with a larger group including the chairmen of the two military affairs committees. The congressmen assured the president of their support of a policy of firmness accompanied by willingness to negotiate. Some questioned the administration's plans under the current budget to reduce military strength. The president replied

that extra troop strength would not help in the current situation, since there was no intention of fighting a full-scale ground war to defend Berlin.⁴⁶

The somewhat diffuse and rambling discussion at the 5 March NSC meeting, held with little staff preparation, had produced no clear-cut decisions on Berlin policy. Feeling the need for guidance, McElroy took the initiative in arranging further discussions with his colleagues.⁴⁷ Accordingly, McElroy, Quarles, Twining, and Irwin met with Herter and other State Department officials on 9 and 14 March as a "Berlin Contingency Planning Group." They reviewed the decisions reached by the interdepartmental working group and approved them for submission to the president. There would be no recourse to general war, it was agreed, until the United States had attempted a probe and had appealed to the United Nations. No need existed yet to rally public opinion or to undertake general mobilization, which should in any case not be launched until access was actually blocked. McElroy expressed a need to have someone make an on-the-spot investigation of convoy procedures. He considered it extremely important to avoid any appearance of being aggressive over what might be construed publicly as a mere technicality. His suggestion to send an interdepartmental group to investigate working convoy procedures received approval.

How far should the United States be willing to deal with East German officials? The right of East Germany to regulate civilian traffic had been recognized; this in turn implied acceptance of a request for identification of military to distinguish it from civilian traffic. But as Quarles and Irwin pointed out, the next step might be East Germany's assertion of a right to question and demand verification of the identification. Also, would East German stamping of documents constitute "control" of access? McElroy pointed out that it was precisely such questions that necessitated a thorough understanding of convoy procedures; hence no decisions could be reached until after the inspection group had reported on the subject.

McElroy brought up the question of air traffic. Currently, flights to Berlin were at altitudes between 2,500 and 10,000 feet. Occasional flights occurred at higher altitudes, but beginning in 1956 the Soviets insisted on 10,000 feet as a fixed ceiling and denied clearance to higher flights. In September 1957 a new turboprop transport, the C-130, was introduced into the European theater; it operated most efficiently at altitudes of 25,000 feet or so. A request by the commander in chief, U.S. Air Forces, Europe (CINCUSAFE) to use the C-130 on the Berlin corridors, at heights well above 10,000 feet, was held up by a dispute between State and Defense over the response to a possible Communist attack on the aircraft. McElroy now proposed to begin using the C-130 to establish clearly the U.S. right to fly at any desired altitude. This would require presidential approval. Herter agreed to support the proposal if Defense considered such flights necessary.

At McElroy's request, Twining read a list of actions proposed by the JCS, which went well beyond the "quiet preparatory measures" already approved. These included activity by the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean;

preparations for deployment of naval units to the Persian Gulf area and of tactical air squadrons to Central Europe; speedup of shipments of military assistance to Western Europe; accelerated training and equipping of two armored divisions; deployment of the Second Fleet to the North Atlantic at an appropriate time; and possibly shipment of an additional division from the United States if Norstad considered it necessary. These were tentatively approved, subject to presidential approval.⁴⁸

One of the questions discussed at the 9 March meeting of the Berlin Contingency Planning Group concerned the relation between the Berlin crisis and the administration's planned reduction of 30,000 in military manpower. Eisenhower had told the congressional leaders that he did not intend to postpone the reduction. He discussed the subject with McElroy on 9 March. McElroy favored the reduction; he thought that it had been a mistake to postpone cutbacks in 1958 at the time of the Lebanon and Quemoy crises. The president told him to go ahead, although Secretary Dulles had earlier remarked that delaying the reduction might have some favorable psychological effect.⁴⁹

Another question involved a proposed cut of approximately 4,000 troops in Europe. Norstad had asked the JCS to suspend this and to furnish him with an additional 7,000 men. McElroy endorsed these requests and obtained the president's approval, explaining that the extra strength in Europe could be absorbed by adjustments elsewhere.⁵⁰

The JCS were not entirely of one mind regarding Berlin, except in favoring an unequivocal defense of U.S. rights. Twining told the president on 9 March that some of his colleagues felt that the United States was not going far enough; they favored actions that he considered provocative. Eisenhower observed that overreaction would play into Soviet hands.⁵¹

Twining nevertheless went along with his colleagues in two papers that they sent to McElroy. In the first, on 11 March, they urged that the United States prepare for a possible outbreak of hostilities and signify a clear determination to fight for Berlin if all other measures failed. The JCS doubted that the Soviets would in fact risk war to evict the allies from Berlin. In any event, the United States was in a better position for a showdown than the USSR if proper preparations were made.⁵²

Five days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cited Berlin as the "most flagrant and dangerous example" of the Soviet tactic of creating crises to divide and weaken the free world. They urged that the United States inform the Soviet Union that any turnover of authority to the GDR would be unacceptable. If it nevertheless occurred, the JCS suggested three possible actions by the Western powers: (1) consider all agreements on Germany to be abrogated and recognize the FRG as the legal government of all Germany; (2) consider that the Soviets had abrogated all their occupation rights and reserve the right to exercise, in any or all parts of Germany, the occupational authority previously exercised by the Soviet Union; or (3) recognize the GDR as the de facto provisional government of the Soviet zone in return for guarantees of access to Berlin. McElroy sent these proposals

to the State Department, drawing in reply an assurance that they would receive consideration in connection with the forthcoming foreign ministers conference.⁵³

The president delivered a nationwide address on the evening of 16 March. The purpose was to assure the nation and the world of U.S. resolve without exciting fear. Both "free people and principle," he said, were at stake in Berlin. While willing to negotiate at any time, the United States could not invite a risk of war by weakness or irresolution. He concluded with an impressive catalog of U.S. military strength and preparedness, explicitly rejecting a need for any increase in military personnel.⁵⁴

McElroy and Herter signed a joint memorandum on 17 March intended to lay before the president the tentative decisions reached by the Berlin Contingency Planning Group. They recommended immediate approval of the following steps:

(1) Authorize test flights in and out of Berlin at altitudes above 10,000 feet, to take place before 27 May.

(2) Amend current contingency plans to include the sending of a routine truck convoy (without an armed escort) immediately after East Germans replaced Soviets.

(3) Direct State, Defense, JCS, and CIA to analyze the implications of the following alternative courses of action if access were blocked and negotiations failed: (a) a substantial effort to reopen ground access by local action; (b) an effort to reopen air access; (c) reprisals against the Communist bloc in other areas, such as naval controls on bloc shipping; and (d) general war measures.

Related questions concerned how far the United States should go in modifying its position for the sake of allied unity and in allowing substitution of German for Soviet personnel. The U.S. opposition to substitution came into question in both foreign and domestic quarters, with attention focusing on the issue of stamping documents. State and Defense tended to disagree on this issue, with State taking the harder line already adopted against submission of any documentation to GDR personnel. Defense believed that this position stressed legal technicalities over fundamentals and gave the impression that the United States preferred dealing with Russian rather than German personnel. The JCS attached to the memorandum their list of proposed additional military measures.⁵⁵

The president read this memorandum the same day and approved it, including the military measures. As for allied unity, he emphasized that the United States could not compromise its principles; it might even be impossible to modify the position on stamping documents. On the general issue of substitution of personnel, however, he inclined toward the Defense view.⁵⁶

The JCS interpreted the president's action on 17 March as a decision

that the United States would maintain its rights in Berlin, and so informed the unified and specified commands. The current U.S. position (on which tripartite agreement had not been reached) declared unacceptable the substitution of GDR for Soviet personnel. Should it take place, procedures for movement of traffic should remain as before with no initial abnormal show of force. The Joint Chiefs instructed Norstad, CINCLANT, and CINCPAC to take measures to strengthen and redeploy their forces and to intensify reconnaissance and surveillance in their areas.⁵⁷

British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visited Washington from 20 to 22 March 1959. He and Eisenhower generally agreed on the importance of maintaining Western rights in Berlin and on an agenda for the forthcoming foreign ministers meeting. They disagreed over the advisability of acquiescing in the Soviet desire for a summit meeting. Reflecting a prevailing British viewpoint, Macmillan inclined to be somewhat more conciliatory. Facing an election in the near future, he was acutely sensitive to public opinion in his country. It would be impossible, he said, to lead his people into war over Berlin without first trying a summit meeting. Eisenhower finally approved a statement that the United States would take part in a summit conference as soon as developments in the foreign ministers meeting justified it. On this basis, the Western powers on 26 March proposed ministerial talks to begin at Geneva on 11 May. Four days later the Soviets agreed.⁵⁸

The JCS made a preliminary analysis of the four possible courses of military action set forth in the Defense-State memorandum of 17 March. The first two—efforts to reopen ground or air access—would, they concluded, introduce the risk of general war; hence appropriate preparatory measures should first be taken. Reprisals in other areas could include harassment of bloc shipping, which would be justified under international law and the UN Charter, but the effort might be disproportionate to the effects, since it would tie up a considerable portion of U.S. naval strength. Preparations for general war could not be carried out without public awareness, and the Soviets would likely feel compelled to respond in some positive way; they might even feel sufficiently threatened to reopen negotiations.⁵⁹

The JCS conclusions were incorporated into the interagency study that the president had directed. At the same time, State and CIA analyzed nonmilitary countermeasures. These included diplomatic pressure on the Soviet bloc (including a break in diplomatic relations); a trade embargo; and denial of landing privileges to bloc aircraft. The JCS reviewed these measures and generally approved them, while noting that some had military implications and should be considered together with the proposed military measures.⁶⁰

The president, in a special NSC meeting on 23 April, approved the proposed actions, military and other, as a basis for unilateral planning by DoD and for use in interdepartmental discussion by a new group, chaired by Murphy of State, which was to consider military, political, and economic actions. Eisenhower specified, however, that any plans for the use of force would be subject to review and decision in the light of circumstances.⁶¹

In Europe, a Defense-State inspection group headed by Deputy ASD (ISA) Robert Knight and Brig. Gen. Hal C. Pattison, USA, deputy director of operations (J-3) in the Joint Staff, conducted a thorough inspection of convoy measures between 16 and 26 March. In forwarding the group's report to McElroy, Knight pointed out how easily rail and road access could be closed, either by troops or simply by demolition of some of more than 100 bridges and overpasses. Likewise the canal system could be readily blocked, and harassing tactics could sharply reduce air traffic. Procedures for documentation of allied travel, Knight continued, had become "extremely technical and legalistic"; this blurred the distinction between control and obstruction and would make it difficult to make a convincing legal case even for the U.S. public. Knight recommended that any probe be strong enough to demonstrate clearly that the allies would use the amount of force necessary to maintain access.⁶²

The president's decision on 17 March had extended to authorization of high-altitude C-130 flights to Berlin. Before these were undertaken, however, Herter and Twining consulted the president again. They warned that the need to maintain a fighter alert for possible protection of the transports might result in an armed clash. The president recognized the danger but stood by his earlier decision.⁶³

Accordingly, on 26 March the JCS directed USCINCEUR to conduct transport flights to and from Berlin above 10,000 feet via selected air corridors. This was to be done "openly in normal fashion following regular procedures" on random schedules several times each week. French and British military authorities were to be advised.⁶⁴

On the following day, CINCUSAFE dispatched a C-130 on a flight from Evreux Air Base, France, to Tempelhof Airport, Berlin, at 27,000 feet. The flight plan was submitted in routine manner to the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC), where the Soviet controller warned that the safety of the flight could not be guaranteed. The aircraft landed safely at Tempelhof, then departed for Ramstein Air Base. On both legs of the flight, it was "buzzed" by Soviet fighter aircraft (MIG-17s), which at times closed to within 10 feet.⁶⁵

The U.S. ambassador in Bonn, David K. E. Bruce, protested the Soviet actions to the Soviet controller in the BASC. The Soviets, on their part, charged that the flight was a violation of established practice. Bruce visited Washington and discussed the matter with U.S. officials. Defense and State then agreed on a U.S. reply to the Soviet protest, to be followed by a second flight after the French and British had been consulted. The reply, delivered on 13 April, denied that the C-130 flight had violated any regulations and maintained that the altitude had been determined by meteorological conditions and the operating characteristics of the aircraft.⁶⁶

The second flight, again from Evreux to Tempelhof, took place on 15 April at 25,000 feet. It proved a repeat of the earlier performance: The Soviet air controller disclaimed responsibility for its safety, and the aircraft was harassed by Soviet and GDR fighters but returned safely.⁶⁷

Some in the United Kingdom were unhappy about these flights;

the British press charged that the Pentagon had overruled the State Department. In fact, British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd had discussed the second flight in advance with Herter in Washington. Ambassador Bruce, however, in light of the British as well as the Soviet reaction, recommended that no further such flights take place until after the foreign ministers conference. McElroy and Herter agreed, and the president approved, since the point had been made that the United States had the right to conduct such flights.⁶⁸

The United States was meanwhile concerting its position for the conference with its allies, including West Germany. The four-power working group met in Paris during March and prepared a draft based on a U.S. plan for reunification of Germany in four stages; the Berlin problem would be discussed within this context. The president reviewed this on 26 March and approved it for further study by State and Defense.⁶⁹

The Western foreign ministers met in Washington on 31 March and 1 April and approved a series of measures which essentially reflected U.S. ideas. The first were "quiet preparatory measures," some of them already under way. Other more observable military steps would also be planned, to be carried out if and when allied traffic met with forcible obstruction by the GDR. All this planning on a tripartite basis came under the supervision of General Norstad. At an appropriate time, the three occupying powers would inform the Soviets that they would tolerate no interference with traffic by the GDR. If surface access was interrupted, a probe would be mounted and, if it was obstructed, the three powers would seek to mobilize world opinion while considering measures for restoring freedom of passage. They would also take steps to maintain unrestricted air access to Berlin.⁷⁰

The foreign ministers also discussed the draft plan for German reunification before sending it back to the working group for refinement. Recognizing the connection between German reunification and disarmament, they directed the working group to study the possibility of a special zone in Europe, including Germany, for limitation of armaments.⁷¹

Final details of the Western position fell in place at a quick meeting of the four foreign ministers in Paris on 29-30 April. All was thus in readiness for the conference to begin on 11 May.⁷²

Tripartite Military Planning: Live Oak

To be prepared for military action meant that the sporadic joint planning by the three Western occupying powers had to be placed on a regular basis. Norstad took the initiative in establishing machinery for contingency planning. In March 1959, after consulting Defense and State, he obtained informal concurrence from British and French military authorities to establish a tripartite staff for the purpose. The JCS approved this proposal; the State Department obtained approval at the ambassadorial level, and on 1 April the JCS authorized Norstad to establish the staff.⁷³

Norstad set up the staff (codenamed Live Oak) in Paris to bridge the gap between tripartite planning and that of NATO. It came directly under his deputy, General Williston B. Palmer, USA, and had appropriate representation from each of the three countries. The immediate directors of the staff, a British major general and a French brigadier general, Norstad indicated might also serve as national representatives if their governments desired. Close contact would be maintained with the Army and Air Force field commands in Germany, which were asked to make representatives available. Liaison would also be established with the FRG. Political guidance would be essential: its source would be determined by each of the countries concerned.⁷⁴

By 18 April the Live Oak staff had drawn up a list of "quiet preparatory and precautionary measures" that would be detectable by Soviet intelligence. These went beyond those recommended by the JCS to Secretary McElroy on 2 February. Some had already been taken: increasing the number of supply convoys to and from Berlin; intensifying alert procedures; maintaining Berlin garrison stockpiles at a 12-month level; increasing patrolling of eastern borders by U.S. and British forces; installing additional navigational aids for an airlift; and designating (without public announcement at the time) a single allied commander in Berlin.⁷⁵

State and Defense approved these measures, subject to deletion of any mention of a Berlin airlift, which the United States regarded as a last resort. The other two governments did likewise, except that the British withheld approval of the appointment of a commander, not considering this a "quiet" measure.⁷⁶

On 13 May Norstad sent Washington a plan for a tripartite probe to determine Soviet intentions. It envisioned use of a convoy under three alternative courses of action. Under the first, if the convoy encountered physical obstacles, the commander would demand their removal; refusal of the demand would serve as proof of Soviet and GDR intentions and the convoy would withdraw. Under the second, armored personnel carriers would be called up; the soldiers would dismount and try to remove the obstacle. If they were unable to do so or were forcibly prevented, again Soviet intentions would be considered established. The third alternative proposed positive action to breach any obstructions without use of fire except in self-defense. Thus a simple barrier would be breached with armored cars; heavy barriers by a tank dozer; a trench by Treadway bridging; and civil demonstrations would be met with fire hoses and tear gas. If Soviet or GDR forces opened fire, the convoy would take defensive action, including returning fire, to extricate the soldiers and then retire.

In executing any of the above plans, Norstad proposed that he exercise overall command. Ground operations to maintain access would start from the British sector along the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn; hence the Commander in Chief, British Army of the Rhine (CINCPACOR) should exercise field command of the operation. Berlin should be placed under his operational control, and he should be authorized to deal directly with the commanders of French and U.S. army forces in Germany.⁷⁷

Reviewing Norstad's three alternatives for a tripartite probe, the JCS and Deputy Secretary Gates judged the last two acceptable; the first, in their view, would not provide unambiguous evidence of Soviet intent to use force. They also approved the proposed command arrangements. The British preferred the second alternative; the French reserved their decision, which they felt would have to be made at the time. Both nations found the command arrangements acceptable.⁷⁸

The Foreign Ministers Conference

Secretary Herter* led the U.S. delegation to the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, which opened on 11 May 1959. Assistant Secretary Irwin and General Randall participated as advisers. McElroy was a member of the delegation, but he did not reach Geneva until 20 May, being delayed by Deputy Secretary Quarles's unexpected death three days before the conference opened.⁷⁹

On 14 May Herter introduced the Western plan for German settlement. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko countered with a draft peace treaty to be signed with a united Germany, giving Berlin the status of a demilitarized free city until Germany was unified. He said nothing about how to accomplish unification.⁸⁰

The Soviet proposal was unacceptable to the West, and discussion went on for several weeks with little progress. Proceedings were interrupted to allow all four ministers to attend the funeral of John Foster Dulles in Washington. Ironically, this took place on 27 May 1959, the expiration date of the original six-month time limit. "The day came and went—a day lost in history," as Eisenhower later wrote.⁸¹

When the conference resumed, the Western powers made slight adjustments in the hope of moving toward an agreement. Already Herter, in spelling out in more detail the Western position, had indicated that, although the Western powers would consider themselves entitled to maintain forces in Berlin even after a new German constitution had been approved, the size of those forces might be the subject of four-power agreement. On 3 June the Western ministers went further, offering to accept a ceiling on their Berlin forces in return for a guarantee of free access.⁸²

This offer implied that the West might be willing to negotiate a reduction in troop strength in Berlin. Norstad strongly opposed such action. On 3 June he told the JCS that the control structure and forces of the Berlin command could not be reduced without readjustment of responsibilities. The tactical element—two battle groups and a tank company—amounted to a mere token force. He warned against starting on the "slippery slope of partial demilitarization" without an overall agreement on European security. Actually, the State Department was not considering a reduction or even an

* Herter had succeeded Dulles as secretary of state on 22 April.

agreement with the Soviets on specific numbers. As Herter told the U.S. ambassador in Bonn on 8 June, he envisioned merely a unilateral declaration of intent by the Western powers.⁸³

On 10 June Gromyko offered to agree to maintenance of Western occupation rights for one year with free communication between West Berlin and the outside world, in return for a reduction in Western troop contingents in West Berlin, an assurance against nuclear or rocket installations therein, and an end to hostile "propaganda" and "subversive" activities in the city. Replying on 16 June, the Western powers went as far as they could toward meeting the new Soviet position. They declared their intention to limit the combined total of their forces in Berlin to the existing strength (approximately 11,000), to arm them only with conventional weapons, and to consider the possibility of a reduction in strength if developments permitted—all this in return for assurance of "free and unrestricted access" to West Berlin by land, water, and air, according to procedures in effect in April 1959. Application of these procedures by GDR personnel would be acceptable so long as existing basic responsibilities remained unaltered. Gromyko gave a negative response, and the meeting recessed on 20 June for three weeks.⁸⁴

During the recess, Murphy's interdepartmental coordinating group considered the question of a force reduction in Berlin. Knight explained DoD objections to the idea. The Soviets might insist on the right of inspection to verify compliance with the agreed limit; reductions would lower the morale of West Berliners and impair the ability of allied forces to support the civil police in the event of disturbances; and there was no evidence that the Soviets would yield an adequate *quid pro quo*. The JCS, in a memorandum to McElroy on 8 July, explained in more detail the objections to even a minor "symbolic" reduction in the Berlin garrison. It would be "morally and psychologically damaging"; it would lessen the ability of the garrison to offer initial resistance to aggression; and the Soviets would seize on it as an excuse for further controls and harassments.⁸⁵

The JCS also evaluated the overall U.S. position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union at that time as compared with the probable situation in 1961-62. This responded to a State proposal for a "moratorium" of two and one-half years for the length of any temporary arrangement on Berlin. The JCS concluded that the United States, because of its currently favorable position, need not feel under pressure to make concessions for the sake of agreement.⁸⁶

Shortly before the reopening of the conference (scheduled for 13 July), State officials passed to OSD some working papers in which they proposed to start from the 16 June position and offer further concessions, including a UN trusteeship over Berlin. McElroy referred these to the JCS, but time did not permit a complete review. In a hurried response on behalf of the JCS, Admiral Burke, speaking for General Twining (who was then hospitalized), declared that the new proposals would degrade U.S. rights; he also objected to use of the 16 June position as a basis for discussion.⁸⁷

McElroy strongly supported the JCS in these views. He told Herter

that the United States should not make "major concessions," as appeared to be the intent of the State Department, but should "adhere to its determination, even at the risk of general war, to retain the essential character of its present rights in Berlin."⁸⁸

The papers that had so exercised the JCS and McElroy had been drafted at a low level and had not been seen, much less approved, by the secretary of state. Herter had in fact obtained presidential approval for certain additions to the offer of 16 June: investigation of propaganda activities (originating in either East or West Berlin) by the UN, creation of a four-power committee to discuss German reunification, and a time limit on any temporary arrangement for Berlin. These had not been discussed with Defense. OSD officials had complained to Gray about this presidential approval of a paper they had not seen. Gray reported this to the president, who observed that negotiations on Berlin were primarily a State Department responsibility; in this situation, Defense was an operating, not a policy-making body.⁸⁹

The entire affair was an exercise in misunderstanding, apparently resulting from hasty action taken over a weekend in preparation for the resumption of talks on 13 July, a Monday. After Herter returned to Geneva, the situation was straightened out by Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon and McElroy. On learning of the content of the paper that Herter had discussed with the president, McElroy found it acceptable save for the time limit, or moratorium, on Berlin arrangements; on this matter, McElroy felt that the JCS view, that the United States was in a better situation currently than it would be in 1961-62, should be considered. The two men then talked to the president, and it was agreed that this JCS view would not be considered overriding, since other considerations favored a moratorium. Dillon then informed Herter that "all interested elements" in DoD agreed with the paper.⁹⁰

That Defense officials were not completely unyielding was shown by an initiative taken by the JCS and approved by McElroy. The JCS suggested that the Western powers might relinquish two of the three Berlin air corridors in exchange for guaranteed control of a single surface and air access corridor. The initial demand would be for a corridor 100 miles wide, with 60 miles as a minimum. McElroy cabled this suggestion to Irwin in Geneva, but it never was presented at Geneva, apparently because a similar proposal had been considered some months earlier and rejected as utterly unrealistic. After all, a corridor 100 miles wide would take in approximately one-fourth of the territory of the GDR.⁹¹

Two days before the meeting reconvened, Murphy told Twining that the course of the discussions suggested that the preparatory military measures taken thus far were inadequate to convince the Soviets that the United States was willing to defend its rights in Berlin at the cost of war. He therefore asked for recommendations concerning additional measures, still keeping to those that would not arouse public alarm. The JCS referred the request to USCINCEUR, meanwhile sending Murphy an interim list of seven measures, mostly involving minor force redeployments or exercises.⁹²

Norstad responded by submitting a list of 45 actions. These included naval movements in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic; establishment of antisubmarine barriers with visible patrolling at the Straits of Gibraltar and the Turkish straits; augmentation of the U.S. Fleet Marine Force in the Mediterranean; tightening control of frontiers, ports, and airports; evacuation of hospital patients to rear areas; bringing units up to strength in men and equipment; increasing in-place exercises; deployment of a tripartite force to the Helmstedt area; rotation of fighter aircraft to Central Europe; and deployment of a C-130 squadron to Central Europe, with simultaneous reinforcement of British and French air forces.⁹³

Although the JCS, in sending this list to the secretary of defense, suggested that execution of some of the measures might be desirable before the Geneva negotiations broke down, not until 6 August, after the close of the conference, was the list sent to the State Department by Knight of ISA. To initiate any of the military measures without concurrent related nonmilitary actions, in Knight's view, would convince neither the Soviets nor the free world of U.S. determination. He promised that the entire subject would be kept under review.⁹⁴

The second phase of the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting, from 13 July to 5 August 1959, proved no more productive than the first. The Western powers took as their point of departure the 16 June proposal, amended as agreed between Herter and the president. They made explicit their promise to introduce no nuclear weapons or missions into Berlin and their willingness to accept East Germans as Soviet agents for control of traffic as part of an overall plan that would insure access to West Berlin. But Gromyko proved as unyielding as ever.⁹⁵

As the conference droned on to its conclusion, another avenue of prospective negotiation opened up, overshadowing what was happening at Geneva. On 8 July 1959 Premier Khrushchev told a group of U.S. governors visiting Moscow that he thought it would be "most useful" if he and Eisenhower exchanged visits to their respective countries. This statement caught the president by surprise; asked about it by a reporter, he could only reply that any meeting of heads of government anywhere would involve careful preparation.⁹⁶

Despite this noncommittal response, the president recognized that Khrushchev's suggestion might offer possibilities for breaking the stalemate on Berlin and other issues. He called Herter in Geneva and suggested that the statement be followed up. After further discussion, the president decided to invite Khrushchev to visit the United States as a prelude to a later four power summit meeting. The invitation was to be tendered by Murphy through First Deputy Premier Frol R. Kozlov, then visiting the United States. An important qualification was that it would be contingent upon satisfactory progress at the foreign ministers conference. Through a failure of communication, however, Murphy, when extending the invitation to Kozlov on 12 July, failed to attach this qualification. Eisenhower learned of this, to his surprise, when he received a message from Khrushchev accepting the

invitation, making no reference to progress at Geneva. The United States was thus committed. In a special press conference on 3 August 1959, the president announced that Khrushchev had accepted an invitation to visit the United States in September and that he himself would go to the Soviet Union later that year.⁹⁷

Two days later, the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference adjourned. The participants confessed their failure to agree; they stated that they had conducted a "frank and comprehensive discussion" of Berlin. A second communiqué dealt with arms control, which had received somewhat desultory discussion in the meeting; it stated that further negotiations would be held on the subject.⁹⁸

Preparing for the Summit

Nikita Khrushchev arrived in the United States on 15 September. After touring a large part of the country, he met with President Eisenhower at Camp David, Maryland, from 25 to 27 September. The two leaders discussed world problems in general without getting deeply into substantive matters. Eisenhower told his visitor bluntly that the United States would never agree to surrender West Berlin either to the Soviets or the GDR, and that he would not discuss a summit conference until the Soviets retracted their ultimatum. Khrushchev promised to take steps publicly to remove any suggestion of a time limit within which he would sign a peace treaty with East Germany; however, he did not wish this concession to appear in the communiqué at the end of the meeting, since he would need time to explain to his own government the reasons for his decision.⁹⁹

Accordingly, the communiqué issued at the end of Khrushchev's visit simply stated with regard to Germany that the question had been discussed and that negotiations would be reopened. On the same day the president told a news conference that they had agreed that there would be no fixed time limit for the negotiations, and Khrushchev confirmed the statement in Moscow.¹⁰⁰

The way thus appeared clear for a summit conference involving the Western Big Three and the Soviet Union. After some weeks' discussion of the time and place, the four heads of government agreed to meet in Paris in May 1960.¹⁰¹

The nagging and chronic Berlin problem had, for the moment at least, lost the aspect of a crisis. Over the next few months, diplomatic discussion of the problem was placed on hold pending the summit, while the Western nations used the interlude to catch up on their military planning. On 5 August Norstad had sent the JCS a study of "more elaborate military measures" intended to improve force readiness, counteract Soviet pressure, support general alert measures, maintain air access, and reopen highway access by use of a ground force. The JCS approved the study as a basis for specific military plans to maintain ground and air access. The British and

French Governments gave their approval a few months later, and the Live Oak planning staff proceeded accordingly. During the first six months of 1960, USCINCEUR completed and approved plans for use of a battalion combat team to restore ground access to Berlin (Trade Wind); for an airlift (Jack Pine); and for an initial highway probe (Free Style).¹⁰²

The question of additional high-altitude C-130 flights to Berlin also resurfaced. U.S. officials in Geneva discussed it during the foreign ministers meeting. Secretary Herter agreed to support the flights if they could be justified as necessary on economic and logistic grounds. On 19 August the JCS recommended resumption of the flights on a weekly basis in September. It could not be stated categorically, they admitted, that C-130 flights were essential, since other aircraft were still available. However, three of the six air transport squadrons in Europe already had C-130s, and the remainder would have them in the near future.¹⁰³

McElroy held up the proposal until Khrushchev's arrival in the United States, then suggested that President Eisenhower bring up the subject with the Soviet premier, who had arrived via a Tu-114 transport, with a normal cruising altitude of 25,000 feet; hence he should be familiar with operation of high-altitude jets. Herter, dubious, thought the matter should be discussed only at Soviet initiative and furthermore that such flights, if undertaken, should be postponed until after the British election scheduled for October. In the end, neither Eisenhower nor Khrushchev broached the subject, but the president asked Goodpaster to make sure that it was kept under consideration.¹⁰⁴

In November, with the British election out of the way, the JCS again recommended resumption of the flights. State concurred, with the proviso that the Soviets be warned of the U.S. intention and that the matter be discussed in advance with France and Britain. Herter obtained approval of the president for an approach to the two allies, who gave their concurrence in February 1960.¹⁰⁵

The president was then on a trip to South America, accompanied by Herter. Acting Secretary Dillon wired the presidential party in Rio de Janeiro to request approval for a note informing the Soviet Union that the flights were about to begin. On 26 February Herter replied that the president had approved.¹⁰⁶

Dillon then approved a message authorizing the U.S. ambassador in Bonn to deliver the note to the Soviet representative in the Berlin Air Safety Center and passed it to Defense. However, Deputy Secretary Douglas held it up, wishing to make certain that State understood clearly that there was no military requirement for the flights and to consult Norstad, who he believed opposed the flights. On the latter point, however, Douglas was wrong. Norstad told the JCS that although the flights were not operationally necessary, there was an increasing commercial requirement for jet airline operations into Berlin. He believed, therefore, that the United States should go ahead.¹⁰⁷

Gates and Douglas then discussed the subject with the JCS on 4 March

and found the members divided. White and Burke's deputy, Admiral J. S. Russell, favored the flights. Lemnitzer equivocated, believing that the possibility of a hostile military reaction by the Soviets or East Germans should first be considered. In the same vein, Shoup, the Marine commandant, feared that the flights might precipitate a world war. Gates had just come from a Cabinet meeting, where the summit had been discussed and a consensus reached that no further concessions should be made to the Soviets. While "philosophically" in favor of the flights, he was inclined to defer to military advice. The JCS gave their opinions later the same day in a memorandum that reflected their uncertainty. They were, they said, "prepared" to resume the flights, but the matter was "primarily a cold war tactic"; the military requirement was secondary.¹⁰⁸

Meanwhile the plans had been jeopardized by a premature and erroneous "leak" to the press. Joseph Alsop reported as a fact on 29 February that high-altitude flights to Berlin would be resumed and that "with the President's approval," the Soviets had been warned. Evidently he was relying on an informant who was aware of the president's actions and assumed that events would take their normal course. The *New York Times* confirmed his statement on 1 March, quoting "sources" in Washington who had disclosed the tripartite agreement. Over the next few days, confirmatory stories appeared in foreign newspapers, and the Soviet press denounced the flights as illegal.¹⁰⁹

With the whole plan now thrown into question, the matter came before the president once more on 8 March. Herter explained that he had always thought that Defense considered the flights operationally necessary; if not, there seemed no reason for them. However, it would be embarrassing to back out now, having secured British and French approval, and the United States might appear to be retreating in the face of Soviet pressure. The president replied that until the note to the Soviets was sent, the matter was simply under study. The British and French could be told that the initial U.S. decision had been a mistake. General White, while favoring the flights, admitted that they were a "cold war tactic," drawing a reply by Eisenhower that such matters were the responsibility of the State Department.¹¹⁰

Herter and Eisenhower then issued public statements that the matter of the flights had been reviewed after the president's South American trip and it had been determined that there was no operational need for them. Under Secretary of State Merchant received the unenviable task of informing the British and French ambassadors of the U.S. change of heart.¹¹¹

This "incredible foul-up," as one news magazine characterized the whole affair, caused some embarrassment to the United States. Herter later cited it to Kistiakowsky as an example of his difficulties with the Defense Department. On the insistence of Defense, he said, State had "rammed the concept down the throats of the British and French," only to have the whole plan dropped just before the Soviets were to be officially notified.¹¹²

As the date of the summit meeting approached, a clear U.S. position on Berlin became necessary. A question that came up in this connection, as

it had during the Geneva meeting, was the possible reduction of the U.S. garrison in Berlin. On 15 March Assistant Secretary Irwin, who represented Defense on a quadripartite working group preparing for the summit, asked the JCS to reexamine their position on this subject. The JCS concluded that their earlier views remained valid. The current size of the Berlin garrison, they said, represented a "minimum balance of force" to maintain U.S. objectives; any reduction would symbolize a decrease in interest in Berlin. Gates fully agreed with this position.¹¹³

The volatile Khrushchev, still blowing hot and cold, threatened to sign a separate treaty with East Germany. On 23 March 1960 Douglas, citing a statement by Khrushchev to this effect, asked the JCS their views on the following questions:

- a. Will the U.S. military posture in mid-summer of 1960 be such as to permit implementation of contingency plans, accepting and being prepared for the risks of general war?
- b. What actions are recommended be taken relating to the Berlin garrison and U.S. military interests in Berlin in the event the USSR announces its firm intention to sign a separate peace treaty?¹¹⁴

Replying on 12 May, the JCS declared that the U.S. military posture would permit implementation of the courses of action discussed a year earlier during the Geneva conference. However, the risk of general war was inherent in the use of military force, and if it became evident that these courses of action must be implemented, suitable readiness measures would be necessary. As for the second question, they saw no need for measures not already foreseen in current plans, unilateral and tripartite. They added a comment that they recognized the need for a "delicate balance" between preparing for the worst and alarming the public, but that it would be difficult to convince the Soviets of U.S. readiness to face a general war without making open preparations for such an eventuality.¹¹⁵

The four foreign ministers met in Washington on 13 April. They agreed to retain the basic Western position that a solution to the Berlin problem should be sought through German reunification. If the Soviets rejected this (as was expected), the West would then propose a plebiscite to allow the German people to express preference for either the Soviet or the allied approach to settlement. The Western powers would be prepared to discuss a *modus vivendi* such as they had offered at Geneva, amended to guarantee allied rights in Berlin and with a provision for ultimate German unification.¹¹⁶

Paris and After

The brief story of the Paris summit and its abrupt termination by the disastrous U-2 fiasco is related in more detail in a subsequent chapter.*

* See Chapter XXII.

The Big Four met only once, on 16 May 1960. Khrushchev, enraged by the U-2 overflights and by Eisenhower's refusal to disavow responsibility for them, imposed impossible conditions for continuing the meeting. The three Western leaders convened the following day, but Khrushchev refused to attend and the summit meeting ended.

On 18 May the Western foreign ministers met twice in Paris. They quickly reviewed the status of Berlin contingency planning, then reported to the heads of their governments the need for further planning, particularly on the problem of supply to the civilian population of West Berlin if communications were disrupted. Eisenhower and his two colleagues, Macmillan and de Gaulle, agreed on further study of these matters.¹¹⁷

Despite its unfortunate outcome, the summit meeting yielded one favorable by-product. Speaking in East Berlin on 20 May en route back to Moscow, Khrushchev promised that the Soviet Union would not attempt to alter the existing situation in Germany or West Berlin until after the next U.S. presidential election. This announcement produced immediate relief in Washington, since it appeared to postpone any new crisis for at least six months.¹¹⁸

After the U.S. delegation returned from Paris, an interdepartmental coordinating group met to begin the further planning agreed on by the foreign ministers. The members heard reports from a JCS representative that both air and ground plans could be implemented at once.¹¹⁹

Gates did not share this assessment. He told the NSC on 24 May, when that body discussed the implications of the abortive summit meeting, that he found that military contingency planning depended at every stage on political decisions that had not yet been made. There was not even a specified commander for Berlin. The British presented the major obstacle; the State Department avoided pressing them too hard, not wanting to stir their latent fear of general war. The president quoted a rhetorical question put to him by Macmillan: "Do you want the British to go to war for two million of the people we twice fought wars against and who almost destroyed us?"¹²⁰

Gates's statement about the absence of a tripartite commander for Berlin did not square with the impression of other officials that Norstad already had authority for both planning and execution. In fact, as Norstad explained on 9 June, he had authority, when directed by the three governments, to command elements involved in an initial ground probe of Soviet intentions and to prepare plans for restoring ground access. He had delegated these responsibilities to the commander in chief, British Army of the Rhine (CINCBAOR). As USCINCEUR, Norstad had similar authority, which he had passed on to CINCUSAFE, to implement the partial airlifts for which plans had been made and to prepare plans for complete air access to Berlin. France and Britain had not yet approved appointment of a tripartite commander for execution of ground access plans or for air access. Nor had any tripartite authority been granted for training, testing, or rehearsal of military plans.¹²¹

The plan for restoring ground access to Berlin prepared by CINCBAOR received Norstad's approval on 20 June. This envisioned use of a force of

battalion size. Norstad proposed to have another plan prepared for a division-size force but learned from British officers on the Live Oak staff that their government believed that a battalion, backed by the ultimate threat of nuclear power, would suffice to achieve the objective. When Norstad consulted the British Chiefs of Staff, they agreed to have the subject studied by the Live Oak staff, and if that body recommended plans for a larger force they would pose no objection. The matter remained unsettled at the end of 1960.¹²²

In August 1960 Norstad resurrected the proposal to designate an overall allied commander for Berlin, to which the British had objected earlier. He would give the assignment to the U.S. commander in Berlin, but would not make it public, in order to avoid provoking the Soviets or detracting from the prestige of the other two commanders. Defense and State approved the proposal. The British and French Governments approved, at first with reservations. By the end of January 1961, however, Norstad had received full tripartite authority to designate a unified commander, without prior consultations with governments, in the event of an armed attack on Berlin or a major civil disturbance.¹²³

Norstad also asked for authority to assemble and train the battalion combat team envisioned in the Trade Wind plan. The JCS approved this proposal and relayed it to Gates to be passed on to the British and French Governments, which, however, apparently had not acted by the end of 1960. Nor had they approved Norstad's proposal to accredit a West German liaison officer to the Live Oak staff as an observer.¹²⁴

In the 1960 interdepartmental study of limited war, Berlin represented one of five cases examined. The study assumed that the GDR had taken over responsibility for Berlin traffic and had refused to clear allied trains or vehicles. At that point, two groups of three vehicles each (one from each of the occupying powers) would be dispatched along the highway, one in each direction, along with air probes by military transport planes. If the vehicles were refused clearance and the aircraft encountered opposition, the next step would be a platoon-sized unit of armored vehicles, which, it was assumed, would encounter physical obstacles as well as armed resistance from GDR troops. Next would follow a tripartite battalion (part of a brigade), which was again assumed to encounter armed opposition. In that event, the battalion would deploy off the autobahn into battle position, where it would soon find itself surrounded by superior forces, with its avenue of retreat cut off.

This would present the allies with grave choices. To accept failure and negotiate for withdrawal of the battalion would seriously degrade the allied deterrent posture. To commit the rest of the brigade would be futile; it could not be employed effectively within the corridor, and even if permitted by GDR forces to reach Berlin, it could not keep open 100 miles of access route behind it. Commitment of a larger force on a broad front converging on Berlin would probably require use of tactical nuclear weapons. Such an operation would probably succeed against GDR forces alone, but would

almost certainly fail and expand to general war if the Soviets intervened with major forces.

It followed that there existed no way to hold Berlin through "limited" military operations. Defense of the allied position there depended on resolution to risk general war over the issue, combined with Soviet unwillingness to accept the risk.¹²⁵

In the months after the summit meeting, Khrushchev continued to threaten to sign a treaty with East Germany, but he also affirmed his willingness to hold another summit conference after a new U.S. administration took office. Meanwhile, officials of the German Democratic Republic showed a new assertiveness in controlling access to Berlin, aiming their restrictions particularly at West Germans. For example, they denied access to West Germans who wished to attend meetings of refugee organizations in Berlin and required West German citizens who wished to enter East Berlin to obtain special passes. When the Western nations, not recognizing the GDR, protested these and similar moves to the Soviet Union, they were told that the GDR possessed full sovereignty over its territory.¹²⁶

These developments, all taking place in September 1960, alarmed the JCS, who saw them as an attempt to sever the economic connection of West Berlin with Western Europe and to destroy the city's viability. The United States should, in their view, seek to convince the Communists that the West would if necessary use force to halt the political-economic erosion of West Berlin. They urged that Merchant's contingency planning group consider suitable countermeasures.¹²⁷

Merchant replied that in accord with the decision of the Western heads of government in Paris, planning to deal with harassment of civilian access to Berlin was already underway. In Merchant's view the FRG, which could apply economic countermeasures, could best deal with the actions of the past few weeks. However, further steps were under consideration.¹²⁸

Merchant's judgment was vindicated when Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany threatened not to renew the East-West trade agreement due to expire on 31 December. This had immediate effect; the situation in Berlin eased, with some of the restrictions being relaxed and no new ones imposed for the next few months. When the new trade agreement was concluded, East Germany promised to permit unhampered West German and allied train and truck traffic to West Berlin.¹²⁹

The changing nature of the principal threat to West Berlin—from physical interference with U.S. and allied military traffic to an attack on the economy of the city—suggested a need to revise U.S. policy toward Berlin, which had been adopted in 1958 when a new "Berlin blockade" appeared the most likely danger. Moreover, the immediate U.S. postwar aims in Germany as a whole had been achieved; West Germany was now a burgeoning nation with a strong economy. The Operations Coordinating Board therefore suggested in November 1960 that the time had come to reconsider policy. This would in any case have been done as part of the administration's comprehensive review of all policy papers in anticipation of a change in administration.¹³⁰

The NSC agreed on 1 December to review the current policy paper (NSC 5803). Acting Secretary of State Dillon warned that if news of the decision leaked out, German public opinion might be disturbed by the implication that the United States was considering a basic change in attitude. The members therefore agreed that the process should not be interpreted as a substantive review of policy toward Germany. It remained incomplete when the Eisenhower administration went out of office.¹³¹

At the end of 1960 the status of Berlin, though it no longer seemed as imminently endangered as two years earlier, remained precarious and would continue that way so long as the Western powers stayed there on Soviet sufferance. Berlin had enormous symbolic significance for both sides in the Cold War. For the Soviets, the Western presence in an enclave surrounded on all sides by the German Democratic Republic must have seemed a kind of running sore—evidence that the Soviets' German satellite had yet to achieve the status of a fully recognized sovereign nation. The Western powers rested their case on the indisputable fact that they had rights in Berlin by virtue of agreements to which the Soviet Union was a party, and which no single signatory had a right to abrogate. As a military position, Berlin had no significance; it could not be held in the face of a large-scale Soviet attack. But if the Western powers had allowed themselves to be forced out of Berlin under threat, they would have suffered a shattering diplomatic defeat and a blow to their prestige that would have had incalculable consequence, quite likely leading to the breakup of NATO.

Thus for the United States, at least, a willingness to defend West Berlin at the cost of general war was never in doubt. Within the administration, the JCS led the way in insisting on this policy, but they had full support from OSD and State as well as the president, who certainly needed no urging from his advisers on this score. The response to any lesser threat would depend on its nature. To determine the range of actions to cover all possible contingencies was a gradual process, which had to be concerted with the allies—the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany. The United States was able to bring the other countries into line, despite some British leaning toward a more conciliatory approach.

How far the Communists intended to push the Berlin issue is unclear. They never carried out their threat of November 1958 to turn over all their responsibilities in Berlin to the GDR, apparently for the reason given later by Mikoyan: All they wanted was for negotiations to be started within their announced six-month period. Even after the failure of the foreign ministers conference in 1959, the fear of an ultimatum was dissipated by Khrushchev's disavowal of a time limit for further negotiations. But any hope of a genuine settlement evaporated with the failure of the Paris summit conference in May 1960. Thus the Berlin problem became one more legacy of the Eisenhower administration to its successor.

CHAPTER XIX

Far Eastern Problems

The outcome of World War II left the Pacific Ocean virtually an American lake. Following the capitulation of Japan, the United States was able to project its power to the farthest reaches of that body of water. On the Asian mainland, however, the situation was different. Communist power flowed into the vacuum left by the successive collapses of the Japanese empire and the Chinese Nationalist regime which had been allied with the United States in World War II. While the Nationalist Government took refuge on Formosa (Taiwan), the Chinese Communists, firmly allied with the Soviet Union, proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The heartland of Central and Eastern Asia thus came under the control of elements hostile to the West.

The objective of the United States was to use its position in the Western Pacific to arrest a further spread of Communist power. For this purpose, in 1950 the United States fought to thwart the attempt by Communist North Korea to seize South Korea by force. The effort was successful, and the end of the war in 1953 left South Korea free. A year later, however, the Communists registered a further advance when the Geneva Conference left them in control of part of Southeast Asia.

The U.S. "containment" policy for Asia, embodied in NSC 5429/5, approved in December 1954, set forth the goal of preserving the territorial and political integrity of the non-Communist countries in the area against further Communist expansion or subversion. To support its essential role in Asia, the United States anchored its military position in the "offshore island chain" consisting of Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.¹

To secure its position, the United States entered into mutual security treaties with the island nations. On the mainland, it had similar ties with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and maintained membership in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), whose members in Asia and the Pacific ranged from Pakistan to New Zealand.

In a revised policy paper in 1959 (NSC 5913/1), the NSC noted a trend toward stabilization of the line of demarcation between Communist and non-Communist Asia and an intensified awareness in Asia of the nature of

the Communist threat. On the other hand, the power of Communist China, backed by the Soviet Union, had increased rapidly, and further increases might be expected. Hence, a "strong countervailing U.S. presence" would be needed in Asia for many years, with U.S. assistance to Asian countries.²

Relations between the United States and the two Chinas, revolving largely around mainland China's threat to Taiwan and smaller nearby islands held by the Nationalists, have been described in an earlier chapter.* The present chapter describes the role of OSD in major issues involving other countries of Asia.

Securing the Republic of Korea

Korea was the only country on the Asian mainland where U.S. military forces were stationed. This situation derived from the Korean War, which had ended with an armistice rather than a full peace settlement. The United Nations Command (UNC), which had conducted the war against the North Korean invaders, remained in existence as a hedge against renewed hostilities. U.S. forces assigned to the UNC consisted in 1956 of 2 infantry divisions and a fighter-bomber wing, with supporting units, totaling some 50,000 men.³

Long-range U.S. policy for the Republic of Korea sought the unification of the entire country, North and South, with a self-supporting economy and a free government. The immediate objectives were to assist the ROK to make a "substantial" contribution to free world strength in the Pacific area and to develop ROK armed forces able to maintain internal security and to defend the nation's territory short of a major attack.⁴

The 1953 Armistice Agreement had established a Military Armistice Commission (MAC) to supervise the terms of the agreement. It forbade the entry into Korea of any "reinforcing" military personnel but allowed rotation of units and personnel on a man-for-man basis. It also forbade the introduction of "reinforcing" combat aircraft, vehicles, weapons, and ammunition, except that equipment in those categories that was "destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up" might be replaced piece-for-piece by equipment "of the same effectiveness." A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) undertook responsibility for enforcing these provisions.⁵

From the outset, the United States suspected North Korea and Communist China of violating the agreement by introducing modern weapons and aircraft into Korea. Inspection efforts by the NNSC were hindered by the representatives of the two Eastern European "neutrals," Poland and Czechoslovakia, or blocked by North Korean authorities who refused to allow free movement. Forces of the outnumbered UNC would be seriously overmatched if the Communists added qualitative to quantitative weapon superiority.

Eventually, on 31 May 1956, the UN Command announced that, owing

* Chapter VIII.

to repeated violations of the armistice agreement by the other side, the functioning of the NNSC and its inspection teams would be provisionally suspended in South Korea. In reply, the NNSC proposed immediate withdrawal of all its teams from both North and South Korea. Both sides agreed, and the inspection teams were withdrawn by 10 June.

This opened the way for the UNC to improve its combat capabilities by introducing new and improved weaponry. The JCS pressed for such action and won the approval of officials of OSD, who agreed to furnish the Department of State with recommendations regarding weapons to be introduced into Korea.⁶

The Army proposed the immediate introduction of all-weather fighters, tactical bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft, plus a battalion (6 weapons) of 280 mm artillery, a battery of Honest John missiles, and 75 mm and 40 mm antiaircraft weapons.⁷ The items on this list likely to be highly controversial were the 280 mm gun and the Honest John, both of which had a dual capability, conventional and nuclear. The JCS favored the introduction of all these weapons. They told Secretary Wilson that it was "logical to assume" that the Communists already had atomic delivery systems in North Korea or could deploy them there on short notice; hence the UNC must be given an atomic capability at once. They recommended that the relevant portions of the armistice be provisionally suspended and that the United States proceed immediately with whatever modification of equipment was militarily justifiable.⁸

The State Department feared that the introduction of these two weapon systems would have serious repercussions on international opinion; moreover, it could not, in State's opinion, be justified under the terms of the armistice agreement without clear evidence that the Communists had taken similar action. OSD upheld the JCS opinion, but failed to convince State. Several months of discussion produced only an agreement to decide this question (and the related one of introducing nuclear warheads) on political rather than narrowly legal grounds.⁹

The question of modernizing of forces in Korea had by now become involved with the level of forces to be maintained there. In an NSC discussion on 20 September of an OCB progress report on Korea, the president asked the JCS to prepare a report on the minimum levels of both U.S. and ROK forces that should be maintained over the next two years. The council decided that the current policy directive for Korea (NSC 5514) should be reviewed in the light of the report of the Prochnow committee, which was studying the question of military assistance for Korea and certain other nations receiving large amounts of aid.¹⁰

Replying to this request on 11 October 1956, the JCS told Secretary Wilson that modernization of forces in Korea, including provision of an atomic capability, must precede determination of minimum levels. It would be possible to make some reductions if force equipment could be modernized. Removal of all U.S. forces, though it might be militarily desirable, was inadvisable owing to political uncertainties—the unpredictability of

South Korea's President, Syngman Rhee, and the possibility that he might "pass from the scene," as the JCS put it (he was already over 80 years old). The minimum level of modernized U.S. forces that should be maintained in Korea was that already existing: two divisions and a fighter-bomber wing. For the ROK forces, they recommended 16 regular infantry divisions, 14 reserve divisions, approximately 61 combat vessels, 1 Marine division, and 9 air squadrons, including 3 of fighter-bombers. Since the ROK then possessed 20 regular divisions and 10 reserve, the JCS in effect proposed a transfer of 4 from the one category to the other.¹¹

Writing to Wilson again on 19 October, the JCS admitted that they could not substantiate the presence of nuclear warheads or of nuclear ground delivery systems in North Korea. But the presence of atomic-capable aircraft there, coupled with the Communists' ready ability to introduce additional delivery systems, fully justified the supplying of nuclear weapons to the UN Command.¹²

Wilson tentatively concluded that the difficulties involved in attempting to introduce atomic weapons into Korea would not be warranted merely to effect the transfer of four active ROK divisions to reserve status while maintaining U.S. forces at their existing level. But he told the NSC that he preferred not to formalize his views until mid-December, by which time Defense would have made decisions on overall deployments in general.¹³

On 7 November Wilson asked the JCS to reconsider the minimum level of forces in Korea under the assumption that the political questions raised by the JCS—the danger of precipitous unilateral action by the ROK or of instability following a change in leadership—could be excluded from consideration. The JCS replied that it was impossible to separate political from military considerations when the United States was providing practically all the equipment, supplies, and training for the ROK forces. Either of the two political developments would have military consequences, and hence they could not be ignored in establishing force levels for Korea. They reaffirmed their previous recommendations for U.S. and ROK forces.¹⁴

The NSC, in considering the Prochnow committee report, directed the Planning Board to review the scope and allocation of foreign aid, military and other, for Korea and several other major recipients of U.S. aid.¹⁵ The board drafted a paper, NSC 5702, that evaluated four possible military programs for Korea. Alternative A was essentially a continuation of the status quo: 2 U.S. divisions and 1 fighter-bomber wing, and for the ROK, 20 active and 10 reserve army divisions and 6 fighter-bomber squadrons. Alternative B embodied the JCS recommendations of 11 October: converting 4 active ROK army divisions from regular to reserve and providing U.S. forces with dual-capability weapons. Alternative C involved converting 10 ROK divisions to reserve status and providing both U.S. and ROK forces with dual-capability weapons of types already in Korea (thus excluding the Honest John and the 280 mm cannon). All three of these included conversion of the six ROK fighter squadrons to jet aircraft (a process already underway). Alternative D differed from C by increasing ROK fighter strength to 12 jet

squadrons and providing the ROK Army with equipment comparable to that of the North Korean Army (but not including dual-capability weapons). None of the alternatives envisaged actual storage of nuclear warheads in Korea.¹⁶

The JCS recommended Alternative B, for reasons they had already explained, as did Secretaries Brucker and Gates. The NSC approved Alternative B and directed its incorporation into a military program that provided plans for gradual further reductions in ROK forces over the long run. All these in turn would be included in a new statement of policy for Korea.¹⁷

The result, NSC 5702/1, reaffirmed the long-range objective of Korean unification as well as the immediate goal of assisting Korea to develop its ability to defend itself. Toward the latter end, the United States would maintain two divisions and an air wing in Korea. The Defense and JCS members of the Planning Board proposed to add a statement that these forces would have weapons "designed primarily for nuclear warfare," such as Honest John and the 280 mm cannon. The State member would make such equipment contingent on "reasonable support by our principal allies" and on a finding by the secretaries of state and defense, after negotiations with the ROK, that it was unavoidably necessary as a means of inducing the ROK to reduce its forces.

The paper called for conversion of four ROK divisions from active to reserve, plus continuation of the modernization of the Korean air force and plans for gradual further reductions in ROK forces. In effect, these passages constituted a "package deal" to be offered the Koreans: the United States would maintain its existing level of forces in Korea (and perhaps provide them with nuclear capability) if the ROK would reduce its forces and thus lessen the load on the U.S. military aid program.

Elsewhere, NSC 5702/1 would commit the United States to continued observance and support of the armistice agreement. Communist violations would be established through adequate evidence and well publicized. If it was decided to introduce nuclear weapons into Korea, the timing and method of announcing the decision would be determined by the secretaries of state and defense, taking into consideration the views of allies.¹⁸

When the council considered NSC 5702/1 on 4 April 1957, Secretary Dulles took the position that the introduction of nuclear-capable weapons into Korea would present political difficulties outweighing the military advantages. Admiral Radford rejoined that the introduction of any new weapons would cause equal difficulties and that these particular weapons constituted an essential part of the "package deal" for reduction of ROK forces. The president deferred a decision pending determination of the reactions of allies.¹⁹

Over the next two months, U.S. officials consulted the governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand. None expressed serious concern over the proposal to introduce modern weapons into Korea. The specific question of nuclear warheads was apparently not raised in these discussions.²⁰

The issue went before the NSC again on 13 June. Secretary Dulles made it clear that he retained his misgivings about the introduction of nuclear-capable weapons. He was willing to issue a statement that in view of Communist violation of the armistice, the United States would henceforth exercise "greater flexibility" in maintaining armaments in Korea, without being more specific. When presidential assistant Cutler estimated the saving resulting from the "package deal" (through reduction in ROK forces) at \$127 million over a four-year period, Dulles thought this insufficient compensation for the political difficulties involved in introducing nuclear weapons. Indeed, he was not certain that there was any connection between such action and reductions in ROK forces. He believed that the United States should issue his proposed announcement, then negotiate with the ROK Government to induce the desired reductions.

The DoD position, as summarized by Quarles, held that the United States must move quickly to achieve its goal. The Koreans wished to increase rather than decrease their forces. Hence, it would be wise for the United States to possess a free hand in modernizing its forces with all available weapons in order to influence the ROK. In support, Radford pointed out that the Joint Chiefs must be free to plan on the use of nuclear weapons in the Far East and elsewhere. Radford engaged in an argument with Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey, who believed that the United States should pull out all its forces from Korea, whether the Koreans agreed or not.

The president decided in favor of Dulles. The United States would announce that in view of Communist violations of the armistice it would modernize its forces in Korea. The ROK would be offered the package deal: conversion of their three remaining air squadrons to jet aircraft (along with modernization of U.S. forces) in return for a "substantial" reduction in active ROK forces. Action on NSC 5702/1 was deferred pending the reaction to these developments.²¹

Accordingly, on 21 June 1957, the senior UNC member of the Military Armistice Commission in Panmunjom, Korea, presented a statement accusing the North Korean and Chinese forces of "flagrant, repeated, and willful violations" of the armistice agreement. The UNC therefore considered itself relieved of obligations to observe the restrictions on introduction of weapons into Korea.²²

On the same day in Seoul, U.S. Ambassador Walter C. Dowling and Commander in Chief, UNC General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, broached with Rhee the question of reducing ROK forces. Rhee replied that this could not be done "at present." A month later Lemnitzer's replacement, General George H. Decker, met with the ROK minister of defense, who agreed to cooperate in the reduction program, providing atomic-capable weapons were introduced into Korea.²³

In revising NSC 5702/1 to reflect the president's decision of 13 June, the Planning Board specified that a reduction of a least four active ROK divisions, with no increase in reserve divisions, would be part of the quid pro quo for the package deal. The United States would maintain its existing

force levels in Korea (two divisions and one wing) through 1958; this was the first time that any time limit had been stated. After conferences with the secretaries of state and defense, the president would make a decision on the introduction of nuclear-capable weapons into Korea.²⁴

The JCS, then contemplating redeployment of a Marine air wing to Korea from Japan, recommended that the revised statement provide for a "minimum" of one air wing. More importantly, they also opposed the postponement of a decision on the introduction of nuclear-capable weapons, a position supported by the Army.²⁵

The JCS had earlier urged Wilson to obtain prompt presidential authorization for 280 mm and Honest John weapons for Korea, pointing out that such action would assist in the negotiations with Rhee. Wilson took no action, probably because the president had already indicated reluctance in this regard. Eisenhower considered the 280 mm gun unsuitable for Korea because of the terrain, and, like Dulles, feared a public reaction against the authorization.²⁶

Dulles told the NSC on 8 August 1957 that the ROK had so far refused to accept the package deal. Rhee was being "stubborn and tough"; he wanted his divisions brought up to the same equipment standards as those of the United States—a tremendously expensive proposition. Wilson demurred at the statement in NSC 5702/1 that there should be no increase in reserve divisions, which would foreclose any possibility of exchanging regular for less expensive reserve units. Radford disagreed, considering the cost differential unimportant. The president suggested allowing for a "minimum" increase in reserve divisions, in order to provide some leeway for U.S. negotiators. The council approved an amended version of the paper (NSC 5702/2) with this change and with a statement that the United States would provide the ROK with "appropriate" U.S. equipment excess to its own needs.²⁷

Some weeks later the JCS obtained what they had been seeking—a presidential authorization to introduce Honest John and 280 mm weapons into Korea. Guidance furnished U.S. officials in Seoul in January 1958 specified that there should be no publicity concerning their introduction. Press inquiries might be answered with a statement that the weapons were present in Korea, but no information was to be released concerning the time of arrival, the number of weapons, or other details.²⁸

The president also approved the introduction of nuclear weapons into Korea. Deputy Secretary Quarles relayed this decision to the JCS on 17 January 1958. The JCS authorized an Air Force Matador tactical missile group, equipped with nuclear capsules, to deploy to Korea before 1 July 1958.²⁹

As Dulles told the NSC, Rhee did indeed prove a hard bargainer. His negotiators contended that a reduction of four divisions would jeopardize the security of their country; two divisions was the most they would accept. U.S. negotiators concluded that this position was firm and that the ROK Government, if pressed further on the issue, might demand the release of

its forces from the UNC. The United States eventually gave in and agreed, in exchange for modernization of the ROK air force, to accept a ROK army of 18 divisions at somewhat reduced strength, with no increase in reserve divisions, and with a reduction of 90,000 in personnel (from 720,000 to 630,000) by 30 July 1958. A formal agreement embodying these decisions was signed on 29 November 1958.³⁰

The four-division reduction proclaimed as a goal in NSC 5702/2 thus became passé. In July 1958, well before the new agreement was formalized, the NSC Planning Board redrafted the relevant portions of NSC 5702/2 to specify U.S. support of the 18-division force through December 1959, with plans for further reductions in ROK strength "in the longer run." Treasury and BoB representatives advocated a statement that these reductions should begin in 1960. The NSC and the president rejected this latter proposal and agreed simply that further reductions should begin "as soon as practicable."³¹

A year later in June 1959, it became necessary to reconsider the commitment for Korean force support, since it would expire at the end of 1959. The Planning Board proposed that the United States continue military assistance for support of agreed force levels, without stipulating a deadline. Again Treasury and Budget sought a commitment to reduce the ROK army to 16 divisions in 1960. Another change, proposed by the State Department's board member, sought to broaden the statement of objectives desired by the United States in maintaining ROK forces. According to NSC 5702/2, these were to enable the ROK to maintain internal order and to conduct a holding operation against outside aggression. State proposed a third objective: to enable ROK forces to exercise "the degree of power, determination, and range of capabilities which have served since the Korean Armistice Agreement in effectively contributing to the peace in Asia."³²

The JCS endorsed this State proposal, because, they wrote, it made explicit one of the requirements implicit in U.S. policy. They opposed any reduction of ROK forces during 1960 that would entail unacceptable military risks. Assistant Secretary Irwin's office concurred in this latter view but opposed the State proposal on grounds that it appeared to establish a "new mission" for ROK forces and to preclude the possibility of future reductions.³³

In an NSC discussion on 25 June 1959, Secretary Herter told the members that the proposed new mission statement for ROK forces reflected a conviction that ROK military capabilities should not be reduced. McElroy opposed any implied commitment to continue present force levels. However, he, Admiral Burke, and Herter opposed further force reductions during 1960, and General Lemnitzer, former CINCUNC, now Army chief of staff, stressed that all existing forces in Korea were needed to hold the 155-mile frontier. Director of the Budget Stans pointed out that the Draper Committee had proposed a 12-division ROK army if tensions in Korea could be reduced by an agreement with North Korea. The president disposed of the issue by stating with great certainty that now was no time to cut back on

forces in Korea in view of the overall world situation. He had that morning received a cable describing a "terrifying" interview between Soviet Premier Khrushchev and former Ambassador W. Averell Harriman. Khrushchev had boasted of Soviet military might and had issued threats against both Berlin and Taiwan.

The council approved the Planning Board paper (designated NSC 5907), revised to affirm that ROK forces should have the capability to demonstrate "continuing determination" to oppose aggression in Korea. The United States would continue to maintain in Korea (with no deadline specified) armed forces with capabilities comparable to those existing on 30 June 1959: two Army divisions, an Army missile command, the Air Force Mator unit, and Air Force units rotating on a continuing basis with an overall capability at least equal to a fighter-bomber wing. The council said nothing about future reductions in ROK forces, but it directed the Planning Board to study the Draper Committee recommendations relating to Korea.³⁴

In 1960 there occurred the political crisis in Korea that the JCS had feared. The 85-year-old President Rhee did indeed "pass from the scene," though not through death. A presidential election in March 1960, in which Rhee was unopposed, was marked by fraud and violence. In the days that followed, long-simmering opposition to Rhee's government and to his increasingly high-handed behavior burst into the open. Protest demonstrations were widespread, and martial law was declared. Rhee resigned on 27 April 1960. The consequences, however, were less serious than they might have been. A new government was installed that was democratic, anti-Communist, and pro-Western. Political stability was quickly restored, and relations with the United States continued as before.³⁵

In August 1960 the press reported from Seoul that the new Korean Government had asked the United States to approve a sizable reduction in its military personnel strength and to supply more modern weapons and increased economic aid. Stans seized on these reports as demonstrating a need to expedite a review of policy toward Korea. The reports proved erroneous; the Korean Government had indeed briefly considered a reduction of 100,000 in military manpower for economic reasons, but had rejected it. Nevertheless the Planning Board undertook a policy review.³⁶

From this process resulted NSC 6018/1, approved by the president in January 1961. This reaffirmed U.S. support for the ROK and ultimately for the unification of Korea. The United States would maintain forces in Korea adequate to assure "prompt and effective resistance" to any Communist aggression, with the actual levels to be reviewed annually. Korean forces would be supported at "mutually agreed" levels.

A question that arose in connection with NSC 6018/1 concerned the size of the military assistance program for Korea. A financial appendix projected \$204 million in 1960 and \$268 million in 1961, as compared with \$203 million in 1959. In approving NSC 6018/1, the NSC directed DoD to submit an estimate of the cost of aid for Korea in light of the entire program.³⁷

U.S. Forces in Japan

The defeat of Japan in World War II left that nation under allied occupation for six years. The occupation ended in September 1951 when a peace treaty returned Japan to full sovereignty. At the same time, in a separate bilateral security treaty, Japan granted the United States the right to dispose land, air, and sea forces "in and about Japan" to maintain peace and security in the Far East, protect Japan against armed attack from without, and assist Japan in putting down internal disturbances. Japan agreed not to grant any similar rights to a third country without U.S. consent. An administrative agreement signed in February 1952 governed the status of U.S. forces in Japan and embodied a Japanese assurance of the use of facilities and areas need to carry out the security treaty.³⁸

For some time after the close of World War II, Japan was entirely without its own means of defense; its new constitution permanently abjured aggressive war and the maintenance of military forces. In the light of the Cold War and the rise of Soviet and Chinese Communist military power in the Far East, this renunciation soon appeared unwise. But it could hardly be interpreted as forbidding all right of self-defense. Accordingly, in 1950 the Japanese Government, with the approval of the occupation authorities, undertook to establish a modest self-defense force (originally disguised as a "police reserve") consisting of four divisions and a naval coast guard. Small as it was, this force could help to redress the military balance in and around Japan and lift some of the burden from U.S. forces. Progress toward the goals lagged, however, in the face of a largely hostile Japanese public opinion that had learned all too well the dangers of militarism. The United States constantly prodded the Japanese Government to speed the pace of rearmament.³⁹

For the United States, retention of Japan within the free world coalition was a vital objective. "The strategic location and military and industrial potential of Japan are such that the security of the United States would require us to fight to prevent hostile forces from gaining control of any part of Japan by attack," stated NSC 5516/1, a policy paper approved by the president and the NSC in April 1955. "Similarly, we would be obliged to assist the Japanese Government, if necessary, to counter subversion or insurrection." The paper recognized that U.S. and Japanese interests did not always coincide. Japan regarded the threat of aggression less seriously than did the United States; the Japanese felt ambivalent about U.S. bases and forces on their soil, fearing they might expose Japan to nuclear attack; Japan valued development of political stability and economic strength ahead of military power. The United States should promote a moderate and stable Japanese Government; consult with Japan as an equal on matters of mutual interest; encourage good relations between Japan and other free nations; assist the development of Japanese defense forces; develop arrangements with Japan for coordinated military planning; and transfer responsibilities to Japan's defense forces "as rapidly as consistent with United States security interests."

A special problem in U.S.-Japanese relations had to do with the several groups of small islands that had been under Japanese rule before World War II: the Ryukyus to the south and the Bonin and Volcano islands farther east. Under Article 3 of the peace treaty, Japan agreed to concur in any U.S. proposal to place these under UN trusteeship, with the United States as the "sole administering authority." The United States had kept these islands under occupation and had made no move to place them under the United Nations. NSC 5516/1 declared that the United States would maintain control for the present but would attempt to accommodate Japanese desires for fuller relations with the islands.⁴⁰

Japan's rearmament moved a step forward in 1955 when the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) adopted a 6-year plan to provide the following forces by 1961: 6 army divisions and 4 brigades, a naval force of 107,000 tons, and 33 air squadrons. Military planners from both countries considered these goals too low but the best that could be attained. Though not officially approved by the Japanese Government, they became the basis of planning by the JDA and the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group. Efforts continued to lag, however; 2 years later, the 6 army divisions were in existence, but only 2 brigades, 62,000 tons of ships, and 4 air squadrons.⁴¹

By 1956 Japan was growing increasingly restive under U.S. tutelage. In part this was the inevitable reaction of a proud people, but specific irritants also hindered good relations. These included U.S. control over the outlying islands; the status of remaining war criminals; the presence of large numbers of U.S. military personnel with their dependents; and Japan's desire for closer economic and cultural relations with mainland China, which the United States was seeking to isolate. Reporting these trends in February 1957, OCB concluded that the major U.S. objective, a "firm alliance in the Pacific," was not being achieved, but that a greater accommodation of Japanese interests could be accomplished within existing U.S. policy.⁴²

In April 1957 Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi held a series of talks with U.S. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II. While admitting that Japanese national sentiment might contain "misunderstandings" which he did not necessarily share, Kishi explained how many of his countrymen felt. The Japanese people, as a result of their experiences in World War II, had developed a deep-rooted aversion to war, which they feared more than communism. Especially sensitive to nuclear weapons, they did not readily appreciate the U.S. view that nuclear testing was indispensable to prevent war. They considered the security treaty a symbol of Japan's subordinate position. The treaty unilaterally granted the United States the right to station forces in Japan and to use them regardless of Japan's intentions and even for purposes irrelevant to the direct defense of Japan. There were also grievances over the Ryukyu and Bonin islands.

Kishi urged amendment of the security treaty to make disposition and use of U.S. forces in Japan subject to mutual agreement. Also, he wanted duration set at five years, with unlimited duration thereafter but subject to the right of termination by either party on one year's notice. The recently

created Japanese National Defense Council would soon start deliberations on a new defense plan aimed at building up to 180,000 personnel by 1958 or 1959 and 111,000 naval tons by 1960. Kishi urged withdrawal of as many U.S. forces as possible from Japan, including all ground forces. Requirements for U.S. bases and facilities in Japan should be reviewed with a view to relinquishing as many as possible. All rights and interests in the Ryukyus and Bonins should be relinquished to Japan after 10 years.⁴³

Ambassador MacArthur, inclined to sympathize with the general Japanese attitude, advised Washington on 17 April that "we have reached the turning point in our relations with Japan." The trend of opinion in Japan was "clearly evident," he continued, and if it were not directed into "constructive channels," the U.S. position would be "gradually eroding away in [the] next several years."⁴⁴

The U.S. Far East commander, General Lemnitzer, likewise understood Japan's wish to be treated as an equal partner, but he opposed any change in the U.S. position in the Ryukyus. Should U.S. forces and facilities be withdrawn from Japan, then Okinawa, the key island in the Ryukyus, might become the only fully reliable base between Korea and Taiwan, or between those countries and Japan. Admiral Felix J. Stump, CINCPAC, also opposed any revision of the treaty but suggested that the United States demonstrate flexibility through mutually agreeable interpretation of its language.⁴⁵

Kishi scheduled a visit to the United States for June 1957 to discuss his concerns. Lemnitzer urged that U.S. officials take advantage of this visit to press Japan to do more in the way of rearmament. The goals of the new plan that Kishi had described were quite inadequate. Pending better arrangements, there should be no reduction of U.S. strength and influence in the Far East.⁴⁶

In preparation for the visit, ISA studied U.S. policies and programs with a view to influencing Japan. In response to an ISA request for advice, the JCS on 13 June reaffirmed the validity of U.S. objectives in Japan but thought that specific programs should be revised. They believed Japan capable of a larger defense effort—one that would eventually supersede any need for U.S. forces there. But, like Lemnitzer, they opposed any immediate reduction of U.S. forces or any relinquishing of U.S. control over the Ryukyus and Bonins.⁴⁷

The question of reducing U.S. forces in Japan, as an economy measure, had already come under study. These forces totaled almost 100,000, including the 1st Cavalry Division, an Honest John battalion, combat units of the Fleet Marine Force, and 20 Air Force squadrons (bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance). The Air Force accounted for half of the total personnel (49,250 out of 98,890).⁴⁸

Talking with his advisers on 6-7 June 1957 on the aircraft carrier *Saratoga*, the president thought it possible to reduce the U.S. military presence in Japan by at least 60 percent, with the reductions being applied to the overall U.S. force level instead of merely being redeployed. Goodpaster and Cutler

subsequently confirmed these statements in writing. Cuts should be made, Goodpaster wrote, "right down to the point where the service can convince Secretary Wilson that further cuts would impair U.S. security in some definite and specific way."⁴⁹

Wilson interpreted the president's instructions freely. Regarding the 60 percent figure as an ultimate rather than an immediate goal, he asked the JCS to prepare 2 plans, for reductions of 40 and 50 percent respectively, both to be accomplished by 30 June 1958. Hastily prepared and tentatively approved by the AFPC on 18 June, they were subject to further refinement. Brucker, however, asked that the Army be allowed until 1 January 1959 to complete its withdrawal under either plan.⁵⁰

Radford and Irwin of ISA had already discussed these withdrawal plans with Secretary Dulles. The JCS, said Radford, were willing to withdraw forces subject to retention of the ability to operate from the outlying islands. This led to a discussion of the status of the Bonin Islands, where the population had been evacuated and wished to return. Radford pointed out that most of these people were of European rather than Japanese descent, to which State officials replied that they had been there for several generations and could hardly be kept out indefinitely.⁵¹

Kishi was scheduled to arrive in Washington on 19 June. On the preceding day, Quarles, Radford, and Sprague met with the president, Dulles, and Ambassador MacArthur, who had returned from Tokyo for the occasion. Dulles expressed opposition to revision of the security treaty but favored measures to put the U.S.-Japanese relationship on a more cooperative basis. Kishi believed, according to MacArthur, that if he were given suitable concessions, he would be able to push through "constructive" changes in the Japanese constitution, presumably meaning those that would liberalize restrictions on armament. All agreed that there could be no question of joint control of U.S. forces in Japan. The president suggested that the United States take the initiative in proposing a total withdrawal of forces and shift to the Japanese the onus of asking that some forces be retained if they so desired. This suggestion, as Radford pointed out, accorded with the thinking in Defense—to let the Japanese decide for themselves the forces they needed. As for the Ryukyus and Bonins, the president suggested a U.S. withdrawal tied to some specific improvement in the Cold War that would reduce the need for U.S. forces in the Western Pacific. Quarles saw no prospect of any such development and urged caution in giving the Japanese a claim to the islands.⁵²

Kishi's visit in Washington lasted from 19 to 22 June. His most important conference took place at the State Department on 20 June with Dulles, Sprague, Radford, and Irwin. Radford explained U.S. plans to withdraw at least half of its forces from Japan (including all ground combat units) for budgetary reasons. If the Japanese desired, he continued, the United States would withdraw everything, but if so, it must maintain full control of the Ryukyus and Bonins. To the U.S. position that Japan had not built up its forces to its capability, Kishi pointed to Japan's economic capacity as the limiting factor.

He appreciated the military importance of the islands, but thought that Japan might be given administrative control. Dulles replied that such a step would not accord with military requirements; the United States could only promise to review the matter if the international situation changed.⁵³

In the end, the Japanese prime minister had to settle for half a loaf. The two nations agreed to establish a committee to study problems relating to the security treaty and the disposition and employment in Japan of U.S. forces. They affirmed their understanding that the treaty was intended to be transitional and not to remain in perpetuity in its present form. The United States "welcomed" Japanese plans for strengthening its defenses and undertook to reduce substantially its own forces in Japan within the next year, with all ground combat forces being withdrawn. Japan's "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyus and Bonins was recognized, but so long as tensions existed in the Far East, the United States must continue to control them.⁵⁴

After Kishi left, OSD officials resumed discussion of force withdrawals. The JCS refined their original hasty proposals and submitted them to Wilson on 10 July 1957. The 2 proposed reductions actually amounted to slightly less than 40 and 50 percent, owing to the need to leave balanced forces in place. Under either alternative, the Army would withdraw all ground combat units by 31 December 1957 except for the Honest John battalion, which would remain until the question of its possible redeployment to Korea was settled. For logistic and administrative personnel, the withdrawal deadline had been moved back to 1 January 1959.⁵⁵

Wilson approved the lesser reduction, subject to revisions that would bring the figure to a full 40 percent. The JCS revised version, submitted on 2 August, would withdraw 39,556 personnel, leaving 59,334 in Japan. They now proposed to withdraw the Honest John battalion and move it to Okinawa if its redeployment to Korea was not approved. Secretary Wilson confirmed this plan, with minor changes, on 13 August.⁵⁶

Withdrawal of the 1st Cavalry Division had already been announced. It would move to Korea to replace the 24th Infantry Division, which would be disbanded as part of the Army's reduction from 19 to 17 divisions. The Marine regiments would move to Okinawa by 1 November 1957. The Honest John unit eventually moved to Korea.⁵⁷

The Japanese-American Committee on Security, the body agreed on during Kishi's visit, was established in Tokyo in August 1957. Ambassador MacArthur represented the United States, along with the commander of U.S. forces in Japan.⁵⁸

Revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty

The pullout of U.S. forces and the establishment of the Committee on Security helped to mollify Japanese opinion but did not fully satisfy those, including Prime Minister Kishi, who wanted a change in the 1951 security

treaty. As the OCB pointed out in July 1958, Japan had not yet "become an ally in the full sense of the word," and the conditions under which the treaty was signed no longer existed; hence it was not clear to what extent the United States could exercise its treaty rights under critical conditions.⁵⁹

Talking with Ambassador MacArthur in July 1958, Kishi explained his views of a "joint security system" between the two nations. As he pointed out, the security treaty did not obligate the United States to defend Japan, nor was there any explicit understanding regarding cooperation in Japan's defense. He suggested that the two countries develop principles for such cooperation. Kishi noted further that although the disposition and use in Japan of U.S. forces there were subject to consultation, there was no such provision regarding the use of these forces outside Japan; hence Japan might become entangled in a war against its will or even without its knowledge.

The Japanese public remained particularly sensitive on the matter of nuclear weapons. In the Japanese legislature (Diet), the Socialist Party had asked what understanding existed concerning the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into the country. Kishi had made it clear that Japan's policy was not to permit any country to introduce such weapons. However, as Kishi told MacArthur, it could be argued that on a legal basis the United States could bring any type of weapon into the country. Kishi felt the need for some understanding on this subject.⁶⁰

The Japanese Government arranged to send Foreign Minister Aichihiro Fujiyama to Washington in September 1958 for further discussions. On 8 August Quarles asked the JCS to provide recommendations on: (a) acceptable changes within the present treaty; (b) essential elements to be included in any renegotiated treaty; and (c) the position that DoD should take regarding the alternatives of maintaining the present treaty, amending it, or replacing it with another.⁶¹

Before the JCS could reply, Assistant Secretary Sprague on 8 September sent the JCS a position paper drafted by State. JCS comments were needed urgently, since discussions with Foreign Minister Fujiyama were scheduled to start in three days. State recommended that the United States offer to consult Japan concerning operational missions mounted by U.S. forces from that country, in return for unrestricted use of bases for logistic purposes, and, if common ground appeared for an agreement, to be willing to discuss a treaty for U.S.-Japanese military cooperation. These discussions would include consideration of a Japanese voice in the use and deployment of U.S. forces in Japan.⁶²

Replying the next day, JCS Chairman Twining criticized the State paper for what he considered excessive willingness to make concessions to Japan. It seemed to reflect a conviction that the United States had an obligation to defend Japan unilaterally, with Japan passively accepting this protection. With no practical capability for self defense, now or in the near future, Japan was in no position to demand guarantees of its safety while hobbling the U.S. ability to defend it.⁶³

The JCS replied on 10 September to Quarles's request of 8 August,

listing acceptable changes in the present treaty and essential elements for a new treaty. The two issues most likely to be brought up by Fujiyama involved use and disposition of U.S. forces and introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. Concerning the former, the JCS believed it would be acceptable to consult with Japan before conducting operations with forces based there. But there must be no Japanese veto over the employment of U.S. forces. As for the question of nuclear weapons, including visits of U.S. ships thus armed, this caused such intense emotion in Japan that it seemed better to maintain the status quo than to seek agreement.

The question of revising or replacing the treaty, in the JCS view, required further study. They recommended that Fujiyama be advised only of the U.S. position on the manner of changing the treaty provisions and that no substantive changes be discussed with him.⁶⁴

The administration overruled the JCS and decided to undertake a revision of the treaty, but did not at once make the decision public. Following Fujiyama's visit on 11-12 September, the two governments announced simply that they would "consult further" on the matter of altering existing security arrangements and on the status of the Ryukyus and Bonins.⁶⁵

On 17 September Sprague sent the JCS for comment the draft of a new treaty prepared by State. Replying on 23 September, the JCS noted that it ignored two of the three elements that they considered essential; it included only the retention of rights and privileges under the administrative agreement. The draft proposed to make deployment of U.S. forces and their equipment to bases in Japan, as well as the operational use of these bases, subject to joint consultation. The JCS believed that this should apply only in an emergency and not to the entry of U.S. warships into Japan.⁶⁶

Sprague discussed the draft and the JCS views with State Department officials, who stressed the Japanese concern over their inability to participate in decisions relating to the use of U.S. bases in hostilities not involving Japan. Ambassador MacArthur believed that agreement for joint consultation would satisfy Japanese demands. After discussion, State agreed to accept an understanding, formalized by an exchange of notes, that joint consultation would apply to major units of U.S. forces, not to day-to-day force movements. However, to limit joint consultation to emergencies would not, in State's view (which Sprague accepted), answer Japanese desires. Moreover, to bring up the question of joint consultation over the entry of U.S. warships would only call attention to a practice that had been going on for some years with no Japanese objection; MacArthur had given assurances that the Japanese Government would not object in the future.

Sprague accepted the State contention that the Japanese would never accept a commitment to allow use of U.S. forces in Japan to repel aggression against other nations. As for use of these forces in the event of a UN-sponsored action, Japan had already given this commitment through an exchange of letters under the peace treaty.

The State draft would permit either government to terminate the new treaty on a year's notice. Sprague won State agreement to allow this right to come into effect only after a 10-year period. Regarding rights and privileges under the administrative agreement, it was agreed that this would not be renegotiated but that technical changes might be needed to bring it up to date.⁶⁷

Sprague then discussed the draft treaty with McElroy and with Admiral Burke, representing the JCS, after which he reached agreement with State on three final points, as follows:

- (1) Entry of U.S. warships into Japanese ports: No effort would be made to have this included in a treaty, but the matter would be raised in negotiations so that the record would reflect the U.S. view on this issue.
- (2) Use of bases in event of aggression not directly against Japan: Again the formula proposed by the JCS would be brought up in the negotiations, but the United States would not insist on it.
- (3) Joint consultation only in emergencies: It would be unrealistic to expect the Japanese to accept this limitation; hence, the wording in State's draft would be accepted.

Sprague believed that the remaining points raised by the JCS were acceptable to State.⁶⁸

The State Department redrafted the treaty and sent it to MacArthur, instructing him to seek Japanese acceptance of the points raised by Defense and to forestall any attempt to renegotiate the administrative agreement. Negotiations dragged on through 1958 and all of 1959, largely owing to internal political disputes within Japan. At length the two sides agreed on a treaty. Prime Minister Kishi and Foreign Minister Fujiyama both came to Washington for the signing on 19 January 1960.⁶⁹

From Japan's viewpoint, the new treaty embodied marked improvements over the old. It was a treaty of "Mutual Cooperation and Security," as distinct from one in which Japan merely granted concessions to the United States. Both parties pledged to settle disputes by peaceful means, to strengthen the bonds of collaboration, and to cooperate in developing their capacities to resist attack. They would consult together whenever the security of Japan or peace in the Far East was threatened. Each party recognized that an armed attack against either party in the territories "under the administration of Japan" would endanger its own peace and security, and would act in such cases "in accord with its constitutional provisions and processes." Japan granted the United States the use of facilities and areas for its armed forces "for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East."

By an exchange of notes attached to the treaty, the parties agreed that

"major changes" in the deployment of U.S. forces into Japan or in their equipment, as well as the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for operations in case of attack on other countries, would be the subject of "prior consultation" with the Japanese Government. But there was no requirement for prior Japanese approval.⁷⁰

A separate document, not made public, recorded an understanding of what was meant by "major changes." Prior consultation would not apply to visits of warships and aircraft, logistics operations from bases in Japan, rotation of U.S. units stationed in Japan or their minor augmentation, or total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan.⁷¹

The application of the treaty to territories "under the administration of Japan" represented a compromise. Japan, for constitutional reasons, had wished to limit the treaty to the home islands plus those listed in Article 3 of the peace treaty (the Ryukyus, Bonins, and Volcanos). The JCS pointed out that Japan's interests would be protected by the provision that each party would act in accord with its constitutional processes; this would relieve Japan of the need to take action to defend any of the territories under the treaty. Specific reference to these islands in the treaty, in the JCS view, might provide the Japanese with a "political lever" toward reestablishing their control. Defense and State accepted the JCS argument and the compromise wording was adopted. However, an agreed minute to the treaty stipulated that if the Article 3 islands came under attack, the United States would consult with Japan and would take measures to defend them.⁷²

In the negotiations, the United States agreed to replace the administrative accord with a separate agreement governing the use of facilities and areas and the status of U.S. forces. However, it contained the substance of the earlier one. The principal change was the dropping of a requirement that Japan would furnish the United States with a yen equivalent of \$155 million annually to support U.S. forces in Japan.⁷³

The United States had thus placed its relations with Japan on a much sounder footing. At the same time, it had retained the right to use Japanese bases and had avoided conceding to Japan any right to veto the actions of U.S. forces. In a joint communiqué issued when the treaty was signed, President Eisenhower gave assurance that the United States "has no intention of acting in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Japanese Government with respect to the matters involving prior consultation under the treaty." Admiral Harry D. Felt, who had replaced Admiral Stump as CINCPAC in 1958, had seen the communiqué in draft and had objected to this statement, fearing that the Japanese might interpret it as an implied acceptance of prior consent. The JCS assured him, however, that the communiqué was sufficiently general to preserve U.S. freedom of action.⁷⁴

During the process of ratification the new treaty became an object of fierce contention, leading to violence in Japan despite the concessions to that country. Leftist and neutralist elements led the attack. The lower

house of the Diet approved the treaty on 20 May 1960, but demonstrations in Tokyo continued. The situation became so bad that Kishi was forced to ask Eisenhower to postpone a scheduled visit to Japan. Eventually, on 18-19 June, the upper house ratified the treaty. The U.S. Senate followed suit on 22 June and the treaty took effect the next day.⁷⁵

Japan's new status as a "fully independent and influential member of international society" was recognized in NSC 6008, a paper drafted by the NSC Planning Board in May 1960. It reaffirmed the objectives of preserving Japan as a U.S. ally and an element in the free world coalition, and noted Japan's rising prosperity, with one of the world's fastest rates of economic growth. This had led Treasury and Budget representatives on the board to argue that the United States should "promptly" undertake consultations to end military aid to Japan. The rest of the board considered such an effort premature.

Members of the board had also split on Japan's role in the free world coalition. Should an increasingly prosperous Japan, with its military strength slowly rising (though not as fast as the United States would like), be encouraged to extend the mission of its forces beyond that of defending its own immediate area? Defense and JCS favored "discreet efforts" in that direction. Other members believed that the United States should simply respond positively to any Japanese initiatives to participate more actively in overall Far Eastern defense.

Finally, two paragraphs relating to the Ryukyus and other islands caused dispute between State and Defense-JCS spokesmen on the board. One paragraph, supported by the board majority, would simply have the United States maintain the present degree of control over these islands as long as they seemed essential to vital U.S. security interests. Defense and JCS favored a statement that these islands were essential to U.S. security and should be controlled "for the duration of the international tensions in the Far East." State believed that, insofar as possible, the United States should accede to Japan's requests for closer relations with the Ryukyus in such matters as trade and cultural relations; Defense and JCS merely held that these should be "considered sympathetically." ISA officials believed, and so informed Secretary Gates, that State wished to alter the existing degree of U.S. control. The difference in outlook, according to ISA, had led to disagreements between the two departments since 1955.⁷⁶

The Treasury-Budget view on military assistance to Japan followed from the general effort by those agencies to curtail such aid to nations that, in their view, could now pay for their own defense. The issue had arisen in 1959 and appeared now in connection with a five-year military assistance program based on the recommendations of the Draper Committee. Admiral Felt on 1 May 1960 had sent in a strongly worded argument against termination of grant military aid to Japan on military, political, and psychological grounds. The "country team" in Tokyo fully endorsed CINCPAC's conclusion, believing that moderate amounts of aid (though increasingly on a cost-sharing basis) were necessary to achieve U.S. objectives.⁷⁷

The NSC discussed NSC 6008 on 31 May. The president ruled against any idea of putting pressure on Japan to extend its defense missions. The question of grant military assistance was settled by a compromise statement that it should be ended "as soon as deemed feasible by the President." The question of the Ryukyus occasioned considerable discussion. Presidential Assistant Gray recalled that disagreement on this matter had been the subject of "weekly controversy" between State and Defense. Twining spoke against any relaxation of U.S. control. Again the question was settled by leaving it to the president to determine the degree of control that should be maintained by the United States. Japanese requests concerning the islands would be "considered sympathetically," but a footnote interpreted this phrase as implying a "positive attitude" toward such requests. The effect was essentially to maintain the status quo.⁷⁸

Indochina: The Pot Begins to Boil

On the whole, it could be said by 1960 that in Japan and South Korea, as in Taiwan, the U.S. objective of securing and stabilizing the Far East rested on a reasonably solid foundation, despite the political unrest that had recently afflicted the first two of these nations. All three were increasingly prosperous, with populations basically satisfied with the status quo. Yet in Japan the danger of a lapse into "neutralism" could not be ignored. Still, it was all but impossible to conceive that any of these three would pass into the Communist camp except through outright conquest.

At the southeastern tip of Asia, however, the story was quite different. The former French colonies of Indochina—Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia—were struggling to establish a stable political base for economic development. These newly established governments had to cope with the absence of any clear-cut consensus about the nature of the polity that should prevail or the role that each should play on the world scene. Moreover, particularly in Vietnam, the government faced a strong, well-organized Communist guerrilla movement that enjoyed considerable support, especially among the peasantry. Next to these countries, the kingdom of Thailand, stable and pro-Western, provided a model of what it was hoped could be made of Indochina. But there the effort rested on sand rather than bedrock.

The situation in Indochina grew out of the long war for independence, centering in Vietnam, waged by the Communist-led Viet Minh against French rule. The outcome was decided in 1954 after a conference in Geneva. Separate agreements ended hostilities in each of the three countries and recognized their independence. The agreement for Vietnam provided for grouping forces on either side of the 17th parallel of latitude—the Communist forces to the north, those of the French Union to the south. General elections to unify the country were to be held in 1956, but these never took place, largely owing to opposition by Ngo Dinh Diem, who emerged as the leader of non-Communist South Vietnam and maintained that free

elections were impossible with much of the country under Communist rule. Thus, in effect, the 17th parallel (like the 38th parallel in Korea) became a political boundary between two separate countries: the Republic of (South) Vietnam with Diem as president and the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" headed by Ho Chi Minh, whose prestige in Vietnam stood supreme as a result of his leadership in the struggle against the French.⁷⁹

The United States had striven to prevent the fall of Indochina by furnishing military aid to the French Union forces. The success of the Communists in gaining a secure foothold in North Vietnam represented a severe setback for the policy of "containment." Perforce accepting defeat at Geneva, the Eisenhower administration fell back and regrouped along a second line of defense aimed at arresting further Communist advance. This took the form of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), established by a pact signed in Manila on 8 September 1954 by the United States, United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand, the only member from mainland Southeast Asia. The "treaty area" included Southeast Asia as well as the territory of the Asian signatories. Each party, in case of overt attack on the treaty area, would "act to meet the common danger" in accord with its constitutional processes. A military staff was established in Bangkok to begin planning.⁸⁰

The military assistance program provided the means for the United States to shore up the ability of the nations of Southeast Asia to cope with Communist insurgency or aggression. The United States had Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) in Vietnam and Cambodia. That in Vietnam was unique in being headed by an officer of three-star rank (invariably an Army lieutenant general). In Laos, the Geneva Agreement forbade the introduction of military personnel from outside Laos, but allowed the retention of 1,500 French military personnel for training the Laotian army. The United States established an organization in Laos innocuously titled "Programs Evaluation Office" (PEO), consisting of officers wearing civilian clothes, to supervise military aid to that nation.⁸¹

A policy paper drafted by the NSC Planning Board in August 1956 (NSC 5612) forthrightly stated that Communist domination of mainland Southeast Asia (defined as including Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, and the three Indochina countries) would adversely affect the entire U.S. position in the Far East. It would destroy the possibility of establishing an "equipoise of power" in Asia. The United States should accordingly assist the nations of the region to develop stable, free governments willing and able to resist communism "from within and without." In event of overt Communist aggression, the United States should invoke the UN Charter or the SEATO Treaty, or both if applicable, and take military and other action to assist the country attacked. Should the Communists attempt to seize control from within, the United States should take all feasible measures, including military action, to thwart the effort.

The question of military and economic assistance to neutral countries of Southeast Asia provoked dispute. Defense and Treasury favored a clear

statement that preference in such assistance should go to countries that participated in regional security arrangements. With specific reference to Burma, they wished to specify that military aid must be on a reimbursable basis.⁸²

The JCS took exception to two passages in NSC 5612. They objected to the implication that the U.S. goal in Asia was an "equipoise of power." In fact, the loss of Southeast Asia would have "far reaching consequences seriously adverse to U.S. security interests." As for congressional consent, the JCS recommended seeking advance authority to act quickly in times of crisis, including use of armed forces. These JCS views received support from the secretaries of the Army and Navy.⁸³

Aid to neutrals became a major focus of discussion when the council considered NSC 5612 on 30 August, with the respective positions sharply argued by Dulles and Radford. Dulles feared that important neutrals such as Burma or India might turn to the Soviet Union for military assistance if unable to obtain it from the United States. He would rather see the United States lose Thailand, an ally, than India, a neutral. Radford rejoined that the United States would lose its allies if they saw neutral countries receiving aid and that the loss of Thailand would "just about finish off" the U.S. position in Southeast Asia. In the final version of the paper, NSC 5612/1, the issue was compromised. Allies would "normally" receive preferential treatment, but the United States should "accept the right of each nation to choose its own path to the future, and should not exert pressure to make active allies of countries not so inclined." As for Burma, that nation would be provided aid on either a loan or a reimbursable basis, as consistent with U.S. interests. Reference to an "equipoise" was removed, the passage in question being revised, as the JCS had wished, to emphasize the consequences of the loss of Southeast Asia.

The JCS proposal to authorize presidential action in advance was not approved. Dulles doubted that it would be constitutional. The president agreed; it would be unthinkable, in his view, to go to war without a declaration by Congress except in event of a direct attack on U.S. territory or armed forces.⁸⁴

NSC 5612/1 committed the United States to provide military assistance to Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam to enable them to build up forces sufficient to present "limited initial resistance" to external aggression. At the request of the NSC, the JCS furnished a definition of this phrase: resistance sufficient to "preserve and maintain the integrity of the government and its armed forces" long enough for the United States to come to its aid, either unilaterally or as part of a collective effort.⁸⁵

Although Vietnam, the largest and most important country of Indochina, would soon draw major attention from the United States, it was the smaller Kingdom of Laos that first presented what looked like a serious crisis. Laos, like Vietnam, had a dissident Communist movement, the Pathet Lao, concentrated in the northeastern part of the country where it could readily draw assistance from Communist China and North

Vietnam. The premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, attempted to steer an uneasy course between East and West.

An agreement between the government and the Pathet Lao in 1956 led to a coalition in which the Pathet Lao political movement, the Neo Lao Hak Xat, was represented, and Pathet Lao forces were to be integrated into the Royal Laotian Army. But this attempted settlement failed to bring about stability. Eventually Souvanna resigned and was succeeded by Phoui Sananikone, who set out to bring the entire country under government control.

In May 1959 two Pathet Lao battalions that had escaped integration rebelled. One later submitted, but the other fled into the hills near the border with North Vietnam. The leader of the Pathet Lao forces, Prince Souphanouvong (half-brother of Souvanna Phouma), was arrested.⁸⁶

The stage was now set for civil war, which began in July 1959. Pathet Lao forces, presumably with assistance from North Vietnam, launched attacks in northeastern Laos, then menaced the two chief centers, Vientiane, the administrative capital, and Luang Prabang, the royal capital. Much of the Royal Lao Army had been shifted to the north, with resultant danger to internal security throughout the country. Early in September the Lao Government appealed to the UN, charging North Vietnam with aggression.⁸⁷

The United States was watching the situation closely. When the Pathet Lao attack began in July, State and Defense moved to provide emergency support for a temporary increase in the Lao army and paramilitary forces. They authorized CINCPAC to provide materiel up to \$1 million in value in response to requests from the Programs Evaluation Office.⁸⁸

At Gates's request, the JCS reexamined contingency plans for the Pacific, with particular reference to Laos. CINCPAC's OPLAN 32-59, which provided for military support of Laos, was designed principally to hold the main cities, freeing the Lao army for counterinsurgency operations. It called for establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF) 116 from Okinawa, using Marine forces with combined sea and air movement. The JCS modified this plan to provide that, except in emergency, Army battle groups would provide the principal combat forces.⁸⁹

Assistant Secretary Irwin's deputy, Robert Knight, and Admiral Burke discussed the crisis with State officials on 4 September. They agreed on preparations to implement CINCPAC's plan, including loading of troops for sealift, preparation of aircraft for airborne troop movements, and dispatch of elements of the Seventh Fleet to the South China Sea. Acting Secretary of State Dillon asked the president for approval of these steps.⁹⁰

Following this meeting, Dillon met with representatives of the SEATO member nations to alert them to the seriousness of the situation. The United States, he said, would prefer to act through SEATO rather than unilaterally, but the United Nations should be allowed to operate before SEATO took any action.⁹¹

It was probably also after the 4 September meeting that the JCS informed Secretary McElroy that they were "gravely concerned" over the situation

in Laos, which they believed resulted from the "strong outside support" of the Pathet Lao. They recommended the following measures: recast U.S. policy so as to free the United States from all restrictions on actions in Laos; augment U.S. personnel in Laos to ensure effective training plus U.S. direction and control of Lao forces; establish a MAAG in Laos; begin preparations to implement CINCPAC's OPLAN; and initiate immediate diplomatic action to provide outside military assistance to Laos.⁹²

Not requiring approval at a higher level, State and Defense decided to send a small contingent of communications personnel and equipment. They would leave the United States by air on 6 September and would be attached to the PEO.⁹³

On the morning of 5 September, State and Defense learned that President Eisenhower (then absent from Washington) had approved their preparatory measures. Twining told Felt that "top level thinking" in Washington considered that any action should be taken with "great swiftness." By the evening of 6 September, JTF 116 had been activated; Marine battalions in Okinawa were being prepared for air and sea transport; and a carrier task group was operating in the South China Sea, with a second off Taiwan and a third due to arrive in the Philippines within a week.⁹⁴

With emergency intervention in readiness, McElroy felt a need for better policy guidance. As he told Dillon on 10 September, Defense had no clear understanding of U.S. objectives in Laos. Was the United States expected to hold with its own forces or merely to step up its aid to those of Laos? Dillon referred the question to the president, who ruled against unilateral action and insisted that all the SEATO nations must do their part. Plans should begin at once for a joint SEATO command. The president warned that the situation might develop into "another Korea."⁹⁵

The president's bleak warning was not borne out. The military situation in Laos stabilized, and the UN succeeded in defusing the crisis, which melted away almost as quickly as it had arisen. A team of investigators sent by the UN Security Council reported on 6 November that they had found no evidence of regular Vietnamese troops in the country. By that time the fighting had diminished to a scale that could be handled by the Royal Lao Army.⁹⁶

Developments in Laos led to a review of U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia. The OCB, examining the situation early in 1960, concluded that the major challenge in Laos was no longer to insure an anti-Communist government, which already existed; rather it was to achieve cohesion among anti-Communist elements there and to encourage Lao leaders to assume greater responsibility. Policy toward Cambodia also needed rethinking. Its leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, appeared to be a typical Third World neutralist leaning toward the Communist bloc. Sihanouk, however, had shown himself an astute leader; he had survived several abortive coup attempts mounted by elements whose real or fancied association with the United States had undermined his confidence in U.S. motives. There seemed no alternative, therefore, according to the OCB, but to get along with him. The NSC discussed

the OCB report on 10 March 1960 and instructed the Planning Board to review U.S. policy accordingly.⁹⁷

In the resulting paper, NSC 6012, the Planning Board recommended that the United States continue to support Cambodia's independence and seek to influence Sihanouk. Military aid should continue to go to Cambodia, not only to strengthen that country's security but to discourage it from accepting aid from the Communist bloc. Regarding Laos, the paper proposed that the United States encourage that nation to develop plans for internal and external security and try to dissuade Laotian leaders from drastic actions that might have adverse international implications. The NSC approved this paper on 21 July.⁹⁸

The revision of policy in 1960 all but ignored Vietnam, which over the past few years had seemed to be emerging as a success story for U.S. policy. President Diem had proved himself a forceful and effective leader. As early as 1957 he had established a "sound and functioning political order" in a situation that three years earlier had seemed "all but hopeless."⁹⁹ Two years later, in July 1959, the Defense Department, reporting to the NSC on the status of the military assistance program, appraised the situation in South Vietnam in glowing terms:

South Vietnam is now a going concern politically, a pivot of U.S. power and influence in Southeast Asia, and a deterrent to communist aggression in Southeast Asia, an effective example of American aid to a friendly regime, a symbol throughout Asia of successful defiance of a brutal communist threat by an indigenous nationalistic government. Having averted almost certain disaster a few years ago, the U.S. now has a valuable and strategic asset in Southeast Asia.¹⁰⁰

By early 1960, however, this self-congratulatory passage was beginning to sound a bit hollow. Over the past three years, the pace of terrorist and guerrilla activity had been increasing. Communist guerrillas (now known as Viet Cong) grew bolder, on occasion entering large cities and remaining for several hours before withdrawing. By March 1960 they had a strength estimated at approximately 3,000. Their activities had at least the moral support of North Vietnam, though the amount of material support was uncertain. At the same time, weaknesses in the security forces of the Government of Vietnam (GVN), such as the lack of unified command and a centralized intelligence service, became more apparent. And there was ominous evidence that the heavy-handed measures of the Diem government were alienating both the educated elite and the peasantry, thus producing an ideal environment in which the guerrillas could operate.¹⁰¹

The United States had no specific commitment to the defense of South Vietnam, but U.S. officials were convinced that its fall to the Communists would lead to the loss of Indochina, with the consequences cited in NSC 5612/1. This "falling domino" theory, as it applied to Indochina, had been explicitly stated by the president in April 1954 at the time of the Geneva conference.¹⁰² As for Vietnam, Eisenhower clearly asserted its importance

in an address at Gettysburg College on 4 April 1959. Proclaiming that "freedom is truly indivisible," he cited Vietnam as an example of the interdependence of the nations of the free world and went on to add:

Strategically, South Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. The freedom of twelve million people would be lost immediately, and that of 150 million others in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss of South Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom.¹⁰³

Neither of Eisenhower's two successors, who were to lead the nation along the road to war in South Vietnam, ever uttered a clearer or more unequivocal assertion of U.S. interest in that country.

Within OSD, responsibility for monitoring the situation in South Vietnam, since it involved "unconventional" war as distinct from outright military attack, fell primarily on the secretary's assistant for special operations, General Graves B. Erskine, USMC (Ret.). Erskine's deputy, Col. Edward G. Lansdale, USAF (appointed in 1957 and soon to be promoted to brigadier general), had achieved a reputation as an expert in counterinsurgency operations when, as adviser to the Philippine Government, he helped devise and carry out a strategy by which a Communist movement had been defeated. He had also served in Vietnam and was on friendly terms with Diem. Lansdale had, however, made himself unpopular in some quarters through his unconventional ideas and unorthodox methods of operation. Soon after Lansdale's appointment, Erskine suffered a severe heart attack and was absent from duty for nearly two years, during which Lansdale acted in his stead.¹⁰⁴

Lansdale served on the Collateral Activities Coordinating Group (CACG), chaired by Deputy Secretary Douglas in 1960, which brought together all responsibilities for "special operations" in the Department of Defense. This body, established in 1959, became somewhat moribund soon after, but it took on new activities in 1960. Douglas's military assistant, Col. Edwin F. Black, also participated in the CACG.¹⁰⁵

The rising threat to Vietnam came up for discussion in the NSC on 9 May 1960. The president spoke vaguely of doing "everything possible" to prevent the deterioration of the situation there, and expressed the hope that State, Defense, and CIA would consult together to see what could be done.¹⁰⁶

Earlier, in April, CINCPAC had forwarded to JCS a study of the problem of Communist insurgency in Indochina as a basis for future actions. The JCS and ISA discussed this study and approved the following conclusions reached by CINCPAC: the United States should encourage both Vietnam and Laos to establish an integrated civil-military organization to centralize control of all counterinsurgency operations and to develop plans for

reduction of Communist influence; U.S. agencies should be authorized to support emergency operations in those countries; the PEO in Laos should provide tactical training and provide operational advice for the Lao armed forces; and the United States should furnish material and budgetary support for counterinsurgency operations in these countries. The JCS submitted these recommendations to Secretary Gates on 6 June 1960.¹⁰⁷

CINCPAC stated his conclusions in a draft plan for counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam, sent to the JCS on 30 June. It called for Vietnam to establish a National Emergency Council and a Director of Operations to formulate and implement a national plan, with U.S. support channeled through the ambassador. Details of the plan were to be filled in by the GVN and the U.S. country team. The JCS urged Gates to obtain interagency approval of the plan for further development.¹⁰⁸

While this plan awaited approval, a special national intelligence estimate (SNIE) issued on 23 August warned of the "marked deterioration" in the situation in Vietnam since January. If continued unchecked, this would "almost certainly in time cause the collapse of Diem's regime."¹⁰⁹

On reading this estimate, Deputy Secretary Douglas called a special meeting of the CACG for 14 September to consider what DoD might do on its own authority to strengthen the Diem government and reverse the unfavorable trends. CINCPAC and the MAAG Vietnam were to send representatives to this meeting.¹¹⁰

In Saigon, the MAAG submitted proposals to strengthen the stability of the GVN. The principal features included moving the first line of defense, the Civil Guard, from the Interior Ministry to the Ministry of Defense and giving it responsibility for all static security functions. It should be given improved training and equipped with U.S. small arms. The regular forces should be increased in strength from 150,000 to 170,000. The army, relieved of responsibility for static security, should receive improved training for mobile operations.¹¹¹

The U.S. ambassador to Vietnam, Elbridge Durbrow, did not fully agree with these proposals. Many of them, he told the State Department, ran "completely contrary to all the basic policies we have been following for the last three years." In particular, he opposed placing the Civil Guard under the Ministry of Defense, which, he feared, would convert it from a provincial police force into a regular army. Nor was he convinced of the need for larger regular forces. A JCS message of 1 September, conveying Douglas's concern and requesting attendance of local representatives at the forthcoming special CACG meeting, Durbrow characterized as a "somewhat panic button telegram." The new chief of the MAAG, Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, and his staff had interpreted it as a "mandate" to give their ideas on how to solve all of Vietnam's problems. The objective should be not to "pamper" Diem by giving him forces with which to "beat people into line," but to provide an adequate Civil Guard and then induce him to take measures that would win over the population.¹¹²

In preparation for the CACG meeting, Lansdale proposed a number of

actions, including some recommended by the MAAG that came within the authority of DoD. He proposed others requiring interagency coordination, but he did not endorse the proposed Vietnamese army increase.¹¹³

When the CACG met on 14 September, the conferees tentatively approved CINCPAC's counterinsurgency plan, subject to coordination with State, and agreed to provide the necessary support for it. Interagency agreement would be sought for transfer and improvement of the Civil Guard, with MAAG to be given responsibility for its training and support. They recommended improvements in counter guerrilla operations and possibly reduction of ARVN force levels, if an effective Civil Guard could be developed and the internal security problem brought under control. No thought was given to increasing force levels.¹¹⁴

As a byproduct of this meeting, W. H. Godel, an official of ARPA who had been present, set forth his views on the broad course of action that the United States should follow in Vietnam. Plans should emphasize not conventional military preparations but the building of a solid base of support among the populace, so that it would be willing to defend itself at the grassroots level using the tactics and weapons of the Viet Cong. Weapons and equipment should be light and easy to maintain; ARPA could be helpful in designing them. Colonel Black forwarded this memorandum to Army planners, noting that it was "worthy of examination by appropriate elements of the Army staff." Lansdale favored this approach, but, as events were to show, it was not followed.¹¹⁵

Two days after the CACG meeting, Irwin informed CINCPAC that OSD had approved his draft plan. At the same time, Douglas sent the plan to State, recommending that staffs of the two departments develop implementing instructions. Also, Rear Adm. Edward J. O'Donnell, ISA's Far Eastern director, told Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs J. Graham Parsons that DoD would do everything possible to expedite the training and equipping of the Civil Guard.¹¹⁶

Shortly thereafter State approved the CINCPAC counterinsurgency plan. A joint State-Defense message of 19 October directed the ambassador and country team to develop it in sufficient detail to provide a basis for determining courses of action and U.S. support requirements. The MAAG was already studying the plan, and on 27 October sent its portion, leaving only the last detail to be filled in by the country team.¹¹⁷

On his own, Diem took some actions recommended by the United States. A decree issued on 7 October established an internal security council to provide centralized direction of the counter guerrilla effort. Later, in December, he transferred the Civil Guard to the Ministry of Defense.¹¹⁸

Progress in Saigon survived an abortive coup d'etat on the night of 11-12 November. A group of disgruntled army officers attempted to remove Diem and institute a more democratic regime, while continuing the fight against the Viet Cong. The coup was put down with the aid of troops loyal to the government.¹¹⁹

After the incipient revolt had been suppressed, Lansdale told Gates

that he thought Diem had learned a lesson from the affair and would probably take closer command of the armed forces. If so, the role of the chief of the MAAG would be enhanced, and it would be advisable to obtain State's approval for McGarr to confer with Diem as often as necessary, "without the Ambassador insisting upon McGarr checking with him every five minutes." The most important lesson that Diem should learn was the need to "change some of his ways." Conveying views on such a matter was normally a task for the ambassador, but Lansdale thought that Durbrow had probably compromised himself through sympathy with the coup attempt. "Thus, it would be useful to get Durbrow out of Saigon," wrote Lansdale. "A graceful way would be to have him come home to report."¹²⁰

Lansdale sent a member of his office, Jerome T. French, on a quick inspection trip to Vietnam. French reported on 17 November that the coup attempt had left bitterness and dissension which might retard operations against the Communists. Moreover, the Viet Cong were stronger than Washington realized; they held secure pockets throughout the country and were beginning to link up those in the southern region.¹²¹

The last elements of the counterinsurgency plan fell in place on 4 January 1961, when Ambassador Durbrow forwarded the country team's contribution. The completed plan provided for a combined politico-military offensive carried out by the GVN, with U.S. advice and assistance, to defeat the Communist insurgency. Besides steps already taken, it would be necessary to develop an operational control system, to implement national plans, to institute a national intelligence organization, and to establish border and coastal surveillance. The GVN armed forces needed a minimum of 20,000 more men. Additional costs to the United States, required in FY 1961, would be modest: \$39.5 million in MAP, mostly to finance the personnel increase, and \$7.5 million in defense support. The administration took no action to approve this plan, and it was awaiting action on 20 January when the new administration assumed office.¹²²

In January 1961 Lansdale himself toured Vietnam. Some months earlier, Diem had asked that Lansdale be assigned to Saigon as an adviser. OSD officials were agreeable, but State opposed, fearing that Lansdale might use his relationship with Diem to undercut efforts to persuade him to undertake drastic political reforms. In November 1960, however, State acceded to Douglas's request that Lansdale undertake a 12-day fact-finding mission.¹²³

On his return, Lansdale told Gates that the coming year promised to be "fateful" for Vietnam. The Communists hoped to take over the country before the end of the year. It had been a "shock" to find that the Viet Cong controlled South Vietnam's most productive agricultural region. He had been given estimates of Communist ground force strength ranging from 3,000 to 15,000; his best guess was that it was closer to the larger figure. But he found the situation by no means hopeless. The VC were off balance; during 1960 they had stressed military action and had neglected to build the necessary political structure, an error that they were now striving to rectify. "We still have a chance of beating them," he told Gates, "if we can

give the people some fighting chance of gaining security and some political basis of action."

Needed now, according to Lansdale, was "a changed U.S. attitude, plenty of hard work and patience, and a new spirit by the Vietnamese." The U.S. team in Vietnam needed a "hard core of experienced Americans who know and really like Asia and the Asians." The present ambassador, suffering from fatigue, should be replaced by "a person with marked leadership talents who can make the Country Team function harmoniously and spiritually, who can influence Asians through understanding them sympathetically, and who is alert to the power of the Mao Tse Tung tactics" and "dedicated to feasible and practical democratic means" to defeat them. He should have as his adviser a "mature American, with much the same qualifications as those given above," to direct political operations against the Communists. It was not hard to guess whom Lansdale had in mind in outlining these qualifications.

Lansdale believed that President Diem should be supported until another "strong executive" could replace him legally. Also, an effort should be made to build a loyal opposition. As for military matters, Lansdale suggested only that MAAG's military advisers should have the freedom to accompany SVN forces in the field.¹²⁴

Lansdale told Diem that Gates and Douglas were "most receptive" to his report. "Douglas in particular called it to the attention of our top people at the White House and State Department," he wrote. Obviously there was no possibility of acting on his recommendations in the few days left to the outgoing administration, but Douglas went to "considerable lengths" to acquaint incoming officials with the situation.¹²⁵

The Crisis in Laos, 1960-1961

While Vietnam caused growing concern to the Eisenhower administration in its last days, Laos seemed to present the most immediate danger to peace. The situation there had settled down after the crisis of August-September 1959, but the calm was suddenly shattered on 9 August 1960. A coup led by Captain Kong Le, who commanded a paratroop battalion in the Royal Laotian Army, overthrew the government in Vientiane, seized control of the city, proclaimed a revolution, and recalled Souvanna Phouma to head a new government. The rebels announced their goals of establishing "neutrality" for Laos, rejecting U.S. "interference," and accepting aid from any source. The most prominent member of the legitimate government, General Phoumi Nosavan, minister of defense, fled to Thailand, from where he at once began laying plans to retake Vientiane with loyal troops.¹²⁶

The United States quickly swung its support behind the legitimate government. State and Defense officials agreed on 11 August that the United States would furnish moral and some material support. On the following day, Douglas listed for Lemnitzer the approved courses of action

and asked him to issue appropriate directives at once. MAP supplies in Thailand would be made available to support military operations by Phoumi's forces; two senior representatives of the PEO would be designated as advisers to the Lao Army and would serve as a channel for requests for logistic support from the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) in Thailand; additional communications equipment would be made available to the Lao forces.¹²⁷

The situation in Laos was thoroughly confused. Kong Le and the Souvanna government controlled Vientiane. Phoumi returned to Laos and took up headquarters at Savannakhet. The King, Savang Vatthana, ineffectual and apparently self-effacing, was at Luang Prabang. In the north there remained the standing menace of the Pathet Lao. U.S. policy was to prevent bloodshed, remove Kong Le, and preserve the unity of non-Communist elements in order that they might be directed against the Pathet Lao.¹²⁸

The U.S. ambassador in Vientiane, Winthrop G. Brown, pointed out on 17 August that military force was on Phoumi's side but legal and international right was on Souvanna's. He believed that the United States, rather than throwing full support to Phoumi, should seek to bring the two leaders together, a position diametrically opposed by the JCS, who favored support to Phoumi; the alternative, they feared, would be a government that was "Communist oriented if not Communist dominated."¹²⁹

On 20 August Brown suggested a coalition government, headed by Souvanna with Communists and Pathet Lao excluded. Admiral Burke, on seeing Brown's message, became greatly agitated. Without waiting to consult his JCS colleagues but believing they would agree with him, he at once wrote Gates that Souvanna was a "weak sister" who had no inclination to resist the Communists. Phoumi, on the other hand, was a friend of the United States and should be supported both overtly and covertly.¹³⁰

Gates accepted this JCS view and so informed officials of the State Department in a meeting on 23 August. The State representatives agreed that Phoumi, despite his apparent lack of popularity, was the "best bet" for the United States; he would be given explicit assurances of complete support, to be furnished by JUSMAG Thailand through the PEO.¹³¹

Souvanna formed a new cabinet, with Phoumi as deputy prime minister, which was ratified by the Laotian assembly, giving it full legal status. Phoumi, though he accepted appointment, refused to return to Vientiane, fearing for his safety as long as Kong Le's forces were in control. The State Department instructed Brown to urge the new government to assure Phoumi's safety, while making it clear to Phoumi that the United States would not support any separatist move on his part.¹³²

Continuing to steer his own course, Phoumi remained unmoved by the U.S. views. He allied with a right-wing leader, Prince Boun Oum, who on 10 September proclaimed establishment of a new government and abolition of the existing constitution. The Souvanna regime declared a state of national emergency and ordered the army to suppress this new revolt.¹³³

These developments did not alter the disagreement between the JCS

and Ambassador Brown. A State-Defense conference on 16 September agreed that the United States should seek Souvanana's ouster, but that Phoumi should be told that U.S. military aid was for the purpose of fighting the Pathet Lao and not attacking Vientiane.¹³⁴

On 5 October Brown reported that a Lao army officer had suggested that his U.S. adviser join him in the field for a projected pro-Phoumi coup in one of the military regions. Brown and the country team believed that no PEO personnel should take the field in any sort of combat operation. Among other dangers, such a step might invite intervention by North Vietnam, which could easily supply large numbers of volunteers. The State Department approved Brown's position.¹³⁵

Gates and Lemnitzer met with Under Secretary of State Dillon and other State officials on 7 October. They agreed on a final effort to work "through and with" Souvanna while at the same time supporting Phoumi and other anti-Communist forces. If this failed, the only alternative would be to support exclusively the anti-Communist elements. Souvanna should be told, as the price of U.S. support, that he must move the seat of government from Vientiane to Luang Prabang, away from Kong Le's forces, and desist from negotiations with the Pathet Lao until they could be conducted from a position of strength. A high-level mission should be sent to Laos to present this new approach; its members would be Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Parsons, Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin, and Vice Adm. Herbert D. Riley, chief of staff of CINCPAC.

The policy of carrying water on both shoulders was obviously a precarious one. Military aid to Phoumi's forces would have to go directly to Savannakhet and to the various military regional headquarters, not through the government in Vientiane. The State Department cautioned Brown that PEO personnel must under no circumstances serve with Laotian units in combat.¹³⁶

Departing from Washington on 9 October, Parsons and Irwin spent some days in Southeast Asia but failed to bring about the desired political solution. Irwin concluded that there was little prospect of improving the U.S. position in Laos while Souvanna remained prime minister. He cabled to Washington his recommendation of continued support for Phoumi in a "careful and cautious manner." PEO officers believed that Laos might be held if the United States moved quickly and supplied sufficient aid to the anti-Communists; Irwin thought that it would help greatly if U.S. advisers were stationed at battalion level. On his return, Irwin recommended to Gates that the United States lend all possible assistance to Phoumi in organizing and training his forces and in planning and executing military operations.¹³⁷

On 28 October State and Defense officials reviewed the Laotian situation in the light of reports from Parsons and Irwin. They concluded that Souvanna's usefulness to the United States had come to an end. He should be replaced by the former prime minister, Phoui Sananikone, who had been living in France but was now returning to Laos. Ambassador Brown,

however, doubted that this plan would gain the acceptance of either the king or Phoui.¹³⁸

Some officials in OSD, notably Lansdale and Black, believed that the State Department, specifically Ambassador Brown, was undermining the effort to keep Laos oriented toward the West. They urged that Gates meet with Herter and seek a clear presidential policy decision in favor of a course of action to eliminate Souvanna. It does not appear that a presidential meeting was held, but Gates conferred with Herter on 10 November and the two reaffirmed the policy of seeking to replace Souvanna with Phoui.¹³⁹

During the next few weeks, the United States pursued this objective, while Souvanna continued to seek a coalition government that would include the Pathet Lao. Matters took an abrupt new turn on 28 November, however, when Phoumi launched an attack against the Vientiane forces, to be coordinated with a coup in Vientiane.¹⁴⁰

The coup took place in Vientiane on 8 December. Souvanna fled, taking refuge in Pnompenh, the capital of Cambodia; what was left of his government was taken over by an outright pro-Communist, Quinim Polsena. Kong Le's forces staged a counter coup, and his forces battled those of Phoumi for control of Vientiane. The political situation, however, took a favorable turn for the United States. The coup leaders set up a government headed by Boun Oum, with Phoumi as deputy prime minister and minister of security. A delegation flew to Luang Prabang and obtained the king's royal assent for this step. The United States was now in the position of assisting a legitimate government instead of a rebel faction.¹⁴¹

Offsetting these favorable developments, the Soviets began an airlift to the Kong Le forces in Vientiane. They were believed to be delivering 105-mm and 120-mm mortars as well as fuel.¹⁴²

Washington experienced a flurry of alarm on 14 December, when the battle for Vientiane seemed to be going badly for Phoumi. Ambassador Brown and the PEO recommended sending 105-mm weapons from Thailand to interdict the airfield, control of which was crucial. A JCS-State meeting approved this recommendation and also urged unrestricted use of U.S. transport aircraft to support Phoumi. Secretary of State Herter and Assistant Secretary Irwin, then in Paris for a NATO meeting, endorsed these recommendations, which had been hastily cabled to them. Later that evening the president (then at Walter Reed Hospital) approved them. The broad governing principle, he said, should be complete firmness within the principle of legality.¹⁴³

These measures proved unnecessary; the threat passed when Phoumi's forces captured the Vientiane airfield on 16 December. Meanwhile, however, CINCPAC had activated JTF 116 and had alerted units earmarked for this task force under OPLAN 32-59.¹⁴⁴

Driven from Vientiane, Kong Le's forces retreated northward toward the strategically important Plaine des Jarres region, where they were soon to link up with the Pathet Lao forces. The Soviet airlift into Vientiane had ended on 13 December, but Soviet aircraft now began supplying the Kong

Le forces by parachute drop. Supported in this fashion, Kong Le and the Pathet Lao could fight on indefinitely. The result might be, as a State message warned, the ultimate defeat of the Laotian Government or perhaps a "second Korea."¹⁴⁵

On 22 December the JCS told Gates that the military situation required "decisive and expeditious" U.S. action. The United States should "express in concrete terms" its intent to block further Communist encroachment in Southeast Asia and specifically in Laos. The Lao Government had formally requested military and economic aid; the United States should expedite its response, which should demonstrate will and determination. Communications equipment, airlift, and increased materiel support, including tanks and mobile artillery, should be furnished.¹⁴⁶

CINCPAC recommended that the United States "effectively advertise" the fact of Soviet bloc intervention in order to enlist international sympathy for the Laotian Government and at the same time support Phoumi so as to enable Laotian forces to accomplish their own missions. Armed trainer aircraft (T-6s) should be furnished Phoumi from stocks in Thailand, to be replenished under the MAP; Laotian pilots should be sent to Thailand for training. As soon as it was ready, the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) should announce that no further intervention by foreign aircraft would be tolerated and that Laotian pilots had been ordered to shoot down intruders. The JCS approved these recommendations, subject to State Department concurrence, and authorized immediate training for Laotian pilots in Thailand.¹⁴⁷

State and Defense officials subsequently approved all the JCS and CINCPAC recommendations. Ambassador Brown and the PEO chief so informed Phoumi on 30 December. At the same time, Brown stressed that there remained one more step to complete the legitimacy of the Boun Oum government, namely, to obtain formal approval by the assembly.¹⁴⁸

Just at that moment, the combined Kong Le and Pathet Lao forces, with assistance from a North Vietnamese force reportedly up to seven battalions in size and supported by the continuing Soviet airlift, opened a coordinated attack in northern Laos. Laos appealed to the United Nations on 30 December. CINCPAC raised to a higher degree of alert the forces earmarked for JTF 116 and requested immediate assignment of a C-130 squadron to improve his airlift capabilities.¹⁴⁹

In Washington, President Eisenhower discussed the situation with Douglas, Lemnitzer, and officials from State on 31 December. Lemnitzer assured the president that forces for JTF 116 were in readiness condition two, meaning an alert in place; these included an airborne battle group in Okinawa and Marine forces with a Seventh Fleet task force. The conferees agreed that it was essential to establish the legitimacy of the Boun Oum government in order to solidify international support. Also, Souvanna, who still commanded some lingering support on the international scene, must be induced formally to resign and leave Southeast Asia. The president stressed that the United States would fight to defend Laos—preferably with allies but, if necessary, without them. He directed that the SEATO Council be alerted

and suggested reinforcement of U.S. forces in the area, but was satisfied when told by Lemnitzer that three attack carriers were available in the Far East.¹⁵⁰

During the first few days of 1961 the Laotian situation dominated the international headlines, as leftist forces completed their conquest of the Plaine des Jarres. The United States called for a meeting of the SEATO Council. On 2 January the Defense Department announced the taking of "normal precautionary actions" to increase readiness of forces in the Pacific. The president followed the situation in meetings with his advisers, including Gates and Douglas, on 2 and 3 January. The Laotian national assembly formally recognized the Boun Oum government on 3 January, giving it full legal status.¹⁵¹

Efforts toward a diplomatic settlement were in full swing, with considerable sentiment for reestablishment of the International Control Commission. The United Kingdom, India, the Soviet Union, and Communist China favored this step. Sihanouk of Cambodia advocated a new Geneva conference with the Southeast Asian countries represented. The Royal Laotian Government, cool to the ICC, preferred mediation by neutral powers. Thailand, Nationalist China, the Philippines, and South Vietnam wanted action by SEATO. The United States would accept any multilateral approach that would end the hostilities and provide for continued support of the RLG.¹⁵²

Within days the military situation stabilized and the crisis eased. The SEATO Council met on 4 January and affirmed the goal of a peaceful solution, at the same time expressing readiness to fulfill the alliance's obligations. After the meeting the secretary general of SEATO, Pote Sarasin of Thailand, stated publicly that there was no proof that North Vietnamese troops had intervened in Laos. The Soviet Union continued to insist that Souvanna was the lawful head of the Laotian Government, but Herter, after discussions with Soviet Ambassador Mikhail A. Menshikov, concluded that the Soviets would not push the situation to the brink of war.¹⁵³

Nevertheless, U.S. officials did not let down their guard. On 7 January the JCS, on the basis of a "high-level conference" held that date, authorized CINCPAC to use U.S. military aircraft, if necessary, to airlift supplies into Laos, although use of covert aircraft was to be preferred. They also authorized use of armed T-6 aircraft in Laos, subject only to the restriction that no bombs be dropped. First priority of use would be against the Communist airlift; second, against troops, dumps, and other military targets. Accordingly, on 12 January four T-6 aircraft, flown by Laotian pilots, strafed leftist troops north of Vientiane.¹⁵⁴

With JCS approval, CINCPAC authorized the PEO to attach advisers to Lao army units as far down as battalion level for support of operations. They were not authorized to engage in operations forward of battalion command posts or behind insurgent lines. Every reasonable precaution was to be taken to avoid assignments that exposed personnel to risk or capture.¹⁵⁵

As the administration in Washington prepared to leave office, the situation in Laos remained serious and baffling. The JCS, according to Lemnitzer, were in the "depths of frustration."¹⁵⁶ Eisenhower and his elected successor,

Kennedy, discussed Laos at some length on 19 January—Eisenhower's last full day in office. Eisenhower was accompanied by Secretaries Gates, Herter, and Robert Anderson. With Kennedy were Robert S. McNamara and Dean Rusk, his appointees as secretary of defense and secretary of state, respectively; Douglas Dillon, former under secretary of state, now Kennedy's choice for secretary of the treasury; and Clark Clifford, a Kennedy adviser. Eisenhower spoke emphatically about the need to hold Laos, which he called the "cork in the bottle"; if it fell to the Communists, most of the rest of the Far East would follow. He favored action through SEATO rather than by the United States alone; if this failed, he preferred a revival of the ICC.

Kennedy agreed that the situation in Laos and in Southeast Asia seemed serious, but he did not otherwise commit himself. When he asked how long it would take to put a U.S. division into Laos, Gates replied with an estimate of 12-17 days, unless forces already in the Pacific were used. Departing from the subject immediately at hand, Gates remarked that U.S. forces were in excellent shape and that modernization of the Army was making good progress.

Discussion of Laos led to some concluding general statements concerning Southeast Asia. It was agreed that Thailand was a valuable U.S. ally and would be endangered by the fall of Laos. Eisenhower saw some evidence of friction between the Soviet Union and China concerning Southeast Asia. He ended the discussion by commenting that Communist forces always seemed to have stronger morale than their democratic opponents; evidently Communists knew how to produce a sense of dedication on the part of their adherents.¹⁵⁷

Such were the problems in Southeast Asia that President Eisenhower bequeathed to his successor. Of the two trouble spots, Laos was at the moment by far the more urgent, presenting as it did the distinct possibility that U.S. forces might soon be involved in a shooting war. Yet the situation in Laos in 1961, as in 1959, never quite reached the flash point; it continued to smolder without bursting into flame. The leftist forces never pressed their attack home; fighting died down and an international conference eventually arranged a settlement.

In Vietnam, on the other hand, matters were to drift from bad to worse. Already, by the end of 1960, the United States had taken what may be seen, with the benefit of hindsight, as the first tentative steps toward the "quagmire." These amounted to a decision in favor of a larger U.S. role in planning the war against the Viet Cong and an increased military aid program for the GVN. In no way did these steps inexorably bring others in their train; the most that could be said was that they involved a heavier commitment of U.S. prestige. President Eisenhower had expressed a willingness to fight for Vietnam, but at the end of 1960 there seemed no reason to believe that it would become necessary. Though no one knew it at the time, the U.S. future in Vietnam hung in the balance on 20 January 1961. To President Kennedy, Secretary of State Rusk, and Secretary of Defense McNamara fell the fateful decision of whether to expand the U.S. role still further.

CHAPTER XX

Military Assistance

The U.S. practice of aiding other nations to strengthen their defense by directly supplying both weapons and training for their armed forces became a major element of foreign policy after World War II. The shattered condition of the nations of Europe and the Far East following the conflict left them vulnerable either to overt attack or to overthrow by a militant internal Communist movement. The United States undertook to rebuild the economies of the wartorn nations, then to provide economic and technical assistance to nations struggling to lift themselves out of conditions of poverty and backwardness that could provide a breeding ground for Communist agitation. Thus military and economic aid went hand in hand in the effort to build a stable international order.

Beginning in 1951, military and other forms of assistance were combined under the title of the Mutual Security Program (MSP). Each year's program was authorized by legislation fixing fiscal limits for each type of aid, followed by separate legislation making appropriations for the coming fiscal year.¹

The Military Assistance Program in 1956

The statute governing foreign aid programs in 1955 was the Mutual Security Act of 1954, an update of the original 1951 law. It authorized military assistance for countries or organizations after the president had declared that such assistance would strengthen U.S. defenses and promote world peace, and after each recipient nation or organization had entered into an agreement governing the use of the aid received. Under the law, the secretary of defense would determine requirements for and procure military equipment; supervise use of end-items by recipient countries and training of foreign military personnel; deliver end-items; and establish priorities for procuring and allocating military equipment. The president was responsible for determining the value of the military assistance program for each country.

Overall supervision of the mutual security program, together with administration of economic and technical assistance, belonged at first to the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), an independent executive agency set up in 1953. It was replaced in 1954 by the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), a semiautonomous agency in the Department of State headed by John B. Hollister.²

Within the Department of Defense, a directive issued in 1955 gave the assistant secretary for international security affairs (ISA) sweeping authority for executing the duties assigned the secretary of defense by the Mutual Security Act of 1954 and also spelled out responsibilities of other DoD elements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided military objectives and force bases for the military assistance program and recommended priorities for allocating materiel among recipient nations and between those and the U.S. armed forces. The military departments, under ISA guidance, developed programs related to their roles and missions, basing them on recommendations prepared by the military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) in each country and forwarded by the unified commanders concerned: USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, and CINCARIB. For the purposes of the military assistance program, CINCARIB's area was extended to include all of Latin America, and that of USCINCEUR to include Ethiopia and the Middle East.³

Another directive in 1957 listed in more detail the military assistance responsibilities of ASD(ISA): to "direct and supervise" the "development, preparation, refinement, and control" of military assistance programs, including establishing monetary values thereof and approving delivery schedules; to approve the composition and organization of MAAGs and their terms of reference as well as the appointment of chiefs of MAAGs. The military departments were responsible for initial drafting of aid programs, for procuring materiel, and for administering training programs for foreign military personnel.⁴

Developing the annual mutual security program became a time-consuming process involving numerous elements of DoD and State. The detailed program never appeared in time for the annual budget message in January. At that point, the president simply gave an overall figure, then submitted details in a separate message later. Since mutual security required a preliminary authorization, followed by a separate appropriation, Congress had two opportunities to slash the president's request. Reductions were inevitable; foreign aid was unpopular in many quarters, where it was stigmatized as a "giveaway," and as such was a favorite target for budget cutters. Following the enactment of appropriations, aid programs had to be revised to accord with the money made available.

Besides direct aid in the form of military equipment and training of foreign personnel, military assistance also took other forms administered by DoD. These included mutual weapons development, a joint program with NATO for producing improved weapons; facilities assistance, in which the United States helped to finance production capacity in allied nations;

and offshore procurement, under which the United States contracted to purchase munitions from other nations, again to expand their productive capacity. Military assistance did not include "defense support," i.e., assistance to enable recipient nations to maintain the economic structure necessary to support their military establishments; that came under ICA.⁵

Direct sale of U.S. military equipment to foreign countries, paid for out of their own resources, was separate from "grant" military assistance. Such sales, specifically authorized by the Mutual Security Act, did not require the purchasing country to sign a previous agreement with the United States.

Despite the limited popularity of the military assistance program outside the executive branch, the Joint Chiefs of Staff enthusiastically supported it as providing an important accretion to the overall strength of the non-Communist world. As Admiral Radford told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1955:

The military aid program is part and parcel of the United States Defense Department program. The expenditures abroad in support of our alliances do not differ in purpose, scope, or objective from our own military expenditures. The fact that this part of our program is not included in the Defense Department budget is more a matter of procedure and administration than of substance. In this connection I can assure you that were it not for the strength which has been generated in the past 5 years by our allies—and in most instances made possible by our military aid programs—the requirements of our own program would be much larger.⁶

For the 7-year period from FY 1950 through FY 1956, the United States provided a total of \$16,175.5 million in military aid, distributed as follows:

	Amount (In millions)	Percentage
Europe	\$10,597.5	65.52
Near East and Africa	1,737.4	10.74
Asia and Pacific	3,049.5	18.85
Latin America	177.0	1.09
Non-Regional	614.1	3.80
Total	\$16,175.5	100.00

These figures included all programs charged to appropriations plus the acquisition cost of surplus stocks of U.S. equipment. The major recipient countries during this period were France, with \$3.6 billion; Italy, \$1.4 billion; the Republic of China, \$1.1 billion; and Belgium, \$1.0 billion. Turkey and Greece accounted for most of the assistance allotted in the Eastern Mediterranean area. In the Far East, the principal recipient, besides Nationalist China, was Indochina with \$851 million. In Latin America, Brazil (\$97.2 million) accounted for over half the total.⁷

During FY 1956, 57 countries received U.S. military assistance in some form. Of these 39 received direct grant aid and 3 others credit assistance. Those countries obtaining aid through purchases totaled 49; many of these also received grant aid in the form of training.⁸

For FY 1957, President Eisenhower in his budget message on 16 January 1956 recommended \$4.86 billion in new obligational authority for the mutual security program—\$3.0 billion for military and the remainder for economic-technical assistance. As in previous years, these funds would be appropriated to the president, not to any department. Expenditures for military assistance for FY 1957 were estimated at \$2.5 billion, approximately the current annual rate.⁹

Two months later in his message on mutual security, the president adjusted the authorization request to \$4.67 billion, but asked \$4.86 billion in appropriations to cover unused authorizations from prior years. The request for military assistance remained the same (\$3.0 billion). These amounts, appreciably larger than those requested or appropriated in either of the two preceding years, were needed to rebuild the declining balances of unexpended funds and thus maintain the flow of materiel in the pipeline. For defense support, the president asked \$1.1 billion.¹⁰

Congress authorized only \$4.0 billion for the MSP, including \$2.225 billion for military assistance, then appropriated for the latter purpose \$2.0 billion, along with \$196 million in unobligated funds from prior years. For defense support, the legislators surprisingly authorized and appropriated slightly more than had been asked (almost \$1.2 billion in each instance).¹¹

The Program Reexamined

Planning for the military assistance program for FY 1958 began in April 1956, when the JCS recommended force objectives, defined as "the military force levels of allied nations, stated in terms of major military units, that the United States has determined should be developed and maintained to contribute to U.S. security and the common defense of the free world." Not related to any particular year, they represented final goals but did not commit the United States to any specific or even general amount of military assistance.

The JCS recommended force objectives for 40 countries. In Europe, these were the 12 NATO members (including Greece and Turkey) plus Yugoslavia, Spain, and Austria. Five were in the Middle East or Africa: Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Libya, and Ethiopia. In the Far East, the JCS listed objectives for Japan, Nationalist China, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and the newly independent nations of Indochina: Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Twelve nations of Latin America were included.

Within each area, the JCS established priorities among the nations involved. Thus for Europe, "first and equal" priority went to West Germany, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, and in the Far East, Japan, Nationalist

China, South Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Iran and Brazil received first priority in the Middle East and Latin America, respectively. "Functional" priorities were also listed for each area. For Europe, these were, in order, to protect the U.S. investment already made; to develop German forces and concurrently to improve air defense and naval escort; to improve the effectiveness of forces committed to NATO; to improve the capability of supplying U.S. and allied forces overseas; and to enhance the effectiveness of forces of non-NATO European countries—Austria, Spain, and Yugoslavia.¹²

The Office of the Assistant Secretary (ISA) incorporated the JCS recommendations in comprehensive instructions providing guidance for the field in drafting programs for each country and region. Owing to difficulty in reaching agreement within OSD, the final document had to be issued in the form of a draft rather than a final instruction, and the program suffered delay.¹³ Eventually, the military aid program that emerged from budget discussions totaled \$2.6 billion out of a total MSP of \$4.4 billion, amounts the president requested in January 1957.¹⁴ A significant reduction from the FY 1957 request, it still represented considerably more than Congress had appropriated.

While the FY 1958 program was in preparation, the subject of mutual security underwent considerable examination. The process of review had begun in 1955 as the outgrowth of one of the recommendations of the Hoover Commission. The OCB established an interagency committee headed by Herbert V. Prochnow, deputy under secretary of state for economic affairs, to survey the entire aid program. The assistant secretary of defense (ISA) represented DoD on the committee. The terms of reference of the committee, signed in December 1955 by the heads of the agencies represented, assigned a less sweeping task: to examine "special country situations" where U.S.-supported military programs might impose undue economic burdens. Six countries, recipients of the largest proportion of U.S. aid, were chosen for study: Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Vietnam, Nationalist China, and South Korea. The NSC noted the proposed study on 8 December 1955.¹⁵

The committee's report, submitted on 24 July 1956, showed that the 6 countries in question had absorbed 54 percent of all aid in 1956 and were scheduled to receive 44 percent in 1957. To equip and maintain existing forces in those countries, and to provide some resources for economic development, would require annual amounts ranging from \$1.6 billion to \$2.5 billion per year through FY 1960. The results of aid thus far furnished had been unimpressive; the six nations had not greatly enhanced their military capabilities, nor had they registered significant economic growth.¹⁶

The council discussed the report on 26 October. A consensus emerged that the entire subject of foreign aid needed study as a whole and not piecemeal, but the members took no action to undertake any such study, since several were already in progress. However, the council directed the Planning Board to review the "scope and allocation" of military and economic aid to Pakistan, Turkey, Taiwan, Iran, and Korea (Vietnam being omitted

probably because it was scheduled for the smallest share of aid in 1957). The president also directed the JCS to recommend the minimum level of indigenous forces that the United States should seek to maintain for the next two years in the first four named countries (force levels for Korea were already under study in connection with policy toward that country).¹⁷

In reply, the JCS recommended, as the minimum level of forces for the countries involved, the same force levels they had proposed earlier for the FY 1958 military aid program.¹⁸ Their recommendations, however, never reached the NSC. The proposed review of the "scope and allocation" of aid to the countries under discussion became mired in consideration of overall policies toward those countries. The force levels were left to be determined in the regular process of formulating the military assistance program. The Prochnow committee was allowed to go out of existence.

The entire subject of foreign aid came under study at a higher level within the executive branch. On 5 September 1956 President Eisenhower appointed a seven-man body known as the Citizen Advisers on the Mutual Security Program headed by Benjamin F. Fairless, former chairman of the board of United States Steel Corporation. The report of this committee, submitted in March 1957, concluded that U.S. aid policies "are proving their worth, and we should hold firmly to them."¹⁹

Both houses of Congress also placed the MSP under scrutiny. A House Foreign Affairs Committee report, completed in December 1956 but not formally published until six months later, concluded that U.S. alliances were essential; that foreign armed forces were of increasing importance to U.S. security; and that foreign military aid was "part and parcel of our own defense program."²⁰ A special Senate committee arranged for a number of studies of aspects of foreign aid by universities, research centers, and individuals. The overall conclusion emerging from these found that U.S. aid served a useful purpose, but they made no attempt to appraise the proper level of aid, either as a whole or for any individual country or area.²¹

Among other issues the studies posed the question of whether money for military assistance should be appropriated to DoD, an idea discussed within the administration since 1953. During hearings on the 1957 mutual security program, various members of Congress suggested the possibility. OSD witnesses saw no objection.²² In November 1956 Assistant Secretary Gray studied the question and concluded that there were compelling reasons why military aid funds should be appropriated to DoD. He urged Wilson to recommend that the president ask Congress to make the change in connection with the 1958 budget. Officials of the military departments concurred, and Wilson so recommended to the president on 28 November.²³

ICA officials opposed the recommendation, fearing weakening of their overall control of the MSP. With the support of State, ICA countered with a proposal to have both military assistance and defense support placed in the DoD budget, with ICA retaining responsibility for administration of defense support. OSD officials opposed this as administratively unworkable. In the end, the president approved a suggestion by Hollister to postpone

decision until the various study groups had been heard from. In sending the budget to Congress, the president told the legislators merely that the pattern of appropriations for military assistance was under consideration.²⁴

The Fairless committee recommended that defense support be split, with the portion actually applicable to support of military forces included in the DoD budget. For OSD officials, this suggestion had no more appeal than ICA's earlier one, although they agreed that a distinction between the economic and military aspects of defense support was desirable. ICA likewise opposed the suggestion. The State Department, at first favorable, later shifted its position on the ground that the change would impose a further delay in sending the final 1958 MSP to Congress.²⁵

In the end, the president overruled OSD and decided to seek appropriation of both military assistance and defense support to DoD, leaving the latter under administration of ICA and making no attempt to split it. A necessary corollary called for placing military assistance under a continuing authorization like the rest of the DoD budget, rather than being authorized annually.²⁶

The president sent to Congress his special message on mutual security on 21 May 1957. The total request had been cut to \$3.9 billion, including \$1.9 billion for military assistance and \$900 million for defense support. He asked that the two latter items be appropriated as a separate title in the DOD budget and that both be provided with a continuing authorization. Congress, however, appropriated only \$3.4 billion, including \$1.879 billion in military aid, partly in the form of fund transfers, and did not provide a continuing authorization. Given the adverse sentiment in Congress, the result was something of a triumph for the administration, but the total fell some \$500 million short of what the president had asked.²⁷

The FY 1959 Program

In planning military assistance for FY 1959 all elements involved agreed on the need for earlier and clearer guidance. Both the military departments and overseas agencies pressed OSD to expedite issuance of a definitive programming document instead of repeating the somewhat unsatisfactory situation of the preceding year, when guidance had to be issued in draft form.²⁸

In recommending force objectives and priorities among countries, the JCS made only minor changes from the preceding year, but they laid down more detailed criteria for translating these into programs. ISA incorporated the JCS recommendations into an instruction issued 13 March 1957 to guide all agencies involved in the military assistance program and to simplify the reporting and submission of programming data, thus reducing the burden on the field. ISA regarded it as a great improvement over earlier guidance.²⁹

For the FY 1959 MSP, Hollister, after conferring with OSD, sought \$4.2 billion, with \$1.9 billion in military aid. When the president set a

tentative ceiling of \$3.5 billion for the MSP, Hollister refused to accept it as final. In a meeting with Budget Director Brundage, representatives of State, Defense, and ICA characterized the \$3.5 billion figure as unacceptable and sought a budget drafted on a "requirements" basis, without reference to any preestablished ceiling. This could then be pared down, if necessary, through the application of priorities. Brundage compromised; he agreed to accept such a budget but insisted also on an alternative planned under the \$3.5 billion limit.³⁰

The secretary of state sent BoB an estimate (the "requirements" budget) of \$4.1 billion for the total MSP program and \$1.95 billion in military aid. The alternative "ceiling" budget, sent to Brundage on 18 November by the new ICA director, James H. Smith, Jr., proposed to allot exactly half of the \$3.5 billion total, or \$1.75 billion, to military assistance.³¹

In the end, the president abandoned the \$3.5 billion limit. In his special message describing the MSP on 19 February 1958, he asked for \$3.94 billion—nearly the same amount as a year earlier. Of this, \$1.8 billion would be for military assistance, \$835 million for defense support. The president did not renew his requests that military assistance funds be appropriated to DoD or that the program be provided with a continuing authorization. The final legislation provided a total of \$3.3 billion, with \$1.515 billion for military assistance and \$750 million for defense support.³²

Congressional action on the FY 1959 budget coincided with the two foreign crises in the summer of 1958, the first in the Near East, the second in the Taiwan Strait. The latter in particular had an immediate impact on the military assistance program. Military materiel rushed to the Chinese Nationalists, to assist them in repelling a possible Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands, drew in advance on the FY 1959 MAP. On 29 August, with the ink barely dry on the president's signature of the FY 1959 appropriation act, Acting Assistant Secretary Irwin told Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles that emergency requirements for Nationalist China already far exceeded the amount programmed for 1959. The deficit so far had been met by reprogramming, but this expedient could not be followed indefinitely.³³ The subsequent easing of the situation over the next six weeks lessened the drain on the MAP, but by October plans were being made for a supplemental request for FY 1959 as part of the FY 1960 budget process.

Planning for FY 1960

In November 1957 the JCS reviewed the FY 1959 programming guidance and concluded that force objectives must be clarified clearly and linked more closely to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. Accordingly, they revised the definition of MAP force objectives so that they no longer represented total requirements for allied forces, but only those that the United States was willing to support with grant military assistance. To be eligible for aid,

such forces must be beyond the capacities of the recipient countries to develop or maintain and be capable of being activated, equipped, and supported by the beginning of the mid-range period. They must also fall within the total of forces that the United States had determined should be developed and maintained, be necessary to insure availability of strategic bases or key military facilities to the United States, or be forces that the United States was committed to support.

The JCS prepared a list of recommended MAP force objectives, together with another giving the larger objectives considered desirable in support of U.S. strategic objectives for the mid-range period, the latter essentially the same as in previous JCS force recommendations. While the United States had no commitment to maintain these higher levels, unified commands and MAAGs should encourage countries to strive for them. A major innovation was the presence for the first time of missile units on both lists of forces, revealing that these weapons were now reaching allied nations.

The JCS considered that West Germany and the United Kingdom had progressed so far that those nations should receive grant military assistance "only on a very selective basis." Likewise Japan and Belgium had reached a point where such aid could be phased out gradually. Consequently, the JCS recommended no MAP force objectives for West Germany, the United Kingdom, or Japan. The tabulation for Belgium illustrated the difference between the two lists. The MAP force objectives were 3 missile squadrons and 6 naval vessels; the larger list of forces considered necessary contained, in addition, 5 army divisions, 54 minesweepers, and 18 air force squadrons. The difference was expected to be made up by the Belgians from their own resources.³⁴

These recommendations served the JCS two months later when they sent Secretary McElroy proposals for FY 1960. They forwarded two lists of force levels, the larger tied to U.S. mid-range plans (designated "strategic" forces) and the smaller for MAP planning. Among the few changes, the MAP list now included U.K. missile units (Corporal and IRBM), indicating a willingness to provide grant assistance for those purposes.

Looking toward reduction of grant aid, the JCS stipulated that recipient countries should bear the primary responsibility for maintenance of equipment furnished by the United States, which would provide only the minimum amount needed to protect its investment. Also, every effort should be made to develop recipients' capability to train their own forces in order to make possible a reduction of U.S. support for that activity.³⁵

In forwarding these recommendations, General Twining admitted that the "strategic" force objectives for the mid-range period (1962-65) might appear in some instances to represent maintenance of obsolescent or ineffective forces. In justification of the JCS recommendations, Twining cited the difficulty of projecting forces seven years ahead and the need to encourage allies to maintain forces in being, which could be modernized much more easily than could forces created from scratch. Moreover, even obsolete forces were useful for internal security and local defense.³⁶

ISA incorporated the JCS recommendations in its programming instructions issued on 15 July 1958. In an evident effort to relate the MAP to national policy, it included quotations from the latest policy directive (NSC 5810/1) emphasizing the need for U.S.-allied cooperation and the importance of attempting to persuade other countries to accept nuclear weapons as an integral part of the free world arsenal.³⁷

Following discussions among OSD, State, ICA, and BoB, Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon on 5 November transmitted to Budget an estimate of \$3.7 billion in new obligational authority for FY 1960, including \$2.0 billion for military assistance. This had been developed on a "requirements" basis; no ceiling had been fixed in advance, as was done the previous year. To finance actions taken in connection with the Middle East and Far East crises, Dillon also recommended \$90 million in supplemental appropriations for FY 1959, far below the \$350.6 million that the JCS had recommended.³⁸

By the time the budget went to Congress early in 1959, the total had been raised to \$3.9 billion, but military aid had been slashed to \$1.6 billion. The administration decided not to seek an amount out of line with the preceding year's appropriation, the more so as the military assistance program was again under intensive review. It made no supplemental request for 1959.³⁹

Of the two studies of military aid then underway, one had been undertaken by the NSC in 1957 as part of a review of the U.S. defense effort overseas. The president's assistant for national security, Robert Cutler, wanted a projection of military assistance requirements to 1965. There was some doubt of the feasibility of such long-range projections. The NSC directed DoD and JCS to study this matter.⁴⁰

The JCS reached the conclusion that such a study was impractical but that much of the relevant information was, or soon would be, available. The military assistance programs for 1958 and 1959 would make possible a general approximation of costs through July 1961; no more specific estimate could be made owing to changes that might be caused by political developments or budget fluctuations. The guidance for FY 1960, then in preparation, would contain force objectives for the beginning of the mid-range period (1 July 1962). Assuming no significant change in trends, figures could be projected until 1 January 1963. But to try to forecast costs through 1965 would be more misleading than beneficial. Deputy Secretary Quarles endorsed these conclusions.⁴¹

The NSC thereupon approved a less ambitious study of the force posture thought desirable as of 30 June 1962 for those nations that, in the FY 1959 budget, would receive the major dollar portion of military assistance. The study would be prepared by DoD and JCS with guidance from State.⁴²

In an initial report submitted to McElroy on 29 July 1958, the JCS described the mission, major force levels, and types of armament considered desirable as of 30 June 1962 for 22 nations: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, France, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Laos, the

Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Spain, Taiwan (Nationalist China), Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam. West Germany, formerly a major recipient, was omitted because in the future it was expected to require only sales assistance. The JCS noted that current developments in the Middle East might invalidate some of their recommendations; thus aid to Iraq, where the government had recently been seized by elements seemingly hostile to the West, had already been suspended.⁴³

Though intended to serve as a basis for cost projections, the study was never so used. On 3 December 1958 the NSC noted the JCS report, then passed to a general discussion of military assistance, guided by a statement of issues drafted by the Planning Board. Since carryover funds for the program were being used up, should larger appropriations be sought in the future or should program levels be reduced? Should military assistance be given for political purposes? Was the need to achieve NATO force goals (as established in the current planning document, MC 70) so compelling that it should be sought at the cost of reducing aid to other parts of the world? The council addressed these questions in an inconclusive discussion that it cut short for lack of time. It made no decisions because the administration was about to turn once more to a favorite device of President Eisenhower: a panel of outside advisers.⁴⁴

The Draper Committee

The establishment of the new advisory group actually stemmed from a congressional initiative. On 25 August 1958 Sen. Theodore Green and seven other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wrote to the president of their "deep concern over the present concept and administration" of mutual security. Programs for undeveloped countries, they believed, overemphasized military at the expense of economic assistance, with the result that the United States was in effect supporting unpopular regimes and creating a "militaristic image" of itself. They urged the president to give "personal attention" to this matter before he presented the next program to Congress.⁴⁵

To Secretary Dulles this letter indicated that unless the administration could justify its military aid program it might be faced increasingly with indiscriminate cuts made by Congress. He suggested appointment of a committee of respected private citizens to appraise the basic purposes of military assistance and the criteria used in fixing its level. If the president agreed, Dulles wrote, he and Secretary McElroy would suggest possible members of such a committee. The president at once approved the suggestion.⁴⁶

State Department officials circulated to DoD a proposed letter of instruction for the new committee. The only objection came from Twining, who saw no need for it; he believed that State and Defense officials should simply improve the methods used in presenting the MSP to Congress. Partly,

no doubt, owing to Twining's views, Assistant Secretary Sprague suggested changes in State's draft to make it clear that the committee should not attempt to evaluate military concepts, strategy, or force levels.⁴⁷

To head the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program (as the new group was titled), Eisenhower selected William H. Draper, Jr., an investment banker and retired major general in the Army reserve, who had served as under secretary of the Army from 1947 to 1949 and as U.S. special representative in Europe, with the rank of ambassador, in 1952-53. A bipartisan group of nine other appointees rounded out the committee. Three were military men: Admiral Radford, former JCS chairman, and retired Generals Alfred M. Gruenther, USA, and Joseph T. McNarney, USAF, both of whom had commanded U.S. forces in Europe. Of the civilian members, Dillon Anderson was a former special assistant to Eisenhower for national security affairs. Joseph M. Dodge and John J. McCloy came from the banking community; the former had headed the Bureau of the Budget in 1953-54, the latter was high commissioner for Germany from 1949 to 1952. Marx Leva, James E. Webb, and George McGhee had held high positions in the Truman administration.⁴⁸

The final instructions issued to the committee on 24 November 1958 directed the group to undertake a "completely independent, objective, and non-partisan analysis of the military assistance aspects of our Mutual Security Program." The president hoped for preliminary conclusions that could be considered in presenting the 1960 MSP to Congress, but he desired a "thoroughgoing analysis" which he realized might well take longer.⁴⁹

Meeting with the committee members on 24 November at Augusta, Eisenhower stressed that they should take a "good hard look" at the military aid program. He believed that it had led to overdevelopment of military forces in some countries. Draper had already met with some members of the Senate; he proposed, with the president's approval, to keep Congress informed. He would also maintain liaison with State and Defense to discuss the committee's findings as they emerged.⁵⁰

The committee released its conclusions in four separate reports during its nine months of deliberations. The issuance of these reports coincided with congressional consideration of the FY 1960 MSP, sent to Congress on 13 March 1959. The amounts requested in the MSP accorded with those in the budget message two months earlier. The \$1.6 billion for military assistance, said the president, fell far below what was needed; it was simply a minimum necessary to prevent "serious deterioration of our collective defense system." However, the president took note of the Draper committee, the members of which, he said, had already indicated that they proposed to recommend an increase for military aid. On receiving the committee's written report, the president would submit further recommendations as necessary.⁵¹

Four days later, on 17 March, the Draper committee submitted its first, or interim, report, containing preliminary conclusions. The members fully endorsed the MSP in both its military and economic aspects. "We believe

the program essential to our own security and that of the free world," declared the report, "and are convinced that we can afford what is necessary." They suggested some changes, notably the placement of the program on a long-term, continuing basis. They noted that more money was needed immediately to maintain the current rate of deliveries. The FY 1959 appropriation of \$1.5 billion, and the \$1.6 billion requested for FY 1960, would, if continued, reduce the rate by approximately one-third, which would amount to a fundamental change in U.S. policy and a "strategic retreat." They recommended approximately \$400 million additional, most of it for NATO.⁵²

The \$400 million figure was less than the JCS considered necessary. The committee had asked the JCS to indicate high-priority requirements, totaling approximately \$400 million. The JCS drew up a list totaling \$573 million, with \$379 million for NATO and the rest for the Middle East and Far East.⁵³

Tentative action had already been taken to provide extra money. The JCS, in endorsing in full the conclusions reached by the committee, drafted a supplemental program based on the list they had furnished the Draper committee. It totaled \$453.6 million, all earmarked for NATO.⁵⁴

The question of a supplemental request for 1960 caused intensive debate within the administration over the next few weeks. Discussions between State and DoD resulted in a cut to \$416.4 million, \$345.3 million for NATO and the rest for the Far East; then the Far Eastern portion was dropped in order to concentrate on NATO. The BoB opposed any supplemental, urging that the extra money for NATO come from reprogramming. McElroy strongly advocated a supplemental; as he told the AFPC on 28 April, if asked he would personally recommend that the president approve the extra money and "forcibly" present it as an exception to the balanced budget policy. Ultimately, however, he was overruled; the \$1.6 billion figure in the FY 1960 budget was allowed to stand.⁵⁵

On 3 June the committee submitted a second and much longer report concerning the organization and administration of military assistance. Its recommendations fell into two basic groups. First, there should be sharper definition of the respective responsibilities of State (policy guidance) and Defense (program execution). The committee found that the two departments had tended to exercise their responsibilities "in a contentious rather than a fully cooperative manner." State officials felt that they had not always been given adequate opportunity to furnish political and economic guidance and that military objectives of the program had not always been clearly defined. Defense, on the other hand, believed that State had on occasion invaded the area of operations, undertaking excessive review of military matters.

The second group of recommendations proposed a sharper distinction between planning and programming, with assignment of greater responsibilities to field elements—the military and diplomatic officials making up the "country team" in each recipient nation. Military assistance should at once be put on a three-year planning basis, to be extended to

five years as soon as possible. State would furnish policy guidance. State and Defense, after consultation with BoB, would develop dollar guidelines, by area or country, for each year of the plan. The JCS would prepare the initial draft of the plan, which would be completed by ISA and State, incorporating the advice of ambassadors and unified commanders. The plan would then be distributed to the field; each MAAG would prepare a plan for its country or area.

In developing the program, ISA would forward instructions, including broad dollar guidelines, to unified commands and MAAGs. Thus the existing practice of programming on a straight "requirements" basis, which led to unrealistic dollar figures, would be superseded. MAAGs would draft detailed programs in collaboration with ambassadors. ISA would consolidate the unified command military assistance programs into an overall program for presentation to Congress, working in conjunction with State and BoB.

The committee believed that including the military assistance appropriation in the DoD budget would more clearly center in DoD the responsibility for administering the military assistance program and permit more precise evaluation of its relationship to other DoD programs. Defense support, however, should not be shifted to DoD, since it was basically economic. Authorization for military aid should be placed on a continuing basis; the president should request this change immediately at the current session of Congress.

Finally, the report concluded that the secretary of defense should have clearer responsibility for implementing military assistance after funds were appropriated, with State free to propose changes on policy grounds. Disagreements between the two departments should be resolved promptly between the secretaries, or if necessary by the president. ISA should establish a director of military assistance who would devote full time to this activity. ISA should also have a staff, independent of the director, to evaluate the military assistance program.⁵⁶

The president sent this report to Congress on 24 June with his endorsement. He urged Congress at once to provide for continuing authorization for military aid and in the future to make appropriations to the secretary of defense. He asked for legislative action to clarify the responsibilities of State and Defense but made no recommendations for specific changes in the law. The remainder of the committee's recommendations, dealing largely with administrative steps that could be taken within the Executive branch, were now under study.⁵⁷

Both houses of Congress had by then completed committee hearings on the FY 1960 authorizing legislation. After hearing McElroy, Twining, and Draper defend the proposed \$1.6 billion program, the House Foreign Affairs Committee allowed only \$1.44 billion. The committee also proposed to write in a provision that the chief of the diplomatic mission in each country would make certain that recommendations for military assistance were "coordinated with political and economic considerations"; also his

comments were to accompany the recommendations. This accorded with the Draper committee's objective of giving a larger role to officials in the field. The full House accepted the committee's amendments.⁵⁸

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee restored the \$1.6 billion, but ordered that \$223 million in military aid be shifted from other countries to NATO because it felt that military assistance for underdeveloped countries was being overemphasized. It accepted the House amendment concerning chiefs of diplomatic missions; another amendment made the secretary of state, under the direction of the president, responsible for "continuous supervision and general direction" of all aid programs in order to make sure that they were "effectively integrated" with foreign policy.

During the Senate hearings, the question of appropriating military assistance funds to DoD had generated extensive discussion. The Senate committee's bill contained no such provision, but it did require that after 1960, military assistance programs should be budgeted in "direct competition for financial support" with other DoD activities and programs.⁵⁹

The full Senate reduced the authorization for military assistance to \$1.3 billion, but another amendment provided an unlimited authorization beginning in FY 1961. In conference between the two houses, the amount was adjusted to \$1.4 billion and the diversion of funds to NATO was dropped. The provision for continuing authorization after 1960 was struck out, but a two-year authorization, unlimited in amount, was inserted for FYs 1961 and 1962. Congress expressed its impatience in a declaration that the MSP had made substantial contributions to the economic recovery of Western Europe and that those nations that had thus benefited should share with the United States the burden of providing aid to other countries. The final bill, authorizing a total of \$3.6 billion, passed Congress on 22 July 1959.⁶⁰

The Draper committee had by then issued its third report, which dealt entirely with economic assistance. In preparation for its fourth and final report, the committee sought advice from OSD as to the effects of current trends in appropriations and in general terms the major items that would be contracted for if an additional \$600 million were to be provided. ISA replied on 11 August that the continuation of the current trend would reduce the rate of modernization of allied forces to approximately one-half of that required. ISA also supplied a list of major items, totaling \$513 million, that would be programmed in FY 1960 if additional funds were available. Of this amount, \$370 million would go to Europe and the Middle East and \$143 million to the Far East.⁶¹

The committee's final report of 17 August 1959 reaffirmed the need for military assistance and for the additional funds recommended in the first report. No "continuing formula" could be found, according to the report, to determine the relative emphasis between military and economic aid. However, the impression held in some quarters that military assistance was being overemphasized was unjustified.⁶²

A month later, Congress enacted the FY 1959 appropriation bill for the MSP, reducing military assistance to \$1.3 billion and defense support to

\$695 million, out of a total of \$3.2 billion. The Draper committee's carefully reasoned plea for more money for the program had fallen on deaf ears.⁶³

Administrative Reorganization

It remained for the administration to determine how far it would go in implementing the changes in planning and programming recommended by the Draper committee in its second report. The president had indicated his general approval, but specific steps had to be worked out in detail. On 5 June 1959, two days after the report was submitted, Goodpaster, on behalf of the president, called for DoD comments.⁶⁴

DoD presented little opposition to the committee's recommendations for longer-range planning, clearer definition of responsibilities, or a greater role for field elements. Opposition centered on the recommendations for a director of military assistance (DMA) and an independent evaluation staff in ISA. The Army and the Air Force opposed this latter recommendation. The Army approved the proposed DMA provided the position was filled permanently by a military appointee. The Navy did not comment.⁶⁵

In a meeting on 11 June 1959, representatives of the services and the Joint Staff favored the DMA proposal; those from ISA believed that the deputy ASD(ISA) for military assistance programs was already serving the purpose. But, as the JCS and Navy representatives pointed out, what was being proposed was not a mere change in title for an existing official, but a shift in emphasis to policy and operational aspects of military assistance rather than financial record-keeping.⁶⁶

The JCS offered generally favorable comments on the Draper committee's recommendations. They favored long-term planning for military assistance but stressed that the program must fully reflect military requirements based on strategy approved by them. Dollar guidelines for the program must be properly integrated with the long-term plan and program; otherwise they would assume the aspect of an arbitrary ceiling. Decentralization of planning and programming to field elements would require provision of detailed guidance. The JCS concurred in the establishment of the proposed DMA, but urged that it be permanently filled by a military appointee, active or retired. They opposed the establishment of an evaluation staff, believing that the function could be adequately performed by existing agencies.⁶⁷

In the end, McElroy approved the Draper committee recommendations and obtained State Department concurrence. On 17 September Assistant Secretary Irwin issued a schedule of actions needed over the next few months to carry out the new procedures. These would be put into effect in formulating the FY 1962 MSP, since that for FY 1961 was already in progress. Hence the first five-year plan would cover the period 1962-66.⁶⁸ The tentative annual fiscal guideline adopted for the five-year program was \$2.2 billion, approximately the level of previous

programs prepared on an austere basis and in line with Draper committee recommendations.⁶⁹

In November 1959 ISA issued a Military Assistance Manual, which standardized policies and procedures for programming and planning, starting with a five-year Mutual Security Objectives Plan (MSOP). DoD would promulgate to unified commands relevant sections of the MSOP, along with order of magnitude guidelines for aid programs. The commands would prepare specific five-year programs and forward them to Washington after review by the cognizant ambassador. ISA and State would review the programs and send them to the military departments for execution.⁷⁰

McElroy also approved the establishment of a director of military assistance. On 21 November, following a meeting in Augusta between the president and Deputy Secretary Gates, the White House announced the appointment of General Williston B. Palmer, USA, to the new position. The intent was that the DMA be able to talk with the JCS at a "comparable level." Further, the president considered that the military assistance program should be an "integral part of the defense system."⁷¹

Irwin delegated to Palmer full authority to act for him in matters relating to military assistance. However, the DMA did not report directly to Irwin; his position was placed under a newly created deputy assistant secretary (ISA) for politico-military affairs, a position held by Robert H. Knight.⁷²

The proposed evaluation office in ISA, approved in principle, did not come into being. The Mutual Security Act of 1959 mandated the establishment within the Department of State of the Office of Inspector General and Comptroller of the Mutual Security Program, to carry out overall evaluation of the effectiveness of military and other aid programs. State moved promptly to set up the new office, which was to have five evaluation teams to conduct surveys in the field. At the request of State, Secretary Gates agreed to furnish five retired general or flag officers to serve on these teams. Creation of ISA's evaluation office remained in abeyance pending assessment of the operation of these teams.⁷³

In a final step, the AFPC approved a revision of the directive assigning responsibilities within DoD for military assistance. Issued on 29 February 1960, the directive made clear the enlarged responsibilities of field elements. Thus where MAAGs had been responsible for developing and submitting "recommendations" concerning the MAP, they were now to "develop military assistance plans and programs," in cooperation with the ambassador and other elements of the country team. A statement of policy specified that the United States would seek to hold costs of military aid to a minimum and to encourage sales as distinct from grant aid.⁷⁴

The FY 1961 Program: Seeking to Shift the Burden

Planning for the FY 1961 MSP began in October 1958, when ISA asked the JCS to submit recommendations for a revised programming

document. ISA requested that the JCS break down their "functional priorities" into separate sections, distinguishing military missions and force development.⁷⁵

Replying in January 1959, the JCS separated priorities into missions, tasks, and requirements for force development for individual countries and regional groups. In determining the strategic priorities of countries, the JCS moved France from second to first priority in Europe, along with Germany, Turkey, and the United Kingdom; they moved Denmark from fourth to second, reflecting the importance of that country's mission of controlling the entrances to the Baltic Sea. The JCS recommended a number of changes in MAP force objectives, most involving increases.⁷⁶

ISA largely overruled the JCS force recommendations and prepared its own recommendations, using for Western Europe the minimum requirements set by NATO, somewhat below those proposed by the JCS. In other instances, JCS recommendations for increases were disallowed as imposing too great an economic burden on the countries involved. The JCS protested, but few of their force increases appeared in the programming guidance that ISA issued on 1 August 1959.⁷⁷

One of the recommendations of the Draper committee that could be implemented in connection with the FY 1961 budget was the appropriation of military assistance funds to DoD. As early as April 1959, Director of the Budget Stans told McElroy that the president wished this done. McElroy agreed that it would help to promote awareness of military assistance as part of overall national defense planning.⁷⁸

Another administration objective in connection with the 1961 program sought to induce the major European allies to assume a large share of the collective defense effort. Partly with this end in view, the president appointed the deputy U.S. commander in Europe, General Palmer, as DMA. Another move in the same direction was the appointment of Charles H. Shuff as Defense representative to NATO. Shuff's position as deputy ASD(ISA) for military assistance had become superfluous with the establishment of Palmer's office. The president wanted him for the NATO post because of his experience in handling military aid and because he had had business experience in Europe. Both Palmer and Shuff were well-qualified to bring discreet pressure to bear on European governments.⁷⁹

The role of grant military assistance to Western Europe, already under study in the NSC, arose again during a discussion of policy toward France. The Planning Board drafted a policy paper in August 1959 in which a majority of members recommended termination of assistance to France for conventional weapons. State and JCS representatives opposed a flat prohibition, favoring a degree of flexibility. When the NSC discussed the matter on 18 August, a consensus favored shifting all military assistance to a reimbursable basis insofar as feasible. In the end, the president directed the secretary of the treasury to determine those nations of the free world financially able to pay for the military equipment and training they needed. At the same time, the Planning Board was to prepare a policy statement

reflecting the general principle that no new commitments for grant aid should be offered to those nations.⁸⁰

Before the board completed its paper, decisions on the 1961 budget forced officials to address the question of aid to Western Europe. State and Defense sought \$2.3 billion for military assistance—a startling increase over the previous year, but in line with the Draper committee's recommendations. The BoB held out for a maximum of \$1.4 billion. The difference in the totals at issue for the entire MSP, \$4.9 billion and \$3.5 billion respectively, was too great to be resolved through the normal process of budgetary adjustment.

The 1961 MSP budget was discussed with the president at Augusta on 25 November. Dillon and Irwin, who presented the State-Defense viewpoint, found it necessary in the face of presidential questioning to defend the inclusion of money for NATO countries, most of it for two of the less prosperous countries—Greece and Turkey. The budget had no money for Germany, and for Britain only \$15 million for the Thor missile program. The inclusion of Portugal was dictated by the need to retain bases in the Azores. Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands would receive aid on a matching basis. Dillon warned that substantial cuts in the NATO program without prior consultation would be quite damaging to the alliance; the president had been so informed by Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak. He argued further that to go below \$2 billion in total military assistance would appear to discredit the Draper report.

Stans and Secretary of the Treasury Anderson then spoke up for a balanced budget. The president admitted that \$4.9 billion would seriously strain the budget. Dillon, willing to compromise, thought that the total MSP might be reduced to \$4.4 billion—not too far from the previous year's figure. The president asked State and the BoB to work out a program "at that general level."⁸¹

Eventually the 1961 MSP was brought down to \$4.2 billion. The \$2.0 billion for military assistance incorporated the \$400 million that the Draper committee had recommended as a supplement for 1960, so that the 1961 program was in effect only \$1.6 billion. In sending the budget to Congress on 18 January 1960, the president included military assistance as a separate title in the DoD budget.⁸²

Earlier, the Planning Board had drafted NSC 5916, which addressed the question of grant aid. Treasury had identified the nations able to pay for aid: the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Belgium/Luxembourg (considered as a unit), the Netherlands, Portugal, and Japan. Treasury and Budget representatives favored a flat prohibition on new commitments for materiel for those nations; the other board members were willing to consider programs on a cost-sharing basis (except for the first four countries on the list). All agreed that training aid should continue, and certainly there was no question of terminating commitments already made. The board further agreed that exceptions might be made, though here another disagreement surfaced. Treasury and Budget believed

these should be approved in each case by the president; the majority would empower the secretary of state to make the decision.⁸³

Prior to NSC discussion of the issue on 3 December 1959, Gates received conflicting advice. ISA argued that the Treasury-Budget view was unduly restrictive and ignored political and military considerations. Addressing another aspect of the matter, ISA denied that military assistance contributed significantly to the U.S. balance of payments deficit; rather it might operate in the other direction, since recipient nations purchased maintenance and replacement items in the United States.⁸⁴

The JCS and Secretary of the Army Brucker likewise endorsed the majority Planning Board view. On the other hand, Deputy ASD (Comptroller) John M. Sprague sided with Treasury and Budget, on the grounds that the president, in the NSC meeting of 18 August, had mandated a change in the policy of aiding financially-capable nations.⁸⁵

In the NSC, the president approved the Treasury-Budget view in principle but, heeding the arguments of Secretary of State Herter, agreed that termination of grant aid must be preceded by consultations with the affected governments. He rejected Anderson's suggestion for an immediate policy of no new commitments to nations able to pay. Gates observed that ending grant aid to NATO nations would require a review of NATO's current planning document, MC 70. This drew from the president a rejoinder that such compromise plans should not be treated as "sacrosanct." The formal decision provided that the secretaries of state and defense, in conjunction with other departments and agencies, would take steps to achieve, at the earliest possible time, the ultimate objective of no new grant aid for nations able to pay for equipment. Ability to pay was to be determined by economic criteria, without regard to political ability or willingness to do so. After a country-by-country analysis, a final decision in each case would come only after full consultation with the country concerned and, where appropriate, with NATO. Periodic reports on these developments were to be submitted to the council.⁸⁶

In accord with this decision, Gates and Herter submitted their first report on 15 February 1960. France, Austria, and Luxembourg, found fully able to pay, would receive no new commitments for military equipment on a grant basis. Consultations had been held with the United Kingdom and Germany; a decision on those nations was pending.⁸⁷

The BoB meanwhile sought to foreclose the issue in part by holding up apportionments of FY 1960 appropriations for the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy. Officials of the bureau maintained that in so doing they were merely carrying out the president's decision of 3 December. Dillon and Irwin appealed to the president, who overruled the bureau.⁸⁸

These developments did not affect the FY 1961 budget, which carried money for France, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Japan, and the United Kingdom (the last for the Thor program). West Germany would receive shipments of fighter aircraft already programmed.⁸⁹

Congress opened hearings on 17 February 1960. The military assistance

portion required no authorization (this had been provided in the 1959 act), but it was discussed during the hearings. Dillon defended the president's \$2 billion request as necessary to maintain the flow of materiel, since the backlog of appropriations had now been exhausted. Gates, Irwin, and Lemnitzer also seized the opportunity to defend the military aid request, as did General Palmer, testifying for the first time as DMA.⁹⁰

The 1960 Mutual Security Act passed Congress on 12 May, and on the same day the Senate began hearings on the FY 1961 appropriation bill. Warned by Republicans in Congress that military assistance faced difficulty, the president sought to rally public opinion in support of it. In a speech on 2 May, he proclaimed that the money he wanted for the MSP was "the minimum required to meet the basic necessities of sheer defense." He drafted a letter to some 200 of his friends urging them to make clear to Congress their full support for the program, and he asked Cabinet members and presidential appointees in DoD to exert their influence in the same direction. Secretary Gates wrote to individuals in the business community and to various influential organizations, including the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Medical Association, and the National Association of Manufacturers. One of Gates's addressees, former Secretary McElroy, replied that he was already doing what he could. Irwin also appealed to a number of his business acquaintances.⁹¹

These solicitations met with only partial success. The House Appropriations Committee trimmed military assistance to \$1.6 billion, justifying the step on the grounds that this amount was \$300 million above the previous year's appropriation. Surprisingly, however, the full House increased the amount to \$1.8 billion, moved by the "darkening world scene," as a newspaper account put it. Gates, Twining, Palmer, and Irwin then appeared before the Senate committee to ask for restoration of the remaining \$200 million, but in vain. Congress finally approved \$1.8 billion in military aid out of a total of not quite \$4.0 billion for the entire MSP. Defense support received \$610 million, of which \$35 million was earmarked for Spain.⁹²

FY 1962 and Long-Range Planning

The MSP for 1962, the last prepared during the Eisenhower administration, was the first planned entirely under the new procedures stemming from the Draper committee recommendations. As such, it was intended to be the first step in a five-year plan covering the years through 1966.

Documents basic to the process included the first Mutual Security Objectives Plan (MSOP) and a Basic Planning Document drafted by State, Defense, and ICA. The MSOP provided general policy and basic objectives. The planning document laid down order of magnitude dollar guidelines based on the assumption of approximately \$2.2 billion in new appropriations for each fiscal year from 1962 through 1966, and set forth objectives for each unified command area and country.⁹³

Adoption of the \$2.2 billion target figure reflected a considerable degree of optimism on the part of State and ISA planners—a degree that some might have considered unjustified. The BoB advocated \$1.8 billion, arguing again that allied countries should assume a larger share of the burden. ISA rejoined that \$2.2 billion had been the annual average of deliveries for the preceding five years.⁹⁴

Meanwhile the discussion of Western Europe's ability to pay had resumed. On 8 July 1960 State and Defense submitted a second report, this one dealing with the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, and Japan. It concluded that there was little or no chance that these countries could devote enough of their own resources to meet all requirements; hence grant aid should continue on a limited basis, accompanied by efforts to induce these countries to make a greater effort. These conclusions had the endorsement of the JCS and the Army.⁹⁵

Dillon presented this report to the NSC on 1 August, asking for a decision on the 1961 programs for the countries involved; the 1962 programs could be considered in connection with the long-range (1962-66) plan to be submitted later. In a predictable reaction, Secretary Anderson charged that the countries in question were devoting to defense a smaller proportion of their gross national product than was the United States; their taxes were lower; and their foreign exchange holdings were rising. Nevertheless, the president believed that the United States was so far committed to these nations that it would be impossible to cut off all aid at once. The council agreed to proceed with the 1961 program as planned, meanwhile maintaining pressure on those governments, with the ultimate objective of avoiding future commitments for grant aid to nations able to pay.⁹⁶

The council now turned its attention to the FY 1962 program and the five-year plan. Submissions from field elements had resulted in an estimate of \$25 billion in aid for 1962-66, obviously far out of line. The Draper committee had prepared a lower 5-year estimate—\$16 billion.⁹⁷ State and Defense had whittled it further to \$11 billion, using the annual average rate of deliveries (\$2.2 billion) from 1955 through 1959 and making optimistic assumptions about country financial capabilities. Regionally, the \$11 billion figure broke down (in round numbers) into \$5 billion for NATO, \$4 billion for the Far East, and \$2 billion for the rest of the world. For the first year (1962), the plan assumed \$2.4 billion in new obligational authority. Any amount substantially less, according to State and Defense, would make it impossible to maintain deliveries at a rate of \$2.2 billion and would require a change in basic national policy and strategic objectives.⁹⁸

For all five countries under discussion in the NSC—the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, and Japan—the FY 1962 budget carried some money for grant aid. In fact, for Portugal a slight increase was proposed over 1961.⁹⁹

The Planning Board discussed the State-Defense report and the long-range plan itself on 7 October. Gray pointed out that in proposing continued aid to the five target nations, the plan violated the NSC decision of 1 August against new commitments to countries able to pay. Moreover, the

financial goals seemed unrealistic in view of what Congress had been willing to appropriate in recent years. The JCS and the Army endorsed both the long-range plan and the \$2.4 billion program for FY 1962, and urged that the 1 August decision be amended.¹⁰⁰

Discussion of the long-range plan consumed most of the time of the NSC on 31 October 1960. The president's science adviser, Kistiakowsky, later characterized this meeting as "the most extraordinary I remember attending." Gates and Dillon briefly introduced the subject, then Irwin presented a rather detailed summary of the plan, warning that it would attain no more than the "skeleton" of U.S. policy and objectives. He stressed that the five-year figure of \$11 billion and the FY 1962 budget of \$2.4 billion were minimal. Lemnitzer spoke up in support of both the plan and the budget. Touching on the balance of payments problem, Dillon pointed out that military assistance helped to alleviate it by leading to greater purchases in the United States; moreover, if the problem made it necessary to reduce U.S. forces abroad, military assistance must be increased.

Secretary Anderson then delivered what Kistiakowsky called an "emotional diatribe." If the proposed program were put into effect, he said, he could not assume responsibility for the security of the dollar. Ranging into wild hyperbole, he charged that continuing the present course would "bring us the greatest holocaust we had ever seen." He was supported by Stans, who pointed out that the program at hand was based on higher force goals than those in MC 70. Dillon and Irwin warned of the consequences of eliminating aid to the 5 target countries, and Herter observed that the \$200 million earmarked for these countries amounted to a trifling percentage of the overall budget. Gates noted that the proposed program offered a better way of supporting free world strength than any alternative and that it would undergo annual review.

Stans recommended that the FY 1962 program be submitted to the BoB for detailed review, together with an appraisal of the effects of a reduction to some lower figure such as \$1.5 billion. Irwin was willing to submit the program to the bureau but added that a reduction of \$1.5 billion would cut into NATO's nuclear deterrent. The council formally decided that the decision on military assistance for FY 1962 should pass through the "normal budgetary process." The NSC also noted the president's endorsement of the principle of long-term military assistance planning, which, however, did not imply approval of the specific plan presented at the meeting.¹⁰¹

Following the meeting, Herter wrote to the president that he and Gates felt strongly that assistance to the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, and Japan should be approved for FY 1962, subject to appropriate increases in the defense budgets of those nations.¹⁰² Further discussions led to an impasse which had to be resolved at the presidential level. Dillon, Anderson, and Stans discussed the FY 1962 MSP budget with the president on 30 November (no one from Defense was present). Dillon held out for a minimum of \$4.75 billion for the entire program (a reduction from the

\$5.5 billion originally thought desirable). Stans favored \$4 billion, with \$4.25 billion an absolute maximum. Either at this meeting or shortly thereafter, the amount for military assistance was fixed at \$1.8 billion—just what the BoB had sought. The question of aid to specific countries, in Europe or elsewhere, was not addressed.¹⁰³

Upset over this reduction, Irwin urged Gates to seek a reclama. As he pointed out, the decision amounted to “backing” into a change of policy. It would cut into NATO’s modernization plans and jeopardize efforts to promote stability in recipient countries. Moreover, no one in DoD, not even Gates himself, had been consulted. Irwin forwarded a draft letter from Gates to the president asking reconsideration of the decision. Gates, however, rejected Irwin’s request and refused to sign the letter. He compared it to a service secretary’s letter written “for the record,” useful only for provoking “conflicting testimony” in Congress. As he told Irwin, the president fully understood the consequences of his decision.¹⁰⁴

The president adopted Stans’s figure of \$4 billion for the entire MSP, along with \$1.8 billion for military aid and \$650 million for defense support, and recommended these sums to Congress on 16 January 1961. As in the previous year, the president presented military assistance as part of the DoD budget.¹⁰⁵

Restriction of military assistance to \$1.8 billion—25 percent below what DoD had sought—disrupted the 1962 program and necessitated a complete review of the five-year plan. At Irwin’s direction, Palmer and the JCS began this review on the assumption that no more than \$1.8 billion would be allowed for each year from 1962 to 1965. Before completion of the process, a new administration took over, with its own approach to foreign aid.¹⁰⁶

By this time, preliminary planning for FY 1963 was under way. Planning documents promulgated guidelines on the basis of assumed annual deliveries of \$2.2 billion for the 1963-67 period, but did not name a specific appropriation figure.¹⁰⁷

One more step remained to complete the implementation of the Draper committee recommendations. The Mutual Security Act of 1959, as noted previously, had enhanced the responsibilities of the secretary of state for military assistance, giving him authority to determine the amount of aid for each country. The committee’s final report, issued a few days after passage of the act, recommended putting this provision into execution through a presidential order that should clarify the respective roles of the secretaries of state and defense.¹⁰⁸

A draft plan prepared for this purpose defined responsibilities for mutual security both in Washington and in the field. It enlarged the responsibilities of the U.S. ambassador in each recipient country. As head of the country team, he would coordinate military and other forms of assistance with foreign policy objectives within that country.¹⁰⁹ Related issues included the authority of ambassadors over military chiefs of MAAGs, the chain of command between the JCS and unified commanders, and the right of military departments to administer their forces in the field. The

JCS took exception to initial drafts of the order, which might be read as authorizing ambassadors to exercise direction and control over MAAGs.¹¹⁰

These problems probably accounted, at least in part, for the delay in issuing the executive order. It finally appeared on 8 November 1960, accompanied by an amplifying presidential memorandum. Together, these assigned in careful detail all the statutory responsibilities related to mutual security. Those involving military assistance were assigned to the secretary of defense; others, for economic, technical, or development assistance, were distributed among State, Commerce, and the managing director of the Development Loan Fund. "All appropriate steps" were to be taken to assure that chiefs of diplomatic missions (i.e., ambassadors) were effective representatives of the president. However, in deference to objections raised by the JCS, the "affirmative responsibility" of ambassadors was limited to "coordination and supervision" (rather than direction or control) over the carrying out of overseas activities, including military and other forms of assistance.¹¹¹

The Direction of Military Assistance, 1956-1960

The U.S. military assistance program reached its peak in money expenditures and distribution of materiel during the early Eisenhower years,

TABLE 9
U.S. Military Assistance—Commitments
(Millions of Dollars)

Fiscal Year	EUROPE		NEAR EAST SOUTH ASIA		FAR EAST		LATIN AMERICA		AFRICA		TOTAL
	Amt.	%	Amt.	%	Amt.	%	Amt.	%	Amt.	%	
1950	37.1	53.9	29.8	43.3	1.9	2.8	—	—	—	—	68.8
1951	604.6	68.6	136.7	15.5	140.3	15.9	—	—	—	—	881.6
1952	1,013.9	73.2	167.3	12.1	204.5	14.7	0.2	—	—	—	1,385.9
1953	2,866.3	73.5	300.4	7.7	722.7	18.5	11.2	0.3	—	—	3,900.6
1954	2,194.0	67.1	359.9	11.0	676.7	20.7	34.5	1.1	3.9	0.1	3,269.0
1955	1,511.3	64.2	277.8	11.8	533.2	22.6	31.8	1.4	0.9	—	2,355.0
1956	1,738.9	60.1	370.4	12.8	747.7	25.9	30.4	1.0	4.7	0.2	2,892.1
1957	1,372.5	57.2	365.7	15.2	614.5	25.6	43.9	1.8	5.2	0.2	2,401.8
1958	919.9	38.9	637.2	27.0	747.4	31.7	47.9	2.0	10.1	0.4	2,362.5
1959	702.3	34.5	504.8	24.8	766.1	37.7	54.0	2.7	6.7	0.3	2,033.9
1960	860.0	45.8	383.1	20.4	568.8	30.3	55.6	3.0	10.2	0.5	1,877.7

Source: ICA Ofc of Statistics and Rpts, *U.S. Foreign Assistance and Assistance from International Organizations, Obligations and Other Commitments, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1960*, 6, 26, 40, 58, 82, OSD Hist. "Near East and South Asia" includes Greece and Turkey.

when the programs approved during the Korean War came to fruition. By 1956 the trend of military assistance spending had turned downward, owing partly to Eisenhower's constant search for a balanced budget, partly to the declining need for military (and other) assistance to many recipient nations, notably those of Western Europe, which were finally overcoming the disastrous effects of World War II. Table 9, showing commitments for military aid through the decade of the 1950s, illustrates both the overall decline after 1956 and the redirection of emphasis from Europe to Asia (the Near East and Far East).

More than any other DoD activity, military assistance involved close collaboration with another element of government, namely the Department of State. Although (as the Draper committee had pointed out) OSD and State officials did not always see eye to eye on the subject of military assistance, they usually agreed on the magnitude of each year's program, which balanced needs against available funds. Their antagonists, chiefly the spokesmen for fiscal restraint—Budget and Treasury—sought constantly to hold expenditures for military assistance (as for other purposes) to a minimum. President Eisenhower, though he repeatedly declared himself a dedicated supporter of military assistance, usually wound up listening to his fiscal advisers in rendering final decisions on the size of the U.S. investment in foreign aid.

CHAPTER XXI

Arms Control

The long-held vision of a world at peace and free from the burden of costly and destructive armaments had seemed to many people within reach at the end of World War I. In the years after the war the major nations of the world negotiated disarmament agreements, but these proved unenforceable in an era of rising totalitarianism. The overwhelming defeat of the Axis powers in the Second World War offered a chance for a fresh start, while the revelation of the awesome force of nuclear weaponry unleashed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki gave a new and terrifying urgency to the goal. The United Nations, coming into existence in 1945, provided a permanent institutional framework for negotiations on arms control as well as on other issues. Both President Truman and his successor, President Eisenhower, gave firm commitment to the search for practical means of limiting both conventional and nuclear arms, commensurate with the requirements of national security.*

In the frigid atmosphere of the Cold War, however, even small steps toward agreement had proved impossible. The Western powers found it unthinkable to accept any agreement that would diminish their armed strength—particularly their nuclear striking power, the bedrock of the “containment” policy—without ironclad guarantees that any agreements would be rigorously observed. Hence they insisted on arrangements for strict international supervision—to a degree wholly unacceptable to the Soviet Union, with its closed society. The Soviet Government asserted loudly its adherence to the goal of disarmament, and made this a major theme of its propaganda, seeking to cast the Western powers as obstructionists. In negotiations, Soviet representatives tended to make sweeping proposals for immediate reduction of arms, leaving until later the question of how these would be enforced.¹

* The terms “arms control” and “disarmament” tend to be used more or less synonymously. In this chapter, “arms control” is the preferred usage except specifically where “disarmament” seems appropriate (as in connection with proposals for total elimination of armaments) or where the term is used in the source documents.

Status of Arms Control Negotiations in 1956

Two major developments in 1955 launched arms discussions in a new and seemingly more hopeful direction. On 10 May the Soviet Union presented a two-stage disarmament proposal. In the first stage, to take place in 1956, the three largest military powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China—would reduce their armed forces to a strength not exceeding 1.5 million, and the United Kingdom and France to 650,000 each. States possessing nuclear or thermonuclear weapons would agree to discontinue their production, and all nations would assume an obligation not to use such weapons. All bases on the territory of foreign nations would be eliminated. In the second stage (1957), production of nuclear weapons would be discontinued; there would be further reductions in armed forces and armaments, to be followed by a complete prohibition on the use of all “weapons of mass destruction.” An international control organization would be established under the United Nations. To prevent surprise attacks, this organization would establish control posts at seaports, airports, and railway junctions and on principal highways. It would have its own staff of inspectors having “unimpeded access at all times to all objects of control.” Violations of the agreement would be referred to the UN Security Council.

The Soviet Union presented this proposal to the United Nations Disarmament Commission Subcommittee, consisting of members from the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and Canada. It went some way toward meeting previous Western positions. Thus the two-stage approach was a compromise between previous Soviet insistence that all steps take place immediately and Western recommendations for disarmament in three stages. The manpower goals in the Soviet plan the Western Powers had themselves suggested. Nevertheless there were aspects that the United States and its allies could not accept; it would require immediate closing down of U.S. bases in NATO countries, and enforcement actions, being left to the UN Security Council, would be subject to a Soviet veto. But at least it offered scope for discussion.²

The second major development occurred a few months later during a “summit” meeting of heads of government of the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and France in Geneva in July 1955. Eisenhower introduced his “Open Skies” proposal, calling for an exchange of blueprints of military establishments, along with provision of facilities for aerial photography to enable each nation to conduct aerial reconnaissance at will, and an effort, through the UN, to devise a reliable system of inspection and reporting. After such a system had been proven, the United States would be willing to reduce armaments further.³

These two sets of proposals had little in common but were not in conflict. They became the basis for discussions during 1956 in the Disarmament Subcommittee and its parent Disarmament Commission. Unfortunately, hopes that they might lead to an early breakthrough proved unfounded.

During the discussions, the United States placed a "reservation" on all its previous positions, pending restudy of methods of inspection and control. In effect, therefore, U.S. arms control policy was "frozen" and new initiatives became impossible until policy had been reviewed.⁴

Formulation of policy recommendations for approval by the NSC and the president was the responsibility of Harold E. Stassen, former governor of Minnesota and recently head of the now-defunct Foreign Operations Administration. In 1955 the president appointed Stassen his special assistant for disarmament, with cabinet rank. He also became deputy U.S. representative on the UN Disarmament Commission, serving in this capacity under the U.S. representative to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge. In other matters involving negotiations, Stassen reported directly to the secretary of state.⁵

These arrangements placed Stassen in an uneasy relationship with the secretary of state, who had previously borne full responsibility for disarmament policy. In March 1957, at Stassen's own recommendation, his office, formerly located in the White House, was transferred to the State Department and placed administratively under the secretary. Nevertheless, friction between Stassen and Dulles continued and was to lead to Stassen's departure a year later.⁶

To coordinate arms control discussions among departments, the president in August 1955 established a Special Committee on Disarmament with representatives from State, Defense, JCS, AEC, Justice, CIA, and the United States Information Agency. This body, rather than the NSC Planning Board, screened proposals originating in Stassen's office before they went to the NSC for decision.⁷

Within OSD, no one specifically had responsibility for disarmament planning, but the activity fell naturally within the responsibilities of the assistant secretary for international security affairs, where the military adviser, Lt. Gen. Alonzo P. Fox, USA, was the principal official involved. Since arms control questions usually involved nuclear weapons, the secretary's special assistant for atomic energy, Herbert B. Loper, also took an active part. Loper in fact represented Defense on the president's special committee.

The U.S. commitment to arms control, as reaffirmed in March 1956 in NSC 5602/1, declared that the United States should, in its own interest, seek a "comprehensive, phased and safeguarded international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments." As the initial step, the United States should give priority to reaching early agreement on "confidence-building measures" such as the "Open Skies" plan and establishment of ground control posts, plus all feasible measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament. The paper made clear, however, that the acceptability of any arms reduction system depended on the value of these safeguards.⁸

Arms control negotiations necessarily paid attention to the worldwide public anxiety over the radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions taking

place in the atmosphere. This anxiety dated back at least to 1954, when a U.S. thermonuclear explosion in the Pacific contaminated a Japanese fishing vessel that ventured too near the test area. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India was the first to suggest some sort of agreement suspending nuclear weapon tests. In 1955 the Soviet Union seized the issue and officially proposed in the General Assembly an agreement on ending tests of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly established a committee to study the effects of atomic radiation. The United States indicated willingness to accept a limitation on tests under proper safeguards.⁹

Radioactive fallout greatly concerned many in the United States. In the 1956 presidential election the Democratic candidate, Adlai E. Stevenson, sought to capitalize on the issue, urging an end to testing of hydrogen weapons (not of atomic weapons generally). If elected, he said, his first order of business would be to seek an agreement ending such tests.¹⁰

The possibility of a test suspension as part of a group of other measures had already come under consideration in the administration. However, on 31 August, well before completion of this study, Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy suggested to Stassen that the United States unilaterally announce a one-year cessation of tests of very large weapons (those with a yield equivalent to 100 kilotons or more).¹¹

Murphy's proposal encountered criticism from Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson and, in more detail, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the ground that continued testing was essential to improve U.S. atomic weapons. Even a mutual moratorium would work to U.S. disadvantage. And a supposedly temporary test ban would be difficult to reverse in the face of world opinion. These views the JCS held firmly over the next few years.¹²

The president rejected any thought of a test moratorium at that time. On 23 October the White House released a statement that the critical issue was not to prevent tests but to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in war. In the absence of safeguarded agreements, continued testing remained vital for national security. The United States would continue to "strive ceaselessly to achieve, not the illusion, but the reality of world disarmament."¹³

Earlier, the president had exchanged letters with Nikolai Bulganin, premier of the Soviet Union. On 17 October 1956 Bulganin had suggested a nuclear weapons test prohibition. Eisenhower rejoined that agreements on test suspension, like those on arms control generally, "require systems of inspection and control, both of which your Government has steadfastly refused to accept."¹⁴

A month later, amid tensions created by the Suez crisis, Bulganin sent Eisenhower a lengthy "declaration" by the Soviet Government. This put forth some of the arms control proposals submitted by the Soviet Union in March 1955 and added two others: aerial inspection in a European zone extending 800 kilometers on either side of the demarcation line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and a conference of heads of government to discuss disarmament. Eisenhower replied that the Soviet proposals were being carefully studied and that the United States would be

prepared to discuss them in the UN, a better arena for discussions than a summit meeting.¹⁵

New Western Proposals, 1957

On 10 May 1956, following a report to the NSC by Stassen on the status of arms control negotiations, the president instructed him to develop recommendations for modification of U.S. policy. Stassen's office accordingly drafted a set of wide-ranging proposals, many of which in one form or another had been made before. They included international inspection of production of fissionable materials and the transfer of such materials to supervised, peaceful purposes; suspension of nuclear testing under an effective inspection system, which should combine aerial photography (as in the "Open Skies" proposal) with the ground control posts suggested by the Soviet Union; use of outer space for peaceful purposes only; international supervision of testing of medium- or long-range missiles; and limiting the number of U.S. troops in West Germany, contingent on agreement with that country. All agreements were to be subject to withdrawal on one year's notice.¹⁶

The JCS criticized Stassen's proposals, primarily because they failed to make it clear that "acceptable and proven" inspection procedures must precede any agreement. They also objected to the requirement for a year's notice for withdrawal and again asserted the vital importance of nuclear weapons testing. Secretary Wilson, in sending these comments to the NSC, expressed the view that Stassen's proposals "submerge the requirements for an adequate control and inspection system to the desirability of reaching early agreement."¹⁷

Despite these criticisms, Stassen's proposals, somewhat amended, became the basis for the administration's decision, embodied in a paper that the president approved on 21 November 1956. It committed the United States to the following elements of policy:

1. International control of fissionable material, under an effective inspection system.
2. Limitation or elimination of nuclear and thermonuclear test explosions, provided an inspection system were first installed.
3. Peaceful use of outer space, with international inspection of and participation in tests of outer space objects.
4. Continued efforts to establish "Eisenhower type" aerial inspection as proposed during the Geneva conference, combined with "Bulganin type" ground control posts.
5. Development and installation of an inspection and control system to guard against "great surprise attacks," with willingness to reduce

U.S. forces during the installation of such a system, such reductions not to be below 2,500,000 during the first stage.

The relationship of the above elements to Stassen's earlier paper is evident. Defense influence appeared in the emphasis on inspection as a prerequisite to both a test suspension and a cutoff of nuclear material production. Likewise the requirement for a year's advance notice to withdraw, to which the JCS had objected, was dropped.¹⁸

Stassen's office undertook to translate the approved proposals into a draft treaty. The JCS set forth their views on certain specific questions concerning the drafting of the treaty. They considered it desirable to incorporate the three weapon areas (nuclear, conventional, and outer space) into a single treaty. The minimum requirements for an inspection and control system should include the unimpeded right of the regulatory agency to inspect atomic weapon delivery systems of each state; exchange and verification of military blueprints; aerial inspection of known or suspected significant military activity; majority membership of U.S. nationals on inspection teams within the Soviet Union; and full communication between those teams and the regulatory agency. The primary consideration should not be control of conventional armaments and forces, as the Soviets preferred, but control and limitation of armaments capable of delivering a surprise nuclear attack.¹⁹

The question of the relation between force levels and designated armaments was a difficult one. Stassen proposed an ingenious solution in a letter to Wilson on 20 February 1957: use agreed force levels as a basis for measurement through specified ratios between armaments and personnel. Thus, for example, a 4.2-inch mortar would be "worth" 42 men (the charge against the agreed force level as a basis of measurement). Other pairs of equivalents were: a Corporal missile, 479 men; a B-47 medium bomber, 188 men; and a *Forrestal*-class aircraft carrier, 12,628 men.²⁰

The JCS rejected this approach. In their view, arms control should concentrate initially on those weapons most likely to be used in a massive surprise attack, and there was no clear relationship between such weapons and military manpower. Stassen's proposal ignored the fact that many weapons had a dual capacity (conventional and atomic); it would bind the United States to an inflexible technical formula; and it would provide the Soviets with opportunity for endless haggling over the ratios. Secretary Wilson agreed with the JCS and added some considerations of his own. He pointed out that the ratios would have varying effects on countries with differing strategic requirements, so that agreement would be highly unlikely. Thus, given the large Soviet submarine fleet, it would be in the U.S. interest to obtain the highest possible "charge" against manpower for submarines; conversely, the United States would want the charge against aircraft carriers to be as low as possible. Both he and the JCS recommended that the proposal come before the NSC, but this was never done and Stassen did not pursue it further.²¹

The NSC discussed Stassen's draft treaty on 6 March. Secretary Dulles disparaged it as unlikely to be accepted by the Soviets, though he characterized it somewhat patronizingly as "interesting and useful." He observed further that portions of the draft went beyond what had been approved on 21 November and, with the president's support, warned that any such proposals must be presented informally, for discussion only, in international negotiations. Wilson recognized a need to make certain that the United States was not outwitted by the Soviets, but he acknowledged the desirability of what he called "a look at the books," presumably meaning an exchange of blueprints. He foresaw also that soon the United States, for budgetary reasons, would have to reduce its military strength to 2.5 million (as indeed proved to be the case), and suggested that this fact might be exploited in negotiations with the Soviets. This suggestion, however, was not followed up.²²

Prime Minister Macmillan met with President Eisenhower in Bermuda from 21 to 24 March 1957. At the conclusion of their meeting, they promised to continue seeking an agreement through the Disarmament Subcommittee. They recognized genuine concern over the dangers of nuclear testing but pointed out that a test limitation could not be effectively enforced in the absence of more general agreement. But they intended to conduct tests in a manner that would hold radiation well below hazardous levels, to continue announcing tests in advance, and to permit "limited international observation" of tests if the Soviets would do the same.²³

The Disarmament Subcommittee met in London on 18 March. The Soviet representative quickly made clear his country's belief that the nuclear test ban issue should be addressed independently of other measures. Nevertheless it appeared, to Stassen at least, that the Soviets might be seriously interested in reaching an agreement.²⁴ Stassen flew back to Washington and told the president that prospects for agreement looked so promising that he had actually found it necessary to try to restrain the optimism of his British and French colleagues.²⁵

In the ensuing month, Stassen's guarded optimism seemed to be borne out, as real progress occurred in narrowing the differences between East and West. In a discussion of aerial inspection zones, the Soviets for the first time offered to include large parts of their own territory (though insisting upon an even larger portion of the United States). Differences remained, however, notably in the Soviet insistence on immediate ending of nuclear tests and on limits for conventional forces, which the Soviets wished to set at 1.5 million.²⁶

Early in May, Stassen sent Dulles an outline of his views to date. Dulles in turn referred them to Wilson on 11 May, describing them as a "partial reformulation" of the U.S. position. Stassen now envisioned an agreement that would prohibit all except the three existing nuclear powers from manufacture of nuclear weapons. After installation of an effective inspection system, the nuclear powers would move promptly to establish aerial inspection zones (limits to be determined later) and ground control posts.

Within a year after the effective date (July 1958), the signatories would furnish military blueprints of major conventional armaments and the United States and the Soviet Union would reduce forces to 2.5 million each.

A 12-month test suspension would begin on the effective date of the agreement. During this period, the powers would seek to devise an inspection system to support the commitment to cut off nuclear production. However, the prior establishment of this system was not to be a prerequisite to the test suspension. The signatories would also establish a committee to devise controls to prevent the sending of objects through outer space and of unmanned missiles over distances exceeding a specified range except for peaceful and scientific purposes.²⁷

Referring Stassen's new plan to the JCS for review, Wilson gave Dulles his preliminary reaction. He thought Stassen had gone well beyond the 21 November decision. Reducing forces in the European inspection zone and prohibiting nuclear weapons there would render NATO "incapable of a sustained defense." The commitment to reduce forces would be unwise in the absence of resolution of outstanding issues between East and West. The pressure of world opinion would make it difficult to withdraw from the 12-month test suspension, which would cripple U.S. technological capability. In short, wrote Wilson, Stassen's reformulation represented an attempt "to settle too many things too far ahead in too much detail."²⁸

The Disarmament Subcommittee recessed on 16 May, and that evening Stassen returned to Washington for consultations. Two days later, having received a copy of Wilson's comments on his proposals, Stassen sent Wilson a reply. He defended his proposals on the grounds that they would prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, provide major insurance against surprise attack, open up Soviet territory to some extent (by introducing inspection teams), and reduce the danger of incidents in Europe. Measured against these advantages, the price to the United States seemed "well within reasonable limits."²⁹

The JCS, in their reaction to Stassen's new plan, aligned themselves with Wilson's views. They did not share Stassen's concern about the spread of nuclear weapons; indeed, such weapons in the hands of allies would strengthen the alliance. They elaborated on these remarks in a careful paragraph-by-paragraph critique of the Stassen plan.³⁰

Deputy Secretary Quarles shared the concern of the JCS. However, he appreciated the importance of moving in the direction of a limited first-step agreement and believed that the 21 November 1956 policy decision, with minor adjustments, would be "equitable and reasonable."³¹

Stassen had already discussed his proposals with Wilson, Dulles, and AEC Chairman Strauss, and had modified them in a way that met some of the objections raised by Wilson and the JCS. Thus it would be made clear that restrictions on nuclear weapons in the European inspection zone would not apply to dual-purpose delivery systems, nor would they prohibit training of armed forces in the zone. Also, he emphasized the temporary nature of the test suspension.³²

In two meetings between the president and his advisers on 25 May, the Stassen plan emerged largely intact after intense debate, with Admiral Radford as the principal opponent. The 12-month test ban was retained, with the provision that on the effective date of an agreement all signatories would be committed to cooperate in setting up an international monitoring system. Tentative inspection zones were laid out, one including part of East and West Europe, the other, areas of the western United States, Canada, and the eastern Soviet Union.³³

Returning to London the next day with the approved draft, Stassen discussed it informally with his British and French colleagues. Then, in a serious lapse of judgment, he showed it to the principal Soviet negotiator, Valerian Zorin, before the British and French had a chance to comment. Representatives of those nations at once protested. Stassen was recalled to Washington, ostensibly to attend his son's college graduation, actually to be reprimanded by Dulles with the president's approval.³⁴

The paper that Stassen showed Zorin was a slightly revised version of the one approved in Washington on 25 May. Stassen had submitted it to the secretary of state on 31 May 1957 (but not before he gave it to Zorin). It also went to the JCS, who had not had a chance to review the 25 May version. They found that it removed most of their objections to Stassen's original proposals. However, it still called for an unrealistic timetable of actions for the first year; the zonal arrangement was potentially detrimental to NATO; and the JCS remained convinced that it would be psychologically impossible for the United States to resume testing at the end of 12 months in the absence of an agreement. Quarles, endorsing the JCS views, drew Dulles's attention to the paragraphs concerning the stationing of forces in Europe. These matters, he said, had not been specifically discussed on 25 May, nor was it indicated that they were integral to the U.S. position; hence they should be omitted from the final Western position in the Disarmament Subcommittee.³⁵

The final U.S. position, following further interagency discussions and approval by the president on 12 June, made it clear that obligations under any agreement would be conditioned on effective operation of the inspection system. Moreover, the United States would feel free to resume testing at the end of the 12-month suspension if no satisfactory agreement had been reached. Negotiations for an inspection zone in Western Europe should allow the nations affected to have a full voice; thus, the United States would leave to them the initiative on the extent and location of the zone, the types of inspection therein, and restrictions on armaments in the zone.³⁶

Discussions in the subcommittee then began in earnest among the Western allies (including Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany, whose country was directly concerned), and also between Eastern and Western delegates. At one point, Dulles flew to London to wrap up the negotiations with the other Western nations.³⁷

As the upshot, on 29 August the delegations of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Canada formally submitted a comprehensive

set of proposals, of which the main features were as follows:

1. Within a year, the Soviet Union and the United States would reduce their armed forces to 2.5 million and France and the United Kingdom to 750,000; all four nations would place in storage quantities of armaments to be determined later. When compliance with these provisions had been verified, further reductions in military strength would follow.
2. The four nations would make available to an international control organization full information about their military budgets.
3. Each party would assume an obligation to use nuclear weapons only in self-defense.
4. Future fissionable material would be used only for non-weapon purposes, and that already produced would gradually be converted to such purposes.
5. There would be no nuclear test explosions for 12 months after the agreement entered into force, provided that a suitable inspection system had been set up by that time. Thereafter, the parties would be free to resume testing unless they agreed on a further extension.
6. The parties would establish a committee to design a system for monitoring space objects to insure that they served peaceful purposes.
7. The parties would immediately establish a working group to set up a system to safeguard against surprise attack, including aerial inspection, ground observation posts, and mobile ground teams. With regard to inspection, the Soviets would be offered two alternatives. One would throw open all the territory of the United States (including Alaska), Canada, and the USSR. If the Soviets rejected this, a smaller zone would be proposed, consisting mainly of territory north of the Arctic Circle. In Europe, the Soviets would be offered an area north of latitude 40 degrees and between 10 degrees west and 60 degrees east longitude. A more limited inspection zone could be discussed, but it must include a significant part of both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
8. All the obligations would be conditional on the continued operation of an effective control and inspection system. In event of a serious violation by any party, the other parties would have the right to suspend obligations upon written notice to the control organization.
9. All the provisions of the Western proposal were inseparable.³⁸

Unfortunately, the Western proposal was stillborn. In an apparent reversal of Soviet policy, Zorin on 27 August harshly denounced the Western nations and called for an immediate and unconditional end to nuclear tests and to military bases in foreign territory. Two days later, when the Western delegates presented their paper, Zorin, without even referring it to his government, dismissed it as containing nothing new.³⁹ Debate then shifted to the UN General Assembly, where the Western powers obtained approval of their proposals, though with no practical effect. The Soviets called for a new commission to include all the 82 members of the UN—in effect, a committee of the whole. The General Assembly rejected this but agreed to enlarge the Disarmament Commission to 25 members.⁴⁰

While the General Assembly was meeting, the Soviets launched their two Sputniks. This double success, coming on the heels of their long-range missile test firing, certainly contributed to the Soviets' self-assurance and perhaps fortified their obduracy.

The 1957 General Assembly session was also notable for a proposal made by the foreign minister of Poland, Adam Rapacki. His government would prohibit the stockpiling of nuclear weapons on Polish soil if the two Germanys would take the same action. The Czech representative at the UN announced his country's support of this proposal. This suggestion for an "atom-free zone" in Central Europe was picked up by the Soviet Union in a letter to Eisenhower on 10 December. The Polish Government later embodied it in a formal proposal submitted to other nations. For the United States, such a plan, in the absence of a broader agreement and lacking any means of enforcement, was wholly unacceptable.⁴¹

Wilson's departure in October 1957 and his replacement by McElroy had no effect on OSD's role in arms control discussions. McElroy, like Wilson, looked to the JCS for judgment as to the military effects of the various proposals advanced within the administration. To a greater extent than Wilson, however, McElroy depended on his deputy, Quarles, whose technical background had particular value in this context.

Focus on Test Suspension

Indefatigable and irrepressible, Stassen refused to accept defeat after the breakup of the Disarmament Subcommittee. On 23 September he suggested to Dulles a limited agreement embracing immediate installation of 8 or 10 test monitoring stations in the United States and the Soviet Union, to be followed by a 24-month test suspension and an agreement by all signatories to seek concurrence on the remaining elements of the Four-Power proposal of 29 August. He also proposed inspection zones to guard against surprise attack. Stassen thought that this plan could become the basis of an agreement to be put into effect by the following August.⁴²

To Dulles, this new brainstorm apparently destroyed whatever remaining confidence he had in Stassen's judgment. He told the president that

Stassen seemed willing to seek agreement with the Soviets on almost any terms. In a reply to Stassen, he called attention to the political effects of abandoning the 29 August proposals so soon after they had been denounced by the Soviets. Strauss, Quarles, and the JCS likewise criticized Stassen's new plan and saw no reason to depart from the established Four-Power position.⁴³

Continuing his efforts, Stassen undertook a comprehensive review of disarmament policy, resulting in still another proposal forwarded to the NSC on 26 December. This essentially repeated the plan of 23 September, with the addition of an inspection system to prevent the sending of objects into space for military purposes.⁴⁴

The JCS criticized this new plan because it abandoned the inseparability of the individual items of the Western proposals of 29 August—the only feature of these proposals that, in the JCS view, had made them “barely acceptable.” Also, the provision of control of fissionable materials was no longer a prerequisite to agreement; it had been included only for future discussion. Finally, Stassen's proposed inspection zones seemed weighted heavily in favor of the Soviets. The JCS recommended continued adherence to the basic principles of the four-power proposals, combined with flexibility in stating the U.S. position.⁴⁵

In the NSC on 6 January, Stassen defended his proposals as likely to draw the support of most free world countries, as well as over two-thirds of the Senate and most leading U.S. scientists. Twining, McElroy, and Strauss opposed Stassen, but the really devastating critique came from Secretary Dulles. Challenging Stassen's competence to appraise foreign opinion, he flatly denied that the proposals would be acceptable to the allies. Any retreat from the position of 29 August would only momentarily appease critics while inviting a new Soviet propaganda campaign. He might support the proposals on technical and military grounds, but not from the standpoint of foreign policy.

Budget Director Brundage spoke in favor of a “middle ground,” believing it undesirable merely to stand pat on the August 1957 position. The president agreed with Stassen on the importance of world opinion but added that it was often misguided. In somewhat rambling comments, he indicated reluctance to end testing until the Atomic Energy Act could be amended to share information with allies (as the administration was currently proposing) and the next series of nuclear tests (Hardtack) could be completed. The newly appointed science adviser, James Killian, reported that the disarmament panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) opposed a test suspension until the possible effects could be appraised. At the end of the discussion, the president decided that the United States should, for the time being, continue to adhere to the proposals of 29 August. The president also directed the PSAC to make technical studies of the effects of a test suspension and the feasibility of monitoring it and of technical factors involved in monitoring long-range rocket tests to assure that they would be carried out for peaceful purposes.⁴⁶

Earlier, Bulganin, in his letter to Eisenhower of 10 December, had proposed an end to testing for at least two or three years beginning on 1 January 1958. The president countered with a suggestion for an indefinite end to testing along with cessation of production of nuclear weapons, peaceful use of outer space, and measures to guard against surprise attack. For all these steps, the president wrote, the capacity to verify fulfillment "is of the essence." Hence, "it would surely be useful for us to study together through technical groups what are the possibilities in this respect upon which we could build if we then decide to do so." This exchange of correspondence had no effect for the moment, but the suggestion for technical consultations was to bear fruit some months later.⁴⁷

Stassen's usefulness as a disarmament advisor was now at an end. The president offered him another position within the administration, but he declined and announced his resignation on 15 February 1958 in order to run for the governorship of Pennsylvania.⁴⁸

With Stassen's departure, arms control policy planning reverted to the State Department. Dulles appointed a four-man ad hoc committee to advise him on the subject. Members included Alfred M. Gruenther, recently supreme allied commander in Europe; Robert M. Lovett, Wilson's predecessor as secretary of defense; John J. McCloy, former high commissioner for Germany; and Walter Bedell Smith, former under secretary of state and director of central intelligence. Stassen's role in arms control negotiations was assigned to James J. Wadsworth, deputy U.S. representative to the United Nations. Within State, the principal official concerned in arms control matters, Philip J. Farley, also advised the secretary on atomic energy.⁴⁹

As a new party in the discussions, the president's science adviser, Killian, played an increasingly prominent role as discussion focused on the feasibility of detecting violations of a nuclear test ban. Previously, technical advice on such matters had come only from Defense and AEC, whose representatives tended toward a suspicious and jaundiced view of a test suspension. Killian and his successor, George Kistiakowsky, viewed the idea more favorably, as did most of the members of the PSAC which they chaired.⁵⁰

The Committee of Principals, established by the president in 1958, appears to have taken the place of the earlier Special Committee as a forum for discussion. It included the secretary of state, the secretary of defense (with Quarles usually attending in place of McElroy), the chairman of the AEC, the director of central intelligence, and the president's special assistants for national security affairs and for science and technology.⁵¹

Opinion in the committee tended to crystallize into two groups, comprising on the one hand the secretary of state and the science adviser who sought a test ban, and on the other the secretary of defense and the AEC chairman. Of course, the depth of disagreement was tempered by the realization that the requirements of national security took precedence.

The NSC decision of 6 January had left the next step in arms control discussions to technical findings by the PSAC. In preparation for these

studies, Quarles asked the JCS to appraise the relative military positions of the United States and the USSR following a total suspension of nuclear testing after the Hardtack series, assuming adequate means of enforcing any cessation. The JCS replied that the result would be "technological parity" in weapons development, plus the possible erosion of U.S. quantitative superiority because of the rapidly increasing Soviet productive capacity. Furthermore, if the Hardtack tests proved unsuccessful, a moratorium might endanger progress on important weapons systems, notably missile warheads and mobile tactical weapons. The JCS accordingly reaffirmed their opinion that test cessation should be considered only as part of a properly verified agreement for complete suspension of weapons production.⁵²

In sending these views to the PSAC, Quarles enlarged on them somewhat. Even after Hardtack, he pointed out, the United States would still not be assured of the design of an effective antimissile system. If a test cessation constituted an integral part of other measures dealing with the reduction of weapon stockpiles, the prevention of surprise attack, and the regulation of armaments and armed forces, it would be acceptable. But in any case the United States should not become a party to an agreement that would prohibit the conduct of tests under conditions that could not be monitored satisfactorily.⁵³

These discussions within the administration took place against a background of rising public apprehension about the effects of continued nuclear testing. Sen. Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota became the spokesman for those favoring a test ban, subject to adequate controls. Outside of Congress, several prominent scientists urged an end to tests, though others disputed the dangers of testing, leaving the public confused.⁵⁴ At the same time, the Soviets conducted a new series of nuclear tests in Siberia. Although carried out in secrecy, their effects could not be concealed. At least nine observed explosions occurred between 22 February and 22 March.⁵⁵

The situation appeared ripe for a master propaganda stroke by the Soviets on completion of their latest test series: a unilateral announcement that they would suspend nuclear testing. This would appeal everywhere to people disturbed by tests. An opportune occasion for such an announcement would come at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet scheduled for 27 March 1958. Intelligence reports suggested precisely this possibility.⁵⁶

The president considered the matter with his advisers on 24 March. In the discussion, Secretary Dulles emerged as the advocate of a moratorium to be announced by the president after the completion of Hardtack and to last through his term of office. The secretary admitted that such an announcement would lay the administration open to a charge of abandoning its long-held stance and accepting the "Stevenson/Stassen" position, though in fact it would merely be announcing an intention, not entering into a hard-and-fast agreement. He was opposed by Quarles and Strauss, who considered continued testing necessary, and by Twining, who doubted that eliminating tests would reduce world tension. McElroy, seeking a

compromise, suggested announcing a one-year cessation; Dulles thought this undesirable (presumably because such a limited cessation would not satisfy public opinion). He added that Defense approached the matter in terms of winning a war, while State had to consider all aspects of the international struggle.

Eisenhower recognized that, as in the case of Sputnik, world opinion had to be accepted as a fact even if not well-founded. He thought it "intolerable" that the United States, seeking peace and loyally supporting its allies, seemed unable to capitalize on these facts. He concluded by asking the group to consider how to get out of the "terrible impasse in which we now find ourselves with regard to disarmament."⁵⁷

Intelligence warnings were soon borne out. On 31 March the Supreme Soviet rubber-stamped a decree abolishing nuclear tests in the Soviet Union, reserving the right to resume tests if other nations did not follow suit.⁵⁸

The NSC briefly discussed the possibility of a U.S. test suspension on 3 April, when the PSAC technical panels reported. The one on nuclear testing, chaired by Hans Bethe, drew particular attention to the difficulty of distinguishing underground nuclear explosions from natural earthquakes. However, the members thought that the distinction could be made in about 90 percent of cases. At Cutler's request, Quarles summarized the objections of the JCS and DoD to any test cessation, drawing from Secretary Dulles the reply that nonmilitary requirements had to be considered. The president directed the secretaries of state, defense, and treasury and the AEC chairman to constitute a special committee to prepare for a possible summit meeting.⁵⁹

The Bethe panel's conclusion about the high probability of detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions derived from an AEC test in September 1957, code-named Rainier, in which an explosion of 1.7 kilotons in Nevada was detected as far away as Alaska. The panel therefore concluded that even in regions prone to earthquakes, a network of seismic stations several hundred miles apart could fix and identify any underground explosion as small as 1-2 kilotons.⁶⁰

The special summit committee set up a working group on disarmament preparations headed by Ambassador Wadsworth and including DoD membership drawn from ISA. In two meetings (9 and 14 April 1958), the group agreed that U.S. disarmament policy required revision and that the question of test suspension, having already been adequately studied, appeared ready for decision at the highest levels.⁶¹

On 26 April Dulles met with his advisory group of "elder statesmen," along with Strauss, Quarles, and Killian. He told the group that it was urgent to correct the impression abroad that the United States was a militaristic nation. Hence, new initiatives must be sought. It appeared possible, he continued, to break up the "package" of measures in the August 1957 proposals. For example, the United States was already preparing to present an initiative in the UN Security Council on an Arctic inspection zone in response to Soviet complaints about Arctic overflights. Reviewing the various options

for disarmament, Dulles concluded that the nuclear testing area offered the only possibility for immediate action.

In the ensuing discussion, Strauss and Quarles opposed any test cessation, but Killian thought that the United States would be ahead of the Soviets in nuclear weaponry after Hardtack and questioned the need for five more years of testing merely to make marginal improvements. Dulles warned of the danger that public opinion in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan might be lost to the United States unless some action were taken. "Do we want further refinement of nuclear weapons at the cost of moral isolation of the United States?" asked Dulles rhetorically.

Dulles believed that the United States should announce readiness to stop testing for 12, 18, or 24 months, resuming testing if no effective inspection system was operating at the end of the period. He asked the reaction of his four outside advisers. Lovett and McCloy favored such a move if it would help to head off a summit meeting, which they opposed because it was likely to focus on the test question to the exclusion of other important matters such as German reunification. Gruenther and Smith also expressed approval, though the former stipulated that the moratorium should come into effect by stages to offer opportunity for withdrawal. Smith doubted that the Soviets would accept an inspection system.⁶²

Thereupon Dulles told the president that his advisers favored a test suspension to be announced as effective after Hardtack and on conditions to be specified. He recommended that the president charge him with determining the manner and timing of the announcement in consultation with other agencies and with foreign countries, particularly the United Kingdom. The president's decision was evidently favorable, though it is not recorded in available documents.⁶³

In the UN Security Council, Lodge on 29 April presented a proposal for an Arctic inspection zone identical with the second alternative in the four-power plan of 29 August 1957. The Soviets vetoed it, after which the council rejected a Soviet resolution demanding an end to U.S. aircraft flights over Soviet territory. Asked about this development in a press conference on 1 May, Dulles admitted that the U.S. disarmament "package" had been broken. However, he declined to express his position on the issue of test suspension, saying that there were "many angles to this question."⁶⁴

The JCS, along with their superiors in OSD, remained firm in opposition to any test cessation unaccompanied by a suspension of production and an effective inspection system. On 30 April 1958 they so informed the secretary of defense, asking that he send their views to the president. In complying, Quarles indicated to the president that he agreed; he disputed the PSAC view that a test cessation would work to U.S. advantage.⁶⁵

During April and May President Eisenhower engaged in another exchange of letters with Nikita Khrushchev, who had become premier of the Soviet Union. This one led to a somewhat grudging assent by Khrushchev to a technical study of methods of detecting violations of a test suspension. The two leaders agreed to begin the discussion on 1 July 1958 in Geneva.⁶⁶

The conference opened on schedule with James B. Fisk, a member of the PSAC, chairing the Western delegation, which included members from the United Kingdom, France, and Canada. The Soviet side included representatives from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania. At the outset, a difference in viewpoint became apparent. The Communist representatives took an optimistic view of the possibility of detecting violations (which would justify a moratorium); Western delegates emphasized the difficulties involved. Nevertheless in 7 weeks of discussion, the conferees agreed on a control net consisting of from 160 to 170 land-based posts and 10 ships, distributed over the globe, and supplemented by air sampling flights. Such a system would have a "good probability" of detecting and identifying surface nuclear explosions (up to about 10 kilometers of altitude) of yields down to about 1 kiloton and of detecting, but not always identifying, explosions at higher altitudes (10-50 kilometers) and in the open ocean.

Underground tests remained the principal problem. Relying on data from the Bethe panel (based in turn on the Rainier test), the experts saw a good probability of recording seismic signals from underground nuclear explosions equivalent to one kiloton or more. A "small" percentage of these could be distinguished from earthquakes of similar magnitude. For earthquakes of 5-kiloton force or greater, some 90 percent could be distinguished from nuclear explosions. All these findings became the basis for the final conclusion of the conference: "It is technically feasible to set up . . . a workable and effective control system for the detection of violations of an agreement on the world-wide cessation of nuclear weapons tests."⁶⁷

The administration kept informed of the progress of the conference. It was clear that a finding of the feasibility of detection would create both a need and an opportunity for the United States to bow to world opinion and agree to test suspension. On 14 August the State Department drafted a proposal for a 24-month suspension, to be coupled with an announcement that the United States would refrain indefinitely if satisfactory arrangements were made for inspection and for the cutoff of nuclear weapons material. The JCS opposed this, seeing it as tantamount to permanent cessation and fearing that any escape clause would prove ineffective in the light of world opinion. Quarles told the president that he fully agreed with the JCS views on the difficulty of resuming testing. However, if political considerations proved controlling, he was prepared to support the State proposal, believing that it would limit risks within acceptable bounds.⁶⁸

In a meeting at the White House on 18 August, Quarles and AEC Chairman John A. McCone (who had replaced Strauss) opposed the State draft, while Killian favored it. The president decided in favor of a one-year suspension with the possibility of renewal on a year-to-year basis.⁶⁹

For maximum possible effect, the president wished to release the announcement immediately on the signing of the report of the experts' conference scheduled for 21 August. First, however, coordination with the British Government was necessary. The administration had by now obtained an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act to allow exchange of

nuclear weapons information, and a U.S.-British agreement for this purpose had been concluded. Thus assured of access to U.S. information on thermonuclear weapons design, the British agreed to announce a suspension of testing.⁷⁰

On 22 August, the day after the Geneva conference ended, President Eisenhower issued the following statement:

The United States . . . is prepared to proceed promptly to negotiate an agreement with other nations which have tested nuclear weapons for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the actual establishment of an international control system on the basis of the experts' report.

If this is accepted in principle by the other nations which have tested nuclear weapons, then in order to facilitate the detailed negotiations the United States is prepared, unless testing is resumed by the Soviet Union, to withhold further testing on its part of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of the negotiations.

As part of the agreement to be negotiated . . . the United States would be further prepared to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons on a year-by-year basis subject to a determination at the beginning of each year: (a) the agreed inspection system is installed and working effectively; and (b) satisfactory progress is being made in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms control measures such as the United States has long sought. The agreement should also deal with the problem of detonations for peaceful purposes, as distinct from weapons tests.

Our negotiators will be instructed and ready by October 31 this year to open negotiations. . . .

The statement concluded with a reminder that the suspension of testing was not an end in itself; it was significant only if it led to "other and more substantial agreements." The British Government issued a similar statement on the same day.⁷¹

At the suggestion of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to discuss a test suspension agreement, beginning on 31 October in Geneva. Ambassador Wadsworth headed the U.S. delegation, with General Fox representing DoD.⁷²

All three nations hurried to squeeze in a few final tests before the suspension took effect. The British held four during August and September. The United States completed its Hardtack series, then conducted a second group (Hardtack II) originally scheduled for the following spring. The Soviets exploded 15 weapons between 30 September and 31 October.⁷³

The Surprise Attack Conference

In a letter to Khrushchev the previous April, Eisenhower had suggested a technical study of means of preventing a surprise attack. Khrushchev ignored the idea for the moment; then, writing to the president on 2 July, he himself proposed such a conference, presenting the suggestion as if it were his own. The U.S. Government at once accepted and called for a conference to begin early in October, again in Geneva.⁷⁴

At the direction of the president, the secretaries of state and defense and Killian established a working group to develop guidance for the U.S. delegation to the conference. Kistiakowsky of the PSAC served as chairman; Deputy ASD(ISA) Irwin and General Curtis E. LeMay, vice chief of staff, USAF, represented DoD. A "Committee of Three" (Killian, McElroy, and Dulles) provided overall guidance.⁷⁵

In drafting terms of reference for the delegation, State wished the talks to go beyond purely technical matters, such as inspection and observation, and to extend into questions of the restriction of armaments and forces. Defense representatives feared that such broadening of the terms of reference would open the door for the Soviets to introduce proposals that the United States had already rejected, such as elimination of overseas bases or withdrawal of U.S. forces from Western Europe. The Committee of Three decided in favor of the narrower interpretation, with a proviso that other considerations might be discussed if the Soviets showed a willingness to make constructive progress.⁷⁶

The White House rejected the JCS recommendation that a military officer head the U.S. delegation and selected William C. Foster, deputy secretary of defense in the Truman administration. The JCS nominated General Otto P. Weyland, USAF, as the principal military member.⁷⁷

The conference opened on 10 November. The U.S. delegation was accompanied by representatives from Canada, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom; on the Communist side were the Soviet Union, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania. From the outset, it was evident that the Soviets intended to exploit the conference for political purposes; the Eastern delegations consisted mostly of men with political and military backgrounds, while the Western nations had selected principally scientists. As soon as the conference opened, the Soviet side attempted to broaden the agenda to range into the entire field of disarmament instead of focusing narrowly on prevention of surprise attack. It pushed for an expansion of the Rapacki plan in Europe. After five weeks without agreement, the conference recessed on 18 December at the request of the Western delegates, who felt a need to consult their governments.⁷⁸

Reporting the results of the conference to McElroy, Weyland wrote that the U.S. delegation had suffered from the delay in settling on the terms of reference, which had hindered agreement with the other Western representatives, and from the lack of an explicit U.S. position on the purpose and scope of the conference. He recommended immediate completion

of the review of U.S. disarmament policy so that the results could serve to guide the delegation when the surprise attack conference resumed.⁷⁹

Underground Testing Becomes an Issue

While the surprise attack conference was proving an exercise in futility, the test suspension meeting in Geneva followed a different course. The Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, which opened on 31 October 1958, was to remain in session, with intervals, for more than three years; it would indirectly lead to a treaty in 1963.

The Committee of Principals undertook to draft a treaty for submission by the U.S. delegation to the conference. The JCS, on their own initiative, sent Secretary McElroy their view of the essential elements of any treaty. These included retention of the right to use nuclear weapons in warfare; limitation of test suspension to one year, with provision for extension on a year-to-year basis; establishment of adequate controls; automatic abrogation of all obligations immediately upon violation, or upon successful test explosion of a nuclear device by a nation not a party to the agreement; and reestablishment of abrogated obligations only after renegotiation and agreement among the nuclear powers. To make certain that these points would appear in the U.S. negotiating position, the JCS asked for an opportunity to review the final draft treaty before the U.S. delegation departed for Geneva.⁸⁰

Lack of time made it impossible to satisfy this JCS request; the U.S. delegation left for Geneva without formulating a final draft. However, Quarles assured the JCS that the guidance given the delegation substantially agreed with their list of essential elements.⁸¹

When the conference opened on 31 October, the first few weeks were spent in wrangling over the agenda; the Soviets insisted that the first order of business should be the signing of a treaty, the West that establishment of a control organization should have priority. The survival of the conference was jeopardized by two nuclear test explosions conducted by the Soviets on 1 and 3 November. President Eisenhower issued a statement on 7 November that the Soviet actions relieved the United States of any obligation to suspend its own tests. For the time being, he promised, the United States would continue its suspension, but would have to reconsider its position if the Soviets did not reciprocate.⁸²

The conference survived this crisis. The Soviets dropped their insistence on an immediate ban on testing, and the Western powers introduced their draft treaty, which called for establishment of a control organization as the first order of business. Before recessing on 19 December, the delegates adopted four articles calling for the establishment of a commission representing the three nuclear powers plus four others to be chosen later. Wide differences remained, however, concerning the powers, organization, and procedure of the commission.⁸³

Before the conference resumed, the administration received disconcerting news. Data from underground tests in the Hardtack II series showed that the seismic signal produced by a blast was weaker than first thought. Moreover, the normal background "noise," or interference, in the earth's crust made it much harder to distinguish between nuclear explosions and earthquakes. Only a nuclear shot on the order of 20 kilotons or more could be definitely recognized as such. This rendered invalid the 5-kiloton threshold postulated by the conference of experts.⁸⁴

The AEC informed Defense and State of this new development on 23 December. The draft treaty tabled by the United States at Geneva had been based on the report of the conference of experts, with its faulty conclusions. There seemed nothing to do but, when the test ban conference resumed, to submit the new data and revise the U.S. position accordingly to require inspection of explosions of less than 20 kiloton force rather than 5 kilotons.⁸⁵

An interdepartmental working group drawn from State, DoD, AEC, CIA, the White House, and the U.S. Information Agency considered this problem on 30 December 1958. The officials agreed that Wadsworth would present the new data in Geneva as soon as the conference reopened and would suggest the establishment of a working group to study the matter. A proposal by Killian to have the PSAC consider ways of improving the "Geneva system" of test detection also received approval. Subsequently Lloyd Berkner was appointed chairman of the working group.⁸⁶

On 5 January 1959 the administration released a public announcement of the effects of the new findings. On the same day in Geneva, Wadsworth submitted the information to the Geneva conference. The principal Soviet delegate, Semyon Tsarapkin, at once assailed the United States for seeking an excuse to increase the number of inspection stations on Soviet soil. Rejecting the new data, he declared that the stage of technical study was over; it was time to reach agreement on the basis of the Geneva experts' conclusions.⁸⁷

Another issue arose at the same time about the relation between test suspension and other actions. The U.S. and British announcements of 22 August 1958 had tied the year-to-year moratorium to progress in other directions. The British now changed their mind; their delegation at Geneva urged their U.S. counterparts to drop this linkage. The U.S. delegation was inclined to agree. As Dulles told the president on 12 January 1959, it had proved difficult to draft a treaty article with this provision, and the attempt had exposed the United States to a charge of introducing extraneous matters.⁸⁸

In an earlier discussion on 30 December, Irwin and Loper reported that both the JCS and Quarles strongly opposed discontinuing this link. McCone viewed the problem as one between State and Defense, but his own view leaned toward that of State: The United States should not try to write criteria of disarmament progress into the test ban treaty but should declare the objective in a preamble. Killian agreed with McCone.⁸⁹

After discussions with Herter, Quarles set forth his position in a letter on 31 December. Defense still held to the basic position, he wrote, that the disarmament link should be maintained, but this had been reevaluated in the light of the political factors involved. Accordingly, the minimum DoD position affirmed that the "purpose" article of the treaty should include progress on general disarmament as one of its provisions, tied in with a substantive clause in the "duration" article giving the right to withdraw if the purpose of the treaty was not being fulfilled.⁹⁰

The question came before the president on 12 January. Dulles warned that the Soviets might use this issue as a breaking point in the negotiations, rather than the control system, which he conceived to be the crucial one. McElroy thought that separating the two issues represented a further "chipping away" of the U.S. position. The president tacitly approved the State position.⁹¹

Accordingly, on 19 January 1959, the U.S. and British delegations at Geneva announced that they would no longer insist that continuation of a ban on nuclear testing be contingent on progress toward disarmament. The only condition would be the effective operation of the control organization. This concession, however, had no effect; the Soviets continued to insist that the conclusions of the experts' conference be considered immutable. However, the conferees managed to agree on a few minor administrative articles before recessing again on 20 March.⁹²

Between 20 and 24 March Prime Minister Macmillan again visited Washington for talks with Eisenhower. The principal subject was the Berlin situation, but they also discussed the impasse at Geneva. The president found Macmillan willing to work initially for a modest and enforceable agreement. He told Macmillan that, despite opposition from some of his advisers, he now favored a ban limited to atmospheric tests of at least three to four years' duration.⁹³

The Berkner panel on detection improvement reported in March that modifications of the Geneva experts' system would enable identification of underground tests down to 10 kilotons; intensive research could probably restore the original 5-kiloton capacity within 3 years. These conclusions assumed the conditions of the Rainier test shot, but a new complication had now arisen. Experts from the RAND Corporation had made theoretical calculations showing that underground explosions detonated in a large cavern (instead of a tunnel, as in the Rainier test), would be "decoupled" from the surrounding earth, and the resulting seismic signals would be greatly reduced (as much as 300 times). The panel concluded that decoupling would probably reduce the seismic signal by a factor of 10 or more.⁹⁴

The other PSAC panel, on high-altitude tests, basing its findings in part on the U.S. Argus tests in 1958, concluded that testing in space (above 100,000 kilometers) was technically feasible and would yield observations adequate for weapon development purposes. It was possible to develop shields that would prevent detection of explosive yields of at least 100 kilotons

and probably 500 kilotons in this environment. Detectors in a satellite system could cover lower altitudes (between 10 and 10,000 kilometers).⁹⁵

Taken together, these findings obviously pointed to vastly increased difficulty in monitoring a test ban treaty, particularly if it involved underground explosions. They appeared to confirm the soundness of the DoD position, which stressed that any agreement should be limited to tests that could be effectively detected.⁹⁶

A meeting of the Committee of Principals on 26 March, looking toward resumption of the Geneva negotiations on 13 April, focused on the Soviets' demand for the right to veto on-site inspection of underground tests. Obviously the United States could not accept a ban on such tests if inspection were subject to a veto. If the Soviets insisted, the United States should propose an initial agreement to ban atmospheric testing under conditions requiring little or no inspection, presenting this as the first phase in a total ban. Eisenhower approved these recommendations.⁹⁷

As soon as the negotiations resumed on 13 April, Wadsworth introduced a proposal for a "first phase" agreement banning tests in the atmosphere, as well as underwater tests, which could be monitored by the Geneva system. On the same day, the president made the proposal directly in a letter to Khrushchev. "In my view," he wrote, "these negotiations must not be permitted completely to fail." The Soviets, however, rejected the "phased" approach and continued to press for a comprehensive ban.⁹⁸

In replying to Eisenhower, Khrushchev reaffirmed rejection of the phased approach but presented a new suggestion made to him by Macmillan on a recent visit—to establish an annual quota of inspections to be carried out on each nation's territory if control posts detected possible nuclear explosions. He did not suggest any actual number, but stipulated that they would not be numerous. On 27 April Tsarapkin introduced this proposal at Geneva, again without specifying the size of the quotas. In answer to questions, however, he made it clear that under the Soviet proposal, inspections made as part of the quotas would not be subject to veto. This represented something of a concession—at least some "veto-proof" inspections, their number as yet undetermined.⁹⁹

After discussing this new proposal with the Committee of Principals, Eisenhower decided to accept it as a basis for further discussion and so informed Khrushchev on 5 May. It would be necessary, he wrote, to determine the voting arrangements under which this and other aspects of control would be carried out—i.e., whether or not there would be a veto. The number of inspections should be related to "scientific facts and detection capabilities." Khrushchev replied that agreement on a quota would obviate all problems connected with a veto. The Soviet Government would guarantee "unhampered access" of inspection teams to Soviet territory to investigate suspicious phenomena. As for the number of inspections, this was a "simple and obvious problem" not requiring extensive study. In any case, he would agree to have the number renegotiated every two years or so on the basis of experience. At the same time, he accepted a suggestion

by Eisenhower for a technical discussion of the problems of detecting high-altitude explosions.¹⁰⁰

After another month's recess at Geneva, Wadsworth on 12 June introduced the Berkner panel findings on seismic detection. Tsarapkin again stood firm on the 1958 conclusions, pointing out that it had already been agreed that the inspection system would be subject to revision every two years. Proceedings dragged on until 26 August, when the sessions again recessed.¹⁰¹

With the end of the 12-month moratorium (31 October 1959) now approaching, the administration began looking toward the next step. On 11 April the president had directed the Committee of Principals to consider a proposal by Macmillan for a controlled agreement to suspend atmospheric tests combined with a temporary moratorium on other tests. The members rejected this, since the other tests could not be effectively monitored. Informing the president on 23 April, Secretary Herter reported that consideration of the British proposal had drawn attention to the urgent need for decisions in advance of the expiration of the moratorium. The committee would undertake studies of future requirements for nuclear weapons testing, improvement of methods of detection, and related matters.¹⁰²

On 23 July 1959 the president and the Committee of Principals discussed the approaching end of the moratorium. McCone suggested that the Geneva talks be recessed until the beginning of the next year, with testing to be undertaken by the United States in the interim (i.e., between 31 October and 31 December). The president, as Kistiakowsky later recalled, "grew heated" on the subject of atmospheric tests and implied he would not approve them. He directed the PSAC, assisted by Defense and AEC, to study the need to resume testing. Kistiakowsky selected James McRae to supervise this study.¹⁰³

The president had by this time decided upon a bold stroke for peace. He would invite Khrushchev to visit the United States to discuss arms control and other issues. Khrushchev himself had told a visiting U.S. delegation that he would like to visit the United States and that he thought that a return visit by Eisenhower to the Soviet Union would be helpful. Eisenhower seized upon the idea, and after some discussion mutual visits were arranged. On 3 August the president announced that Khrushchev would come to the United States in September* and that he would visit the Soviet Union later in the autumn.¹⁰⁴

In the Committee of Principals on 13 August, Under Secretary of State Dillon outlined a proposal to recess the Geneva talks until October because Wadsworth, the principal U.S. delegate, would be needed at the United Nations to replace Lodge, who would accompany Khrushchev on his U.S. visit. At the same time, the United States would postpone resumption of nuclear testing at least until 1 January. The president, added Dillon, had approved this proposal. This statement, in Kistiakowsky's words, produced

* See Chapter XVIII for a fuller account of the Khrushchev visit.

a "wild reaction" from Gates (successor to Quarles) and McCone, who thought that the president had approved an entirely different plan on 23 July—one that would not put off testing until January. Gates told Dillon he would have to take the matter up with the JCS; if they felt strongly, he would appeal to the president. The committee finally agreed to recommend to the president that instead of a flat postponement of tests until January, a "reasonable time" be allowed for the Geneva conference to progress after it resumed in October. In the end, this was the plan approved by the president.¹⁰⁵

Gates consulted the JCS, who reaffirmed their oft-repeated conviction that any restrictions on weapons development, in the absence of firm and enforceable agreement, was contrary to U.S. interests. At their request, McElroy immediately transmitted their views to the president.¹⁰⁶

Simultaneously the JCS, for reasons not clear, protested the proposal (part of the "phased" plan presented at Geneva on 13 April) to prohibit underwater tests in the open sea, such as the United States had conducted in the past, while excluding tests in inland waters that did not emit detectable radioactivity; these latter were to be grouped with underground tests. The JCS pointed out that the whole question of detection of underwater tests was uncertain, but it appeared that they could be concealed as readily as those conducted underground. Moreover, the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, possessed deep inland lakes suitable for testing. The JCS urged that all underwater tests come under the same category as underground testing until further research could be conducted.¹⁰⁷

McElroy told the president that he did not agree with this recommendation, owing to the political and psychological implications incident to underwater testing. The PSAC, he added, would be asked to investigate the technical questions raised by the JCS. This investigation was, however, never undertaken. Kistiakowsky demurred, proposing to seek clarification of the points raised by the JCS, and in the end the matter seems to have been allowed to drop.¹⁰⁸

The McRae panel, completing its work in mid-August, concluded that there existed no urgency about testing weapons, except for purposes of safety. This conclusion probably settled the argument within the administration over the resumption of tests immediately after 31 October. It also probably prompted another memorandum by the JCS on 21 August opposing continuation of the moratorium.¹⁰⁹

On 26 August State announced that, by direction of the president, the U.S. suspension of nuclear weapons testing would be extended through the calendar year in order to allow a "reasonable time" for the negotiations to proceed after being resumed in October. The British Government made a similar announcement the following day, and on 29 August the Soviets promised that they would conduct no more tests so long as the Western powers abstained.¹¹⁰

Later the same day, the Committee of Principals discussed the McRae report. McElroy and McCone criticized it for understating the importance of

weapon testing, but by that time the issue had been settled, for the moment at least. As for safety testing, Kistiakowsky pointed out that this could be done in the New Mexico desert rather than at the AEC's Nevada Proving Grounds, so that it could be considered research rather than weapons development. McElroy indicated little interest in safety testing, having been told by the director of defense research and engineering that the hazard of accidental explosion was insignificant. The president subsequently ruled in favor of continuing safety tests at Los Alamos.¹¹¹

Whether to resume tests after the first of the year remained an open question. The JCS views on the need to do so were still relevant, and on 14 September McElroy sent the president the JCS memorandum of 21 August, indicating that he did not entirely agree. "In the light of world opinion and public concern over the hazards of atmospheric testing," he wrote, "I cannot support a position in favor of the resumption of relatively limited testing." He favored negotiating for an agreement that would allow underground testing and its resumption after 31 December 1959, unless by then a comprehensive agreement had been reached. The president forwarded McElroy's letter and the JCS memorandum to the Committee of Principals, "to be borne in mind in their further consideration of the subject."¹¹²

The Geneva conference recessed on 26 August, but other avenues of discussion remained. The Big Four foreign ministers had met in Geneva intermittently between May and August. Although Berlin was the principal topic of discussion, arms control was not ignored. An announcement issued at the close of the meeting on 5 August 1959 stated that the four nations had a "useful exchange of views" regarding further negotiations on disarmament. As soon as "appropriate consultations" were completed, the results would be made known.¹¹³

After completing these "appropriate consultations," the four nations announced on 7 September the establishment of a new disarmament committee to consist of the Big Four plus two Western nations, Canada and Italy, and four Eastern (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania). The 10 countries represented, 5 from each bloc, would begin work early in 1960 in Geneva.¹¹⁴

Nikita Khrushchev arrived in the United States on 15 September. His talks with Eisenhower at Camp David on 25-27 September served to defuse the Berlin situation to some extent; the Soviet leader agreed there would be no fixed time limit for concluding negotiations. This removed Eisenhower's principal objection to a summit conference. He agreed to pay a return visit to the Soviet Union in 1960.¹¹⁵

Addressing the UN General Assembly on 18 September, Khrushchev presented a proposal for complete disarmament to be carried out over a four-year period, beginning with an immediate agreement to discontinue nuclear testing. If the West was unwilling to embark on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet leader suggested partial measures, including an atom-free zone in Central Europe, withdrawal of "foreign" troops from European states, a nonaggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw

Pact countries, and an agreement to prevent surprise attack. In an elaboration of this plan submitted the next day, the Soviet Government added a proposal to reduce U.S. and Soviet forces to 1.7 million men.¹¹⁶

The assembly referred the Soviet proposals to the newly established Ten Nation Committee, along with a less sweeping plan offered by British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd. The first meeting of the committee was set for 15 March 1960.¹¹⁷

The Geneva test ban conference was scheduled to reconvene on 27 October 1959. The Committee of Principals met on 6 October and considered a suggestion by McCone, which he had already discussed with Kistiakowsky, that the United States propose a technical conference of experts to determine the feasibility of an effective control system for underground nuclear tests. If the Soviets refused, the United States would then, on 1 January 1960, declare itself free to act on underground tests, but would not at that time resume them, and would also declare an intention not to resume atmospheric testing. Gates, Irwin, and Loper all opposed this plan; they wanted resumption of underground tests on 1 January.¹¹⁸

The president approved the proposal for technical talks, and Wadsworth presented it when the Geneva conference reassembled. The Soviets eventually agreed, and the new technical working group began meeting on 25 November. The members agreed on some measures that would improve the system proposed by the 1958 experts' conference, but they disagreed on interpretation of the Hardtack II experiments and on the possibility of hiding underground tests by decoupling. The working group concluded its deliberations on 18 December and submitted a report to the Geneva conference, which recessed the next day.¹¹⁹

The Soviet delegates in the working group did not merely disagree. They filed a separate report in which they accused the West of manipulating and misrepresenting data and of using "onesidedly developed material" to undermine confidence in the control system agreed on in 1958. As if this were not enough, the chief Soviet delegate, Yevgeni Fedorov, delivered a public statement which Kistiakowsky characterized as a "violent personal attack" on the U.S. delegates and specifically on their leader, James Fisk.¹²⁰

This outcome inevitably led to pressure within the administration to resume testing. At a meeting of principals on 11 December, when the results at Geneva could be foreseen, Gates urged an immediate end to the moratorium. He was, however, "sharply put in his place" by Herter. The president was then away on another extensive foreign "peace" tour, and Herter warned of the impression that would be created if tests were resumed as soon as he returned.¹²¹

Meeting on 16 December, Kistiakowsky and McCone agreed on a ban on atmospheric tests and on underground tests above a certain level, which would be determined by the number of on-site inspections acceptable to the USSR. Thus the fewer inspections on which the Soviets insisted, the bigger the weapons that could be tested. Kistiakowsky favored a wider ban, but supported this proposal because he was convinced that the Senate

would not ratify a comprehensive treaty in the face of opposition from AEC, DoD, and atomic scientist Edward Teller.¹²²

The Committee of Principals reaffirmed the formula of a threshold above which underground tests would be banned. They agreed, however, that the threshold should be expressed in terms of seismic magnitude (which could be readily detected by instruments) instead of kiloton yield. Kistiakowsky suggested that the threshold signal be set at 5.0 on the Richter scale of seismic measurements, the equivalent of an explosion of slightly above 20 kilotons. Gates accepted this proposal on political grounds. Twining stated that the JCS were now willing to accept an adequately controlled cessation of tests, though they remained basically opposed, fearing the difficulty of resuming tests once they were stopped.

The need for a public announcement of testing policy also came under discussion. Herter favored a temporizing statement that the United States had no immediate plans to resume testing. A suggestion by Gray for a declaration forswearing atmospheric testing was rejected on the ground that it might undercut Wadsworth's bargaining power at Geneva.¹²³

On 29 December the committee flew to meet the president in Augusta, Georgia, to get his decision on their recommendations. En route, they worked out a text of a presidential statement deploring the Soviet attack on U.S. scientists at Geneva and announcing that the United States would not at once resume testing. The president approved the statement with some changes and authorized further development of the threshold proposal.¹²⁴

Later that day, the president released a statement that the prospects for an agreement at Geneva had been impaired by the unwillingness of the "politically guided" Soviet experts to consider detection problems objectively and by their attack on the U.S. scientists. He then announced future policy. "Although we consider ourselves free to resume nuclear weapons testing," he said, "we shall not resume nuclear weapons tests without announcing our intention in advance of any resumption. During the period of voluntary suspension of nuclear weapons tests the United States will continue its active program of weapon research, development and laboratory-type experimentation."¹²⁵

All hope of a total ban on nuclear weapons testing had by now disappeared. The situation at the end of 1959 has been described by one student of the arms control process:

The failure at Geneva and the expiration of the moratorium marked the effective end of the quest for a comprehensive test ban. For fourteen months, diplomats had tried to exploit the scientific agreement reached in the summer of 1958 to achieve a complete halt to nuclear testing. The inadequacy of the technical data combined with the mutual Cold War suspicions had ultimately blocked what had appeared to be a promising first step toward nuclear disarmament. Now the best that could be hoped for would be some kind of partial test ban treaty, one that limited atmospheric tests and possibly large underground ones.¹²⁶

Such a limited agreement would in fact emerge several years later.

One idea that floated up during arms control discussions in 1959 is also worth noting for its ultimate result. On 16 November, during a "coffee break" in a meeting on the Defense budget, the Army's assistant secretary for research and development, Richard S. Morse, suggested to Gates the establishment of a direct telephone link between Eisenhower and Khrushchev. Gates agreed that the idea was promising and asked his military assistant, Col. Edwin F. Black, to study it further. Black understood that a similar idea had been discussed several months earlier at a meeting of the Defense Science Board. He discussed it with Col. Edward G. Lansdale, deputy to the secretary's assistant for special operations. The suggestion was taken up in the Coolidge report and, though not further pursued under Eisenhower, later materialized in the "hot line" established between Washington and Moscow during the Kennedy administration.¹²⁷

Policy Review: The Coolidge Report

There had been no comprehensive review of U.S. disarmament policy since November 1956. Impetus for a new review, undertaken in 1959, fell from the abortive surprise attack conference of 1958. The U.S. delegation had called attention to the need to discuss the surprise attack problem within a context of broader arms control measures. Secretary Dulles accordingly suggested to McElroy a "high-level study" of the threat and of possible measures to reduce it. In the end, the surprise attack conference never resumed, but Dulles's suggestion grew into an agreement between State and Defense for a broad policy review, to be undertaken by a presidentially appointed study group.¹²⁸

Agreement on terms of reference proved more difficult. Defense held that the group should examine those disarmament measures that fell within existing policy (i.e., the "package" proposals of 29 August) and consider the surprise attack problem within this context. The State view, which ultimately prevailed, specified that the study should examine any measures that, directly or indirectly, might reduce the threat of surprise attack. Herter sent agreed terms of reference to the president on 27 April 1959 and recommended that the study be directed by "an individual named by me who enjoys your complete confidence."¹²⁹

As approved by the president, the terms of reference called for a joint State-Defense study of disarmament policy under a director responsible to the secretary of state. The basic question to be considered was "whether there are comprehensive or partial measures of arms control and reduction which would contribute to the achievement of our national security objectives." Conclusions and recommendations were to be submitted by 1 January 1960. To head the group, the president selected Charles A. Coolidge, who had earlier directed the study that led to the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act.¹³⁰

Meeting its deadline, the Coolidge committee transmitted its report to the secretary of state on 1 January 1960. The basic conclusion stated clearly the relationship between arms control and national security: "The United States must strengthen its over-all defense posture before significant arms control measures can be successfully negotiated with the Soviet Union, and should proceed to do so, even if it will require a substantial increase in defense expenditures." Specifically, and regardless of any arms control negotiations, the "missile gap" should be closed and the security of strategic retaliatory forces enhanced to insure their survival. Arms control measures could contribute to a "stable balance of deterrence" by helping to determine the level at which the balance was established and by slowing or halting technological developments that tended to upset stability.

Before considering specific measures, the committee proposed establishment of a long-range objective—"world peace under law." Toward this goal, the United States should favor measures that worked toward accepted rules of international law to prevent armed conflicts, and agreements to reduce national military establishments to the point where no single nation or group of nations could oppose enforcement.

Turning toward measures for immediate negotiation, the committee expressly rejected the idea of presenting a comprehensive "package" of proposals which, by creating a confusing multiplicity of interests, would cause negotiations to bog down and would commit the United States prematurely to future actions. The more limited proposals of the committee fell into two groups. One, aimed at limiting national capabilities, included the following: (1) prohibition of nuclear tests (preferably excluding underground tests from the prohibition); (2) zones of inspection against surprise ground attack in both East and West Europe; (3) a prohibition against stationing in outer space, or placing in orbit, vehicles capable of mass destruction. The other group of measures aimed to build up international capability, including the following: intensification and codification of international law through the UN; strengthening of the International Court of Justice and repeal of the so-called "Connally Amendment" limiting the court's jurisdiction; and action to create a UN "presence" in areas where disputes occurred. Limiting negotiations to these relatively few objectives would enable the United States to concentrate all its prestige and power behind them and reduce the scope for diversions by the Soviets.

Recognizing that the United States might find it necessary to discuss other measures, the report considered two other groups of proposals that might be offered for negotiation without endangering U.S. security. One concerned means of lessening the likelihood of accidental war, perhaps by stationing in the capital of each country high-ranking officers with direct communications to their own capital, and ultimately what the report called a "purple telephone" directly connecting the Soviet premier and the U.S. president. Another related to preparatory steps to reduce force levels and the study of means of verification.

Lastly, the Coolidge report set forth measures that, for various reasons,

should not be presently negotiated. Limitations on conventional armaments should be avoided until force levels were agreed upon. Proposals to eliminate or reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons or to cut off nuclear production would adversely affect the U.S. retaliatory capability and would be difficult to enforce. Cessation of long-range missile tests should await achievement of a stable balance of deterrence. Other measures to be avoided included agreements not to aid other countries to obtain or manufacture nuclear weapons, abandonment of overseas bases, and limitation of military expenditures (until the United States had remedied the defects in its defense posture).¹³¹

Coolidge appeared before the NSC on 1 December 1959 and gave an interim report on his group's major conclusions. Pessimistic, he saw little hope of accomplishing U.S. arms control objectives until Soviet thinking changed, though he noted that concentration on relatively few proposals would reveal whether such a change had occurred. Herter expressed disappointment at the largely negative tone of Coolidge's report and that he had not proposed a cessation of nuclear production. There was some discussion of the question of controlling long-range delivery vehicles, apparently emphasized more in the oral presentation than in the written report. Eisenhower and Kistiakowsky thought that Coolidge had overestimated the difficulty involved. Kistiakowsky recalled that in April 1958 a PSAC panel had concluded that an end to missile testing would be disadvantageous for the United States; however, Atlas and Polaris were now about to be successfully tested, and an end to testing might prevent the development of small mobile missiles (of the Minuteman type) which would make arms control much more difficult.¹³²

At a further discussion of the control of long-range missiles in the council on 10 December, Gates considered it inconceivable that the United States would ever agree to end missile testing in view of the importance of missiles as part of the deterrent. Burke supported Gates, but Herter warned that the French Government was likely to make such a proposal and that the United States must be prepared to respond. The council directed Kistiakowsky to undertake a study of the problems of monitoring missile testing and production.¹³³

After the formal Coolidge report became available, Gates sent it to ISA and JCS for study. Meanwhile, he assured Herter that steps were already under way to improve U.S. military capabilities, as Coolidge had urged.¹³⁴

The JCS gave Secretary Gates their general impressions of the Coolidge report on 8 February 1960, praising it for emphasizing that no agreements restricting U.S. capabilities should be undertaken without adequate controls. Detailed application of the recommendations would require consideration by all branches of government, and the JCS asked to participate in this process. The report should be sent to the NSC, they said, so that measures for initial actions might be considered. They agreed with the list of measures that should not be presently negotiated, although not necessarily with the reasoning behind it.¹³⁵

Coolidge's recommendations concerning measures that should and should not be negotiated had relevance in light of the approaching opening of the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference. Preparations for the conference could not, however, await the result of detailed interagency discussion of the report.

The State Department prepared a draft of proposals for discussion with the other four Western nations in the conference and circulated it to ISA on 20 January along with a somewhat similar British paper. State prepared a full list of measures broken into three categories. Those to be sought initially included establishment of inspection zones to prevent surprise attack; exchange of observers at military installations; agreement to refrain from deploying IRBMs and ICBMs in inspection zones for three years; agreement to use space only for nonmilitary purposes; agreement to transfer fissionable material to international custody; and a ban on transferring nuclear weapons to other countries. The second category, subject to negotiation of control measures, involved reductions of armed forces and cessation of production of fissionable materials and of flight testing of ICBMs. The final measures, for ultimate attainment, included reduction of armed forces to levels needed only for internal security and achievement of an "open world," including aerial and ground inspection and an international police authority.

The less ambitious British paper proposed, as initial steps, establishment of an international disarmament organization, followed by reductions of forces and placement of weapons in storage; prior notification of missile and satellite launchings; and study of means of controlling fissionable material production, preventing surprise attack, and insuring use of space for peaceful purposes.¹³⁶

The newly appointed JCS assistant for disarmament, Rear Adm. Paul L. Dudley, criticized the State paper as providing inadequate safeguards and contrasted it unfavorably in this respect with the Coolidge report. The British plan was similarly flawed, in his view, though it might be accepted for discussion with certain amendments. However, either the Coolidge report or the 1957 four-power proposals would serve better as a basis for inter-departmental discussion.¹³⁷

ISA also criticized both sets of proposals and endorsed Coolidge's recommendation to limit initial negotiating objectives to a relatively small number. Irwin noted that the State paper seemed to be intended as an alternative to the Coolidge report, even before that document had been formally considered. No final U.S. position should be adopted until the JCS had formally reviewed the report.¹³⁸

Following discussions with OSD representatives, State officials revised their paper to include a statement of the ultimate arms limitation goal, drawn partly from the Coolidge report. A number of differences of opinion remained. Thus, Defense representatives believed that the first step should be establishment of a control organization; they opposed any discussion of ending production of fissionable materials; and they noted that any agreement to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons to other nations would contravene U.S. policy.¹³⁹

The JCS endorsed the Defense position. They found the State draft unsuitable as a statement of policy; it was simply a negotiating paper. State seemed to be judging proposals on the basis of their negotiability and responsiveness to world opinion rather than their effects on U.S. security. The underlying assumption was that arms control would facilitate resolution of political conflicts. The JCS still wanted a statement of policy approved by the NSC.¹⁴⁰

Gates sent these views to Herter along with the earlier JCS comments on the Coolidge report. He drew from Herter a denial that State sought agreement as an end in itself. State's approach, wrote Herter, conformed fully with the current basic national security directive (NSC 5906/1), which had reaffirmed the U.S. interest in a "comprehensive, phased and safeguarded international system" for regulation and reduction of armaments. As for the Coolidge report, it had already served a useful purpose in providing a basis for discussion, and it was currently being used by U.S. representatives in conversations with the other four Western nations on the Ten Nation Committee. In effect, Herter disagreed with the proposal to place the Coolidge report before the NSC, and in fact that body never did discuss it.¹⁴¹

The possible cutoff of fissionable materials drew particular attention. The question came before the president on 18 February, with Herter and Gates, respectively, arguing the two positions. The president, according to Kistiakowsky, delivered a "strong statement, virtually condemning Gates and the chiefs." However, he instructed the two men to seek a compromise. The result, which satisfied Gates, was an agreement that a study of the question would be included in first-phase measures, with implementation to be sought in the second phase after an agreed verification system was installed and operating.¹⁴²

Another question requiring resolution at high levels pertained to ballistic missile testing. The JCS, asked for an opinion, told Gates that any agreement to ban such tests before 1965 would severely affect U.S. weapons programs. Furthermore, any agreement that limited deployment of long-range delivery systems would be to the U.S. disadvantage, given U.S. and allied strategic dependence on widely deployed striking forces.¹⁴³

With the Ten Nation Conference set for 15 March 1960, the United States had to enter discussions with its four negotiating partners before State and Defense had resolved all their differences. Since the other four nations favored a comprehensive approach, these discussions had the effect of further eroding the Defense position. Also, among the group of five nations, there was some difficulty in reaching agreement, with France playing the role of "odd man out."¹⁴⁴

The paper that the five Western countries presented at the opening of the conference was therefore a compromise. It proclaimed the ultimate goal of a "secure, free and peaceful world" with general disarmament under effective international control and procedures for the settlement of disputes. It proposed the following measures to be undertaken at once: establishment of an international disarmament organization; prior notification

to the organization of proposed launchings of space vehicles; collection of information on force levels and their reduction (initially to 2.5 million) upon the establishment of agreed verification procedures; and placement of armaments in storage. It asked also for joint studies of peaceful use of space, control of missile launchings, cutoff of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, transfer of fissionable material to nonweapons use, and protection against surprise attack through air and ground inspection.

A second group of measures would follow after preparatory studies were completed. These included prohibition against placing weapons in orbit, prior notification of proposed missile launchings, cessation of fissionable material production, measures to prevent surprise attack, and establishment of force levels for all states. Additional steps to be sought ultimately included further reduction of armed forces, prohibition of production of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological, etc.), measures to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, and completion of arrangements to preserve world peace.¹⁴⁵

The resemblance of these proposals to the original State draft is obvious. Defense had won some concessions, notably in the omission of proposals to ban transfers of nuclear weapons. Noteworthy also was the omission of any proposal for inspection zones, probably dropped at the instigation of the French, who believed that the prevention of surprise attacks was completely independent of the concept of zones and that if there were to be a zone it should embrace all of Europe.¹⁴⁶

The conference was no more successful than others had been. The Soviets replied to the Western proposal with one embodying an inspection zone in Western Europe and a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, withdrawal of foreign troops from European countries, liquidation of bases in foreign countries, a nonaggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and agreement on the prevention of surprise attacks. Later they submitted a statement of principles for complete disarmament, providing that it should be carried out in stages under international control and that violations would be referred to the Security Council and the General Assembly. The Soviets also proposed that, as an "act of good will," all states declare that they would not initiate the use of nuclear weapons. On 26 April the Western powers replied with their own statement of principles, specifying that nuclear and conventional disarmament steps must be kept in balance and effectively controlled by an international organization. By that time, however, the two sides had already agreed that, in view of the impending Paris summit meeting, the Ten Nation Conference should recess on 29 April.¹⁴⁷

The JCS remained of the opinion that a statement of disarmament policy, more specific than the generalities in NSC 5906/1, was needed. They so informed Gates on 23 March, urging him to submit a draft statement for NSC consideration. They also noted that they had not been given an opportunity to comment on the final U.S. position for the Ten Nation Conference, and asked that they be allowed to review all substantive issues arising from that meeting. Gates made no formal reply.¹⁴⁸

The Test Ban Talks, January-May 1960

While the Ten Nation Conference was meeting, the conference on ending nuclear tests was also in session in Geneva. The sixth phase of the conference opened on 12 January, with the first few weeks largely consumed in rehashing the problem of detecting underground explosions. The Soviets still refused to accept the conclusions reached by Western experts in the recent technical working group.¹⁴⁹

Meanwhile in Washington, administration officials undertook to implement the president's decision in favor of a threshold for underground explosions in terms of the Richter scale. Kistiakowsky recommended a figure of 4.75, the Richter equivalent of an explosion of 20 kilotons. OSD officials at first held out for 5.0, but ultimately accepted Kistiakowsky's figure.¹⁵⁰

Accordingly, Ambassador Wadsworth on 11 February proposed the 4.75 threshold to the other conferees at Geneva. He also proposed joint research to improve the detection of underground explosions and make it possible progressively to lower the magnitude of the threshold.¹⁵¹

The Soviets at first demurred, but after some discussion Ambassador Tsarapkin on 19 March agreed to these proposals. He attached one condition: During the period of research (which he later estimated at 4 to 5 years), the parties should voluntarily observe a moratorium on underground tests producing seismic oscillations of 4.75 or below.¹⁵²

The two sides had thus made important progress toward an agreement. The question now was whether the United States would accept the Soviet-proposed moratorium on underground tests. In the Committee of Principals, Herter favored it, while McCone and Irwin objected. Later, however, Douglas, representing Gates, agreed to a moratorium of short duration, and the president approved it and set a limit of one or two years. Some question arose about the right of Eisenhower (who by now had less than a year remaining in office) to bind his successor to a moratorium without a formal treaty.¹⁵³

The British Government already favored the moratorium. On 29 March Macmillan, again in Washington, and Eisenhower issued a joint declaration accepting the Soviet offer, without specifying the length of any moratorium, and tying it to the resolution of certain other points yet to be resolved before a treaty could be signed, such as the number of on-site inspections and the composition of the proposed control commission. As soon as the treaty had been signed and arrangements had been made for the research program, they would be ready to institute a voluntary moratorium "of agreed duration" on tests below 4.75 magnitude.¹⁵⁴

Ambassador Wadsworth introduced this counteroffer at Geneva on 31 March. The Soviets replied that it might play a "positive part" if agreement could be reached on the length of a moratorium, on which the entire question of a treaty now hinged. They agreed, however, to a meeting of experts to discuss the proposed research program. This meeting opened in Geneva on 11 May.¹⁵⁵

As part of the U.S. contribution to joint research, the administration undertook its own program to improve seismic detection. This grew out of the recommendations of the Berkner panel. The White House announced this (known as Project Vela) on 7 May. It would encompass both conventional and, where necessary, nuclear explosions.¹⁵⁶

The dangers of the existing situation had been underscored by an announcement on 13 February that France had successfully tested its first nuclear weapon in the Sahara desert of northern Africa, the first atmospheric nuclear explosion since the Soviet test in November 1958. The "nuclear club" now had four members.¹⁵⁷

The Abortive Paris Summit Conference

Nikita Khrushchev had for some months been pushing for a meeting of the heads of government of the Big Four. A reluctant Eisenhower eventually concurred when the threat of an "ultimatum" over Berlin was removed. In the later months of 1959, after considerable discussion, the four nations concerned selected Paris as the locale. The date was first set for 27 April, but since this conflicted with the Soviet Union's celebration of May Day, it was rescheduled for 16 May.¹⁵⁸

The State Department drafted several positions on arms control for possible discussion at the summit. One recommended support of the proposals submitted by the Western powers in the Ten Nation Conference. Another warned of a possible Soviet effort to obtain agreement to its position through a statement of general principles. Particularly ironic in the light of later events, a paper on the subject of peaceful use of outer space foresaw that the Soviets might object to the use of satellites for reconnaissance on the ground that they were aggressive in character; in that event, the United States should offer to make satellite capabilities available to an international disarmament organization.¹⁵⁹

At this point a new actor entered the scene, inadvertently but with disastrous results: Francis Gary Powers, a former Air Force pilot currently employed by the Central Intelligence Agency. His name was then utterly unknown outside his own immediate circle. Within a few weeks it would reverberate around the globe.

The tightly closed nature of the Soviet system placed the United States at a great strategic disadvantage. Information readily available in the open societies of the democratic West could be obtained only with the greatest difficulty in the Communist bloc. Reconnaissance from the air, to the extent that it was feasible, offered some means of reducing the Soviet advantage. For this reason the United States had undertaken electronic reconnaissance ("ferret") flights along Soviet borders. But the range of such flights was limited and, like other aircraft, the planes performing such missions became increasingly vulnerable to the improving Soviet air defenses.

In 1954 CIA, in cooperation with the Air Force, undertook the

development of an aircraft especially designed for long-range reconnaissance. It would fly at an altitude of 70,000 feet, well above the range of fighter aircraft or of ground-based missiles, and would be equipped to take high-resolution photographs of the earth's surface far below. The first aircraft of this type, designated U-2, flew in 1955. Flights over the Soviet Union began in 1956, under careful CIA supervision, and subject to the most rigorous security regulations. Each mission had to be individually approved by the president. Since existence of the aircraft could not be concealed, a cover story gave out that the U-2 was designed for high-altitude meteorological observations.

Results of this photographic reconnaissance proved unique and irreplaceable. It showed that the Soviets were not building missile launching sites as rapidly as some alarmists had predicted; hence it was instrumental in enabling the administration to ride out fears of a "missile gap." The Soviets could observe and track the flights by radar, but, having no weapons to reach such altitudes, they could only protest through diplomatic channels, correctly assuming that the mystery aircraft were American. Since they had no proof, however, the U.S. Government could plausibly deny any violation of Soviet air space.¹⁶⁰

How long could the United States keep the U-2 program a secret? The longer it operated, the greater the chances of a loss of secrecy. Inevitably there were leaks, giving rise to rumors of the real mission of the U-2. Moreover, by 1960 the Soviets were known to possess a surface-to-air missile with a range of 70,000 feet, though its accuracy at such an extreme range was uncertain.¹⁶¹

As the Paris summit conference drew near, the wisdom of continuing these overflights, with the inevitable possibility of a mishap, became questionable. President Eisenhower's reputation for honesty was one of the major assets enjoyed by the United States on the world scene. What would be the effect if it became known that he had allowed these clandestine overflights? In February 1960 Goodpaster recorded a remarkably prescient remark by the president himself: if a U-2 were lost while the United States was engaged in negotiations, "it could be put on display in Moscow and ruin the President's effectiveness."¹⁶²

Despite his misgivings, the president allowed the flights to continue. He authorized one on 9 April 1960 on the basis of representations by CIA that the Soviets might be building new missile sites. The Soviets tracked the flight by radar and attempted without success to bring it down with missiles.¹⁶³

CIA officials then pressed for another mission, stressing the importance of covering an area where they believed the first Soviet operational ICBMs were being deployed. Delay might be fatal; the sites might be completed and effectively camouflaged. Moreover, in northern latitudes, the angle of the sun was critical for U-2 photography and dictated a need for flights between April and July. Eisenhower authorized a second flight in April, but it was delayed by weather. When CIA applied for an extension,

the president, through Goodpaster, authorized an operation no later than 1 May, after which no more were to be carried out.¹⁶⁴

Accordingly, on 1 May 1960, Francis Gary Powers took off in a U-2 from Peshawar, Pakistan, for a flight of some 3,800 miles, crossing the Soviet Union from south to north and ending in northern Norway. Neither he nor anyone else had reason to suspect that this flight would differ in any way from others that had been carried out routinely. But deep inside the Soviet Union, something went wrong. Apparently struck by a missile, the aircraft spun out of control. Hurling from the cockpit before he could throw the switches that would destroy the aircraft and all its contents, Powers parachuted to earth and was captured.¹⁶⁵

Because of the time differential between the United States and the Soviet Union, Washington knew before the end of the day that Powers's plane was overdue and assumed to be lost and the pilot presumed dead. The fact was tragic but seemed no cause for alarm. The U-2 was equipped with a destruct mechanism, and pilots carried a poisoned needle with which to commit suicide. On 3 May NASA issued a prearranged statement that a U-2 research aircraft, being flown in Turkey on a joint mission for NASA and the USAF Air Weather Service, had apparently gone down in Turkey. The pilot was described as an employee of Lockheed Aircraft (which had constructed the U-2) under contract to NASA.¹⁶⁶

The first indication that the incident might not blow over in routine fashion came on 5 May, when Khrushchev, speaking to the Supreme Soviet, informed his hearers that a U.S. aircraft on a mission of "aggressive provocation aimed at wrecking the summit conference" had been shot down on 1 May after invading Soviet territory. This act, he said, cast doubt on the prospects for a successful summit meeting. Khrushchev craftily withheld the news that the pilot had been captured alive.¹⁶⁷

News of Khrushchev's statement reached Washington early on the morning of 5 May. The president and members of the NSC had left that morning for a flight to a relocation center as part of a rehearsal to insure continuity in case of attack. To give it realism, the exercise was called suddenly, participants being notified shortly after 7:00 a.m. Secretary Gates had no time to obtain official transportation to the helicopter takeoff site; he was hurriedly driven to the site by his wife and, without official identification, had difficulty persuading the Marine guards to allow him through the gate.¹⁶⁸

The text of Khrushchev's speech came in during a meeting held by the president. At 10:30, after the meeting, the president met informally with Gates, Allen Dulles, Gray, and Dillon (acting for Herter). They agreed that the United States must respond to the speech. All then returned to Washington, where James Hagerty, the president's press secretary, issued a brief statement that NASA and State were investigating Khrushchev's charges. Later that day, the two agencies released statements that the missing aircraft was a NASA weather plane and carried only instrumentation for weather observation. In a press conference, a NASA spokesman expressly denied that the U-2 carried reconnaissance cameras.¹⁶⁹

Two days later, Khrushchev dropped his bombshell. He told the Supreme Soviet that the U-2 pilot, very much alive, had confessed the real nature of his mission and that parts of the aircraft had been recovered. He displayed photographs supposedly taken by the plane; they were actually counterfeit, but that the U-2 had been on a reconnaissance mission was no longer in doubt. Khrushchev denounced the United States in harsh language. He voiced the suspicion that the mission was a "plot" by American militarists to sabotage the forthcoming summit. He was willing to grant, however, that President Eisenhower had known nothing about the mission.¹⁷⁰

All previous U.S. statements were now exposed as false. CIA officials quickly drafted another, admitting that a flight over Soviet territory had "probably" been made by an unarmed civilian reconnaissance flight but that no one in Washington had authorized any such action. The State Department released this after hurried clearance with the president.¹⁷¹

OSD officials had thus far played little or no role in the affair. Gates of course was fully aware of the U-2 program, and had been informed of the loss of the 1 May flight, but his only participation in shaping the course of events had been through his attendance at the 5 May meeting. When he read the CIA statement of 7 May, he was infuriated by the implication that the mission had been launched on the initiative of some underling. He telephoned Herter and insisted that someone must assume responsibility. Herter replied that the principal objective was to keep the president clear.¹⁷²

The repercussions deepened on 8 May. Members of Congress demanded to know why such a flight had been undertaken so near to the opening of the summit. There were calls for a full congressional investigation. "This was a sad and perplexed capital tonight," wrote James Reston in the *New York Times*, "caught in a swirl of charges of clumsy administration, bad judgment and bad faith." The Soviet press exploited the affair to the utmost, publishing photographs of the equipment carried by Powers, including money, weapons, and the poisoned needle.¹⁷³

Administration officials now concluded that they must admit that the U-2 program had operated under presidential authorization, since the fact would probably leak out eventually. However, the president need not be connected directly with the 1 May flight. With help from Gates and Douglas, the State Department drafted a new announcement and cleared it with the president, who made a few changes intended to make it less defensive in tone. Later that day, in a brief NSC meeting, the president cautioned the members to make no comment on the U-2 affair; they were to leave public statements to the State Department.¹⁷⁴

The statement issued on the afternoon of 9 May stressed Soviet actions that caused the world to live in a "state of apprehension," and contrasted the closed Soviet society with those of the West. This condition, which gave rise to fear of surprise attack, had necessitated unilateral U.S. action to lessen the danger. The president had accordingly directed that information needed to protect the free world be gathered "by every possible means." Then came the important part, carefully worded:

Under these directives programs have been developed and put into operation which have included extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft, normally of a peripheral character but on occasion by penetration. Specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not been subject to Presidential authorization. The fact that such surveillance was taking place has apparently not been a secret to the Soviet leadership, and the question indeed arises as to why at this particular juncture they should seek to exploit the present incident as a propaganda battle in the cold war.

The statement closed with a hope that the summit meeting would lead to cooperation in removing the fear of surprise attack. In fact, the U-2 incident should serve to underline the importance of that goal.¹⁷⁵

Both by what it said and what it did not say, the statement left no doubt that the president had been generally aware of the U-2 mission. Khrushchev was enraged. He had offered the president an avenue of escape through the denial (customary in such instances) that the head of government was responsible for espionage. Moreover, nothing in the statement suggested that the flights would not continue.¹⁷⁶

Over the next few days, U.S.-Soviet tension increased. Khrushchev publicly warned of Soviet rocket attacks on foreign countries that allowed U.S. aircraft to take off on flights over Soviet territory. The United States replied that other countries had no responsibility for U-2 flights and promised to defend its allies. On 10 May the Soviets officially threatened retaliation against any repetition of overflights, drawing the reply two days later that there had been no aggressive intent behind the flights.¹⁷⁷

No one suggested cancellation of the summit conference, and preparations accordingly continued. Before leaving for Paris, the president issued instructions forbidding intelligence activities that the Soviets might consider provocative. He rejected suggestions from his associates that he punish officials responsible for U-2 operations, to imply that they had acted without his knowledge or authority.¹⁷⁸

Eisenhower arrived in Paris on the morning of 15 May, accompanied by Herter, Gates, and Irwin. Khrushchev had arrived the day before, along with his defense minister, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky.¹⁷⁹ Meeting on 15 May with President de Gaulle of France, who was to preside at the conference, Khrushchev demanded that Eisenhower denounce the U-2 flights as a provocation, promise not to continue them, and punish those responsible. Otherwise, he declared, he could not participate in a meeting with a leader who had made "perfidy" the basis of policy. Obviously the president could in no way consider such demands.¹⁸⁰

On the evening of 15 May, Gates, concluding that the meeting was about to collapse before it began, deemed it prudent to declare a limited alert of U.S. forces. Such an action would also provide a test of long-distance military communications, which, only a few days before, had been consolidated under the direction of the newly established Defense Communications Agency. With the concurrence of Herter and the approval of the president, he

accordingly ordered what he later described as "a quiet increase in command readiness, particularly with respect to communications," to be accomplished without public notice if possible. At the same time, he moved from his hotel to the U.S. ambassador's residence, where he spent the night at an impromptu command post. In Washington, the JCS relayed Gates's order to the unified commands, some of whom went beyond the intent of the order by recalling off-duty personnel. Thus the alert became a matter of public knowledge. Confusion resulted when officers on duty in the Pentagon that night could not explain to inquiring reporters the purpose of the order, thus contributing to the impression of administration ineptitude. Some of the president's political opponents later criticized the alert as an example of overreacting.¹⁸¹

On 16 May the four leaders met in a stormy scene. Khrushchev denounced Eisenhower and called for a postponement of the conference until after Eisenhower's term had expired. He also withdrew his invitation for the president to visit the Soviet Union. Eisenhower, controlling his temper, pointed out that he had already ordered the overflights stopped. He had come to Paris to seek agreements that would eliminate the need for all forms of espionage, including overflights; he saw no need to use this incident to disrupt the meeting. He planned to propose a new "open skies" plan under which mutual surveillance missions would be flown by the United Nations. This statement did not appease Khrushchev, who demanded an apology for the insult to the Soviet Union. Further exchanges took place, during which de Gaulle seized the opportunity to remind Khrushchev that Soviet satellites were overflying France. The Soviet premier then stalked out.¹⁸²

The three Western leaders convened on 17 May, but Khrushchev declined to join them until he received an apology. This unacceptable demand effectively ended the meeting. "The summit conference died tonight," began a dispatch from Paris in the *New York Times*.¹⁸³

Eisenhower lingered in Paris for another day, then departed; he stopped over in Portugal, reaching Washington on 20 May. Khrushchev gave a press conference in Paris at which he continued his harsh denunciation of the United States. Still, it appeared that he did not intend to press the U-2 incident much further. In a speech in East Berlin en route home, he suggested that the summit be reconvened after Eisenhower left office; in the meantime he promised not to aggravate the international situation.¹⁸⁴

Back in Washington, the NSC on 24 May heard a somewhat reassuring estimate of probable future Soviet policy from Allen Dulles, based in large part on Khrushchev's Berlin speech. The members agreed that the United States should not take the initiative in seeking to reopen discussions with the Soviet Union, but should continue to take part in the test ban negotiations and the Ten Nation Conference. Herter suggested that visible actions to increase U.S. military readiness might be helpful. Gates agreed, although, as he pointed out, the U.S. defense posture had not been predicated on the expectation of significant Soviet concessions at the summit.¹⁸⁵

On 25 May the president reported to the public via radio and television. He summarized developments at the conference, then announced future U.S. policies: first, to maintain U.S. defenses, which "are tailored to the situation confronting us"; second, to continue "businesslike dealings" with the Soviets, and particularly to continue negotiations on arms control; finally, to "improve world conditions in which human freedom can flourish."¹⁸⁶

Privately, Eisenhower was deeply depressed by the collapse of the summit conference. Speaking with Kistiakowsky, he talked with "much feeling" about the hopes he had of making progress toward ending the Cold War and how the "stupid U-2 mess had ruined all his efforts." He saw nothing worthwhile to do, he said, during the remainder of his presidency.¹⁸⁷

After the Summit

The failure to reach agreement among the heads of government doomed any hope of breaking the deadlock in negotiations at lower levels. Nevertheless both sides found it expedient to continue discussion in the test ban conference and, for a shorter time, in the Ten Nation Conference.

In the meeting of seismic research experts, which opened in Geneva on 11 May, the Soviets were at first cooperative. The tone changed abruptly, however, on 27 May, when Ambassador Tsarapkin told the conference that the Soviet Union still adhered to the conclusions of the 1958 experts' panel and saw no need for underground test explosions. At the same time, he insisted that Soviet scientists must participate in any experiments conducted in the Western nations. This position threw into question the matter of a moratorium, since it was agreed that the length of the moratorium must be related to the duration of the research program, which was now in abeyance. Before the conference recessed on 22 August, the only positive development came when the Soviets for the first time suggested a specific number for the annual quota of inspections on the territory of each of the powers. But the number suggested—3—was absurdly low by the standards of the U.S. and British representatives, who had proposed 20.¹⁸⁸

The Ten Nation Conference reconvened on 7 June. Five days earlier, Khrushchev seized the initiative by sending to the heads of government a new plan for general and complete disarmament in three stages, supervised by an international organization. A prominent feature of the first stage would be total elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons. Others included the usual Soviet proposals, such as withdrawal of foreign troops and elimination of bases in foreign territory, as well as prohibition of overflights by military aircraft. Reduction and then elimination of armed forces would follow in the second and third stages.¹⁸⁹

In proposing to eliminate nuclear delivery systems, the Soviets had borrowed an idea advanced by France. The French emphasis on this point "ran like a leitmotif through the history of the present negotiations in

Geneva," as Ambassador Frederick Eaton remarked on 20 June. Hence there was room for suspicion that the Soviet plan was, at least in part, designed as a device to split the Western coalition. In any event, the Soviets had scored a propaganda coup, as shown by the reaction to their new plan both in the United States and abroad. The Western powers had to make some response; they could not merely stand on the plan they had submitted to the Ten Nation Conference on 16 March.¹⁹⁰

The Joint Chiefs characterized the Soviet proposal as another effort "to disrupt Free World alliances, disintegrate our collective defenses, and frustrate the United States forward strategy." Gates agreed. He told Herter that in his view, the Western position was "fundamentally sound" and should not be substantially altered.¹⁹¹

Ambassador Eaton drafted a revision of the 16 March plan, adding provisions for a study of control of nuclear delivery systems and for worldwide inspection of air and missile bases, and spelling out more carefully the proposals for transfer of fissionable materials. After interagency discussions, a revised version was sent to the JCS, who pronounced it militarily acceptable but foresaw that modifications of language would probably occur at the Ten Nation Conference. The JCS warned that any further revisions must include agreement on verification procedures and an escape clause.¹⁹²

The Committee of Principals and the president approved the revision on 23 June. Eaton at once carried it back to Geneva and began discussing it with his Western colleagues. On 27 June, however, the delegates from the Soviet bloc withdrew. On the same date in Washington, the Soviet ambassador delivered a letter from Khrushchev accusing the Western powers, and specifically the United States, of having no desire for serious negotiations on disarmament.¹⁹³

The Ten Nation Conference thus ended in failure. The representatives of the five Western nations remained in session for a few weeks longer to discuss the new U.S. proposal. Four of them agreed on a modification, the holdout being France, which continued to insist on its own view concerning elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles.¹⁹⁴

Prospects for agreement were not improved when, on 11 July, the Soviets informed the United States that they had shot down a U.S. aircraft over Soviet territorial waters on 1 July and were holding two survivors of the crew. The aircraft, an RB-47 fitted out for "ferret" electronic reconnaissance, had been ordered to stay well away from Soviet borders; the United States declared that it had not been within 30 miles of Soviet territory. The president considered an immediate military response, but there seemed nothing appropriate. The Soviets complained to the United Nations, and the matter remained in diplomatic channels, with the United States seeking release of the two pilots, who in fact were not released until 1961. The incident became one more reason, along with the collapse of the Ten Nation Conference and the U-2 affair, for the general measures of military readiness adopted by the administration later in the summer of 1960.¹⁹⁵

Six months earlier, on 20 January 1960, Douglas had sent the JCS for

comment a copy of a draft treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, including articles that had been adopted at Geneva, others that had been tabled but not yet adopted, and still others that were awaiting coordination with the United Kingdom. For unknown reasons, the JCS did not reply until 13 June. By that time, as they pointed out, the situation had been altered, notably by the submission of the U.S. threshold proposal. The JCS characterized this proposal as a "departure from adequate safeguards." They considered even more dangerous the possibility of further retreat, including a moratorium as part of the treaty itself. The JCS noted that scientists disagreed as to the feasibility of the 4.75 threshold and urged reexamination of the entire inspection and control system envisioned in the treaty.

Ranging into questions of policy, the JCS admitted that the U.S. lead in quantity and quality of nuclear weapons, if taken in isolation, could justify acceptance of an enforceable test ban. But unless a treaty could guarantee cessation of testing in the Sino-Soviet bloc, further U.S. testing was vital. The historic U.S. insistence on adequate safeguards appeared to be "deteriorating rapidly in the interest of arriving at agreement." Douglas forwarded these views to State without comment.¹⁹⁶

On 26 August the JCS, growing increasingly agitated, reaffirmed to Gates their view of the importance of nuclear testing. Fearing that the Soviets might already be doing so on the sly, they urgently recommended that the United States resume tests, beginning with those in outer space, underground, and underwater. Douglas assured the JCS that he shared their view on the dangers of a continued moratorium. ISA was studying the best method of proceeding in the absence of progress at Geneva, and JCS views, he promised, would receive full consideration.¹⁹⁷

ISA had in fact already drafted a letter for the president expressing concern over the lack of progress in resolving arms control issues. The letter recommended that when the Geneva conference resumed (it was then in recess), the United States take a firm stand to test Soviet sincerity. If there were no agreement by October, the United States should announce willingness to agree to a ban on atmospheric tests combined with a determination to resume testing underground and in outer space until effective controls could be established for those environments. Gates decided not to sign the draft letter, though, as he informed Irwin, he had no objection to discussing the subject again with the president or having it placed on the NSC agenda.¹⁹⁸ However, the NSC did not discuss it, nor did the United States submit in the Geneva conference the near-ultimatum suggested by Irwin's office.

Throughout these months of fruitless negotiations, there had been extended discussion within the administration of improving the organization for handling arms control. The subject had assumed increasing importance and was consuming more time of busy officials. The Joint Chiefs led the way to improvement in January 1960 when they established a special assistant for disarmament affairs. Admiral Dudley, as already noted, was the first appointee.¹⁹⁹

After the reorganization of DoD in 1958, the assistant secretary (ISA) received a new directive in February 1959 that for the first time specifically made him responsible for coordinating positions, policies, and plans for disarmament. The military adviser to the assistant secretary, Maj. Gen. John A Dabney, USA, retained primary responsibility for the function.²⁰⁰

Douglas's military assistant, Colonel Black, perhaps inspired by the recent JCS action, suggested the appointment in OSD of a special assistant for disarmament who would coordinate positions within the department and maintain liaison with State (where the establishment of an assistant secretary for disarmament was under consideration). However, Assistant Secretary Irwin opposed this suggestion and established in ISA an Office of Disarmament and UN Affairs, headed by Addison Lanier, formerly his special assistant. This office would be responsible to Dabney, who was expected soon to be promoted to lieutenant general and would then be appointed a deputy assistant secretary.²⁰¹

Reporting this step to Gates on 4 March 1960, after the fact, Irwin gave his reasons for opposing a special assistant at OSD level. They boiled down to an assertion that disarmament was an integral part of politico-military policy and should not be divorced therefrom. Gates agreed and on 18 March confirmed the responsibility of ISA for coordinating DoD positions on disarmament, for providing a point of contact with other departments and agencies, and for providing DOD representation in disarmament discussions.²⁰²

A matter requiring more extensive discussion involved the handling of arms control policy at the national level. Since the demise of Stassen's position, State had held the responsibility; it was assigned to an assistant (Farley) who also dealt with atomic energy. In October 1959 the president suggested to Herter that State establish a separate organization for disarmament. Herter concurred.²⁰³

Others favored an office outside State. Kistiakowsky advocated an organization in the White House, like Stassen's. Gordon Gray suggested a committee chaired by the secretary of state that would report to the NSC. Herter rejected these suggestions and obtained the president's approval for a disarmament office in his department. This decision had the approval of Gates.²⁰⁴

On 11 April 1960 Herter informed Gates of his proposal to establish an office that would have "senior status" within the State Department, with its head reporting directly to the secretary. It would serve as a focal point for political, military, and technical studies on disarmament. He did not contemplate any change in existing arrangements for interdepartmental coordination. Gates agreed to the inclusion of DoD representatives in this organization, with the understanding (later confirmed by Herter) that they would serve as technical advisers rather than DoD policy representatives.²⁰⁵

Planning for the new organization proceeded, and Edmund A. Gullion was selected as acting head. It would now have responsibility not only for study and research, but for formulating policies and for supporting international negotiations on arms control.²⁰⁶

On 9 September State announced the establishment of the United States Disarmament Administration. At the same time, Herter sent Gates a draft of a presidential letter describing the purposes of the new organization and a statement of its functions. The JCS, supported by Irwin, objected that these documents failed to make it clear that the new agency's recommendations must be coordinated with other agencies; also, they feared that its authority and responsibility, as stated, might infringe on the authority of other elements of the government. Following discussions between ISA and State, the documents were redrafted to remove these objections. The DoD general counsel rendered an opinion that the revised drafts would in no way encroach on the statutory authority of DoD.²⁰⁷

In a letter to Gates and other officials of cognizant agencies on 25 October 1960, President Eisenhower issued a directive setting forth the mission and functions of the U.S. Disarmament Administration. "I am confident that your agency will give full and continued support to the Secretary of State," he wrote, "in developing an effective organization and in building a sound and imaginative disarmament and arms control policy." ISA agreed to furnish six high-ranking military officers to serve in the new organization. Thus was born what was later to become the independent Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.²⁰⁸

The last few months of 1960 saw a resumption of arms control discussions in the UN, but with no results. At the request of the United States, the 82-nation UN Disarmament Committee (which the General Assembly had established in 1958, after rejecting it the preceding year) met in August. Ambassador Lodge submitted the U.S. proposals from the Ten Nation Conference, with two additions: a declaration of U.S. willingness to set aside 30,000 kilograms of weapons-grade U-235 for transfer to an international agency and to close uranium and plutonium processing plants, both conditioned on Soviet reciprocity. The committee took no action except to approve a noncontroversial resolution favoring early resumption of disarmament negotiations.²⁰⁹

Gates and the AEC had concurred in these offers, although they violated the U.S. position at the Ten Nation Conference, since they were not conditioned on progress in other areas of disarmament. After the Soviets had rejected Lodge's proposals, officials in ISA and in Loper's office urged Gates to make certain that the offers were not repeated and did not become part of U.S. policy. The president did in fact repeat them in his address to the UN General Assembly on 22 September, but made it clear that they were contingent on other measures. This qualification reflected the influence of ISA officials, who had obtained its insertion after reviewing a draft of the president's speech.²¹⁰

The General Assembly that met in September 1960 became known as the "summit" session because a number of heads of government attended: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and leaders from Indonesia, India, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Eastern European satellites, and other countries. Eisenhower's address on 22 September dealt largely with the chaotic situation in the former

Belgian Congo, where the United Nations had been forced to intervene. He suggested resumption of disarmament negotiation on the basis of the 27 June proposals.²¹¹

The following day the Soviets presented the proposals they had submitted earlier to the Ten Nation Conference. At the same time Khrushchev, in a vituperative speech, attacked UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld and called for replacement of the position of secretary general by a three-man executive body with members drawn respectively from the "Western," "socialist," and "neutralist" nations. This demand was rejected, and the remainder of the session was notable largely for Khrushchev's boorish behavior; on one occasion, he pounded on a table with his shoe.²¹²

The eighth session of the Geneva test ban conference opened on 27 September; though more decorous it proved no more productive. The United States proposed a moratorium on underground tests below the 4.75 Richter threshold to become effective during the proposed program of seismic research (estimated at 2 years' duration). The Soviets continued to insist on a moratorium of at least four or five years. Each side adhered to its stated position on the number of inspections: 20 for the West, 3 for the Soviets. The delegates agreed only on a few minor administrative articles before recessing on 5 December 1960, with an agreement to reconvene on 7 February 1961.²¹³

Within the administration, there appeared proposals to revise or codify U.S. arms control policy in preparation for the impending change in occupancy of the White House. On 29 October the JCS, in response to a request by Irwin, forwarded their recommendations for policy as well as for a position for negotiations.²¹⁴

It was probably this JCS paper that Gates sent to Herter and CIA Director Dulles on 19 November. Dulles agreed to review it, while Herter referred it to the new disarmament agency in his department. Herter held the view that the position drafted earlier for the Ten Nation Conference should be used as a basis for policy.²¹⁵

On 14 December the president, with little more than a month left in office, instructed Gates and Herter to prepare a single document codifying arms control policy and to cooperate with the AEC chairman on a similar codification of policy on nuclear testing. These had not been completed by 20 January, and the instructions were withdrawn shortly thereafter because President Kennedy was conducting his own policy reviews.²¹⁶

Four Years of Arms Control Negotiations

Between 1956 and 1960 the main outlines of U.S. arms control policy remained consistent. The United States sought a limitation on nuclear test explosions, cessation of production of nuclear weapons material, measures to prevent surprise attack, reduction of conventional armed forces, and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. At all times, however, a cardinal rule

held that these measures could be implemented only under adequate supervision to guarantee compliance.

In all arms control discussions, OSD sought to insure that any proposals safeguarded the legitimate security interests of the United States. The JCS in particular, while by no means hostile to arms control as such, viewed all proposals with a highly critical eye—as was indeed their responsibility. Their civilian superiors, the secretary and deputy secretary of defense, accepted JCS judgment on the military consequences of arms control proposals but, being more sensitive to broader political and diplomatic considerations, displayed more flexibility. They demonstrated willingness to accommodate elements of public opinion in the United States and elsewhere increasingly impatient with the lack of agreement among the nuclear powers.

While some progress occurred during these years toward narrowing the positions of the two sides in the Cold War, the overall record was one of futility. No agreements were reached, although on a few occasions they appeared possible. But for the acrimonious quarrel that ended the Paris summit, a limited test ban agreement might have been concluded before the end of the year. Nevertheless the progress made before the end of 1960 helped to pave the way for the test ban treaty of 1963, which in turn became the forerunner of other agreements aimed at reducing the chances of a catastrophic war between the two superpowers.

CHAPTER XXII

The Final Year

President Eisenhower's last secretary of defense, Thomas Sovereign Gates, Jr., was sworn into office on 2 December 1959. He had less than 14 months to serve, but in that period he proved himself a forceful and innovative holder of the position.

Gates was born in 1906 in Philadelphia, the son of a banker who became president of the University of Pennsylvania. He took up a career in investment banking, interrupting it during World War II to serve in the Navy. In October 1953 he entered the Eisenhower administration as under secretary of the Navy, then rose to the positions of secretary of the Navy and deputy secretary of defense before being appointed to the top position. Thus, unlike his two immediate predecessors (but like Forrestal, Marshall, and Lovett), he came to the secretaryship with a thorough knowledge of the arcane ways of the Pentagon. This background made him an obvious choice to succeed McElroy in December 1959. By then, Eisenhower had so little time left in office that there would have been no opportunity to break in an "outsider" like Wilson or McElroy.¹

Gates as Secretary of Defense

Gates was fated to serve during the most troubled year of Eisenhower's entire term of office. The Cold War, which had seemed to be cooling down somewhat, grew noticeably hotter. The acrimonious end of the Geneva test ban conference in December 1959 was followed by the disastrous breakup of the Paris summit in May 1960. Then came the unrest in the Congo and the obvious Soviet readiness to fish in troubled African waters; the rise of a pro-Communist regime in the Caribbean "back yard" of the United States; and the steadily worsening situation in Laos, raising the specter of U.S. military intervention. The president observed on 1 August 1960 that during the past year, the world had developed "a kind of ferment greater than he could remember in recent times."² And this was before the situations in Cuba and Laos became acute.

On top of these international problems, the approach of a presidential election intensified interparty disputes over the adequacy of the administration's military preparations. This aspect of his year in office seems to have impressed Gates more than anything else. "We had a very tough, tough, tough year," he remarked later. He named four Democratic senators—Kennedy, Johnson, Symington, and Jackson—who were, in effect, running for president, with the result that "we had politics rampant." He spent more than 100 hours testifying on the "missile gap." "I didn't think I'd make it, many times," he said, "because I'd get worn down like I was [in] the last year of the war."³

Gates's personal qualities were summed up in a few words by OSD Historian Rudolph Winnacker: "Intellectual, thoughtful, friendly." A reporter wrote that he brought a "warm informality" to his job. Another characterized him as a "born listener," in contrast to Wilson whose "ebullient personality" tended to dominate meetings. He was a hard worker and put in long hours—10-12 per day, according to one estimate.⁴

His relations with reporters, based on frankness and a command of language, were good, though he did not share Wilson's easy rapport with the press. His popularity with Congress dated from his days as secretary of the Navy. In his first appearance as secretary of defense before the House Appropriations Committee, he made a highly favorable impression. "I am personally very much intrigued with the manner [in which] you have taken over your position," said Democratic Rep. Harry R. Sheppard of California. Rep. Carl Vinson, who did not always agree with Gates, characterized him as "the best appointment President Eisenhower has made."⁵

Mansfield Sprague, an assistant secretary of defense (ISA), called Gates one of the "really outstanding" men in the administration, and thought that he would have "gone down as one of the great ones" if he had held the position longer. He was particularly impressed by Gates's grasp of the relationships of DoD with the president, the State Department, and Congress. Admiral Burke, on the other hand, though he called Gates "a very good man," was somewhat lukewarm in his praise. He thought that Gates made decisions largely from a "political angle" and that he did not fully understand the Navy even when he was secretary of that service. Gates was no doubt too independent-minded on some important issues to suit Burke's notion of the secretary's role. On the whole, however, the JCS respected Gates for his knowledge and experience.⁶

Gates's harmonious relationship with his deputy, James H. Douglas, based in large part on a close personal friendship, dated back to the days when both were service secretaries. He was also on very good terms with Herter and Dillon of the State Department. Kistiakowsky found working with Gates "rather easy," and characterized him as a "much better thinker" than McElroy, with a better command of facts.⁷

Gates kept McElroy's two assistants, General Randall and Oliver Gale. When Randall left, his replacement was Brig. Gen. George S. Brown, USAF, who had been Gates's military assistant when he was deputy secretary.⁸

Gale left in June 1960 to assist the Nixon campaign in the approaching election; he was replaced by Capt. Means Johnston, Jr., USN.

The most important appointment made by Gates during his tenure was that of a new JCS chairman to replace General Twining, whose health was failing. Gates was no doubt sorry to see Twining leave. He later characterized Twining as the "salt of the earth" and an "unbelievably strong ally," notable for his "loyalty and his absolute rockbound integrity."⁹

Twining's original two-year term expired in 1959; he had been reappointed, but made it clear at that time that he did not expect to serve a full second term. He and McElroy had discussed his possible replacement; McElroy mentioned General Lemnitzer, the Army chief of staff, and Twining endorsed the suggestion "enthusiastically."¹⁰

Lemnitzer had thus emerged as the candidate of choice when the selection of Twining's replacement became urgent. If the position were to be rotated, as had been the previous practice, it was the Army's "turn" to hold the position. The first chairman, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, had been followed by Admiral Radford and General Twining, from the Navy and the Air Force respectively. This consideration did not weigh heavily with Gates. He told a press conference on 18 June 1960 that in choosing unified commanders there would be no "rotation in commands for rotation's sake"; the best man would be chosen regardless of service.¹¹ Presumably he felt the same way about the position of JCS chairman.

The president, however, recognized that it was important to the morale of the Army to have the appointment go to a member of that service. Shortly before General Taylor retired as Army chief of staff in 1959, the president's son, Maj. John S. D. Eisenhower, reminded him that the only unified command held by an Army officer was the position of CINCARIB, a relatively unimportant three-star billet, in contrast with the four-star commands held by Navy and Air Force officers. The president promised at that time that Lemnitzer, after replacing Taylor, would succeed Twining as JCS chairman.¹²

Lemnitzer would not, of course, have been chosen merely on the basis of the color of his uniform. He had earned a reputation as a man with administrative ability and a grasp of the problems of the other services. He had been tactful in dealing with the troublesome question of service missile assignments, and had helped to negotiate the agreement with NASA for the transfer of some Army facilities to that agency.¹³

Gates told Eisenhower on 6 July that Twining wished to retire but was willing to leave the timing of his departure to the president. Gates saw one possible objection to Lemnitzer's appointment: General Norstad, SACEUR, also wished to retire, and Gates thought Lemnitzer even better qualified for that position than for JCS chairman. After some discussion, however, the two men agreed on Lemnitzer as chairman. The president told Gates to submit the nomination in time for Congress to act on it when that body reconvened on 8 August.¹⁴

Lemnitzer's appointment as JCS chairman was announced on 15 August.

The Senate confirmed it on 27 August, along with that of General George H. Decker as the new Army chief of staff.¹⁵

Of great importance to Gates was the relation between force and diplomacy, i.e., military planning and foreign policy. He disclosed his views on this matter in a speech on 6 July 1960, in which he stated certain guiding principles for defense planning, including the "need for a constantly effective and vital relationship between the Departments of State and Defense." The responsibilities of these two agencies, he said, were "almost indivisible"—how much so, he had not appreciated until he became deputy secretary of defense. He went on to describe the nature of the relationship that should obtain between the two departments, in words that bear repeating:

The relationship of State and Defense must be a partnership. In years past, apparently, we had a system in the Defense Department of reaction to State Department papers. State Department wrote the policy; then we scurried around with some very energetic, hard-working people and found a way to react—usually 10 minutes before a meeting of the NSC. I feel the Defense Department must also take the initiative in providing counsel in politico-military matters . . . rather than just reacting to papers written by the State Department. I have done the best I can in my short months here to develop a relationship with the State Department that will be one of complete trust, confidence, and partnership with Defense. I must say I am encouraged and gratified, for the success of this effort is demonstrated by the fact that I have not yet had to go to the President on a split State-Defense decision. Yet, much remains to be done in making this principle work at all levels, and we must make progress in developing across the board teamwork.¹⁶

Establishment of the relationship sought by Gates was facilitated by his personal friendships with Secretary of State Herter and Under Secretary Dillon. Gates and Herter met frequently outside of working hours on Sunday afternoons. Gates later estimated that he spent 75 percent of his time working on problems of mutual concern to State and Defense.¹⁷

These contacts at the highest level supplemented those that State maintained with ISA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military services. Such contacts, according to Gates, averaged several hundred each day. "Working relationships between the State and Defense Departments are excellent," Gates told the Jackson subcommittee on 13 June 1960, "and I am told they have never been better." However, this rapport did not prevent occasional disagreements between the two departments.¹⁸

One marked contrast between Gates and his predecessor lay in their attitudes toward the JCS. Where McElroy had been reduced to despair by JCS disagreements on such fundamental issues as force levels, Gates's long experience in the military establishment had taught him to take these in stride. As he told a House committee in 1960:

I am not afraid of divided opinions [in the JCS]. I believe they are healthy If civilian control is to be meaningful . . . then civilians must take the responsibility for making the decisions, and they can only do this on an informed basis. An informed basis to me means working closely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that the civilians can be educated and properly informed. They should not exclude themselves on the basis that they are not wise enough to make military decisions.¹⁹

Gates accepted the organization of the Defense Department as he found it. "In my judgment," he said to the Jackson subcommittee, "the Department of Defense has at present a sound basis of organization within which it can discharge its responsibilities." The changes introduced by the 1958 law, notably establishment of DDR&E and simplification of the chain of command to the unified and specified commands, had proved highly beneficial. He opposed any further statutory changes until the 1958 reorganization had been "more thoroughly digested."²⁰

Gates had two studies made of his powers and authority under the existing legislation. They convinced him that "the Secretary of Defense has great power and the administrative ability to do a great many things."²¹ Armed with this assurance, Gates undertook certain steps on his own authority to carry out further the letter and spirit of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.

Gates's first such action came on 2 December 1959, the day he was sworn into office. Demonstrating that he had no intention of being a mere "caretaker" secretary, he issued a directive that all line officers must serve a normal tour of duty with a joint, combined, allied, or OSD staff before they could be considered for promotion to general or flag officer rank.²² This was in keeping with, but went beyond, President Eisenhower's ruling in April 1958 that promotions to flag or general rank would require a recommendation from the secretary of defense.

On the following day Gates gave the service secretaries and the JCS some of his ideas on the operation of DoD. He felt that the JCS were spending too much time on minor matters. He was willing, he said, to make any changes that would improve departmental operations. The conferees considered and rejected the establishment of a special policy planning group in the secretary's office or perhaps in AFPC. Gates preferred to determine policy through discussion with the service secretaries. Later he rejected a suggestion by Assistant Secretary Irwin to establish an under secretary for plans and policies.²³

Gates's most widely noticed innovation was his decision to sit with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to reach decisions immediately. Somewhat surprisingly, no previous secretary of defense had made this a regular practice, though others had attended JCS meetings on occasion. Two years earlier, in January 1958, a JCS committee headed by Lt. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler had examined the organization and functions of the JCS and recommended regular meetings with the secretary. General Twining forwarded the

recommendation to McElroy, who took no action on it, probably because the entire question of DoD organization was about to undergo scrutiny.²⁴

In a directive to the JCS chairman on 29 December 1959, Gates reaffirmed the requirement that the chairman inform him promptly of differences on issues developing within the JCS. He continued:

I intend that either the Secretary of Defense and/or the Deputy Secretary of Defense will promptly meet with the Joint Chiefs at such times as they consider the issue in question. This procedure will insure that I am fully informed on the problems involved with a view to effecting their resolution in the most expeditious manner possible, and, where necessary, bringing the matter to the attention of the President for decision.²⁵

Gates's directive implied that meetings would be held as issues arose. However, as the practice developed, they were held regularly each Monday. Deputy Secretary Douglas presided in Gates's absence.²⁶

Thus in his dealings with the JCS, as with State, Gates sought to look ahead and anticipate difficulties. The beneficial effects of this practice soon became apparent. General White told the House Appropriations Committee on 22 January 1960 that it was a "very great step forward." It had "worked out even better than I dreamed," said Gates at a Senate hearing on 16 March. "We have made decisions which freed up a backlog of papers."²⁷

The first issue resolved in this fashion involved the responsibilities of the commander in chief, Northeast Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) and the commander in chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) for operations and planning in the Middle East, a matter of disagreement among the JCS. Gates discussed the matter with the Joint Chiefs on 30 January 1960 and rendered a decision on 3 February. Pending the establishment of a Middle East Command, CINCNELM would conduct operations in the Middle East and carry out contingency planning therefor as directed by the JCS.²⁸

As of 27 April 1960, Gates had met with the JCS on 10 occasions to discuss 17 issues and had settled 5. These, besides the role of CINCNELM, involved guidance for military plans, an operations plan for USCINCEUR, definitions for use in military planning, and reorganization of MAAGs and missions in Latin America. Other important subjects remained matters for discussion, with no decision required at the time.²⁹

General Twining told the president on 5 May 1960 that only two JCS "splits" remained to be settled, although these were particularly difficult. One involved control of Polaris forces, the other unified control of strategic targeting.³⁰ Gates settled both of these three months later when he decided in favor of a unified target plan without joint control of all strategic forces.*

In another innovation, Gates met directly with the Joint Staff, a practice he adopted when he came to grips with the problem of strategic targeting.³¹ It was a logical outgrowth of the 1958 reorganization, which had made the

* See Chapter XV.

Joint Staff more responsive to the chairman and, by inference, to the secretary of defense. The president, in his message to Congress, referred to the JCS organization, which of course included the Joint Staff, as "the military staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense."³²

Gates's initiative in meeting regularly with the JCS received wide praise in the press. The *New York Times* reported on 1 May 1960 that Gates had "galvanized the decision-making process of Government by the simple expedient of making decisions." George Fielding Eliot, a well-known military commentator, contrasted Gates's procedure with the old method, by which differences among the JCS were allowed to harden into fixed "position papers" sent to the secretary for decision. More importantly, according to Eliot, Gates was making the JCS system work as it was supposed to, by providing a forum in which issues could be thrashed out among the highest civilian and military officials.³³

In a demonstration of another side of Gates's mind, he requested his comptroller, Franklin B. Lincoln, to determine the dollar value of military programs aimed at deterring the outbreak of general war. In reply, Lincoln submitted estimates of \$14.0 billion, \$13.1 billion, and \$13.4 billion for fiscal years 1959 through 1961, respectively. These included both strategic retaliatory (SAC, Polaris, etc.) and continental air defense forces.³⁴ This approach by Gates foreshadowed the functional budget later developed by his successor, Robert S. McNamara. Gates himself did not attempt to go further in that direction. "As a practical matter," he told the House Appropriations Committee, "there is no simple way to divide our forces or our budget into general war and limited war categories." Testifying before the Jackson subcommittee, he cited the aircraft carrier as a system that did not fit neatly into a functional pigeonhole.³⁵

Gates did not adopt some ideas submitted by his subordinates. Colonel Black, Deputy Secretary Douglas's military assistant, suggested a new conference on service roles and missions—the first since 1948. Gates, however, took no action. Black also suggested in November 1960 establishment of a "Cold War Operations Center" to maintain an up-to-the-minute picture of the world situation and provide a coordinated response to crises. He discussed this idea with Douglas, who decided that it was too near the end of the administration to launch such a project.³⁶

Gates's forceful grasp of his responsibilities, his interest in policy—both military and diplomatic—and his aggressive leadership style, emphasizing anticipation of issues instead of waiting for them to float up to him through the bureaucracy, all marked him as unique among Eisenhower's secretaries of defense and as a man of the same stamp as his successor, McNamara. One student of government characterized Gates as a "generalist" in the same mold as Forrestal and Lovett, as contrasted with "functionalist" secretaries like Wilson and McElroy. President Eisenhower's son, John Eisenhower, used the word "ecumenical" in characterizing Gates's breadth of mind.³⁷

Had Gates stayed in office longer, he could hardly have escaped some

criticism from press and public, such as McElroy encountered after his "honeymoon" year. As it was, Gates's "press" remained overwhelmingly favorable. It was not surprising that, as the election approached, speculation was rife that he might be asked to continue in office regardless of the outcome of the election.³⁸

The Defense Agencies

One avenue of managerial improvement open to Gates, without requiring any drastic reorganization or any new legislation, permitted him to move forward with consolidation of department-wide functions. The process, an outgrowth of the 1958 reorganization, had begun in 1959 with the establishment of the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA).*

Communications networks used by the services and OSD seemed an obvious target for consolidation in the interests of economy and efficiency. The possibility arose as early as May 1957, when the president asked his advisers to make a "searching examination" of military communication systems to identify possible economies. But this initiative seems to have produced no result.³⁹

In August 1958 the JCS told Secretary McElroy that the recent reorganization had given them the means to exercise improved control and coordination of military long-haul strategic communications. Accordingly, they proposed to exercise direct supervision over these facilities. This action would be in keeping with the new responsibilities they were assuming in connection with the unified and specified commands.⁴⁰ Six months later the JCS proposed to combine all long-haul military communications facilities into a joint network to be operated under JCS control. Gates approved it in July 1959 after some discussion.⁴¹

By that time, McElroy had issued a directive to establish policy guidance for the development and management of telecommunications along with procedures to insure that systems were thoroughly integrated and compatible. The JCS regarded their joint management concept as a step in implementing it.⁴² Simultaneously the House Appropriations Committee urged that OSD and JCS "aggressively pursue their plan for integrated communications to match the development of the unified and specified command planning."⁴³

Responsibility for managing a joint military communications network now became an issue. Army Secretary Brucker touched off the dispute on 5 June 1959 with a proposal that responsibility go to the Army's Signal Corps, which was uniquely qualified by virtue of its long experience. The Air Force believed that the Military Communications Electronics Board (MCEB), an agency of the JCS, should be responsible; the Navy favored a joint agency to be established for the purpose.⁴⁴

* See Chapter XIV.

By the time the JCS considered the question, the Navy and the Air Force had merged their views and now favored division of responsibility between a new operating agency and the MCEB. The Army continued to favor operation by the Signal Corps. The JCS split along these lines. Twining proposed a joint agency supervised for the JCS by their director of communications-electronics (J-6).⁴⁵

Gates decided in favor of an agency responsible directly to the secretary of defense, with advice provided by a Defense Communication Board and policy guidance from the ASD(S&L) and the DDR&E. On 14 January 1960 he established a working group chaired by E. Perkins McGuire, the assistant secretary (S&L), to develop the plan. When the JCS objected because they were not included in the chain of command to the proposed new agency, Gates amended his plan to specify that the agency would report to him through the JCS.⁴⁶

The Defense Communications Agency (DCA) was established on 12 May 1960 to assume responsibility for the defense communications system, including all worldwide, long-haul circuits and facilities required to provide communications at the higher levels of government and the military establishment, down to the major command level. The system excluded tactical and short-range communications of the services. The DCA was to be headed by a military officer of general or flag rank appointed by the secretary on recommendation of the JCS. A Defense Communications Policy Advisory Committee was established, to be chaired by the ASD(S&L).⁴⁷

The JCS nominated Rear Adm. William D. Irvin, USN, as the first head of DCA. Gates approved the nomination, but not the recommendation for a two-year tenure of office, believing that this should not be fixed at that time. He likewise rejected the suggestion to rotate the position among the military departments; selection of the chief should be on the basis of the best qualified individual, regardless of service.⁴⁸

The next candidate for consolidation was the intelligence function, but the process was not completed before Gates left office. The need for better integration of intelligence became plain after disputes in 1958 and 1959 over the prospective size of the Soviet missile force.⁴⁹ Within DoD, the stimulus to action came from General Erskine, the assistant for special operations, who pointed out to Gates in December 1959 that there existed no overall statement of requirements against which to judge the effectiveness of intelligence machinery. Moreover, a full year after DoD reorganization, it was high time to begin handling intelligence at the level of DoD rather than the services in order to insure a more balanced product. Erskine sent a draft letter, which Gates approved and forwarded to the JCS, directing them to prepare a statement of essential intelligence requirements of all elements of DoD. After a preliminary survey, the JCS estimated in March 1960 that preparation of the statement would require another six months.⁵⁰

The director of the Bureau of the Budget proposed a study that would not attempt to evaluate the substance of the intelligence product but seek

to improve management and reduce costs. The administration adopted the suggestion and assigned the study to the director of central intelligence. The CIA's Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., chaired an interdepartmental working group established for the purpose. Appropriately, Erskine represented Defense.⁵¹

After 5 months of work, the Kirkpatrick group submitted a report on 15 December containing 48 recommendations for reorganization of agencies and elements responsible for intelligence. These included changes in the overall interagency directing committee (United States Intelligence Board); establishment of a national photographic interpretation center; and expansion of the intelligence role of the Joint Staff. The NSC considered the report on 18 January 1961 and approved a number of the recommendations, but it was obviously too late then for action by the outgoing administration.⁵²

Also on 18 January, the JCS informed Gates that the review of military intelligence requirements, which he had called for a year earlier, had been completed; but it was overshadowed by the report of the interagency study group. Nevertheless they believed that their work should prove a valuable supplement. Gates passed this study on to his successor, who also inherited the report of Kirkpatrick's group, and it was left to him to take the final step—creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency.⁵³

Military Planning

National security policy continued to receive the close attention of the president and his advisers, including Gates, in the last year of the administration. As the end of his time in office neared, President Eisenhower determined to have a thorough review of policy from the top down. For 1960 he did not repeat the annual review of basic national security policy. Instead, he told the NSC on 7 April 1960 that he wanted every NSC policy paper examined for possible revision before the change of administration. The Planning Board was to draft any necessary revisions or, where no substantial revision was needed, to submit a written report to the NSC to that effect.⁵⁴

These provisions, of course, applied to NSC 5906/1, the directive on basic national security policy adopted in July 1959. The Planning Board reviewed it and reported on 10 November 1960 that it needed no revision.⁵⁵ This action precluded any reopening of the argument over the role of nuclear weapons in national strategy that had taken place annually for several preceding years.

In its search for ways to balance resources and requirements for defense, the Eisenhower administration paid special attention to the "military logistics base," a term the NSC adopted in preference to "mobilization base." The logistics base, after all, was the final determinant in war planning. In an administration that had always sought to keep the military budget down, logistics occupied a central position in deliberations of national security policy. In this connection, the administration also found it necessary to

take into account to a somewhat greater extent than before the possibility of the incidence of large-scale limited wars and the potential use of nuclear weapons in such conflicts.

In NSC 5906/1, the president and NSC had adopted a new mobilization policy that dropped the assumption of a six-month mobilization period before the outbreak of war, introduced the term "military logistics base," and directed that planning make provisions for cold, limited, and general war. Plans for the first two contingencies were to take account of the need to maintain an acceptable general war posture.⁵⁶

Discussion of mobilization policy had awaited formulation of a Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) for 1 July 1963. As soon as this policy was settled, Gates requested the JCS in October 1959 to proceed with the new JSOP. The JCS had anticipated this action and had already issued guidance to the Joint Staff for JSOP-63, basing forces on FY 1960 budget expenditures plus a five percent increase each year through FY 1963.⁵⁷

JSOP-63, covering FYs 1963 through 1966, was completed in January 1960—in time, the JCS hoped, to provide a basis for the FY 1962 budget. M-day force tabs for general war, representing "reasonably attainable" objectives, were: Army, 14 divisions (rising to 42 by M+6 months); Navy, 15 attack carriers; Air Force, 88 wings, including 10 missile (3 ICBM and 7 Bomarc air defense), rising to 127 on M+1. For limited war, the plan assumed forces of the same order of magnitude as those in CINCPAC's plan for the resumption of hostilities in Korea.

The plan had the agreement of all the chiefs, but each submitted a statement of views, with resulting wide divergence. General White thought JSOP-63 nearly useless; it had come too late to provide guidance for the FY 1961 budget, and it did not assign tasks for unified and specified commanders and thus did not adequately reflect the 1958 reorganization, which had given these commanders enlarged responsibilities. General Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke pointed out that the JSOP had never been intended to provide specific guidance for these commanders; any attempt to do so four years in the future would be meaningless. General Twining recommended that the secretary approve the JSOP for planning purposes and simply note the service views.⁵⁸

Douglas, acting for Gates, gave qualified approval to JSOP-63, but not to the force tabs; instead, the smaller force goals in his logistics guidance directive, issued earlier, were to be used for planning. He thus withheld approval of the Army buildup projected in JSOP-63. Moreover, he did not approve the logistic annex containing the assumption of a five percent annual increase in expenditures over FY 1960. Also, JSOP-63 was to be revised as necessary to reflect a starting point consistent with the recent decisions amending the FY 1961 budget. Douglas requested that future plans contain the following: (1) JCS comments and recommendations on force objectives; (2) military personnel strengths by service and the maximum buildup contemplated; and (3) a general estimate of costs of the logistic base to support the plan.⁵⁹

Gates's logistic guidance, based on a draft prepared by the JCS and issued on 15 March 1960, stipulated the following forces to be used in logistic planning: 22 Army divisions, 15 attack carriers, and 125 Air Force wings (including 25 troop carrier wings). These were not goals that the services were to strive for; they were "paper" figures for determining the level of materiel support. The general war objective envisaged 90 days combat support for most forces, without a pipeline. For limited war the logistic base would support the forces in CINCPAC's Korean war plan: two divisions on M-day (2 July 1963), rising to six divisions by M+6, six attack carriers, and six Air Force wings plus one reconnaissance squadron. These requirements plus those for peacetime forces would constitute the total acquisition objectives of the military logistics base. Production planning for limited war would assume that the U.S. industrial base would not be subject to enemy attack. For general war, production planning would give major consideration to reorganization of the industrial base following a nuclear attack, then reconstitution of capacity equal to the planned level of production for limited war. Logistic support for peacetime would be based on personnel strengths approved for 30 June 1961, totaling 2,489,000.⁶⁰

Assistant Secretary McGuire explained to the NSC how the new concept of military logistics planning, based on NSC 5906/1, differed from that in previous years. Most startling was the contrast in force objectives used: 42 Army divisions, 2,168 ships, and 140 combat wings applied to an assumed M-day of 1 July 1962, as compared with the new basis of 22 divisions, 1,568 ships, and 125 combat air wings for 1 July 1963. Moreover, the new concept specifically provided for limited war support. The full impact of the new guidelines could not be measured until the military services completed their more detailed implementing plans. McGuire warned that the change would probably not reduce the budget for logistic support, since in recent years funding requests had not been designed to support fully the requirements computed from the old planning concepts.⁶¹

McGuire's presentation received a good hearing from the NSC. The president was impressed by the contrast with the old planning base with its 42-division objective. Gray pointed to the provisions now made for limited war and noted that under the new concept, U.S. forces would be prepared to use conventional weapons in such wars except where the main Communist power might become involved. These facts, Gray suggested, constituted an answer to those critics who charged the administration with neglecting preparations for limited war.⁶²

In the successor to JSOP-63, the JCS projected M-day forward to 1 July 1965 instead of 1 July 1964 to permit more realistic planning for long lead-time items and closer orientation to budgeting. Also, the plan used as reference the fiscal year, rather than the calendar year, in which M-day fell, and thus became JSOP-66. It was expected to guide development of the FY 1963 budget and also to apply to that for FY 1962. Force tabs for main forces in the plan (for 1 July 1965) were as follows:

Army:	
Divisions	14
Air defense battalions	65 1/2
Navy:	
Attack carriers	14
ASW carriers	9
FBM (Polaris) submarines	21
Marine Corps:	
Divisions	3
Air wings	3
Air Force:	
B-52 wings	16
Atlas missile squadrons	15
Titan missile squadrons	18
Minuteman missiles	1,450
	(Tentative Air Force estimate)
Personnel:	
Army	900,000
Navy	655,000
Marine Corps	200,000
Air Force	820,544
Total	2,575,544

These force tabs were "related" to the FY 1963 budget and would obviously be affected by decisions on the budget for 1962. Predictably, each JCS member had a number of reservations. White recommended only 54 1/2 air defense battalions; he approved a total force of 10 attack carriers and 13 antisubmarine carriers; he favored only 15 Polaris submarines, arguing that Polaris was much less cost-effective than land-based missiles. General Lemnitzer sought 15 B-52 wings, 27 Atlas-Titan squadrons combined, and 800 Minuteman missiles; for Burke the corresponding objectives were 14 B-52 wings, 18 missile squadrons combined, and 400 Minuteman missiles. The Chiefs also held divergent views on personnel strengths. They told Gates that they proposed to resolve these disagreements during the budget process. Meanwhile, they asked that he approve the objectives, the strategic concept, and the basic undertakings in the plan.⁶³

Twining told Gates that "the degree of agreement reached in JSOP-66 represents a commendable effort on the part of the Service Chiefs of Staff to subordinate their individual Service views in favor of a corporate objectives plan." He also thought that the force objectives would provide a "valid basis for mid-range planning" and an "acceptable point of departure for the development of the annual budget." He did not comment on the disputed force levels.⁶⁴

After holding up action long enough to consult the new JCS chairman, General Lemnitzer, who agreed with Twining, Gates approved the plan on 17 November 1960, except for the force tabs and the logistic annex, since these did not fully reflect the most recent logistic guidance. The JCS had responsibility, he wrote, to recommend "the proper and realistic weapons systems and force compositions which are essential for national security." Accordingly, he directed the JCS to continue to evaluate their differences.⁶⁵

The administration demonstrated its growing interest in limited war in a decision to update the study of the subject that had been completed in 1958. McElroy and Herter had agreed at Geneva in 1959 on the need for a new study. Gray approved the project on behalf of the president; the JCS drafted terms of reference, and a joint committee, representing State, Defense, JCS, and CIA, convened in July 1959 to prepare the study.⁶⁶

Narrower in scope than the 1958 assessment, the new study considered only five possible areas of operations: Korea, Taiwan and the offshore islands, Iran, Berlin, and Indochina. Examination of each situation should consider both U.S.-allied and enemy capabilities, nuclear as well as nonnuclear, and should lead to conclusions as to the overall adequacy of U.S. capabilities for limited military operations as well as for each geographic area.⁶⁷

Preparation of the study required more than a year. In July 1960, when it was nearing completion and conclusions were beginning to emerge, the JCS reviewed it and sent their comments to Gates. They found that by itself the study did not "constitute a valid basis for formulating programs or reaching decisions"; it contained assumptions that might not prove accurate. For example, enemy reaction to U.S. use of nuclear weapons might be quite different from that envisaged in the study. Moreover, in exaggerating the probable alarm of allies over U.S. actions, it did not do justice to their perception and resolution. And the full U.S. and allied capabilities were not used in all cases. Nevertheless its conclusions presented "a general picture of the adequacy of forces for the limited military operations covered by the study."⁶⁸

Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning Gerard C. Smith also reviewed the draft. He thought that it lacked provision for adequate airlift and of capability for counter guerrilla operations. Smith expressed particular concern about the inability to deal with limited aggression in the Far East without recourse to nuclear weapons.⁶⁹

About the same time, a panel of the PSAC completed a study of weapons technology for limited warfare. Their report, dated 3 August 1960, concluded that present and planned capabilities for limited warfare "fall far short of what could be achieved with present funding and force levels." There was a need for greater lift capacity (air and sea), improved tactical support aircraft, smaller and more numerous aircraft carriers, more effective non-nuclear weapons, and improvements in small tactical nuclear weapons. The members recommended that DoD establish a single agency responsible for preparing for limited war.⁷⁰

Howard P. Robertson, chairman of the panel, presented these conclusions

to the president on 24 August. Gates and Douglas were present and apparently did not challenge any of the conclusions, although Kistiakowsky thought that both looked "most disapproving." The president obtained assurance from Robertson that the panel was not recommending any "crash" program of weapons procurement. He agreed on the importance of being prepared for limited war but did not direct any action.⁷¹

The completed interdepartmental study on limited war, which reached Gates on 26 September 1960, stated its cardinal conclusion at the very beginning:

U.S. capabilities in conjunction with those of our allies are generally adequate to conduct any one of the limited military operations studied but these capabilities are dependent on prompt action, as required in each case, to:

- a. Initiate partial mobilization.
- b. Augment existing military lift capabilities.
- c. Expand the war production base.
- d. Waive financial limitations.

Any one of the five operations studied (except Berlin, which involved at most a brigade-sized highway probe) would initially degrade overall capability, although not to an unacceptable degree. There would be no serious effect on the U.S. nuclear retaliatory capability unless two operations had to be undertaken simultaneously.

The desirability of initiating the use of nuclear weapons varied according to the situation. In Iran, Berlin, and Laos, "their use would not provide a clear military advantage." In Korea, however, their use against advancing North Korean forces would be advantageous, and if used in air defense in the Taiwan Strait they would greatly enhance defensive capability.

An augmentation of sealift would be needed in all cases except Berlin. To prevent a "dangerous degradation" of war reserves, the war production base would have to be expanded in the event of hostilities in Laos, Korea, or the Taiwan Strait.⁷²

Irwin, in a lengthy and somewhat rambling memorandum, submitted his thoughts to Gates on the issues raised. Particularly important among these were the use of nuclear weapons, which balanced military and political considerations, and the problem of keeping limited war from expanding, in which, again, flexibility (to give the aggressor a chance to withdraw) had to be weighed against firmness. On these issues, Irwin noted, State and Defense did not entirely see eye to eye. The questions of air- and sealift, logistic-support facilities in Laos and Iran, and the adequacy of the war production base, all touched on in the study, required further analysis in his view.⁷³

The AFPC discussed the study on 27 September in a meeting attended by Gray, Allen Dulles, and Livingston T. Merchant, under secretary of state for political affairs, representing Herter. Merchant commended it and stressed State's view of the importance of an adequate limited war

capability. Gates warned that it would probably be impossible, under the 1962 budget, to fully finance the mobilization base; unless there occurred a "radical change in policy or financing," the United States would not have an enduring capability for "another Korea."⁷⁴

A sharp criticism came from George W. Rathjens of the PSAC. He thought that the basic conclusion might better have been stated thus: "U.S. and Allied capabilities are adequate provided the Bloc does not take actions for which they are inadequate." "I think this is a sad example," wrote Rathjens, "of people coming up with a conclusion that they think their bosses want to hear, regardless of the facts and any analysis."⁷⁵

When the NSC discussed the study on 6 October, attention focused largely on the issue of using nuclear weapons. The council finally agreed that DoD and JCS, in conjunction with other cognizant agencies, would reevaluate U.S. capabilities for conducting limited war in Korea and the Taiwan Strait on the assumption that both sides used nuclear weapons. Also, DoD and JCS were directed to examine logistic deficiencies suggested in the study, with particular reference to Southeast Asia.⁷⁶

For the first of these studies, the JCS drafted terms of reference and circulated them to State, CIA, and Gray. A deadline of 8 December 1960 set for completion was not met, and in fact it appears that, for whatever reasons, the study was never made.⁷⁷

A report drafted by the JCS in December 1960 met the second requirement—to appraise logistic limitations for war in Korea and Southeast Asia and indicate improvements under way. Sea and air transport capabilities would be adequate in spite of some shortages; new studies of these were scheduled for completion by May 1961. As for materiel readiness, the secretary's logistic guidance for FY 1961/62, issued on 15 March 1960 (and recently made applicable to FY 1962/63 by action of the secretary), would improve capability to support limited war, but only if full funding were provided. Especially in Southeast Asia, logistic limitations would severely affect operations. Countries there could not fully support their own forces. Already military assistance to those countries had been increased; additional forces had been deployed to Okinawa and to the Seventh Fleet; CINCPAC's operation plan for Southeast Asia had been refined and approved; airlift would be modernized with funds provided in the 1961 and 1962 budgets.⁷⁸

On 5 January 1961 Lemnitzer briefed the NSC on these JCS conclusions. The council found no need for a "radical allocation" of additional resources to limited war. "In my opinion," Lemnitzer said, "the greatest benefits can be derived from the Limited War Study by the integration of our findings into the regular procedures for planning, balanced programming, and budget review in connection with our over-all force objectives."⁷⁹ Although the JCS had cited deficiencies in service materiel programs, it remained for the incoming administration to decide what, if anything, to do about these.

One conclusion in the limited war study judged that the United States and its allies lacked adequate capability for counter guerrilla operations. In

the AFPC meeting of 27 September 1960, Merchant commented on the importance of this; Lemnitzer had previously pointed out that the Army was devoting considerable attention to the subject. He and Douglas agreed that the effort should be stepped up, but it did not draw major attention.⁸⁰

Earlier, a State-JCS meeting on 8 July had resulted in creation of an inter-agency study group on counter guerrilla warfare. Reporting on 29 August, the group concluded that success of such warfare depended on meeting the underlying causes that produced guerrillas. Military counter guerrilla doctrine, comparable to that already developed for guerrilla and psychological warfare, should be developed as a matter of priority. It should take into account the political, economic, social, and other factors giving rise to disaffection in regions afflicted by guerrilla warfare, and hence would require close coordination among Defense, State, CIA, and the United States Information Agency. However, the study apparently led to no follow-up. The problem of dealing with guerrillas never enjoyed the high-level attention in the Eisenhower administration that it was to receive under the succeeding one.⁸¹

The Balance of Payments Problem

In the waning months of the Eisenhower administration a new difficulty arose that affected national security planning: the adverse balance of payments between the United States and the rest of the world. Because this affected the military assistance program and the question of U.S. deployments in foreign countries, OSD had to take it into account in drafting the FY 1962 budget.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, when the war torn countries were seeking to rebuild their shattered economies, the United States enjoyed a surplus in its balance of payments; other countries could not earn enough dollars through normal trade. From 1950 through 1956 the United States had a trade deficit, but this caused little concern; it merely reflected reacquisition of normal reserves by Europe. In 1957, partly as a result of the Suez crisis and its widespread effects, the United States again had a surplus. Beginning in 1958, however, deficits became a matter of serious concern, amounting to \$3.6 billion that year and \$3.8 billion in 1959 and resulting in a rapid loss of gold and the growth of liquid dollar liabilities in the hands of foreigners.

The deficit resulted largely from a sharp decline in U.S. exports, attributable chiefly to the industrial recovery of Europe and Japan and their increasing ability to compete with the United States in world markets. This had been a major objective of U.S. policy in the postwar years. By 1960, however, the problem had become just the opposite—to safeguard the U.S. position.⁸²

Secretary of the Treasury Anderson sounded the alarm in July 1959. He estimated the outflow of U.S. gold at \$4.5 billion annually—somewhat

of an overestimate, as it turned out. Potential demands on U.S. dollar reserves totaled \$16 billion, largely as a result of payments to U.S. military personnel overseas and offshore procurement of military supplies. McElroy warned the AFPC on 28 July that the situation might affect the military assistance program as well as the deployment of forces overseas.⁸³

This warning was borne out a few months later, when Treasury and BoB pressed for an immediate end to aid to Japan and the more prosperous European NATO members. Defense and State persuaded the president that any termination should be gradual.⁸⁴

Early in 1960 the president, evidently without considering the matter urgent, asked Gates about the possibility of reducing U.S. forces overseas. Gates told Douglas's military assistant, Black, about his difficulty in persuading the military departments to agree to reductions. Black pointed out that the problem was essentially a political one and that it would be a great mistake "to let the budgeteers get charging around in this china shop."⁸⁵

As 1960 advanced, the situation worsened, and the "budgeteers" could no longer be held back. At a lengthy meeting on 4 October 1960 the president and his advisers pondered the problem. Preliminary figures for the third quarter of calendar year 1960 showed \$1.6 billion in accumulations of gold and dollars in foreign hands, which would make a total of \$6.4 billion for the year. Current U.S. gold stocks were \$18.7 billion, of which \$11.9 billion was required as a reserve to support outstanding Federal Reserve notes and deposits. Anderson felt that he could not, in the absence of overriding military or political considerations, approve the continuation of policies that had produced this situation. He had discussed the matter with officials of State and Defense, who had agreed that European countries should bear a larger share of the common defense but feared the effects if those countries were pressed too hard.

Dillon recognized the problem. He recommended that at the forthcoming NATO meeting in December the United States agree to maintain current force levels in Europe while making studies looking toward reductions in 1962 and 1963. Anderson, however, wanted immediate action. He understood that domestic procurement of supplies and relocation of troops to the United States might involve higher budget costs, but they would reduce the accumulation of dollars in Western Europe, which was the immediate problem. The meeting closed with an agreement to do this and to inform the NATO allies that they were expected to assume a larger share of defense costs.⁸⁶

U.S. forces deployed outside U.S. territories, according to figures compiled by OSD, cost almost \$12 billion in FY 1961, including \$3.5 billion for deployments to NATO. Expenditures for military functions abroad, plus those for military assistance and atomic energy, totaled \$3 billion in FY 1960, accounting for nearly all of the overall imbalance of payments for that year. Redeployment from Europe of a division and its supporting forces would reduce operating costs by at least \$50 million during the first full year and dollar outlays in Europe by \$65 to 75 million. The corresponding

figures for redeployment of a tactical air squadron amounted to \$8-13 million and \$3 million.⁸⁷

A meeting at the White House on 9 November dealt largely with the balance of payments in relation to the 1962 budget. The discussion swung to the question of reducing the number of overseas dependents. Gates asked and received assurance from the president that the military forces would not be singled out and turned into "second class citizens." After the meeting, Eisenhower asked Goodpaster to make certain that in any such action, the same principles were applied to both military and nonmilitary personnel.⁸⁸

At another meeting on 15 November, the conferees approved a directive drafted by Goodpaster that would, among other steps, mandate a reduction in the estimated 500,000 military dependents abroad. To Gates's concern over the effect of a proposed cut of 60 per cent in dependents on retention and enlistment rates, the president replied that it was time to convince military personnel that their goal was service and not personal gain. Good leadership, he thought, could prevent a morale problem.⁸⁹

The president released the directive on 16 November. It ordered the secretary of defense to reduce, and thereafter limit, the number of military and civilian dependents abroad to not more than 200,000 at any one time, reducing at the rate of 15,000 per month beginning 1 January 1961. The secretary should also cut by a "very substantial amount" expenditures planned for procurement abroad during calendar year 1961. The directive said nothing specifically about diplomatic personnel, but the heads of all departments and agencies were to reduce personnel and dependents overseas.⁹⁰

Secretary Gates at once informed the unified and specified commanders that he was "fully aware" of the difficulties that could result from the directive. However, he and the president were "confident that through the personal leadership of our military commanders any adverse impact will be minimized."⁹¹ Gates followed this with another message to all commands asking that, as far as possible, they carry out the directive by returning dependents when their sponsors completed normal tours. It was to be "impartially implemented throughout all ranks and grades." It did not apply to Alaska, Hawaii, the Canal Zone, or U.S. island possessions and protectorates.⁹²

On 25 November Gates directed that the reduction begin on 1 January 1961 and be completed by 31 July 1962. As far as possible, the reductions should come in "highly industrialized countries with strong currencies."⁹³

Douglas allocated the 200,000 quota of dependents as follows: Army, 108,270; Navy, 17,560; Air Force, 74,170. The services were to propose monthly reduction quotas to be approved by the secretary of defense. Dependents who were also full-time civilian employees, and those who were foreign nationals residing in the country of their citizenship, would not be counted against the limit.⁹⁴

OSD approved a schedule of reductions through 1961, beginning in January with 2,711 dependents. The number would increase each month

until it peaked in June; this accorded with the normal rotation policy of making reassignments during the summer as far as possible. It appeared that no dependents would have to be returned involuntarily.⁹⁵

Gates told the president on 18 January 1961 that actions carried out thus far "have been taken in good spirit and can be sustained if necessary for an appreciable period." But, as he had feared, the impact of the separation of families was "substantial," and relief should be offered as soon as possible. This effect had been heightened by the perception that other agencies were not planning significant reductions in dependents abroad. He asked and received permission to acquaint his successor with these circumstances.⁹⁶

The FY 1962 Budget

The adverse balance of payments could be counted on to reinforce the president's unceasing efforts to minimize military spending, and thus to aggravate Gates's difficulties with the budget for FY 1962. This was a "lame duck" budget, submitted to Congress by an administration about to leave office.

The process began on 15 March 1960, when, as already noted, Gates issued guidance for FY 1961/62 logistic programs. He specified that requirements submissions for the 1962 budget would follow this guidance. A month later Assistant Secretary (MP&R) Charles C. Finucane directed the services to use as personnel ceilings the goals approved by the administration for end FY 1961, totaling 2,489,000.⁹⁷

From his advisers, Gates received suggestions for two different approaches to the budget. Colonel Black recommended that Gates seize the initiative. He told Douglas on 7 April 1960 that BoB was already preparing recommendations for FY 1962 and that unless Douglas and Gates exerted "personal leadership" within the next few weeks, the opportunity would be lost; the 1962 budget would be developed in the same way as that for 1961, when fiscal considerations had been given primacy. He proposed 2 ceilings for planning purposes, a high of \$45 billion and a low of \$41 billion.⁹⁸

This approach did not sit well with ISA officials, who wanted to insure that foreign policy requirements received full consideration. On 20 April Deputy Comptroller John Sprague reported to Comptroller Lincoln the results of a meeting with Gates, Douglas, and others to discuss budget guidelines. Sprague had the impression that the meeting was "Black-Douglas sponsored with the idea of putting out guidelines now." He had sought to prevent such action until a political assessment could be made, perhaps at a Cabinet meeting scheduled for 3 June, and until the secretary could consider such matters as NATO commitments and force levels. Sprague persuaded Gates to postpone the establishment of guidelines. Gates and Douglas agreed to evaluate the results of another "spring fever" exercise like the previous year's, which projected costs of current programs. Gates would then be in position to explore policy areas with the president.⁹⁹

Following this meeting, Irwin discussed budget planning with the chiefs of the services. They agreed that foreign policy and politico-military considerations should be incorporated at an early stage to avoid the mistake made in 1959 when these matters had not been taken into account until after the budget had begun to take shape.¹⁰⁰

On 5 May ISA listed for Gates the politico-military factors bearing on the development of the 1962 budget. These included the need for military capabilities to support national strategy and foreign policy; the requirement for nuclear retaliatory forces and those for limited war; and the dependence of U.S. security on a forward military strategy and support of allies, especially the "vital" NATO alliance. ISA evidently felt it useful to spell out explicitly these broad requirements. Their effect would be to counterbalance powerful fiscal considerations.¹⁰¹

The results of the "spring fever" exercise became available about that time. A budget exercise pure and simple, it did not attempt to consider the consequences of the assumptions made. Projection of currently approved programs, at about the same level of effort as in 1960 and 1961 (including the 1961 personnel total of 2,489,000), would require expenditures of \$41.9 billion in FY 1962 and \$42.3 billion in 1963. The analysts then ran the exercise on the assumption that 1962 expenditures were held to \$41.5 billion. This would require personnel reductions of approximately two percent by the end of 1962 and sharp cuts in procurement. Interpreting the results for Gates, Lincoln pointed out that a \$41 billion expenditure limit (the FY 1961 level) would force a choice between (1) reductions in military strength and overseas forces, (2) a new look at the balance between development of future weapons and procurement for forces in being, or (3) a complete reevaluation of roles and missions. He thought that the last alternative, involving a reconsideration of the balance between offensive and defensive forces, might result in a substantial reduction in costs.¹⁰²

In anticipation of the Cabinet meeting of 3 June, Stans told Lincoln that he expected the president to set a limit of \$80 billion in total federal expenditures for 1962—approximately the 1961 level. When Lincoln suggested that this would limit Defense to \$41 billion, Stans replied that DoD should not be bound by that or any other figure; the president was flexible on Defense. In Lincoln's view, \$41 billion was far too low. Costs were rising for personnel, operations, and research and development; reduction of overseas deployments, in the current international climate, would be difficult; and new weapons were coming along—Polaris, Nike-Zeus, Minute-man, and the B-70.¹⁰³

When the Cabinet met on 3 June, Eisenhower's hortatory remarks on the subject of economy were, if anything, more emphatic than usual. Reflecting his philosophy of government, he ridiculed the idea of cradle-to-grave security and praised Americans' old-time independence and willingness to take risks. The 1962 budget would provide an opportunity for each department and agency to "clean house" and eliminate needless programs. Unnecessary research should be pruned away.

Gates, speaking for the largest departmental share of the budget, admitted that costs could be tightened in places but pointed out that it would cost \$400 million more in funds for operation and maintenance merely to keep military forces at their present level. Any force reductions would have serious implications for NATO. As for research, he saw a need for more rather than less in order to diminish dependence on manpower. In the end, the president laid down no hard-and-fast ceiling but directed use of the 1961 budget as a general guide for 1962.¹⁰⁴

At the annual Quantico meeting on 18 June, Gates and the service secretaries agreed that the Defense budget should offer four tentative levels, all based on "new obligational availability" for FY 1961. They defined this as new obligational authority plus transfers from revolving funds and unprogrammed carryovers from the preceding fiscal year. This amount would be defined as the "B" budget level. The "A" and "C" levels would be the same amount minus or plus five percent, respectively. The "D" budget, for which no dollar amount was set, would be that needed to accommodate high-priority programs that could not be financed under the other three. The amounts thus fixed were as follows (in billions):

	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>
	<u>Budget</u>	<u>Budget</u>	<u>Budget</u>
Army	\$ 9.482	\$ 9.981	\$10.480
Navy	11.743	12.361	12.979
Air Force	17.783	18.719	19.655
OSD	1.217	1.281	1.345
Total	\$40.225	\$42.342	\$44.459

Gates set a deadline of 10 September for submission of initial requests, with supporting data by 20 September.¹⁰⁵

The AFPC agreed on 28 June 1960 that the military departments should submit tentative force levels supportable under the four budget levels. These would be reviewed by the JCS, who in turn would make their recommendations. The secretary of state would then be invited to sit with the AFPC to discuss the political and diplomatic aspects of the budget. Results of this joint Defense-State discussion would go to the president for final decision.

Gates stressed that the "A" budgets should include only programs that the departments considered indispensable. The basic 1961 budgets had contained many "soft" programs, with some essential ones left for the addendum. In the review of the 1962 submissions, the dollar value of any such programs that were deleted would not necessarily be returned to the submitting departments; all three departments would be in competition for the money involved.¹⁰⁶

Three days later, Herter sent Gates an outline of State Department thinking on the 1962 budget. The major military requirements to support foreign policy consisted of an invulnerable nuclear retaliatory force and a substantial

and flexible capability to meet the threat of limited aggression, the latter likely to assume increasing importance in the future. Also needed was an improved capability to deal with guerrilla warfare and infiltration. Major regional requirements were a cohesive NATO alliance (which in turn called for continued U.S. willingness to station substantial forces in Europe) and, along the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc, a forward military posture responsive to a wide range of possible threats. Gates acknowledged receipt of these views and indicated that he would ask Herter to participate in an AFPC discussion.¹⁰⁷

The administration's decision in July 1960 to finance a modest strengthening of U.S. defenses with extra money appropriated by Congress for FY 1961 actually had little effect on the FY 1962 budget. The Navy was allowed a small personnel increase which, in the end, was carried over for 1962.

During August the services submitted their estimates of forces and deployment supportable under the four budget levels. At each level, the services would maintain through 1962 their 1961 forces, making adjustments in manpower, procurement, and research. The Army and the Air Force submitted lengthy explanations of the inadequacy of the three lower-level budgets.¹⁰⁸

After reviewing the service submissions, the JCS told Gates on 16 August that they would include their own force-level recommendations in JSOP-66. They noted the similarity in the forces proposed for each service under all four budgets—a fact dictated by U.S. commitments and by increasing Communist capabilities. Moreover, none of the proposals would make it possible fully to meet NATO commitments in FY 1962. Action on the budget, they warned, “will be watched over the world as a measure of U.S. purpose and determination. Failure to provide adequate funds would blunt the effectiveness of our foreign policy and degrade our position of leadership in the Free World.” They concluded that resources for FY 1962 must be of an order “significantly above that of the ‘C’ budget,” to provide the improved capabilities needed to maintain an effective long-term military posture.¹⁰⁹

In preparation for discussions with State, ISA also reviewed the service submissions from the standpoint of their effect on foreign policy. Like the JCS, ISA concluded that budgets above the C level would be needed to meet the requirements outlined by Herter in his letter.¹¹⁰

A joint meeting of AFPC with Herter and others from State, attended also by Treasury Secretary Anderson, took place on 2 September 1960. Service briefings on force capabilities under each level stressed the inadequacies of the lower levels. Twining then summed up for the JCS, tailoring his appraisal to the points raised in Herter's letter. For general war, said Twining, U.S. capability had increased in absolute terms, but it had perhaps declined relatively during the past year owing to advances by the Soviets. Adequate capability existed to counter a single limited aggression, but it would be difficult to cope with operations in more than one area and still

maintain an acceptable general war posture. These conclusions derived from the recently concluded limited war study. The JCS saw eye to eye on the need to meet regional requirements like NATO and to have both mobile and forward-deployed forces near the periphery of the Communist bloc. The increasing boldness of the Communists in international affairs the JCS viewed as a reflection of their assessment of U.S. national will and of relative capabilities. Twining warned that a straight-line budget would require the United States to choose between thinning out forces in order to continue modernization or maintaining present force levels with obsolete equipment.¹¹¹

In the ensuing discussion, Herter restated the requirements advanced in his letter to Gates. Since the principal one was an invulnerable retaliatory force, he said, the first essential was to secure Polaris along with hardened and mobile ICBMs. Recent developments in Africa and Latin America had accentuated the need for a mobile limited war force. Turning to the difficulty of maintaining forces for NATO, Herter saw only one solution—a complete reassessment of NATO's strategic plan (MC 70). However, given the current political situation, he was “nervous about rocking the boat unilaterally.” Twining pointed out that MC 70 was already undergoing review, with the results to be ready by the following spring. Lemnitzer warned that, in light of increasing Soviet strength, this review might result in a requirement for greater rather than lesser force levels.

Secretary Anderson then held forth in words that showed him unmoved by what he had heard. He saw no prospect of any significant increase in defense spending and no justification for such. A tax increase was politically impossible. Increasing military costs could not be attributed to inflation; there had been less inflation in the preceding 18 months than at any time since the depression of the 1930s. The present world situation might last for another 50 years or so; the economic system must provide for the long pull. The balance of payments situation, with its threat to currency stability, must also be considered. Anderson, as it turned out, had the last word; no one responded to his pessimistic harangue.¹¹²

This AFPC meeting of 2 September was perhaps the only occasion during the Eisenhower administration when the highest military, diplomatic, and fiscal officials sat together during the process of formulation of the Defense budget. The meeting invites comparison with the similar British practice institutionalized in the Committee of Imperial Defence.¹¹³ In the NSC meetings, State, Defense, and Treasury sat in collective judgment on each year's military budget (or rather its underlying “program”), but it was largely a pro forma process.

It does not appear that Gates obtained much assistance from bringing State into the budget process at an early stage. Herter's remarks hardly suggested that he would speak up strongly for a less constricting budget. Anderson was inflexible, and experience had clearly demonstrated that, for the most part, he and Stans spoke with the president's voice. Once again the FY 1962 budget preparation would be an exercise in allocating scarcity.

In JSOP-66, submitted on 20 September, the JCS, as promised, included their force recommendations for FY 1962, as follows:¹¹⁴

<u>Recommended for</u>	<u>Recommended by</u>		
	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
<i>Army</i>			
Divisions	14	14	14
Air defense battalions	78 1/4	78 1/4	68 1/4
<i>Navy</i>			
Attack carriers	14	14	13
Total combat vessels	517	517	516
<i>Air Force</i>			
B-52 wings	14	14	14
B-47 wings	16	16	21
B-58 wings	2	2	2
Total strategic wings	32	32	37
<i>Personnel</i>			
Army	891,000	891,000	870,000
Navy	630,000	636,000	619,000
Marine Corps	180,000	190,000	175,000
Air Force	825,000	798,000	848,000
Total	2,526,000	2,515,000	2,512,000

The tendency of the Army and the Navy to agree, with the Air Force the odd man out, was again clearly visible.

Service budget estimates submitted early in October varied widely. The range between the highest and lowest levels was as follows (in billions):

	<u>A</u>	<u>D</u>
	<u>Budget</u>	<u>Budget</u>
Army	\$ 9.573	\$12.685
Navy	11.805	14.749
Air Force	17.881	21.593
OSD	1.217	1.420
Total	\$40.476	\$50.447

Expenditure estimates ranged from \$42.966 billion for "A" to \$46.596 billion for "D". Obviously, there was no chance that either Gates or the president would approve anything like the higher figures.¹¹⁵

At a "mini-AFPC" meeting held on 28 October under the auspices of Brig. Gen. James H. Polk, director of the Office of Planning in OASD (ISA), with representatives of State and BoB present, service representatives summarized their submissions, while officers from the Joint Staff

discussed these in relation to national policy. The service briefers referred to the "C" level as an "equal resources" budget, since the five percent increase over "B" (the "equal funds" budget) would merely suffice to hold military strength level. Stans took issue with this view, arguing that the inflation rate in 1962 would drop below five percent and would not occur across the board. Questions by Stans reflected his doubt that the means for economizing had been thoroughly explored.¹¹⁶

The comptroller's staff, choosing among the service submissions and applying reductions of their own, proposed a tentative budget of \$41.4 billion in new obligational authority. This would allow some improvements: another wing of B-58 bombers, as called for in the Air Force "D" budget, and more money for Nike-Zeus development than in the Army's "C" budget (though none for production). Such features necessitated cuts in other programs even below the "A" level.¹¹⁷

The President's Science Advisory Committee also reviewed the service submissions. The members feared that too many strategic systems were being developed; for this reason they opposed expansion of Titan and Minuteman programs. They likewise opposed any expansion of B-52 procurement, as the Air Force had sought, but favored an immediate airborne alert. They doubted the value of the B-70 and felt that the program should be limited to an experimental one. Similarly, they favored a "vigorous" development program for Nike-Zeus but no funds for production or deployment. The committee noted "gratifying" improvements in limited war capabilities during the past year; nevertheless the FY 1962 budget still appeared inadequate in this area. Noting that the Air Force had no effective close air support aircraft in production or development, the members urged using money from fighter procurement for that purpose.¹¹⁸

Gates found the comptroller's budget too restrictive. He discussed the budget with Stans on the basis of \$42.2 billion in NOA and \$43.3 billion in expenditures for the services and for OSD. After discussion, they lowered these figures to \$41.7 billion and \$42.9 billion, respectively.¹¹⁹

Gates and Stans then discussed their tentative estimates with the president. Gates explained that merely maintaining and operating existing military forces would cost \$23 billion in 1962—a half billion more than in 1961. As a result, procurement and modernization had been cut back to a degree that he considered undesirable. At the same time, the services argued that they were short of personnel and could make a strong case area by area around the world. A substantial carryover into 1962 of work in process resulted in very little being bought that was really new or that went beyond present programs.

The president asked a few questions about particular programs to satisfy himself that too much money was not being spent on them. Stans characterized the budget as the result of the "toughest, tightest review" in DoD of which he had any knowledge. Gates thought that if a "sensible" budget were presented, Representative Mahon and others

might be able to get it through Congress. He would like, Gates said, to see NOA increased somewhat, with more for Titan and Polaris. The president, however, replied that the result would set a "new plateau" for ensuing years. The economy must be kept sound for another 10 years. The United States could win the present struggle only by maintaining its deterrent; there might be some use in having some mobile forces, but he foresaw no "little wars."¹²⁰

Gates and Lincoln outlined the major features of the military program to the NSC on 8 December. Gates told the members that, to an even greater extent than the previous year, the service secretaries and the JCS had participated in the review of the entire budget, which consequently reflected the best thinking of all principal DoD officials.

Basic force objectives for FY 1962 comprised 14 Army divisions, 817 Navy vessels (including 14 attack carriers), and 84 combat wings (34 strategic). Personnel strength would be held close to the 1961 level; the Navy would retain its recent increase, but this would be offset by a slight reduction for the Air Force. The actual distribution of strength would be:

Army	870,000
Navy	625,000
Marine Corps	175,000
Air Force	822,900
Total	2,492,900

The budget would substantially complete the funding of all 13 Atlas and 14 Titan squadrons. It would set a goal of 12 Minuteman squadrons by June 1964, complete the Hound Dog program, continue Skybolt under development (using 1961 funds), and provide a capability for a 24-hour airborne alert by one-eighth of the heavy bomber force, but not for an actual alert other than training flights. For the first time in over a quarter of a century, there was no money for procurement of manned bombers. Procurement of cargo aircraft would increase to 68, as compared with 49 in 1961, and a new transport (CX-1) would continue under development. No major redeployments of any forces from Europe would be necessary; however, there would be some reduction in air tactical and reconnaissance units.

A noteworthy feature of the budget was an increase in money for conventional warfare capabilities. Thus the Army, which had been nearly starved of procurement money for several years, now received \$1.8 billion for the purpose, as compared with \$1.6 billion in 1961 and \$1.4 billion in 1960—a 29 percent increase in 2 years. The Army could thus fund the first significant production quantities of Pershing missiles and M-60 tanks, plus other tactical missiles as well as vehicles, artillery, and small arms.

The Navy's shipbuilding program consisted of 30 ships—10 more than in 1961. This included 5 Polaris submarines, as part of a "five by five" program

of construction and advance procurement, thus increasing to 24 the number of Polaris vessels authorized for construction (including those already in service). These would enhance the strategic deterrent, but the program also included other nuclear-powered submarines along with guided missile frigates and escort vessels. Air Force capabilities for limited war would gain strength from increased procurement of fighter-bombers for ground support and of troop carrier aircraft, plus money for continued development of the CX-1.¹²¹

In the ensuing discussion, the service secretaries expressed some unhappiness that their services had not received more procurement money, but none challenged the budget. Stans characterized it as good because it seemed to spread dissatisfaction widely. The BoB had participated closely in its formulation and he considered it realistic; hence he could not conscientiously press for significantly lower amounts.

Gray proposed that the record of action show that, subject to the normal budgetary process and final action by the president, the military program presented by Gates generally accorded with policy objectives. Herter demurred; not having examined the budget in detail, he hesitated to go on record as endorsing it and suggested merely a statement that the budget had been discussed. Gates assured Herter that he would never put forward a budget that did not conform to national security policy. The final record of action appeared as Gray had proposed.¹²²

At the same meeting, the NSC discussed the DoD status report on the military program as of 30 June 1960. The overall appraisal essentially agreed with what Twining had told the AFPC on 2 September: U.S. general war capabilities had increased absolutely, but perhaps not relatively; capacity to counter one local aggression was adequate, but not two at once without impairing readiness for general war. This led to a discussion of the issue of general versus limited war. The president doubted that any war could be kept limited. He was more convinced than ever that the major effort in U.S. defense planning should be to maintain the deterrent. Herter agreed that large-scale limited war seemed unlikely, but he added that U.S. conventional capabilities for limited war held great interest for allies and many neutrals. The record of action took note of both the president's and Herter's statements.¹²³

In final action on the budget, Stans accepted slightly higher figures—\$41.84 billion in new obligational authority with an expenditure estimate of \$42.91 billion. As compared with the budget presented to the NSC, this permitted slight increases in operation and maintenance for all services and in Army and Navy procurement. An additional \$150 million would become available by transfer from prior year balances. Another \$31 million in retired military pay was proposed for later transmission. The breakdown of the NOA figure was as follows:¹²⁴

By Function

Current and permanent authorization:

Military personnel	\$12,235,000,000
Operation and maintenance	10,841,945,000
Procurement	13,378,000,000
Research, development, test, and evaluation	4,349,400,000
Military construction	985,000,000
Revolving and management funds	20,000,000
Total	<u>\$41,809,345,000</u>

Proposed for later transmission:

Military personnel (Retired pay, Department of Defense)	31,000,000
Total	<u>\$41,840,345,000</u>

By Service

Army	\$10,405,500,000
Navy	12,237,000,000
Air Force	17,856,400,000
OSD	1,341,445,000
Total	<u>\$41,840,345,000</u>

As compared with the goals set by Gates in June, the final budget came to somewhat less than the "B" budget figure but appreciably more than the minimum "A" level. In the adjustments made in those goals, the Army had been the chief beneficiary, receiving almost as much as called for in its "C" budget. For all the services, a supplemental budget for 1961 amounting to \$288,549,000 in NOA provided some relief from the stringency imposed by the 1962 budget. Intended principally to meet the cost of a recent civilian pay increase, it also went to pay for the special readiness measures undertaken in the summer of 1960, including the Navy's personnel increase of 6,000.¹²⁵

The 1962 NOA request of \$41.840 billion exceeded that for 1961 (\$40.577 billion) by slightly more than 3 percent. Likewise the 1962 expenditure estimate of \$42.910 billion was almost 5 percent higher than the \$40.995 billion for 1961. These increases exceeded the inflation rate by a considerable margin and thus represented a gain in real terms. The administration had bowed to the strongly felt need to spend more money for defense.¹²⁶

The president sent the 1962 budget (together with the 1961 supplemental) to Congress on 16 January 1961. For the overall Federal budget, he forecast expenditures of \$80.9 billion and receipts of \$82.3 billion, leaving a surplus of almost \$1.5 billion. The president described some of the improvements that would take place in 1962. Near-completion of the Atlas force, installation of a "significant number" of Titan missiles, and deployment of the first Minuteman missiles, together with termination of

production of B-52 and B-58 aircraft, would mark a major shift in emphasis in the nuclear deterrent force. Further steps in that direction would include the entry into service of the first nuclear-powered surface combat vessels, the carrier *Enterprise* and the cruiser *Long Beach*. The dispersal program for the manned bomber force and the construction of facilities for a 15-minute ground alert for one-third of the force were already substantially completed.

The president again proposed a 10 percent reduction in strength in the National Guard and Army Reserve. As a sequel to the 1958 reorganization, he called on Congress to give "earnest consideration" to a plan that would make appropriations directly to the secretary of defense, with due regard for the congressional constitutional prerogative of raising and supporting military forces.¹²⁷

To defend the budget before Congress would be the task of Gates's successor. However, Representative Mahon, chairman of the House subcommittee on defense appropriations, asked Gates to submit a statement similar to the one he had submitted the preceding year. "You understand the philosophy behind the budget," wrote Mahon, "and are aware of the problems and limitations." Gates obliged, stressing the long-term nature of the threat to national security and the major objectives and features of the budget.¹²⁸

With the submission of this statement, Gates terminated his responsibility for the 1962 budget. Its fate now lay with Congress and a new administration, which, on the basis of declarations already made by leading members, could be expected to adopt a very different approach to national security planning and budgeting. The prospect was for changes at least as extensive as those imposed on President Truman's final budget by President Eisenhower when he took office in 1953.

The Belgian Congo

The problems of military planning and budgeting for FY 1962 were further complicated by foreign involvements that potentially or actually required the employment of U.S. military forces. During its last year the Eisenhower administration had to cope with two important potential foreign entanglements in addition to those previously discussed. The former Belgian Congo and Cuba engaged the close attention of the national security apparatus, the latter continually during the course of 1960.

Although sub-Saharan Africa seemed an unlikely region for U.S. involvement, the turmoil there briefly raised the specter of U.S. military engagement. Most of the region, with the exceptions of Ethiopia and Liberia, had long been under colonial rule by Western European countries. After World War II these colonies began to emerge as independent nations, though often with ties to the former colonial power. The United States had no direct interest in the region, but recognized its importance because of the strategic materials produced there and its location athwart East-West

air and sea routes. The U.S. objectives were to assist Africa to develop toward self-government and to steer it away from Soviet influence.¹²⁹

The troubles that arose in Africa in 1960 centered in the former colony of the Belgian Congo. It became independent on 30 June 1960, whereupon Belgian forces withdrew. The immediate unrest that occurred quickly developed into virtual civil war among various factions, some "neutralist" and sharply hostile to the West, others moderate in their views.¹³⁰

In July 1960 the new central government in the Congo appealed to the United States for troops to maintain law and order. State and Defense officials preferred that any military intervention come through the United Nations, with forces supplied insofar as possible by other African nations. On 12 July the JCS furnished a list of Army and Marine Corps units that could be sent to the Congo from Europe or the United States within 50 hours. While preferring UN action, the JCS believed that the United States should consider unilateral action, if necessary, to preclude Communist exploitation of the situation. The issue of U.S. intervention was quickly settled; on the same day the president's press secretary, James Hagerty, told a news conference that the president and the secretary of state believed that no troops should be sent from any major Western nation.¹³¹

The new Congolese prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, did in fact appeal to the United Nations. The Security Council on 14 July authorized Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld to provide military assistance. A quickly-organized force consisted of troops from African nations as well as from Sweden and Ireland, commanded by a Swedish general. The United States furnished airlift, drawn from Europe, as well as various supplies.¹³²

Admiral Burke was particularly concerned about ensuring that bases and airfields at the mouth of the Congo River did not fall into Soviet hands. Lumumba's actions had demonstrated unmistakable antagonism toward the West, and there seemed real danger that he might ask the Soviets for "assistance" in operating these facilities. Soviet bloc countries were sending in technicians and establishing large diplomatic missions in the Congo; they also supplied Lumumba with military equipment to use against his internal enemies, in violation of the objectives of the UN.¹³³

On 18 August the JCS told Secretary Gates that it was essential that these facilities remain in friendly hands. They recommended that the UN assume control of the area, also that the United States supply military assistance to provide for continued operation of these facilities and train Congolese personnel in base operations. The State Department concurred with the first of these recommendations, which fully accorded with the U.S. policy of supporting the UN effort in the Congo, but considered the others not practical at that time.¹³⁴

No contingency plans existed for military operations in sub-Saharan Africa, since no unified commander had responsibility for the area. In August the JCS moved to fill this vacuum but quickly disagreed, and so informed Gates on 24 September. The Army and Air Force chiefs of staff proposed the assignment of planning responsibility to a joint task force, commanded

by an Army officer, reporting directly to the JCS. The CNO recommended that operational responsibility for the area be assigned to CINCLANT and that a joint task force be formed, drawn from the Continental Army Command, Atlantic Fleet Command, and Tactical Air Command, to begin operational planning under CINCLANT's coordination. The commandant, Marine Corps, merely recommended that CINCLANT's area of responsibility be enlarged to include Africa. After discussing the subject with the JCS, Gates asked them to consider the establishment for this planning responsibility of a specified command with a relatively small joint staff, headquartered in the continental United States.¹³⁵

The Army and Air Force approved this suggestion and recommended immediate establishment of the command under an Army lieutenant general, with details to be filled in later. Burke remained of the opinion that the responsibility should be assigned to CINCLANT, but since that alternative had been rejected, he considered Gates's proposal acceptable and submitted terms of reference for the new command. Commandant Shoup repeated his earlier recommendation to assign the responsibility to CINCLANT. Lemnitzer recommended that since the situation in the Congo remained critical, an interim command be established at once to begin planning and ultimately become the specified command for the area.¹³⁶

Gates's decision, announced on 21 November, assigned planning responsibility to CINCLANT. A joint task force would be established, whose commander (an Army officer) would be CINCLANT's principal assistant in carrying out these responsibilities. The task force would have a "modest" permanent planning staff and such forces as might be made available by the JCS. Headquarters would be established in the area of Hampton Roads, Virginia.¹³⁷

Gates apparently announced his decision in a meeting with the JCS and confirmed it in writing. He later recalled it as an example of how he worked with the JCS. "In about twenty seconds," he said, "I decided Navy would be responsible for military activity related to Africa. That decision freed up thirty-two position papers that had been written arguing over who should."¹³⁸ This account, however, ignored Gates's earlier discussions with the JCS.

Moreover, this decision did not quite dispose of the matter. Because it was not clear whether CINCLANT was to be responsible for operations as well as planning, the JCS asked for clarification from the secretary, who ruled that CINCLANT should indeed bear both responsibilities. A revision of the Unified Command Plan approved by President Eisenhower on 30 December 1960 incorporated these new arrangements. In the end, no U.S. military action was necessary in the Congo; the crisis abated for the time being.¹³⁹

The Rising Threat in Cuba

Much more disturbing than the situation in Africa, the rise of a potential Communist satellite in Cuba, only 90 miles from Florida, presented a serious

threat to the integrity of the inter-American system that the United States had sought to build up in order to exclude hostile powers from obtaining a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. The objective traced back as far as the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. Efforts by the United States to cement relations with Latin American countries had climaxed with the signing of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance at Rio de Janeiro in 1947 and the establishment of the Organization of American States (OAS) at Bogota, Colombia in 1948.¹⁴⁰

The United States regarded Latin America as having a "key role" in its own security. Any marked trend toward neutralism or communism among the Latin nations would seriously impair the prestige of the United States and its ability to lead the free world. Also, the area's rapidly growing population and expanding economies made it important. U.S. policy in Latin America sought to promote friendship among the American republics and to steer them toward prosperity and democracy. U.S. military strategy envisioned each of the countries as assisting in the defense of the hemisphere by defending its own territory and internal security and by participating in collective defense as necessary. For these purposes, the United States furnished military assistance to the Latin American nations.¹⁴¹

Cuba became a problem for the United States, and for the inter-American system generally, with the rise of a dynamic revolutionary leader, Fidel Castro. At the head of a guerrilla movement, Castro overthrew the government of Fulgencio Batista, a Latin American "strong man" who had dominated the country since the 1930s. When his ineffectual army proved unable to cope with the guerrillas, Batista fled the country on 1 January 1959, and Castro and his supporters took over. Castro established a government that included respected democratic politicians. Many in the United States considered it a great improvement over the Batista regime.

Events in Cuba soon took an alarming turn. Statements by Castro and other leaders first professed a neutral position between the Soviet Union and the West, then became increasingly antagonistic toward the United States. This development accompanied an unmistakable trend toward dictatorship in Cuba. At the same time, Cuba turned increasingly to the Soviet bloc for support. In February 1960 Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan of the Soviet Union visited Cuba and signed an agreement to supply aid in return for Cuban sugar. A few months later all U.S.-owned oil companies in Cuba were seized by the government.¹⁴²

By the beginning of 1960 it had become clear that the democratic promise of the Cuban revolution had turned sour and that Castro was implacably hostile toward the United States. On 25 January Eisenhower told his advisers that Castro was beginning to behave like a "madman."¹⁴³

The JCS also considered Castro a menace. On 2 March 1960 they told Gates that the Cuban government "appears to be following the path of International Communism." The establishment of a Communist-controlled government in Cuba would present a "direct threat" to U.S. security. They recommended a political offensive against the Cuban government, including

covert support of opposition in Cuba, establishment of a government in exile, and an effort to induce the Organization of American States to call on Cuba to place itself under OAS auspices to preserve the Cuban revolution for the people. If this last step failed, the United States should seek OAS action to intervene by force, or, as a last resort, prepare for unilateral military action to establish a non-Communist government in Cuba.¹⁴⁴

CIA Director Dulles warned the NSC on 10 March that Castro might demand that the United States evacuate its naval base at Guantanamo. The president directed preparation of contingency plans for action in Cuba, especially to protect U.S. citizens and the Guantanamo base, and that developments in Cuba be followed at each future NSC meeting. The discussion covered much of the ground in the JCS memorandum of 2 March, which, as a result, was not forwarded to the NSC.¹⁴⁵

A week later, Admiral Burke told the NSC that the JCS had plans for landing Marines in the Guantanamo area as well as two airborne Army battle groups elsewhere in Cuba. Moreover, the Navy stood ready immediately to blockade the island.¹⁴⁶

Already the CIA had undertaken discreet planning for possible elimination of Castro. The agency created a task force headed by Richard Bissell, which drafted a four-part plan of action: creation of a unified anti-Castro opposition movement outside Cuba; development of a propaganda offensive in Cuba; creation of a covert intelligence and action organization in Cuba that would be responsive to the exile opposition; and development of a paramilitary force outside Cuba for future guerrilla action.

Bissell's task force reported to an organization known as the "5412 Committee" (also referred to as the "Special Group"), which took its name from the NSC directive that established it (NSC 5412/2). Chaired by the president's special assistant for national security, its formal membership included the secretary of defense, the director of central intelligence, and the secretary of state. This body approved the plan on 21 March 1960, four days after the president approved it in principle.¹⁴⁷

The CIA plan was considered so highly sensitive that it was never presented to or discussed by the NSC. The council continued to receive reports on the Cuban situation from Dulles or his deputy as part of his regular presentation of significant world developments affecting U.S. security.¹⁴⁸

Within OSD, contact with the CIA planning group came through Erskine's office, with the deputy, Lansdale, playing a prominent role. At various times, Gates, Douglas, Burke, and Irwin attended meetings of the 5412 Group at which the plan was considered.¹⁴⁹

On 18 August Eisenhower approved a budget of approximately \$13 million for the operation and the use of personnel and equipment supplied by DoD. He specified, however, that he wanted no U.S. military personnel used in a combat role.¹⁵⁰

Relations between the United States and Cuba meanwhile continued to deteriorate. After the president, with congressional authorization, reduced

the quota of Cuban sugar that could be sold to the United States at a preferential price, Castro struck back by expropriating all U.S.-owned companies in Cuba. In September the volatile Cuban premier came to New York and harangued the UN General Assembly at length, assailing the United States for "aggression" against his nation.¹⁵¹

The JCS interpreted this speech as evidence of Castro's possible intention to denounce the treaty under which the United States occupied Guantanamo. They urged Gates to obtain State Department concurrence in a declaration that the United States would defend the base, taking action beyond the perimeter if necessary. Gates, in reply, affirmed that Guantanamo was to be held against all forms of attack. As for action beyond the base perimeter, he consulted Herter, who agreed that contingency plans should be prepared but added that a final decision must rest with the president.¹⁵²

Anticipating possible clashes with Cuban forces (particularly aircraft), the JCS examined rules of engagement governing such action. This would be the responsibility of CINCLANT, who was responsible for defense in the Caribbean area. On 16 October the JCS instructed CINCLANT that, pending decision at high government level, U.S. fighter aircraft reacting to any harassment by Cuban aircraft would, if feasible, refrain from entering Cuban airspace, i.e., within three miles of Cuba's shores. If a fighter came under attack, these rules would not apply; the aircraft would disengage as feasible. The president agreed to these rules and to further review.¹⁵³

After more consideration, the JCS proposed that the pilot of a U.S. aircraft or commander of a U.S. ship should be authorized to take appropriate counteraction, to include destruction if required, against any aircraft firing at them. A fighter in the "immediate area" of an attack would continue in immediate pursuit of any Cuban aircraft that had fired on U.S. forces, flying over Cuban territory, if necessary, to destroy it. However, such pursuit was not to be prolonged deep into Cuba, nor was it authorized for a pursuing force that had been "deliberately and systematically organized." These proposals required State's concurrence.¹⁵⁴

On 7 November the NSC discussed the possibility of a Cuban attack on Guantanamo and of Cuban harassment of U.S. citizens in Cuba. Lemnitzer outlined contingency plans for such eventualities. The president ruled that the United States should maintain the integrity of the Guantanamo base against attack, taking action as appropriate to the situation.¹⁵⁵

Immediately after the NSC meeting, the president discussed the question of "hot pursuit" of aircraft in his office with a smaller group including Gates, Douglas, Lemnitzer, and State Department officials. There already existed a general directive (NSC 5604) governing action in the event of an unprovoked Communist attack against U.S. aircraft, which had been revised as late as February 1959. Agreement that the policy therein should apply to Cuba had the effect essentially of approving the rules drafted by the JCS, with some qualifications. Immediate pursuit was authorized only for "sporadic isolated, small-scale incidents." Firing was authorized only for self-defense or in the event of an attack on U.S. forces. The president made

it clear that only "experienced and mature" pilots, who could be counted on to follow instructions, should be relied on in implementing this policy.¹⁵⁶

Meanwhile the plan drafted by the CIA task group under Bissell had undergone an important change. There seemed less and less reason to expect that a small guerrilla operation could succeed. Shipments of arms from Communist countries to Cuba appeared to be increasing; existing resistance groups were small, poorly organized, and quickly rounded up; Castro's militia was growing in effectiveness. CIA planners shifted their objectives to the establishment of an amphibious landing by a sizable force (600-750 men), preceded by air strikes—a kind of miniature Overlord. CIA established a camp in Guatemala to train the force of Cuban refugees who had volunteered for the operation.¹⁵⁷

Douglas and Lansdale, who followed development of the plan for OSD, viewed the change in concept with a jaundiced eye. Lansdale's experience had given him a keen appreciation of the vital importance of an adequate political background for covert action. He pointed out that the success of the plan would depend entirely on a large-scale uprising by the Cuban people in support of the invasion. He doubted that this would occur, given the continued support of Castro by the majority of Cubans and the effectiveness of his control measures. Lansdale thought that there should first be a propaganda offensive to isolate Castro from the Cuban people. Then should come establishment of a unified political leadership, followed by a blockade, preferably under OAS auspices but if necessary by the United States alone, to sever Castro's supply line to the Soviet bloc. The new Cuban leadership would eventually have to move into Cuba, with assistance from the United States. Lansdale did not indicate the nature of this assistance, but the implication was that he had chiefly covert operations in mind.¹⁵⁸

The revised CIA plan, formally presented to the Special Group on 8 December, called for air strikes originating in Nicaragua to precede the landing. The objective would be to seize a limited area in Cuba, maintain a visible presence, draw in dissident elements, and, it was hoped, eventually trigger a general uprising.¹⁵⁹

It was perhaps at this meeting that Lansdale expressed opposition to the plan. When Dulles objected that Lansdale, not being a "principal," had no right to speak, Douglas defended his right to do so. Douglas wished to make it clear to the next administration that the project in no way had the approval of the Eisenhower Defense Department. Lansdale expressed doubt that the landings would find the kind of mass support in Cuba that was being assumed. His warning, however, was ignored.¹⁶⁰

In a memorandum to Bissell three weeks later, Lansdale again stressed the importance of a preparatory political campaign to separate Castro from the people. Also, he believed, a suitable leader should be found—young, dynamic, and able to share the hardships and dangers of the operation. Bissell expressed "sincere appreciation" for these suggestions.¹⁶¹

The attitude of OSD officials became apparent when CIA requested the loan of instructors from the Army's Special Forces to assist in training

the teams of infiltrators specified in the plan. Douglas agreed to recommend their release but made it clear that DoD did not approve the plan. Gates, present at the discussion of the matter with the president, expressed the view that the invasion force was inadequate and that the invaders lacked a leader with national appeal to the Cubans. The president asked for better coordination between State and Defense; he did, however, authorize release of the instructors. Nevertheless, Secretary of the Army Brucker refused to release them merely on the basis of an "authorization," and another appeal to the president was necessary.¹⁶²

Lansdale by now had become thoroughly discouraged by his failure to secure modification of what he considered a potentially disastrous plan. For this reason, as he later recalled, he undertook his trip to Vietnam in January 1961;* apparently thinking the invasion of Cuba was imminent, he wished to distance himself from it.¹⁶³

By the end of 1960 relations between the United States and Cuba had reached a point where the question of severing diplomatic ties had to be faced. The president and his advisers considered this on 3 January 1961. Merchant of State favored a 24-hour postponement of the action to give the embassy in Havana time to prepare for it; Gates and Gray favored announcing the breach at once. The president decided to leave the timing to Herter.

The proposed invasion plan also came in for discussion. Gates again urged that the United States single out one of the Cuban leaders to be recognized as head of an exile government, to which the president replied that he would "recognize in a great hurry the man whenever we do find him." Allen Dulles warned that time was running against the United States, since the strength of Castro's military was growing. The best time for the invasion, in his view, would probably be early in March. Goodpaster, in a remarkable display of foresight, pointed out that CIA had created a relatively large military force not responsible to any government, and that the operation was creating a momentum that would be difficult to stop. The president, however, rejoined that CIA was merely "creating an asset," not committing the United States to an invasion; whether the force would be used would depend on political developments.¹⁶⁴

The JCS were officially notified of the CIA plan on 11 January 1961 when representatives of the Joint Staff and the chairman's office received a full briefing. Subsequently, in a memorandum to Gates's successor, Robert S. McNamara, the JCS criticized the plan as inadequate and recommended that it be replaced by an "over-all U.S. Plan of Action" to be drafted by an interdepartmental group. But this recommendation was ignored.¹⁶⁵

On 12 January the 5412 Group established a State-Defense-CIA working group to coordinate actions aimed at overthrowing Castro. Under chairman Whiting Willauer, a former ambassador to Costa Rica, this body appraised the CIA plan and submitted its conclusions on 18 January 1961. Somewhat

* See Chapter XIX.

timidly, the group concluded that the plan "*might* not succeed" in its objective, but added that it was "not trying to pass judgment on this point." Partly on the basis of an evaluation of possible military courses of action in Cuba supplied by DoD, the group concluded that the incoming administration should immediately make essential policy decisions on such matters as the extent of direct U.S. support and how and when a provisional government would be recognized. Without these decisions, wrote Willauer, there was grave danger that the plan "may have to be abandoned as an *effective* means of overthrowing Castro without more overt support," leaving the United States with a choice between open war with Cuba or formation of a larger force, trained on U.S. soil, that would eventually strike at Cuba with overt U.S. logistical support.¹⁶⁶

The JCS representative on the Willauer group, Brig. Gen. David Gray, undertook to evaluate military methods of overthrowing Castro if political and paramilitary capabilities appeared inadequate. He cleared his conclusions informally with Lemnitzer and reported to the group on 19 January that certainty of success would require overt U.S. military intervention, alone or in conjunction with volunteer forces.¹⁶⁷

The moment was now imminent when the Eisenhower administration would surrender to its successors the responsibility for Cuba and Castro. In a discussion of the Cuban situation on 19 January, Eisenhower told Kennedy that the United States should support the guerrilla operation in Cuba even at the cost of doing so openly; it was unthinkable to allow the Castro regime to continue. Other Latin American governments, though publicly opposed to any attempt to eliminate Castro, had privately urged that the United States "do something." Kennedy's first job, Eisenhower said, should be to find a leader of stature—one not tainted by association with Batista—to head a government in exile, after which specific plans for an invasion should be made. By this he presumably meant that the date and other details should be determined.¹⁶⁸

Thus, when Eisenhower and Gates went out of office, the foundation for the subsequent debacle at the Bay of Pigs had been well laid. As yet, however, there was no irrevocable commitment; it would not have been too late to turn back.

The 1960 Election and the Transition

There could be little doubt, as the time approached for President Eisenhower to leave office, that issues of national security would play an important role in the election—perhaps as much so as in the election of 1940 when World War II was looming on the horizon. Ever since the inception of the "New Look" in defense planning in Eisenhower's first term, the Democratic opposition had sought to make an issue of it, charging that it produced a dangerous distortion by overemphasizing retaliatory capability. After Sputnik and the early Soviet missile successes, with their trau-

matic effect on the American psyche, the Democrats had intensified their criticism, notably in their charge that the administration had allowed a "missile gap" to develop.

The Democratic convention met in July 1960 and adopted a platform calling for an "enduring peace," which depended on a restoration of "our national strength—military, political, economic, and moral." It promised that a new Democratic administration "will recast our military capacity in order to provide forces and weapons of a diversity, balance, and mobility sufficient in quantity and quality to deter both limited and general aggressions."¹⁶⁹

On 13 July, the day after the platform was adopted, the convention nominated Sen. John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts for the presidency. His running mate, chosen on 15 July, was Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas. Both senators had been among the most outspoken critics of the administration. Kennedy, despite his relative youth, had attracted widespread attention through his speeches attacking the administration's foreign and domestic policies. Johnson had chaired the combined Senate investigation that focused on the shortcomings, real or alleged, in the administration's missile and space programs.¹⁷⁰

On the Republican side, Vice President Nixon was the leading candidate, with Nelson Rockefeller, governor of New York, as his principal rival. Rockefeller had emerged as one of the national leaders of his party, with positions not entirely in harmony with those of the president. On 8 June he issued a public statement calling for increases in defense programs that he estimated at \$3 billion. Gates told the Cabinet on 1 July that tentative figures compiled by his staff gave a price tag closer to \$10 billion for the Rockefeller proposals, to which a grumpy Eisenhower rejoined that, in its present mood, Congress would probably prefer the larger figure.¹⁷¹

On the eve of the Republican convention, Rockefeller and Nixon met and approved a joint statement setting forth a number of positions for the party platform. Concerning defense, the statement appeared in line with many of the criticisms that had been made of Eisenhower's defense policies. It called for more and improved bombers, an airborne alert, faster production of missiles and Polaris submarines, accelerated dispersal and hardening of bases, modernized equipment for ground forces, and an enlarged civil defense program. The United States, it asserted, "can afford and must provide" the increased expenditures necessary.¹⁷²

Eisenhower's reaction to this statement can be readily imagined. He was able to persuade Nixon to keep it out of the party platform, replacing it with a pledge merely to maintain a defense second to none, along with praise for the administration's defense policies. After adopting the platform, the Republican convention nominated Nixon by an overwhelming margin and chose Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. representative to the United Nations and former senator from Massachusetts, to run with him.¹⁷³

During the campaign, Kennedy, elaborating on positions he had already expressed, sharply criticized the Eisenhower administration for allowing U.S. military strength to lag. Nixon replied that the United States was

already the world's strongest military power and promised to maintain that position. He admitted, however, that defense spending would probably have to increase.¹⁷⁴

Gates did not participate actively in the campaign. He preferred, as he told the Jackson subcommittee, "to be disassociated from any political activity while holding office in the Department of Defense." Well before the campaign began, he had discussed the subject with the president, who saw no objection to Gates making speeches defending the administration's record, particularly since he was not running for office. After all, the president pointed out, the other party had raised the issue.¹⁷⁵

Gates accordingly spoke out on several occasions in defense of the administration's policies and, by implication, his own stewardship of the Defense Department. In a speech on 6 July, he confessed that he was "a little allergic to the statement that the United States is second-best in defense posture." On 22 August he told the Veterans of Foreign Wars that "in the judgment of the President, in the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in my judgment, the Armed Forces of the United States are equal to the historic task which confronts them." At a conference in the Pentagon on 5 October, he again denied that the United States was second best "as advertised in some quarters," and disputed a statement by the Democratic Party's national chairman that the United States had lost its military lead.¹⁷⁶

Gates's strongest defense of administration military policy came on 25 October at the annual convention of postmasters in Miami, Florida. "We have, I believe," he said, "every right to deeply resent the many implications now current" about the dissipation of U.S. military strength. "I would resign my position as Secretary of Defense this moment," he continued, "if I had any reason to believe that our national policies were building a second rate defense." He ran through a long list of improvements introduced since 1953, including nuclear-powered submarines, missiles, and orbiting satellites, also conventional forces that had demonstrated their capability in the Lebanon and Quemoy contingencies.¹⁷⁷

Gates's assistant, Oliver Gale, also aided the administration (and the Republican candidate) in trying to ward off attacks. Carter Burgess, a former assistant secretary of defense now engaged in private business, had written to Gates expressing confusion about the state of the nation's defenses and the "missile gap." Gates turned the letter over to the so-called "truth squad" headed by Gale, which had been formed to provide information about the 1961 budget. Gale replied to Burgess that the U.S. lead in bombers far more than compensated for the admitted Soviet lead in missiles. The Defense Department released the text on 8 April, and the letter circulated widely. "Pentagon sources" conceded that, although not an official document, it was an authoritative evaluation of the situation. As a result of this incident, the White House asked Gale to leave the Defense Department to take charge of an information unit formed by the Republican National Committee.¹⁷⁸

On the Democratic side, Sen. Henry Jackson's subcommittee on national policy machinery took no further testimony in 1960 after recessing on

1 July. Jackson had been a critic of the administration and was considered at least a dark horse presidential candidate. Still, the proceedings of his subcommittee were not as partisan as the administration had feared. Jackson himself published a mildly critical magazine article in the spring of 1960 in which he concluded that "the smoke of criticism is so heavy that one suspects fires." He suggested that the NSC and the budget process needed better coordination, as did military and foreign policy.¹⁷⁹

The election, held on 8 November, resulted in a victory for Kennedy by a substantial electoral vote margin, though the popular vote was extremely close. "It was certainly no mandate from the people," remarked Gates in a cabinet meeting the day after the election.¹⁸⁰ Still, Kennedy had won, and OSD now had the task of handing over responsibility to his incoming administration.

Gates's performance in office had so impressed Kennedy that he considered asking Gates to stay in office.¹⁸¹ In the end, however, he decided against doing so and selected Robert S. McNamara, recently appointed president of the Ford Motor Company, as secretary of defense. McNamara's appointment was announced on 13 December.¹⁸²

Gates had, in fact, been working with McNamara at least as early as 9 December, when the two met for an hour. They met again on 21 December. On 3 January 1961 McNamara moved into an office in the Pentagon immediately adjacent to that of Gates to familiarize himself with the manifold problems confronting DoD. Gates told McNamara that the most important task awaiting action was the consolidation of intelligence activities. The general framework for carrying this out had been established, and the necessary changes in NSC policy had been made in the last NSC meeting held under Eisenhower.¹⁸³

Gates's deputy, Douglas, likewise gave his successor, Roswell Gilpatric, the benefit of his thinking. He considered the present organization "generally workable and effective" if the secretary and deputy secretary would "work closely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and seek briefings from the Joint Staff rather than from Service staffs when practicable. I know you understand as well as I do," he continued, "that you cannot expect agreement on important organizational, forces, and weapons problems by the Joint Chiefs." They could, however, "give good advice and will accept your decisions much better than attitudes expressed in discussion of the problems would indicate." He suggested that the Tactical Air Command and the Strategic Army Corps become specified commands under the JCS; to combine them into a new unified command would simply add a superfluous new headquarters. He warned that the two "principal accomplishments of the past year," revision of the mobilization base and institution of the SIOP, would need to be defended against attack by the services.¹⁸⁴

In his letter of resignation to the president, written on 4 January 1961 to be effective on 20 January, Gates summarized Defense accomplishments since 1953. These included replacement of propeller-driven B-36s by B-52 jets; production of both multimegaton thermonuclear and small

tactical nuclear weapons; development of long-range ballistic missiles; establishment of joint strategic target planning; establishment of an integrated continental defense system combining early warning with semi-automatic direction; introduction of supersonic jet fighter aircraft armed with air-to-air missiles; and the introduction of nuclear power, as well as nuclear-armed missiles, for the Navy. The president acknowledged this letter on 6 January, expressing his "deep appreciation and admiration of the distinguished contribution you have made."¹⁸⁵

Two days before he went out of office, the president awarded the Medal of Freedom to Gates, Douglas, Gray, Herter, Kistiakowsky, and Goodpaster. The omission of Brucker, who had served in DoD since 1954—longer than Gray and almost as long as Gates and Douglas—was not accidental. It reflected the friction that had marred Brucker's relations with his superiors, the secretary of defense and the president.¹⁸⁶

On 19 January 1961—his last full day in office—Gates attended Eisenhower's final meeting with President-elect Kennedy. The chief subject of discussion was Indochina.*

Before the morning was over, an unexpectedly heavy snowstorm began and continued into the night, accumulating to a total of almost eight inches—a heavy fall by Washington standards. By afternoon, traffic in Washington, which was jammed with visitors for the inauguration, had come to a standstill, and plans for the inaugural parade were seriously jeopardized. In one of his last actions, Gates assumed responsibility for providing military personnel and equipment to support the District of Columbia government, which mounted an emergency operation to clear at least the main streets. Gates called the White House about 6:30 in the evening and spoke to Major Eisenhower, the president's son. "Tell your Dad that I'm turning out the whole Army to keep the streets clean," he said. From Fort Belvoir, the Army Corps of Engineers contributed a 700-man snow removal team with 200 vehicles. The operation succeeded to a degree that reporters pronounced a "miracle." The inaugural parade on 20 January, along Pennsylvania Avenue, proceeded without a hitch.¹⁸⁷

The terms of Gates and Douglas officially ended at noon on 20 January. The highest-ranking holdover in DoD, Herbert York, director of defense research and engineering, served as acting secretary of defense until McNamara could be confirmed. On the following day McNamara, along with Kennedy's other cabinet appointees, was confirmed and sworn into office. York's brief tenure of the position ended, and a new era in OSD began.¹⁸⁸

* See Chapter XIX.

CHAPTER XXIII

OSD at the End of 1960

During the four years of Eisenhower's second term the "Cold War" between the Soviet Union and the United States still dominated the world scene. To be sure, Nikita Khrushchev, who had emerged as the unquestioned leader of the Soviet Union, was demonstrating a measure of flexibility in his dealings with the West. Indeed the beginning of what later went by the name of "détente" had become discernible, at least implied by Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959 (at his initiative) and, until the U-2 fiasco in 1960, his desire to play host to Eisenhower in Moscow. Such events would have been inconceivable in Josef Stalin's time.

Contrary to these favorable developments, however, stood Khrushchev's frequent belligerent utterances; his apparent willingness to jeopardize the status of Berlin, where vital U.S. interests were at stake; and his support of insurgencies in Indochina and the Congo and of a defiantly anti-American regime in Cuba, only 90 miles from U.S. territory. In the light of this behavior, there was reason to question Khrushchev's sincerity, or to ask whether he had really abandoned the basic Marxist conviction that peace with the capitalist world was impossible.

The situation in Berlin, though it had cooled off somewhat by the end of 1960, represented the most dangerous threat that confronted the Eisenhower administration, owing to the importance attached to that city by both the United States and the Soviet Union. There were two dangers: that the Soviets might turn over their responsibilities to the German Democratic Republic, forcing the United States to deal with that regime and thus accord it *de facto* recognition, or that the Soviets or the GDR might deliberately block access to Berlin—a real possibility, since the Soviets had alleged that Western rights there were null and void. A determined and prolonged blockage would have led to general war; the Eisenhower administration was willing to risk this rather than cravenly abandon the allied position in the center of Europe. How the United States would respond to lesser threats was never determined; it would have depended on the situation and probably also on the wishes of the allies—the United Kingdom and France. Fortunately, Khrushchev never pushed matters as far as he had seemed to threaten.

In Western Europe, the North Atlantic alliance remained the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. The perennial problem was the difficulty encountered by all the NATO member nations in meeting the force goals set by their military planners. At the end of 1960, as a decade earlier, the defense of Western Europe still rested on the deterrent power of the United States and to a lesser extent of the United Kingdom.

Relations between the United States and other NATO nations were good except for uncertainties involving France, a key member. President de Gaulle showed an unsettling tendency to think in terms of unilateral defense of his country. But he gave no evidence at the time of actually withdrawing from the alliance.

On the other side of the globe, Southeast Asia loomed as an increasingly dangerous hot spot. Attention centered on Laos, where political unrest had erupted into civil war. The United States could not accept a Communist takeover of the region and twice came to the point of activating contingency plans for direct support of the Laotian Government by CINCPAC. No one foresaw at the end of 1960 that the real peril lay in Vietnam. There the problem seemed to be merely a matter of strengthening an apparently stable and successful government with military assistance. The events that were to transform the situation still lay in the future.

The troubling developments in Southeast Asia, the Communist foothold in Cuba, the Berlin situation, and the harsh utterances of Khrushchev after the breakup of the Paris summit conference in May 1960, combined with unmistakable evidence of Soviet progress in weapons technology, suggested to many people that the world was a more dangerous place at the end of 1960 than it had been four or eight years earlier. Presidential candidate John F. Kennedy effectively exploited this concern during his successful campaign in 1960.

Eisenhower and National Security

President Eisenhower did not share such a pessimistic appraisal of the world situation. He had evidence, notably from U-2 aircraft reconnaissance, that Soviet military strength was not increasing at the rate suggested by alarmists. A cautious man whose commitment to peace was unmistakable, he made clear his willingness if necessary to defend U.S. interests, in Berlin for one, at the cost of war. However, when he did resort to military force, as in Lebanon, he was careful to use only enough to achieve limited objectives. At the same time, he markedly extended U.S. military commitments abroad. From his predecessor he inherited the NATO alliance and treaties with Australia and New Zealand through the ANZUS pact, as well as a mutual security treaty with Japan. To these he added membership in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and bilateral treaties with Korea and Nationalist China, plus at least moral support to the Central Treaty Organization in the Middle East. These represented potential claims on U.S. military resources

in case of hostilities as well as demands on U.S. military assistance.

Eisenhower's response to the world situation was in large part shaped by his views on the national economy. A strong defense, sufficient to deter war or to win it if necessary, was foremost in his mind. At the same time, he believed that prolonged or sizable federal deficits would bring on a ruinous inflation and undermine the safety of the nation, thereby defeating the purpose of defense. He also strenuously opposed increases in taxes, and in fact looked forward eventually to reducing them. It followed that the costs of national defense, which represented the largest part of the federal budget, must be kept under firm control. And his long military background convinced him that the armed services were wasteful and offered plenty of room for economy.

The president also worried about the pervasive influence of a large military establishment combined with an armament industry of unprecedented size. In his "farewell address" to the American people on 17 January 1961, he warned of the "grave implications" of this combination, which was "new in the American experience." "In the councils of government," he said, "we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex."¹

A belief in the need for economy and the fear of intrusive military influence harmonized with the president's conviction that civilian control of the military was a fundamental tenet of U.S. constitutional government. He continually admonished one and all—DoD civilian authorities, the military, and Congress—of this principle. He emphasized it in his messages on the DoD reorganizations of 1953 and 1958 and on many other occasions. He believed strongly that the military must accept civilian policy decisions and that they might not oppose them publicly except in testifying before congressional committees. He repeatedly stressed the primacy of the secretary of defense over the military establishment.

Eisenhower's belief in the principle of civilian control was in large part responsible for his dissatisfaction with General Taylor. It led him, on at least one occasion, to consider firing General White, who had seemed to oppose in public the decision not to put the B-70 aircraft into production. Discipline, he complained on that occasion, "had been lost in the high ranking officers of the services."² Shortly thereafter, in speaking to congressional leaders, he characterized the attitudes and statements of some officers as "damn near treason."³

Cutting the Forces

Eisenhower's determination, supported by his secretaries of defense, to hold down the cost and size of the military establishment succeeded in effecting a notable shrinkage in the armed forces between 1956 and 1960. When Secretary Gates went out of office in January 1961, major combat forces stood approximately as follows:⁴

Army	
Divisions	14
Air defense battalions	80 ¹ / ₄
Navy	
Warships	376
Other ships	436
Total	812
Marine Corps	
Divisions	3
Wings	3
Air Force	
Strategic wings	40
Air defense wings	23
Tactical wings	33
Total	96

The falloff from 30 June 1956 is striking: Army divisions decreased from 18, air defense battalions from 133, naval vessels from 973, and air wings from 131.* The Army's combat readiness was in fact less than indicated by the number of divisions, since 3 of the 14 were engaged in training recruits and would require 8 weeks to achieve combat readiness.⁵

The corresponding drop in personnel strength amounted to about 11 percent overall, with 15 percent in the Army, as shown in the following table:⁶

	30 June 1956	31 Dec 1960
Army	1,025,778	876,662
Navy	669,925	630,311
Marine Corps	200,780	176,340
Air Force	909,958	810,823
Total	2,806,441	2,494,136

These force and manpower reductions were in some degree offset—indeed, made possible—by technological advances yielding weapons of enormously increased effectiveness: antiaircraft missiles in place of guns, improved fighter aircraft, tactical surface-to-surface missiles of increasing range, a small but growing number of intercontinental missiles, and nuclear munitions for tactical use, as well as nuclear warheads combining increased

* See Chapter II, Table 3.

destructiveness with smaller weight. It could be argued, therefore, that there had been no decline in combat effectiveness; indeed, this was the contention of the administration.

At the same time, the bureaucracy needed to administer defense also shrank at first. Between June 1956 and September 1957 OSD's civilian and military personnel strength declined from 2,474 to 2,176, or 12 percent.* Thereafter the 1958 reorganization, bringing new functions under the purview of OSD and expanding the Joint Staff, reversed the trend; the total rose to 2,773 by June 1959 and 2,971 by August 1960.†

The armed forces still consisted, as they had since their inception, primarily of white males, with blacks and women underrepresented in relation to their proportion of the total population. The following summary shows the percentage of black personnel in each service in 1954 and 1962:‡

	Army		Navy		Marine Corps		Air Force	
	Enl	Ofcrs	Enl	Ofcrs	Enl	Ofcrs	Enl	Ofcrs
1954	13.7	3.0	3.6	0.1	6.5	0.1	8.6	1.1
1962	12.2	3.2	5.2	0.2	7.6	0.2	9.3	1.2

Only in Army and Air Force enlisted ranks did the proportion of blacks approximate that of the population as a whole. OSD experienced no pressure, from the Eisenhower administration or from public opinion, to recruit a higher proportion of blacks, as occurred when the "civil rights revolution" began in the 1960s. OSD did, however, continue the process, begun during the Truman administration, of racially integrating the services, by disbanding remaining segregated military units and by integrating naval shipyards as well as schools operated on military installations.⁸

The proportion of women in the armed services remained barely above one percent. The actual numbers declined between 1956 and 1960, as follows:⁹

	30 Jun 1956	30 Jun 1960
Army	12,646	12,542
Navy	8,066	8,071
Marine Corps	1,747	1,611
Air Force	11,187	9,326
Total	33,646	31,550

* Chapter I, Tables 1 and 2.

† Chapter IX, Table 4, and Table 10 below. In both of these, figures for the JCS have been included even though after the 1958 reorganization the JCS were no longer officially included in OSD.

Here again the attitude of OSD, in making no particular effort to recruit women, reflected public opinion. During the Korean War OSD had sought to increase the numbers of servicewomen in order to release men for combat.¹⁰ With the end of the conflict, that objective was no longer urgent.

TABLE 10

Civilian Employees and Assigned Military Personnel
Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff
31 August 1960

	Civilian	Military
Office of the Secretary	143	57
Director of Defense Research and Engineering	244	90
Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs)	215	92
Assistant Secretary (Comptroller)	172	1
Assistant Secretary (Supply and Logistics)	180	13
Assistant Secretary (Properties and Installations)	61	—
Assistant Secretary (Manpower, Personnel and Reserve)	85	43
Assistant Secretary (Health and Medical)	11	9
Assistant Secretary (Public Affairs)	75	55
General Counsel	57	—
Assistant to the Secretary (Special Operations)	17	8
Assistant to the Secretary (Atomic Energy)	12	17
Assistant to the Secretary (Legislative Affairs)	7	8
Special Programs	42	3
Joint Chiefs of Staff	304	614
Advanced Research Projects Agency	60	22
Standing Group, North Atlantic Treaty Organization	41	69
Court of Military Appeals	41	—
Defense Communications Agency	23	60
Interdepartmental Activities	8	12
Total	1,798	1,173

Source: Typewritten table in fldr 200 (Pers and Budget Acts FY 61) 1960, Box 9, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.

Determining Policy

While reducing the forces, Eisenhower and his advisers faced the delicate and complicated task of ensuring that they remained adequate to meet the exigencies of the unstable and threatening world situation. This required careful integration and direction of the diverse elements that combined to determine what might be done. These included basic national security policy,

strategy, budgeting, mobilization planning, supply of weapons (particularly nuclear), alliance relations, military assistance, arms control, and others.

Probably to a greater degree than any other president before or since, Eisenhower institutionalized the process of national security planning. He made regular use of the National Security Council; endowed it with a Planning Board to draft papers for consideration; instituted an annual directive on basic national security policy; and established the Operations Coordinating Board to supervise the execution of policies.

The key to the process was the annual basic national security policy paper. This reflected Eisenhower's desire to have policies set down in writing, following staff procedures that would allow all interested departments and agencies to be heard. Each paper set forth objectives and courses of action for all aspects of national security—military strategy, foreign relations, internal security, civil defense, and mobilization. The task of harmonizing these requirements took place in the National Security Council, and was naturally guided by the president, but it was a genuine process of give and take.

Eisenhower's series of policy papers, beginning in 1953, laid down his New Look strategy of relying primarily on strategic nuclear forces. This exploited the tremendous advances in firepower brought about by the onset of nuclear weapons and made it possible to economize on manpower. Thus it met the need for "a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost," a phrase used by Secretary of State Dulles, considered the principal spokesman for what was generally referred to as "massive retaliation." However, the New Look could also be defended on military grounds as the medium for adapting national defense to the progress of weapons technology.¹¹

At the same time, the need for some measure of conventional military force received recognition in each policy statement. Balance in the allocation of resources between conventional forces and the nuclear deterrent could not be effected through general discussions in the NSC; it could only emerge from the annual budget process, which determined the structure of U.S. forces. Preparing and administering the budget represented probably the most difficult task facing OSD, given the constant pressure from the president to hold down expenses and from the services for larger forces.

Under the general procedure adopted by the administration between 1956 and 1960, the secretary of defense set fiscal and personnel guidelines (never referred to as "ceilings") for use by the services. Derived from discussions with the services as well as with the president, they were not directly related to any specific force levels. There was thus some justice in the charges made by Eisenhower's political opponents (notably by Kennedy in his 1960 presidential campaign) that administration budgets were based on "arbitrary" ceilings.

Within this general procedural framework, the administration experimented a good deal. In 1956, in connection with the budget for FY 1958, Secretary Wilson sought to place it on a logical basis by asking the JCS for an outline military strategy to provide guidance. The JCS accompanied their reply with a broad fiscal estimate of from \$38 billion to \$40

billion in annual expenditures needed for the next few years. These figures gave the administration a general target and made it clear that it could have little or no hope of a return to the budgets of the earlier Eisenhower years (\$35 billion or less), although the final figure for FY 1958 (\$37.9 billion) came in slightly below the lowest JCS estimate.

The following year, 1957, saw the first effects of Sputnik. An initial budget request of \$39.1 billion in NOA for FY 1959 had to be supplemented later by an additional \$1.5 billion. Thus the level rose above \$40 billion, never again to fall below that amount.

For FY 1961, McElroy in 1959 introduced an innovation in the form of two different fiscal guidelines to allow the services a measure of flexibility. Gates carried this approach further in 1960 when he provided four tentative fiscal levels for FY 1962. The final 1962 budget request of \$41.8 billion, though close to the lowest of Gates's 4 target figures, was nevertheless the largest ever submitted by the Eisenhower administration.

The \$41.8 billion figure for 1962 stood in sharp contrast to the \$35.7 billion requested for FY 1957. Thus over a period of 5 years, budget requests rose by \$6.1 billion, or 17 percent, despite the strenuous efforts of the administration to contain them. Part of the increase could of course be attributed to a rise in the general price level, but most of it reflected the costs of increasingly advanced and complex weapons and the perception of growing Soviet military strength. At the same time, a comparable rise in the gross national product made these higher costs manageable. The portion of the GNP allocated to defense actually declined slightly, from 9.6 percent in 1956 to 9.1 percent in 1960.¹²

Mobilization planning, an aspect of overall national security policy, had to come into line with military strategy. If a general war erupted with the Soviet Union, presumably initiated by the dropping of nuclear bombs or launching of nuclear-armed missiles, there would be no prospect of a lengthy buildup of military forces such as had occurred in the two world wars. The administration moved cautiously to make changes, but over a period of several years, unrealistic Army mobilization schedules calling for a 6-month increase to 42 divisions were abandoned, along with the assumption of a 6-month mobilization period before D-day. Indeed, the dropping of the term "mobilization base" pointed in the same direction.

The supply of nuclear weapons, tactical as well as strategic, grew steadily during the 1950s, reflecting technological progress as well as need; an ample stockpile was necessary to support a strategy that relied primarily on these weapons. At the same time, they were more widely dispersed to combat commanders and placed increasingly under the control of DoD rather than of the Atomic Energy Commission. Another aspect of the administration's nuclear weapons policy looked to augment the capabilities of allies, the purpose of liberalizing the Atomic Energy Act in 1958. This was not considered incompatible with the attempt to hold back the spread of nuclear weapons; U.S. advice and assistance would go only to countries that demonstrated their own nuclear capability.

Another part of preparation for general nuclear war involved strengthening the defenses of the U.S. land mass, now that the United States found itself vulnerable for the first time in its history to a sudden surprise attack. Continental defense became an integral part of the New Look—the shield accompanying the sword of nuclear retaliation. Under the Eisenhower administration, the somewhat scattered measures taken earlier coalesced into a comprehensive program. Forces and facilities were expanded; two radar warning lines were constructed across Canada; and surface-to-air missiles increasingly replaced antiaircraft artillery. By the end of the decade, however, the threat of missile attack was beginning to replace that from conventional aircraft. It was by no means certain that active defense against missiles was possible, but the obvious first step was to provide maximum warning time. Hence the administration began the construction of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), together with reconnaissance satellites to detect missiles as soon as they were launched.

At all times, the administration emphasized active rather than passive continental defense, with the principal objective protection of the all-important strategic striking force, the bedrock of deterrence. Large-scale passive protection of the civilian population through construction of air-raid shelters would have been prohibitively expensive; the \$22.5 billion cost estimated by the Gaither panel over a 5-year period would have disrupted the entire federal budget. As the threat of missiles loomed larger, passive defense seemed more justifiable, but President Eisenhower's decision in favor of it in principle, in December 1960, came too late to have any effect.

Support of NATO was an objective to which the Eisenhower administration was firmly committed. With this end in view, OSD and the administration made every effort to meet force goals set by NATO planners. All the other NATO countries, however, manifested reluctance to meet force goals established on a basis of pure "requirements." In Europe as in the United States, strong pressures persisted to hold down military spending.

U.S. policy toward NATO had as a principal object strengthening of the allies' nuclear capability. Reliance on enormously destructive weapons seemed the only answer to the manpower advantage of the Soviet bloc. This goal, pursued by officials in Washington, received the enthusiastic support of SACEUR, General Norstad, who needed nuclear-armed missiles able to reach targets in Soviet bloc territory as a counter to the growing arsenal of such weapons in Soviet hands.

Between 1956 and 1960 the effort to enhance NATO's nuclear striking power took several forms, none particularly successful. The "NATO nuclear stockpile" accomplished little except perhaps to increase the number of U.S. nuclear weapons readily available to commanders in Europe. It was followed by the proposal for joint manufacture of a European missile, which, it was generally agreed, must be based on Polaris—a solid-fuel missile with sufficient range, needing only to be modified for land launching. The project appeared promising, but faded from the picture before it came to fruition, lacking a strong push from either side of the Atlantic. Its successor, the

multilateral force of Polaris submarines, had the advantage of making use of weapons already available. Delayed by disagreement in Washington over the details, it only reached NATO's agenda in December 1960 in the form of a vague "concept," leaving for future consideration the details of how such a force would be organized, manned, and commanded.

Relations with the United Kingdom differed somewhat from those with other NATO members, owing to the "special relationship" linking the two English-speaking nations. Though temporarily disrupted by the 1956 Suez crisis, when the British embarked on what U.S. officials saw as a tragically ill-advised misadventure, it was quickly repaired. There followed the agreement to station nuclear-capable IRBM squadrons in the United Kingdom, then the offer of facilities for Polaris submarines in Britain, in essence a quid pro quo for U.S. agreement to furnish Skybolt missiles to the British.

The U.S. program of military assistance to other countries, begun under Truman, was enthusiastically continued by the Eisenhower administration. As Radford told Congress, military assistance was "part and parcel" of the nation's own military program. A logical corollary to the New Look, it aimed at strengthening foreign forces to supplement those of the United States, especially ground forces to handle less than all-out attacks. The foreign aid program, economic as well as military, demonstrated its success by 1960; by then the countries of Western Europe, as well as Japan, had recovered from the effects of World War II and were nearing the point where they could be dropped from the program. This led BoB and Treasury to seek a complete cutoff of aid to those countries, an effort that OSD and State regarded as premature.

A search for means of restricting the spread of nuclear weapons had by 1960 become an important aspect of U.S. national security planning under the Eisenhower administration. The growing destructiveness of such weapons made the search imperative, while at the same time the somewhat more open leadership of the Soviet Union suggested at least a possibility of success. Starting with the president's Open Skies proposal in 1955, the last years of the decade saw much activity, as both sides put forth suggestions for various arms control measures. The JCS scrutinized each of these with a skeptical eye, as was indeed their responsibility. OSD usually followed JCS advice in appraising proposals from the Communist side, while showing somewhat more flexibility. By the end of the decade, unilateral renunciations by both sides of atmospheric nuclear tests suggested that an agreement on the subject might be within reach; conceivably it might have been attained in 1960 had it not been for the U-2 incident and the breakup of the Paris summit conference.

The administration's decisions on defense matters seem to have been little influenced by public opinion. Eisenhower's background as a professional military man and successful commander of one of the greatest combined military forces ever assembled gave him supreme confidence in dealing with defense. Confident that he knew more about military matters than anyone else in the country, he was not the man to be swayed by what he regarded

as an untutored public. In his speeches and press conferences, he sought to guide opinion rather than follow it. Public opinion did, however, influence defense planning through its effect on Congress, leading that body sometimes to cut defense appropriations, reflecting a national mood of economy, and at other times to increase them.

Nor was the administration influenced to any notable degree by that small but highly vocal segment of the public made up of professional students of and writers on defense problems. The president, as his son once made clear, followed these discussions closely, but he no doubt considered his judgment superior to that of any number of "defense intellectuals." Secretary Wilson once admitted that he had not even read an important article on the subject of strategy by his colleague, Secretary Dulles.¹³ Neither of Wilson's two successors, McElroy or Gates, had a particularly reflective turn of mind, and the demands of their busy schedules no doubt limited the time they had for reading.

Interdepartmental Relations

The manifold activities of OSD necessarily brought it into close contact with the State Department. Indeed, in discussions of matters affecting both departments, State usually took the lead, a fact noted with some unhappiness by Secretary Gates; State drafted proposals to which Defense reacted. This was particularly true under Secretary of State Dulles. The anticipated effects on allied countries often loomed large in the shaping of military decisions. For this reason Dulles, originally the principal spokesman for "massive retaliation," began to rethink his views, fearing unfavorable reaction by allied countries to a U.S. strategy too rigidly tied to nuclear weapons.

Dulles's departure from the scene came less than a year before Gates took office as secretary of defense. Gates seized the opportunity to place departmental relationships on what he regarded as a more equitable basis, establishing a "partnership" with Dulles's successor, Christian Herter, and improving the integration of military and political considerations in determining military policy. However, the effects of this new approach were hardly noticeable in the few months remaining to the Eisenhower administration.

State-Defense collaboration was particularly important in relations with NATO, though it was marked by occasional disagreement. Both State and Defense supported the goal of strengthening the NATO alliance and providing its forces with nuclear weapons. Initially, State took the initiative in this latter objective, with Dulles pushing his "NATO stockpile" plan and urging deployment of IRBM squadrons on the continent. But when it came to encouraging the production of nuclear-capable weapon systems for the NATO countries, State took a cautious view, fearing any step that might lead to individual national missile forces. OSD remained chary of some of State's proposals that seemed to aim at a fundamental change in NATO's

strategy, especially one that would give greater emphasis to conventional forces.

Some differences in viewpoint between State and Defense emerged also in discussions of arms control. Both stood firm in opposing Soviet proposals for renunciation of weapons that did not provide for proper machinery of enforcement. Dulles, however, showed a measure of flexibility, particularly with regard to nuclear testing. He saw the political advantages to be gained by a moratorium, even in the absence of a formal agreement with the Soviet Union, and was able to carry the president with him, over the opposition of OSD.

The other element of the executive branch with which OSD was closely involved was the Bureau of the Budget. At the working level, BoB cooperated with OSD (in the person of the comptroller) to help pare down initial service budget requests to a reasonable level. Moreover, BoB showed considerable ingenuity in devising military reasons to reduce force levels. And in NSC discussions, the BoB director often expressed views that seemed to suggest a conviction that expenditures for military purposes were almost always excessive and ought to be cut.

Making the Organization Work

Eisenhower's sure touch in dealing with defense revealed itself in the two reorganizations of the Department of Defense that he initiated in five years. Although the earlier one, in 1953, owed much to recommendations submitted by the outgoing Truman administration, that in 1958, much more far-reaching, was entirely Eisenhower's own. Both had the effect of moving the military establishment in the direction of "unification," in line with Eisenhower's conviction that "separate" ground, sea, or air warfare was a thing of the past. They also had the support of public and congressional opinion, as a means (so it was hoped) of ending interservice "bickering" and reducing the costs of defense by eliminating wasteful duplication of military functions.

Eisenhower's ability to impose his will on the military services rested on his knowledge that he could count on public support against any challenge to his authority. Thus he was able to override the Navy's traditional opposition, chiefly from Admiral Burke, to a more centralized military establishment. Still, he and his secretaries of defense had to yield on occasion to military pressure, especially when the services received support in Congress. The most conspicuous instance occurred in connection with the 1958 reorganization, when some of the positions taken by the military had to be accommodated in whole or in part. It was at this time that the JCS succeeded in having themselves recognized as an entity apart from OSD, although they remained directly responsible to the secretary of defense. And in implementing the 1958 reorganization, the military departments and the JCS succeeded in moderating the extent to which OSD officials at the

assistant secretary level might exercise authority over them in the name of the secretary. The continual adjustment of the lines of authority between the contending civilian and military authorities of DoD has characterized the department throughout its history.

The reorganization of 1958 closed a period of almost 10 years of experimentation with the somewhat rudimentary administrative machinery established by the National Security Act of 1947. It tightened the secretary's control over the service departments and fixed his position in the chain of command, according him the status of deputy commander in chief of the armed forces. It gave him a powerful role in the control of service research and development. By the end of 1960 Secretary Gates wielded considerably more authority than had James Forrestal when the office was first established.

The most important development in OSD organization between 1956 and 1960 was the establishment of the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (ODDR&E). In authority and responsibility, this new official, third-ranking in OSD, far surpassed his predecessor, the assistant secretary for research and engineering, whose functions had been mainly advisory. ODDR&E supervised the research activities of the Department of Defense, conducted additional research as necessary, and provided another echelon for review of the defense budget. The office quickly became the largest component of OSD (see Table 10). Secretary Gates told the Jackson subcommittee in June 1960 that ODDR&E had made a "major imprint on our operations" and that its establishment was a "forward step, of significant importance."¹⁴ The creation of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), which operated under ODDR&E, gave OSD its own research organization, supplementing those of the services.

In terms of policy influence, DDR&E ranked with two other officials in OSD, the assistant secretary (ISA) and the comptroller. The expanding role of ISA (marked by its growth in size) from the days when the function was handled by a single individual reflected the need for close integration of military and foreign policy during the Cold War. The widening range of U.S. alliances, the expansion of the military assistance program, and the rising tempo of arms control discussions all contributed to the growth and influence of ISA, as did its responsibility for liaison with NSC and the State Department.

The comptroller's prominence derived from his role in budgeting and in controlling funds. For more than 12 years, until November 1959, it reflected also the ability and personality of the incumbent, Wilfred J. McNeil, whose role in OSD went beyond his formally stated responsibilities. For example, he participated actively in selection of weapon systems for funding and in establishment of force levels to a degree that earned him the distinction of being targeted by legislation that would forbid him to exercise "judgment" in military matters. After McNeil left office, his successor did not serve long enough to make an impact.

The 1958 reorganization also significantly affected the status and func-

tions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Now clearly in the chain of command to the combat forces, they served in effect as the military staff of the secretary of defense in the exercise of his command functions. The Joint Staff, greatly enlarged after 1958, assumed responsibility for operational planning and replaced the service staffs in the drafting of orders and directives to the commands.

The JCS chairman gained increasing recognition as "first among equals." He benefited from his close association with the secretary of defense and the president. The frequent disagreements among the JCS opened the way for the chairman to press his own recommendations upon higher authority. Admiral Radford made full use of his opportunities to exert influence during his four years in office. He formed an effective team with Wilson, both working to hold down expenses; Radford had fully adopted the view of President Eisenhower that the state of the economy was a "military factor" to be incorporated into military planning.

Neither of Radford's two successors, Twining and Lemnitzer, played such a strong advocacy role, though they did not hesitate to express their views. Twining, like Radford, fully supported the administration's strategy of deterrence, but exercised considerably more tact than Radford in dealing with his JCS colleagues. Lemnitzer held office only a few months under Eisenhower and had little opportunity to influence military planning. It was no doubt a source of satisfaction to him that Eisenhower's successor leaned toward the "flexible response" doctrine that the Army had been advocating.

The other JCS members had a second role to perform, as military chiefs of their services; this sometimes brought them into disagreement with their superiors. Admiral Burke, as CNO, enjoyed Eisenhower's confidence to an unusual degree, as shown by his six years in office. General Taylor angered Eisenhower by his stubborn advocacy of Army interests as he saw them and (after he retired) by publishing details of what Eisenhower considered privileged discussions. General White also became an object of the president's irritation, as already described. However, none of the JCS members directly questioned any of the decisions of the president or the secretary.

The JCS planning machinery was operating smoothly by 1960, after getting off to a stumbling start. The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) appeared on a more or less regular schedule. These blueprints of sorts assigned missions to be accomplished by unified and specified commanders, who were responsible for producing their own operating plans. The institution in 1960 of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), drafted under the overall direction of the JCS, though not undertaken at their initiative, was a logical capstone to the planning process, tying together the separate strategic air missions of the field commands in general war.

The JCS had less success in determining the direction in which U.S. forces would evolve. The JSOP, intended to prescribe force objectives several years in the future, failed to accomplish this mission because of the inability

of the JCS to agree. It became necessary to await rulings—based on budgetary considerations—by the secretary of defense before the JSOP could be completed. Thus the relationship between JCS planning and budgeting became the opposite of what had originally been intended; the budget drove the plan instead of vice versa.

The inability of the JCS to agree proved the principal obstacle to a larger or more effective role for them. The basic disagreement was between the chief of staff, Air Force, on the one hand, and the heads of the surface forces, the Army chief of staff and the chief of naval operations, on the other. The Air Force favored a strategy that would emphasize nuclear striking power at the expense of conventional forces. Its opponents foresaw an approaching "atomic stalemate," requiring adequate forces for a conventional response to lesser threats—one that would not touch off a global holocaust.

This disagreement surfaced each year when the NSC discussed basic national security policy and in the annual budget discussions. The intensity of the dispute was exacerbated by the administration's stringent budgetary controls, which forced the services to compete for limited funds. The "battle of the dollar" played a role in most interservice issues.

Most of these other issues related to the basic strategic dispute and centered around missiles, which tended to overlap service missions. Controversies boiled up over responsibility for developing and using the IRBM, the role of Army and Air Force antiaircraft missiles, and service roles in developing a space program. The entry of the Navy as a major player in strategic air operations, with the development of Polaris, introduced a source of increased friction with the Air Force. The Navy's long-standing resistance to a highly centralized military establishment asserted itself strongly in its opposition to the promulgation of the SIOP.

Naturally these disputes reached the ears of the general public, as well as of Congress, where each service had its partisans. It was noteworthy, however, that after 1956 none of the public disputes compared in intensity with those of 1949 involving the B-36 bomber and the role of the aircraft carrier. This may have reflected among leaders of the services a measure of reluctant acceptance of "unification," in letter if not in spirit.

Disagreement among the JCS served as a major source of irritation to President Eisenhower. He viewed the JCS as a group of elder statesmen whose task was to take a balanced and perhaps somewhat Olympian overall view of national problems, military and political, and merge their individual judgments into an agreed national strategy, their sage counsel untainted by service prejudices. Such an expectation was hardly realistic, given the differences in background of men who had spent years in their individual services and had conflicting views of how best to serve the national interest. Even in World War II, when the objective of victory was clear-cut, General Marshall and Admiral King had disagreed frequently. Perhaps the nearest thing to what the president had in mind was the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (later renamed Council), a body of three senior flag or general officers outside the Joint Staff, answering directly to the JCS, and

charged with advising the JCS on long-range prospects and trends, free from the pressures of day to day problems.¹⁵

The three service secretaries, not a part of OSD, interacted intimately with it at many levels. As the status of the secretary of defense rose, that of the service secretaries inevitably declined. After 1958 they were no longer in the chain of command to the combat forces. Nonetheless, the size of the departments that they had to administer gave them heavy responsibilities. The individual departmental budgets were larger in most instances than those of the civilian executive departments of the government.¹⁶ With perhaps some exaggeration, Secretary Gates remarked in 1962 (after he had left office) that in terms of their workload and responsibility for managing the expenditure of large amounts of money, the service secretaries "are now more important than ever."¹⁷

Occupying a position between the secretary of defense and the military services, the service secretaries came under pressure from two directions, from above to hold down costs and from below to meet military requirements. Secretary of the Army Brucker, particularly vigorous in his advocacy of Army interests even to the extent of irritating his superiors, did not push his views far enough to produce an irreparable breach with the secretary of defense or the president. But he never received consideration for a higher position in DoD, as did three of his colleagues, Quarles and Douglas of the Air Force and Gates of the Navy.

Besides their "line" authority in running their departments, the service secretaries had a "staff" responsibility as advisers to the secretary of defense. They had their own formal (though nonstatutory) channel, the Joint Secretaries, for advice on administrative and managerial problems. In matters of defense policy, the secretaries made their voices heard largely through their membership in the Armed Forces Policy Council, although here their advice mingled with that of the military service chiefs.

The Men at the Top

The three men who held the position of secretary of defense between 1956 and January 1961 had a number of characteristics in common. All had successful backgrounds in business, though in different spheres—Wilson the engineer-industrialist, McElroy the sales executive, Gates the financier. As businessmen and conservatives, they fully sympathized with Eisenhower's desire to minimize federal expenditures and balance the budget. This predisposed them to support emphasis on strategic nuclear weapons, which seemed to provide a basis for economy. All supported, in letter and in spirit, the administration's foreign policy objectives: solidarity with allies (particularly in Western Europe), military assistance, and a search for effective but adequately safeguarded arms control. All seem to have earned the respect of the military men with whom they dealt, with the notable exception of Wilson and the Army.

Another condition shared by all three was that (except for Wilson in 1953-54) they had to contend with a Congress controlled by the opposition party. On the whole, they had good relations with Congress. With the key congressional posts held by Representatives George Mahon and Carl Vinson and Senators Lyndon Johnson and Richard Russell, all ardent supporters of a strong defense, the administration could maintain an essentially bipartisan approach to national security. Indeed, the Democratic leadership in Congress tended to try to push the administration further in the direction of military preparedness, particularly after the launching of the Soviet Sputniks in 1957 and the rise of "missile gap" fears shortly thereafter.

In relations with Congress, McElroy encountered the least difficulty, successfully employing a salesman's approach. Wilson's occasional run-ins with the legislators resulted principally from his outspokenness, which sometimes bordered on tactlessness. Gates met with friction engendered by the "missile gap" worries, to which both he and McElroy contributed by some of their statements, and also from the approach of the 1960 presidential election, which inspired efforts to make political capital out of defense issues.

Secretary Wilson enjoyed the distinction of being the first secretary of defense to serve throughout an entire presidential term. He was largely responsible for the reorganization of the Department of Defense in 1953. In line with President Eisenhower's conception of his role, he remained essentially a business manager, leaving strategy mainly to Admiral Radford, whose term of office as JCS chairman coincided closely with that of Wilson as secretary. Within these limits, he was a strong executive, enforcing on unwilling service chiefs the president's economy drive. He did not attempt to play a role in foreign policy, though he was not as self-effacing in this regard as sometimes thought.¹⁸ His comments on foreign matters were sometimes unfortunate, as when he upset the British by seeming to dismiss the importance of Suez.

Eisenhower was clearly disappointed in Wilson. Still, he retained him although he "often recounted Wilson's shortcomings in detail to his staff." That the secretary served almost five years could perhaps be explained by the fact that, as one of Eisenhower's biographers has remarked, the president "found it extremely difficult to fire anyone who had been loyal to him."¹⁹ Such was not the image that Eisenhower had of himself. "Whenever I had to make a decision that properly belonged to a subordinate," he wrote later, "I admonished him once, but if he failed again it was time to begin looking for a replacement."²⁰ Yet he kept in office a man who, he once complained, perhaps unfairly, was "afraid to make decisions."²¹

Wilson's unpopularity in Army circles was understandable, since that service bore the brunt of the force reductions that he imposed in order to meet Eisenhower's budget restrictions.²² His relations with Secretary of the Army Brucker frequently sparked friction—so much so that the two must have found it difficult to work together.

When he left office, Wilson had the misfortune to be blamed for decisions

made higher up that seemed to give the Soviets a commanding lead in important aspects of weapon technology. These decisions appeared at the time more potentially disastrous than they eventually proved to be. At the same time, he experienced pressure from below in the form of requirements urged on him by the services. The attempt to balance these with the president's economy demands clearly told on him by the time he completed his term.

Although McElroy entered office almost simultaneously with the two Soviet Sputniks, this startling demonstration of unsuspected Soviet technological prowess actually eased his problems somewhat by helping to relax constraints on military spending. Essentially a managerial specialist like Wilson, he left technical matters largely to his deputies, Quarles and Gates. Nor did he pretend to any particular expertise in foreign affairs, although he took a prominent part in discussions of the Berlin situation. His principal contribution was in steering the 1958 reorganization plan through Congress and subsequently putting it into effect.

Handicapped by his lack of military background and experience, without even Wilson's familiarity with military production, McElroy never acquired as firm a grip on the department as did Wilson or Gates. Nor did he get over his bewilderment at having to make decisions that, in his view, were the responsibility of military men. He evidently entered office with a somewhat idealized expectation that the JCS would provide force-level recommendations that could readily be translated into budgets.

Just why Eisenhower rated McElroy so much higher than Wilson is not entirely clear. McElroy apparently learned from Wilson's mistakes and avoided referring too many matters to the president for decision. At any rate, Eisenhower never criticized McElroy; he did not share the opinion held in some quarters that McElroy was indecisive.

Secretary Gates was the most forceful and innovative of the three secretaries. With his naval service in World War II and his service successively as secretary of the Navy and deputy secretary of defense, he entered office far better prepared than either Wilson or McElroy. His familiarity with the job and its requirements was evident in his first actions, when he stepped firmly into the thicket of JCS disagreements. His confidence was shown also by his initiative in pushing through the SIOP over determined resistance from his one-time Navy colleagues. So far as known, Eisenhower never put on record his opinion of Gates, but he must have been favorably impressed by Gates's accomplishments—as was Eisenhower's successor, who considered keeping Gates in office. Had Gates held the position longer than 13 months, he would undoubtedly have made a greater impact.

Promulgation of the SIOP demonstrated Gates's willingness to make full use of the authority and prestige granted him by the 1958 legislation. Gates also pushed unification further by moving ahead with the consolidation of common functions under control of agencies responsible to OSD. McElroy began the process with the Defense Atomic Support Agency; Gates followed with the Defense Communication Agency and laid the groundwork

for similar consolidation of intelligence activities, a task completed by his successor. Otherwise, Gates did not alter the internal organization of DoD.

Another prominent feature of Gates's tenure—his effort to integrate defense planning with diplomatic and political considerations—manifested itself in a close relationship with Secretary of State Herter, his giving a larger role to ISA in the budget process, and his effort to involve both State and Treasury in the early stages of budget formulation. These efforts, necessarily confined to Gates's single year in office, represented a rational approach to defense budgeting, but in practice they seem to have had little effect; the final budget for that year turned as usual on the judgment of the secretary and the president on how to allocate a scarce supply of dollars, at a time when fiscal problems were aggravated by serious concerns about an unfavorable balance of payments.

Overview

Broadly speaking, perhaps the most important accomplishment of OSD during the Eisenhower administration was to preside over the birth of the age of strategic missiles. General research in the field began during the previous administration, but all the specific missile projects—Thor, Jupiter, Atlas, Titan, Polaris, and the impending Minuteman—began and were carried to fruition by OSD between 1953 and 1960. It could be argued that the administration, by not pushing these projects more rapidly, allowed the Soviets to get a head start in this field. Fortunately the Soviets failed to press their advantage, and the United States eventually overtook them. The president's judgment in not being swayed by the "missile gap" alarm thus proved justified.

It is a reasonable judgment that from 1956 through 1960 OSD successfully carried out its mission of maintaining the security of the United States. The close of the Korean War ushered in approximately a decade of peace during which no U.S. military personnel were killed by hostile action. The Soviet Union was successfully "contained"; communism gained no new accretions of territory, with the important exception of Cuba, where a native Communist regime took power with no assistance from the Soviets. That the Soviet Union did not attack the United States (or any other country) could be claimed as evidence that deterrence "worked," though whether this was the result of U.S. influence, no one could say. The U.S. military establishment proved easily able to act effectively on the few occasions when required to do so. If, as some believed, the Eisenhower administration was taking a risk with its economy program—holding force levels below what many military men believed essential—the judgment was vindicated; the risk had been accurately assessed.

The implications for the future, however, were a different matter. Suppose the United States were to face a relatively large-scale war in which, for political reasons, its nuclear deterrent proved useless? This had happened in Korea

in 1950 and would recur in Vietnam in the ensuing decade. Secretary Gates had warned in September 1960 that the United States could not, under conditions then existing, fight "another Korea." Such a contingency had been tacitly excluded from consideration under the policy of the Eisenhower administration, the assumption being that in a large-scale limited war, allies would furnish most of the ground forces and nuclear weapons might be used. The assumption proved invalid in Vietnam; the United States had to furnish its own forces, and succeeded in doing so only because of the buildup of conventional forces early in the next administration. The war that followed would provide a test for the OSD organization of 1958, as Korea had for an earlier OSD.

List of Abbreviations

ABMA	Army Ballistic Missile Agency
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACSI	Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
ADC	Air Defense Command
AE	atomic energy; applications engineering
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
AEW	airborne early warning
AFB	Air Force base
AFPC	Armed Forces Policy Council
AFSWP	Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
AICBM	anti-intercontinental ballistic missile
ALBM	air-launched ballistic missile
ALCOM	Alaska Command
ANP	aircraft nuclear propulsion
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States
AOMC	Army Ordnance Missile Command
ARAACOM	Army Antiaircraft Artillery Command
ARDC	Air Research and Development Command
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASW	anti-submarine warfare
ATSD	Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
AWF	Ann Whitman File
BASC	Berlin Air Safety Center
BMC	Ballistic Missiles Committee
BMEWS	Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
BoB	Bureau of the Budget
BPO	Baghdad Pact Organization
CACG	Collateral Activities Coordinating Group
CADIN	Continental Air Defense Integration North
CADOP	Continental Air Defense Objectives Plan
CARIBCOM	Caribbean Command
CASF	composite air strike force
CEWA	Charles E. Wilson Archives

CHMAAG	Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCAFMED	Commander in Chief, Mediterranean
CINCAL	Commander in Chief, Alaska Command
CINCAMLANFOR	Commander in Chief, American Land Force
CINCARIB	Commander in Chief, Caribbean
CINCBAOR	Commander in Chief, British Army of the Rhine
CINCHAN	Commander in Chief, Channel
CINCFE	Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCLANTFLT	Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
CINCNELM	Commander in Chief, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCNORAD	Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCSAC	Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
CINCSOUTH	Commander in Chief, Southern Command
CINCSPECOMME	Commander in Chief, Specified Command, Middle East
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CINCUSAFE	Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces, Europe
CINCUSARPAC	Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific
CINCUSAREUR	Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe
CINCUSNAVEUR	Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Europe
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMLC	Civilian-Military Liaison Committee
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COMSIXTHFLT	Commander, Sixth Fleet
CONAD	Continental Air Defense Command
CONUS	Continental United States
CSA	Chief of Staff, Army
CSAF	Chief of Staff, Air Force
DA	Department of the Army
DACOWITS	Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
DASA	Defense Atomic Support Agency
DASD	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DCNO	Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
DCS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DDED	Dwight David Eisenhower Diaries
DDEL	Dwight David Eisenhower Library
DDR&E	Director of Defense Research and Engineering
DEFREPNAMEA	Defense Representative, North Atlantic and Mediterranean Areas

DEW	Distant Early Warning
DGM	Director of Guided Missiles
DJS	Director, Joint Staff
DM	Director's Memorandum
DMA	Director of Military Assistance
DoD	Department of Defense
DSB	Defense Science Board
DSTP	Director of Strategic Target Planning
ECM	electronic countermeasures
FBM	fleet ballistic missile
FCDA	Federal Civil Defense Administration
FECOM	Far East Command
FM	Financial Management
FOA	Foreign Operations Administration
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GC	General Counsel
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GMT	Greenwich mean time
GRC	Government of the Republic of China
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HIWRP	Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace
ICA	International Cooperation Administration
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
ICC	International Control Commission
ICEM	Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration
IGY	International Geophysical Year
IOC	initial operational capability
IRBM	intermediate-range ballistic missile
ISA	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
JAIEG	Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group
JCAE	Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
JCC	Joint Coordination Center
JCCGM	Joint Coordinating Committee on Guided Missiles
JCSM	Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
JDA	Japanese Defense Agency
JMEPPG	Joint Middle East Policy Planning Group
JLRSE	Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate
JPL	Jet Propulsion Laboratory
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JSPG	Joint Strategic Plans Group
JSTPS	Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
JTF	Joint Task Force
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group
LANTCOM	Atlantic Command

LOFAR	low-frequency analysis and recording
LST	tank landing ship
LVT	landing vehicle, tracked
MAC	Military Armistice Commission
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP	Mutual Assistance Program
MC	Military Committee
MCEB	Military Communications Electronics Board
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MEDO	Middle East Defense Organization
MIRV	multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle
MLC	Military Liaison Committee
MLF	multilateral force
MoD	Ministry of Defense; Ministry of Defence
MP&R	Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve
MRBM	medium-range ballistic missile
MSG	Military Study Group
MSOP	Mutual Security Objectives Plan
MSP	Mutual Security Program
MWDP	Mutual Weapons Development Program
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACA	National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
NADET	NATO Deterrent Force
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NAS	National Academy of Sciences
NASA	National Air and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFORCONAD	Naval Forces Continental Air Defense
NDU	National Defense University
NELM	United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
NESC	Net Evaluation Subcommittee
NGA	National Guard Association
NHC	Naval Historical Center
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NNSC	Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
NOA	New Obligational Authority
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command
NSC	National Security Council
NSF	National Science Foundation
NSTL	National Strategic Target List
OAS	Organization of American States
OASD	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OATSD(SO)	Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
OCB	Operations Coordinating Board

OCDM	Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
OCJCS	Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
OCNO	Office of Chief of Naval Operations
ODM	Office of Defense Mobilization
OPLAN	operations plan
OPNAV	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OSANSA	Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
OSAST	Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD Hist	Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSS	Office of Staff Secretary
PA	Public Affairs
PACOM	Pacific Command
PACGO	President's Advisory Committee on Government Operations
PB	Planning Board
PEO	Program Evaluation Office
PERT	Program Evaluation and Review Technique
PJBB	Permanent Joint Board on Defense
PM	Prime Minister
Pol Plng	Policy Planning
PP	Papers as President
PR	press release
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSAC	President's Science Advisory Committee
RAF	Royal Air Force
R&D	research and development
R&E	research and engineering
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
RG	record group
RLG	Royal Laotian Government
ROK	Republic of Korea
S&L	supply and logistics
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SAGE	Semi-automatic Ground Environment
SAGM	Special Assistant for Guided Missiles
SAINT	satellite interceptor
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SCC	Super Combat Center
S-DMICC	State-Defense Military Information Control Committee
SETAF	Southern Europe Task Force
SG	Standing Group

SGN	Standing Group NATO
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan
SJCS	Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SNIE	Special National Intelligence Estimate
SO	Special Operations
SOSUS	underwater sound surveillance system
SSBN	nuclear-powered fleet ballistic-missile submarine
SSM	surface-to-surface missile
SVN	South Vietnam
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TIAS	Treaties and other International Acts Series
UAR	United Arab Republic
UNC	United Nations Command
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNOGIL	United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
USAFE	United States Air Forces, Europe
USARMA	United States Army Military Attache
USCOB	United States Commander, Berlin
USCINCEUR	United States Commander in Chief, Europe
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USNMR	United States National Military Representative
USNR	United States Naval Reserve
USRO	United States Regional Organizations
USUN	United States Mission, United Nations
VC	Viet Cong
VCNO	Vice Chief of Naval Operations
VCSAF	Vice Chief of Staff, Air Force
WHO	White House Office
WNRC	Washington National Records Center
WSEG	Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
WWCC	World-Wide Coordination Conference
ZI	Zone of the Interior

NOTES

I. THE CLOSE OF THE WILSON ERA, 1956-1957

1. The standard account of the Eisenhower administration is Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*: vol II, *The President* (hereafter cited as *Eisenhower the President*). R. Gordon Hoxie, *Command Decision and the Presidency: A Study of National Security Policy and Organization*, devotes two chapters to the Eisenhower administration (191-259).
2. *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1956*, 2-4, 345.
3. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1957*, M21-M22. The \$34.6 billion covered only the cost of equipping, training, and operating the armed services. Related activities not included in the budget of the Department of Defense—atomic weapons development, stockpiling, and military assistance—would add another \$5 billion to expenditures for national security.
4. The texts of the laws of 1947 and 1949 (PLs 80-253 and 81-216) and of Reorganization Plan No. 6, together with relevant background documents, are printed in Alice C. Cole et al, eds., *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978*, 3-159. The origin and enactment of the laws are described in Steven L. Rearden, *The Formative Years, 1947-1950*, vol I in *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 1-55.
5. E. Bruce Geelhoed, *Charles E. Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon, 1953 to 1957*, 165-68. For Wilson's own statement of his managerial philosophy, see his speech to the National War College, 11 Jun 1957, *Public Statements of Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, 1957*, II:467-74 (hereafter cited as *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson* with year). The 1953 reorganization was also based in large part on recommendations submitted by Truman's outgoing secretary of defense, Robert A. Lovett. For a more complete account, see Doris M. Condit, *The Test of War, 1950-1953*, vol II in *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 525-31.
6. Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 88, 148; General Services Administration, National Archives and Records Service, Office of the Federal Register, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, 228-29 (hereafter cited as *Eisenhower Public Papers* with year).
7. Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 294 (DoD Dir 5100.1, 16 Mar 54).
8. Ibid, 86, 88, 89 (PL 81-216 (10 Aug 49)).
9. "The Organization of the Department of Defense," 11-12, briefing paper prepared for orientation of new appointees, undated, encl/w memo Burton B. Moyer, Jr., OSD, for James L. Brewer, Jr., OASD(C), et al, 20 Nov 56, fldr 353 Jul-Dec, Box 11, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1956, Acc 60-A1339 (hereafter cited as "Organization of DoD"). This paper was published, with some changes, as part of an anonymous article, "This is the Department of Defense," *Armed Forces Management*, III (Sep 57), 8-18.
10. Geelhoed, *Wilson*, 34-37; C. W. Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon: From Forrestal to McNamara*, 139-40.
11. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1956*, III:988. For a more complete picture of Wilson than that presented here, see Richard M. Leighton, "New Bosses in the E Ring," a draft chapter in the forthcoming vol III of *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*.

12. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (vol I in *The White House Years*), 446.
13. Quotation from Jack Raymond, *Power at the Pentagon*, 10. There is a large literature on Wilson's role as secretary of defense and his relationship with Eisenhower. See especially Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon*, 138-60; Fred L. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader*, 80, 83-85; James M. Roherty, *Decisions of Robert S. McNamara: A Study of the Role of the Secretary of Defense*, 46-53; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, 442-44; Douglas Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management: A Study in Defense Politics*, 127-30. Geelhoed, *Wilson*, provides a summary account of Wilson's years as secretary. An article by the same author, "Executive at the Pentagon: Re-examining the Role of Charles E. Wilson in the Eisenhower Administration," is essentially a defense of Wilson. For a short account of the Wilson years, see Roger R. Trask, *The Secretaries of Defense: A Brief History, 1947-1985*, 19-23.
14. Quote from Emmet John Hughes, *The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years*, 75; Sherman Adams, *Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration*, 99.
15. Geelhoed, *Wilson*, 165, 168-70; Merlo J. Pusey, *Eisenhower the President*, 59-60; interv with Wilfred J. McNeil by Doris M. Condit and Ronald Hoffman, 7 Jun 76, 48-49, 130-33, OSD Hist; interv with Robert LeBaron by Alfred Goldberg, Samuel Wells, and Doris M. Condit, 4 May 75, 24-25, *ibid*. For criticism of Wilson by Army officers, see Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*, 283; James M. Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, 155; interv with J. Lawton Collins by Alfred Goldberg, Roger R. Trask, Doris M. Condit, and Steven L. Rearden, 2 Jul 81, 43-44, OSD Hist.
16. McNeil interv, 7 Jun 76, 48, 50-51, OSD Hist. General Taylor, army chief of staff from 1955 to 1959, recalled only one occasion when Wilson met with the JCS "for an extended period"; this was in March 1956 in Puerto Rico (see ch IV): Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, 120. Wilson testified in January 1956 that "I do not very often sit with the Chiefs, although I have done so at times": US Cong, House, Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957: Hearings*, 84 Cong, 2 sess (1956), 43.
17. For the origin of the Quantico conferences, see *New York Times*, 24 Jul 53, and *Army-Navy-Air Force Journal*, XC (25 Jul 53), 1443.
18. Memo for SecDef, nd, "The Evolution of 'Immediate Staff Assistance' for the Secretary of Defense," and untitled paper, 29 May 61, both apparently prepared by OSD Historian (R. A. Winnacker), OSD Hist; handwritten notations by Henry Glass on earlier draft of this chapter, Nov 85, *ibid*.
19. Randall's role in the Pentagon was compared with the White House roles of both Sherman Adams and Andrew Goodpaster: *Washington Post*, 15 Dec 58; interv with Thomas S. Gates, Jr., by John T. Mason, Jr., 3 Aug 67, 43, Columbia University Oral History Project (hereafter abbreviated CUOHP). For Randall's own account of his role, see interv with Carey A. Randall by Alfred Goldberg, Ronald Hoffman, Richard M. Leighton, Maurice Matloff, and Robert J. Watson, 26 and 27 Apr 88, *passim*, esp. 26 Apr, 40-47, OSD Hist. For his promotion, see memo Persons for AttyGen, 17 Aug 56, w/encls, fldr DoD vol I (3) (Sep-Dec 56), Box 1, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; *New York Times*, 15 Jan 57; Randall interv, 27 Apr 88, 58, OSD Hist.
20. Ezra Taft Benson, *Cross Fire: The Eight Years with Eisenhower*, 34; Randall interv, 26 Apr 88, 45, OSD Hist; interv with Arleigh A. Burke by Maurice Matloff, 9 Nov 83, 29, *ibid*; McNeil interv, 7 Jun 76, 134, *ibid*. Other interviews available in CUOHP testify to the high regard in which Wilson was held by his subordinates: e.g., those with Carter Burgess, Gordon Gray, E. Perkins McGuire, and Mansfield D. Sprague.
21. "Colorful but politically disastrous phrase": Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management*, 73; reporter statement in press conference, 12 Oct 56, *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1956*, III:1053. For an example of Wilson's humor, see press conference on 1 Aug 1957 at which he passed around cartoons that poked good-natured fun at him: *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, II:561. Wilson had an entire room full of such cartoons: Randall interv, 26 Apr 88, 39, OSD Hist.

22. Interv with Mansfield D. Sprague by John T. Mason, Jr., 2 Oct 68, 9-10, CUOHP.
23. Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries*, 237.
24. Mansfield D. Sprague interv, 2 Oct 68, 19, CUOHP; interv with Gordon Gray by Maclyn P. Burg, 25 Jun 75, 3-4, *ibid*; handwritten notations by Henry Glass on draft of this chapter, Nov 85, OSD Hist.
25. Adams, 50-70; Patrick Anderson, *The Presidents' Men: White House Assistants of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson*, 133-37; Stephen Hess, *Organizing the Presidency*, 68-71; Andrew J. Goodpaster, "Organizing the White House," in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., *The Eisenhower Presidency: Eleven Intimate Perspectives of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, vol III in *Portraits of American Presidents*, 65-66, 80, 83; interv with Andrew J. Goodpaster by Richard D. Challener, 11 Jan 66, 28, John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton Univ (hereafter abbreviated JFDOHP); I. M. Destler, "The Presidency and National Security Organization," 233-34.
26. Memrcd Goodpaster, 24 Mar 55, fldr Administrative Arrangements (1) (Feb-Apr 55), Box 1, White House subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL. Goodpaster's memorandums have been described as "the single most reliable source for what happened in the Eisenhower Presidency": Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 676.
27. William Bragg Ewald, Jr., *Eisenhower the President: Crucial Days, 1957-1960*, 192-93; Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 77, 299, 345; Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management*, 48, 73; Adams, 402-03; interv with John S. D. Eisenhower by Maurice Matloff and Alfred Goldberg, 22 Oct 84, 53, OSD Hist; Mansfield D. Sprague interv, 2 Oct 68, 18, and 15 Oct 68, 24, CUOHP. In Sherman Adams's words, Eisenhower was "discombobulated" by Wilson's detailed discussion of matters that should have been settled at the secretarial level: interv with Sherman Adams by Richard D. Challener, 15 Aug 64, 8, JFDOHP. Wilson's subordinates agreed that he took up an inordinate amount of the president's time: interv with Thomas S. Gates by Richard D. Challener, 13 Jul 65, 27, *ibid*; interv with Carter Burgess by Thomas F. Hogan, 29 Aug 67, 13, CUOHP. According to the president's secretary, Ann Whitman, Wilson took up more of the president's time than any other Cabinet officer: ltr Ann Whitman to Milton Eisenhower, 28 Aug 56, Name ser (Eisenhower, Milton (2)), PP, DDEL. To some extent, however, this fact doubtless reflected the greater importance of defense issues as compared with most others.
28. Telephone call, 7 Dec 56, fldr Dec 56 Phone Calls, Box 20, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL. For the occasion when this statement was made (during a discussion of the FY 1958 defense budget), see ch IV.
29. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 299. Eisenhower wondered on one occasion, "How in hell did a man as shallow as Charlie Wilson ever get to be head of General Motors?": Ewald, 192. On another occasion, he remarked to General Taylor that "I can't get him [Wilson] in to do his work; he wants me to solve all his problems": interv with Taylor by Maurice Matloff, Richard M. Leighton, and Robert J. Watson, 18 Oct 83, 8, OSD Hist.
30. Telephone call, 7 Dec 56, fldr Dec 56 Phone Calls, Box 20, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
31. Greenstein, 84.
32. Adams, 403; Gates interv, 3 Aug 67, 34-35, CUOHP; statement by Wilson, 12 Jul 57, as reported by Gates to Burke, memrcd Burke, 13 Jul 57, fldr 1, Sensitive files, Burke papers, NHC.
33. Interv with Bernard M. Shanley by Richard D. Challener, 14 Jul 66, JFDOHP. Shanley does not give the date of this incident, but it must have been near the end of Wilson's tenure, when he was acutely feeling the burdens of office (see ch V).
34. Geelhoed, *Wilson*, 179; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 14 Mar 57, Mar 57 Diary-Staff Memos (2), Box 22, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
35. Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 89; *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, I: 265-66; DoD Dir 5105.2, 8 Jun 54, reissued 5 Aug 55 and 7 May 57; Exec Order 10483, 2 Sep 53.
36. "Remarks at a Meeting with Key Members of the Former Hoover Commission, 4 October 1956," fldr Orgn of Exec Branch of the Govt 1956 (Apr-Dec), Box 17, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379. The author of this paper is not indicated, but internal

evidence shows that it was Reuben Robertson. It is cited hereafter as Robertson, "Remarks."

37. OSD Organization Charts, 23 Mar 56, 1 Jun 56, 15 Aug 56. On the Administrative Secretariat, see memo Wilson to Secs of Mil Depts et al, 9 Mar 53, and OSD Organization Manual, 7 Dec 53, 1.04-1.06. All sources are in OSD Hist.
38. *New York Times*, 27 Mar 57. For Quarles's background, see Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon*, 166; George M. Watson, Jr., *The Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1947-1965*, 149; and, at greater length, Paul F. Healy, "Boss of the Birdmen," *Saturday Evening Post*, CCXXXVIII (10 Mar 56), 136-38.
39. Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 41, 89, 157-58; DoD Dir 5105.1, 30 Jun 53.
40. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1953, 232.
41. DoD Dir 5025.1, 31 Jan 56; individual directives for ASDs cited below, OSD Hist.
42. US Cong, House, Cte on Armed Svcs, *Reorganization of the Department of Defense: Hearings*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), 6755 (testimony of ASD(ISA) Mansfield D. Sprague).
43. The responsibilities of ASD(ISA) were assigned by DoD Dirs 5132.2, 26 Apr 54, 5132.3, 14 Jul 55 (amended 6 Sep 55, reissued in amended form 22 Jul 57), 5132.4, 26 Apr 54, 5132.6, 1 May 56, and 5132.7, 10 Dec 56. The quotation is from DoD Dir 5132.3, 14 Jul 55. For the actual functioning of the office, see testimony of ASD(ISA) Sprague in House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Reorganization of the Department of Defense: Hearings*, 6754-58; "Role, Mission and Function of the Department of Defense in International Relations," paper prepared for orientation of employees, encl to memo Col J. S. Hughes for Mr. Moyer, OSD Personnel Div, 14 Nov 56, fldr (353 Jul-Dec), Box 11, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1956, Acc 60-A1339; Timothy W. Stanley, *American Defense and National Security*, 46-54; Thomas J. Bigley, "The Office of International Security Affairs," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* XCII (Apr 66), 61-72; Fred Hamlin, "International Security Affairs: The Quiet Side," *Armed Forces Management*, VI (Feb 60), 16-18.
44. House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Reorganization of the Department of Defense: Hearings*, 6756-57, 6760, 6763; "This is the Department of Defense," 40-41; Stanley, 48-50.
45. Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 100-02.
46. On the powers of the comptroller, see Huntington, *Soldier and State*, 437-40; Paul Y. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century*, 304-07; Rearden, *Formative Years*, 361-62; memo Ronald Hoffman for Richard M. Leighton, nd, "Managing the Defense Establishment," 13-18, 31-34, OSD Hist; McNeil interv, 7 Jun 76, 26-30, OSD Hist.
47. Rearden, *Formative Years*, 60, 361-62.
48. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Subcommittee Report on Special Personnel Problems in the Department of Defense*, 10; Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, 304; memo for SecDef, nd, "The Evolution of 'Immediate Staff Assistance' for the Secretary of Defense," OSD Hist.
49. McNeil interv, 7 Jun 76, 127-35, OSD Hist; US Cong, House, Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (1957), pt 2, 1895; Charlotte Knight, "Mystery Man of the Pentagon," *Collier's*, CXXXIII (22 Jan 54), 30-36; *Washington Star*, 28 Jul 57.
50. Memo Ronald Hoffman for Richard M. Leighton, "McNeil Reforms," nd, OSD Hist; McNeil interv, 7 Jun 76, 35-38, 65-67, 55-56, 23, *ibid*; US Cong, House, Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956: Hearings*, 84 Cong, 1 sess (1955), 541, and *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957*, 84 Cong, 2 sess (1956), 972, 1032-33; comments by Henry Glass on draft of this chapter, OSD Hist. The "full-year" funding requirement was not at first enforced and became the subject of controversy in 1957: see ch IV.
51. DoD Dirs 5128.7, 12 Nov 53, and 5128.8, 17 Aug 54; John Ponturo, *Analytical Support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The WSEG Experience, 1948-1976*, 112-15.
52. DoD Dirs 5129.1, 8 Dec 53, and 3200.2, 18 Jul 56; DoD Instr 5100.3, 27 Oct 54; Stanley, 115; Melvin Bell, "The Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering: Its Organization and Administration," 33-35; House Cte on Appros, *Guided Missiles Programs*, *Department of Defense*, Rept to Cte by Surveys and Investigations Staff, Jan 57, iii, 21-23.

53. DoD Dir 5126.1, 13 Aug 53.
54. *New York Times*, 26 Jun 56.
55. DoD Dir 5131.1, 13 Aug 53.
56. "This is the Department of Defense," 26-27.
57. DoD Dirs 5122.4 and 5122.5, 30 Jul 54; memo, OSD Historian (R.A. Winnacker) for McGiffert, "What Place Legislative Affairs?," 25 Aug 65, notebook: Legislative Affairs Organization files, OSD Hist.
58. DoD Dir 5136.4, 2 Sep 53; "This Is the Department of Defense," 44-45.
59. DoD Dir 5145.1, 24 Aug 53.
60. Secretary of the Navy Gates, who was under secretary from 1953 to 1957, testified that originally the assistant secretaries interfered in "petty details of the Navy's operation," but "eventually everyone found himself and his proper role": interv with Thomas S. Gates, Jr., by Vincent Davis, 16 Jul 62, 14-15, CUOHP. General Ridgway, Army chief of staff, 1953-55, complained that the assistant secretaries had repeatedly exceeded their authority: ltr Ridgway to Sec McElroy, 6 Feb 58, OSD Hist. But Secretary of the Army Brucker testified in 1956 that he did not feel that there was any interference with his "freedom of administration": US Cong, Senate, Cte on Armed Svcs, Subcte on the Air Force, *Study of Airpower: Hearings*, 84 Cong, 2 sess (1956), 1321-22.
61. "Powers of Assistant Secretaries of Defense," 16 Dec 56, by Charles A. Coolidge, OSD Hist; "Defense Procurement: The Vital Roles of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," in Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Five Staff Papers Prepared for the Task Force on Procurement*, I:A-57; US Cong, House, Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1957*, 84 Cong, 2 sess (1956), H Rept 2104. The instruction cited by the House Committee was DoD Instruction 4150.6, 7 June 55, setting forth standards for the maintenance of grounds at military installations. For an analysis of the role of the assistant secretaries and their relations with the service secretaries, see Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, 298-320.
62. DoD Dir 5025.1, 31 Jan 56.
63. DoD Dir C-5148.4, 1 May 56; "This is the Department of Defense," 35. The Operations Coordinating Board is described below. The "5412 Committee" (so called from the NSC directive that established it) consisted of officials from Defense and State (assistant secretaries or higher), the director of central intelligence, and the president's special assistant for national security affairs. The alternate DoD member was the assistant for special operations: memo W. H. Godel for Charles G. Ellington, 8 Feb 56; ltrs DepSecDef to DCI, 4 May, 2 Aug 56: fldr NSC 5412 (PCG), Box 4, ATSD(SO) files, Acc 63-A1803. For the origin and operations of the 5412 Committee, see Wayne G. Jackson, *Allen Welsh Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence, 26 February 1953-29 November 1961*, III:41-82.
64. DoD Dirs 5148.1 and 5148.2, 5 Oct 54; PL 83-703 (30 Aug 54); "This is the Department of Defense," 48.
65. DoD Dir 5105.10, 27 Mar 56. The establishment of this position is described more fully in ch VII.
66. Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 36-37, 40-45, 86-92.
67. "Organization of DoD," 6-7.
68. Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 150-52, 296. See ch II for the unified and specified commands.
69. Drew Pearson, "Washington Merry-go-Round," *Washington Post*, 30 May 59, characterized Brucker as a "potent power" in the Republican Party. Eisenhower's scientific adviser, George Kistiakowsky, was told by an official in the Department of the Army that Brucker kept in touch with party politicians in Michigan and frequently sought their advice: Kistiakowsky, *A Scientist at the White House: The Private Diary of President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Science and Technology*, 277. For Army views of Brucker, see Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, 167, and John B. Medaris, *Countdown for Decision*, 246. For Brucker's colleagues' views, see Gates interv, 3 Aug 67, 38, CUOHP, and interv with Herbert F. York by Maurice Matloff, 30 Dec 84, 51, OSD Hist.

70. John R. Wadleigh, "Charles Sparks Thomas" and "Thomas Sovereign Gates, Jr.," both in Paolo E. Coletta, ed., *American Secretaries of the Navy*, II:857-74, 877-93.
71. For the origin and early history of the JCS, see Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Secretariat, Historical Division, *A Concise History of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1979*, and Robert J. Watson, "The Evolving Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the National Security Structure," in Schratz, 90-96. Two other studies by the JCS Historical Division deal with JCS postwar history in more detail: *Chronology, Functions and Composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 1-93, and *Chronology of JCS Organization, 1945-1984*, 1-94.
72. Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 94-95.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid, 157, 196; DoD Dir 5158.1, 26 Jul 54.
75. Message to Congress transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 6, Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 155-56.
76. JCS Hist Div, *Concise History of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 23-24, and *Chronology of JCS Organization*, 43-44.
77. The president met regularly with the chairman, but he assured the other JCS members that this was for convenience only and that any other JCS members might meet with him at any time: memrcd Goodpaster, 10 Feb 56, fldr JCS (2) (Jan-Apr 56), Box 4, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL. For an example of a meeting of the JCS with both Eisenhower and Wilson, held at the latter's request, see memrcd Burke, 19 Dec 56, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC. Burke estimated that the president met with the JCS on an average of roughly every two weeks: interv with Burke by Cole Christian Kingseed, 18 Jun 81, in Kingseed, "Eisenhower and Suez: A Reappraisal of Presidential Activism and Crisis Management," 227.
78. Interv with Maxwell D. Taylor by Richard D. Challener, 11 May 66, 11, JFDOHP; John N. Irwin, "The Nature of the Participation of the Department of Defense in the Formulation of National Security Policy," 10 Oct 59, 11; records of JCS-ISA-State mtgs in OSD Hist.
79. The president explained his views in a meeting with the JCS on 10 February 1956; subsequently, at the request of some JCS members, Goodpaster set down the president's views in a memo to the chairman: memrcd Goodpaster, 10 Feb 56, memo Goodpaster for Radford, 14 Feb 56, fldr JCS (2) (Jan-Apr 56), Box 4, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
80. Thus in 1955 a staff group of the Hoover Commission spoke of the need to convert the JCS "from a trading post to an objective group in which the national interest is paramount": "Defense Procurement: The Vital Roles of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," A-31. Three years later, a report commissioned by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund complained that the JCS functioned "too often as a committee of partisan adversaries engaged in advancing service strategic plans and compromising service differences": Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Special Studies Project, *International Security: The Military Aspect*, 29.
81. Memos of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 18 and 24 May 56, US DeptState, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-57* (hereafter cited as *FRUS*, with appropriate years, volume, and page numbers), XIX:303-05, 311-15 (quote, 305). Later the president told Wilson that, except for Admiral Radford, he was "disappointed" in the performance of the JCS because "they do not seem to be able to rise above a service approach": memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 31 Jul 56, fldr Budget and Programs Defense FY 58 (4), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
82. Lawrence J. Korb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years*, 26-93, provides a convenient summary of biographical information on JCS members.
83. Hughes, 50.
84. Senate Subcte on the Air Force, *Study of Airpower: Hearings*, 1457.
85. Radford statements during 1956 hearings on airpower, *ibid*, 1457-58, 1451, 1464-65.
86. Interv with Robert B. Carney by Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, 22 Feb 84, 15, OSD Hist; Burke interv, 9 Nov 1983, 32, *ibid*.
87. Gates interv, 3 Aug 67, 43, CUOHP; Senate Cte on Govt Opns, Subcte on Natl Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, I:667-68; Senate Subcte on the Air

- Force, *Study of Airpower: Hearings*, 1464-65 (Radford testimony); Stephen Jurika, Jr., ed., *From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford*, 323; McNeil interv, 7 Jun 76, 51, OSD Hist; Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management*, 127-28.
88. For Radford's views in 1949, see Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy and Politics," in Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies*, 516-17.
 89. US Cong, Senate, Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1955: Hearings*, 83 Cong, 2 sess (1954), 83. For similar statements by Radford, see U.S. Department of Defense, *The Collected Writings of Arthur W. Radford*, I:37, II:147.
 90. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 255; Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, 110. On Radford's conduct of the chairmanship, see Taylor, "Reflections on the American Military Establishment," 11; Peter F. Witteried, "The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: An Evolving Institution," M.A. thesis, University of Virginia, 1964, 62-115; and Joseph S. Harrelson, Jr., "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security," Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1968, 177-79, 273-75.
 91. Nathan F. Twining, *Neither Liberty Nor Safety: A Hard Look at U.S. Military Policy and Strategy*, 125; *New York Times*, 27 Mar 57; column by Brig Gen Thomas R. Phillips, USA (Ret), *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 30 Mar 57.
 92. McNeil interv, 7 Jun 76, 109, OSD Hist; Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, 110; interv with Taylor by Cole C. Kingseed, 17 Jun 81, in Kingseed, "Eisenhower and Suez," 221; Witteried, 128; Harrelson, 275-76; quote from Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 255; Burke interv, 9 Nov 83, 33, OSD Hist; Randall interv, 27 Apr 88, 84, *ibid*. General Lemnitzer, who replaced General Taylor as Army chief of staff in 1959, spoke of Twining's "indecisiveness": interv with Lyman L. Lemnitzer by Maurice Matloff, 19 Jan 84, 44, OSD Hist.
 93. Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, 108-10. Taylor's son recalled that his father suffered from psychosomatic back pains induced by the stress of dealing with Radford and Wilson: John M. Taylor, *General Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the Pen*, 211-12.
 94. Intervs with Arleigh A. Burke by John T. Mason, Jr., 14 Nov 72, 34-35, 79-83, CUOHP, and by Kingseed, 18 Jun 81, "Eisenhower and Suez," 226-27; John S. D. Eisenhower interv, 22 Oct 84, 22-23, OSD Hist. On Burke's career, see E. B. Potter, *Admiral Arleigh Burke*; Ken Jones and Humbert Kelley, Jr., *Admiral Arleigh (31-Knot) Burke: The Story of a Fighting Sailor*; David Alan Rosenberg, "Arleigh Albert Burke," in Robert William Love, Jr., ed., *The Chiefs of Naval Operations*, 263-319.
 95. PL 82-416 (28 Jun 52); Edwin H. Simmons, "The Marines: Survival and Accommodation," 80, 88; interv with Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., by Benis N. Frank, 16 Feb 67, 436-37, and 22 Feb 67, 481-82, History and Museums Division, Headquarters, USMC, Washington, DC.
 96. Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 94; file of Agendas and Advices of Action for AFPC mtgs, OSD Hist; DoD Dir 5105.3, 13 May 52, reissued 2 Jan 59.
 97. PLs 79-585 (1 Aug 46) and 83-703 (30 Aug 54).
 98. Memo SecDef for SvcSecs et al, 14 Jul 55, OSD Hist; "This is the Department of Defense," 24-25.
 99. Memo DepSecDef for AsstSecsDef et al, 13 Dec 55, OSD Hist; memo Col J. S. Hughes for McGuire, 13 Jun 56, fldr 337 Apr-May-Jun 56, Box 11, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1956, Acc 60-A1339.
 100. For the origin and early history of the NSC, see James S. Lay, Jr., and Robert H. Johnson, "Organizational History of the National Security Council," in Senate Subcte on Natl Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, II:417-44; Rearden, *Formative Years*, 118-23; and John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush*, 19-56.
 101. The operation of the NSC under Eisenhower is described in Prados, 57-95; Robert Cutler, "The Development of the National Security Council," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIX (Apr 56), 442-58; Dillon Anderson, "The President and National Security," *Atlantic*, CXCVII (Jan 56), 42-46; and Stanley L. Falk, "The National Security Council under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXIX (Sep 64),

- 403-26 (reprinted in shorter form in Falk, *The National Security Structure*, 33-52). The Cutler and Anderson articles (both by authors who had served as special assistant for national security affairs) are reprinted in Senate Subcte on Natl Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, II:166-79, 159-66.
102. Lay and Johnson, "Organizational History of the National Security Council," 447-53; Cutler testimony, 24 May 1960, in Senate Subcte on Natl Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, I:579-83; Cutler, "The Development of the National Security Council," 443-46; Anderson, "The President and National Security," 44-46.
 103. Lay and Johnson, 443-44. Cutler, though a banker by profession, was often referred to as "General" Cutler, having achieved the rank of brigadier general in World War II.
 104. Intervs with Gordon Gray by Paul Hopper, 19 Jul 67, 273, and by Maclyn P. Burg, 25 Jun 75, 7-10, CUOHP. For the contrast between the role of the special assistant under Eisenhower and under his successors, see Phillip G. Henderson, "Advice and Decision: The Eisenhower National Security Council Reappraised," in Hoxie et al, 156, 180-83, and "Evolution of the Position of National Security Adviser, 1947-1980," Ofc of the Historian, DeptState, Research Project No 1225, Apr 80.
 105. See William R. Kintner, *Forging a New Sword: A Study of the Department of Defense*, 81-83, for a discussion of this point.
 106. Lay and Johnson, 453-65; Cutler, "The Development of the National Security Council," 448-49; "Functions and Organization of the Operations Coordinating Board," handbook prepared by the OCB, Feb 58, printed in Senate Subcte on Natl Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, II:136-41; interv with Karl G. Harr by Paul Hopper, 27 Apr 67, 23-30, CUOHP; Exec Orders 10483, 2 Sep 53, and 10700, 25 Feb 57.
 107. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Business Organization of the Department of Defense*, A22; Falk, *The National Security Structure*, 423-26; Hammond, "The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination," 904-05.
 108. For a defense of Eisenhower's use of the NSC, see Gordon Gray, "Role of the National Security Council in the Formulation of National Policy," Senate Subcte on Natl Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, II:185-89, and, at greater length, the definitive article by Henderson, "Advice and Decision: The Eisenhower National Security Council Reappraised."
 109. For a general account of Dulles as secretary of state, see Louis L. Gerson, *John Foster Dulles*. For comments on his role from various points of view, see Hughes, 70-71, 204-08; Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (largely hostile); and Richard Gould-Adams, *John Foster Dulles: A Reappraisal* (more favorable). Richard H. Immerman, ed., *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, is a balanced collection of essays.
 110. Interv with Arthur W. Radford by Philip A. Crowl, 8 May 65, 7-9, 14, 16, JFDOHP; interv with John W. Hanes, Jr., by Philip A. Crowl, 12 Aug 66, 240, *ibid*; Taylor interv, 11 May 66, 11-12, *ibid*. According to Hanes, Dulles was "appalled" by some of Wilson's remarks that had adverse diplomatic repercussions (interv, 229). Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 365-66, cites an example of a disagreement between Radford and Dulles in the NSC.
 111. Hughes, 71; Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 23; McNeil interv, 7 Jun 76, 127, OSD Hist; interv with Robert Sprague by Richard D. Challener, 11 Aug 64, 40-42, JFDOHP; interv with George Humphrey and Herbert Hoover, Jr., by Philip A. Crowl, 5 May 64, 13-15, 18, *ibid*.
 112. *United States Government Organization Manual, 1956-57*, 65-71; Harry B. Yoshpe and Stanley L. Falk, *Organization for National Security*, 141-48.
 113. A detailed study of OSD-BoB relationships in the preparation of the FY 1960 budget was conducted by a Senate subcommittee in 1959: US Cong, Senate, Cte on Armed Svcs (Preparedness Investigating Subcte), *Major Defense Matters: Hearings*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (1959), 205-352. For evidence of friction between OSD and BoB, see Randall interv, 26 Apr 88, 65-66, OSD Hist, and McNeil testimony in House Cte on Appros, *Military Construction Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (1957), 50.

114. For these and other managerial improvements, see *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1956*, 32-42, and *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1957*, 8-10, 35-43.
115. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, I:215. The change was formally promulgated by DoD Dir 5129.1, 18 Mar 57.
116. Memo OSD Historian for McGiffert, "What Place Legislative Affairs?," 25 Aug 65, and encls D and E; White House PR, 14 Feb 57; DoD Dir 5122.5, 17 Aug 57.
117. Mins of first mtg of DSB, 20 Sep 56, OSD Hist; DoD Instr 5128.31, 31 Dec 56.
118. Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 164-72; memo DepSecDef for ASDs et al, 8 Feb 56, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for SecA et al, 7 May 57, fldr Orgn of Exec Branch of Govt 1956 (Jan-Mar), Box 17, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379; Robertson, "Remarks."
119. The 19 recommendations in this report are printed in Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 164-66, with the secretary's comments on 166-70.
120. The recommendations of the Cordiner Committee, which led to legislative changes in the pay and grade structure of enlisted military personnel, stemmed from the Hoover Commission's subcommittee report on special personnel problems of DoD. See ch V.
121. Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 172. For a complete list of all the recommendations, excluding those concerning intelligence, see Senate Cte on Government Operations, *Action by the Congress and the Executive Branch of the Government on the Second Hoover Commission Reports, 1955-57*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), S Rept 1289.
122. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Business Organization of the Department of Defense*, 19-23; Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 164, 167; Robertson, "Remarks."
123. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Subcommittee Report on Research Activities in the Department of Defense and Defense Related Agencies*, 18-19, and *Research and Development in the Government: A Report to the Congress*, 6-7; ltr ASD(AE) to SecDef, 10 Oct 56, fldr Resignation from Defense Dep, Box 3, Frank D. Newbury papers, DDEL; ltr ASD(R&D) to Wilson, 15 Feb 57, fldr 95 Organization General (June 1953-Oct 1958), Box 13, OASD(R&E) files, Acc 61-A1491.
124. Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 164, 169.

II. DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROBLEMS IN 1956

1. *New York Times*, 26 Sep 52; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1953*, 17.
2. The evolution of the New Look will be treated in full in Richard M. Leighton, the forthcoming vol III in *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*. For earlier accounts, see Glenn H. Snyder, "The 'New Look' of 1953," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets*, 379-524; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics*, 64-88; and Robert J. Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-54*, vol V in *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 4-7, 59-87.
3. Figures from various sources are given in Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 59-60, 80-84. Only 15 of the Army's 18 divisions were combat-ready, the other 3 being engaged in training activities: Kenneth W. Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955-56*, vol VI in *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 52. Force reductions had of course been facilitated by the end of the Korean War in July 1953.
4. Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 82.
5. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1954*, 556-62; *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1956*, M28, 506-08. The 1956 figures include under "OSD and Interservice" money for military construction, which was to be requested later.
6. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1957*, M5, M22-M27; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957: Hearings*, 2-7.
7. *Budget of the United States, 1957*, M22. Actual expenditures for 1956 were \$35.791 billion—somewhat higher than forecast: *DoD Fact Sheet 1976*, 31.

8. *Army-Navy-Air Force Journal*, XCIII (21 Jan 56), 630.
9. On the reception of the FY 1957 budget, see Edward A. Kolodziej, *The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945-1963*, 225-36.
10. Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, *Study of Airpower: Hearings*, passim.
11. US Cong, House, Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957: Additional Hearings*, 84 Cong, 2 sess (1956), 2-6; US Cong, Senate, Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957: Hearings*, 84 Cong, 2 sess (1956), 5.
12. US Cong, House, Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957: Additional Hearings*, 84 Cong, 2 sess (1956), 32-39. The above figures do not include \$785 million to be transferred from stock funds and an additional \$200 million proposed for later transmission. Addition of these sums would bring the total to \$36.174 billion, compared with the original request of \$35.7 billion.
13. On this episode, see *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1956*, III:765; *New York Times*, 23 Jun 56; Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, *Study of Airpower: Hearings*, 1788-89; Geelhoed, *Wilson*, 140-44.
14. US Cong, Senate, *Appropriations, Budget Estimates, etc.*, 799-800, 822. The supplemental act also authorized \$437 million for construction to be drawn from Army and Navy stock funds.
15. Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, *Study of Airpower: Hearings*, 1708-16, 1722, 1756-57.
16. See Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 1-57, on the origin of the "basic national security policy" paper.
17. NSC 5602/1, 15 Mar 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:42-68.
18. See Taylor's comments on the similar language in NSC 5501, which preceded NSC 5602/1 in 1955: Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, 26-27.
19. Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 89-93.
20. *Ibid*, 93-100.
21. *Ibid*, 98-105, 159-61; Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 23-31.
22. Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 32-37. For a general description of the position of the services at this time, see Charles J. V. Murphy, "Defense: The Revolution Gets Revolutionary," *Fortune*, LIII (May 56), 101-03, 281-86. Preparation of the FY 1958 budget is described in ch VI.
23. Ronald H. Cole et al, *The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993*, 11-24.
24. Memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Jun 56, fldr 320.2 16 Jan 57, Box 12, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372; AFPC mtg notes, 19 Jun 56, fldr AFPC 2nd Quarter 1956, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; memo SecDef for JCS, 21 Jun 56, ltr SecDef to SecState, 22 Jun 56, ltr SecState to SecDef, 27 Jun 56; fldr 320.2 16 Jan 57, Box 12, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 63-A1372; memo Goodpaster for Radford, 29 Jun 56, fldr JCS (3) (Jun 56-Jun 57), Box 4, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
25. Memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Jun 56, cited in preceding note; Cole et al, *History of the Unified Command Plan*, 26-27.
26. Rearden, *Formative Years*, 385-402. The Key West Agreement is printed in Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 275-85.
27. Rearden, *Formative Years*, 402-22; Condit, *Test of War*, 298; Alfred Goldberg, *History of the United States Air Force*, 117-18; Alfred Goldberg and Donald Smith, *Army-Air Force Relations: The Close Air Support Issue*, 9-10.
28. Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 177-79; Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 293-306.
29. Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 179-86.
30. Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*; 62-64; Murphy, "Defense: The Revolution Gets Revolutionary," 254-56; Huntington, *The Common Defense*, 381-84; *Time*, LXVII (4 Jun 56), 19-21; Wilson press conference, 21 May 56, *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1956*, II:662-88.
31. AFPC mtg notes, 26 Jun 56, fldr AFPC 2nd Quarter 1956, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; memo DepSecDef for AFPC members, 3 Aug 56, fldr 400.174 1956, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379.
32. Memo, SecAF for SecDef, 14 Aug 56, fldr 452 11 Jan 57, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
33. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 17 Aug 56, memo SecA for SecDef, 10 Sep 56: *ibid*.

34. Memos (2) JCS for SecDef, 25 Oct 56, memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Nov 56: *ibid*.
35. Memo JCS for SecDef, 15 Nov 56, fldr 452 (Case File 27 Jan 58) 1958, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606.
36. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 8 Nov 56, fldr Nov 56 Diary—Staff Memos, Box 19, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memo Randall for CSA et al, 21 Nov 56, with replies, 21-23 Nov 56, fldr 452 11 Jan 57, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093; AFPC mtg notes, 20 Nov 56, fldr Armed Forces Policy Council Oct-Nov 56, Box 3, OASD (C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; memo SecDef for AFPC members, "Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense," 26 Nov 56, printed in Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 306-12; *New York Times*, 27 Nov 56. Wilson also issued directives (dated 26 Nov 56) to the CJCS; these are in fldr AFPC Oct-Nov 1956, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
37. DoD Dir 5160.22, 18 Mar 57, printed in Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 312-15.
38. For the 1956 election, see Hughes, *Ordeal of Power*, 174-229; John Bartlow Martin, *Adlai Stevenson and the World: The Life of Adlai E. Stevenson*, 359-92; and, with specific reference to defense and the test ban as issues, Huntington, *The Common Defense*, 259-62, and Robert A. Divine, *Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960*, 84-112. The account given here draws upon all of these.
39. *New York Times*, 11 Oct 56. One observer during the campaign deplored the fact that the Democrats were missing an opportunity to make an issue of the New Look and its resulting imbalance of forces: Gordon Harrison, "Wanted: More Politics in Defense," *Harper's*, CCXIII (Sep 56), 50-55. This article foreshadowed the public debate in 1957 over preparation for limited war, as described in ch V.
40. For Stevenson's major speeches on these subjects, see *New York Times*, 6 Sep and 16, 18, 19 Oct 56. Eisenhower's principal replies can be found in *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1956*, 779-88, 863-70, 971-78, 997-1002.
41. Text of letters in DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXV (29 Oct 56), 662-64.
42. *New York Times*, 28 Oct, 2 Nov 56; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1956*, 1053. The two crises are described in detail in ch III.
43. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1956*, III:1016-17, 1064-76, 1077-99 (quote, 1017).
44. *New York Times*, 22 Dec 56.

III. THE 1956 CRISES: SUEZ AND HUNGARY

1. These two terms seem to be used more or less interchangeably, with no precise definition, but "Middle East" is apparently the wider and more inclusive term. NSC policy papers dealing with the Near East included Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Israel, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and the Arabian peninsula sheikdoms. See, e. g., NSC 5428, 23 Jul 54, *FRUS 1952-54*, IX:525. The subtitle of this volume is "The Near and Middle East," indicating a distinction between the two terms. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan were dealt with in separate NSC papers. In this volume, the phrase "Near East" will be used to refer to the Arab states and Israel, "Middle East" to the larger area including Turkey and Iran. In discussions of foreign assistance, Greece was sometimes considered a part of the Near East along with Turkey and Iran.
2. On the attempt to organize MEDO, see Walter S. Poole, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol IV, 1950-1952, 331-53, and Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 326-30.
3. For the Tripartite Declaration, see DeptState, *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, II:2237, and for the Eisenhower and Dulles statements, *ibid*, 2238, and DeptState, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956*, 593.
4. NSC 5428, 23 Jul 54, *FRUS 1952-54*, IX:525-36.
5. On the evolution of the "northern tier" concept into the Baghdad Pact and U.S. relations with the latter, see Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 323-47, and Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 151-63.
6. Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 159-60; memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Mar 56, ltr SecDef to SecState, 5 Apr 56, ltr SecState to SecDef, 23 Apr 56, memo SecDef for ExecSec NSC, 15 May 56: *FRUS 1955-57*, XII:261, 267, 294-95, 297-98.

7. On Nasser in general, see Donald Neff, *Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East*, 29-120, passim; also Ali M. Yahya, "Egypt and the Soviet Union, 1955-1972: A Study in the Power of the Small State," 21-104.
8. Neff, 77-82, 93; Jon D. Glassman, *Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East*, 10-11. On the earlier consideration of military aid for Egypt, see Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 340-43.
9. Documents on the early history of the Suez Canal are in DeptState, *The Suez Canal Problem, July 26-September 22, 1956*, 1-20.
10. Ibid, 2-5.
11. Neff, 125-30; Keith Kyle, *Suez*, 82-85.
12. Neff, 244-45, 253-55, 257-58; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 30-33.
13. Memo of conv at White House, 19 Jul 56, memo of conv, DeptState, 19 Jul 56: *FRUS 1955-57*, XV:861-62, 867-73.
14. Kyle, 119-20, 130-34; Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, *The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen*, 64-65, 89-93; Neff, 266-72.
15. Anthony Eden, *The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: Full Circle*, 472-73; msg AmEmb London for State, 27 Jul 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI:3-5; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 27 Jul 56, *ibid*, 5-7; ltr Eden to Eisenhower, 27 Jul 56, *ibid*, 9-11; Neff, 275-76; Kyle, 135-37.
16. Msg AmEmb Paris for State, 27 Jul 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI:7-9; Neff, 255-56, 280, 289; Kyle, 143-45.
17. Msg CNO 27646 for CINCNELM, 280045Z Jul 56, OSD Hist; Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 327-28.
18. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 37-38, 40-41; Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, 378-86; documents in *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI:26-28, 62-68, 94-127; DeptState, "The London Tripartite Conversations on the Suez Canal, July 29-August 2, 1956," 1-52, and "The Suez Canal Problem, 1954-1958," 28-33.
19. Memo JCS for SecDef, 31 Jul 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI:117-18; memo DepSecDef for ExecSecNSC, *ibid*, 116.
20. Memo JCS for SecDef, 3 Aug 56, *ibid*, 154-56; memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 7 Aug 56, *ibid*, 153.
21. Memrcd Dillon Anderson, 6 Aug 56, *ibid*, 151-53.
22. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1956*, III:970-71, 974, 975.
23. Record of telephone call, Dulles to Pres, 8 Aug 56, fldr Aug 56 Phone Calls, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL. Dulles described the ambassador as "very disturbed" by Wilson's remarks. In recording the incident in his memoirs, Eisenhower used the more colorful word "horrified" and added that he had to tell Wilson not to deride the seriousness of the matter: Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 43.
24. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1956*, 660-61, 668, 670-71 (quote, 660).
25. Memo of disc (Boggs), 292nd NSC mtg, 9 Aug 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI:165-76.
26. Memo SecDef for SecA et al, 14 Aug 56, fldr 380 (11 Jan 56) 1956, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379; Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 179.
27. Memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Aug 56, fldr 380 (11 Jan 56) 1956, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379. The conclusions are printed in *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI:264-67.
28. Memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Aug 56, fldr 380 (11 Jan 56) 1956, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379.
29. Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 181-82; ltr ASD(ISA) for AsstSecState (Rountree), 3 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI:628-29.
30. Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 182.
31. DeptState, "The Suez Canal Problem, 1954-1958," 51-126; Kyle, 223-32, 242-48, 252-55; Neff, 296-307, 320.
32. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1956*, 756-57 (quote, 757); DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXV (24 Sep 56), 479.
33. Neff, 308; Kyle, 249-50; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 51.
34. Kyle, 272-90; DeptState, "The Suez Canal Problem, 1954-1958," 127-40; DeptState, *United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956-June 1957: Documents*, 120, 122-23 (hereafter cited as DeptState, *U.S. Policy in M.E., 1956-57*).

35. Kennett Love, *Suez: The Twice-Fought War*, 433-69; Neff, 304-48; Kyle, 167-79, 233-42, 266-71, 291-97, 314-36; Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy*, 263-74.
36. For a thorough analysis of information available to the United States, see Wayne G. Jackson, *Allen Welsh Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence, 26 February 1953-29 November 1961*, V:1-38 (especially 36-38).
37. Chester L. Cooper, *The Lion's Last Roar: Suez, 1956*, 158-59; Love, 471-73.
38. Neff, 310-12, 330-32, 354-58; Kyle, 293-97; *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI:801-02; DeptState, *U.S. Policy in M.E., 1956-57*, 135.
39. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1956*, III:1088-91 (quote, 1090).
40. NSC 5608/1, 18 Jul 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXV:216-21.
41. R. F. Leslie, Antony Polonsky, Jan M. Ciechanowski, and Z. A. Pelzynski, *The History of Poland Since 1863*, 330-66; Konrad Syrop, *Spring in October: The Story of the Polish Revolution, 1956*, 3-187.
42. Ferenc A. Vali, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism Versus Communism*, 258-305; Leonard Bushkoff, "Hungary (October-November 1956)," in D. M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al, *The Experience in Europe and the Middle East*, vol II in *Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict*, 537-50; Noel Barber, *Seven Days of Freedom: The Hungarian Uprising 1956*, 21-122.
43. Memo of disc (Gleason), 301st NSC mtg, 26 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXV:295-99; Ferrell, 333 (entry for 26 Oct 56).
44. Gates's memo to Wilson on this subject has not been found but is mentioned in a briefing paper for the PB mtg, 29 Oct 56, fldr 5616 U.S. Policy toward Develop Poland and Hungary, Box 16, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
45. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 27 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXV:309-10; *New York Times*, 29 Oct 56.
46. NSC 5616, 31 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXV:354-58; memo JCS for SecDef, 31 Oct 56, fldr 5616 U.S. Policy toward Develop Poland and Hungary, Box 16, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
47. DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXV (5 Nov 56), 697; msgs State 510 for AmEmb Moscow, 29 Oct 56, and AmEmb Moscow 1005 for State, 30 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXV:328, 347-48; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1956*, 1062.
48. Kyle, 347-50; Neff, 363-74; *New York Times*, 30 Oct 56.
49. Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 185-86.
50. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 71-72; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 29 Oct 56, 7:15 pm, *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI:833-39; Hughes, *Ordeal of Power*, 214.
51. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 29 Oct 56, cited in preceding note; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 72-73. Adams, *Firsthand Report*, 256, has what appears to be an account of this meeting but represents it as taking place in the morning rather than the evening of 29 October.
52. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 29 Oct 56, 8:15 pm, *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI: 839-40.
53. Memo CNO for SecNav, 30 Oct 56, fldr 370.02 1957, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372; memo SJCS for CJCS, 29 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI:826-27; msg JCS 912463 for Specified and Unified Cmdrs, 29 Oct 56 (9:38 pm Washington time), *ibid*, 844-46.
54. Texts of messages in *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI:848-50, 856-57.
55. DeptState, "The Suez Canal Problem, 1954-1958," 161-67; Kyle, 363-65.
56. Kyle, 358-59; Neff, 378; DeptState, "The Suez Canal Problem, 1954-1958," 163; *New York Times*, 31 Oct 56.
57. DeptState, *U.S. Policy in M.E., 1956-57*, 138-42; Neff, 374-77; Kyle, 361.
58. Memo JCS for SecDef, 30 Oct 56, ltr SecDef to SecState, 30 Oct 56, memo UnderSecState to SecState, 31 Oct 56: fldr 370.02 1957, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
59. Interv with Arleigh A. Burke by Richard D. Challener, 11 Jan 66, 12-22, JFDOHP; interv with Burke by Cole Christian Kingseed, 18 Jun 81, in Kingseed, "Eisenhower and Suez," 224-35.
60. Love, 508-10, 515-18, 591-92; Neff, 381-82.
61. Neff, 382-83, 393-95; Kyle, 371-75, 380-84, 413-18; *New York Times*, 1 Nov 56.
62. Vali, 296-97, 316; Bushkoff, 561; Barber, 123-41; text of Soviet declaration in DeptState, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956*, 463-66.

63. Record of telcon, Lodge and Eisenhower, fldr Oct 56 Phone Calls, Box 18, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
64. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 80; Hughes, 219-21; text of speech in *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1956, 1060-66.
65. Condit, *JCS and National Policy*, 1955-56, 336; Marshall Smelser, "The Amiable Armada: Operations of the U.S. Sixth Fleet During the Suez War," passim; interv with Vice Adm Charles R. Brown, COMSIXTHFLT, *U.S. News and World Report*, XLI (14 Dec 56), 30; Kingseed, 145-46, and interv with Burke, *ibid*, 233. The "take no guff" message is quoted in *New York Times*, 15 Nov 56.
66. Memo of disc (Gleason), 302nd NSC mtg, 1 Nov 56, *FRUS* 1955-57, XVI:902-16; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 82-83.
67. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 83-84; DeptState, *U.S. Policy in M.E.*, 1956-57, 151-58; editorial note, *FRUS* 1955-57, XVI:932-33.
68. DeptState, *U.S. Policy in M.E.*, 1956-57, 158-60, and "The Suez Canal Problem, 1954-1958," 171-72; Eden statement in *FRUS* 1955-57, XVI:946.
69. DeptState, "The Suez Canal Problem, 1954-1958," 172-73, and *U.S. Policy in M.E.*, 1956-57, 160-61; Neff, 400.
70. DeptState, *U.S. Policy in M.E.*, 1956-57, 167-69, 173-74, and "The Suez Canal Problem, 1954-1958," 174-75.
71. DeptState, *U.S. Policy in M.E.*, 1956-57, 174-75; Kyle, 437-43; Neff, 402-03; *New York Times*, 5 Nov 56.
72. DeptState, *U.S. Policy in M.E.*, 1956-57, 175-76; *New York Times*, 5 Nov 56.
73. Neff, 397-98, 402-03; Kyle, 413-14, 446.
74. Vali, 358-77; Bushkoff, 553-55, 561-62; Barber, 145-91; *New York Times*, 4, 5 Nov 56; United Nations Organization, *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1956, 69.
75. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 87; *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1956, 1080-81.
76. Kyle, 445-50, 454-56, 461-64; ltr Dixon to UNSG in DeptState, *U.S. Policy in M.E.*, 1956-57, 188.
77. *New York Times*, 6 Nov 56; DeptState, *U.S. Policy in M.E.*, 1956-57, 178-80, 182-88; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 89-90; Hughes, 222-23.
78. Msg JCS 912901 for CINCAL et al, 060019Z Nov 56 (7:19 pm Washington time), OSD Hist.
79. Neff, 407-09; Kyle, 461-64.
80. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 90-91.
81. AFPC mtg notes, 6 Nov 56 (beginning 9:35 am), fldr AFPC Oct-Nov 56, Box 3, OASD (C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
82. Memo SJCS for CJCS, 6 Nov 56, w/encl, JCS recommendations to Pres to improve state of readiness, fldr 091 Palestine (Jun-Dec 56), Box 16, Chairman's file, Adm Radford 1953-57, RG 218, NARA.
83. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 91; memrcd Burke, 6 Nov 56, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
84. AFPC mtg notes, 6 Nov 56, 4:00 pm, fldr AFPC Oct-Nov 56, Box 2, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; msg JCS 912988 for Specified and Unified Cmdrs, 6 Nov 56, 11:56 pm Washington time, *FRUS* 1955-57, XVI:1035-36.
85. Neff, 209-10; Love, 623-25; Kyle, 465; Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, 1956-1959, 164.
86. Neff, 409-11; Kyle, 464-76.
87. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 92-93; telcon Pres and PM, 6 Nov 56, *FRUS* 1955-57, XVI:1025-27.
88. DeptState, *U.S. Policy in M.E.*, 1956-57, 190-91.
89. *Ibid*, 188-89.
90. Bushkoff, 555-56; Vali, 377; Barber, 192-221.
91. *New York Times*, 7, 9, 11 Nov 56; msg USUN DELGA 28 for SecState, 7 Nov 56, OSD Hist; Tass statement in DeptState, *U.S. Policy in M.E.*, 1956-57, 214-16.
92. Condit, *JCS and National Policy*, 1955-56, 191; memo Radford for Goodpaster, 15 Nov 56, with notations by Goodpaster 17 Nov 56 indicating presidential action, fldr JCS (3) (Jun 56-Jun 57), Box 4, DoD subser, Sub ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; memo by Robert Murphy of conv with Radford, 17 Nov 56, fldr 091 Palestine (Jun-Dec 56), Box 16, Chairman's file, Adm Radford 1953-57, RG 218, NARA.

93. Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 190; ltr ASD(ISA) to DepUnderSecState, 9 Nov 56, memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 9 Nov 56, memo CJCS for SecDef, 9 Nov 56, memo DepSecDef for SecNav, 12 Nov 56: fldr Egypt 1956, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379.
94. Joint Proposal by State and Defense, "Proposed United States Contribution to United Nations International Force," 10 Nov 56, approved by Pres, *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI:1102-03.
95. Memo DepSecDef for SecAF, 23 Nov 56, fldr Egypt 1956, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379.
96. *New York Times*, 10, 16 Nov 56; United Nations Organization, *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1957*, 47-52; E.L.M. Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli*, 186-239.
97. DeptState, *U.S. Policy in M.E., 1956-57*, 207-08, 238-39; Neff, 431.
98. Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 191.
99. Neff, 430, 435-36; quote from memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 25 Nov 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI:1194-95.
100. Statement by Flemming, DirODM, at meeting with congressional leaders, 12 Aug 56, cited in Adams, 252-53; Love, 651; Neff, 420.
101. Adams, 252; notes on Presidential-Bipartisan Congressional Leadership mtg, 12 Aug 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI:192-93.
102. Memos of disc (Gleason), 303rd and 304th NSC mtgs, 8, 15 Nov 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI:1070-78, 1127-32; memo SecDef for DepSecDef, 16 Nov 56, fldr 1956, Additional SecDef Wilson files, Acc 63-A1768.
103. Adams, 268-70; memo of disc (Gleason), 305th NSC mtg, *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI:1223-29; ODM PR, 30 Nov 56, in DeptState, *U.S. Policy in M.E., 1956-57*, 358; Love, 655.
104. DeptState, "The Suez Canal Problem, 1954-1958," 224-45; Love, 651-52; United Nations Organization, *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956*, 53-55; Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1957*, 159-60, 171-72; *New York Times*, 19, 21 Feb, 9, 30 Mar, 30 Apr 57.
105. Stebbins, 1957, 172-73; ltr Egyptian ForMin to UNSG, 24 Apr 57, in DeptState, *U.S. Policy in M.E., 1956-57*, 386-89.
106. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 193.
107. AFPC mtg notes, 13 Nov 56, fldr AFPC Oct-Nov 56, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; AFPC Advice of Action, 13 Nov 56, OSD Hist; ltr SecDef to SecState, 14 Nov 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XII:324-25.
108. Memo by SecState, 16 Nov 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XII:330-31.
109. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 21 Nov 56, 4:00 pm, *ibid*, 340-42; DeptState, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956*, 699-700.
110. Memo JCS for SecDef, 30 Nov 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XII:361-63.
111. Memo of disc (Gleason), 305th NSC mtg, 30 Nov 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XVI:1218-29. For the 1955 Taiwan Strait crisis and the congressional resolution, see Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 193-99.
112. Ltr UnderSecState to SecDef, 3 Dec 56, ltrs SecDef to Pres, 4 Dec 56, w/encls, and SecDef to SecState, same date: fldr 092.3 (A-2) 1956, Box 10, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379.
113. Note by Robert G. Sturgill, ExecSecretariat, DeptState, 18 Dec 56, memo by SecState, 18 Dec 56, memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 20 Dec 56: *FRUS 1955-57*, XII:412-13, 415-17.
114. Notes on Presidential-Bipartisan Congressional Leadership mtg, 1 Jan 57, *ibid*, 432-37.
115. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1957*, 6-16; text of joint resolution in DeptState, *U.S. Policy in M.E., 1956-57*, 23-34.
116. US Cong, House Cte on Foreign Affairs, *Economic and Military Cooperation with Nations in the General Area of the Middle East: Hearings*, 79-98; Sen Ctes on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, *The President's Proposal on the Middle East: Hearings*, 404-43; *New York Times*, 31 Jan 57.
117. Neff, 431-35; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 183-89; U.S. aide-mémoire given Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban by SecState, 11 Feb 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XVII:132-34; Eisenhower statement in press conf, 7 Mar 57, *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1957*, 182-83.
118. *New York Times*, 6, 10 Mar 57; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1957*, 187-88; text of resolution in DeptState, *U.S. Policy in M.E., 1956-57*, 44-46.

119. Memo of disc (Gleason), 303rd NSC mtg, 8 Nov 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXV:418-21. The text of Bulganin's letter, as broadcast by Moscow radio on 9 November, is in *New York Times*, 9 Nov 56.
120. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1956, 1093.
121. Memo of disc (Gleason), 302nd NSC mtg, 1 Nov 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXV:358-59; NSC 5616/1, 13 Nov 56, OSD Hist.
122. Memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Nov 56, fldr 5616 U.S. Policy toward Develop Poland and Hungary, Box 16, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; memo of disc (Gleason), 304th NSC mtg, 15 Nov 56, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
123. NSC 5616/2, 19 Nov 56, fldr 5616 U.S. Policy toward Develop Poland and Hungary, Box 16, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; printed in *FRUS 1955-57*, XXV:463-69, but with the quoted sentence omitted.
124. Memo of disc (Gleason), 305th NSC mtg, 30 Nov 56, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Melvin J. Lasky, ed., *The Hungarian Revolution: The Story of the October Uprising as Recorded in Documents, Dispatches, Eye-Witness Accounts, and World-Wide Reactions*, 315.
125. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1956, 1116-18.
126. Memrcd Earl B. Smith OASD(S&L), 5 Dec 56, memos DepSecDef for SecAF and SecNav, 6 Dec 56: fldr Hungary 1957, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372; ltr McNeil to Corhal D. Orescan, House Cte on Appros, McNeil Reading file 1957, OSD Hist.
127. Memrcd Earl B. Smith, 4 Jan 57, memos DepSecDef for SecNav, 7 Jan 57, and for SecA and SecAF, 10 Jan 57, memo ASD(S&L) for DepSecDef, 15 May 57: fldr Hungary 1957, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372.

IV. THE BUDGET FOR FY 1958

1. For budgeting during President Eisenhower's administration, see Watson, *JCS and National Policy*, 1953-54, 59-87, and Condit, *JCS and National Policy*, 1955-56, 65-87.
2. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 27 Jan 56, fldr Reading File June 55-Oct 57, Wilson Reading and Speech files, Acc 63-A1802. For the 1953 procedure, see Watson, *JCS and National Policy*, 1953-54, 14-21.
3. Memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Mar 56, OSD Hist.
4. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 24 May 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:311-15. One reason why the JCS estimates proved so far off the mark was, as Radford later told the president, that they had been prepared without staff assistance: memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 17 Aug 56, fldr Aug 56 Diary—Staff Memos, Box 17, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
5. Ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 5 Apr 56, memo ASD(C) for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 21 Apr 56: fldr Budget 1958 #1, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
6. The service requests and projections, with analyses by McNeil's staff, are in fldr FY 1958 Flash Estimates, *ibid*.
7. Ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 1 June 56, fldr Budget 1958 #1, *ibid*.
8. Memo of disc (Gleason), 285th NSC mtg, 17 May 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:310.
9. Memo SecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 14 Jun 56, fldr 1958 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. The analysis of "problem areas" is not attached and has not been found, but it doubtless focused upon the largest items in the service proposals.
10. Memo of conf at White House (Goodpaster), 23 May 56, fldr Budget, Military (4) (May-Dec 1956), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 23 May 56, notes of meeting on Wednesday, May 23, ns, evidently prepared in McNeil's ofc, encl/w memo McNeil for Shannon and Lehrer, 5 Jun 56: fldr Budget 1958 #1, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
11. Handwritten note by Goodpaster of conf, 12 Jul 56, fldr Budget and Program, Defense FY 58 (5), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL. The source of Wilson's target figure of \$38.7 billion is not indicated in available records; presumably it was based on discussions with Radford, McNeil, and others.
12. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 31 Jul 56, fldr Budget and Program, Defense FY 58 (4), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.

13. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1956*, III:972-74.
14. NSC Action 1574, 14 Jun 56, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1956, Box 3, OASD Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024; memo SecDef for SecA et al, 27 Jul 56, fldr 381 Feb-Dec 56, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379.
15. NSC 5609, 6 Aug 56, is summarized in editorial note, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:337. See also McNeil presentation in fldr Defense Budget Outlook (FY 1958-60) Presentation to NSC 17 August 56, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memos of disc (Boggs), 293rd and 294th NSC mtgs, 16, 17 Aug 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:345-57.
16. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 17 Aug 56, fldr Aug 56 Diary—Staff Memos, Box 17, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
17. Memos DepSecDef for ASD(C) and ASD(R&D), 24 and 28 Aug 56, for SvcSecs, 24 Aug 56, and for ASDs et al, 5 Sep 56, fldr 110.01 Jan-Dec 56, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379; presentations to DepSecDef Sep-Oct 56, fldrs Robertson Presentations (File I and II), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
18. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 2 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, IV:99-102.
19. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 11 Oct 56, fldr Oct 56 Diary—Staff Memos, Box 19, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL. For the background of the "pentomic" division reorganization, see Virgil Ney, *Evolution of the U.S. Army Division, 1939-1968*, 71-75, and John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, *Army Lineage Series, Infantry*, pt 1, *Regular Army*, 89.
20. Memo CNO for SecDef, 6 Nov 56, fldr 110.01 (1958-59 Budget) 1956, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379.
21. Memrcds Burke, 4, 8 Nov 56, summarizing mtgs between SecDef and SvcSecs (evidently based on information from SecNav Thomas, since Burke was not present), Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; memrcd Max Lehrer and W. Carl Blaisdell, OASD(C), 10 Nov 56, fldr FY 1958 Budget—Nov-Dec 56 (File 2), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist (quotes from Burke memo of 4 Nov).
22. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 8 Nov 56, fldr Nov 56 Diary—Staff Memos, Box 19, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
23. Memo JCS for SecDef, 15 Nov 56, fldr Budget 1958 #1, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
24. Memrcd Burke, 15 Nov 56, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
25. Memo SecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 16 Nov 56, fldr Budget 1958 #1, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. Actual strength of the services was 2,800,524 on 31 October 1956 and 2,797,754 on 30 November: *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1 to December 31, 1956*, 71.
26. Memo SecDef for Pres, 20 Nov 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:371.
27. Memo SecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 21 Nov 56, fldr Budget 1958 #1, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
28. D/Army FY Budget Estimates Submitted to Department of Defense November 26, 1956, OCA BUD #186, 187, 188, memo SecNav for SecDef, 27 Nov 56, memo SecAF for SecDef, "Air Force Budget Estimates FY 1958," (originally undated; bears date 27 Nov 56 in pencil): fldr 110.01 (1958-59 Budget) 1956, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379. Convenient summaries of the service submissions are given in two typewritten tables, evidently prepared by OASD(C), in fldr FY 1958 Budget—Nov-Dec 56 Work Papers, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
29. For details of the programs on which the service submissions were based, see various papers in FY 1958 Budget—Nov-Dec 56 Work Papers, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
30. The AF program for FY 1960 was based on the abortive JSOP-60 prepared earlier (see ch II). During its preparation, the number of heavy bomber wings had been a matter of disagreement among the JCS. See encl to memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Jun 56, fldr 381 JSOP 60, Box 1, OASD(C) files, Acc 62-A4671.
31. Table "Major Force Structure, ME-58," atchmt A with memo SecAF for SecDef, 27 Nov 56, fldr 110.01 (1958-59 Budget) 1956, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379, gives AF objectives in terms of units. For numbers of aircraft and missiles and the amount of money required for each, see tables headed "F.Y. 1958 Aircraft" and "F.Y. 1958 Missiles," 26 Nov 56, in fldr FY 1958 Budget—Nov-Dec 56 (File 2), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
32. Papers on guided missiles and continental defense, prepared by Military Div, BoB, 14-15 Nov 56; similar papers on aircraft, 20 Nov 56, and on military construction, undated, unidentified but obviously from same source: fldr FY 1958 Budget—Nov-Dec 56 Work

Papers, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. Attached to these is a handwritten office memo, unsigned but doubtless prepared by someone in McNeil's office, reading: "Miscellaneous back-up material for McNeil-Wilson trip to Augusta, FY 1958 Budget." This indicates that Wilson and McNeil took the BoB analyses with them when they visited the president at Augusta on 7 December 1956.

33. Memrcd Lt Col R. L. Dooley, 26 Nov 56, transcripts of remarks by Wilson at AF presentation, 27 Nov 56, and Navy presentation, 28 Nov 56: fldr 110.01 (1958-59 Budget) 1956, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379. Also in this file are handwritten summaries (presumably prepared by McNeil or someone in his office) of the oral presentations by the SvcSecs, the MilSvcChiefs, and their assistants.
34. Handwritten notes of discussions of Wilson and others with services personnel, in fldr FY 1958 Budget—Nov-Dec 56 (File 2), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
35. Executive Branch Development of FY 1958 Budget Estimates by Appropriation Title, Table EFAD-324, 10 Sep 59, OSD Hist; typewritten tables showing new obligational authority, expenditures, and direct obligations by budget category, 6 Dec 56, fldr Meeting with President—December 7, 1956, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
36. Memo DirBoB for Pres, 3 Dec 56, OSD Hist.
37. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 7 Dec 56, record of telephone call, 7 Dec 56: fldr Dec 56 Diary—Staff Memos, Box 20, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL. It was during this conversation with Humphrey that the president made the remark, quoted in ch I, that Wilson was "frightened to make decisions." Evidently the president was irritated that Wilson had not taken the initiative in driving down the budget below \$39.6 billion. It was probably in reference to this meeting that the president later remarked that "Charlie [Wilson] almost had the colic": handwritten notes on Cabinet mtg, 9 Jan 57, fldr C-35(1) 9 Jan 57, Box 4, Cabinet ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
38. Interv with Wilson by Robert J. Donovan, 30 Dec 57, *New York Herald Tribune*, 31 Dec 57. Wilson said that he was "disappointed" over the results of the trip and felt that the White House "didn't pay enough attention" to recommendations of Defense officials—meaning, presumably, himself.
39. Table, "FY 1958 Budget," 15 Dec 56, fldr FY 1958 Budget—Nov-Dec 56 (File 2), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
40. Figures from tables in fldr FY 1958 Budget—Presentation to NSC, *ibid*.
41. Table, "Summary of Military Forces," *ibid*.
42. The composition of the 137-wing force had, however, been altered. One strategic fighter wing originally scheduled had been replaced by a strategic reconnaissance wing; 5 fighter wings had been dropped and replaced by 4 troop-carrier assault wings (previously considered supporting rather than combat forces) and a tactical missile wing (Matador): US Cong, Senate, Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (1957), 273.
43. US Cong, House, Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (1957), pt 1:1158-59, 905, 922.
44. *Ibid*, 404, 406, 604-05.
45. Table, "Summary of Military Forces," fldr FY 1958 Budget—Presentation to NSC, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
46. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 19 Dec 56, fldr Dec 56 Diary—Staff Memos, Box 20, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memo of disc (Gleason), 307th NSC mtg, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:384-94; debrief of NSC disc, 21 Nov 56, by Adm Burke, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
47. NSC Action 1643, 21 Dec 56, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1956, Box 3, OASD Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 11 Jan 57, fldr Jan 57 Diary—Staff Memos, Box 21, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memo SecDef for SecA et al, 25 Jan 57, fldr FY 1958 Budget—Presentation to NSC, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. About the same time the president noted this decision in his diary, giving the figure as "something on the order of \$38.5 billion": Ferrell, *Eisenhower Diaries*, 337 (dated by the editor Dec 1956, with a question mark).
48. Ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 26 Dec 56, fldr Budget 1958 #1, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
49. Ltrs DirBoB to SecDef, 29 Dec 56, and SecDef to DirBoB, 31 Dec 56, *ibid*.

50. Memrcd Goodpaster, 12 Jan 57, fldr Budget, Military (5) (Jan-Aug 57), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL. Available sources do not indicate the date of the meetings with the JCS referred to by Goodpaster and Radford.
51. Memo Goodpaster for SecDef et al, 31 Dec 56, atchmt to memrcd Goodpaster, 1 Jan 57, OSD Hist.
52. Memrcd Goodpaster, 1 Jan 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:395-96.
53. Notes on Presidential-Bipartisan Congressional Leadership mtg, 1 Jan 57, fldr Miscellaneous (4), Box 21, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; "Mr McNeil's Remarks before the Meeting of the Legislative Leaders. . .," fldr FY 1958 Budget—White House Presentation, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; Adams, *Firsthand Report*, 359-60. Most of the discussion at the meeting was devoted to the Middle Eastern situation (see ch III).
54. Minutes of Cabinet mtg, 9 Jan 57, fldr Jan 57 Miscellaneous (3), Cabinet record of action 9 Jan 57, RA-57-64, fldr Jan 57 Diary—Staff Memos: Box 21, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL. According to one account, the president had approved in advance the wording of the letter: Charles J. V. Murphy, "The Budget—and Eisenhower," *Fortune*, LVI (Jul 57), 230.
55. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1958*, M27, M29, 487-89.
56. *Ibid*, M29.
57. *Ibid*, M4-M5.
58. *New York Times*, 17 Jan 57. According to this source, the press conference was held on 15 January but was not made public until the next day. Most accounts state that the press conference took place on 16 January.
59. The text of the press conference is printed in US Cong, House, Cte on Appros, *The Budget for 1958: Hearings*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (1957), 1-14 (quotes, 2, 5, 7, and 14).
60. Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter*, 50. Neustadt's general account of this entire episode and its aftermath (49-60, 80-91) is excellent. A shorter account by one who was involved is Hughes, *Ordeal of Power*, 235-41.
61. *New York Times*, 18 Jan 57.
62. House Cte on Appros, *The Budget for 1958: Hearings*, 17-18, 37-39, 91, 102, 106, 109, 122-23, 131-32, 158-59, 171; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, pt 1:942-43.
63. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1957, 72-74, 78-79 (quote, 73-74.)
64. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, pt 1:13.
65. *Ibid*, 53.
66. PL 84-305 (9 Aug 55).
67. Memo SecDef to SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 26 Nov 56, fldr Budget 1958 #1, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist, printed in House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval and Military Establishments, 1957: Hearings*, 85 Cong, 2 Sess (1957), 665-66 (hereafter cited as *Sundry Legislation: Hearings*).
68. *New York Times*, 15 Jan 57. The full text of the Army announcement is in *Sundry Legislation: Hearings*, 486. On its background, see *ibid*, 692-93, 825; also John K. Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard*, 217-18.
69. *New York Times*, 15, 16 Jan 57. On the political power of the National Guard Association, see Martha Derthick, "Militia Lobby in the Missile Age—The Politics of the National Guard," in Samuel P. Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, 218-23, 227-30, and, at greater length, *The National Guard in Politics*, passim, esp. 72-108.
70. *Sundry Legislation: Hearings*, 111, 114, 128.
71. *New York Times*, 29, 30 Jan 57; Geelhoed, *Wilson*, 152-54. For a strongly worded assertion of the NGA viewpoint, see Maj Gen Walsh's statement before the Brooks subcommittee in *Sundry Legislation: Hearings*, 919-31. National Guard officials believed that an 11-week training period would suffice. On the NGA's efforts to block the execution of the Army directive, see Derthick, *National Guard in Politics*, 136-38.
72. *New York Times*, 30 Jan 57; Geelhoed, *Wilson*, 154. Wilson's staff tried to put the best possible face on the "dunghill" remark by suggesting, implausibly, that Wilson was alluding to a statement by the ancient Roman philosopher, Seneca, "Every cock is at his best on his own dunghill": *New York Times*, 30 Jan 57. Wilson himself cited this statement a few weeks later, attributing it to an "old Roman senator" and explaining that he had

meant that the White House "is not the place where I can talk best": *Time*, LXIX (4 Mar 57), 42. According to one report, however, Wilson used an earthier expression than "dunghill": Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson, *U.S.A.—Second-Class Power?*, 79.

73. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1957, 102; *New York Times*, 1 Feb 57; *Washington Evening Star*, 21 Jan 57.
74. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson*, 1957, I:167-69.
75. Memo Bryce Harlow for Ann Whitman, 4 Feb 57, describing mtg of Pres with Natl Guard officials, memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 6 Feb 57: fldr Feb 57 Diary—Staff Memos, Box 22, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
76. *Sundry Legislation: Hearings*, 433-39. For the aftermath of the controversy, see Geelhoed, *Wilson*, 158-63.
77. Ltr Pres to SecDef, 1 Feb 57, and reply SecDef to Pres, same date, Box 35, Charles E. Wilson Archive, Anderson, Indiana (hereafter abbreviated CEWA); *New York Times*, 3 Feb 57; Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon*, 144.
78. Correspondence in Boxes 76-79, CEWA. Only a few of the letters expressed disagreement with Wilson. Many avowed personal knowledge of individuals who had joined the National Guard to avoid being drafted. Often the writer linked Wilson with Humphrey as the two fearlessly frank members of the administration. Mrs. Wilson also came in for admiration for her defense of her husband. Geelhoed, *Wilson*, 157-58, summarizes this correspondence, with some quotes.
79. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, pt 1:415-16, 421-23, 443-87 (Army), 595, 609, 619, 622-24, 641 (Navy and Marine Corps), 910-11, 920, 941-42 (Air Force). Quarles and Twining rebutted some of the charges about the inadequacy of U.S. airpower made by the report of the Symington subcommittee, which had just been released: *ibid*, 1035-54.
80. *New York Times*, 17 Jan, 4, 17 Feb, 10 Mar 57; Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 390; Hughes, 237; Lyon, *Eisenhower: Portrait of a Hero*, 736; Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, 51; quotes from Kiplinger Washington Agency newsltr, 23 Feb 57.
81. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, pt 1:423, 1066-67; memo Maj Gen R.S. Moore (SpecAsst to McNeil) for Maj Gen William Lawton [evidently in DeptA], 13 Feb 57, fldr Budget 1958 #1, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; *Congressional Record*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (12 Mar 57), vol 103, pt 3:3520.
82. Memo Lee R. Shannon, DepASD(C), for Maj Gen Moore, 25 Feb 57, memo W. Carl Blaisdell for McNeil, 23 Mar 57: fldr Budget 1958 #1, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; notes on conversation between Shannon and Moore, ns, fldr FY 1958 Budget-January (File 3), *ibid*; Jt Secs Adv of Action, 25 Mar 57, OSD Hist; ltr AsstSecA(FM) to Mahon, 19 Apr 57, ltr SecNav to SecDef, 1 Apr 57, ltr SecAF to Mahon, 17 Apr 57: fldr FY 1958 Budget (McNeil File), *ibid*; memo McNeil for SecNav, 16 Apr 57, fldr FY 1958 File #1A, *ibid*.
83. *New York Times*, 13 Mar 57; *Congressional Record*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (12 Mar 57), vol 103, pt 3:3493-3529; US Cong, House, Cte on Appros, *Requesting the President for Certain Information Pertaining to the Budget*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (1957), H Rept 187.
84. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 25 Mar 57, memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 1 Apr 57: OSD Hist; memrcd Goodpaster, 18 Apr 57, fldr Budget, Military (5) (Jan-Aug 57), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; handwritten notes Cabinet mtg, 29 Mar 57, fldr C-36 (3) March 29 and April 5, 1957, Box 4, Cabinet ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1957, 301-09.
85. The wholesale price index for 1955 was 110.7 (lower than the 1952 figure of 111.6). For 1956 it rose to 114.3 and for 1957 to 117.6, an increase of slightly over 6 percent in 2 years. For the consumer index, the corresponding figures were: 1955, 114.5, 1956, 116.2, 1957, 120.2: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1962, 343, 348. (1947-49=100).
86. Ltr Wilson to Humphrey, 29 May 57, fldr FY 1958 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist (one of three identically labeled folders in this file, with documents arranged approximately in chronological order); statements by Wilson to AFPC, AFPC mtg notes, 9 Jul 57, fldr AFPC 3rd Qtr 1957, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062 (also rptd in memrcd Burke, 9 Jul 57, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC); *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson*, 1957, II:619-20.

87. Average computed from figures in memo Brundage for Pres, 26 Aug 57, fldr Budget, Military (5) (Jan-Aug 57), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
88. Jt Secs Advice of Action, 14 Jan 57, OSD Hist.
89. Ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 29 Jan 57, fldr Budget 1958 #1, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
90. In his budget message in January 1957, the president had estimated a total for these programs amounting to \$38.6 billion, \$36.0 billion for the military and \$2.6 billion for military assistance: *The Budget of the United States for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1956*, M13. For the first 3 months of calendar year 1957, the actual totals were \$3.5, \$3.4, and \$3.5 billion, respectively, or a total of over \$10 billion for the quarter: memo, Brundage to Pres, 26 Aug 57, cited in n 87.
91. Ltr, DirBoB to SecDef, 29 Mar 57, fldr Budget CL-100 Apr-June 57, Box 5, OASD(C) files, Acc 64-A2375.
92. Memo, SecDef for SecA et al, 18 Mar 57, fldr FY 1958 Budget-January (File 3), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
93. "Air Force Actions Which will Result in Reduction of Expenditure for FYs 1957 and 1958," nd [ca 17 Apr 57], evidently prepared by DeptAF, fldr 1957 Budget (McNeil File) #2, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; George M. Watson, Jr., *The Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1947-1965*, 179-80. General LeMay, Air Force vice chief of staff, told a Senate investigating subcommittee in December 1957 that for the last five weeks of FY 1957 most of SAC was grounded for lack of money to buy gasoline: US Cong, Senate, Cte on Armed Svcs (Preparedness Investigating Subcte), *Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs*, 85 Cong, 1 and 2 Sess (1957 and 1958), 917 (hereafter cited as Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*).
94. Memo AsstSecNav (Financial Mgmt) for DepSecDef, 17 Apr 57, memo AsstSecA(FM) for SecDef, 17 Apr 57: fldr 1957 Budget (McNeil File) #2, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
95. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 20 May 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:486-88. A regulation prohibiting the use of overtime in the performance of all DoD contracts, except where specifically authorized, was issued on 19 June, but it applied only to "premium" pay, i.e., that over and above the regular hourly rate: DoD Instr 4105.48, 19 Jun 57.
96. Jt Secs Advice of Action 20 May 57, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 22 May 57, fldr FY 1957 Budget (McNeil File) #2, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
97. Ltr Wilson to Brundage, 29 May 57, fldr Budget CL-100 Apr-June 57, Box 5, OASD(C) files, Acc 64-A2375. An accompanying memo, McNeil for Wilson, 27 May 57, in the same file, indicates that Brundage wanted a formal reply to his letter of 29 March even though he had been kept fully informed.
98. Testimony of McNeil in US Cong, House, Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956: Hearings*, 84 Cong, 1 sess (1956), 541-42.
99. Memos McNeil for SecDef, 15 and 16 May 57, fldr House Appn Cte-FY 1958-ASD(C) Testimony, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. On "overprogramming," see also Quarles testimony in Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 1340.
100. Draft memo Military Div (BoB) for Dir, 25 Oct 56, fldr Budget 1958 #1, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
101. Memos McNeil for SecDef, 15, 16 May 57, fldr House Appn Cte-FY 1958-ASD(C) testimony, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 439; Jt Secs Adv of Action, 20 May 57, OSD Hist; DoD Dir 7200.4, 21 May 57.
102. Ltr Mahon to Wilson, 7 May 57, fldr FY 1958 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
103. Ltr Wilson to Mahon, 15 May 57, *ibid*.
104. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, I:296. President Eisenhower saw the press conference on television and, so he said, "stood up and cheered" when Wilson made this statement: memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 2 May 57, fldr May 57 Diary—Staff Memos, Box 24, DDEL ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
105. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, I:315, 321-22 (16 May).
106. *New York Times*, 19 May 57.
107. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1957*, 341-52, 353, 372-96, 399 (quotes, 347, 356, 353, 399).

108. US Cong, House, Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1958*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (1957), House Rept 471, 7-8, 29, 31-32, 37-38, 42, 47, 51, 64, 72, 74.
109. Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 4 (Wilson testimony); *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1957*, 397.
110. *New York Times*, 30 May 57.
111. Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 3-5, 9.
112. Ibid, 393-94, 452-58; Ltr SecDef to Sen Chavez, 11 Jun 57, fldr FY 1958 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
113. *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1957*, 372-79.
114. Memo Brundage for Pres, 26 Aug 57, fldr Budget, Military (5) (Jan-Aug 57), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
115. *New York Times*, 17 Jul 57.
116. Memo Lehrer for Livesay (OASD(C)), 3 Jun 57, w/encl, "Defense Budget Problem," 15 May 57, prepared by BoB, fldr FY 1959 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
117. Memo of disc (Gleason), 317th NSC mtg, 28 May 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:446-55; mins of Cabinet mtg, 3 Jun 57, OSD Hist. A newspaper column of 3 May by a well-known Washington defense reporter, John G. Norris, quoted "persons close to Wilson" as saying that he was "good and sore" at some administration officials, notably Brundage for his constant pressure to cut expenses, and that accusations of "waste" and "duplication" in the Pentagon were felt by Wilson to be personal criticism: *Washington Post*, 4 May 57.
118. Memo SecA for SecDef, 13 Jun 57, memo SecNav for SecDef, 11 Jun 57, memo SecAF for SecDef, 12 Jun 57: fldr 1958 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
119. Ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 29 Jun 57, fldr FY 1958 File #1A, *ibid*.
120. US Cong, House, Cte on Appros, *Repudiation of 1958 Budget: Hearing*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (1957), 7, 5.
121. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 27 Jun 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:531-32. The statutory debt limit at that time was \$275 billion.
122. Memo SecDef for Pres, 10 Jul 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:540-46.
123. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 10 Jul 57, *ibid*, 547-48.
124. Memrcd Burke, 10 Jul 57, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
125. Memo SecDef for Pres, 16 Jul 57 (referring to mtg held 15 Jul), memo SecDef for Svc Secs, 16 Jul 57: fldr Adjustments in FY 1958 Program, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
126. Ltr SecDef to Rep Mahon, 17 Jul 57, fldr FY 1958 Budget—Manpower Reduction (17 July 57), *ibid*.
127. Memo SecDef for Pres, 16 Jul 57, cited in n 125.
128. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 16 Jul 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:549-53; AFPC mtg notes, 23 Jul 57, fldr AFPC 3rd Quarter 1957, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, 49 (where the meeting is erroneously dated 22 July).
129. Statement by SecA and CSA, 25 Jul 57, fldr Military Planning 1958-61 (2), Box 6, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
130. Memo SecAF for SecDef, 22 Jul 57, w/encl, memo CSAF for SecAF, 16 Jul 57, fldr 110.01 Budget Guidelines for 1959 (30 Jul 57), Box 8, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372.
131. Summary of Important Points, NSC mtg 25 Jul 57, by Robert Cutler, fldr Military Planning 1958-61 (2), Box 6, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; Presentation to Pres and NSC by DoD, 25 Jul 57, fldr 110.01 Budget Guidelines for 1959 (30 Jul 57), Box 8, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372; memo of disc (Boggs), 332nd NSC mtg, 25 Jul 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:556-65; debriefing by Burke of NSC mtg 25 Jul 57, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, 50-52. In approving the record of action at this meeting, the president deleted the warning about possible lack of support for a \$38 billion limit, but he directed that DoD officials keep it constantly in mind: memo Cutler for SecDef, 31 Jul 57, fldr 110.01 30 Jul 57, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
132. Memo SecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 1 Aug 57, fldr FY 1958 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
133. Memo SecDef for SvcSecs and JCS, 6 Aug 57, fldr Force Levels for 1959 Budget, Box 8, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372. The 1958 figure was later adjusted to 2,608,000, to allow the Marine Corps a temporary addition of 8,000: memo SecDef for Pres,

- 12 Sep 57, OSD Hist, copy from DDEL; memo SecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 19 Sep 57, fldr FY 1958 Budget-January (File 3), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
134. Memo SecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 13 Aug 57, fldr FY 1958 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
135. Jt Secs Adv of Action, 8 Jul, 29 Jul 57, OSD Hist; Summary of DoD Economy Measures and Cutbacks, nd, evidently prepared in OASD(C), fldr Adjustments in FY 1958 Program, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; list of installations and facilities to be closed or curtailed, 8 Jul 57, prepared in response to Jt Secs Adv of Action 13 Jun 57, fldr 337 May-Sep, Box 9, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-A1672; AFPC mtg notes, 9 Jul 57, fldr AFPC 3rd Quarter 1957, Box 3, OASD(C) (A) files, Acc 77-0062. For reductions in missile programs, see ch VII.
136. *New York Times*, 3 Jul 57. For a comparison of the Senate bill with that passed by the House and with Wilson's reclama, see table, Congressional Action on FY 1958 Budget Requests by Appropriation Title, OSD(C) EFAD-333, 28 May 59, OSD Hist.
137. Memo SecDef for Pres, 16 Jul 57, fldr Adjustments in FY 1958 Program, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; ltr SecDef to Mahon, 17 Jul 57, fldr FY 1958 Budget (McNeil File), *ibid*; *New York Times*, 19 Jul 57.
138. *New York Times*, 1, 3 Aug 57; PL 85-117 (2 Aug 57, DoD Appropriation Act 1958).
139. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, II:549-65 (quote, 553).
140. Ltr DepSecDef to DirBoB, 13 Jun 57, ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 20 Jun 57, ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 24 Jun 57: fldr FY 1958 Budget (McNeil file), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for Pres, 10 Jul 57, fldr 110.01 Budget Guidelines for 1959 (30 Jul 57), Box 8, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372; ltr SecDef to Sen Carl Hayden, 8 Aug 57, fldr FY 1958 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; PL 85-170 (28 Aug 57, Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1958).
141. Ltr McNeil to Mahon, 14 Aug 57, fldr FY 1958 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
142. Huntington, *Common Defense*, 95.

V. POLICY UNDER REVIEW, 1957

1. Memos ASD(ISA) to SvcSecs and other ASDs, 9 Jan 57, fldr 5602 Basic National Security Policy, Box 15, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
2. AFPC Advice of Action, 15 Jan 57, OSD Hist.
3. Mins of mtg, Ad Hoc Cte on Revision of NSC 5602/1, 22 Jan 57, fldr 5602 Basic National Security Policy, Box 15, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
4. Memo Marion W. Boggs (Dir NSC Secretariat) for Spec Cte members, 30 Jan 57, *ibid*.
5. NSC 5707, 19 Feb 57, OSD Hist.
6. Memo of disc (Gleason), 314th NSC mtg, 28 Feb 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:425-41; "Individual Comments During Council Discussion of NSC 5707—February 28, 1957," presumably prepared by OASD(ISA), for use by PB members, memo ExecSecNSC to NSC, 19 Feb 57: fldr NSC 5707/8 Basic Policy 1, Box 17, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
7. NSC 5707/2, 19 Mar 57, OSD Hist; memo of disc (Gleason), 317th NSC mtg, 28 Mar 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:446-54.
8. The president had laid down the FY 1959 ceiling in an NSC meeting on 19 December 1956: see ch IV.
9. Memo of disc (Gleason), 319th NSC mtg, 11 Apr 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:465-80; memrcd Burke, 11 Apr 57, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
10. Memo of disc (Gleason), 320th NSC mtg, 17 Apr 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:480-86; ltr Cutler to SecDef, 18 Apr 57, fldr NSC 5707/8 Basic Policy 2, Box 17, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
11. NSC Action 1503, 18 Jan 56, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1956, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
12. Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 159-61. For JSOP-60, see ch II.
13. Memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Dec 56, fldr Mobilization Base, Box 4, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.

14. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 6 Mar 57, fldr JSOP 9 Jan 58, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606.
15. Memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 25 Feb 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX: 419-24.
16. Presentation by CJCS before NSC on 14 March 1957, "Basic Military Concept to Govern Planning and Development of the Mobilization Base," fldr FY 1959 Budget—Mobilization Planning, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
17. Memo of disc (Gleason), 316th NSC mtg, 14 Mar 57, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL. McGuire later claimed credit for originating the new mobilization base concept; see McGuire interv, 27 Nov 72, 41-42, 44, CUOHP.
18. Implementation of the New Mobilization Base Concept, 9 Apr 57, ns, with handwritten note, "Presented by Mr. McNeil to NSC 11 Apr 57," fldr Mobilization (NSC Gen), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memo of disc (Gleason), 319th NSC mtg, 11 Apr 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:465-69. After the adoption of the new mobilization concept, the services were authorized to prepare mobilization plans extending to M+36, but only to develop a base adequate to support the forces generated by M+6; no provision was to be made for expansion of forces after that date. See also ch XI.
19. Copies of the first three PB drafts are in fldr NSC 5707/8 Basic Policy 2, Box 17, OASD (ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500. This also contains a copy of NSC 5707/7 prepared for Wilson in connection with impending discussion in the NSC; it shows changes made in NSC 5602/1 and recommendations by OSD elements on disputed portions of NSC 5707/7.
20. NSC 5707/7, 14 May 57, OSD Hist. For further information on Cutler's views, see Peter J. Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap*, 67-68.
21. Annex to NSC 5707/7, 14 May 57, OSD Hist.
22. "Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5707/7)," briefing paper prepared by OASD(ISA) for SecDef Wilson, 27 May 57, summarizes recommendations by OSD officials and those of ISA: fldr NSC 5707/8 Basic Policy 2, Box 17, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500. Actual memorandums from these officials, dated 22-24 May, are in the same folder. No recommendations were received from the Air Force.
23. Memo of disc (Gleason), 325th NSC mtg, 27 May 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:488-507; NSC 5707/8, 3 Jun 57, *ibid*, 507-24.
24. Memo Cutler for Pres, 7 Aug 57, w/encls, fldr Manpower and Personnel (2) (1956-1960) (5), Box 5, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; memo (but not encls) in *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:578-80.
25. Hanson W. Baldwin, "More than the H-Bomb is Needed," *New York Times Magazine*, 18 Aug 57, 57.
26. For summaries of some of the critiques of the New Look between 1954 and 1959, see Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management*, 43-47, and Aliano, *American Defense Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy*, 184-91. Morton H. Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age*, 133-84, provides an annotated bibliography of writings on limited war as of 1962.
27. Kaufmann's views were set forth in three articles: "The Requirements of Deterrence," "Limited Warfare," and "Force and Foreign Policy," in Kaufmann, ed., *Military Policy and National Security*. Osgood's book is *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*.
28. *Time*, LXX (26 Aug 57), 14.
29. Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, 132-202, *passim*. Kissinger's views were extensively criticized by Kaufmann in "The Crisis in Military Affairs," *World Politics*, X (Jul 58), 579-603.
30. See the editorial, "Two Books that Support Our Story," *Army* (Oct 57), 12-13, and the review of the Osgood and Kissinger books by G.A. Lincoln, USA, and Amos A. Jordan, Jr., "Limited War and the Scholar," *Military Review* (Jan 58), 50-60.
31. For example, Admiral Radford had argued in April 1957 that if U.S. forces were capable of deterring or defeating an all-out attack, they should also be able to prevent or suppress local wars if used "quickly and with resolution": memo CJCS for SecDef, 25 Apr 57, OSD Hist. Air Force Secretary Quarles said on 2 February 1957, "It seems logical that if we have the strength required for global war we could certainly meet any threat of lesser magnitude." (Quoted in Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1957*, 51.)

32. Editorial note, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:526-27; memrcd Burke, 17 Jun 57, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC. Dulles had often expressed similar views in discussions within the State Department, see interv with Robert R. Bowie by Richard D. Challener, 10 Aug 64, 16-17, JFDOHP. General Taylor later claimed credit for having influenced Dulles's views: Taylor, "Reflections on the American Military Establishment," 15-16.
33. John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United States Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVI (Oct 57), 31.
34. *Baltimore Sun*, 11 Aug 57; *New York Times*, 11 Aug, 23 Sep 57; *Time*, LXX (26 Aug 57), 14-15; *U.S. News and World Report*, XLIII (23 Aug 57), 35-37.
35. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, II:605-06; John S.D. Eisenhower interv, 22 Oct 84, 9, 12-13, OSD Hist.
36. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 6 Mar 57, fldr 381 JSOP 9 Jan 58, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606.
37. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 25 Apr 57, CM-480-57, OSD Hist.
38. Ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 8 Apr 57, fldr FY 1959 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
39. Ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 13 Apr 57, *ibid*; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 12 Apr 57, OSD Hist.
40. Memrcd CSA, 27 May 57, fldr CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec 33, Box 42, CDC 1957, JCS files, RG 218, NARA. The \$38.3 billion figure presumably represented the total for the services, leaving \$700 million for OSD and interservice projects under the \$39 billion ceiling. Some information on discussions within the JCS is given in memo Burke for SecNav, 30 Apr 57, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
41. Mins of Cabinet mtg, 3 Jun 57, OSD Hist; ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 3 Jun 57, fldr FY 1959 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. The minutes of the Cabinet meeting indicate no decision by the president on the FY 1959 budget; presumably Brundage was referring to a conversation with the president after the meeting. For the problem of 1958 expenditures, see ch IV.
42. Ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 4 Jun 57, ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 11 Jun 57, ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 12 Jun 57; fldr FY 1959 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
43. Ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 3 Jun 57, *ibid*.
44. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 16 Jul 57, CM-502-57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:549-53.
45. Memo SecDef for Pres, 10 Jul 57, memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 10 Jul 57; *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:540-56, 547-48. These events are described more fully in ch IV.
46. NSC Action 1755, 25 Jul 57, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1957, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024. For a complete account of this meeting, see ch IV.
47. Memo SecDef for SvcSecs and JCS, 6 Aug 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:574-76. Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, 52, comments on the inconvenience for the services of having budget limits stipulated in terms of expenditures instead of NOA.
48. Memo SecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 7 Aug 57, fldr McNeil Budget File FY 1959 #1, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
49. Ltr Wilson to J. F. Dulles, 1 Aug 57, fldr 091.3 MAP Jan-Jun 1957, Box 7, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372; memrcd Col Robert H. Warren, USAF, MilAsst to DepSecDef, 5 Sep 57, fldr 337 (1957), Box 2, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372; memrcd Burke, 7 Sep 57, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; memo DepAsstSecState for FE Affairs for AsstSecState, 9 Sep 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXI:375-78. For the negotiations with South Korea at this time, see ch XIX.
50. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Subcommittee Report on Special Personnel Problems in the Department of Defense*, 6-7, 27.
51. Terms of reference of the committee are printed on xv-xvi of the committee's report, vol. I, cited in next note. Membership of the committee is listed on 6-7.
52. *Report of the Defense Advisory Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation* [Cordiner Report], May 1957, vol I, *Military Personnel*, and vol II, *Civilian Personnel*.
53. *Ibid*, I:25-42.
54. Memo ActgASD(MP&R) for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 13 Feb, OSD Hist; *New York Times*, 25 Jan 57; *Congressional Record*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (18 Feb, 2 Apr 57), vol 103, appendix, A1118-A1119, A2655-A2657.

55. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 4 Mar 57, fldr Cordiner Cmte, Box 3, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
56. Memo SecDef for Pres, 8 Mar 57, memo Pres for SecDef, 14 Mar 57: OSD Hist; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 14 Mar 57, fldr Mar 57 Diary—Staff Memos (2), Box 22, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
57. Ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 20 Mar 57, w/encl (draft legislation), fldr 334 Profess & Tech Compensation Defense Adv Committee, Box 14, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372.
58. Ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 4 Apr 57, *ibid*.
59. *Army-Navy-Air Force Journal*, XCIV (4 May 57), 1; *ibid*, (11 May 57); Thomas R. Phillips, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 3 May 57. As a result of this unfortunate incident, when Cordiner formally presented his report to Wilson on 8 May the ceremony was somewhat strained; Wilson was obviously embarrassed, and newsmen were not allowed to question either him or Cordiner: *Army-Navy-Air Force Journal*, XCIV (11 May 57), 12.
60. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 12 Apr 57, fldr Apr 57 Diary—Staff Memos (2), Box 22, memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 2 May 57, fldr May 57 Diary—Staff Memos, Box 24, both in DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 7 May 57, and reply DirBoB to SecDef, 8 May 57, fldr 334 Profess & Tech Compensation Defense Adv Cmte, Box 14, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372; DoD PR 425-57, 8 May 57, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for ASD(MP&R), 9 May 57, fldr AFPC Apr-May 57, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
61. *New York Times*, 9 May 57; AFPC Advice of Action, 18 Jun 57, OSD Hist; Ltr SecDef to Sen Richard B. Russell, Chm Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, 15 Jul 57 (with typewritten notation that identical letters had been sent to the House), OSD Hist; memo Goodpaster for Persons, 27 Jul 57, fldr Cordiner Cmte, Box 3, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
62. Memo ActgSecNav for SecDef, 3 Sep 57, memo SecAF for SecDef, 5 Sep 57, memo SecA for SecDef, 3 Sep 57: fldr 110.01 Budget Guidelines for 1959 (30 Jul 57), Box 8, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372.
63. AFPC mtg notes, 10 Sep 57, fldr AFPC 3rd Quarter 1957, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; memo SecDef for Pres, 12 Sep 57, *FRUS* 1955-57, XIX:595-97.
64. Memo SpecAsst (Cutler) for SecDef, 17 Sep 57, OSD Hist.
65. Memo SecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 19 Sep 57, fldr FY 1958 Budget—January (File 3), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
66. Memo SecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 28 Sep 57, fldr McNeil Budget File FY 1959 #1, *ibid*.
67. Memo SecA for SecDef, 27 Sep 57, fldr FY 1959 Budget, *ibid*.
68. A member of McNeil's staff learned this in conversations with Department of Army personnel, before the Army budget was completed. He recommended that when the budget came in, it be returned to the department with a "blistering" letter: memo Troy V. McKinney for McNeil, 27 Sep 57, fldr McNeil Budget File FY 1959 #1, *ibid*.
69. Memo SecDef for SecA, 28 Sep 57, fldr FY 1959 Budget, *ibid*.
70. Memo Clarence B. Randall (SpecAsst to Pres) for Gov Adams, 12 Sep 57, ofc memo W.F. Schaub for DirBoB, 13 Sep 57, encl with memo DirBoB for Goodpaster, 13 Sep 57: fldr Budget, Military (6) (Sep 57-Jan 59), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, II:626.
71. Memo SecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 19 Sep 57, fldr FY 1958 Budget-January (File 3), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; DoD Dir 4105.48, 1 Oct 57. For the earlier prohibition of "premium" overtime, see ch IV.
72. For a general account of the Little Rock crisis, see James C. Duram, *A Moderate Among Extremists: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the School Desegregation Crisis*, 143-72; also, more briefly, Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 413-23. Robert W. Coakley, *Operation Arkansas*, deals at length with the troop deployment. The role of the Army chief of staff, General Taylor, is briefly described in John M. Taylor, *General Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the Pen*, 212-13.
73. *New York Times*, 24 Sep 57; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1957*, 689.
74. Adams, 354.
75. Coakley, 15-43; *New York Times*, 24 Sep 57.
76. Executive Order 10730, 24 Sep 57, *Federal Register*, XXII: 7628.

77. Text of order by SecDef is in an untitled looseleaf binder in Box 11, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372. The time of the order is given by Coakley, 46.
78. Coakley, 47-53.
79. See *ibid*, 68-226, for the subsequent history of the Little Rock situation. Box 11, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372, contains information copies of messages exchanged between the Department of the Army (deputy chief of staff for military operations) and the commanders at Little Rock and copies of situation reports: see fldr 291.1 1957, and looseleaf binder Little Rock Sitreps 1957.
80. Memo SecA for SecDef, 7 Oct 57, fldr Budget CL 100-2 1957, Box 5, OASD(C) files, Acc 64-A2375.
81. Memo SecDef for SecA, 4 Nov 57, *ibid*.
82. Stewart Alsop column in *New York Herald Tribune*, 5 Jul 57, reprinted in Joseph and Stewart Alsop, *The Reporter's Trade*, 337-39; NIE 11-5-57, 12 Mar 57, OSD Hist. For the status of the U.S. missile effort in 1957, see ch VII.
83. *New York Times*, 27 Aug 57. In November 1957 CIA concluded that by then the Soviets had "probably" tested an ICBM: NIE 11-4-57, 12 Nov 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:670.
84. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 242. Ambrose does not indicate the date of this statement. On 14 May the president told congressional leaders that he would be "concerned" if the Soviets first achieved an ICBM: Supplementary Notes, Legislative Leadership mtg, 14 May 57, OSD Hist.
85. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1957*, 639-40; *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, II:614-15.
86. *New York Times*, 5 Oct 57.
87. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1954*, IV:1170-71, *ibid*, 1956, III:1033.
88. The summary of the reaction to Sputnik in the two preceding paragraphs is based on a collection of news stories published by Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Information, *Missiles and Satellites: Press Reports*; news stories following Sputnik I are on 1-64, editorials on 93-136. For the "virtually defenseless" statement, see 3, and for the Furnas-Wilson exchange, 30, 165, 35. Good summaries of the reaction to Sputnik are in Aliano, *American Defense Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy*, 47-53; Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, *Vanguard: A History*, 185-89; Walter A. McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age*, 141-56. Robert A. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, focuses on the effects on the administration's subsequent actions, with a brief summary (xiv-xviii) of public opinion.
89. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 206. One unnamed official later recalled that the week after the first Sputnik was "one prolonged nightmare," with urgent advice pouring in to the president about the need to launch a satellite and to speed up the ICBM program: Charles J. V. Murphy, "The White House Since Sputnik," *Fortune*, LVII (Jan 58), 100.
90. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 8 Oct 57, 8:30 am, OSD Hist; memo of same, ns, *FRUS 1955-57*, XI:755-56; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 210-11.
91. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 8 Oct 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:598-601. The time of this meeting is not given, but internal evidence indicates that it followed the 8:30 am meeting described in the memo cited in preceding note.
92. *New York Times*, 9 Oct 57.
93. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1957*, 719-35.
94. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 9 Oct 57, OSD Hist.
95. Aliano, 191-94.

VI. THE FY 1959 BUDGET: FINAL

1. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 14 Mar 57, fldr Mar 57 Diary—Staff Memos (2), Box 22, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
2. *Newsweek*, I (29 Jul 57), 25; *New York Herald Tribune*, 17, 18 Jul 57; *New York Journal-American*, 16 Jul 57; *Washington Star*, 28 Jul 57.
3. Interv with Neil McElroy by Ed Edwin, 8-9 May 67, 7-10, CUOHP.
4. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1957*, 590; *New York Times*, 8 Aug 57; *Washington Post*, 8 Aug 57; *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, II:575. Wilson's letter of resignation, 7 Aug 57, and the president's reply, 2 Oct 57, are in *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1957*, 702-03.

5. US Cong, Senate, Cte on Armed Svcs, *Nomination of Neil H. McElroy: Hearing*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (1957), passim; *New York Times*, 16, 20 Aug 57.
6. Ltr Pres to McElroy, 4 Oct 57, fldr McElroy, Neil 1957-58 (5), Box 25, Admin ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
7. *U.S. News and World Report*, XLIII (27 Sep 57), 17; *New York Times*, 18 Sep 57; NSC Action 1798, 2 Oct 57, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1957, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
8. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, II:625-52; Geelhoed, *Wilson*, 178; *Washington Star*, 4 Oct 57.
9. AFPC mtg notes, 8 Oct 57, fldr AFPC Oct 57, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 8 Oct 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:598-601. For the actions on the missile projects (Jupiter and Polaris), see ch VII.
10. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1957*, 735-36; *New York Herald Tribune*, 10 Oct 57.
11. Charles J.V. Murphy, "The Embattled Mr. McElroy," *Fortune*, LIX (Apr 59), 148 (conversation with Wilson as remembered in 1959 by McElroy).
12. Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon*, 160; memrcd Burke, 13 Jul 57, fldr No. 1, Sensitive files, Burke papers, NHC.
13. Letters to Wilson on the occasion of his retirement are in Box 56 (Resignation Letters), CEWA; that from McNeil, dated 30 Oct 57, is in box 100.
14. See e.g., *Time*, LXXI (13 Jan 58), 13-14.
15. Stewart Alsop in *Washington Post*, 12 Aug 57.
16. *Congressional Record*, 9 Aug 57, vol 103, pt 11:14166, and 10 Aug 57, vol 103, pt 11:14321.
17. *New York Herald Tribune*, 9 Aug 57.
18. McElroy interv, 8-9 May 67, 1-6, CUOHP; Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon*, 161-63; Ben Pearce, "Defense Chief in the Sputnik Age," *New York Times Magazine*, 10 Nov 57, 20, 80-81.
19. *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1957-1958*, I:25-39.
20. Handwritten notes Cabinet mtg, 11 Oct 57, fldr C-39 (2) October 11, 1957, Box 4, Cabinet ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 11 Oct 57, 8:30 am, OSD Hist.
21. Interv with Willfred J. McNeil by Alfred Goldberg and Harry B. Yoshpe, 31 May 74, 51-52, OSD Hist; Oliver M. Gale, "Comments of a Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1957-1960," 1 Feb 71, 18, Oliver M. Gale Papers, DDEL (hereafter cited as Gale, "Comments"); quotes from Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon*, 164, 175; *Washington Daily News*, 18 Nov 57; Gavin testimony, 13 Dec 57, Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 501.
22. *Newsweek*, LIII (16 Feb 59), 27; Gale, "Comments," 18-19; Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon*, 176; John Osborne, "The Man and the Plan," 122; *Time*, LXXI (13 Jan 58), 12; interv with Richard M. Nixon by Stewart Alsop, nd (ca early 1958), Box 47, Joseph and Stewart Alsop Papers, LC. Nixon thought McElroy a "fine man," but "you need a son of a bitch" in the job of secretary of defense.
23. Randall interv, 27 Apr 88, 62-63, OSD Hist; Lemnitzer interv, 19 Jan 84, 43, OSD Hist. For a widely publicized example of a delay by McElroy in making up his mind, see his "feet to the fire" remark to Congress quoted on p. 426.
24. Gale, "Post-Sputnik Washington from an Inside Office," 246.
25. Gale, "Comments," 23; Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 235-41; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959: Advanced Research Projects Agency, etc.: Hearings*, 385.
26. McElroy interv, 9 May 67, 79-80, CUOHP.
27. Gale, "Comments," 16. One newspaper story predicted that McElroy would "clean out" the staff he inherited from Wilson, being convinced that they were "incurably timid": *Washington Daily News*, 2 Dec 57.
28. Gale, "Comments," 16-17, 20-31; Randall interv, 27 Apr 88, 67, OSD Hist; interv with James R. Killian by Stephen White, 9 Nov 69, 3-4, 6-7, CUOHP. The president's son, John Eisenhower, thought that "Don Quarles ran the Defense Department," and quoted McElroy as having told the president, "You have to be your own Secretary of Defense": John S.D. Eisenhower interv, 22 Oct 84, 54, OSD Hist.

29. Randall interv, 27 Apr 88, 59, OSD Hist; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 14 Oct 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:605-06.
30. Gale, "Comments," 4-14; Randall interv, 27 Apr 88, 59, 61-62, OSD Hist; untitled paper on staff assistance for secretary, 29 May 61, apparently prepared by OSD Historian, *ibid*; memo R. Eugene Livesay for SvcSecs et al, 12 Nov 58, *ibid*.
31. McElroy interv, 9 May 67, 16, 80, CUOHP. General Twining later characterized McElroy as "very fine," "a real hard worker," and "a pretty smart man"; it was obvious from his statements, however, that he did not feel as warmly toward McElroy as he had toward Wilson: interv with Nathan F. Twining by John T. Mason, Jr., 12 Sep 67, 246, CUOHP. Charles J. V. Murphy, a reporter with excellent Pentagon connections, characterized Twining as an "admiring friend" of McElroy, though attributing to Twining the quip that McElroy came into office at the time of Sputnik and had "been in orbit ever since": Murphy, "The Embattled Mr. McElroy," 150.
32. General Taylor recalled that he had suggested frequent informal conferences between the secretary and the JCS but that McElroy did not act on the suggestion: *Uncertain Trumpet*, 120-21.
33. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 441, 545-46 (quote, 433).
34. Murphy, "The Embattled Mr. McElroy," 149; *Time*, LXXI (13 Jan 58), 11-12; Alsop in *New York Herald Tribune*, 12 May 58. Lt Gen James M. Gavin, the Army's Chief of Research and Development, characterized McElroy as "the most able man who has come to that office [of Secretary]": Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 501 (testimony, 13 Dec 57).
35. Ltr Pres to Capt Edward E. Hazlett, USN (Ret), 26 Feb 58, fldr DDE Dictation February 1958, Box 30, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
36. Memo of disc (Gleason), 339th NSC mtg, 10 Oct 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XI:757-64; Murphy, "The White House Since Sputnik," 100.
37. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 11 Oct 57, OSD Hist.
38. Memo SecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 18 Oct 57, encl/w ltr SecDef to Pres, 21 Oct 57, *ibid*.
39. Memo Pres for SecDef, 17 Oct 57, ltr SecDef to Pres, 21 Oct 57: *ibid*.
40. "When Pentagon Swings Its Ax," *Business Week*, 26 Oct 57, 43-45; *Wall Street Journal*, 30 Oct 57; AFPC Advice of Action, 15 Oct 57, OSD Hist; Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 242; memo DirBoB for Gov Adams, 22 Oct 57, fldr Budget, Military—Chron 1957-59, Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 23 Oct 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:611-12.
41. Memo DirBoB for Adams, 22 Oct 57, and memo of conf, 23 Oct 57, both cited in preceding note; "The Problem at the End of Fiscal Year 1958," 22 Oct 57, evidently prepared in OASD(C), fldr FY 1958 File #1A, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 29 Oct 57, fldr Reading File June 1953 to Oct 1957, Box 1, SecDef Wilson Reading and Speech Files, Acc 63-A1802. McElroy's memorandum to contractors has not been found, but the text is given in DoD PR 1069-57, 30 Oct 57, OSD Hist.
42. Memo SecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 17 Aug 57, fldr 110 17 Aug 57, Box 8, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372; *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, II:604-05 (press conf 19 Sep 59); ltr Wilson to McElroy, 30 Oct 57, Box 109, CEWA; *Washington Post*, 20, 21 Oct 57. On the actual effects of the 17 August memo, see House Cte on Appros, *Supplemental Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 319-20, 345-46. The amount of money involved, according to Wilson's letter here cited, was not more than \$15-20 million.
43. Memos for SecDef from SecA, SecNav, SecAF, 24 Oct 57, memos SecDef for each Svc Sec, 28 Oct 57: fldr 110 17 Aug 57, Box 8, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372; DoD PR 1064-57, 28 Oct 57, OSD Hist.
44. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, I:218 (quote), 220; ltr Wilson to McElroy, 30 Oct 57, Box 109, CEWA; handwritten notes of Cabinet mtg, 3 Jun 57, fldr C-37 (3) June 3, 1957, Box 4, Cabinet ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; Wilson interv by Mike Wallace, *New York Post*, reprinted in Department of the Army, Office of Information, *Missiles and Satellites: Press Reports*, 84.
45. *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1957-58*, I:34.

46. DoD Dir 3210.1, 12 Nov 57.
47. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 211-12; James R. Killian, Jr., *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology*, 15-17; handwritten notes, apparently by Quarles, of mtg with ODM SAC, 15 Oct 57, and attached typewritten document, unsigned, "Meeting in the President's office of the ODM Science Advisory Committee," 15 Oct 57, fldr Mr. Quarles' Notes, Box 4, DepSec Def files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 23 Oct 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:611-12.
48. DoD Dir 5129.22, 30 Oct 57.
49. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1957*, 755; *Washington Post*, 27 Oct 57.
50. *New York Times*, 3 Nov 57; *Washington Post*, 4 Nov 57.
51. For news stories and editorials concerning Sputnik II, see Department of the Army, Office of Information, *Missiles and Satellites: Press Reports*, 60, 65-93, 135-44.
52. *New York Times*, 4 Nov 57; *New York Herald Tribune*, 4 Nov 57.
53. *New York Times*, 6 Nov 57; entry from Ann Whitman diary, 6 Nov 57, DDEL.
54. NSC 5709, 29 Mar 57, OSD Hist; memo of disc (Gleason), 318th NSC mtg, 4 Apr 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:459-64. On the origin of the Gaither panel, see Morton H. Halperin, "The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process," *World Politics*, XXI (Apr 61), 361-64, and, more briefly, Murphy, "The White House Since Sputnik," 230.
55. Members of the Gaither panel and its subordinate bodies are listed in the report of the panel, cited in n 58.
56. Informal memo for use at a meeting with Mr. Gaither, June 27, 1957, by R[obert] C[utler], 25 Jun 57, Terms of Reference for Study by Security Resources Panel, nd, encl with AFPC Adv of Action, 17 Jul 57, fldr Gaither Panel, Bulky Package 334 Security Resources Panel 9 Jul 57, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489; AFPC mtg notes, 17 Jul 57, fldr AFPC 3rd Quarter 1957, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; Steven L. Rearden, *The Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine: Paul H. Nitze and the Soviet Challenge*, 42.
57. Ltr DirODM to SecDef, 18 Jun 57, memo DepSecDef for SecDef, 19 Jun 57, handwritten memo for rec ("Per Sec Quarles' direction"), RHW (Col Warren), 17 Jul 57, memo Col Warren for SvcSecs and CJCS, 19 Jul 57; fldr Gaither Panel, Bulky Package 334 Security Resources Panel 9 Jul 57, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489. Numerous documents in the same folder relate to arrangements made to brief the panel and the subject matter of the briefings.
58. Executive Office of the President, Office of Defense Mobilization, *Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age: Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee*, 7 Nov 57. Circulated as NSC 5724, 7 Nov 57, and printed in *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:638-61, but without the appendix giving membership of the panel and its staff (hereafter cited as Security Resources Panel, *Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age*).
59. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 4 Nov 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:620-24. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 434-35, has an account of this meeting but erroneously dates it 6 November, which is the date of Goodpaster's memorandum.
60. The meeting was large enough to draw the attention of the press. The *New York Times* (8 Nov 57) reported that the president had conferred with 45 of his "top scientific and military-civilian advisers," although the subject of the meeting was not known at that time.
61. Memo of disc (Gleason), 343rd NSC mtg, 7 Nov 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:630-37; memrcd Burke, 7 Nov 57, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; Robert Sprague interv, 11 Aug 64, 21-23, JFDOHP; Halperin, "The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process," 364-69; Murphy, "The White House Since Sputnik," 230; article by Chalmers M. Roberts in *Washington Post*, 20 Dec 57; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 221-22.
62. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 7 Nov 57, fldr Military Planning 1958-61 (3), Box 6, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; memo Cutler for Pres, 25 Oct 57, OSD Hist.
63. Memcon Dulles, 7 Nov 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:638.
64. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1957*, 789-99 (quotes, 794, 797, 798).
65. *Ibid*, 807-16 (quote, 813).

66. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 436-41; quote from Murphy, "The White House Since Sputnik," 99.
67. *New York Times*, 16 Nov 57. For Killian's appointment, see his own account in *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower*, 20-24, 33-38 (with his letter of appointment, dated 7 Dec 57, 35-36); also Killian interv, 1 Feb 70, 102-05, CUOHP; Murphy, "The White House Since Sputnik," 228; Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, 47-51.
68. *New York Times*, 30 Nov 57; Killian, *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower*, 21-23, 107-11; Killian interv, 1 Feb 70, 104-05, 23 Feb 70, 178-79, CUOHP.
69. Joseph and Stewart Alsop column, 23 Nov 57, reprinted in their book, *The Reporter's Trade*, 362-63; Halperin, "The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process," 374-80; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 95-96, 117-18.
70. US Cong, House, Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense: The Ballistic Missile Program: Hearings*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (1957), 1-123; Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 193-342.
71. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 212-13.
72. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 14 Oct 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:605-06.
73. Memo SecDef for SvcSecs and JCS, 6 Aug 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:574-78. Expenditure limits for OSD were \$800 million and would bring the total to the \$38 billion limit laid down by Wilson (see ch V).
74. Memo SecA for SecDef, 23 Oct 57, fldr FY 1959 Budget—Service Submissions, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
75. Memos SecNav for SecDef, 10, 21 Oct 57, *ibid*.
76. Memo SecNav for SecDef, 22 Oct 57, *ibid*; ltr SecNav to SecDef, 7 Nov 57, fldr Force Levels for 1959 Budget, Box 8, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 63-A1372.
77. Memo SecAF for SecDef, 18 Oct 57, fldr FY 1959 Budget—Service Submissions, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
78. Memo SecNav for SecDef and CJCS, 28 Oct 57; memo SecA for SecDef, 28 Oct 57, memo SecAF for SecDef, 31 Oct 57: *ibid*. The supplementary Air Force submission has not been found; it was transmitted by memo SecAF for SecDef, 5 Nov 57, fldr Force Levels for 1959 Budget, Box 8, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 63-A1372, but the attachment listing the additional items is not included.
79. Memo JCS for SecDef, 1 Nov 57, fldr FY 1959 Budget—Military Forces, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
80. AFPC mtg notes, 29 Oct 57, fldr AFPC Oct 1957, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; AFPC Advice of Action, 29 Oct 57, OSD Hist.
81. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 30 Oct 57, OSD Hist.
82. Handwritten notes on these discussions are in fldr FY 1959 Budget—Staff Studies (Oct-Nov 1957), ATSD & DepSecDef files, *ibid*.
83. Ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 7 Nov 57, fldr McNeil Budget File FY 1959 #1, *ibid*.
84. Memo ASD(R&E) for SecDef, 11 Nov 57, fldr 110.01 Budget Guidelines for 1959 (30 Jul 57), Box 8, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372.
85. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 11 Nov 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:662-64.
86. Statement by Gen Taylor to NSC, 14 Nov 57, fldr Selected Speeches, Box 4, Taylor papers, NDU; statement of AsstSec McNeil before NSC, 14 Nov 57, presentation by CJCS, 14 Nov 57, statements by SecA and SecNav, 14 Nov 57, handwritten notes by Max Lehrer, OASD(C), on NSC mtg 14 Nov, beginning with Quarles presentation: fldr FY 1959 Budget Nov-Dec 57, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memo of disc (Gleason) 345th NSC mtg, 14 Nov 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:677-86; memrcd Burke, 14 Nov 57, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
87. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 15 Nov 57, OSD Hist.
88. Memrcd Burke, 18 Nov 57 (debrief of JCS mtg 17 Nov), Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Nov 57, fldr 110.01 Budget Guidelines for 1959 (30 Jul 57), Box 8, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372; notes on AFPC mtg, 18 Nov 57, fldr AFPC Nov-Dec 57, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; discs in JCS, 16-17 Nov 57, summarized in Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962*, 313-14.
89. Typewritten list, ns, nd, "High-priority items which are recommended for addition to the basic budget," with tables showing breakdown of basic and add-on budgets, fldr

- FY 1959 Budget Nov-Dec 57, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. Other documents in this folder indicate intensive discussions in DoD between 14 and 19 November. Details of the budget, including the supplements for 1958 and 1959, are given in terms of NOA in OSD(C) Table EFAD-346, 8 Apr 59, OSD Hist.
90. Handwritten notes by Goodpaster of conf of Pres with McElroy and McNeil, 19 Nov 57, fldr Budget, Military FY 1960 (3), Box 3, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL. These are rather fragmentary but give the drift of the discussion. Evidently Goodpaster never wrote up these notes into a formal "memorandum of conference."
 91. Memo SecDef for Pres, 19 Nov 57, marked "approved" by Eisenhower, fldr FY 1958 [sic] Budget—January, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memrcd Burke, 20 Nov 57, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
 92. Statement of McNeil before NSC, 22 Nov 57, fldr FY 1959 Budget Nov-Dec 57, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
 93. Memo of disc (Gleason), 346th NSC mtg, 22 Nov 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:689-95; memrcd Burke, 23 Nov 57, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
 94. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 22 Nov 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:687-88.
 95. Ltr SpecAsst to Pres to SecDef, 25 Nov 57, fldr FY 1959 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist (emphasis in quote in original); NSC Action 1817, 22 Nov 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:695.
 96. Memo SecA for SecDef, 22 Nov 57, fldr FY 1959 Budget—Military Forces, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. McElroy's reply was apparently oral; he prepared a written reply which he seems to have used merely as a talking paper. Fldr FY 1959 Budget, *ibid*, contains two versions of a memorandum from McElroy to Brucker. Neither is signed or dated. One is marked "Draft"; the other, a final version, bears handwritten notations, "written 2 Dec 1957" and "This was never signed nor sent out officially." Another copy of the final version is in fldr Budget CL 100-2 1957, Box 5, OASD(C) files, Acc 64-A2375, with a handwritten memo to SecDef from McNeil reading: "Do not sign unless after reading you choose to so handle. You may, however, wish orally to use the substance with Secy Brucker." Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, 53-54, has some remarks on this episode, though he uses slightly different figures from those given by Brucker.
 97. Memos DGM for SecA and SecAF, 27 Nov 57, fldr M 471.94 9 Jan 58, Box 26, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
 98. Memo Lehrer for McNeil, 3 Dec 57; typewritten tables, "Included in FY 1958 Supplemental," 4 Dec 57, and "Dept of Defense FY 1959 Budget Summary," 4 Dec 57 (corrected to 5 Dec), both prepared in OASD(C), fldr FY 1959 Budget Nov-Dec 57, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; House Cte on Appros, *Supplemental Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 81-92, 166-69, 193-200.
 99. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 5 Dec 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:702-04; budget memorandum by D.A. Q[uarles], 9 Dec 57, fldr Reading File #1—30 April 1957-31 Dec 57, Box 4, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769.
 100. Ltrs (2) SecDef to DirBoB, 20 Dec 57, fldr FY 1959 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. The bureau's approval is indicated by subsequent developments.
 101. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1958, 2-15. For a contrast between this speech and the budget message four days later, see Kolodziej, *The Uncommon Defense and Congress*, 275-77.
 102. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1959*, M12, M14-M15, 431, 433-37, 442; OSD(C) Table EFAD-346, 8 Apr 59, OSD Hist. The contingency reserve fund and transfer authority were apparently the president's own ideas at the last moment; see memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 23 Dec 57, fldr Budget, Military (6) (Sep 57-Jan 59), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
 103. *New York Times*, 20 Jan, 1, 5, 23 Feb 58. For a general account of the reception of the 1959 budget, see Kolodziej, 280-87.
 104. *New York Times*, 6 Jan 58; Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Special Studies Project, *International Security: The Military Aspect*, *passim*, esp 57-58. Rockefeller summarized the findings of the panel for the House Appropriations Committee on 31 January: US Cong, House, Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959: Overall Policy Statements: Hearings*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), 44-107.

105. *New York Times*, 16 Nov 57, 15 Jan 58.
106. Ltr Pres to Speaker of House, 7 Jan 58, fldr Budget FY 1958 Supplemental, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; House Cte on Appros, *Supplemental Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 282-313; Senate Cte on Appros, *Supplemental Defense Appropriation Bill, 1958: Hearings*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), passim; *New York Times*, 24 Jan, 4, 12 Feb 58; PL 85-322 (11 Feb 58).
107. Senate Cte on Appros, *Supplemental Defense Appropriation Bill, 1958: Hearings*, 8, 19; House Cte on Appros, *Supplemental Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 208.
108. House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Investigation of National Defense, Missiles: Hearings*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), 3973-4926.
109. Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 2427-30; *New York Times*, 24 Jan 58. The subcommittee was recalled into session on 3 April and again on 24 July 1958 to hear reports by McElroy, Quarles, and Twining on progress toward meeting the 17 recommendations.
110. Senator Johnson himself issued a statement summarizing White's testimony: *New York Times*, 9 Jan 58, and *U.S. News and World Report*, XLIV (17 Jan 58), 54. The full testimony is published in Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 1551-1605.
111. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959: Overall Policy Statements: Hearings*, 18.
112. Ibid, 262-65, 441-42, 447, 511-15, 580, 453, 537, 124, 154-55, 181-82, 129-32. General White was referring to testimony given by McElroy on 28 January before the Senate Appropriations Committee on the FY 1958 supplemental; he said that it would be "sound" to keep the B-52 production line open but wished to postpone a decision until the newer B-58 could be evaluated, and that the Titan program was being reviewed: Senate Cte on Appros, *Supplemental Defense Appropriation Bill, 1958: Hearings*, 8, 19.
113. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959: Department of the Army: Hearings*, 217, 229-38, 244-45, 261-62, 274-75; *Department of the Navy*, 634-47; *Department of the Air Force*, 65-66.
114. *New York Times*, 1 Feb 58.
115. NSC Action 1814, 7 Nov 57, *FRUS* 1955-57, XIX:636.
116. Memo DepSecDef for Cutler, 21 Dec 57, fldr 334 Security Resources Panel (9 Jul 57), BP same title, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.
117. NSC 5724/1, 16 Dec 57, fldr 5802 U.S. Policy on Continental Defense, Box 21, OASD (ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
118. Memo of disc (Gleason), 350th NSC mtg, 6 Jan 58, memo of disc (Boggs), 351st NSC mtg, 16 Jan 58: NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
119. Memo of disc (Gleason), 356th NSC mtg, 27 Feb 58, *ibid*; presentation to NSC on 27 Feb 58, unsigned, evidently by Holaday, fldr Missiles and Satellites—vol II (1) (Jan-Feb 58), Box 6, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
120. Memo SecDef for JCS, 27 Feb 58, fldr FY 1959 Budget Amendment 2 April 1958, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
121. Memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Mar 58, fldr FY 1959 Budget Amendments—JCS (12 Mar 58), *ibid*. The chairman, General Twining, submitted no recommendations and apparently did not participate in the action; the JCS memorandum was signed by Admiral Burke.
122. Memo Livermore for Blaisdell, both in OASD(C), 17 Mar 58, memo SecDef for CJCS, 17 Mar 58: fldr 1959 Budget Amendment 2 April 1958, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Mar 58, AFPC mtgs notes, 17, 20 Mar 58: fldr AFPC Mar 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; memrcd Burke, 20 Mar 58 (debrief of AFPC mtg that date), Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; memos of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 20 Mar 58, 3:00 and 4:00 pm, OSD Hist.
123. Ltr DepSecDef to DirBoB, 1 Apr 58, Ltr DirBoB to Pres, 2 Apr 58: fldr FY 1959 Budget Amendment 2 April 1958, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. The breakdown by projects is as given by McElroy to the Johnson subcommittee on 3 April: Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 2359-61. For details of the missile projects included in the request, see ch VII.
124. Ltr Pres to Speaker of House, 2 Apr 58, fldr FY 1959 Budget Amendment 2 April 1958, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. DoD PR 302-58, 2 Apr 58, OSD Hist, gave the

supplemental request as \$1,592.3 million, but this included \$136.6 million in military construction to be transmitted later.

125. *New York Times*, 6 Jun 58; "Congressional Action on DoD Appropriation Bill for FY 1959," 23 Jun 58, typewritten document prepared in OASD(C) for use by SecDef in briefing Congressional leaders on budget, fldr FY 1959 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; US Cong, House, Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1959*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), H Rept 1830.
126. US Cong, Senate, Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959: Hearings*, 11-19; ltr McElroy to Sen Chavez, 6 Jun 58, *ibid*, 261-312.
127. *New York Times*, 15 Jan, 13 May 58; ltr SecDef to Speaker of House, 14 Jun 58, fldr 240 (Cordiner) Pay Increase 9 Jun 58, Box 15, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; PL 85-422 (20 May 58). For the president's comment, see memo of conf (Goodpaster), 15 Apr 58, fldr DoD—Vol. II (4) (Jan 1958), Box 32, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL. The bill did not authorize retention contracts for reserve officers; a separate bill for this purpose was introduced during 1958 but not approved: *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1958*, 33.
128. Ltr Pres Eisenhower to Pres of Senate, 6 Jun 58, w/encl, ltr ActgDirBoB to Pres, 6 Jun 58, US Cong, Senate, Cte on Appros, *Amendments to the Budget—Department of Defense—Military Functions*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), S Doc 103; Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959: Hearings*, 43-46. Another request was submitted on 9 June for an additional \$18 million in retired pay: OASD(C), Table EFAD-348, 19 Nov 59, OSD Hist.
129. *New York Times*, 31 Jul 58; US Cong, Senate, Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1959*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), S Rept 1937.
130. Ltr SecDef to Sen Chavez, 2 Aug 58, fldr FY 1959 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
131. PL 85-724 (22 Aug 58). For a convenient comparison of the appropriation amounts with administration requests, see OSD(C) Table EFAD-348, 19 Nov 59, OSD Hist. S Rept 1937, cited in note 129, tabulates the amounts initially provided by the House and the Senate.
132. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 635.
133. Ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 12 May 58, fldr FY 1959 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; US Cong, House Cte on Appros, *Proposed Supplemental Appropriations for the Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1959*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), H Doc 395; *New York Times*, 23 Jul 58; US Cong, House, Cte on Appros, *Military Construction Appropriations for 1959: Hearings*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), *Overall Program, Department of the Air Force*, 1-8; US Cong, Senate, Cte on Appros, *Military Construction Appropriations for 1959: Hearings*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), 1-10; memo McNeil for McElroy and Quarles, 23 Jul 58, fldr FY 1959 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; PL 85-852 (28 Aug 58).
134. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 24 Sep 58, fldr Staff Notes Sep 58, Box 36, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memo SecDef for Pres, 24 Sep 58, initialed as approved by Pres 25 Sep 58, fldr FY 1959 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
135. *New York Times*, 12 Sep 58; "Utilization of FY 1959 Funds appropriated by the Congress in excess of the President's request," 28 Oct 58, prepared for use in discussions with Sen Saltonstall, atchmt to ofc memo, Max Lehrer, OASD(C), for Brig Gen Warren, MilAsst to DepSecDef, 29 Oct 58, fldr FY 1959 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
136. Memos SecDef for SecNav, both 29 Jul 58, fldr Force Levels for 1959 Budget, Box 8, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372; McElroy press conf, 12 Sep 58, *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1957-58*, IV:1717-20; memo SecDef for Pres, 24 Sep 58, fldr FY 1959 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 24 Sep 58, fldr Staff Notes Sep 58, Box 36, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL. Strengths of the services as of 30 September were: Army, 900,440; Navy, 643,452; Marine Corps, 188,885; Air Force, 865,238; total, 2,598,015: *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1958 to June 30, 1959*, 382.
137. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 24 Sep 58, fldr Staff Notes Sep 58, Box 36, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 27 Sep 58, fldr FY 1959 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.

VII. MISSILE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS, 1956-1958

1. For the evolution of missile technology, see Eugene M. Emme, *A History of Space Flight*, 62-97; G. Edward Pendray, "Pioneer Rocket Development in the United States," in Emme, ed., *The History of Rocket Technology*, 19-28; Lloyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, *This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury*, 1-31. For missile development in the Soviet Union, see G.A. Tokaty, "Soviet Rocket Technology," in Emme, ed., *The History of Rocket Technology*, 271-84.
2. OASD(AE), Directorate of Guided Missiles, "Review of Guided Missile Program," 24 Jun 55, Box 6, ASD(R&D) JCCGM files, Acc 63-A1920. Additional information about the characteristics of some of the above missiles is given in "The Guided Missile Program," Jul 1957, presentation by SAGM before Pres, 3 Jul 57, fldr M-319.1 Missile Bible, 21 May 57, Box 23, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372 (hereafter cited as "The Guided Missile Program," Jul 57).
3. OASD(AE), "Review of Guided Missile Program," and "The Guided Missile Program," Jul 57, both cited in n 2.
4. "The Guided Missile Program," Jul 57; Ernest G. Schwiebert, "The USAF Ballistic Missiles, 1954-64: A Concise History," in Schwiebert, *A History of the U.S. Air Force Ballistic Missiles*, 67-103, 117-23; Robert L. Perry, "The Atlas, Thor, Titan, and Minuteman," in Emme, ed., *The History of Rocket Technology*, 143-47; House Cte on Govt Operations, *Organization and Management of Missile Programs*, 30-33, 74-79; Bernard A. Schriever, "The USAF Missile Program," *Air University Quarterly Review*, IX (Summer 57), 7-8.
5. Vincent Davis, *The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases*, 21-28.
6. Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 183-85.
7. The JCCGM was set up by DoD Instr 5100.7, 2 Feb 55. For the ASD(R&E) and ASD(AE), see ch I.
8. ODM Science Advisory Committee, Technological Capabilities Panel, "Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack," 14 Feb 55. The panel's recommendations are on 37-46. For the origin of the panel and a summary of its recommendations, see Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 11, 67, 272-75.
9. NSC Action 1433, 8 Sep 55 (approved by Pres 13 Sep), bound fldr Record of Actions by the National Security Council 1955, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
10. Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 68-70; memo SecDef for SecA et al, 8 Nov 55, OSD Hist; memos SecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 8 Nov 55, fldr Organization and Operations (BMC), Box 1, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923. For a full discussion of events leading up to Wilson's decision, see Michael H. Armacost, *The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy*, 22-81.
11. Memo SecDef for ASDs et al, 8 Nov 55, memos SecDef for SecA and SecNav and for SecAF, both 8 Nov 55; fldr Organization and Operations (BMC), Box 1, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923. After von Neumann's death, Clark B. Millikan, professor of aeronautics at California Institute of Technology, became chairman of the Scientific Advisory Committee.
12. Ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 8 Nov 55, *ibid*; Ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 29 Nov 55, fldr 470 Guided Missiles Jul-Dec 55, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1955, Acc 59-A2376; Max Rosenberg, *Plans and Policies for the Ballistic Missile Initial Operational Capability Program*, 20-21, 27.
13. Memo ExecSecNSC (Lay) for SecDef, 21 Dec 55, fldr TCP-ICBM, IRBM & 1500-mile Missile, Box 13, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
14. *Baltimore Sun*, 2 Feb 56; *New York Times*, 5, 6 Feb 56 (column by Hanson Baldwin); T.F. Walkowicz, "The Race for the ICBM," *Air Force*, XXXIX (Feb 56), 33-37. For the Symington investigation, see ch II.
15. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1956*, II:359, 361-67, 370-71 (quotes, 361-62, 364). The press continued to use the term "czar" after Wilson had explicitly disowned it: see *New York Times*, 1 Feb 56, *New York Journal-American*, 3 Feb 56, and Hanson Baldwin in the *New York Times*, 5 Feb 56.
16. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1956*, II:432-33; DoD Dir 5105.10, 27 Mar 56. In establishing this office, Wilson was to some extent following a precedent set by President Truman, who in 1950 had established a somewhat similar position, Director

- of Guided Missiles, held by K.T. Keller. When Keller resigned in 1953, soon after Eisenhower's accession, the position was allowed to lapse: Condit, *Test of War*, 474-75.
17. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1956*, II:434-35.
 18. Minutes of the meetings of the OSD BMC, starting with the first on 25-28 November 1955, are in Box 9, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923. For the committee of alternates, see minutes of the 38th mtg (19 Feb 58) of the BMC, 10 Mar 58, and memo SAGM for SecDef, 20 Mar 57, fldr 020 DoD Guided Missiles 1957, Box 6, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
 19. Monthly Reports of Progress of ICBM Programs, Nos 1-10, 31 Dec 55-30 Sep 56, all in OSD Hist. Each contains a memorandum of transmittal from the chairman to the secretary of defense and a letter from the secretary to the president.
 20. Scientific Advisory Committee Report on Ballistic Missiles to Secretary of Defense, Nos 1-6, 11 Feb 56-15 Jan 57, OSD Hist.
 21. The organization of the Air Force ballistic missile effort is described in Jacob Neufeld, *The Development of Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1960*, 93-148, and Claude J. Johns, Jr., "The United States Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Program—Technological Change and Organizational Innovation," 50-132. For brief summaries, see Schwiebert, "The USAF Ballistic Missiles, 1954-64," 113-14, and J. S. Butz, "The USAF Missile Program: A Triumph of Orderly Engineering," in Schwiebert, ed., *A History of the U.S. Air Force Ballistic Missiles*, 187-88. For Polaris, see James Baar and William E. Howard, *Polaris*, 35-51; Ed Rees, *The Seas and the Subs*, 124-27, 136-38; Harvey M. Sapolsky, *The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government*, 8, 61-64. On ABMA see Medaris, *Countdown for Decision*, 68-75.
 22. Monthly Repts on Progress of ICBM and IRBM Programs, 31 Dec 55-30 Sep 56, OSD Hist; Schwiebert, "The USAF Ballistic Missiles, 1954-64," 96, 114; Butz, 189-91; Armacost, 100; Schriever, 17-19; Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 843, 966. For PERT, see Sapolsky, 94-130, and Rees, 147-52.
 23. Monthly Repts on Progress of ICBM and IRBM Programs, 31 Dec 55-30 Sep 56, OSD Hist; Medaris, 119-20; Wernher Von Braun, "The Redstone, Jupiter, and Juno," in Emme, ed., *The History of Rocket Technology*, 111-14.
 24. Sapolsky, 23-35; Baar and Howard, 52-67.
 25. Mins, 4th mtg (15 Feb 56) and 5th mtg (20 Mar 56) of OSD BMC, Box 9, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; Sapolsky, 26-28; Wyndham D. Miles, "The Polaris," in Emme, ed., *The History of Rocket Technology*, 164-65; memo SecNav for SecDef, 9 Nov 56, fldr M-Polaris 400.112 (10 Jan 57), Box 23, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372. Roy Neal, *Ace in the Hole: The Story of the Minuteman Missile*, 73-76, has an account of the 15 February BMC meeting by an Air Force participant.
 26. Sapolsky, 27-28; Baar and Howard, 67.
 27. Sapolsky, 28-30 (quote, 30); Armacost, 108.
 28. Ltr CNO to ChmAEC, 14 Sep 56, memo SAGM for ATSD(AE), 18 Sep 56, ltr Dir of Mil Application, AEC (Brig Gen Alfred D. Starbird, USA) to SAGM, 5 Oct 56; fldr Polaris 1956-57, Box 3, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919; memo Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr, Sec Tech Adv Panel on Atomic Energy, OASD(R&D), for Murphree, 12 Oct 56, fldr 203.3 Guided Missiles, Box 46, ODDR&E files, Acc 61-A1491; SAC 5th Rept on Ballistic Missiles to SecDef, 23 Oct 56, OSD Hist.
 29. Sapolsky, 31-32; Baar and Howard, 67-73; Miles, 165-66. Polaris was originally the name of the missile, but it came to be applied to the complete weapon system, including the submarines.
 30. Memo SecNav for SecDef, 9 Nov 56, ltr SecNav to SecDef (via ChmOSDBMC), 9 Nov 56, fldr M-Polaris 400.112 (10 Jan 57), Box 23, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372.
 31. Memo SAGM for SecDef, 21 Nov 56; memo SAGM for DepSecDef, 3 Dec 56; memo McNeil for DepSecDef, 23 Nov 56, atchd to memo SecDef for SecNav, 8 Dec 56: *ibid*.
 32. Baar and Howard, 71-72.
 33. Memo SecDef for SecNav, 8 Dec 56, fldr M-Polaris 400.112 (10 Jan 57), Box 23, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372.
 34. Mins of 26th mtg (9 Jan 57) of OSD BMC, *ibid*. For membership of the service ballistic missiles committees, see Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 354-55.

35. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1956*, II:669, 678-79 (press conference 21 May 56); Armacost, 110.
36. On the positions of the services in this matter, see Armacost, 82-117.
37. "Requirement: Guided Missiles for the Army," *Army*, VI (Mar 56), 10, and "The IRBM: The Army Has the Know-How," *ibid*, 11-13; N.A. Parson, Jr., "The IRBM: Artillery-Support Weapon," *ibid*, 10, 11-13, 14, 16, 53 (quote, 53).
38. Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, *Study of Airpower: Hearings*, 711.
39. *Ibid*, 1287-88.
40. Armacost, 96; memo SecAF for SecDef, 31 Mar 56, fldr 471.6-510, Box 24, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1956, Acc 60-A1339.
41. Memo SecDef for AFPC members, 26 Nov 56, Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 306-12. For the background of this directive, see ch II.
42. Mins of 23rd mtg (15 Nov 56) of OSD BMC, 4 Dec 56, Box 9, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923.
43. Medaris, 125.
44. "Considerations on the Wilson Memorandum," nd, ns, atchmt to memo A.G. Waggoner (ExecAsst to SAGM) for DepGC, 8 Jan 57, fldr 020 DoD (11 Jan 57), Box 17, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
45. On the Nickerson case, see Armacost, 124-28, and Clay Blair, Jr., "The Case of Colonel Nickerson," *Saturday Evening Post*, CCXXIX (18 May 57), 32 ff. Accounts by those involved include Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson, *U.S.A.—Second-Class Power?*, 148-63 (extremely hostile to Medaris), and Medaris, 124-32. Documents with somewhat cryptic handwritten notes bearing on the investigation, evidently made at the time, are in fldr Considerations on the Wilson Memorandum, Box 17, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
46. Ltr Robertson to Pearson, 7 Jan 57, ltr Pearson to Wilson, 23 Feb 57, ltr Dechert to Pearson, 1 Mar 57; Box 44, CEWA.
47. Pearson column ("Washington Merry-Go-Round"), *Washington Post*, 27 Mar 57; Wilson press conf, 19 Mar 57, *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, 1:242-43; Tyler Abell, ed., *Drew Pearson Diaries, 1949-1959*, 375-76 (where the press conference is misdated 27 Mar); ltr Wilson to Pearson, 28 Mar 57, and reply Pearson to Wilson, 1 Apr 57, Box 44, CEWA; also in fldr 250.4 Col. Nickerson 7 Jan 57, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372.
48. Rosenberg, *Plans and Policies*, 27-34.
49. Mins of 15th mtg (27 Jul 56) of OSD BMC, Box 9, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; Rosenberg, *Plans and Policies*, 35-41, 49-52.
50. Memo AsstSecAF (Richard E. Horner) for ChmOSDBMC, 23 Nov 56, fldr Requests for Action from AF BMC, 1955-56, Box 4, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; mins of 24th mtg (5 Dec 56) of OSD BMC, 12 Dec 56, Box 9, *ibid*; Rosenberg, *Plans and Policies*, 41-44, 52-53.
51. Mins of 24th mtg (5 Dec 56) of OSD BMC, Box 9, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923.
52. Presentation by Murphree to NSC, 11 Jan 57, fldr TCP-ICBM, IRBM and 1500-mile Missile, Box 13, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; presentations by Medaris, Raborn, Schriever, and Rear Adm J. H. Sides, 11 Jan 57, fldr AFPC Dec 56, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; memo of disc (Gleason), 309th NSC mtg, 11 Jan 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:401-05.
53. Rosenberg, *Plans and Policies*, 44-45; memo of disc (Gleason), 317th NSC mtg, 28 Mar 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:454-56.
54. WSEG Brief No 3 (Final), "The Relative Military Advantages of Missiles and Manned Aircraft," 19 Jun 57, fldr AFPC Jun 57, Box 6, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; memo of disc (Gleason), 327th NSC mtg, 20 Jun 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:528-30.
55. Ltr ASD(ISA) to SecState, 21 May 56, fldr TCP-ICBM, IRBM & 1500-mile Missile, Box 13, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
56. AFPC mtg notes, 19 Mar 59, fldr AFPC 1st Quarters 1957, 9 Apr 57, fldr AFPC Apr-May 57, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; AFPC Advice of Action, 19 Mar 57, 9 Apr 57, OSD Hist.
57. "The Guided Missile Program," 3 Jul 57.

58. Memo SecA for SecDef, 15 Jun 57, fldr Missile (Redstone) (471.94) 4 Sep 59, Box 1, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 63-A1668.
59. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 26 Jun 57, memo SecDef for SecA, 29 Jun 57: *ibid*.
60. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 2 Aug 57, memo CSA for SecDef, 2 Aug 57: *ibid*.
61. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, II:567-569.
62. DDE diary excerpt, 5 Aug 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:572-74. The president in this passage spoke of having received a memorandum from Army officials calling attention to the reporters' error.
63. Telcon Pres and Wilson, 7 Aug 57, OSD Hist.
64. Memo ActgSecA (Charles C. Finucane) for SecDef, 8 Aug 57, fldr Missile (Redstone) (471.94) 4 Sep 59, Box 1, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 63-A1668.
65. Memo SecDef for Pres, 10 Aug 57, *ibid*.
66. Summary of conf (12 Aug 57) on Army missile program, by Maj Eisenhower, 14 Aug 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:583-86; Eisenhower, *Strictly Personal*, 191-92 (quotes, 192).
67. Eisenhower, *Strictly Personal*, 192-93; Eisenhower interv, 22 Oct 84, 52, OSD Hist; ltr Lemnitzer to Taylor, 20 Aug 57, fldr Eyes Only vol 1, Box 68, Lemnitzer papers, NDU. As a result of this episode, John S. D. Eisenhower recalled, "Charlie Wilson never spoke to me again for the rest of his life": (Eisenhower interv, 22 Oct 84, 52, OSD Hist)
68. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 9 Sep 57, CM-6-57, fldr Missile (Redstone) (471.94) 4 Sep 59, Box 1, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 63-A1668; memrcd Goodpaster, 6 Nov 57 (summarizing mtg 4 Nov), OSD Hist.
69. Memo SAGM for SecDef, 15 Apr 57, forwarding progress report of SAGM, April 1956-April 1957, memo SecDef for SAGM, 3 May 57: fldr 020 DoD Guided Missiles 1957, Box 6, OSD CCS files, 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
70. *Washington Post*, 3 May 57; *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, 1:278-79; memo SAGM for SecDef, 28 Mar 57, fldr 020 Guided Missiles 1957, Box 6, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372. Murphree chaired a meeting of the OSD BMC on 16 April 1957, but by the time of the next meeting (28 May 57), the minutes show Holaday as chairman.
71. Memo SecDef for SAGM, 3 May 57, *ibid*.
72. "This is the Department of Defense," 37; memo Dep ASD(R&E) and SAGM for Dir, Ofc of GM, OASD(R&E), 3 Jul 57, OSD Hist; DoD Instrs 5129.4 and 5129.16, 14 Aug 57. For the merger of the two assistant secretaryships, see ch I.
73. DoD Progress Rept No 1 on Anti-Ballistic Missile Weapon System Program, 15 May 58, Box 2, ODDR&E files, Acc 66-A3589.
74. Memo Ronald Hoffman for Alfred Goldberg, 5 Jan 89, OSD Hist.
75. Memo SAGM for ASD(R&E) et al, 28 Aug 56, printed in House Cte on Govt Opns, *Organization and Management of Missile Programs*, 752; memo SecDef for CJCS, "Adjustment of Army/Air Force 'Differences': Air Defense," 26 Nov 56, fldr 452.11 Jan 56, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
76. Benson D. Adams, *Ballistic Missile Defense*, 24; DoD Progress Rept No 1 on Anti-Ballistic Missile Weapon System Program, 15 May 58, Box 2, ODDR&E files, Acc 65-A3589; fact sheet, "Army Anti-ICBM Development Program (Nike-Zeus)," 3 Sep 57, OSD Hist.
77. "Anti-ICBM Program," Tab C with memo SAGM for SecDef, 15 Apr 57, fldr 020 DoD Guided Missiles 1957, Box 6, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372; memo Wilson for Murphree, 12 Apr 57, fldr Reading File Jun 55-Oct 57, Wilson Reading and Speech files, Acc 63-A1802.
78. Memo of disc (Gleason), 319th NSC mtg, 11 Apr 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:479.
79. *New York Times*, 27 Aug 57; memo SecA for SecDef, 5 Sep 57, fldr TCP-ICBM, IRBM & 1500-mile missile, Box 13, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
80. Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, *Vanguard: A History*, 1-24.
81. *Ibid*, 18-30; OASD(R&E), "History of the Scientific Earth Satellite Program," 16 Feb 56, fldr Advisory (Stewart) Group on Special Capabilities (Corres), Box 1, ARPA files, Acc 61-A1589; R. Cargill Hall, "Origins and Development of the Vanguard and Explorer Satellite Programs," *Air Power Historian*, XI (Oct 64), 101-02.
82. Green and Lomask, 29-34; NSC 5520, 20 May 1955, *FRUS 1955-57*, XI:723-32; memo of disc (Gleason), 250th NSC mtg, 26 May 55, *ibid*, 732-33.

83. Green and Lomask, 35-36, 41-56; "Project VANGUARD, A Scientific Satellite Program for the International Geophysical Year," Rept to House Cte on Appros by Surveys and Investigations Staff, House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 6:54-60. The Advisory Group became in effect a permanent standing committee despite the term "ad hoc" in its title.
84. Progress reports and record of meetings of the Advisory Group are in a looseleaf binder in ARPA files, Acc 61-A1589.
85. Green and Lomask, 55, 62-64, 98-100; "History of the Scientific Earth Satellite Program," 16 Feb 56, fldr Advisory (Stewart) Group on Special Capabilities (Corres), Box 1, ARPA files, Acc 61-A1589.
86. Naval Research Laboratory, Preliminary Test Plans for Vanguard Launching Operations, 14 Nov 55, fldr Project Vanguard, ARPA files, Box 1, Acc 61-A1589.
87. Ltr Wilson to Pres, 5 Apr 56, memo for file, S.E. Clements, OASD(R&E), 7 May 56: fldr Advisory (Stewart) Group on Special Capabilities (Corres), *ibid*; memo of disc (Gleason), 283rd NSC mtg, 3 May 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XI:734-42.
88. Ltr Stewart to ASD(R&D), 2 May 56, w/encl, ltr Col J.C. Nickerson for ChmAdvGrp, 27 Apr 56, memo DepASD(R&E) for Lt Gen James M. Gavin, Chief of Res and Dev, DeptA, 15 May 56: fldr Advisory (Stewart) Group on Special Capabilities (Corres), Box 1, ARPA files, Acc 61-A1589; memo ChmAdvGrp for ASD(R&D), 22 Jun 56, filed in notebook with record of Advisory Grp mtg, *ibid*.
89. Memo of disc (Gleason), 310th NSC mtg, 24 Jan 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XI:742-48.
90. Ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 28 Jan 57, fldr FY 1958 Budget January File 3, ATSD & DepSec Def files, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for SecA et al, 2 May 57, fldr Reading File June 55-Oct 57, Wilson Reading and Speech files, Acc 63-A1802.
91. Green and Lomask, 172-74, 176; ltr Stewart to Paul A. Smith (SecAdvGrp), 11 Mar 57, fldr Advisory (Stewart) Group on Special Capabilities (Corres), ARPA files, Acc 61-A1589.
92. "The U.S. Scientific Earth Satellite Program," presentation to NSC by DoD, 10 May 57, fldr NSC 5520 1957, Box 59, ODDR&E files, Acc 69-A1491; memo of disc (Gleason), 322nd NSC mtg, 10 May 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XI:748-54. The Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1958 authorized the secretary of defense to transfer to Vanguard \$34.2 million from DoD appropriations: PL 85-170 (28 Aug 57).
93. Ltr Stewart to Holaday, 12 Jun 57, and atchd handwritten memo, P[aul] A. S[mith], nd, summarizing meeting of Holaday, Stewart, and others, 19 Jun 57, fldr Advisory (Stewart) Group on Special Capabilities (Corres), Box 1, ARPA files, Acc 61-A1589.
94. Memo Advisory Grp on Special Capabilities for SAGM, 10 Oct 57, filed with records of Advisory Group in looseleaf notebook, *ibid*; Green and Lomask, 176-82.
95. SAC Third Rept (18 May 56) and Fifth Rept (18 Jul 56) on Ballistic Missiles to SecDef, OSD Hist; memo SecAF for SecDef, ns, nd [May 57], with atchmt, "Summary of the Advance Reconnaissance System Development," and memo by Maj M. P. Parsons, Ofc of ViceCSAF, 22 May 57, stating that the memo was not signed but was discussed with Quarles by Department of Air Force officials, Box 97, Twining papers, LC. The origin of the WS-117 program is described in William E. Burrows, *Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security*, 82-86, and Paul B. Stares, *The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-1984*, 30-31.
96. Memo SAGM for ChmAdvGrp on Spec Capabils, 6 Sep 57, fldr Project Vanguard Files, Box 1, ARPA files, Acc 61-A1589.
97. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, pt 2:1334-43; Rept to House Cte on Appros by Surveys and Investigations Staff on Guided Missile Programs, Jan 57.
98. Mins 28th mtg (13 Feb 57) of OSD BMC, 30th mtg (27 Mar 57), 31st mtg (2 Apr 57), 32nd mtg (16 Apr 57), memo SAGM for SecDef, 10 Jan 57: fldr M-Polaris 400.112 (10 Jan 57), Box 23, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372; memo SAGM for SecDef, 17 Apr 57, fldr Action Memos to Navy BMC, Box 5, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; memo SecDef for SecNav, 19 Apr 57, fldr M-Polaris 400.112 (10 Jan 57), Box 23, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372.
99. Memo Pres for SecDef, 26 Apr 57, OSD Hist.
100. Memo SecDef for Pres, 7 May 57, fldr Polaris 1956-57, Box 3, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919.

101. Memo Cutler for SecDef, 21 May 57, fldr M-319.1 Missile Bible 21 May 57, Box 23, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372.
102. "The Guided Missile Program," 3 Jul 57, notes by Quarles, typed and handwritten, for presentation at 3 Jul 57 mtg, fldr Mr. Quarles' Notes, Box 4, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769; memo of disc (Gleason), 329th NSC mtg, 3 Jul 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX: 535-38.
103. Ltr Pres to SecDef, 8 Jul 57, fldr M-471.94, 8 Jul 57, Aerodynamic Missile Program, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
104. Agenda for 34th OSD BMC mtg, 9 Jul 57, mins of 34th OSD BMC mtg, 10 Jul 57, memo SAGM for ChmArmyBMC, 16 Jul 57: fldr Action Memos to Army BMC 1957, Box 7, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; memo SAGM for ChmAFBMC, 16 Jul 57, fldr Action Memos to AF BMC 1957, Box 1, *ibid*; Rosenberg, *Plans and Policies*, 65.
105. Mins of 30th (27 Mar 57) and 34th (10 Jul 57) mtgs of OSD BMC, OSD Hist.
106. Memo SecDef for Pres, 31 Jul 57, fldr Reading File Jun 55-Oct 57, Wilson Reading and Speech files, Acc 63-A1802; memo of disc (Boggs), 333rd NSC mtg, 1 Aug 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:569-72.
107. Memos SecDef for SecA and SecAF, 13 Aug 57, fldr 471.6 Jan-Sep, Box 11, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-A1672.
108. Rosenberg, *Plans and Policies*, 66-70; memo SecDef for SecAF, 16 Aug 57, fldr Reading File Jun 55-Oct 57, Wilson Reading and Speech files, Acc 63-A1802; memo SAGM for ChmNavyBMC, 16 Aug 57, memo SecDef for SecNav, 14 Aug 57: fldr Polaris 1956-57, Box 3, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919.
109. Memo SecAF for SecDef, 8 Jul 57, approved by Wilson 9 Jul 57, fldr FY 1958 file #1A, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; DoD NR 710-57, 11 Jul 57, OSD Hist; "The Guided Missile Program," 3 Jul 57.
110. Ltr SecDef to Pres, 9 Aug 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:580-83. On Triton, Regulus II, and the Air Force air-to-surface missiles, see "The Guided Missile Program," 3 Jul 57.
111. *New York Times*, 18 Sep 57. Whether Wilson or the Navy took the initiative in this decision is not indicated in available sources, but his ready concurrence may be safely assumed.
112. Memo CNO for CSAF, 7 Oct 57, fldr Polaris 1956-57, Box 3, ODDR&E (SAGM) Files, Acc 63-A1919.
113. Rosenberg, *Plans and Policies*, 70-72.
114. Memo SecDef for SecAF, 5 Oct 57, fldr Action Memos to AF BMC 1957, Box 1, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; Rosenberg, *Plans and Policies*, 72.
115. Schriever testimony in Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 992-93.
116. Memo SecDef for SecA, 16 Sep 57, fldr Reading File June 55-Oct 57, Wilson Reading and Speech files, Acc 63-A1802.
117. Memo R.H.W. [Brig Gen Robert H. Warren] for Quarles, 17 Oct 57, fldr Reading file #1 Gen. Warren, 1 May 57-1 Oct 58, Box 4, DepSecDef files, Acc 63-A1769.
118. DoD Dir 4105.48, 1 Oct 57. Quarles's directive to the service secretaries (dated 4 Oct 57) has not been found but is referred to in memo Warren for Quarles, 17 Oct 57, cited in preceding note.
119. Monthly Repts on Progress of ICBM and IRBM Programs, No 18 (31 May 57), No 20 (31 Jul 57) (forwarded to SecDef by SAGM, 23 Aug 57, incorporating account of 8 Aug 57 Jupiter C test): Box 22, ODDR&E files, Acc 66-A3589; Eugene M. Emme, *Aeronautics and Astronautics: An American Chronology of Science and Technology in the Exploration of Space, 1915-1960*, 86-87; Medaris, 142-46.
120. Monthly Repts on Progress of ICBM and IRBM Programs, No 14 (31 Jan 57), No 17 (30 Apr 57), No 19 (30 Jun 57), No 21 (21 Aug 57), No 22 (30 Sep 57), Box 22, ODDR&E files, Acc 66-A3589; *Baltimore Sun*, 12 Jun 57; *New York Times*, 26 Sep 57; Emme, *Aeronautics and Astronautics*, 91; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1957*, 792.
121. Emme, *Aeronautics and Astronautics*, 83; Monthly Repts on Progress of ICBM and IRBM Programs, No 22 (30 Sep 57) and No 23 (31 Oct 57), Box 22, ODDR&E files, Acc 66-A3589; Charles A. Ravenstein, *Air Force Combat Wings: Lineage and Honors Histories, 1947-1977*, 293.
122. Monthly Repts on Progress of ICBM and IRBM Program, No 16 (31 Mar 57), No 18 (31 May 57), No 20 (31 Jul 57), Box 22, ODDR&E files, Acc 66-A3589; memo SecNav

- for SecDef, 10 Oct 57, Encl (2), Fldr FY 1959 Budget—Service Submissions, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; Baar and Howard, 106-30; Miles, 167-72.
123. *New York Times*, 11 Aug 57.
 124. Randall interv, 27 Apr 88, 7, 73, OSD Hist; interv with Lyman L. Lemnitzer by David C. Berliner, Nov-Dec 72, 52-53, CUOHP; Medaris, 154-57 (quote, 157).
 125. Memo SecDef for SecNav, 8 Oct 57, fldr M-Polaris 400.112 (10 Jan 57), Box 23, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372. Wilson's action on the Jupiter program is mentioned in ltr SecDef to Pres, 21 Oct 57, OSD Hist.
 126. Rosenberg, *Plans and Policies*, 84.
 127. Memo SecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 18 Oct 57, OSD Hist; released to the press in DoD NR 1029-57, 18 Oct 57, *ibid*.
 128. Memo Pres for SecDef, 17 Oct 57, ltr SecDef to Pres, 21 Oct 57: OSD Hist.
 129. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 8 Oct 57, *ibid*. On the ad hoc committee's discussions, see Armacost, 170-71; Medaris, 148-49; and Medaris's remarks in Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 548-49. No records of the committee's meetings have been found.
 130. Memo of disc (Gleason), 339th NSC mtg, 10 Oct 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:601-04.
 131. Memo SecDef for SecA, 31 Oct 57, fldr Action Memos to Army BMC 1955-57, Box 7, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; memos SecDef for SecAF, 31 Oct 57, 13 Nov 57, fldr Action Memos to BMC 1957, Box 1, *ibid*.
 132. Rosenberg, *Plans and Policies*, 84.
 133. Memo SecA for SecDef, 7 Oct 57, fldr 209.9 Satellites #3, Box 58, ODDR&E files, Acc 61-A1491; memo of conf with Pres, ns, 8 Oct 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XI:755-56; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 8 Oct 57, OSD Hist; *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1957, 733-34.
 134. Memo SecDef for SecA, 8 Nov 57, fldr Army-Navy-AF Satellite Program (Mr. Spriggs) ARPA, Box 1, ARPA files, Acc 61-A1589.
 135. Medaris, 166-70, 173-74.
 136. Mins of spec mtg of DSB, 4 Apr 57, memo Holaday for Newbury, 16 Apr 57, w/atchmt (Points for Discussion between DSB Members and Wilson, apparently prepared by OASD (R&E)), memo George D. Lukes, ExecSecDSB, DASD(R&E), 24 May 57, and Tab G, memrcd Lukes, 10 Apr 57: fldr 95.1 Organization Defense Science Board 1956, Box 13, ODDR&E files, Acc 61-A1491. After the 4 April meeting, a news magazine, apparently on the basis of exaggerated statements from some DSB members, reported that the DSB faced a "crisis" with its future in doubt: Claude Witze, "Scientists Clash with Newbury on Policy," *Aviation Week*, LXVI (15 Apr 57), 26-27. Kevin R. Cunningham, "Scientific Advisors and American Defense Policy: The Case of the Defense Science Board," unpublished paper, U.S. Military Academy, 18 Feb 91, 15, erroneously reports, on the basis of the minutes of the 4 April meeting, that the board members had threatened to resign en masse if not given satisfaction.
 137. Memo ASD(R&E) for DepSecDef, 21 Oct 57, fldr 95.1 Organization Defense Science Board 1956, Box 13, ODDR&E files, Acc 61-A1491; DoD Dir 5129.22, 30 Oct 57.
 138. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1957, 796-97.
 139. DoD Dir 5105.10, 15 Nov 57.
 140. *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy*, 1957-58, I:42-44.
 141. *Ibid*, 45-46.
 142. Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 212-17 (quotes, 212).
 143. *Ibid*, 330, 345-49, 453-54, 457-58. For a summary of the director's authority as distilled from questioning before this subcommittee, see Charles H. Donnelly, *The United States Guided Missile Program*, 43-44.
 144. Donnelly, 44, 119-20.
 145. Security Resources Panel, *Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age*, 16-19. For a more complete account of the panel, see ch VI.
 146. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense: The Ballistic Missile Program: Hearings*, *passim*; Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, *passim*.
 147. Statement of AsstSec McNeil before NSC, 14 Nov 57, fldr FY 1959 Budget Nov-Dec 57, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
 148. Ltr SecNav to SecDef, 22 Oct 57, fldr FY 1959 Budget Service Submissions, *ibid*.
 149. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 11 Nov 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:662-64.

150. Memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Nov 57, w/encls (service submissions in excess of budget ceilings), fldr 110.01 Budget Guidelines for 1959 (30 Jul 57), Box 8, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372. For the Air Force ICBM proposal, see Rosenberg, *Plans and Policies*, 85-86, and for the breakthrough in radar detection, testimony of Lt Gen D. L. Putt, DCS/Development, USAF, in House Cte on Appros, *Supplemental Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 90-92.
151. Memo of disc (Gleason), 346th NSC mtg, 22 Nov 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:689-95.
152. Testimony by Rear Adm Raborn, 21 Nov 57, House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense: The Ballistic Missile Program: Hearings*, 93; memo DGM for SecNav, 9 Dec 57, fldr Polaris 1956-57, Box 3, ODDR&E (SAGM) Files, Acc 63-A1919.
153. Memrcd Goodpaster, 2 Dec 57, fldr Missiles & Satellites vol 1 (3) Sep-Dec 1957, Box 6, DoD subser, Subj Ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
154. Memos DGM for SecA and SecAF, 27 Nov 57, fldr M 471.94 9 Jan 58, Box 26, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 194.
155. Typewritten table headed "included in FY 1958 supplemental," 4 Dec 57, fldr FY 1959 Budget Nov-Dec 1957, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 5 Dec 57, OSD Hist; House Cte on Appros, *Supplemental Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 2-8.
156. Memo DGM for SecAF, 12 Dec 57, fldr Atlas (SM-65/SM-68), Box 1, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919; "Re-evaluation of the Snark Program," encl with memo SpecAsst to CSAF (Maj Gen H. C. Donnelly) for AsstGC, OSD, nd (ca Feb 58), Termination Report, Strategic Missile System SM-62 (Snark), apparently prepared by ARDC project officers, 15 Dec 60: fldr Snark (SM-62), Box 4, OASD(R&D) JCCGM files, Acc 63-A1920; Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 1889.
157. House Cte on Appros, *Supplemental Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 288, 302, 317. Assistant Secretary McNeil later claimed credit for obtaining money for the improved Redstone (and for its subsequent change of name to Pershing): McNeil interv, 7 Jun 76, 39-42, OSD Hist.
158. Memo JCS for SecDef, 7 Jan 58 (JCS 1620/171); memos SecDef for CJCS and for SecA, 7 Jan 58, quoted in note to holders of JCS 1620/171, 8 Jan 58: fldr CCS 471.6 (5-31-44) sec 13, Box 127, CDC file 1958, JCS files, RG 218, NARA. In testifying before a House committee on 14 January, McElroy erroneously gave the date of his approval as 2 January: House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Investigation of National Defense, Missiles*, 4040-41.
159. House Cte on Appros, *Supplemental Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 283-84, 288-89, 302-03, 317, 388-89; ltr McNeil to Mahon, 16 Jan 58, with handwritten note reading, "At noon today the Army decided to name this the Pershing missile, per Sec. Brucker": fldr Budget FY 1958 Supplemental, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; PL 85-322 (11 Feb 58).
160. Memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Dec 57, fldr 471.6, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-B1672.
161. Memo Charles A. Haskins (Ofc of DGM) for Cutler, 21 Jan 58, memo SecDef for Pres, 21 Jan 58: fldr Missiles, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 21 Jan 58, fldr Missiles & Satellites vol II (1) (Jan-Feb 1958), Box 6, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; NSC Action 1846, 22 Jan 58, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1958, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
162. *New York Times*, 1 Feb 58; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 140-41; Medaris, 201-26; Von Braun, 114.
163. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 11 Oct 57, OSD Hist; ltr Pres to SecDef, 17 Oct 57, fldr Secretary of Defense (Nov 53-Jan 59), Box 11, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
164. Memo GC for SecDef, 6 Nov 57, fldr ARPA & Space Legislation, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769.
165. *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1957-58*, I:45, 46-47, 48-49 (quotes, 45, 47); House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense: The Ballistic Missile Program: Hearings*, 7, 21, 25 (quote, 23).

166. Watson, *Office of the Secretary of the Air Force*, 188; testimony of AF officials in Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 863, 948, 976, 1001; Claude Witze, "Pentagon Girds for New Research Feud," *Aviation Week*, LXVII (23 Dec 57), 18-19 (quoting speech by former SecNav Dan A. Kimball); Medaris, 172-74; memo David Z. Beckler, White House, for Killian, 20 Dec 57, fldr Department of Defense (1957) (1), Box 6, OSAST files, WHO, DDEL, and memo ChmExecCteDSB for SecDef, both summarizing DSB actions 19 Dec 57, fldr Research and Development, Box 16, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078.
167. Memo JCS for SecDef, 25 Nov 57, memo Randall for SecA et al, 29 Nov 57: fldr ARPA & Space Legislation, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769.
168. House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Investigation of National Defense, Missiles: Hearings*, 4051-52, 4083-84.
169. Ibid, 3981, 3990-91, 3998-99, 4002-03, 4021-22, 4035-36, 4046-47, 4051-52, 4056-62, 4068-69, 4073-85; memo Dechert for Rep Arends, 4 Feb 58, w/atchmt, memo Dechert for SecDef, 6 Jan 58, encls w/ltr Dechert to Bryce Harlow, 5 Feb 58: fldr Missiles—Misc Papers (1957-1958) (1), Box 2, Harlow papers, DDEL.
170. Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 171-75; House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval and Military Establishments, 1958: Hearings*, 3801-46; Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, *Fiscal Year 1958 Supplemental Military Construction Authorization (Air Force): Hearings*, 59-93; House Cte of Conference, *Supplemental Military Construction Authorization Act*, 85 Cong, 2 sess, H Rept 1329, 5 Feb 58; *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1957-58*, II:499-500; PL 85-325 (12 Feb 58).
171. *New York Times*, 8 Feb 58; *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1957-58*, II:488-99; DoD Dir 5105.15, 7 Feb 58; DoD NR 259-58, 18 Mar 58, OSD Hist.
172. Memo ASD(R&E), DGM, and DARPA for Secs of Mil Deps et al, 7 Apr 58, printed in Donnelly, 119-20.
173. Memo DGM for SecDef, 10 Jan 58, fldr M-373.24 Defense Against ICBM 16 Jan 58, Box 26, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; memos SecDef for SecA and SecAF, 16 Jan 58, printed in House Armed Svcs Cte, *Investigation of National Defense, Missiles: Hearings*, 4196-97.
174. Memo ChmAdvGrp on Spec Capabils for DGM, 15 Jan 58, fldr Army-Navy-AF Satellite Program (Mr. Spriggs) ARPA, Box 1, ARPA files, Acc 61-A1589. For the X-15, see Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, "The Rocket Research Airplanes," 205-09.
175. Memos, DirR&D, DeptA (W. H. Martin) for DGM, 10, 14 Jan 58, fldr Army-Navy-AF Satellite Program (Mr. Spriggs) ARPA, Box 1, ARPA files, Acc 61-A1589.
176. Memo AsstSecNav(Air) (Garrison Norton) for DGM, 15 Jan 58, *ibid*.
177. Memo AsstSecAF(R&D) (Richard E. Horner) for DGM, 24 Jan 58, *ibid*. For DYNASOAR (later redesignated X-20), see Kleinknecht, 209-10.
178. Memo SecA for DGM, 19 Feb 58, memo SecNav for DGM, 18 Mar 58: *ibid*.
179. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 7 Feb 58, fldr Intelligence Matters (4), Box 14, Alpha subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; memrcd D. R. Bowman, OASD(C), 7 Feb 58, fldr WS-117L (SAMOS and Discoverer) Historical File, Box 2, OASD(C) files, Acc 69-A4566; memo SecDef for SecAF, 24 Feb 58, fldr 110 OSD-ARPA, Box 27, OASD(R&E) files, Acc 61-A1491.
180. Memos (3) DirARPA for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 27 Mar 58, fldr ARPA and Space Legislation, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769; DoD NR 288-58, 27 Mar 58, OSD Hist.
181. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1959*, 431-33; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959: Overall Policy Statements: Hearings*, 18.
182. NSC Actions 1841, 6 Jan 58, 1842, 16 Jan 58, 1866, 27 Feb 58: bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1958, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
183. Schwiebert, 123-30; Neal, 63-93.
184. Memo Douglas for McElroy, 8 Feb 58, fldr Guided Missiles 1958, Box 6, OASD(C) Files, Acc 65-A3552.
185. Rosenberg, *USAF Ballistic Missiles 1958-1959*, 15.
186. Memo Hq USAF (Brig Gen Charles M. McCorkle) for DGM, 21 Feb 58, fldr Requests

- for Action from AF BMC 1958, Box 4, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; memo UnderSecAF for DGM, 21 Feb 58, fldr Minuteman 1958, Box 3, *ibid*.
187. Baar and Howard, 131-36; Rees, 163-65.
 188. House Cte on Appros, *Supplemental Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, 208.
 189. Baar and Howard, 154-55.
 190. Ltr SecNav to SecDef, 30 Jan 58, fldr Request for Action from NAV BMC 1958, Box 7, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923.
 191. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 5 Feb 58, fldr Polaris 1958, Box 3, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919; Rosenberg, *USAF Ballistic Missiles 1958-1959*, 15-16; memo JCS for SecDef, 24 Feb 58, fldr 334 Security Resources Panel (9 July 57), BP 334 Security Resources Panel 9 Jul 57, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.
 192. Memo (ns, apparently from DGM) for SecDef, 27 Feb 58, fldr 5724 Rept to Pres by Security Resources Panel of Science Advisory Cte, File #1, BP 334 Security Resources Panel (9 July 57), OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489; presentation to NSC on 27 Feb 58, ns, evidently by Holaday, fldr Missiles and Satellites, Vol. II (1) (Jan-Feb 58), Box 6, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; memo of disc (Gleason), 356th NSC mtg, 27 Feb 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL. For the JCS recommendation regarding Talos, see memo JCS for SecDef, 5 Feb 58, fldr 334 Security Resources Panel (9 July 57), BP 334 Security Resources Panel 9 Jul 57, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.
 193. Memo DGM for SecAF, 27 Feb 58, fldr Minuteman 1958, Box 3, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919.
 194. Memo Ballistic Missiles Panel (Kistiakowsky, Chm) for Killian, 4 Mar 58, OSD Hist. Some of the views in this report had been expressed orally by Kistiakowsky in a conference with the president on 4 Feb and a report to Killian on 13 Feb: memo of conf with Pres (4 Feb 58) (Goodpaster), 6 Feb 58, OSD Hist; memo Kistiakowsky for Killian, 13 Feb 58, fldr M-471.94, 3 Jan 58 (Long Range Ballistic Missiles), Box 26, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
 195. Ltr Killian to Pres, 8 Mar 58, fldr Meetings with the President (Nov 57-Jul 60), Box 12, OSAST files, WHO, DDEL.
 196. Memo DGM for SecAF, 13 Mar 58, fldr M-471.94 Minuteman 3 Feb 58, Box 25, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; memo UnderSecAF for DGM, 13 Mar 58, fldr Requests for Action from AF BMC 1958, Box 4, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923.
 197. Memo SecNav for SecDef, 19 Mar 58, Box 25, fldr M-471.94 Minuteman 3 Feb 58, Box 25, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606. A handwritten note by Holaday, dated 7 April 1958, says that he and McElroy had discussed this and adds, "No reply required. We must keep after problems."
 198. SAC 11th Rept on Ballistic Missiles to SecDef, 15 Mar 58, fldr 209.11 Guided Missiles (OSD SAC) 1959, Box 13, ODDR&E files 1959, Acc 63-A1885.
 199. Ch VI; Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 2359-61.
 200. Memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Apr 58, fldr 334 Security Resources Panel (9 Jul 57), BP 334 Security Resources Panel 9 Jul 57, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.
 201. Memo SecAF for SecDef, 25 Feb 58, fldr Missiles, Box 3, OSD CCS Files 1958, Acc 62-B1606.
 202. Rosenberg, *USAF Ballistic Missiles 1958-1959*, 17.
 203. Monthly Repts on Progress of ICBM and IRBM Programs, No 27 (28 Feb 58), and No 29 (30 Apr 58), Box 22, ODDR&E files, Acc 66-A3589; mins of 40th mtg (12 Jun 58), OSD BMC files, OSD Hist.
 204. Memo SecAF for SecDef, 12 Apr 58, fldr Request for Action from AF BMC 1958, Box 4, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923.
 205. Statements by Quarles at AFPC mtg, 11 Mar 58, AFPC mtg notes, 11 Mar 58, fldr AFPC Mar 58, Box 4, OASD (C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; ltr DepSecDef to Pres, 18 Apr 58, fldr Reading File #2—1 Jan-30 Jun 58, Box 4, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769.
 206. DoD Progress Rept No 1 on Anti-Ballistic Missile Weapon System Program, 15 May 58, Box 2, ODDR&E Files, Acc 66-A3589; NSC Action 1842 (g (5)), 16 Jan 58, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1958, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.

207. Memo DepSecDef for Cutler, 22 Apr 58, fldr 334 Security Resources Panel (9 July 57), BP 334 Security Resources Panel 9 Jul 57, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489; presentation to NSC 24 Apr by DGM, and memo of disc (Gleason), 363rd NSC mtg, 24 Apr 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; statements by Quarles at AFPC mtg 29 Apr 58, fldr AFPC Apr-May 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
208. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959: Overall Policy Statements: Hearings*, 517-52, 594-600; Baar and Howard, 149-60.
209. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959: Department of the Air Force: Hearings*, 13, 31-32, 66, 179; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1959*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), H Rept 1830.
210. Monthly Repts on Progress of ICBM and IRBM Programs, Nos 26-31 (31 Jan-30 Jun 58), OSD Hist; *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1958*, 11, 129-30; Rees, 166-67; Donnelly, 65; Ravenstein, 292.
211. Emme, *Aeronautics and Astronautics*, 96, 100, 140; Green and Lomask, 218-19.
212. Progress Rept No 1 on Anti-Ballistic Missile Weapon System Program, 15 May 58, Box 2, ODDR&E files, Acc 66-A3589.
213. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959: Advanced Research Projects Agency, etc.: Hearings*, 289, 297-301; memo DepSecDef for ASD (R&E), DGM, and DirARPA, 12 Jun 58, fldr Reading File #2—1 Jan-30 Jun 58, Box 4, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769; memo AICBM Panel for Killian, 12 May 58, fldr AICBM (Mar-Sep 58), Box 1, OASD files, WHO, DDEL. The Skifter Steering Group apparently replaced the ABM committee headed by Holaday, which seems to have become inactive by this time. Skifter had been a technical adviser to that committee: Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 353.
214. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 4 Feb 58, fldr Staff Notes Feb 58, Box 30, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memo Kistiakowsky for Killian, 13 Feb 58, fldr M-471.94, 3 Jan 58 (Long Range Ballistic Missiles), Box 26, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
215. Tokaty, 278-82.
216. Alison Griffith, *The National Aeronautics and Space Act: A Study of the Development of Public Policy*, 8-13; Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 600-21, 1884-85, 2089-2149; Senate Special Cte on Space and Astronautics, *Compilation of Materials on Space and Astronautics*, No 1, 27 Mar 58, 14-22, No 2, 14 Apr 58, 308-09. Johnson's role is described in Glen P. Wilson, "The Legislative Origins of NASA: The Role of Lyndon B. Johnson," *Prologue*, XXV (Winter 1993), 363-73. For Johnson's view of the importance of a national space policy, see his book, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969*, 275-77.
217. *New York Times*, 12, 14 Dec 57; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 13 Dec 57; Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 413-14, 444-50; memo SecAF for DGM, 23 Dec 57, printed *ibid*, 450.
218. Robert L. Rosholt, *An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963*, 19-34; Swenson et al, 6-13; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, *Fifty Years of Aeronautical Research*, 3-47.
219. Rosholt, 34-36; Swenson et al, 75-77.
220. Killian, 126-32; memo President's Adv Cte on Govt Orgn for Pres, 5 Mar 58, *ibid*, 280-87; Rosholt, 8-10; Swenson et al, 82-83; Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, 99-105; text of administration bill in Senate Special Cte on Space and Astronautics, *Compilation of Materials on Space and Astronautics*, No 2, 83-91.
221. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 269-73; memo Pres for SecDef and ChmNACA, 2 Apr 58, printed in House Select Cte on Astronautics and Space Exploration, *Astronautics and Space Exploration: Hearings*, 967-69.
222. House Select Cte, *Astronautics and Space Exploration: Hearings*, 1102-23, 1163-1214; Senate Special Cte on Space and Astronautics, *National Aeronautics and Space Act: Hearings*, 65-96, 143-85, 188-213, 214-35, 237-45; McElroy press conf, 8 May 58, *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1957-58*, III:1225-26. Griffith, 44-74, provides an analysis of all the issues that arose in consideration of the bill.
223. Senate Special Cte on Space and Astronautics, *National Aeronautics and Space Act: Hearings*, 168-69, 189-91, 213, 218-20; House Select Cte, *Astronautics and Space Exploration: Hearings*, 1522-23, 1526-27.

224. House Select Cte, *Astronautics and Space Exploration: Hearings*, 1521-42; ltr Dechert to Sen Johnson, 12 May 58, *ibid*, 1188-89; Senate Special Cte on Space and Astronautics, *National Aeronautics and Space Act: Hearings*, 279-85.
225. Griffith, 75-83; House Select Cte on Astronautics and Space Exploration, *Establishment of the National Space Program: Report on H. R. 12575*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (24 May 58), H Rept 1770.
226. Griffith, 84-89; Senate Spec Cte on Space and Aeronautics, *National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (11 Jun 58), S Rept 1701.
227. Memo D. A. Q[uarles] for McElroy, 12 Jun 58, fldr Reading File #2—1 Jan 58-30 Jun 58, Box 4, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769.
228. Johnson, *Vantage Point*, 276-77; House Cte of Conference, *National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (15 Jul 58), H Rept 2166.
229. Griffith, 90-96; PL 85-568 (29 Jul 58, National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958). For the establishment and organization of NASA under this act, see ch XII.
230. "Statement Regarding Negotiations between National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and Advanced Research Projects Agency," 9 May 58, submitted by Hugh L. Dryden (Director NASA) to House, printed in House Select Cte, *Astronautics and Space Exploration: Hearings*, 949-50.

VIII. FOREIGN CRISES IN 1958: LEBANON AND TAIWAN

1. Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1957*, 175-77; *New York Times*, 19 Jan, 10 Mar 57.
2. *New York Times*, 23 Mar 57; text of communiqué in DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXVI (8 Apr 57), 561-62.
3. *New York Times*, 23 Mar 57. For Wilson's advocacy of Baghdad Pact membership, see ch III.
4. Stebbins, 1957, 181-85; Peter Gubser, *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events*, 93-95; msg JCS 921766 for Unified and Specified Cmdrs, 24 Apr 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIII: 107-08; editorial note, *ibid*, 118.
5. Stebbins, 1957, 188-89; Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958*, 291-95; SNIE 36.7-57, 3 Sep 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIII:674-80; memo ActgASD(ISA) (Irwin) for DepSecDef, 28 Aug 57, w/atchmt, memo for CJCS, ns (probably also by Irwin), fldr 091.3 Middle East 690.1, Box 21, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-B1672; msg State 737 for AmEmb Beirut, 28 Aug 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIII:661.
6. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Secretariat, Historical Division, 1957-1960, vol VII in *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs and National Policy*, 423-24 (hereafter cited as JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*).
7. *Ibid*, 408-13.
8. Stebbins, 1957, 331; msgs AmEmb London 2985 for State, 12 Nov 57, and State 1503 for AmEmb Paris, 15 Nov 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIII:159, 161-62; JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 426-31; ltr Irwin for Murphy, DepUnderSecState, 6 Feb 58, and reply, G. Frederick Reinhardt, State, to Irwin, 19 Mar 58, fldr 092 Lebanon TS Sensitive Chg D/NESA & ASD, Box 21, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-B1698.
9. JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 432-34; memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Mar 58, msg JCS 939174 for USCINCEUR, 281450 Mar 58, fldr CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6, JCS files, RG 218, NARA.
10. NSC Action 1667, 7 Feb 57, bound fldr Record of Actions by the National Security Council 1957, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024; JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 399.
11. Memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Jun 57, fldr CCS 381 E. M.M.E. A. (11-19-47) sec 60, Box 5, JCS files 1957, RG 218, NARA; memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 26 Jun 57, fldr 091.3 Middle East 608.1, Box 21, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-B1672.
12. JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 400-01; memo of disc (Boggs), 331st NSC mtg, 18 Jul 57, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.

13. Presentation by CJCS during State-Defense conference, 23 Jul 57, OSD Hist.
14. Memo of disc (Gleason), 334th NSC mtg, 8 Aug 57, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL (summarized in *FRUS 1955-57*, XII:editorial note, 573).
15. NSC 5801/1, 24 Jan 58, *ibid*, 17-32.
16. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1958*, 188-91; Seale, 307-26; *New York Times*, 2 Feb, 9 Mar 58.
17. Stebbins, *1958*, 191-92.
18. Abdul Aziz Said, "Lebanon (1958)," in Doris M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al, *The Experience in Europe and the Middle East*, 433-36.
19. Said, 437-40.
20. Stebbins, *1958*, 194-96; Said, 440-45; *New York Times*, 13 May 58; Robert McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, LXXXVIII (Oct 62), 66-68.
21. Memrcd Goodpaster, 15 May 58, recording mtg in White House, 6:00 pm, 13 May 58, file May 1958 Staff Notes (2), DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memcon, 13 May 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:45-48. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 266-67, states that this conference took place on the morning of 13 May.
22. Msg State 4271 for AmEmb Beirut, 13 May 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:49-51.
23. Msg CNO for CINCNELM, 132307Z May 58, fldr CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 1, Box 155, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA; msg State 4259 for AmEmb Beirut, 13 May 58, OSD Hist: Edward F. Baldrige, "Lebanon and Quemoy—the Navy's Role," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, LXXXVII (Feb 61), 95.
24. JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 435-36; msg JCS 941927 for USCINCEUR, 162224Z May 58, msg DeptA for USCINCEUR, DA 941722, 14 May 58: fldr Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 1, Box 155, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA.
25. Jack Shulimson, *Marines in Lebanon, 1958*, 7-8.
26. JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 436-37; Shulimson, 8; msg JCS 941935 for CINCSPECOMME, 171616Z May 58, fldr CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 1, Box 155, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA.
27. Msg JCS 941855 for CINCSPECOMME, 161708Z May 58, fldr CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 1, Box 155, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA.
28. DeptState, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, 940-45; Stebbins, *1958*, 196-99.
29. Msg JCS 942263 for USCINCEUR et al, 231509Z May 58, fldr CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 1, Box 155, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA; DeptState, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, 945-48; Stebbins, *1958*, 199.
30. Memo ISA for CJCS, 11 Jun 58, memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Jun 58, ltr DepASD(ISA) to State, 16 Jun 58: file envelope Lebanon 381 Sensitive 1958, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.
31. Memo of info atchd to memo CNO for CJCS, 15 Jun 58, *ibid*; msg Beirut 4726 for SecState, 14 Jun 58, OSD Hist; statement by AsstSecState Rountree, DeptState memcon, 15 Jun 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:133-37; memrcd D. A. Quarles, 14 Jun 58, fldr Reading File #2—1 Jan-30 Jun 1958, Box 4, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769; msg State 4790 for AmEmb Beirut, 15 Jun 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:128-29; memo of conf with Pres (L.A. Minnich, Jr.), 15 Jun 58, fldr June 1958 Staff Notes (3), DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
32. *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1957-58*, IV:1542-45.
33. Msgs Beirut 4988 for SecState, 21 Jun 58, and State 3448 for AmEmb Cairo, 21 Jun 58, OSD Hist.
34. First Rept of UNOGIL, 3 Jul 58, in DeptState, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, 952-58.
35. Msg JCS 943672 for USCINCEUR, 202130Z Jun 58, fldr CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 2, Box 155, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA.
36. Msg Beirut 325 for State, 12 Jul 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:206-07.
37. Msgs CHMAAG Baghdad for DoD et al, 14 Jul 58 (DTG 140535Z, 140135 EDT) and USARMA Baghdad CX 39 for DeptA, 140605Z Jul 58, OSD Hist; Stebbins, *1958*, 201-02; *New York Times*, 14 Jul 58.

38. Msg Beirut 358 for SecState, 14 Jul 58 (received in Washington 8:35 am), *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:207-08; msg USARMA, USAIRA, and ALUSNA Beirut for ACSI DeptA, Hq USAF, and CNO, CX 238, 141048Z Jul 58 (140648 EDT), OSD Hist.
39. Roger J. Spiller, "Not War But Like War": *The American Intervention in Lebanon*, 17; Chronology of Telephone Calls, 14 Jul 58, fldr Telephone Calls July 1958, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; telcon, Pres and SecState, 14 Jul 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:209.
40. *New York Times*, 15 Jul 58.
41. Memo of disc (Gleason), 372nd NSC mtg, 14 Jul 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; *New York Times*, 13 Jul 58; McElroy Daily Calendar, 11 Jul 58, Box 5, McElroy papers, DDEL; McElroy interv, 8 May 67, 64, CUOHP.
42. Memrcd of mtg at State, 9:30 am, 14 Jul 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:209-11; Mansfield Sprague interv, 2 Oct 68, 21, CUOHP; Quarles Daily Diary, 14 Jul 58, Box 2, Quarles papers, DDEL.
43. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 14 Jul 58, 10:50 am, *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:211-15; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 269-71; *Time*, LXXII (28 Jul 58), 11-12; Robert Cutler, *No Time for Rest*, 362-64; Mansfield Sprague interv, 2 Oct 68, 21-22, CUOHP. Sprague and Cutler both report that the decision for intervention was reached at this meeting and that the president accordingly gave orders to Twining in dramatic fashion. However, Eisenhower's own account and that of *Time* (obviously based on interviews shortly after the event) make it clear that the president did not make his decision until after his meeting that afternoon with congressional leaders. The memo of that meeting by Goodpaster, cited in next note, indicates that at that time the decision had not been made.
44. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 14 Jul 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:218-26; *Time*, LXXII (28 Jul 58), 12-13 (quote); Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 271-72.
45. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 14 Jul 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:226-28; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 273; *New York Times*, 15 Jul 58; quote from *Time*, LXXII (28 Jul 58), 13.
46. Msg CNO 29288 for CINCNELM and COMSIXTHFLT, 142223Z Jul 58 (6:23 pm EDT), and CNO for CINCSPCOMME and COMSIXTHFLT, 142249Z Jul 58, 6:49 pm EDT, fldr CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA. The first of these is printed in *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:231.
47. Shulimson, 9.
48. Msg JCS 944751 for USCINCEUR et al, 150031Z Jul 58, 8:31 pm EDT, fldr CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3, Box 155, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA.
49. Msgs State 204 for AmEmb Beirut and 455 for USUN, both 14 Jul 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:239-40, 236-37.
50. Twining interv, 16 Mar 65, 11-15, JFDOHP. Twining gives a shorter account of this incident in his book, *Neither Liberty nor Safety*, 64. Dulles's state of mind was later confirmed by Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith, who recalled that after the crisis was over, Dulles admitted that he had been "scared," and this was "the only time I ever heard him use that word": interv with Gerard C. Smith by Philip A. Crawl, 13 Oct 65, 31-32, JFDOHP.
51. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 549-52; *New York Times*, 16 Jul 58; editorial comment from other newspapers in *New York Times*, 17 Jul 58.
52. AFPC mtg notes, 15 Jul 58, fldr AFPC 2nd Quarter 1956, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
53. *New York Times*, 16 Jul 58; Shulimson, 12-15.
54. Shulimson, 12-16; Spiller, 20-22; McClintock, 70-71.
55. Msg JCS 944755 for CINCSPCOMME et al, 151508Z Jul 58, fldr CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA.
56. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 15 Jul 58, 11:25 am, *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:245-56.
57. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 553-57 (quote, 555).
58. DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXIII (4 Aug 58), 186-89; DeptState, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, 967-68, 964-65.
59. Msgs AmEmb Beirut 406 for State, 15 Jul 58, and State 217 for AmEmb Beirut, 15 Jul 58, 2:27 pm, *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:248-51.
60. Shulimson, 19-20; Baldridge, 95; msg CINCSPCOMME 1810 for CNO, 160644Z Jul 58, and 1821, 161156Z Jul 58, fldr CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 4, Box 155, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA; McClintock, 79.

61. Spiller, 24-25 (quote, 25); Shulimson, 20-25; msg AmEmb Beirut 428 for State, 16 Jul 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:254-55; McClintock, 71.
62. Spiller, 25; quote from *New York Times*, 17 Jul 58; DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXIX (4 Aug 58), 183.
63. Msg State 56 to all American diplomatic posts, 16 Jul 58, OSD Hist; Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, 397-98.
64. Msg AmEmb Amman 132 for State, 16 Jul 58, OSD Hist; printed, slightly abridged, in *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:312-14.
65. DeptState memcons, 17 Jul 58, 11:30 am, 2:30 pm, *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:317-20.
66. DeptState, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, 931-83; *New York Times*, 18 Jul 58; msg USARMA Amman CX 55 for DeptA, 182030Z Jul 58, OSD Hist; msgs CNO for CINCSPECOMME, 29661, 180727Z Jul 58, and 20008, 221931Z Jul 58, both in fldr CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 6, Box 155, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA.
67. Shulimson, 27-29; Spiller, 33-34.
68. JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 468.
69. Spiller, 29-33; Gary H. Wade, *Rapid Deployment Logistics: Lebanon, 1958*, 14-15, 27-34; Shulimson, 28-29; Robert D. Little and Wilhelmine Burch, *Air Operations in the Lebanon Crisis of 1958*, 24-25.
70. Msg CINCSPECOMME 4119 for CNO, 211341Z Jul 58, and msg DeptA for USCINCEUR, DA 945322, 231659Z Jul 58, fldr CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 3, JCS Geographic file 1958, Box 155, RG 218, NARA; Shulimson, 30; Spiller, 33-35.
71. JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 452; Wade, 37-41.
72. Spiller, 36-37; msgs JCS 941598 for CINCAL et al, 212131Z Jul 58, and State 412 for AmEmb Paris, 24 Jul 58, OSD Hist.
73. Memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 26 Jul 58, file envelope Lebanon 381 Sensitive 1958, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489; msgs JCS 945598 for USCINCEUR et al, 281605Z Jul 58, and CINCSPECOMME 8437 for JCS, 312126Z Jul 58, fldr CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 4, Box 155, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA.
74. *Baltimore Sun*, 24 Jul 58; memo of disc (Boggs), 373rd NSC mtg, 24 Jul 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XII:100-09.
75. Stebbins, 1958, 204-06; DeptState, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, 990-92; *New York Times*, 19 Jul 58.
76. DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXIX (11 Aug 58), 231-33.
77. Ibid, 229-31, 223-34, 274-77.
78. Ibid (1 Sep 58), 342-46.
79. *New York Times*, 14 Aug 58; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 606-16.
80. Stebbins, 1958, 213-16, 220-21; text of resolution of 21 Aug 58 in DeptState, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, 1047-48.
81. Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, 397-416; Stebbins, 1958, 208-09.
82. Memo DJS for JCS Ops Deps, 4 Aug 58, DM-245-58, msg JCS 946103 for CINCSPECOMME, 041914Z Jul 58, fldr CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 4, Box 155, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA; JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 464-65.
83. Msg CINCSPECOMME 0724 for CNO, 072216Z Aug 58, fldr CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec 4, Box 155, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA; msg AmEmb Beirut 1041 for State, 11 Aug 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XI:449-51; JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 465-66; Shulimson, 40.
84. Shulimson, 58, 41; Spiller, 44; Wade, 79; Little and Burch, 68-69; DeptState, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, 1061 and n 1.
85. Papers prepared by NSC PB, 29 Jul, 19 Aug 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XII:114-24, 145-54; memo of disc (Boggs), 374th NSC mtg, 31 Jul 58, *ibid*, 124-34; memo of disc (Gleason), 377th NSC mtg, 21 Aug 58, *ibid*, 154-56.
86. NSC 5820 is summarized in *ibid*, 162-66, and briefing sheet (by ISA) for 383rd NSC mtg, 16 Oct 58, fldr 5820 U.S. Policy Toward the Near East (File #1), Box 24, OASD (ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
87. Memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 13 Oct 58, memo SecA for SecDef, 15 Oct 58: *ibid*; memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Oct 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XII:171-74.
88. Memo of disc (Gleason), 383rd NSC mtg, 16 Oct 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XII:175-80.

89. Memo of disc (Gleason), 384th NSC mtg, 30 Oct 58, NSC 5820/1, 4 Nov 58: *ibid*, 182-99.
90. For a detailed account of the above developments, see Rearden, *Formative Years*, 209-41; Condit, *Test of War*, 173-85; and Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 256-64.
91. *FRUS 1955-57*, II:30-34.
92. Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 347-58; text of joint resolution in *FRUS 1955-57*, II:162-63; quote from president's message to Congress in *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1955*, 209.
93. Memo of disc (Gleason), 301st NSC mtg, 26 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, X:124-33.
94. *FRUS 1955-57*, II:31 (NSC 5503, para 3), 32 (para 13).
95. Rept by NSC PB to NSC on review of U.S. policy towards Formosa and GRC, encl with memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 9 Sep 57, *FRUS, 1955-57*, III:593-99.
96. Memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Sep 57, *ibid*, 609, n 3.
97. Memo of disc (Gleason), 338th NSC mtg, 2 Oct 57, *ibid*, 611- 19; NSC 5723, 4 Oct 57, *ibid*, 619-23.
98. "U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961," 29 May 58, Box 21, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500. For the background of this study, see ch X.
99. Stebbins, *1958*, 311-13.
100. *New York Times*, 3, 14, 16, 18, 19 Aug 58; msg, USARMA Taipei CX 18 for DeptA, 181205Z Jul 58, OSD Hist.
101. M. H. Halperin, *The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History*, 20-24.
102. Stebbins, *1958*, 313-15; Jonathan Trumbull Howe, *Multicrisis: Sea Power and Global Politics in the Missile Age*, 193-98.
103. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 2-9.
104. Howe, 165-66.
105. *New York Times*, 30 Jul 58.
106. Msg Taipei 99 for SecState, 30 Jul 58, msg State 81 for AmEmb Taipei, 2 Aug 58: OSD Hist.
107. Msg COMTAIWANDEFCON(US)/MAAG Taiwan 9505 for CINCPAC, 040940Z Aug 58, *ibid*.
108. MSG JCS 946104 for CINCPAC, 051936Z Aug 58, fldr 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 37, Box 147, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA; msg CNO 20928 for CINCPAC, 050447Z Aug 58, OSD Hist; *New York Times*, 7 Aug 58.
109. Memo JCS for SecDef, 7 Aug 58, fldr 5723 US Pol toward Formosa and the Gov of the Republic of China, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
110. Memo of disc (Boggs), 375th NSC mtg, 7 Aug 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; briefing paper for 14 Aug 58 NSC mtg, fldr 5723 US Pol toward Formosa and the Gov of the Republic of China, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
111. DeptState memo of mtg, 8 Aug 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:46-47.
112. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 11 Aug 58, fldr Aug 58 Staff Notes (2), Box 35, DDED, PP (AWF), DDEL.
113. Memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 13 Aug 58, w/encl (Situation in Taiwan Straits Area), fldr 5723 US Pol toward Formosa and the Gov of the Republic of China, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; memo DJS for JCS, 20 Aug 58, DM-280-58 (JCS 2118/113, 3 Sep 58), fldr 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 38, Box 147, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA.
114. Memo of disc (Gleason), 376th NSC mtg, 14 Aug 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; briefing paper for 14 Aug 58 NSC mtg, fldr 5723 US Pol toward Formosa and the Gov of the Republic of China, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
115. Memrecd Lay, recording discussion following 376th NSC mtg, 14 Aug 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:52-55; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 14 Aug 58, fldr Aug 58 Staff Notes (1), Box 35, DDED, PP (AWF), DDEL.
116. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 74-81; memo ActgSecState for SecState, 15 Aug 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:56-57.
117. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 80n; msg JCS 946950 for CS USAF, 222145Z Aug 58, OSD Hist.

118. Memo DJS for JCS, 20 Aug 58, DM-280-58, and note by SJCS, 3 Sep 58 (JCS 2118/113, 3 Sep 58), fldr CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 38, Box 147, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA.
119. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 91-94; DeptState memo of mtg, 22 Aug 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:67-68; memo Byers for Sprague, 22 Aug 58, fldr 091.3 Natl China 471.6, Box 20, OASD(ISA) files 1958, Acc 62-B1698.
120. *New York Times*, 24 Aug 58; text of letters in DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXIX (8 Sep 58), 379.
121. JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 680-81.
122. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 101, 156-60.
123. Memo SecState for ActgSecState and AsstSecState for FE Aff, 23 Aug 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:69-70.
124. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 156-62.
125. Msg JCS 947006 for CINCAL et al, 242248Z Aug 58, OSD Hist; msg JCS 947007 for CINCPAC, 242339Z Aug 58, fldr CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 37, Box 147, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA; Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 107-08.
126. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 110-11; memrcd Burke, 25 Aug 58, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC. The text of the JCS draft policy statement is given in Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 115.
127. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 25 Aug 58, file Aug 58 Staff Notes (1), Box 35, DDED, PP (AWF), DDEL; DeptState memo of mtg, 25 Aug 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:73-75; Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 112-16.
128. Msg JCS 947046 for CINCPAC, 252147Z Aug 58, OSD Hist.
129. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 643-44 (quote, 644).
130. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 150, 151-53.
131. Ibid, 191-96; DeptState memcon, 28 Aug 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:89-96; memo Burke for Twining et al, 28 Aug 58, fldr 091.3 Natl China 471.6, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-B1698.
132. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 29 Aug 58, 9:00 am, file Aug 58 Staff Notes (1), Box 35, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; DeptState memo of mtg, 20 Aug 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:96-99.
133. Msg JCS 947298 for CINCPAC, 29 Aug 58, OSD Hist. The message from State to Drumright is quoted in this.
134. For Brucker's report of these conversations, see msg CHMAAG Saigon for DeptA (personal for AsstSecArmy Hugh M. Milton from Sec Brucker), MAGCH-CH 1060, 031141Z Sep 58, OSD Hist. A summary by Drumright of the meeting of 31 August is in msg Taipei 271 for State, 1 Sep 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:109-11.
135. *New York Times*, 30 Aug 58; *Washington Post*, 29 Aug 58; msg Taipei 260 for SecState, 30 Aug 58, OSD Hist; msg CINCPAC 8521 for JCS, 312200Z Aug 58, fldr CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 38, Box 147, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA.
136. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 160, 213, 215; *New York Times*, 5 Sep 58.
137. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 244-46; msg CINCPAC 9938 for JCS, 050354 Sep 58, fldr 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 38A, Box 148, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA.
138. DeptState memcon, 2 Sep 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:115-22.
139. Memcon Dulles and Twining, 2 Sep 56, quoted in McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, 279.
140. DeptState memcon, 3 Sep 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:125-28.
141. *New York Times*, 5 Sep 58; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 4 Sep 58, fldr Staff Notes Sep 58, Box 36, DDED, PP (AWF), DDEL; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 299, 691-93.
142. DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXIX (22 Sep 58), 445-46.
143. DeptState memcon, 5 Sep 58, encl with memo Fisher Howe for SecDef, 8 Sep 58, Box 1, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.
144. *New York Times*, 7 Sep 58.
145. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 284-86 and n on 286.
146. Memo CJCS for JCS members, 15 Sep 58, CM-177-58, fldr CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 39, Box 148, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA; memo of conf with Pres

- (Goodpaster), 6 Sep 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:142-43; Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 285-86; JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 689.
147. Text of White House statement in DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXIX (22 Sep 58), 446-47.
 148. Memo JCS for SecDef, 6 Sep 58, w/encl, Box 1, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.
 149. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 294-75, 298; msg Taipei 332 for State, 7 Sep 58, OSD Hist.
 150. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 295-96; msgs Taipei for State, 341, 8 Sep 58, 364, 11 Sep 58, OSD Hist.
 151. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 406-07.
 152. Ibid, 416; msg CNO 23554 for CINCPACFLT et al, 082325Z Sep 58, fldr CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 38A, Box 148, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA.
 153. Memo Burke for Twining, 7 Sep 58, fldr CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 38A, Box 148, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA; Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 408-11, 414.
 154. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 297-304.
 155. DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXIX (29 Sep 58), 498-503.
 156. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 11 Sep 58, fldr Staff Notes Sep 58, Box 36, DDED, PP (AWF), DDEL.
 157. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 694-700.
 158. *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1957-58*, IV:1712-31.
 159. For summaries of public opinion, see Howe, 243-45, and Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 236-40, 381-93. The concluding sentence in the above paragraph is from Howe, 245. A story in the *Wall Street Journal*, 8 Sep 58, noted that "Washington's decision to defend the Nationalist Chinese offshore islands against Communist invasion is drawing far less popular support than the dispatch of U.S. Marines to Lebanon in mid-July."
 160. *New York Herald Tribune*, 9, 18, 25 Sep 58 (Lippmann); 3, 19 Sep 58 (Alsop).
 161. Msg CINCPAC 2365 for JCS, 111245Z Sep 58, fldr CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 39, Box 148, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA; msg JCS 947931 for COMNAVPHIL (for CINCPAC) and COMTAIWANDEFCON(US), 121823Z Sep 58, OSD Hist.
 162. DeptState memcon, 12 Sep 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:172-75.
 163. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 298-99.
 164. Ibid, 422-23, 427-28.
 165. Memo VCNO (Adm James S. Russell) for JCS, 17 Sep 58, fldr CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 39, Box 148, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA.
 166. DeptState memcon 20 Sep 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:241-47.
 167. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 441-55; Jacob D. Beam, *Multiple Exposure: An American Ambassador's Unique Perspective on East-West Issues*, 120-34.
 168. *New York Times*, 20, 21 Sep 58; DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXIX (6 Oct 58), 530-31.
 169. Memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Sep 58, fldr 091.3 Natl China 471.6, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-B1698; Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 435-37; ltr DepASD(ISA) to SecState, 26 Sep 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:282-84.
 170. *Baltimore Sun*, 25 Sep 58; Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 438.
 171. Msg CINCPAC 7242 for COMUSTDC, 262328Z Sep 58, OSD Hist.
 172. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 298-302.
 173. Ibid, 305; msg State 272 for AmEmb Taipei, 26 Sep 58, and msg JCS 948588 for CINCPAC, 252018Z Sep 58: OSD Hist.
 174. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 29 Sep 58, file Staff Notes Sep 58, Box 36, DDED, PP (AWF), DDEL.
 175. DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXIX (1 Oct 58), 565, and XXXIX (20 Oct 58), 597-604.
 176. *New York Times*, 6 Oct 58.
 177. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 302, 492-94.
 178. DeptState memcon, 5 Oct 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:329-30; msg CNO 25002 for CINCPAC, 060045Z Oct 58 (5 Oct, 8:45 pm EDT), fldr CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec 40, Box 148, JCS Geographic file 1958, RG 218, NARA.
 179. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 495-96.
 180. Ibid, 533; *New York Times*, 13 Oct 58.
 181. DeptState record of mtg, 10 Oct 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:363-71; handwritten notes by Quarles on same mtg, fldr Mr. Quarles' Notes, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc

- 63-A1769; statement by Twining in memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 13 Oct 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:381-82.
182. Msg Taipei 584 for State, 13 Oct 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:379-81; *New York Times*, 14, 15 Oct 58; Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 501-02.
183. *Washington Post*, 21 Oct 58; *New York Times*, 21 Oct 58; editorial note, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:411-12.
184. Halperin, *1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis*, 518-33; rept by Dulles to NSC, memo of disc (Gleason), 384th NSC mtg, 30 Oct 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
185. *New York Times*, 26 Oct 58.
186. Memo of conf with Pres (J. S. D. Eisenhower), 30 Oct 58, and addendum, memrcd by same 31 Oct 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XIX:473-74, and 474, n 5.
187. Msg CINCPAC 270053Z Nov 58 for CNO, msg JCS 951567 for CINCPAC, 270018Z Nov 58: OSD Hist; JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 694.
188. Memo Gale for Maj Eisenhower, 11 Dec 58, fldr China 1958, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; memo Rear Adm E. J. O'Donnell, DirFEReg, for Dir Ofc of Programming and Control (both in OASD(ISA)), fldr 370.5 Natl China 470, Box 13, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-A1698.
189. Ch VI; personnel statistics in *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1958 to June 30, 1959*, 382.
190. See McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, 279-83, for discussion of the possible use of nuclear weapons in the 1958 Taiwan crisis.
191. Senate Ctes on Armed Svcs (Preparedness Investigating Subcte) and Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Missile and Space Activities: Hearings*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (29 Jan 59), 34.
192. *New York Times*, 27 Jul 58 (Hanson W. Baldwin); *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 27 Jul 58 (Thomas R. Phillips); Burke statement in Senate Cte on For Rels, *Disarmament and Foreign Policy: Hearings*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (1959), pt 1:106-07. For the limited war debate, see chs V and X.
193. Memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Feb 59, JCSM-42-59, w/encl, Lessons Learned from the Lebanon and Quemoy Operations, fldr 5723 US Pol toward Formosa and the Gov of the Republic of China, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500. It was originally intended that these "lessons" would be submitted to the NSC PB, but under a later decision by Gray, they were retained by the JCS PB adviser to be used as necessary: memo Knight, OASD(ISA), for CJCS, 11 Feb 58, *ibid*.
194. OCB Report on Near East (NSC 5820/1), 3 Feb 1960, Box 24, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; briefing paper for PB mtg, 2 Jun 60, fldr 5820 US Policy toward the Near East (File #2), Box 24, *ibid*.
195. NSC 6011, 17 Jun 60, OSD Hist.
196. Memo JCS for SecDef, 5 Jul 60, JCSM-275-60, memo AsstSecA(FM) (George H. Roderick) for SecDef, 5 Jul 60, fldr 6011 U.S. Policy toward the Near East, Box 28, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; memo of disc (Robert H. Johnson), 451st NSC mtg, 15 Jul 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; NSC 6011, 17 Jun 60, OSD Hist.

IX. REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 1958

1. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., and Louis Galambos, eds., *Occupation, 1945*, vol VI in *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, 121.
2. *Ibid*, 214-15 (emphasis in original).
3. Lawrence J. Legere, Jr., "Unification of the Armed Forces," 267-361; Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, 186-226; Rearden, *Formative Years*, 16-27.
4. JCS Hist Div, *Role and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A Chronology*, 73-94. The other members of PACGO were Milton S. Eisenhower and Arthur S. Flemming, with Arthur A. Kimball as staff director.
5. Ofc memo L. Niederlehner (DepGC) for Sprague, 13 Mar 56, forwarding drafts of proposed legislative changes and reorganization plans with handwritten corrections by Wilson, OSD Hist; ltr SecDef to Pres, 5 Apr 56, forwarding reorganization plan, and memo Chm Pres Adv Cte on Govt Org (Rockefeller) for DirBob, 2 May 56, both in fldr

- 1956 Reorganization of DoD, Box 12, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078; memo Kimball for PACGO members, 16 May 56, fldr No 29 Reorganization Program and Plans 1953-59 (2) 1955-56, Box 5, PACGO files, DDEL. For the Hoover Commission, see ch I.
6. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1956*, 492-94; House Cte on Govt Operations, *New Offices in the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force*, 84 Cong, 2 sess (1956), H Rept 2585; *Congressional Record*, 84 Cong, 2 sess, vol 102, pt 7:9440, pt 9:11613-18, 11886.
 7. Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 163-64; *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1956*, 11; PL 84-1028 (10 Aug 56). Title 10 dealt with the armed services and the Department of Defense, Title 32 with the National Guard.
 8. JCS Hist Div, *Chronology of JCS Organization, 1945-1984*, 123-26.
 9. Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, *Airpower: Report of the Subcommittee on the Air Force, 25 January 1957*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (1957), 74-80.
 10. Text of resolution in *Air Force* (Sep 56), 38.
 11. For examples, see: Elwood R. Quesada, "How to Make Peace at the Pentagon," *Collier's*, CXXXVIII (3 Aug 56), 17-19, 52-53; Henry A. Kissinger, "Strategy and Organization," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXV (Apr 57), 379-94; Albert P. Sights, Jr., "Major Tasks and Military Reorganization," *Air University Quarterly Review*, IX (Winter 1956-57), 3-26; John A. McCone, "Organizing Efficiently for National Defense," *Air Force*, XI (Sep 57), 67-70; and for a temperate and low-key defense of the status quo, Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "Some Thoughts on Department of Defense Organization," *Naval War College Review*, IX (Dec 56), 23-47.
 12. Memos of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 18, 24 May 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:303-05, 311-15.
 13. *Ibid*, 301-03.
 14. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 6 Jun 56, fldr Jun 56 Goodpaster, Box 15, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
 15. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, I:308, II:467-74 (quote, 472-73).
 16. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Information, *Missiles and Satellites: Press Reports*, 17, 20, 22, 29, 32, 37, 136, 159, 168; *Washington Star*, 2 Dec 57; Harold H. Martin, "Showdown in the Pentagon," *Saturday Evening Post*, CCXXX (9 Nov 57), 37, 114-16; C. C. Furnas, "Why Did U.S. Lose the Race? Critics Speak Up," *Life*, XLIII (21 Oct 57), 22-23; Trevor Gardner, "But We Are Still Lagging: Reasons Why, What We Can Do About It," *Life*, XLIII (4 Nov 57), 30-33.
 17. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 11 Oct 57, OSD Hist.
 18. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 31 Oct 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:617-19.
 19. Statements by McElroy during hearings on reorganization, House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Reorganization of the Department of Defense: Hearings*, 6088, 6091 (hereafter cited as *Reorganization of DoD*). According to one account, McElroy, when "needed" on the subject, suggested that the president himself take the responsibility for recommending changes, with the result that for a time, the two men became "irritated with each other": Osborne, "The Man and the Plan," *Life*, XL (21 Apr 56), 124-27.
 20. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 30 Oct 57, OSD Hist.
 21. Staff memo, "Reorganization of the Department of Defense," 14 Oct 57, fldr Bureau of the Budget, Box 15, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078. The document bears no indication of its authorship, but that it emanated from the BoB is indicated by the fact that it was filed with other documents from the Bureau, also by a memo DirBob for SecDef, 21 Oct 57, in same location, which refers to "my memorandum of October 14," evidently meaning this one.
 22. "Notes on the Reorganization of the Department of Defense," encl with memrcd Goodpaster, 28 Oct 57 (stating that the paper was received from Rockefeller, who had told the president of its "general approach"): fldr Defense Reorganization (8), Misc ser, PP (AWF), DDEL. Another copy of the paper bears the handwritten date, 17 Oct 57, and a note in Quarles's handwriting, "Received from Nelson Rockefeller": fldr Mr. Rockefeller, Box 16, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078.
 23. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), breakfast, 4 Nov 57, OSD Hist; notes by Donna Mitchell of PACGO mtg, 4 Nov 57, fldr no. 21 Minutes and Notes for PACGO meetings FY 1957 (1), Box 3, PACGO files, DDEL.
 24. Security Resources Panel, *Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age*, 8, 10.
 25. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 4 Nov 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:620-24.

26. Memrcd Goodpaster, describing mtg 4 Nov 57, *ibid*, 624-28; memrcd Burke, 4 Nov 57, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
27. Memo Brundage and Rockefeller for Pres, 15 Nov 57, w/encl, draft memo, "Reorganization of the Department of Defense," 12 Nov 57, fldr McElroy, Neil 1957-58 (5), Box 25, Admin ser, PP (AWF), DDEL. A handwritten note at bottom of the 15 November memo, apparently in McElroy's handwriting, referring to the proposed advisory committee, reads: "Not to study organization in general but specific plan & how best to do it." Another copy of the 12 November draft memo, in fldr Rockefeller Report, Box 15, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078, bears a note on the first page, again apparently by McElroy: "Ask Lovett-Wilson-Radford-Foster-Robertson-Rockefeller to meet with us & discuss."
28. Memrcd Goodpaster, 27 Nov 57, fldr Bureau of the Budget, Box 15, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078. Attached is a handwritten memo for McElroy, nd, probably by Randall, reading, "I talked to Goodpaster about this matter and he gave me this copy for your info."
29. Memrcd Eisenhower, 4 Dec 57, fldr McElroy, Neil 1957-58 (5), Box 25, Admin ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; ltr Killian to SecDef, 30 Dec 57, fldr Science Advisory Committee, Box 16, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078.
30. Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 220.
31. *Ibid*, 480-82, 880-81, 662-63, 643, 2429.
32. Handwritten memo by "WF" (probably William Finan, AsstDirBoB), 27 Nov 57, fldr No 21 Minutes and Notes for PACGO Meetings FY 1957 (1), Box 3, PACGO files, DDEL.
33. *Time*, XXIII (23 Dec 57), 12-13.
34. JCS Hist Div, *Role and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A Chronology*, 95-96.
35. *Washington Post*, 3 Jan 58; *Baltimore Sun*, 5 Jan 58; *Time*, LXXI (6 Jan 58), 12-13; memo Frank J. Sherlock, Ofc of GC, for Coolidge, 29 Jan 58, fldr Legislation Proposed to Implement Reorganization Plan, Box 15, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078.
36. *New York Times*, 6 Jan 58; Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Special Studies Project, *International Security: The Military Aspect*, 7, 31-33.
37. *Washington Post*, 3 Jan 58; *New York Times*, 5 Jan 58.
38. Text of Burke speech in DoD NR 8-58, 6 Jan 58, OSD Hist.
39. Phillip Barry Brannen, "A Single Service: Perennial Issue in National Defense," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, LXXXIII (Dec 57), 1280-87; Howard E. Orem, "Shall We Junk the Joint Chiefs of Staff?," *ibid*, LXXXIV (Feb 58), 57-60; Davis Merwin, "An Analysis of the Rockefeller-Kissinger Report," *Marine Corps Gazette*, XLII (Mar 58), 21-31; "Organizing for the Technological War," *Air Force*, XL (Dec 57), 41-48; Carl Spaatz, "Where We Went Wrong—A Plan for the Future," *Newsweek*, L (30 Dec 57), 19; William R. Kintner (in association with Joseph I. Coffey and Raymond J. Albright), *Forging a New Sword: A Study of the Department of Defense*, *passim*.
40. Memrcd Bryce Harlow, 15 Jan 58, recording mtg 2 Jan 58, fldr DOD vol II (4) (Jan 1958), Box 1, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
41. Supplementary Notes, Legislative Leadership mtg, 7 Jan 58, OSD Hist.
42. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1958, 2-15.
43. Memrcd Randall, 11 Jan 58, fldr Meetings, Box 15, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078.
44. Memrcd Randall, 11 Jan 58, memo Randall for McElroy, 13 Jan 58: *ibid*; memo Randall for Gruenther, 29 Jan 58, fldr Panel Material—Memos, etc., Box 16, *ibid*; *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1957-58*, II:510.
45. Memrcd Randall, 18 Jan 58, looseleaf binder Mr. Coolidge Panel Mins, Box 13, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078; memo Randall for Quarles et al, 18 Jan 58, fldr Meetings, Box 15, *ibid*.
46. Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 2062 (McElroy testimony 22 Jan 58); *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1957-58*, I:401; House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Reorganization of DoD*, (McElroy testimony 24 Apr 58), 6089.
47. DoD NR 48-58, 21 Jan 58, OSD Hist; *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1957-58*, I:391-98; *Washington Post*, 27 Jan 58.
48. JCS Hist Div, *Role and Functions of the JCS*, 96-99.
49. Memrcd Harlow, 30 Jan 58, of mtg 25 Jan 58, OSD Hist.

50. Interv with Charles Coolidge by Ed Edwin, 7 Jun 67, 5-7, CUOHP; records of Coolidge group, Boxes 13-16, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078; PACGO docs in Box 18, PACGO files, DDEL.
51. Typewritten document, "Organization Study, First meeting—January 21, 1958," ns but probably prepared by Randall, looseleaf binder Mr. Coolidge Panel Mins, Box 13, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078; typewritten notes by N[elson] A. R[ockefeller], 21 Jan 58, fldr No 136 Reorganization Proposals and Dept of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 (Jan-Aug 58), Box 1, PACGO files, DDEL.
52. Memrcd Randall, nd, "Meeting on Defense Organization Saturday, January 25th, 10:00 a.m.," looseleaf binder Mr. Coolidge Panel Mins, Box 13, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078; memrcd Harlow, 30 Jan 58, and memo by Goodpaster, "Meeting at the Pentagon, Saturday, 25 January 1958," 30 Jan 58, both in OSD Hist; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 245. Coolidge later recalled that at this meeting he was "deeply worried" by the president's difficulty (presumably resulting from his recent stroke) in expressing himself. On this and subsequent occasions he had to rely on Goodpaster and Harlow to clarify the president's statements: Coolidge interv, 7 Jun 67, 6-7, CUOHP.
53. Lists of persons to be interviewed in fldrs Comments Requested—Alphabetical File, Box 15, and Panel Material—Memos, etc, Box 16, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078; written comments in looseleaf binders, Box 14, *ibid*; House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Reorganization of DoD*, 6060 (McElroy testimony); notes by Rockefeller on mtgs 27-28 Jan and 5 Feb, fldrs No 136 Defense—Reorganization Proposals and DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 (Jan-Aug 58) (2) and (3), Box 18, PACGO files, DDEL.
54. Ltr Killian to McElroy, 22 Jan 58, memo ExecSecDSB for Coolidge, 6 Mar 58: fldr Research and Development, Box 16, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078; memrcd Randall, mtg 4 Feb 58, looseleaf binder Mr. Coolidge Panel Memos, Box 13, *ibid*; memo DSB for SecDef, 10 Jan 58, atchmt to Detailed Agenda, DSB, 3 Mar 58, fldr 95 Organization General (Jun 53-Oct 58), Box 12, OASD(R&E) files, Acc 61-A1491.
55. Memo Mil Div for DirBoB, 3 Feb 58, fldr Bureau of the Budget, Box 15, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078; agenda for meeting with Defense Reorganization Committee, 5 Feb 58, prepared by BoB, memrcd Randall, 5 Feb 58: looseleaf binder Mr. Coolidge Panel Memos, Box 13, *ibid*.
56. US Cong, House, Cte on Govt Operations, *Research and Development: Hearings*, 84-117, 155-90, 211-90, 332-436.
57. US Cong, House, Cte on Armed Svcs, *Investigation of National Defense, Missiles: Hearings*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), 4362-63, 4425-26, 4506-07, 4642-49, 4665-66, 4685-86.
58. *New York Times*, 27 Feb 58; draft of HR 11001, 85 Cong, 2 sess, OSD Hist.
59. *New York Times*, 27 Feb 58.
60. *Washington Post*, 21 Feb 58; *New York Herald Tribune*, 23 Feb 58; Gale, "Post-Sputnik Washington from an Inside Office," 233.
61. Memo on Puerto Rico Conference, initialed by Coolidge, 25 Feb 58, fldr Panel Material—Memos, etc., Box 16, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078.
62. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 27 Feb 58, OSD Hist; ofc memo by Coolidge, 12 Mar 58, with attached notes on matters communicated to President on 27 Feb, fldr Panel Material—Memos, etc., Box 16, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078.
63. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 12 Mar 58; memo Coolidge for Murray Snyder, ASD(PA), and Gale, 12 Mar 58: OSD Hist.
64. The drafting of the message from the president to Congress can be followed in fldrs entitled: Recommendations to President, Bureau of the Budget, and Mr. McElroy—memos to, drafts, etc, Box 15, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078. The earliest draft, bearing Coolidge's typed initials, is dated 19 February. For Harlow's role, see fldrs Defense Department Reorganization. . . , 12 Feb-31 Mar 58 and 2-26 Apr 58, Box 3, Harlow papers, DDEL.
65. Draft msg for Congress from Pres, 21 Mar 58, fldr Recommendations to President, Box 15, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078.
66. AFPC mtg notes, 25 Mar 58, fldr AFPC Mar 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062, contains a copy of the draft message of 21 March with handwritten corrections reflecting the changes approved by the AFPC.
67. Draft msg, 26 Mar 58, OSD Hist; notes by Rockefeller, Defense Meeting, 26 Mar 58,

- fldr No 136 Defense-Reorganization Proposals. . . (Jan-Aug 58) (1), Box 18, PACGO files, DDEL. An intermediate draft dated 25 March 1958 is in fldr Recommendations to President, Box 15, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078.
68. See documents in fldrs Recommendations to the Pres—White House Drafts and Legislation Proposed to Implement Reorganization Plan, Box 15, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078, and Panel Material—Memos etc., Box 16, *ibid*. The title "Director of Defense Research and Engineering" was suggested by Foster and approved by Coolidge and McElroy: handwritten note (apparently by Coolidge) on memo Coolidge for Quarles, 27 Mar 58, and ofc memo JB (unidentified) for Randall, 28 Mar 58: Box 16, *ibid*.
 69. Supplementary Notes, Legislative Leadership mtg, 1 Apr 58, fldr Staff Notes Apr 58 (2), Box 32, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; *New York Times*, 2 Apr 58.
 70. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1958, 274-90.
 71. Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 2357-2425.
 72. *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy*, 1957-58, II:785-808.
 73. *Washington Post*, 4 Apr 58; *New York Herald Tribune*, 4 Apr 58; *Baltimore Sun*, 6 Apr 58; *New York Times*, 7 Apr 58; *Washington Star*, 9 Apr 58; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 244-45.
 74. *New York Herald Tribune*, 5, 11 Apr 58; *Washington Star*, 10 Apr 58; *Washington Post*, 13 Apr 58; *New York Times*, 13 Apr 58 (quote).
 75. *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy*, 1957-58, II:809-31 (quote, 827-28); *Washington Post*, 12 Apr 58.
 76. Memrcd Goodpaster, 9 Apr 58, fldr Staff Notes Apr 58 (2), Box 32, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
 77. Memrcd Goodpaster, 10 Apr 58, *ibid*.
 78. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1958, 297-98.
 79. *Washington Post*, 14 Apr 58.
 80. Interv with Robert W. Berry by Alfred Goldberg and Robert J. Watson, 16 Jun 87, 5, OSD Hist; papers in fldr Defense Department—Reorganization of, 16 Jan-20 May 58, Box 1, Harlow papers, DDEL, and fldr Defense Department Reorganization Proposal, Box 2, *ibid*.
 81. House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Reorganization of DoD*, 6710 (Dechert testimony); memo for file, Robert Dechert, 11 Apr 58, memo Dechert for ASDs et al, 4 Apr 58, w/encl, memo for SvcSecs and CJCS enclosing draft bill: OSD Hist. The bill sent Dechert by Morgan on 3 April is perhaps the draft dated 29 March 1958, not otherwise identified, in OSD Hist. This bears comments and notes in pencil and apparently served as the basis of the draft enclosed with Dechert's memo of 4 April.
 82. Berry interv, 16 Jun 87, 5-6, OSD Hist; House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Reorganization of DoD*, 6556, 6709-10 (testimony of Capt W.C. Mott, USN, CJCS representative on drafting committee, and of Dechert); ltr SecDef to DirBob, 10 Apr 58, memo for file, Dechert, 11 Apr 58: OSD Hist; AFPC mtg notes, 15 Apr 58, fldr AFPC Apr-May 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; Quarles statement to AFPC, 17 Apr 58, OSD Hist; typewritten document, "President's Determination on Disputed Points in Defense Reorganization Legislation—15 April 1958," ns, with handwritten corrections, memo DirBob for ActgSecDef, 15 Apr 58: fldr Legislation Proposed to Implement Reorganization Plan, Box 15, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078.
 83. US Cong, House, Cte on Armed Svcs, *Department of Defense Reorganization Bill of 1958*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), H Doc 371.
 84. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1958, 310; *Public Statements, DepSecDef Quarles*, 1957-59, II:811-37.
 85. *Washington Post*, 17 Apr 58; *Washington Star*, 17 Apr 58.
 86. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1958, 332.
 87. *New York Herald Tribune*, 18 Apr 58; *New York Times*, 21 Apr 58; *Washington Star*, 21 Apr 58.
 88. Memo Coolidge for Snyder, 11 Apr 58, fldr Panel Material—Memos, etc., Box 16, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078; memo James G. Dunton, OASD(PA), for DepASD(PA), 21 Apr 58, fldr Meetings, Box 15, *ibid*.
 89. *New York Times*, 8 May 58; Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, 135. An example of one of the president's letters (to Dillon Anderson) is reproduced in Dillon Anderson, "Recollections of Eisenhower," unpublished MS, Dillon Anderson papers, HIWRP. Before writing

to these individuals, the president read to Secretary McElroy the draft of the letter he proposed to send: memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster) 21 Apr 58, fldr Staff Notes Apr 58 (1), Box 32, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.

90. Memo Gale for Goodpaster, 14 Apr 58, fldr Panel Material—Memos, etc, Box 16, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078. The interview was published in *U.S. News and World Report*, 25 Apr 58: see text in *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1957-58*, III:1033-42.
91. Memo Coolidge for DepSecDef, 12 Apr 58, fldr Defense Department Reorganization, Box 2, Harlow papers, DDEL; ofc memos Coolidge for Gale, 14, 15 Apr 58, memrcd ns and nd, summarizing mtg of Gale subcte, 16 Apr 58: fldr Task Force, Box 16, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078; AFPC mtg notes, 15 Apr 58, fldr AFPC Apr-May 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; Gale, "Comments," 13-14; memrcd Harlow, 27 May 58, fldr Staff Notes Apr 58 (1), Box 32, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
92. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 21 Apr 58, fldr Staff Notes Apr 58 (1), Box 32, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
93. House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Reorganization of DOD*, 5971-73 (quote, 5972).
94. Ibid, 5974-77 (quotes, 5975).
95. Ibid, 5978-87 (quotes, 5986, 5987).
96. Ibid, 5978-6005.
97. Ibid, 6005-74. The newspaper columnist referred to was Marquis Childs (*Washington Post*, 23 Apr 58). A factual description of the Gale unit appeared in *New York Times*, 10 May 58.
98. House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Reorganization of DoD*, 6109-13, 6155-56, 6171, 6097-98, 6043 (quote).
99. Memo Coolidge for SecDef, 25 Apr 58, OSD Hist.
100. *New York Times*, 27 Apr 58; copy of McElroy statement, 26 Apr 58, OSD Hist.
101. Memrcd Harlow, 27 May 58, summarizing conf held 28 Apr 58, fldr Staff Notes Apr 58 (1), Box 32, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
102. House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Reorganization of DoD*, 6175-6220.
103. Ibid, 6277-6344.
104. Ibid, 6344-91.
105. Ibid, 6391-95. On the drafting of the replies, see memo Coolidge for Niederlehner, 22 Apr 58, OSD Hist, and memo Gale for Harlow, 30 Apr 58, fldr Legislation Proposed to Implement Reorganization Plan, Box 15, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078. Presumably McElroy sent them to Vinson by a letter, which, however, has not been found.
106. House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Reorganization of DoD*, 6395-6426 (quote, 6406).
107. Ibid, 6426-71, 6471-6519, 6523-59.
108. Ibid, 6559-6641.
109. Ibid, 6680-6739, 6739-54; *New York Times*, 9 May 58.
110. House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Reorganization of DoD*, 6745-77.
111. *New York Times*, 11 May 58; *Washington Post*, 11 May 58; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 12 May 58, fldr May 58-Staff Notes (2), Box 32, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
112. *New York Times*, 7 May 58; *Congressional Record*, 85 Cong, 2 sess, vol 104, pt 6:8146-49 (quote, 8149).
113. Memo Ofc of GC for DepSecDef, ns, 16 May 58, OSD Hist, provides an analysis of the committee's draft bill.
114. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 412; *Baltimore Sun*, 17 May 58.
115. HR 12541, 19 May 58; House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), H Rept 1765, 3-15, 21-25 (quote, 3).
116. Ltr Vinson to McElroy, 16 May 58, w/encl ltr McCormack to Vinson, 13 May 58, and ltr McElroy to Vinson, 23 May 58: fldr 020 DoD Reorganization (May 1958), Box 11, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078; memo by Dechert, 19 May 58, OSD Hist.
117. Statement by McElroy to AFPC, AFPC mtg notes, 27 May 58, fldr AFPC Apr-May 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
118. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 439-43.
119. *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1957-58*, IV:1283-85.
120. Ltr Summerfield to McElroy, 31 May 58, fldr 020 DoD Reorganization (May 58), Box 11, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078; ltr L. Clair Nelson, Champion Paper and Fibre Co., to Gale, 3 Jun 58, and reply Gale to Nelson, 6 Jun 58, fldr Copies of Letters sent to

- Outsiders re Reorganization Bill, Box 16, *ibid*.
121. Ltrs Weeks to Wilson, 5 Jun 58, and Wilson to Weeks, 20 Jun 58, Box 109, CEWA.
122. *Air Force Magazine*, Jun 58, 34; White House PRs, 7, 11 Jun 58, OSD Hist; Ltr Pres Navy League to League Members, 14 Jun 58, fldr Copies of Letters Sent to Outsiders re Reorganization Bill, Box 16, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078; *Washington Star*, 19 Jun 58; *New York Times*, 2, 7 Jun 58.
123. *Congressional Record*, 86 Cong, 2 sess, vol 104, pt 8:11017-51; *New York Times*, 13 Jun 58.
124. *Baltimore Sun*, 9 Jun 58.
125. Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, *Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958: Hearings*, 8-93 (quote, 12-13) (hereafter cited as *DoD Reorganization Act of 1958*).
126. *Ibid*, 95-133.
127. *New York Times*, 20, 21 Jun 58.
128. *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1957-58*, IV:1571-75 (quote, 1575); *Baltimore Sun*, 22 Jun 58.
129. *Washington Post*, 23 Jun 58.
130. *Washington Post*, 24 Jun 58; *New York Times*, 24 Jun 58; statement by Sen Russell, 23 Jun 58, OSD Hist.
131. Supplementary Notes, Legislative Leadership mtg, 24 Jun 58, OSD Hist.
132. *New York Times*, 25 Jun 58; Ltr McElroy to Sen Russell, 25 Jun 58, OSD Hist.
133. *New York Times*, 26 Jun 58.
134. Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, *DoD Reorganization Act of 1958*, 135-289.
135. *Ibid*, 291-331.
136. *Ibid*, 333-421.
137. *Washington Post*, 13 Jul 58; *New York Times*, 13 Jul 58; *New York Herald Tribune*, 14 Jul 58; memo Dechert for Quarles, 15 Jul 58, fldr Defense Department, Reorganization of, May 23-July 22, 1958, Box 1, Harlow papers, DDEL.
138. Memo Dechert for Quarles, 15 Jul 58, cited in preceding note.
139. Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, *Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), S Rept 1845; *New York Times*, 16 Jul 58.
140. *Washington Post*, 17, 19 Jul 58.
141. *New York Times*, 24 Jul 58; US Cong, House Cte of Conference, *Defense Reorganization Act*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (1958), H Rept 2261; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 564; *New York Times*, 25 Jul 58.
142. Ltr SecDef to DirBob, 28 Jul 58, OSD Hist; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 597.
143. *New York Times*, 5 Apr 58; memo SecDef for Pres, 7 Apr 58, fldr McElroy, Neil 1957-58 (4), Box 25, Admin ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
144. Memo SecDef for SecA et al, 24 Apr 58, fldr 010 DoD Reorganization (Apr 58), Box 11, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-C3078; *Baltimore Sun*, 26 Apr 58; DoD Dir 1320.4, 25 Apr 58.
145. Memrcd Harlow, 27 May 58, fldr Staff Notes Apr 58 (1), Box 32, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; *New York Times*, 7 May 58; Otto L. Nelson, Jr., *National Security and the General Staff*, passim. A "Checklist" for implementation of the Defense Reorganization Act, 13 Aug 58, ns, in OSD Hist, indicates the scope of Nelson's activity, listing the tasks that he was to undertake.
146. Memo SecDef for Secs of Mil Depts et al, 1 May 58, fldr 334 1 May 1958, Box 18, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 65-A1606.
147. Memo SecDef for Secs of Mil Depts et al, 27 Jun 58, OSD Hist. The list was announced to the public by DoD PR 629-58, 27 Jun 58, *ibid*. The secretary's general instructions were made specific in memos from Nelson to each sponsoring agency, 2 Jul 58, fldr 334 1 May 58, Box 18, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
148. Memo SecDef for Secs of Mil Depts et al, 13 Aug 58, fldr 334 1 May 58, Box 18, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; typewritten document, "Actions on Reorganization," 22 Oct 58, ns, atchmt to AFPC Advice of Action, 22 Oct 58, OSD Hist.
149. Memo DepSecDef for ASDs et al, 30 Jun 58, fldr 334 1 May 58, Box 18, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606. The following year, however, staff meetings were placed on a regularly scheduled basis, thus reviving the Staff Council in all but name: memo R. Eugene Livesay for DDR&E et al, 31 Mar 59, fldr 110, Relations with Other Agencies within DoD-OSD 1959, Box 5, ODDR&E files, Acc 63-A1885.

150. JCS Hist Div, *Chronology of JCS Organization*, 131.
151. Ibid, 132-34.
152. Ibid, 134-37, 139-46.
153. Ibid, 140; memo CJCS for SecDef, 26 May 58, CM-122-58, fldr 334 1 May 58, Box 18, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
154. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 1 Aug 58, CM-154-58; memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 2 Aug 58; DOD Dir 5100.3, 12 Sep 58: OSD Hist.
155. Unified Command Plan, 28 Aug 58, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for Pres, 28 Aug 58, bearing approval of Pres, fldr 322 Unified Comd Plan 1 Aug 58, Box 17, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 28 Aug 58, fldr Aug 58 Staff Notes (1), Box 35, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
156. Memo CNO for VCNO, 28 Jul 58, memo CSA, 22 Sep 58, memo CSAF for VCSAF, 25 Nov 58: OSD Hist; statements by White and Quarles to AFPC, AFPC mtg notes 22 Oct 58, fldr AFPC Oct 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
157. House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Reorganization of DoD*, 6157-59, 6202; House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Department of Defense Reorganization Bill of 1958*, 22. Presumably the committee consulted the JCS in drafting its definition.
158. Memo JCS for SecDef, 26 Jan 59, JCSM-29-59, atchmt to memo Randall for Goodpaster, 28 Jan 59, fldr DoD vol III (4) (Jan-Feb 59), Box 1, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL. The JCS referred to a memorandum request from McElroy dated 16 January 1959, which has not been found, although a draft of it is in OSD Hist.
159. Memo GC for SecDef, 28 Jan 59, memo Randall for Goodpaster, 28 Jan 59, memo Goodpaster for Randall, 30 Jan 59: *ibid*.
160. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 21 Apr 58, memrcd Harlow, 27 May 58: fldr Staff Notes Apr 58 (1), Box 32, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
161. Records maintained by Winnacker, documenting his participation in the rewriting of directives 5100.1 and 5158.1, are in OSD Hist.
162. Draft of proposed changes in DoD Dir 5100.1, 30 Jul 58, with handwritten corrections by Winnacker, memo Monroe Leigh (Ofc of GC) for Winnacker et al, 7 Aug 58, draft of proposed changes 9 Aug 58, with covering brief, GC for SecDef, 11 Aug 58, proposed changes to DoD Directive 5100.1, Working Draft, 25 Aug 58: *ibid*.
163. App B to memo JCS for SecDef, 18 Aug 58, *ibid*.
164. Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Components, working draft, 8 Sep 58, *ibid*. This was based on a draft dated 2 September 1958, in same file, with attached handwritten memo for Quarles from deSaussure identifying it as a "first cut" at a new approach by Niederlehner and Randall, "as opposed to mere word changes using current format."
165. Memo Winnacker for Randall, 18 Sep 58, statement by Niederlehner, staff mtg notes, 30 Sep 58: *ibid*.
166. Staff mtg notes, 30 Sep 58, memo by Niederlehner, 30 Sep 58, summarizing discussion at same mtg: *ibid*.
167. Memo Loftis for ASDs et al, 1 Oct 58, w/encl, working draft 30 Sep 58, *ibid*.
168. Memo Winnacker for Brig Gen Warren, 3 Oct 58, *ibid*.
169. Functions of DoD and Major Components, Working Draft, 21 Oct 58, encl with memo DepSecDef for SecA et al, staff mtg notes, 31 Oct 58, AFPC mtg notes, 22 Oct 58, AFPC Advice of Action, 22 Oct 58: *ibid*. The 21 October draft and subsequent versions omitted reference to the functions of the unified and specified commands, probably because the subject was adequately covered in the Unified Command Plan.
170. Memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Sep 58, w/encl, draft revision of Dir 5158, *ibid*.
171. Annotated revisions of 5158.1, memo Brig Gen Warren for ASDs et al, 23 Oct 58, w/encls, memo Warren for SvcSecs and CJCS, same date, and revised draft of 5158.1, memrcd Winnacker, 31 Oct 58; staff mtg notes, 31 Oct 58: *ibid*.
172. The JCS comments on the drafts of 5100.1 and 5158.1 were contained in separate memos for SecDef, both 5 Nov 58, *ibid*.
173. AFPC mtg notes, 5 Nov 58, fldr AFPC Nov 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; AFPC Advices of Action (2), 5 Nov 58, OSD Hist.
174. Memo Quarles for Harlow, 11 Nov 58, OSD Hist; statement by Quarles to AFPC on 16 Dec, AFPC mtg notes, 16 Dec 58, fldr AFPC Dec 58, Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.

175. Memo Capt L. P. Gray, USN (OCJCS) for Gen Twining, 9 Dec 58, initialled as approved by Twining, OSD Hist. An attached office memo from Warren for Dechert and Winnacker asks them to prepare rebuttals for Quarles "so that he can see the other side of this problem."
176. Memo Winnacker for Quarles, 11 Dec 58, *ibid*.
177. Memo Dechert for Quarles, 12 Dec 58, *ibid*.
178. Memo Winnacker for Quarles, 16 Dec 58, w/encl, *ibid*.
179. AFPC mtg notes, 16 Dec 58, fldr AFPC Dec 58, Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; AFPC Advice of Action, 16 Dec 58, staff mtg notes, 17 Dec 58: OSD Hist.
180. Memo Warren for ASDs et al, 17 Dec 58, w/encls; memrcd Winnacker, 17 Dec 58: OSD Hist.
181. Memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 22 Dec 58, fldr JCS (5) (Sep 58-Sep 59), Box 4, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
182. Memo Winnacker for Quarles, 24 Dec 58, w/encl (draft of 5100.1), 23 Dec 58, OSD Hist; memo Quarles for Harlow, 26 Dec 58, fldr 020 DoD Reorg (DoD Dir 5100.1), Box 11, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-C3078; drafts of portions of 5100.1, with notation that they had been approved by Quarles, Harlow, and Goodpaster, 29 Dec 58, AFPC Advice of Action, 30 Dec 58, memo Randall for SecA et al, 30 Dec 58: OSD Hist; DoD Dirs 5100.1 and 5158.1, both 31 Dec 58.
183. Memo DirAdminSvcsDiv for ASDs et al, 26 Sep 58, OSD Hist; memo Loftis for Quarles, 6 Dec 58, fldr Reorganization & Charters—1958, Box 1, OSD/OASP Admin Mgmt, Pol and Plng records, RG 330, NARA.
184. Memo Loftis for CJCS et al, 8 Dec 58, memo Loftis for Quarles, 13 Dec 58, memo ActgSec Nav (Franke) for Quarles, 24 Dec 58, fldr General Comments—Reorg Plan 1958: *ibid*. A revised draft of the ASD(S&L) charter, dated 31 December 1958, is attached to memo Charles V. Brewer for Quarles, 3 January 1959, in same file; the other revised drafts have not been found but are referred to in memos by OSD officials (same file).
185. Memo GC for SecDef, 7 Jan 59, *ibid*; AFPC Advice of Action, 5 Jan 59, OSD Hist.
186. DoD Dirs 5120.26, 5126.1, 5131.1, 5136.4, 5118.3, 5148.2, 5148.4, 5145.1, all 7 Jan 59.
187. Memo Sprague and Twining for SecDef, 14 Aug 58, OSD Hist.
188. Memo Loftis for Quarles, 4 Dec 58, draft ASD(ISA) charter, 3 Dec 58 (apparently enclosed with preceding memo but not actually attached thereto), memo ASD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 3 Nov 58, w/encl: fldr ASD (ISA) Charter-Reorg Plan 1958, Box 2, OSD/OASP Admin Mgmt, Pol and Plng records, RG 330, NARA.
189. Draft charter for ASD(ISA), 12 Jan 59, atchmt to ltr Irwin to Quarles, 12 Jan 59, *ibid*.
190. Ltr Irwin for Quarles, 12 Jan 59, msg CHMAAG Bonn for OSD, MAAG FRG 174, 211652Z Jan 59: *ibid*.
191. Memo Loftis for secs of mil depts et al, 23 Jan 59, summary of comments on 23 Jan draft of ISA charter, ns, nd, presumably prepared in Loftis's ofc, memo SpecAsst (Livesay) for AFPC, 20 Feb 59, circulating revised draft, same date, comments on ISA charter, 26 Feb 59, presumably prepared in Loftis's ofc: *ibid*; DoD Dir 5132.2, 27 Feb 59.
192. Draft directive for ASD(PA), nd [around 5 Dec 58], memo ASD(PA) for DirAdmin Svcs, 5 Dec 58, memo Loftis for Quarles, 5 Dec 58: fldr Reorganization and Charters—1958, Box 1, OSD/OASP Admin Mgmt, Pol and Plng records, RG 330, NARA.
193. DoD Dir 5122.5, 27 Feb 59; memo SecDef for SecA et al, 20 Nov 58, fldr 020 DoD Reorganization (May 58), Box 11, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078.
194. DoD Dirs 4158.2 and 4158.4, 7 Jan 59.
195. Memrcd Lansdale, 19 Jun 58, "Notes on Defense Role in the Cold War," 19 Jun 58, ns, probably originating in OATSD(SO), with an earlier version bearing corrections in Lansdale's handwriting, memo ATSD(SO) for SecDef, 11 Jul 58: fldr Cold War Intelligence, Box 1, ATSD(SO) files, Acc 63-A1803; memo DepSecDef for SecA et al, 8 Jan 59, memo ATSD(SO) for DepSecDef, 9 Jan 59, draft memo for SecDef, ns, probably prepared in OATSD(SO), 13 Jun 59: fldr NSC 5412, Box 4, *ibid*; AFPC mtg notes, 10 Feb 59, fldr AFPC Jan-Feb 59, Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; memo DepASD (ISA) (Haydn Williams) for DepSecDef, 25 May 59, fldr 040 OSD (Collateral Activities Coordinating Grp), Box 2, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1672. For the 5412 Group, see ch I. The activities of CACG in connection with Indochina are described in ch XIX.

196. Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, 142-43; *New York Times*, 3 Nov 58. General Medaris, head of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, recalled being told by Holaday that "every man who is smart enough to do that job [DDR&E] well is much too smart to accept it": Medaris, *Countdown for Decision*, 252.
197. DoD PR 1319-58, 24 Dec 58, OSD Hist.
198. Memo Loftis for Quarles, 5 Dec 58, w/atchmt, draft directive for DDR&E, fldr Reorganization & Charters—1958, Box 1, OSD/OASP Admin Mgmt, Pol and Plng records, RG 330, NARA.
199. Memo Loftis for Quarles and York, 6 Jun 59, memo Loftis for Secs of Mil Depts et al, 8 Jan 59, comments by SecA, 12 Jan 59, SecNav, 15 Jan 59, AsstSecAF, undated, and DJS, 12 Jan 59, msg CHMAAG Bonn for OSD, MAAG FRG 175, 211654Z Jan 59 (Quarles for Loftis), memo Loftis for Quarles, 27 Jan 59, ofc memo Loftis for Quarles, 2 Feb 59, memo Loftis for DDR&E et al, 2 Feb 59, memo Loftis for Quarles, 9 Feb 59: fldr DDR&E Charter—Reorg Plan 1958, Box 1, *ibid*.
200. DoD Dirs 5105.3 and 5105.4, 2 Jan 59.
201. *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1959*, III:1127-28.

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1. *New York Times*, 6, 18, 27 Mar, 16 May, 27 Jul, 18 Aug 58. See chs VII and XII for details of these launchings.
2. *New York Times*, 9, 13 Aug 58.
3. *New York Times*, 12 Apr, 16, 17, 20 Jul 58; *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1958*, Table 2, 357.
4. *New York Times*, 25, 30 May, 7 Aug 58.
5. *New York Times*, 14, 19 Mar 58. For evidence of friction between Brundage and OSD, see McNeil interv, 7 Jun 76, 68-70, OSD Hist.
6. *New York Times*, 24 Jul 58. Gray seems to have taken a more active role than Cutler in bringing issues to the president for resolution. Like Goodpaster, he prepared memorandums of his meeting with the president which are of great historical value.
7. *New York Times*, 23 Sep, 8 Oct 58. On the Adams affair, see Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 467-69, 480-82, and Adams's own account, *Firsthand Report*, 427-43.
8. Edward J. Marolda, "The Influence of Burke's Boys on Limited War," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, CVII (Aug 81), 36-41.
9. "Informal Notes - R.C.," 23 Mar 58, for 25 Mar 58 PB mtg, with atchmt, checklist (prepared by NSC Staff) showing drafting asgmts for paras of NSC 5707/8, fldr NSC 5707/8 Basic Policy 2, Box 17, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
10. Army and Navy views were set forth in memorandums to the DoD member and the JCS adviser to the NSC PB, from ODCSOPS or the NSC/OCB Br, OPNAV, dated as follows: Army—21 Mar, 7 Apr, 10 Apr 58; Navy—24 Mar, 10 Apr, 11 Apr 58; all in fldrs NSC 5707/8 Basic Policy 2 and 3, *ibid*.
11. Evidence of PB discussion is shown by redrafts of NSC 5707/8 dated 4 Apr and 10 Apr 58, in fldr NSC 5707/8 Basic Policy 3, *ibid*. The latter shows evidence of Army and Navy views, with a notation that the DoD member and JCS adviser were withholding judgment on the portion dealing with limited war. For the ISA recommendations, see "Identification of Portions of NSC 5707/8 Requiring Amendment," briefing paper prepared by ISA Staff for mtg 14 Mar 58, fldr NSC 5707/8 Basic Policy 2, *ibid*.
12. H.W. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," *American Historical Review*, XCIV (Oct 89), 985, citing Dulles's memo of conv with Eisenhower, 1 Apr 58.
13. Memrcd Goodpaster, 9 Apr 58, fldr Nuclear Exchange (Sep 57-June 58) (3), Box 21, Alpha subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; memrcd R[obert] C[utler], 7 Apr 58, fldr Nuclear Policy, Box 14, Briefing Notes subser, NSC ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL; summary of comments [by Dulles] at 7 Apr mtg, encl w/ltr Dulles to Gen Norstad, SACEUR, 25 Apr 58, fldr Secretary of State, Box 110, Subj ser, Norstad papers, DDEL.

14. Peter J. Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap*, 68-70; ltr Cutler to McElroy, 7 Apr 58, w/encls, memos entitled "Some Elements for a Realistic National Military Strategy in Time of Maximum Tension and Distrust," 7 Apr 58, and "Massive Exchange of Nuclear Weapons," 16 Mar 58, fldr McElroy 9 Oct 57 to 1 Dec 59, Box 1, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 63-A1770; memo Morse for Cutler, 8 Mar 58, fldr Nuclear Policy (1958), Box 14, Briefing Notes subser, NSC ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL. Morse later sent Cutler a paper (not found), which in his covering memo he described as representing the thinking of Admiral Burke and probably also of Generals Taylor and Pate: memo Morse for Cutler, 20 Jun 58, *ibid.* For Cutler's views in 1957, see ch V.
15. NSC 5810, 15 Apr 58, OSD Hist.
16. Memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 18 Apr 58, w/encl, fldr 5810 Basic National Security Policy File #1, Box 23, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
17. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 23 Apr 58, encl with another memo, 22 Apr 58, from Twining summarizing views of other JCS members, *ibid.* Quarles sent Twining's comments to the White House and received a reply indicating that at least one member of the White House staff, Robert Cutler, leaned toward the Army-Navy position. In an informal memo, 29 April, Cutler wrote that "whether or not the situation is called 'mutual deterrence', the realization today that both sides are capable of delivering massive nuclear devastation of incalculable proportions (regardless of which side strikes first) increasingly will deter each side from initiating a general onslaught": memo Bob [Robert Cutler] to D. [onald] A. Q. [uarles], 29 Apr 58, *ibid.*
18. Memos JCS for SecDef, "Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5819)," and "Basic National Security Policy: Limited Military Aggression," and memo CJCS for SecDef, CM-114-58, all 25 Apr 58: *ibid.*
19. Memo SecA for SecDef, 28 Apr 58; memo SecNav for SecDef, 30 Apr 58; "Basic National Security Policy, NSC 5819," briefing paper prepared for SecDef by OASD(ISA) for 1 May mtg: *ibid.* Secretary Douglas apparently submitted no written comments.
20. Memo of disc (Gleason), 364th NSC mtg, 1 May 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; presentations by Gens Taylor, White, and Twining at 1 May mtg, ltr Cutler for McElroy, 5 May 58, summarizing questions raised by Pres at mtg, fldr 5810 Basic National Security Policy File #1, Box 23, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, 59-65; NSC 5810/1, 5 May 58, OSD Hist.
21. Memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 28 May 58, w/encls, position papers by CSA, CNO, and CSAF, fldr 381 1958, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606. The CSAF paper is identified as having been presented at a meeting (no doubt between the secretary of defense and the JCS) on 23 May 1958. General Twining apparently did not submit a paper on this occasion.
22. Memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Jan 58, w/encl, fldr JSOP 61, Box 1, OASD(C) files, Acc 62-A4671.
23. AFPC mtg notes, 11 Feb 58, fldr AFPC Jan-Feb 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; memo DepSecDef for JCS, 10 Mar 58, fldr JSOP-61 (MC-70), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memo DepSecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 8 Apr 58, 381 Natl Def (9 Jan 58) Joint Strategic Objectives Plan-1961, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
24. AFPC mtg notes, 11 Feb 58, fldr AFPC Jan-Feb 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
25. Memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Mar 58, fldr 381 JSOP 62 (31 Mar 59), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
26. Draft memo for CJCS, evidently prepared in OASD(C), nd, atchmt to ofc memo, W. Carl Blaisdell for Lehrer, OASD(C), 18 Apr 58, fldr JSOP 62, Box 1, OASD(C) files, Acc 62-A4671. Blaisdell's memo reads: "I am returning your draft on JSOP Plan 62. Mr. McNeil states not approved at AFPC—Chiefs wish to build plan on requirements basis. This letter will subsequently be used to ask Chiefs for a 'capability plan' within probable availability of assets." AFPC Advice of Action, 17 Apr 58, OSD Hist.
27. Memo JCS for SecDef, 6 Jun 58, w/encl, fldr JSOP 62, Box 1, OASD(C) files, Acc 62-A4671.
28. AFPC mtg notes, 10 Jun 58, memo Livesay for Quarles, 18 Jun 58: fldr AFPC Jun-Jul 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; memrcd Burke, 10 Jun 58, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
29. Memo Livesay for Quarles, 2 Jul 58, fldr AFPC Jun-Jul 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.

30. Memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Dec 57, fldr 5724 Rept to Pres by Security Resources Panel of Science Advisory Cmte, File #1, BP 334 Security Resources Panel 9 Jul 57, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.
31. Memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 11 Dec 57, *ibid*.
32. Memo of disc (Boggs), 351st NSC mtg, 16 Jan 58, OSD Hist.
33. Memo Cutler for SecDef, 17 Jan 58, fldr 334 Security Resources Panel (9 Jul 57), BP 334 Security Resources Panel 9 Jul 57, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489; memo of disc (Gleason), 352nd NSC mtg, 22 Jan 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
34. Memo JCS for SecDef, 3 Mar 58, w/encl, Draft Terms of Ref for Study, memo DepSecDef for ExecSecNSC, 5 Mar 58: fldr 5724 Rept to Pres by Security Resources Panel of Science Advisory Cmte, File #2, BP 334 Security Resources Panel 9 Jul 57, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.
35. Memo of disc (Gleason), 359th NSC mtg, 20 Mar 58, NSC Ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
36. "U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations," 29 May 58, Box 21, OASD (ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
37. Memo JCS for SecDef, 11 Jun 58, fldr 5724 Rept to Pres by Security Resources Panel of Science Advisory Cmte, File #2, BP 334 Security Resources Panel 9 Jul 57, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.
38. Notes on conf 17 Jun 58, by R[obert] C[utler], fldr Nuclear Exchange (Sep 57-Jun 58) (3), Box 21, Alpha subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; memrcd Sprague, 17 Jun 58, fldr 381, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-A1698.
39. Memo SecDef and SecState for NSC, 17 Jun 58, encl w/memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 18 Jun 58, fldr 5724 Rept to Pres by Security Resources Panel of Science Advisory Cmte, File #2, BP 334 Security Resources Panel 9 Jul 57, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.
40. Memo of disc (Gleason), 370th NSC mtg, 26 Jun 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
41. AFPC mtg notes, 15, 17 Jul 58, fldr AFPC Jun-Jul 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; memsrcd, 15 Jul 58, "AFPC Discussion on NSC 5810/1," and "ISA Comments Before AFPC-15 July 1958," both ns, probably prepared in OASD(ISA), "Remarks by Mr. Quarles at AFPC Meeting on 15 Jul 1958 on NSC 5810/1," atchmt with memo Robert H. B. Wade, DirOfcofNSCaff, OASD(ISA), for Sprague et al, 16 Jul 58: fldr 5810 Basic National Security Policy File #1, Box 23, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
42. Memo SecDef for NSC, 18 Jul 58, encl with memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 21 Jul 58, fldr 5810 Basic National Security File #1, Box 23, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; ltr SecDef to SecState, 18 Jul 58, fldr 381, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-A1698.
43. Ltr Dulles to McElroy, 19 Jul 58, fldr 5810 Basic National Security Policy File #1, Box 23, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500. A handwritten note on the letter reads: "Taken care of by phone call from McNeil to Dulles." The meaning is not clear, but in his letter to the president on 23 July (see n 45), Dulles told the president that McElroy had agreed to further "urgent study" of strategic concepts and doctrine by a small State-Defense group. However, Sprague in his briefing paper written in preparation for the 24 July NSC meeting (cited in n 44) was evidently unaware of any such agreement.
44. "Basic National Security Policy," briefing paper by OASD(ISA) for NSC mtg, 24 Jul 58, memo CJCS for NSC, 23 Jul 58, CM-152-58: *ibid*.
45. Ltr SecState to Pres, 23 Jul 58, Box 8, Dulles-Herter ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
46. Memo of disc (Boggs), 373rd NSC mtg, 24 Jul 58; memo of mtg with Pres, G[ordon] G[ray], 28 Jul 58, fldr Meetings with Pres 1958 (4), Box 3, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL.
47. App C, "U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations," cited in n 36.
48. Senate Ctes on Armed Svcs (Preparedness Investigating Subcte) and on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Missiles, Space, and Other Major Defense Matters: Joint Hearings*, 86 Cong, 1 Sess (1959), 34 (hereafter cited as Senate, *Missiles, etc.: Joint Hearings* (1959)).
49. Maurice Stans, "The Eisenhower Presidency and Beyond," in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., *The Eisenhower Presidency: Eleven Intimate Perspectives of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, vol III in *Portraits of American Presidents*, 214-15.
50. Minutes of Cabinet mtg, 18 Apr 58, fldr Staff Notes Apr 58 (2), Box 32, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.

51. Memrcd Harlow, 27 May 58, of mtg 28 Apr 58, fldr Staff Notes Apr 58 (1), Box 32, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memo DirBob for Pres, 27 May 58, fldr Budget, Military FY 1950 (3), Box 3, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
52. AFPC mtg notes, 24 Jun 58, fldr AFPC Jun-Jul 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; memrcd Burke, 24 Jun 58, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
53. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 25 Jun 58, loose document not in fldr, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; memo JCS for SecDef, 3 Jul 58, CM-144-58, OSD Hist.
54. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 2:2; draft memo SecDef for Pres, ns, 10 Jul 58, loose document not in fldr, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606. There is no evidence that this memo was ever signed or forwarded to the president, but it may have been used as a "talking paper." An earlier version is attached to a memo from Randall for McElroy, 12 Jun 58, *ibid*, which begins, "Attached is a draft memorandum for use in discussing with the President our plan for the FY 1960 budget."
55. Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 2474-75.
56. Hanson W. Baldwin, *The Great Arms Race: A Comparison of U.S. and Soviet Power Today*, 11-43.
57. Lippmann in *New York Herald Tribune*, 21 Aug 58; Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII (Jan 59), *passim*.
58. Baldwin, *The Great Arms Race*, 103; Committee for Economic Development (Research and Policy Committee), *The Problem of National Security: Some Economic and Administrative Aspects*, 52; James F. Brownlee, *The Defense We Can Afford*, 5, 12; James Tobin, "Defense, Dollars, and Doctrines," *Yale Review*, XLVII (Spring 58), *passim* (with reply by John Davenport, "Arms and the Welfare State," defending the administration). The gross national product was \$433.9 billion in FY 1957, \$443.1 billion in FY 1958, and \$474.4 billion in FY 1959: *Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 1986*, Table 1.2.
59. Speech by Dulles reported in *New York Times*, 29 Apr 58, printed in full in House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 1: 197-202.
60. For accounts of the "missile gap" controversy, see Edgar M. Bottome, *The Missile Gap: A Study of the Formulation of Military and Political Policy*, 30-85; Roy E. Licklider, "The Missile Gap Controversy," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXXV (Dec 70), 600-15; unpublished paper by Henry Glass, "A Brief History of the 'Missile Gap' Controversy," 12 Feb 61 (with extensive quotes from statements by McElroy and Twining), OSD Hist. Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap*, is a detailed study of the effects of the controversy on U.S. policy.
61. Briefing for Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, on Soviet Guided Missile and Related Soviet Capabilities, encl/w memo CIA for Brig Gen Goodpaster, 29 Nov 57, 27-29, OSD Hist; Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence*, 164-65; Trevor Gardner, "How We Fell Behind in Guided Missiles," *Air Power Historian*, V (Jan 58), 11. Gardner was assistant secretary of the Air Force for research and development from 1953 to 1955. The Air Force ICBM program objectives in 1958 were 9 Atlas and 4 Titan squadrons deployed by FY 1962—a total of 13 squadrons, with 10 missiles each. See the Air Force 1960 budget submission cited below.
62. *New York Herald Tribune*, 30 Jul, 15 Aug 58; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 13 Aug 58. Alsop appears to have been the first to use the word "gap" in this context and hence should perhaps be credited with originating the phrase "missile gap."
63. *New York Times*, 5 Jan, 1 Apr 58.
64. James M. Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, 4-13; *Life*, LXV (4 Aug 58), 74-86, and (11 Aug 58), 106-14.
65. Memrcd Howard Stoertz, Jr., CIA, 18 Aug 58, ltr Symington to Pres, 29 Aug 58: fldr Symington Letter (Aug-Dec), Box 24, Alpha subser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 29 Aug 58, fldr August 1958 Staff Notes (1), Box 35, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memo DCI for Pres, 10 Oct 58, fldr (Missiles) Sen Stuart Symington 1958, Box 2, Harlow papers, DDEL. For a complete account of this Eisenhower-Symington exchange, see Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, 178-82, and Roman, 36-40.
66. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 649-50.

67. Michael R. Beschloss, *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair*, 121, 154, 366-67; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 547, n 1. For the U-2 incident of May 1960, see ch XXI.
68. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 487; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 762, 791, 823.
69. *New York Times*, 19 Sep 58; ltr Pres to McElroy, 7 Oct 58, ltr McElroy to Pres, 9 Oct 58: fldr McElroy, Neil 1957-58 (1), Box 25, Admin ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1957-58*, IV:1742.
70. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 488; *New York Times*, 5 Nov 58.
71. Memo SecA for SecDef, "Comments on the Army's Budget proposal for FY 1960," 1 Oct 60, w/encl, memo CSA for SecA, 1 Oct 58, memo SecA for SecDef, "Department of the Army Budget Estimates, FY 1960," 1 Oct 58, w/encls: fldr FY 1960 Budget Submission—October 1958 (4), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
72. Memo SecNav for SecDef, 3 Oct 58, *ibid*.
73. Memo SecNav for SecDef, 1 Oct 58, w/encl, memo CSAF for SecAF, 1 Oct 58: *ibid*.
74. Memo SecAF for SecDef, 3 Oct 58, w/encl, memo CSAF for SecAF, 3 Oct 58, *ibid*.
75. Typewritten table, "Summary of NOA, Direct Obligations and Expenditures—FY 1958-1960," 23 Nov 58 (columns headed "FY 1960 Service Request, NOA and Net Expenditures"), fldr FY 1960 Budget—Miscellaneous, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
76. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 1:342; documents in fldr FY 1960 Budget Submission—October 1958 (4), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist, and handwritten notes on discussions with McElroy and Quarles, 26 Nov 58, fldr FY 1960 Bu—Secretary's Mtg with President, *ibid*. For the BoB participation in the 1960 budget process, see testimony by Stans and William F. Schaub in Senate Cte on Armed Svcs (Preparedness Investigating Subcte), *Major Defense Matters: Hearings*, pt 2:passim, esp 215-17, 224, 227-35, 241, 245-53. These hearings were held for the express purpose of ascertaining BoB influence over the 1960 defense budget.
77. Column "28 November Estimates" in table, "Summary of NOA, Direct Obligations, and Expenditures, FY 1958-1960," nd, fldr FT 1960—Mr. Lehrer's Statement before the Cabinet 19 December 1958 (9), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; AFPC mtg notes, 26 Nov 58, fldr AFPC Nov 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
78. Memo McNeil for McElroy, 17 Nov 58, fldr Miscellaneous Folder FY 1960 Budget (13), Box 11, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
79. Memo McNeil for McElroy, 27 Nov 58, fldr Material Used re 1960 Budget—Trip to Atlanta [sic], ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
80. Memo of conf with Pres (J. S. D. Eisenhower), 28 Nov 58, fldr Budget, Military FY 1960 (4), Box 3, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
81. Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, 70-72; Kinnard, "President Eisenhower and the Defense Budget," 614 (citing a memorandum for record from DDEL).
82. Column "2 December Estimates" in typewritten table, "Summary of NOA, Direct Obligations and Expenditures, FY-1958-1960," prepared in OASD(C), nd [Dec 1958], fldr FY 1960-Mr. Lehrer's Statement Before the Cabinet 19 December 1958 (9), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
83. The figure of \$40.776 billion in NOA was presented by McElroy to the NSC on 6 December. For a breakdown of the total in comparison with the \$41.509 billion submitted to the president at Augusta, see OASD(C) Table EFAD-361, 22 Jun 60, OSD Hist. For Burke's view on the carrier issue, see a typewritten document, "Carriers in the 1960 Naval Budget Request, to be given by Admiral Burke," 15 Dec 58, apparently prepared for a Cabinet meeting of 19 Dec at which the budget was discussed: loose document in Box 11, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606. This paper was prepared after the decision to substitute a conventionally-powered aircraft carrier had been approved by the secretary and the president; Burke states that the decision to request the substitution was his own.
84. Memo Stans for Persons, 10 Dec 58, fldr Staff Notes Dec 58 (2), Box 38, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
85. Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, 72; Taylor testimony in House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 1:433. The JCS received the budget for review on "a Thursday evening," which would have been 4 December, for an NSC meeting on "a Saturday," i.e., 6 December.

86. Memo JCS for SecDef, 5 Dec 58, fldr CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 64, Box 87, JCS files, RG 218, NARA. The JCS had evidently been informed of Stans's \$40.8 billion proposal. Sources do not indicate the origin of their \$41.165 billion alternative (which was eventually adopted by McElroy); undoubtedly it was one that had been under discussion, since it would hardly have originated with the JCS.
87. Memo of disc (Gleason), 389th NSC mtg, 6 Dec 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Ann Whitman Diary, 6 Dec 58, fldr DDE Diary—Dec 1958, Box 38, *ibid*; statement by Lehrer before NSC, 6 Dec 58, loose document in Box 11, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, 72. The agitation of Navy spokesmen at the meeting may have resulted from BoB opposition to the attack carrier, which was a point of sharp disagreement between the two agencies; see Stans's testimony in Senate Cte on Armed Svcs (Preparedness Investigating Subcte), *Major Defense Matters: Hearings*, 241.
88. NSC Action 2013, 6 Dec 58, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1958, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
89. Statement by Max Lehrer, OASD(C), before Cabinet, 19 Dec 58, fldr FY 1960—Mr. Lehrer's Statement. . . , ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; mins of bipartisan Congressional mtg, 5 Jan 59, fldr Staff Notes Jan 59 (2), Box 38, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; ltr SecDef to DirBob, 6 Jan 59, fldr FY 1960 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist (no reply found, but approval indicated by subsequent action); *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1958, 866-67.
90. Memo JCS for SecDef, bearing handwritten date 9 Dec 58, stamped as having been signed by all JCS members, fldr CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 64, Box 87, JCS files, RG 218, NARA. An attached handwritten memo for Sec JCS by O. E. P. (Lt Gen Picher, DJS), 10 Dec 58, reads: "This was signed by all chiefs and sent by hand to Mr. Quarles on 9 Dec 58." Another copy of the JCS memo with the lower figure, dated 19 Jan 59, with serial number CM-280-59, and bearing actual signatures of JCS members, is in fldr FY 1960 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. The memo is printed in Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, 72-73.
91. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1958, 286 (msg to Congress, 3 Apr 58); McNeil testimony in House Cte on Science and Astronautics, *Basic Science and Astronautic Research in the Department of Defense: Hearings*, 40.
92. Documents in fldr FY 1960 Budget Structure (33), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; ltr DirBob to SecDef, 3 Jul 58, fldr 110.01 FY 1960, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; AFPC mtg notes, 21 Oct 58, fldr AFPC Oct 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; AFPC Advice of Action, 21 Oct 58, OSD Hist; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 2:4-6. For the decision to drop the more radical proposal, see *New York Times*, 13 Oct 58.
93. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1960*, M7, M27, 449-53.
94. *Ibid*, 449-53.
95. The 270,000 for the Army Reserve included 261,000 in drill pay status and 9,000 in the enlisted six-month training program. Reservists in other programs would bring the total for the Army Reserve to 330,022, the figure given in the president's message (*ibid*, 462). In budget hearings, attention fixed entirely on the 270,000 figure, representing a 10 percent reduction in the same categories mandated in the FY 1959 appropriation. See testimony of Army officials in House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 3:155, 161, 183; see also ch VI.
96. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1960*, M34, 445-46, 448-49.
97. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1959, 8, 13.
98. Bottome, 86; Licklider, 604-05; *Baltimore Sun*, 6 Jan 59 (article by Mark Watson); *New York Times*, 12, 13, 14 Jan 59; Thomas R. Phillips, "The Growing Missile Gap," *The Reporter*, XX (8 Jan 59), *passim*.
99. *New York Times*, 4, 5, 11 Jan 59; *Baltimore Sun*, 5 Jan 59; *Wall Street Journal*, 5 Jan 59.
100. Senate Cte on For Rels, *Executive Sessions (Historical Series)*, XI:20, 25-27, 43-45.
101. Robert S. Allen in *Northern Virginia Sun*, 22 Jan 59.
102. *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy*, 1959, 1:3-5, 10-13.

103. Gale, "Post-Sputnik Washington," 242-44.
104. Bottome, 87 and n 4; Licklider, 606-07 and n 19. Thomas Phillips, writing in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 6 Feb 59, gave the figures supposedly mentioned by McElroy: Soviets 600, United States 200.
105. Gates told the House Appropriations Committee on 13 January 1960 that McElroy had made the statement "in his testimony last year" and had confirmed it in a television interview in December 1959: House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 1:23-24. Two months later, however, he told a Senate committee that he did not know whether McElroy had made the statement or not; he had a "research group" investigating the matter, but had found no definite evidence. It was, however, his "personal impression" that McElroy had said it: Senate, *Missiles etc.: Joint Hearings* (1959), 476-77.
106. *New York Times*, 28 Jan 59; *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1959, 137; *Baltimore Sun*, 29 Jan 59; Alsop column in *New York Herald Tribune*, 28 Jan 59.
107. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 1: 1-295. For testimony on missiles, see especially 50-58.
108. Senate, *Missiles, etc.: Joint Hearings* (1959), 8, 57, 73 (quote, 106); *Army-Navy-Air Force Journal*, XCVI (7 Feb 59), 1.
109. House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Sundry Legislation Affecting Naval and Military Establishments, 1959: Hearings*, 791-932.
110. *New York Times*, 8 Feb 59. The six were the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, the House Appropriations and Armed Services Committees, and the House Foreign Relations Committee, which had also been briefed on military posture.
111. General Twining remarked to the president on 9 February 1959 his admiration for the secretary's performance before Congress: memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 9 Feb 59, fldr Staff Notes Feb 59 (2), Box 39, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
112. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 2:163-440.
113. *Ibid*, pt 1:329-32, 341-43, 345-49, 418-20, 478, 506-07, 536-38, 546-48, 554-60, 594-97, 819-20, 824-26, 880-82.
114. House Cte on Science and Astronautics, *Missile Development and Space Science: Hearings*, 244-46, 252-54, 329-30, 419-24, 433-34, 440-41, 443, 449-54, 469-71.
115. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 2:380-81.
116. *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1959*, II:602-627.
117. *New York Times*, 9 Mar 59; Senate, *Missiles, etc.: Joint Hearings* (1959), 21-24.
118. Memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 9 Mar 59, fldr Staff Notes Mar 1-15 59 (1), Box 39, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
119. Senate Cte on Armed Services (Preparedness Investigating Subcte), *Major Defense Matters: Hearings*, 1-199; *Washington Post*, 16 Mar 59; *Baltimore Sun*, 18 Mar 59.
120. *New York World-Telegram*, 11 Feb 59; *Washington Post*, 20 Feb 59.
121. Murphy, "The Embattled Mr. McElroy," 149-50. For examples of criticism of McElroy, see Phillips in *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 23 Jan 59; Joseph Alsop in *New York Herald Tribune*, 30 Jan 59; *Washington Post*, 2 Feb 59, and editorial, 25 Jan 59.
122. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1959*, 233.
123. *New York Journal-American*, 22 Feb 59.
124. *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1959*, II:602-04, 626.
125. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1959*, 218, 243-44.
126. *Ibid*, 273-82 (quotes, 280-81).
127. Ltr McElroy to Sen Chavez, 13 May 59, McNeil Reading file, 1959, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; House Cte on Appros, *Proposed Supplemental Appropriations and Other Authorizations for Various Agencies*, 86 Cong, 1 Sess (1959), H Doc 58, and *Proposed Supplemental Appropriations for the Legislative Branch . . .*, 86 Cong, 1 Sess (1959), H Doc 90; *New York Times*, 1, 15 May 59.
128. *New York Times*, 29 May 59; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1960*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (28 May 59), H Rept 408, passim (quote, 13).
129. *New York Times*, 4 Jun 59.

130. Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, 1-425; Senate Cte on Armed Svcs (Preparedness Investigating Subcte), *Major Defense Matters: Hearings*, pt 2:205-352 (particularly 236, 238).
131. Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, 1405-37, 1504-34 (quote, 1408); ltr SecDef to Sen Chavez, 15 Jun 59, *ibid*, 1437-1504; ltr SecDef to Sen Chavez, 24 Jun 59, ltrs McNeil to Sen Chavez, 20 Jun 59 (2) and 22 Jun 59; fldr FY 1960 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
132. Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1960*, 86 Cong, 1 Sess (1959), S Rept 476; *New York Times*, 15 Jul 59.
133. Ltrs SecDef to Rep Mahon and Sen Chavez, 17 Jul 59, fldr FY 1960 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
134. *New York Times*, 1, 5 Aug 59; PL 86-166 (18 Aug 59); House Cte of Conf, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (3 Aug 59), H Rept 743, 1-8. OASD(C) Table EFAD-368, 25 May 60, OSD Hist, summarizes the separate appropriations and provides a comparison with the budget request.
135. House Cte on Appros, *Military Construction Appropriations for 1960: Overall Statements: Hearings*, 1-10; Senate Cte on Appros, *Military Construction Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, 1-17; PL 86-275 (16 Sep 59); OASD(C) Table EFAD-368, 25 May 60, OSD Hist.
136. Remarks by Sprague and Gates, AFPC mtg notes, 28 Jul 58, 8, fldr AFPC May-Aug 59, Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; House Cte of Conf, *Military Construction Authorization, Fiscal Year 1960*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (29 Jul 59), H Rept 729, 38-39; PL 86-149 (10 Aug 59, sec 412).

XI. POLICY, STRATEGY, AND THE BUDGET, FY 1961

1. Doris Fleeson in *Washington Star*, 4 Mar 59; *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1959*, II:767; *New York Times*, 9 May 59.
2. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 13 May 59, fldr Staff Notes May 59 (2), Box 41, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
3. *New York Times*, 4 Feb 59.
4. Gates interv, 3 Aug 67, 13, 14, CUOHP.
5. *Baltimore Sun*, 18 May 59; *Time*, LXXI (18 May 59); *New York Journal-American*, 12 May 59; *New York Times*, 17 May 59. Foster had in fact been mentioned as a possible successor to McElroy as Secretary of Defense. A reporter asked McElroy about this possibility on 16 April; the reply was that Foster was merely one of a number of competent men and that the president had not yet asked McElroy's advice about a successor: *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1959*, II:770.
6. *New York Times*, 19 May 59.
7. *Federal Register*, Doc 59-4406, 26 May 59.
8. *New York Times*, 9 Jun 59; John R. Wadleigh, "William Birrell Franke," in Paolo E. Coletta, ed., *American Secretaries of the Navy*, II:895-96.
9. Staff mtg notes (Livesay), 25 May 59, fldr Staff Meetings Jan-Dec 59, Box 9, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
10. Memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 9 Feb 59, fldr Staff Notes Feb 59 (2), Box 39, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
11. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 6 Mar 59, fldr Staff Notes Mar 1-15 59 (2), *ibid*. Taylor's recollection (*Swords and Plowshares*, 174) was that he had been offered reappointment as Army chief of staff. It seems likely that his memory played him false in this matter. Twining told the president on 9 February that McElroy considered it "unwise" to reappoint Taylor to a third term (see memo of conf with Pres, 9 Feb 59, cited in preceding note).
12. Telcon, 9 Mar 59, fldr Telephone Calls Mar 59, Box 39, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
13. Memo SecDef for Pres, 11 Mar 59, fldr 020 JCS 59, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; *New York Times*, 19 Mar 59.
14. *New York Times*, 13 May 59.

15. Ltr SecDef to Adm Radford, 13 Mar 59, atchmt to memo Randall for Goodpaster, 16 Mar 59, fldr DoD vol III (5) Mar-Apr 59, Box 1, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL. Randall informed Goodpaster that McElroy felt that similar arrangements should be made for any future JCS chairmen who resided in or near Washington to serve as advisers.
16. Memrcd Goodpaster, 12 May 59, fldr Dept of Def vol III (6) May-June 59, Box 1, DoD subser, Subj ser, WHO, OSS files, DDEL; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 13 May 59, fldr Staff Notes May 59 (2), Box 41, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; *New York Times*, 28 Jul 59.
17. Ltr McNeil to Pres, 10 Sep 59, Reading File 1959, McNeil papers, OSD Hist; *New York Times*, 16 Sep 59.
18. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 3 Nov 59, fldr DoD vol III (9), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; *New York Times*, 25 Nov 59; *Armed Forces Management*, VI (Feb 60), 36-37 ("Pentagon Profile" of Lincoln).
19. *New York Times*, 9 Feb, 16, 19, 23 Apr, 25 May 59; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1959*, 329-30, 333; Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 508-09, 523-25.
20. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 525.
21. See the following interviews with former OSD civilian and military officials from the John Foster Dulles Oral History Collection at Princeton University: Gates, 13 Jul 65, 6; McElroy, 6 May 64, 14-15, 31-33, 35; Burke, 11 Jan 66, 2-3, 43, 49-50, 52-53; Taylor, 11 May 66, 11-12; Radford, 8 May 65, 7-10, 76-77; Twining, 16 Mar 65, 20-21, 23-24, 27-28, 39-40, 43; Irwin, 19 Feb 65, 8-11, 27-28, 39-40; also Goodpaster, 11 Jan 66, 6-7. Radford was particularly warm in his praise for Dulles. Burke's favorable comments were qualified by his belief that Dulles could have consulted the JCS even more and that Dulles did not fully understand the value of seapower in exerting power indirectly.
22. *New York Times*, 29 May 59. Kistiakowsky's letter of appointment, dated 15 Jul 59, is printed in his book, *A Scientist at the White House: The Private Diary of President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Science and Technology*, 1-3. It is nearly identical with that of Killian except that Kistiakowsky, unlike Killian, was specifically authorized to attend meetings of the NSC and the OCB as well as the Planning Board. However, Killian had attended NSC meetings on occasion.
23. Kistiakowsky, 42.
24. Memo Marion W. Boggs, Dir Policy Coord Secretariat, NSC, for NSC PB, 21 Jan 59, fldr 5810 Basic Nat Sec Pol file #1, Box 23, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; memo Gray for SecDef, 4 Feb 59, ltr McElroy to Gray, 6 Feb 59; fldr 381 Natl Def NSC 5810-5906 9 Mar 59, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574; memo DepASD(ISA) (Haydn Williams) for ASD(ISA), 16 Mar 59, fldr 5810 Basic Nat Sec Pol file #2, Box 23, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
25. For Army views, see memos from ODCSOPS for SpecAsst to JCS for NSC Matters, 3, 20 Feb 59, fldr 5810 Basic Nat Sec Pol file #1, Box 23, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; also memos ODCSOPS for SpecAsst to JCS and Def Member of NSC PB, 5 Mar, 4 Apr 59, fldr 5810 Basic Nat Sec Pol file #2, *ibid*. For the Navy: memo DirStrPlans Div, OPNAV, for Def Member of NSC PB and SpecAsst to JCS, 13 Mar 59, memo DCNO (Plans and Policy) for ASD(ISA), 19 Mar 59: *ibid*. A summary of the views of both services is given in memo Williams for ASD(ISA), 16 Mar 59, *ibid*.
26. Memo SecAF for SecDef, 13 Jan 59, fldr 5810 Basic Nat Sec Pol File #1, *ibid*; memo DepSecDef for SecAF, 13 Mar 59, memo DCS (Plans and Ops), USAF, for ASD(ISA), 26 Mar 59; fldr 5810 Basic Nat Sec Pol file #2, *ibid*.
27. Ltr SecState to SecDef, 24 Jan 59, w/encl, "A Concept of US Military Strategy for the 1960s," 5 Jan 59, fldr 381 Nat Def NSC 5810-5906 9 Mar 59, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
28. Memo of mtg at Pentagon (Gray), 6 Feb 59, fldr Def Presentations to NSC, Box 6, Briefing Notes subser, NSC ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL; ltr Herter to Quarles, 23 Feb 59, fldr 381 Nat Def NSC 5810-5906 9 Mar 59, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
29. Ltrs Herter to Quarles, 23 Feb 59, and SecState to SecDef, 25 Apr 59, fldr 381 Nat Def NSC 5810-5906 9 Mar 59, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574; memo Williams for

- ASD(ISA), 16 Mar 59, fldr 5810 Basic Nat Sec Pol file #2, Box 23, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
30. Ltr SecState to SecDef, 25 Apr 59, w/encl, fldr 381 Nat Def NSC 5810-5906 9 Mar 59, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
 31. Memo Boggs for NSC PB, 24 Apr 59, fldr 5810 Basic Nat Sec Pol file #2, Box 23, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
 32. JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 39.
 33. Memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 18 May 59, fldr Meetings with Pres 1959 (2), Box 4, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL.
 34. DeptState memcon, Geneva, 23 May 59, fldr 5906 Basic Nat Sec Pol (Secy), Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500. For the Geneva conference, see ch XVIII.
 35. Memos Boggs for NSC PB, 25 May, 3 Jun 59, fldr 5810 Basic Nat Sec Pol file #3, Box 23, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
 36. DeptState memcon, Geneva, 5 Jun 59, *ibid*.
 37. NSC 5816, 1 Jul 58, OSD Hist; ltr Pres to Hickey, 27 Nov 58, fldr Net Evaluation Subcommittee (1957-60), Box 14, Briefing Notes subser, NSC ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL. For the establishment of the NESC, see Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 140-41.
 38. NSC Action 2009, 20 Nov 58, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1958, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
 39. Memo of mtg at Pentagon (Gray), 6 Feb 59, fldr Def Presentations to NSC, Box 6, Briefing Notes subser, NSC ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL.
 40. Draft memo Gray for SecDef, atchmt to memo Gray for Goodpaster, 13 Feb 59 (with changes suggested later by Pres), *ibid*; memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 16 Feb 59, fldr Meetings with Pres 1959 (6), Box 4, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL.
 41. Memo Gray for SecDef, 18 Feb 59, fldr Def Presentations to the NSC, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
 42. Memo CJCS for Gray, 19 Feb 59, CM-303-59, OSD Hist; memo CJCS for Hickey, 20 Feb 59, CM-305-59, looseleaf binder Def Presentations to Pres, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
 43. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 21 Feb 59, CM-306-59, and ltr Gray to Quarles, 19 Mar 59, looseleaf binder Def Presentations to Pres, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574; memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 19 Mar 59, fldr Meetings with Pres 1959 (3), Box 4, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL.
 44. Memrcd DJS (Lt Gen Oliver S. Picher, USAF), 23 Jun 59, memo Gray for DepSecDef, 12 Aug 59: looseleaf binder Def Presentations to Pres, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574; memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 14 Sep 59, fldr Meetings with Pres 1959 (3), Box 4, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 35, 38, 63-64.
 45. NSC 5906, 8 Jun 59, OSD Hist.
 46. Memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Jun 59, JCSM-239-59, fldr 5906 Basic Nat Sec Pol (Secy), Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
 47. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 8 May 59, ns, w/covering memo from Whisenand for McElroy, 23 Jun 59, fldr 381 Nat Def NSC 5810-5906 9 Mar 59, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
 48. Memo SecA for SecDef, 23 Jun 59, fldr 5906 Basic Nat Sec Pol (Secy), Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
 49. AFPC mtg notes, 23 Jun 59, fldr AFPC May-Aug 59, Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
 50. Memo of disc (Gleason), 411th NSC mtg, 25 Jun 59, 16, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
 51. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 2 Jul 59, fldr Staff Notes July 1959 (4), Box 43, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memo Gray for DepASD(ISA), 8 Jul 59, enclosing "issues for discussion" as presented in 2 Jul 59 mtg, fldr 5906 Basic Nat Sec Pol (Secy), Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
 52. Memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 7 Jul 59, fldr Meetings with Pres Jun-Dec 1959 (6), Box 4, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL.
 53. Memo Whisenand for Gray, 8 Jul 59, w/encls, fldr 5906 Basic Nat Sec Pol (Secy), Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.

54. Memo of disc (Gleason), 412th NSC mtg, 9 Jul 59, 8-11, 13-14, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memrcd, "Debriefing of the NSC Meeting on 8 [sic] July 1959 on Basic Nat Sec Pol, NSC 5906," 13 Jul 59, ns, on JCS letterhead, redraft of para 12-a, 9 Jul 59, encl with memo DASD(ISA) for JCS, 20 Jul 59: fldr 5906 Basic Nat Sec Pol (Secy), Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
55. Memo DepASD(ISA) for CJCS, 20 Jul 59, fldr 5906 Basic Nat Sec Pol (Secy), Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
56. Memos DCSOPS, DeptA, for Def Member NSC PB and SpecAsst to JCS for NSC Aff, 14, 16, 27 Jul 59, memo DCNO (Plans and Policy) to same, 23 Jul 59: fldr 5906 Basic Nat Sec Pol (Secy), Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
57. Memo ExecSecNSC (Lay) for NSC, 28 Jul 59, *ibid*. In adopting Gray's version of paragraph 12-a, the Planning Board altered the phrase "All deployed organized units" in the penultimate sentence to "designated commanders."
58. Memo SecA for SecDef, 29 Jul 59, *ibid*; memo CSA for JCS, 29 Jul 59 (JCS 2101/360, 30 Jul 59), CD CCS 3001 Basic Nat Sec Pol (20 July 59), JCS files, RG 218, NARA; comments on para 12 prepared by OASD(ISA) for use of SecDef in NSC mtg, fastened in copy of NSC 5906 in Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
59. Memo of disc (Boggs), 415th NSC mtg, 30 Jul 59, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; NSC 5906/1, 5 Aug 59, OSD Hist.
60. Status of Mobilization Base 1 Jul 61, presentation by Perkins McGuire before NSC, 18 Dec 58, fldr AFPC Dec 58, Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; memo of disc (Boggs), 391st NSC mtg, 18 Dec 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL. For Secretary Wilson's ruling that M-day would be assumed to precede D-day by six months, see ch V.
61. Memo ActgSecDef for CJCS, 19 Feb 59 (JCS 1725/337, 24 Feb 59), CD CCS 4000 General (13 Mar 59), JCS files, RG 218, NARA; memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Mar 59, JCSM-88-59, fldr Mobilization Base, Box 4, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024; memo DepSecDef for SecA et al, 8 Apr 59, encl to JCS 1725/341, 13 Apr 59, OSD Hist.
62. Memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Jun 59, JCSM-239-59, fldr 5906 Basic Nat Sec Pol (Secy), Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
63. Memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 27 Jul 59, encl with JCS 2101/358, 29 Jul 59, OSD Hist.
64. Memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Aug 59, JCSM-324-59, memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 24 Aug 59; memo JCS for SecDef, 31 Aug 59, JCSM-357-59, memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 21 Sep 59: fldr 381 Nat Def NSC 5810-5906 9 Mar, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574. NSC Action 2131, 1 Oct 59 (approved by Pres 14 Oct 59), bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1959, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
65. Memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 14 Oct 59, fldr Meetings with Pres Jun-Dec 59 (2), Box 4, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL.
66. Memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 31 Mar 59, fldr JSOP-62 (31 Mar 59), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
67. JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 304-07.
68. Memrcd, 11 Mar 59, ns, apparently by OASD(C), fldr FY 60 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; rept on mtg of Sec and DepSecDef with DirBoB, 11 Mar 59, nd, prepared by McNeil as shown by internal evidence, wording partly identical with preceding memo, fldr Budget Jan-Mar 59 100, Box 1, OASD(C) files, Acc 64-A2024.
69. DoD Dir 5100.1, 31 Dec 58; memo SJCS for CINCAL et al, 1 May 59, SM-456-59, CD CCS 7000 General (6 Apr 59) pt 1 of 5, JCS files, RG 218, NARA.
70. Papers in fldr FY 61 Budget—Spring Fever (File #1), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; McNeil statement to AFPC, AFPC mtg notes 23 Jun 59, fldr AFPC May-Aug 59, Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
71. Handwritten mins of Cabinet mtg, 5 Jun 59, fldr C-51 (2), 5 June 59, Box 5, Cabinet ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL. For the president's warning in 1957 of the dangers of budget cuts, see ch IV.
72. *New York Times*, 1 Jul 59.
73. Jt Secs Advice of Action, 27 Jun 59, w/at chd tables, "FY 1961 Budget - Planning Data for New Obligational Availability" and "Planning Data for Expenditures," fldr FY 1961 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memrcd Burke, 1 Jul 59, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.

74. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 30 Jun 59, fldr Budget Military FY 61 (1), Box 3, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
75. Memo ASD(MP&R) for AsstSecA et al, 29 Jul 59, fldr FY 1961 Budget, ATSD & DepSec Def files, OSD Hist.
76. Alfred Goldberg, *Strategy and Money: The Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 1961*, 8. This study provides an excellent account of the JCS role in the 1961 budget, supplementing the account in JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 369-70. Taylor's proposal for a budget based on functional categories was endorsed by Secretary Brucker in memo for SecDef, 13 Apr 59, fldr 110.01 Budget FY 1961, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574. Taylor had described the proposal earlier in testifying on the FY 1960 budget: House Cte on Appros, *DoD Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 1:334, 336-38. The idea was later adopted by Secretary of Defense McNamara.
77. Memo CJCS for JCS, 29 Apr 59, CM-354-59 (JCS 1800/283, 29 Apr 59), CD CCS 7000 General (6 Apr 59) pt 1 of 5, JCS files, RG 218, NARA.
78. Service views are in JCS 1800/285, 1800/286, and 1800/287, all 19 May 59, CD CCS 7000 General (6 Apr 59) pt 2 of 5, *ibid*. The analysis of the service submissions by the Joint Programs Office, incorporating memorandums explaining the rationale for the service recommendations, is in JCS 1800/288, 26 May 59, *ibid*, pt 3 of 5. For a detailed summary of the service views, see Goldberg, *Strategy and Money*, 12-18.
79. Tabulation from Goldberg, *Strategy and Money*, 13.
80. Memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Jun 59, JCSM-217-59, fldr 110.01 FY 61 SecDef papers, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
81. Memo Randall for DJS, 2 Jul 59, atchmt to JCS 1800/294, 7 Jul 59, CD CCS 7000 General (2 Jul 59), JCS files, RG 218, NARA.
82. Memo SecA for SecDef, 1 Sep 59; memos SecNav for SecDef, 1, 9 Sep 59; memo SecAF for SecDef, 9 Sep 59; fldr 110.01 Budget FY 1961, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574. The summaries furnished the JCS are in JCS 1800/300, 1800/303, and 1800/304, all 22 Sep 59, CD CCS 7000 General (15 Sep 59), Gps 2, 3 and 5 respectively, JCS files, RG 218, NARA. They are summarized in typewritten table "FY 1961 Budget Estimates—Service Submissions," OSD(C), 17 Sep 59, fldr 110.01 FY 61 SecDef papers, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; this also gives the OSD submission.
83. DeptA, "Summary Statement of Military Implications," 15 Sep 59, part of supplemental information transmitted to JCS for budget review, JCS 1800/299, 16 Sep 59, CD CCS 7000 General (15 Sep 59), Grp 1, JCS files, RG 218, NARA. Additional details about the content of each service's budget are given in "Presentation of FY Budget Summary to SecDef McElroy, Introductory Statement by Dep ASD Sprague," 21 Oct 59, fldr FY 61 Bu Presentations, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
84. Memo SecNav for SecDef, 9 Sep 59, fldr 110.01 Budget FY 1961, Box 11, OSD CCS Files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; JCS 1800/305, 24 Sep 59, CD CCS 7000 General (15 Sep 59), Grp 6, JCS files, RG 218, NARA; JCS 1800/301, 22 Sep 59, CD CCS 7000 General (15 Sep 59) Grp 2, *ibid*.
85. Memo CSAF for SecAF, 9 Sep 59, memo SecAF for SecDef, 9 Sep 59, and tables summarizing AF "high," "low," and "minimum essential" budgets, all included in AF budget submission transmitted to JCS, JCS 1800/304, 22 Sep 59, CD CCS 7000 General (15 Sep 59), Grp 5, JCS files, RG 218, NARA. The Air Force statement of military implication, prepared for JCS use, dealt entirely with the "minimum essential" budget, ignoring the other two: JCS 1800/302, 22 Sep 59, CD CCS 7000 General (15 Sep 59), Grp 2, *ibid*.
86. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 16 Sep 59, fldr Staff Notes Sep 59 (2), Box 44, DDEL ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
87. Handwritten notes by Col Black on mtg 21 Oct 59, fldr Col. Black's Notes 1959, Box 4, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078; "Presentation of FY 1961 Budget Summary to SecDef McElroy, Introductory Statement by Dep ASD Sprague," 21 Oct 59, fldr FY 61 Bu Presentations, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. A handwritten note on this document states that the briefing was actually given by McNeil. For McElroy's trip, see *New York Times*, 27 Sep 59. The roles of Kistiakowsky and York are described in Kistiakowsky, 110, 112, 113, 116-17, 123, 124, 141-42, 146, 156, 175.

88. "Presentation of FY 1961 Budget Summary to SecDef McElroy, Introductory Statement by DepASD Sprague [McNeil]," 21 Oct 59, cited in preceding note.
89. Memos ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 20, 23, Oct 59, fldr 110.01 FY 1961, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
90. Memos of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 3 Nov 59, fldr Department of Defense Vol III (9), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL, and 5 Nov 59, fldr Staff Notes Nov 59 (3), Box 45, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
91. For the trip on the *Sequoia*, see *Baltimore Sun* and *New York Times*, both 8 Nov 59. McNeil later recalled that on this trip, he and York were at odds on the budget for research and that McElroy acted as "judge" between them: McNeil interv, 31 May 74, 53, OSD Hist. The questions that McElroy posed to the JCS appear in encl A to memo CJCS for JCS members, 10 Nov 59, CM-423-59, CD CCS 7000 General (17 Nov 59), JCS files, RG 218, NARA. The JCS replies to the questions have not been found; they may have been given orally during budget discussions.
92. Figures from table "FY 1961 Budget Summary, 9 November Staff Position—By Service," Tab C to notes for mtg with Pres on FY 1961 Defense budget, Augusta, Ga, 16 Nov 59, fldr FY 61 Bu Presentations, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
93. York, Kistiakowsky, and the PSAC favored cancellation of the F-108. McElroy told General White that he must choose between the two. White, after "sleepless nights," chose the B-70: House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 2:253-54, 267-68, pt 6:32-33; Herbert F. York, *Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist's Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva*, 179-80; *New York Times*, 23 Sep 59.
94. Notes for mtg with Pres on FY 1961 Defense budget, Augusta, Ga, 16 Nov 59, with tabs giving further details, fldr FY 61 Bu Presentations, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 16 Nov 59, fldr Staff Notes Nov 59 (3), Box 45, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
95. Memo CJCS for JCS members, 10 Nov 59, CM-423-59, CD CCS 7000 General (17 Nov 59), JCS files, RG 218, NARA.
96. Memo SJCS for JCS, 13 Nov 59, SM-1156-59, w/encl, memo for SecDef, same date, *ibid*. Schedule of Actions by JCS with Respect to FY-61 Budget, JCS 1800/320, 8 Dec 59, CD CCS 7000 General (2 Dec 59), *ibid*, mentions the JCS-SecDef meeting but provides no details.
97. Kistiakowsky, 157-63, gives a detailed account of this meeting of 16 November, obviously based on notes taken at the time, which conveys much of the flavor of the discussion. Goodpaster's memo of the conference, cited in n 94, was prepared some time later (it is dated 2 December 1959) and takes some of the wrinkles out of the rough spots in what was evidently a spirited debate. A handwritten account (presumably by Lemnitzer) of McElroy's summary of the meeting, given to the JCS, is in fldr L-184-71 Meeting Notes Armed Forces Policy Cmte [sic], Box 25, Lemnitzer papers, NDU; it is undated but obviously refers to this meeting.
98. Handwritten notes by Col Black on mtg 16 Nov 59, fldr Col. Black's notes 1959, Box 4, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078. For Khrushchev's visit to the United States, see chs XVIII and XXI.
99. Telcon, 17 Nov 59, fldr Telephone Calls Nov 59, Box 46, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
100. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 18 Nov 59, fldr Staff Notes Nov 59 (2), Box 45, *ibid*.
101. Telcon, 18 Nov 59, fldr Telephone Calls Nov 59, Box 46, *ibid*.
102. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 21 Nov 59, fldr Staff Notes Nov 59 (2), Box 45, *ibid*.
103. Sprague presentation to NSC, 25 Nov 59, with additional details from Glass presentation to Cabinet, 11 Dec 59, fldr, FY 61 Bu Presentations, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; Kistiakowsky, 176-77.
104. Kistiakowsky, 176-77; presentation by CJCS to NSC, 25 Nov 59, CD CCS 7000 General (27 Nov 59), JCS files, RG 218, NARA; memo of disc (Boggs), 415th NSC mtg, 25 Nov 59, 12-13, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
105. Ltr DepSecDef to DirBoB, 1 Dec 59, fldr FY 61 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 9 Jan 60, fldr SecDef Papers 110.01 FY 61, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.

106. NSC Action 2168, 7 Jan 60, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1960, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
107. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 1:17.
108. Senate Ctes on Armed Svcs (Preparedness Investigating Subcte) and on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Missiles, Space, and Other Major Defense Matters: Hearings*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (1960), 369 (hereafter cited as Senate, *Missiles, etc.: Joint Hearings* (1960)); memrcd Burke, 21 Nov 59 (debrief of AFPC mtg 20 Nov), Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
109. For examples of such stories, see *New York Times*, 2, 8, 13, 15, 16 Nov 59; *Washington Sunday Star*, 15 Nov 59.
110. *Washington Post*, 22 Nov 59; *Time*, LXXIV (30 Nov 59), 14.
111. A news story on 6 November 1959 by Jack Raymond described Taylor's book and reported that at his request, its publication had been timed for 5 January 1960 to coincide with the return of Congress: *New York Times*, 7 Nov 59. The book was reviewed by Raymond in the *New York Times Book Review*, 3 Jan 60.
112. Maxwell D. Taylor, "Our Great Military Fallacy," *Look*, XXIII (24 Nov 59), 27-31. Kistiakowsky recalled that at the 16 Nov 59 meeting in Augusta, described above, the president referred to Taylor's article (about which he knew before publication) and, "white with anger," directed General Twining to "tell the Chiefs that they can't scare me by such inexcusable indiscretions as that of Taylor": Kistiakowsky, 158.
113. *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1959*, III:1021.
114. Memrcd Goodpaster, 16 Sep 59, fldr Staff Notes Sep 59 (2), Box 44, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
115. McElroy's letter of resignation, 27 Nov 59 (in McElroy papers, DDEL), asked the president to accept his resignation as of approximately 1 December 1959. Available sources do not indicate when the date became firm.
116. *New York Times*, 2 Dec 59; *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1959*, III:1118-41.
117. As one writer has remarked, McElroy's role "was essentially the same as Wilson's; only the outward personalities were different": Kinnard, *The Secretary of Defense*, 55.
118. This was the appraisal of an outside study group appointed in 1960: McKinsey and Company, "Study of the 1960-61 Presidential Transition," Sec III, 6, fldr 020 Department of Defense Agencies 1960, Box 5, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
119. Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, 120-21.
120. Charles J. V. Murphy, "Is the Defense Budget Big Enough?" *Fortune*, LX (Nov 59), 146.
121. Killian interv, 1969-70, 6-7, CUOHP. Killian quoted a remark by "some wit in Washington" that "McElroy's greatest ambition in coming to Washington was to have been Secretary of Defense" (ibid, 9). McElroy's two lengthy trips to the Far East in 1958 and 1959, while the budget was in preparation, have already been noted. These were in addition to his regular trips to NATO meetings.
122. Doris Fleeson in *Washington Star*, 2 Dec 59; Walter Lippmann in *New York Herald Tribune*, 3 Mar 59; *Fortune*, XLI (Jan 60), 84-86.
123. *New York Times*, 2, 3 Dec 59.
124. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 3 Nov 59, fldr Department of Defense vol III (9), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; memrcds Gray, 24 Nov and 1 Dec 59, fldr Miscellaneous Correspondence 1958-59, Box 1, Gray papers, DDEL; Gates interv, 3 Aug 67, 38, 50, CUOHP. Obviously Eisenhower did not consider Army Secretary Brucker as a possible deputy secretary of defense.
125. *New York Times*, 11, 12 Dec 59.
126. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1961*, M4-M6, M16, M20-M23, 440-42.
127. Ibid, M20-23.
128. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1960-61*, 26, 28-29.
129. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 1:1-22 (quote, 20).
130. Ibid, 23 (testimony 13 Jan 60).
131. Gates recalled that "we were flying the U-2, and we had the dope [on missiles], but

we couldn't say we were flying the U-2, and nobody knew about the U-2": Gates interv, 3 Aug 67, 33, CUOHP.

132. *Public Statements, SecDef Gates, 1959-60*, I:254-55 (quote, 254).
133. *New York Times*, 26 Jan 60.
134. Quoted by John G. Norris in a news story, "Military Policy Enters Election-Year Politics," *Washington Post*, 28 Jan 60.
135. Alsop columns printed in *Washington Post*, 25-30 Jan 60.
136. House Cte on Science and Astronautics, *Review of the Space Program: Hearings*, 81.
137. *Public Statements, SecDef Gates, 1959-60*, II:312. The speech had to be read for Gates when bad weather prevented him from making the trip to Oregon.
138. *Washington Star*, 27 Jan 60. See also Dulles's remarks in *The Craft of Intelligence*, 164-65.
139. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1960-61*, 126.
140. Ch X; memrcd, "G. " [Goodpaster], 9 Jun 58, fldr June 58 Staff Notes (3), Box 33, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
141. Memo Chm Ad Hoc Panel (L. A. Hyland) for DCI, 25 Aug 59, fldr CIA Vol. II (8) (Sep-Dec 59), Box 8, Alpha subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
142. There were actually two NIEs issued on 9 February 1960: NIE 11-4-59 (main trends in Soviet capabilities and policies, 1959-64) and NIE 11-8-59 (Soviet capabilities for strategic attack through mid-1964). The estimates for ICBMs were identical in them. Both are in OSD Hist; NIE 11-8-59 is published (along with other NIEs) in Donald P. Steury, ed., *Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950-1983*, 71-107 (missile estimates on 74-75, 83-85). However, for some reason, this publication does not indicate the dates of the documents published.
143. *Life*, XLVIII (8 Feb 60), 51.
144. Speech of 19 Jan 60 reported in House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 2:274-79; speech of 28 Jan 60 reported in Senate, *Missiles, etc.: Joint Hearings* (1960), 8-12.
145. *New York Times*, 22 Jan 60.
146. *Ibid*, 26 Jan 60.
147. *Congressional Record*, 26 Jan 60, vol 106, 1244. George Fielding Eliot, a veteran military commentator, attributed Johnson's apparent change of heart to information given him by Republican senators and nonpartisan sources that public confidence in Gates, "a most promising Secretary of Defense," might be impaired by further delay in his confirmation: *New York Herald Tribune*, 30 Jan 60. The *New York Times* account (27 Jan 60) of the confirmation remarked that the one-day delay "seemed to have political earmarks."
148. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 2:9, 42, 47, 67-68, 68-71, 107.
149. *Ibid*, 197, 206, 217, 243, 271.
150. *Ibid*, 405, 412, 443, 489-90, 413-14, 449-50, 421-26.
151. *Ibid*, 491-92. One congressman asked for instances in which money had been withdrawn from Army appropriations for the benefit of other services. In reply, Brucker's office cited five examples (*ibid*, 492). OSD (presumably the comptroller's office) then drafted a rebuttal, denying that there had been any instances in which money had been shifted to other services after having been appropriated to the Army. Apparently, however, this material was never transmitted to Congress: looseleaf binder, Analysis of Secretary Brucker's testimony before the House Appropriations Committee on the FY 1961 Budget, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
152. Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, 5, 21-42, 48, 49-50.
153. *New York Times*, 30 Jan 60. Some of the figures were leaked to Joseph Alsop and published by him: *New York Herald Tribune*, 5 Feb 60.
154. Senate, *Missiles, etc.: Joint Hearings* (1960), 18, 24, 44, 114-21, 122-58, 186-225, 225-73, 276-335.
155. *Ibid*, 353-435 passim (quote, 407); *New York Times*, 10, 25 Feb 60.
156. Senate, *Missiles, etc.: Joint Hearings* (1960), 441-45, 456-63. For a summary of these hearings, see Bottome, *The Missile Gap*, 122-35.

157. Gallup Poll results reported in *Denver Post*, 1 Mar 60. For contemporary expressions of concern about the missile gap, see *Time*, LXXV (8 Feb 60), 18-19; Brig Gen Phillips in *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 21 Feb, 6 Mar 60; Robert C. Toth in *New York Herald Tribune*, 20 Mar 60; and for a rebuttal, emphasizing U.S. military superiority, *U.S. News and World Report*, XLVIII (29 Feb 60), 42-49.
158. Senate Subcte on Natl Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, I:20-22, 50-51; *New York Times*, 24, 25 Feb 60.
159. *New York Times*, 28 Feb 60 (where the memo of 17 Feb 60 is largely quoted); *New York Herald Tribune*, 29 Feb 60.
160. Gale, "Post-Sputnik Washington," 247-50, and "Comments," 15; *Public Statements, SecDef Gates, 1959-60*, III:555; text of letter (with addendum giving replies to Burgess's questions) in *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, LXXII (25 Apr 60), 61-79.
161. *New York Times*, 10 Apr 60; editorial in *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, LXXII (25 Apr 60), 72; Phillips in *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 10, 15 Apr 60; *Baltimore Sun*, 20 Apr 60; *Public Statements, SecDef Gates, 1960*, III:555.
162. House Cte on Armed Svcs, *Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval and Military Establishments, 1960: Hearings*, 4055-4964 (hearings), 4027-55 (report); House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 7:328-39.
163. Senate, *Missiles, etc.: Joint Hearings* (1960), 443; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 1:9, 137; Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, 8, 34-35.
164. Kistiakowsky, 262, 267 (entries for 7, 10 Mar 60); York, *Making Weapons, Talking Peace*, 187-88; memo Kistiakowsky for Persons, 12 Mar 60, fldr Department of Defense, Box 1, OSASt Addl records 1957-61, WHO, DDEL; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 18 Mar 60, fldr Staff Notes Mar 60 (2), Box 48, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL. Reduction of the SAGE program involved the so-called "supercombat centers" that were no longer considered cost effective: see ch XIII.
165. Robert Frank Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1960*, I:538-39; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 7:263-66, and *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Revisions in 1960 and 1961 Air Force Programs: Hearings*, 2-3; memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Mar 60, JCSM-119-60, fldr BOMARC 1960, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093. The continental defense master plan is described in ch XIII.
166. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Revisions in 1960 and 1961 Air Force Program: Hearings*, 2; memrcd Goodpaster, 23 Mar 60, fldr DoD vol IV (3) (Mar-Apr 60), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 280-81.
167. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Revisions in 1960 and 1961 Air Force Programs: Hearings*, 2, 15, 18-22.
168. Telcon, 26 Mar 60, Box 48, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memrcd Burke, 28 Mar 60, memo J. M. Sprague for Douglas, 31 Mar 60: Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
169. Memo Paul M. Kearney (AdmAsst to CJCS) for Capt Gray, OCJCS, 26 Apr 60, fldr 337 Conferences and Briefings 1960, Box 14, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 6 Apr 60, fldr Staff Notes Apr 60 (2), Box 49, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
170. Ltrs SecDef to Rep Mahon and Sen Chavez, 6 Apr 60, fldr FY 1961 Budget, ATSD & SecDef files, OSD Hist; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 7:311-28; *New York Times*, 7 Apr 60. The amended NOA figure is given in OASD(C) Table EFAD-387, 31 Oct 61, OSD Hist (it excludes the \$24 million in retired pay included in the original budget estimate).
171. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1961*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (29 Apr 60), H Rept 561, passim; *New York Times*, 6 May 60. For a particularly informative summary of this report, see *Baltimore Sun*, 30 Apr 60.
172. Ltr SecDef to Sen Chavez, 12 May 60, listing changes requested in House bill, Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, 1406-1524; Douglas testimony, 18 May 60, *ibid*, 1524-65; testimony of service secretaries and military chiefs, 19-24 May 60, *ibid*, 1567-1728; Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of*

- Defense Appropriation Bill, 1961*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (10 Jun 60), S Rept 1550, passim; *Baltimore Sun*, 17 Jun 60.
173. Ltrs SecDef to Rep Mahon and Sen Hayden, 20 Jun 60, fldr FY 1961 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
 174. PL 86-601 (7 Jul 60); House Cte of Conf, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1961*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (29 Jun 60), H Rept 2040, 7, 9-10; *Baltimore Sun*, 1 Jul 60.
 175. The April reprogramming resulted in a net increase of some \$36 million for Air Force construction: memo SecDef for SecAF, 13 Apr 60, and ltrs SecDef for Sen Stennis (Chm Subcte on Mil Constr, Senate Appros Cte), 13 Apr 60, and for Rep Cannon (Chm House Cte on Appros), 14 Apr 60, fldr FY 1961 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
 176. House Cte on Appros, *Military Construction Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pts 1 and 2, passim; Senate Cte on Appros, *Military Construction Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, 1-20; PL 86-630 (11 Jul 60).
 177. Memo Burke for Op-95, 9 Jul 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; memo Herter for Gates, 20 Jul 60, fldr 091.412, Box 7, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
 178. Memrcd Burke, 14 Jul 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; memo Herter for Gates, 20 Jul 60, cited in preceding note. Earlier, Comptroller Lincoln had told Burke that another carrier was desired in both the Sixth and Seventh Fleets (i.e., in the Mediterranean and the Pacific): memo Burke for Op-05 and Op-90, 12 Jul 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
 179. Memo of disc (Boggs), 453rd NSC mtg, 25 Jul 60, NSC scr, PP (AWF), DDEL; memo SecDef for Goodpaster, 29 Jul 60 (with atchd ofc memo Col Black for Col Brown summarizing president's reaction), fldr 110.01 (FY 62) 1960, Box 8, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1960-61*, 612-19.
 180. Ltrs SecDef to Reps Vinson and Mahon and Sen Russell, 9 Aug 60, fldr 110.01 (FY 62) 1960, Box 8, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; ltr SecDef to Sen Chavez, 9 Aug 60, fldr FY 1961 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. A similar letter was sent to Senator Johnson (by then the Democratic vice-presidential nominee), who had inquired about plans to use the extra money: ltr Sen Johnson to SecDef, 28 Jul 60, and reply 9 Aug 60, *ibid*.
 181. Memo J. R. Loftis for SecDef, 14 Jun 60, memo DepSecDef for DDR&E et al, 9 Jul 60, memo ASD(MP&R) for SecDef, 19 Jul 60, memo CJCS for SecDef, 29 Jun 60, CM-558-60, memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 14 Jul 60, memo ASD(MP&R) for SecDef, 19 Jul 60: fldr 200 (Pers & Budget Actns FY 61) 1960, Box 9, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
 182. See Kolodziej, *The Uncommon Defense and Congress*, 317-22.

XII. MISSILES, SATELLITES, AND SPACE, 1958-1960

1. DoD Dir 5129.1, 10 Feb 59.
2. DoD Dir 5129.22, 23 Nov 59.
3. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 6:2, 56; House Cte on Govt Opns, *Organization and Management of Missile Programs: Hearings* (1960), 26; Melvin Bell, "The Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering: Its Organization and Administration," 66-69.
4. House Cte on Science and Astronautics, *Missile Development and Space Sciences: Hearings*, 418; DoD Dir 5105.15, 17 Mar 59; Bell, 86-88.
5. Encls to DoD Dir 5105.15, 17 Mar 59, listing projects assigned to ARPA, OSD Hist; memo DDR&E for SecA et al, 11 Jun 59, fldr 110 Relations with Other Agencies within DoD— ARPA 1959, Box 4, ODDR&E files, Acc 63-A1885.
6. DoD Dir 5129.33, 30 Dec 59; Senate Cte on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Transfer of Von Braun Team to NASA: Hearing*, 29-30; DoD NR 1412-59, 8 Dec 59, OSD Hist.
7. House Cte on Science and Astronautics, *Missile Development and Space Sciences: Hearings*, 418-19; memo SecDef for Secs of Mil Depts et al, 8 Apr 59, printed in Senate Cte on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Investigation of Governmental Organization for Space Activities: Hearings*, 502; memo DepSecDef for SvcSecs et al, 7 Jul 59, fldr Organization and Operations (BMC), Box 1, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923.

8. House Cte on Govt Opns, *Organization and Management of Missile Programs: Hearings* (1959), 280-83, 286-87.
9. Senate Cte on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Investigation of Governmental Organization for Space Activities: Hearings*, 484-91, 271-72B.
10. House Cte on Govt Opns, *Organization and Management of Missile Programs*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (2 Sep 59), H Rept 1121, 149-56; *New York Times*, 2 Sep 59.
11. House Cte on Govt Opns, *Organization and Management of Missile Programs: Hearings* (1960), 169-75.
12. Ch VII; Progress Rpts of ICBM and IRBM Programs, No 36 (30 Nov 58), No 47 (Jan-Mar 60), OSD Hist.
13. Ch VII; mins 40th (12 Jun 58), 41st (21 Jul 58), and 42nd (13 Aug 58) mtgs, OSD BMC, Box 9, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; memo SecAF for ChmOSDBMC, 24 Jun 58, and memo ActgDGM (A. W. Betts) for SecAF, 19 Aug 58: fldr M 471.94 9 Jan 58, Box 36, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; Max Rosenberg, *USAF Ballistic Missiles 1958-1959*, 20-21.
14. Memo DGM for SecAF, 14 Aug 58, fldr Atlas (SM-65/SM-68), Box 1, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919.
15. Rosenberg, *USAF Ballistic Missiles*, 22-23; McElroy testimony in House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 1:76-77, 90-91.
16. Rosenberg, *USAF Ballistic Missiles*, 23. According to Rosenberg, OSD BMC approval came on 18 November. The formal record of OSD BMC meetings shows none between 5 September and 11 December 1958. Perhaps the decision was taken by executive action or by Holaday, the chairman, acting on behalf of the BMC. It is unlikely that McElroy would have reached a decision without referring the matter to the BMC.
17. Memo of conf with Pres (J. S. D. Eisenhower), 28 Nov 58, fldr (Budget, Military FY 1960 (4)) DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
18. Ch X; NSC Action 2013, 6 Dec 58, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1958, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
19. Ch VII; Rosenberg, *USAF Ballistic Missiles*, 32-33; memo SecAF for ChmOSDBMC, 11 Aug 58, fldr Minuteman 1958, Box 3, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919.
20. Memo DGM for CJCS, 7 Aug 58, memo DGM for SecAF, 17 Sep 58: fldr Minuteman 1958, Box 3, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919.
21. Rosenberg, *USAF Ballistic Missiles*, 36-37.
22. Holaday's memo of 8 November 1958 has not been found but is referred to in Agenda for 48th mtg (13 May 59) of OSD BMC filed with the minutes of the meeting in Box 9, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923.
23. Memo ActgSecDef for SecAF, 20 Oct 58, fldr Action Memos to AF BMC 1959, Box 1, *ibid*.
24. Memo DGM for ChmAFBMC, 8 Dec 59, *ibid*; Rosenberg, *USAF Ballistic Missiles*, 35.
25. Rosenberg, *USAF Ballistic Missiles*, 35-36; mins of 44th mtg (11 Dec 58) of OSD BMC, Box 9, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; memo DGM for ChmAFBMC, 7 Jan 59, fldr M 471.94 Minuteman 8 Feb 58, Box 25, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
26. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 1:66, and pt 6:37.
27. Memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Feb 59, JCSM-61-59, fldr Missiles, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606.
28. Ch X; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 1:848-49.
29. Rosenberg, *USAF Ballistic Missiles*, 25; memo SecAF for DGM, 25 Mar 59, fldr Missiles 000.7-471.94 1959, Box 1, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 63-A1668. On Thor-Able, see Green and Lomask, *Vanguard*, 254.
30. Mins of 48th mtg (13 May 59) of OSD BMC, and item 1 for agenda for same, Box 9, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; Rosenberg, *USAF Ballistic Missiles*, 26-27.
31. Mins of 58th mtg (13 May 59) of OSD BMC, Box 3, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; Rosenberg, *USAF Ballistic Missiles*, 38; memo SAGM for ChmAFBMC, 1 Jun 59, fldr Action Memos to AF BMC 1959, Box 1, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; memo SecDef for CJCS, 29 Jun 59, fldr Missiles, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606.

32. Rosenberg, *USAF Ballistic Missiles*, 28-31.
33. SAC 15th Rept on Ballistic Missiles to SecDef, 31 Mar 59, OSD Hist; Progress Rept to Killian from Ballistic Missile Panel, 22 Apr 59, atchmt to ltr Killian to Quarles, 24 Apr 59, fldr 471.94 1959, Box 19, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; mins of 47th mtg (1 May 59) of OSD BMC, Box 9, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; memo DDR&E for SecAF, 4 Jun 59, memo AsstSecAF, R&D (Joseph V. Charyk) for DDR&E, 24 Jun 59; fldr Titan (SM-68), Box 5, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919.
34. Rosenberg, *USAF Ballistic Missiles*, 39; Progress Rept to Killian from Ballistic Missiles Panel, 22 Apr 59, atchmt to ltr Killian to Quarles, 24 Apr 59, fldr 471.94 1959, Box 19, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
35. Neal, *Ace in the Hole*, 139-42.
36. Mins of 47th mtg (13 May 59) of OSD BMC, item 3 for agenda, 49th mtg (29 Jun 59) of OSD BMC, filed with mins of mtg: Box 9, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923.
37. Mins of 49th mtg (29 Jun 59) of OSD BMC, *ibid*.
38. Memo McElroy for SpecAsst (Gray), 10 Aug 59, fldr 400.174 10 Aug 59, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574; memo of disc (Robert H. Johnson, DirPBSecretariat), 417th NSC mtg, 18 Aug 59, and briefing note for same, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
39. Progress Rpts of ICBM and IRBM Programs, No 38 (31 Jan 59), No 44 (31 Jul 59), OSD Hist; memo ActgSecAF for SecDef, 24 Jun 59, fldr Atlas (SM-64/SM-68), Box 1, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919.
40. Progress Rpts of ICBM and IRBM Programs, Nos 38-43, (31 Jan-Jun 59), OSD Hist; memo ActgSecAF for SecDef, 24 Jun 59, cited in preceding note; memo ExecSec OSDBMCSAC (Edward E. Harriman) for SAC members, 1 Jul 59, w/encl, rept from Ad Hoc Grp to SecAF, nd, fldr Atlas (SM-64/SM-68), Box 1, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919.
41. Progress Rpts of ICBM and IRBM Programs, No 44 (31 Jul 59), No 45 (Aug-Sep 59), No 46 (Oct-Dec 59), OSD Hist; *New York Times*, 2 Sep 59.
42. Progress Rept to Killian from Ballistic Missiles Panel, 22 Apr 59, atchmt to ltr Killian to Quarles, 24 Apr 59, fldr 471.94 1959, Box 19, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; memo of disc (Boggs), 406th NSC mtg, 13 May 59, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
43. Memo SecDef for SecAF, 24 Jun 59, fldr Atlas (SM-64/SM-68), Box 1, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919.
44. Kistiakowsky, 28; memo Brig Gen Brown for Gates, 25 Nov 59, w/encl, Rept of Working Group on Cost of ICBM Operational Forces, 20 Nov 59, fldr 471.94 1959, Box 19, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
45. Memo for Pres, 4 Aug 59, ns but evidently by Kistiakowsky, memo of conf with Pres (J. S. D. Eisenhower), 4 Aug 59; fldr Staff Notes Aug 59 (2), DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; NSC Action 2118, 18 Aug 59, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1959, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
46. Jacob Van Staaveren, *USAF Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Fiscal Years 1960-1961*, II:9-14; mins of 50th mtg (12 Aug 59) of OSD BMC, Box 9, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; memo SecAF for SecDef, 3 Oct 59, fldr Requests for Action from AF BMC 1959, Box 4, *ibid*; memo SecAFBMC (Col Theodore H. Runyon) for ExecSec OSDBMC, 9 Oct 59, fldr Titan (SM-68), Box 5, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919; Kistiakowsky, 134-35.
47. Memo DDR&E for ChmAFBMC, 3 Nov 59, fldr Action Memos to AF BMC 1959, Box 1, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923. Again it is not clear how or when the OSD BMC took this action. The BMC met on 28 October 1959, but the minutes indicate that the entire meeting was given over to a discussion of Minuteman. There was no subsequent BMC meeting until 17 February 1960.
48. Progress Rpts of ICBM and IRBM Programs, No 41 (30 Apr 59), No 42 (31 May 59), OSD Hist; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 3:778-79; Van Staaveren, *USAF Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles*, II:19-20; memos of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 5 Nov 59, fldr Staff Notes Nov 59 (3), and 15 Jan 60, fldr Staff notes Jan 60 (2), DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
49. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 16 Nov 59, fldr Staff Notes Nov 59 (3), DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 160-61.
50. Memo SecDef for SpecAsstforNatSecAff, 4 Jan 60, fldr 471.94 GM and Rockets (1 Jan-

- 31 Jul 60), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; NSC Action 2168, 7 Jan 60, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1960, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024; Van Staaveren, *USAF Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles*, II:19; mins of 52nd mtg (17 Feb 60) of OSD BMC, Box 9, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923.
51. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 12 Oct 59, CM-407-59, w/encl, memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Oct 59, JCSCM-414-59, fldr Missiles, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606. For the question of target selection, see ch XV.
 52. Mins of 51st mtg (28 Oct 59) of OSD BMC, Box 9, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; memo DDR&E for ChmAFBMC, 5 Nov 59, fldr Minuteman 1959, Box 3, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919.
 53. *New York Times*, 28 Nov 59; Van Staaveren, *USAF Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles*, V:61; *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1959, to June 30, 1960*, 322.
 54. Presentation by CJCS to NSC, 25 Nov 59, CD CCS 7000 General (27 Nov 59), JCS files, RG 218, NARA; *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1961*, M20-M21; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 1:8; House Cte on Appros, *Military Construction Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 2:27-28.
 55. Van Staaveren, *USAF Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles*, V:61-62; memo AF BMC for ChmOSDBMC, 12 Jan 60, fldr Requests for Action from AF BMC 1960, Box 3, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; mins of 53rd mtg (19 Feb 60) of OSD BMC, Box 9, *ibid*.
 56. Memo ActgDepSecDef for ChmAFBMC, 25 Mar 60; memo ActgDepSecDef for SpecAsstforNatSecAff, 25 Mar 60; fldr Minuteman 1960, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
 57. Kistiakowsky, 293; memo of disc (Boggs), 439th NSC mtg, 1 Apr 60, OSD Hist.
 58. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 5:564-65.
 59. *Ibid*, pt 1:158-59, pt 2:330-35, pt 6:84-92; Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, 1611-12, 1824-25; Van Staaveren, *USAF Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles*, II:20-22; memo Col Milton B. Adams, USAF (DepAsstCS forGM) for Brig Gen Brown, 10 Feb 60, fldr GM & Rockets (1 Jan-31 Jul 60), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
 60. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Revisions in 1960 and 1961 Air Force Programs: Hearings*, 2-3, 16-18, 22. For a general account of this budget revision, see ch XI.
 61. Van Staaveren, *USAF Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles*, IV:41.
 62. Progress Rpts of ICBM and IRBM Programs, No 44 (31 Jul 59), and No 45 (Aug-Sep 59), OSD Hist; *Wall Street Journal*, 5 Jul 60; James Baar and William E. Howard, "AF Cracks Down on ICBM Base Delays," *Missiles and Rockets*, VII (22 Aug 60), 8-9; statements by Gates to NSC, memo of disc (Boggs), 453rd NSC mtg, 25 Jul 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; documents in fldr 337 Alpha, Box 14, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
 63. *Baltimore Sun*, 27, 30 Jul 60; Baar and Howard, 8-9; Van Staaveren, *USAF Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles*, IV:44-45; documents in fldr 337 (ICBM Contractors mtg) 26 July 60, Box 14, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
 64. Van Staaveren, *USAF Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles*, III:26-29; memo DepSecDef for ChmAFBMC, 30 Dec 60, fldr Requests for Action from AF BMC, Box 4, ODDR&E (BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923.
 65. AF BMC Development Plan, Presentation to OSD BMC, 3 Aug 60, fldr Titan (SM-68), Box 5, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919; Van Staaveren, *USAF Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles*, V:66-67; mins of 55th mtg (9 Aug 60) of OSD BMC, fldr 209.12 Guided Missiles—OSD BMC (#1), Box 17, ODDR&E files, Acc 72-A2228.
 66. Memo UnderSecAF for ChmOSDBMC, 17 Nov 60, fldr Requests for Action from AF BMC 1960, Box 3, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; memo ChmOSDBMC for ChmAFBMC, 13 Dec 60, fldr 209.12 Guided Missiles—OSD BMC (#2), Box 17, ODDR&E files, Acc 72-A2228.
 67. NSC 6021, 14 Dec 60, OSD Hist; memo DepSecDef for NSC, 14 Dec 60, fldr 6108 Certain Aspects of Missile and Space Programs, Box 2, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files,

- Acc 68-A4024; memo DepSecDef for SpecAsst (Gray), 19 Dec 60, memo of disc (Boggs), 473d NSC mtg, 5 Jan 61, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; NSC 6108, 18 Jan 61, OSD Hist.
68. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1962*, M23, 524.
 69. Memos DepDDR&E for Oldham, AsstDir(Strategic Wpns), ODDR&E, both 25 Jul 60, memo DDR&E for AsstSecAF(R&D), 29 Jul 60, memo ActgDDR&E (Rubel) for AsstSecAF (R&D), 17 Oct 60: fldr 209.7 Guided Missiles 1960 Small ICBMs, Box 9, ODDR&E files, Acc 64-A2359.
 70. Emme, *Aeronautics and Astronautics*, 91; ARDC Termination Rept, Strategic Missile System SM-62 (Snark), 15 Dec 60, fldr Snark (SM-62), Box 4, OASD(R&D) JCCGM files, Acc 63-A1920.
 71. Ch VII; ARDC Termination Rept, 15 Dec 60, cited in preceding note; Ravenstein, *Air Force Combat Wings*, 292; Kenneth P. Werrell, *The Evolution of the Cruise Missile*, 96-97.
 72. NSC Action 1898, 24 Apr 58, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1958, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024; statement by Quarles to AFPC, AFPC mtg notes, 29 Apr 58, fldr AFPC Apr-May 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
 73. Memo of conf with Pres (J. S. D. Eisenhower), 28 Nov 58, fldr Staff Notes Nov 1958, Box 37, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memo of disc (Gleason), 389th NSC mtg, 6 Dec 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
 74. Memo DDR&E for ChmAFBMC, 3 Nov 59, fldr Action Memos to AF BMC 1959, Box 1, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; NSC Action 2118, 18 Aug 59, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1959, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
 75. Ch VII; statement by CJCS to NSC, 25 Nov 59, CD CCS 7000 General (2 Nov 59), JCS files, RG 218, NARA; Progress Rept of ICBM and IRBM Systems, No 49 (Jul-Sep 60), OSD Hist; *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1959, to June 30, 1960*, 322-23. For IRBM discussions with NATO, see chs XVI and XVII.
 76. "The Guided Missile Program," presentation by SAGM before Pres, 3 Jul 57, fldr M-319.1 Missile Bible 21 May 57, Box 23, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372; ARDC Management Rept, Guided Aircraft Missile, GAM-77, 21 Dec 60, fldr Hound Dog, Box 2, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919; Tab 3 (Air Force Priority Projects), 77-78, with memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Mar 58, fldr FY 1959 Budget Amendment—JCS (12 March 58), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959: Department of the Air Force: Hearings*, 317-18; Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 2360-61; *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1959, to June 30, 1960*, 24. For the FY 1959 supplemental, see ch VI.
 77. Charles G. Worman, *History of the GAM-87 Skybolt Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile*, 1-46, 169-71; memo DepSecDef for SecAF, 1 Feb 60, fldr 209.3 Guided Missiles Projects 1960, Box 9, ODDR&E files 1960, Acc 64-A2359; memo JCS for SecDef, JCSM-509-59, 8 Dec 59, Rept on Background and Status of ODDR&E Activities Relating to ALBM (GAM-87A), prepared in ODDR&E, 2 Feb 60: fldr Skybolt, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919; York testimony in House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962: Hearings*, pt 4:39.
 78. Chs VI and VII; Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959: Hearings*, 23-24; memo DepSecDef for SecNav, 15 Jul 58, fldr Action Memos to Navy BMC 1958, Box 5, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923.
 79. Mins of 41st mtg (21 Jul 58) of OSD BMC, Box 9, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; memo DGM for ChmNavyBMC, 28 Jul 58, fldr Action Memos to Navy BMC 1958, Box 5, *ibid*.
 80. Memo DGM for SecDef, 3 Dec 58, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606 (loose document not in file folder).
 81. Memo of disc (Gleason), 389th NSC mtg, 6 Dec 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
 82. Progress Rept of ICBM and IRBM Systems, No 37 (31 Dec 58), OSD Hist; *New York Herald Tribune*, 1 Jan 59; Polmar, *The American Submarine*, 127-29.
 83. *New York Times*, 3 Nov 58; Rees, *The Seas and the Subs*, 196; Polmar, 129.

84. "The Guided Missile Program," 3 Jul 57; handwritten notes of budget discussions, McNeil and Schaub (BoB), 27 Oct 58, fldr FY 1960 Budget Submission—October 1958 (4), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memo SecNav for SecDef, 18 Dec 58; ltr Actg SecDef to Pres, 18 Dec 58; fldr Regulus II (SSM-N-9), Box 8, ODDR&E files, Acc 72-A2228; Berend Derk Bruins, "U.S. Naval Bombardment Missiles, 1940-1958: A Study of the Weapons Innovation Process," 328-31; *New York Times*, 19 Dec 58.
85. Memo UnderSecNav for DGM, 12 Feb 59, memo SecNav for DGM, 16 Mar 59; fldr Polaris 1959, Box 3, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919.
86. Hewlett and Duncan, *Nuclear Navy*, 317; memo of disc (Johnson), 417th NSC mtg, 18 Aug 59, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; *New York Herald Tribune*, 26 Jul 60; memo of disc (Boggs), 453rd NSC mtg, 25 Jul 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
87. *New York Times*, 10 Jun, 31 Dec 59; Progress Rpts of ICBM and IRBM Programs, No 43 (30 Jun 59), No 45 (Aug-Sep 59), No 46 (Oct-Dec 59), OSD Hist.
88. Memo ChmNavyBMC for ChmOSDBMC, 12 Sep 59, fldr Requests for Action from Navy BMC 1959, Box 7, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; memo of disc (Boggs), 430th NSC mtg, 7 Jan 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
89. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 1:9, 127, 137; Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, 8, 35, 145 (quote).
90. Memo SecNav for SecDef, 7 Mar 60; memo ActgSecDef for SecNav, 25 Mar 60; fldr Polaris 1960, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
91. Memo SecNav for SecDef, 8 Mar 60, fldr Polaris—Navy, Box 5, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923.
92. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 18 Mar 60, fldr Staff Notes Mar 60 (2), Box 48, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memrcd Goodpaster, 23 Mar 60, fldr DoD Vol IV (3) (Mar-Apr 60), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
93. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 6 Apr 60, fldr Staff Notes Apr 60 (2), Box 49, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
94. Ltr Gates to Gray, 4 Nov 60, fldr Polaris 1960, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; memo Gates for Goodpaster, 29 Jul 60, fldr 110.10 (FY62), *ibid*; ch XI.
95. *New York Times*, 21 Jul 60.
96. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1960-61, 614.
97. Memo DepSecDef for SpecAsstforNatSecAff, 2 Sep 60, fldr Polaris 1960, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; NSC Action 2315, 5 Oct 60, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1960, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
98. Memo DepSecDef for SpecAsst (Gray), 27 Dec 60, fldr Polaris 1960, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1962*, 485.
99. Memo ChmOSDBMC for ChmNavyBMC, 18 Jul 60, fldr Polaris 1960, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; memo SecNav for SecDef, 27 Jul 60, fldr Requests for Action from Navy BMC 1960, Box 7, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; memrcd Goodpaster, 29 Jul 60, fldr DoD Vol. IV (5) (Jan-Jul 60), DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; memo SecDef for SecNav, 22 Sep 60, fldr Polaris 1960, Box 3, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919; *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1960-61, 614. A novel feature of the A-3 Polaris missile was that it would be equipped with three warheads (the so-called "claw" warhead): memo George W. Rathjens (PSAT) for Kistiakowsky, 1 Nov 60, fldr Department of Defense (1960) (7), Box 6, OSAST files, WHO, DDEL. This was the origin of the multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV).
100. Memo SecNav for SecDef, 6 Apr 59, fldr Polaris 1960, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; memo SecNav for SecDef, nd (ca Apr 59), fldr Polaris—Navy, Box 5, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923.
101. Memo Comptroller, Navy, for ASD(C), 7 Apr 59, fldr Polaris 1959, Box 3, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919; memo SecDef for CJCS, 20 Apr 59, fldr Polaris 1960, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
102. Memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 22 Apr 59, fldr Meetings with Pres 1959 (3), Box 4, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL.

103. Memo JCS for SecDef, 8 May 59, JCSM 168-59, fldr Polaris 1960, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
104. Memo Gates for McElroy, 4 Jun 59, fldr Polaris 560 (Command Arrangements) 23 Jun 59, Box 1, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 63-A1668; memrcd Burke, 16 Jun 59, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; memo SecDef for CJCS, 17 Jun 59, fldr Polaris 1960, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
105. Memo SecNav for SecDef, 8 Mar 60, fldr Polaris—Navy, Box 5, ODDR&E (OSD BMC) files, Acc 63-A1923; memo SecNav for SecDef, 17 Oct 60, w/encl, memo CNO for SecDef, 9 Oct 60, fldr Polaris 1960, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
106. Memo ActgDDR&E for AsstSecNav (R&D), 24 Oct 60, fldr Polaris 1960, Box 3, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919; memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Dec 60, JCSM-564-60, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for CJCS, 5 Jan 61, memo SecDef for SecNav, 10 Jan 61: fldr Polaris 1960, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093. The NSC noted the president's approval of Gates's action on 12 January: memo of disc (Boggs), 474th NSC mtg, 12 Jan 61, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
107. *New York Times*, 16 Nov 60; Polmar, 131.
108. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1960-61*, 860.
109. Memo ODDR&E for SecDef, 21 Mar 59, enclosing chronology of developments in connection with Nike-Zeus, fldr 209.10 Guided Missiles—Air Defense 1959, Box 13, ODDR&E files 1959, Acc 63-A1885; memo SecA for SecDef, 1 Oct 58, forwarding DeptA budget estimates FY 1960, fldr FY 1960 Budget Submission October 1958 (4), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; "Considerations and Recommendations Concerning a Production Decision for Nike-Zeus," Rept to SecDef from OSD BM Defense Steering Grp (H. R. Skifter, Chm), 7 Nov 58, fldr AFPC Nov 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; documents making up Tab 5, Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, DeptA, in looseleaf binder FY 1960 Budget Review—Service Submissions, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memo of conf with Pres (J. S. D. Eisenhower), 28 Nov 58, fldr Budget, Military FY 1960 (4), DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, 68-69. The estimate of \$7 billion as the ultimate cost was given by McElroy in his 28 November conference with the president.
110. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 6:342-43, 422, and pt 5:193; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1960*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (1959), H Rept 408; ch X.
111. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 4 Mar 59, fldr Staff Notes Mar 1-15 1959 (2), Box 39, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
112. Memrcd Goodpaster, 11 Jun 59, w/encl, memo on "Warning and Defense in the Missile Age," fldr Staff Notes June 1-15 1959 (2), Box 42, *ibid*.
113. Memo JCS for SecDef, 2 Jun 59, JCSM-211-59, fldr Continental Air Defense Master Plan (19 May 59), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574. The air defense plan and its reception are described in ch XIII.
114. Memo DDR&E for SecDef, 21 Mar 59, fldr Guided Missiles 1959, Box 6, OASD(C) files, Acc 64-A3522.
115. Memo of conf in president's ofc (Goodpaster), 9 Jun 59, with handwritten notation by Randall, 17 Jun 59, fldr Continental Air Defense Master Plan (19 May 59), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, 1424, 1517; ch X.
116. Kistiakowsky, 58; Philip J. Klass, "Defense Group Evaluates Zeus Potential," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, LXXI (2 Nov 59), 30; *New York Times*, 6 Jan 60; Brucker testimony in House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 2:433-34; Gen White testimony in House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Revisions in 1960 and 1961 Air Force Programs: Hearings*, 28.
117. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 2:433-35, pt 6:13-14 (quote, 14).
118. Memo H. J. Watters for Kistiakowsky, 7 Jan 60, fldr AICBM (June 1959-May 1960) (2), Box 4, OASD files, WHO, DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 218, 277.
119. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 2:437; Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 1:104-05 (Brucker), 120 (Lemnitzer).

120. Memo DGM for ChmArmyBMC, 2 Mar 59, fldr 209.12 Guided Missiles—OSD BMC Minutes & Agenda, 1955 thru 1959, Box 18, ODDR&E files, Acc 72-A2228; memo SecA for SecDef, 26 Apr 60, fldr Nike 471.94 26 Apr 60, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; memo DepSecDef for SecA and SecNav, 12 Feb 60, fldr Nike-Zeus (Nike II), Box 3, ODDR&E (SAGM) files, Acc 63-A1919; Progress Rept of Anti-Ballistic Missile Weapon System Program, No 9 (16 Jan-15 Apr 60), OSD Hist.
121. Memo SecA for SecDef, 26 Apr 60, memo DDR&E for SecDef, 9 May 60: fldr Nike 471.94 26 Apr 60, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; Kistiakowsky, 319-20.
122. Kistiakowsky, 323-24; ltrs Gates to Kistiakowsky, 10 May 60, and Kistiakowsky to Gates, 11 May 60, ltr Kistiakowsky to Gates, 26 May 60, w/encl, rept of ad hoc panel, same date, memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 16 Jun 60: fldr Nike 471.94 26 Apr 60, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
123. Kistiakowsky, 357; msg Kistiakowsky (White House party Seoul) for OSD, 200236Z Jun 60, fldr Nike 471.94 26 Apr 60, Box 3, OSD CCS files, 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
124. Memo SecDef for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 29 Jun 60, memo of agrmt, DeptA and DeptAF, for provision of Nike-Zeus targets, signed by Brucker and Sharp 22 Sep 60, approved by Gates 28 Oct 60: fldr Nike 471.94 26 Apr 60, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
125. Memrcd (probably by Kistiakowsky), 18 Oct 60, ltr George W. Rathjens to Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky (both members of PSAC), 23 Nov 60, fldr AICBM Jun-Dec 60 (3), Box 4, OSAST files, WHO, DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 413; msg CINCNORAD for JCS, 151512Z Dec 60, fldr NSTL/SIOP Msgs other than Exclusives and Personals (1 Aug-31 Dec 60), Burke papers, NHC; *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1962*, M25; memo SecDef for CJCS, 4 Jan 61, fldr 6108 Certain Aspects of Missile and Space Programs, Box 2, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
126. Progress Rpts of Anti-Ballistic Missile Weapon System Program, No 1 (15 May 58), No 2 (15 Jul 58), No 5 (15 Apr 59), No 7 (15 Oct 59), Box 2, ODDR&E files, Acc 66-A3589; *New York Times*, 18 Feb 1960.
127. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Revisions in 1960 and 1961 Air Force Programs: Hearings*, 20-21; Progress Rpts of Anti-Ballistic Missile Weapon System Program, No 3 (15 Oct 58) and No 12 (15 Oct 60-15 Jan 61), Box 2, ODDR&E files, Acc 66-A3589.
128. Memo of disc (Boggs), 374th NSC mtg, 31 Jul 58, and atchd briefing note, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; NSC 5814, 20 Jun 58 (App B, revised 2 Jul 58), OSD Hist.
129. For these projects and their names, see House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 6:20-24; US Cong, House, *U.S. Aeronautics and Space Activities, January 1 to December 31, 1958*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (1958), H Doc 71, 5; US Cong, House, *U.S. Aeronautics and Space Activities, January 1 to December 31, 1959*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (1958), H Doc 349, 9; encls with DoD Dir 5105.15, 17 Mar 59.
130. Memo Robert O. Piland (PSAC) for Killian, 31 Jul 58, memo Killian for Goodpaster, 8 Aug 58: fldr Space (Jun-Dec 58) (5), Box 15, OSAST files, WHO, DDEL; ltr DepSecDef to Pres, 7 Aug 58, OSD Hist.
131. Emme, *Aeronautics and Astronautics*, 143; *New York Times*, 19 Dec 58; US Cong, House, *U.S. Aeronautics and Space Activities, January 1-December 31, 1958*, 7; *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1958, 865. Available sources do not indicate when or by whom the broadcast message was suggested.
132. Encl 3 (8 Jun 59) with DoD Dir 5105.15, 17 Mar 59.
133. Ch VII; US Cong, House, *U.S. Aeronautics and Space Activities, January 1-December 31, 1958*, 5; Emme, *Aeronautics and Astronautics*, 100-105, 142-43.
134. US Cong, House, *U.S. Aeronautics and Space Activities, January 1-December 31, 1959*, 9; Emme, *Aeronautics and Astronautics*, 106-17, 143-46.
135. NSC Action 1846, 22 Jan 58, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1958, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
136. Memo of disc (Boggs), 406th NSC mtg, 13 May 59, and briefing note for same, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
137. Memo ActgSecAF (Malcolm A. MacIntyre) for SecDef, 5 May 59, memo UnderSecAF (MacIntyre) for SecDef, 8 May 59, fldr 471.96 (Coordination of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations) (18 May 60), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.

138. Memo DirARPA for SecDef, 29 May 59, memos (3) SecDef for CJCS, 29 May 59: *ibid.*
139. Memo JCS for SecDef, 25 Jun 59, JCSM-244-59, *ibid.* On the interservice dispute, see Medaris, *Countdown for Decision*, 253-55, and Craig Lewis, "Navy Bids to Capture Major Space Role," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, LXXI (27 Jul 59), 26-27.
140. Memo JCS for SecDef, 24 Jul 59, JCSM-283-59, fldr 471.96 (Coordination of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations) (18 May 60), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093. According to one report, the proposal for a joint astronautical command originated with the Navy: Lewis, 26-27.
141. Memrcd Burke, 3 Sep 59, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; memo Randall for Goodpaster, 8 Sep 59, memo Kistiakowsky for Goodpaster, 15 Sep 59, memo Goodpaster for Randall, 17 Sep 59: fldr DoD Vol. III (8) (Sep 59), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 16 Sep 59, fldr Staff Notes Sep 59 (2), DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
142. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 18 Sep 59, fldr 471.96 (Coordination of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations) (18 May 60), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; Herbert F. York, *Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race*, 138-39.
143. Memo Brig Gen Brown for SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, 23 Sep 59, fldr 471.96 (Coordination of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations) (18 May 60), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; DoD NR 1087-59, 23 Sep 59, OSD Hist; *New York Times*, 24 Sep 1959; Medaris, 254.
144. Memos (3) SecAF for SecDef, 6 Nov 59, memos DepSecDef for SecAF and for ARPA, 17 Nov 59: fldr 471.96 (Coordination of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations) (18 May 60), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093. On Corona and its relation to other satellite programs, see Kenneth E. Greer, "CORONA," in Kevin C. Ruffner, ed., *CORONA: America's First Satellite Program*, 3-24, and source documents, *ibid.*, 43-96; also Richard M. Bissell, Jr., with Jonathan E. Lewis and Francis T. Pudlo, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs*, 135-38.
145. Military Space Projects, Rpts of Progress, Jan-Feb 60 through Dec 60-Feb 61, OSD Hist; memo ActgSecDef for SecA, 25 Mar 60, memo SecA for SecDef, 24 Aug 60, memo DirR&D, DeptA, for DDR&E, 14 Sep 60, memos ActgSecDef for SecA and Actg SecDef for SecA and SecAF, 15 Sep 60: fldr 471.96 (Coordination of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations) (18 May 60), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; memo DepSecDef for SecNav, 9 May 60, fldr 209.9 Guided Missiles—Satellites 1960 (1), Box 16, ODDR&E files, Acc 72-A2228.
146. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 30 Jun 59, fldr Staff Notes Jun 16-30 59 (2), Box 42, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memrcd McElroy, 15 Jul 59, memo Cisler for SecDef, 30 Nov 59, fldr 680 (Cisler Study—Mgmt of Ranges and Tracking Stations) 26 Jan 60, Box 19, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
147. Kistiakowsky, 204-05; memo A. G. Waggoner, ODDR&E, for SecDef, 1 Feb 60, ofc memo Black for Douglas, 18 Feb 60, w/atchd memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 16 Feb 60: fldr 680 (Cisler Study—Mgmt of Ranges and Tracking Stations) 26 Jan 60, Box 19, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
148. AFPC mtg notes, 31 Mar, 5 Apr 60, fldr AFPC Mar-Apr 60, Box 6, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; handwritten notes by Col Black on AFPC mtg, 5 Apr 60, fldr Col Black's Notes 1960, Box 4, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078; DoD Dir 5129.34, 7 Apr 60.
149. Memos (2) UnderSecAF for SecDef, 25 Feb 60, memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 14 Mar 60, ltr CSAF to SecDef, 10 Jun 60, ofc memo Brown for Gates, 23 May 60, atchd to memo SecA for SecDef, 18 May 60, memo SecDef for SecA et al, 16 Jun 60: fldr 471.96 (Coordination of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations) (18 May 60), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; ltr CSAF for CINCSAC, 16 Jun 60, fldr 4-5 Missiles/Space/Nuclear, Box 36, Thomas D. White papers, LC.
150. US Cong, House, *Third Annual Report in the Fields of Aeronautics and Space* [1960], 87 Cong, 1 sess (1961), H Doc 56, x-xiii; Emme, *Aeronautics and Astronautics*, 118-35, 146-51; Gross, 21-24.
151. Emme, *Aeronautics and Astronautics*, 125-26; *Time*, LXXVI (22 Aug 60), 44-45; *Newsweek*, LVI (22 Aug 60), 78-80; *U.S. News and World Report*, XLIX (29 Aug 60), 30-33; *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 Aug 60.
152. Emme, *Aeronautics and Astronautics*, 147-51.

153. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Revisions in 1960 and 1961 Air Force Programs: Hearings*, 17, 21.
154. House Cte on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1961*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (29 Apr 60), H Rept 1561, and House Cte of Conf, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1961*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (29 Jun 60), H Rept 2040; Senate Cte on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1961*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (10 Jun 60), S Rept 1550; PL 86-601 (7 Jul 60). For a summary of press stories on SAMOS in 1960, see Gerald M. Steinberg, *Satellite Reconnaissance: The Role of Informal Bargaining*, 40-41.
155. Memo of disc (Boggs) 445th NSC mtg, 24 May 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 335.
156. Memo Kistiakowsky for Pres, 6 Jun 60, OSD Hist. A handwritten note by Goodpaster reads: "Dr. Kistiakowsky says this is *not* a recommendation."
157. Kistiakowsky, 336 (entry for 26 May 60); ltr Pres to SecDef, 10 Jun 60, fldr SAMOS 1960, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
158. Kistiakowsky, 387-88, provides an account of this special NSC meeting, for which the usual "memorandum of discussion" was not prepared, obviously owing to the sensitivity of the subject. The conclusions approved by the president are stated in memo SecDef for SecAF, 10 Oct 60, fldr 209.9 Guided Missiles—Satellites 1960 (2), Box 16, ODDR&E files, Acc 72-A2228. An attached "covering brief" indicates that a formal record of action was prepared, but it has not been found.
159. Memo ActgSecDef for SecAF, 15 Sep 60, fldr 471.96 (Coordination of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations) (18 May 60), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; *Washington Post*, 9 Dec 73.
160. Memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 6 Oct 60, fldr SAMOS 1960, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; *New York Times*, 11, 12 Oct 60.
161. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 6:22; Military Space Projects, Rpts of Progress for Jan-Feb and Mar-May 1960, OSD Hist.
162. Memo SecDef for SecAF, 10 Oct 60, fldr 471.96 (Coordination of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations) (18 May 60), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; Military Space Projects, Rpt of Progress for Sep-Nov 60, OSD Hist; Richard I. Wolf, *The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions*, 355, 357-59.
163. Documents in fldr MRS-V, Box 1, ARPA Nuclear Test Detection Ofc files, Acc 61-A1687; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 6:23; Paul B. Stares, *The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-1984*, 112-15.
164. Kistiakowsky, 239; Stares, 112-15.
165. Ltr Douglas to Gray, 23 May 60, fldr Reconnaissance Satellites (1960), Box 10, Subj subser, NSC ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 229, 246, 334; memo CJCS for DepSecDef, 6 May 60, CM-533-60, fldr U.S. Policy on Continental Defense (File #2), Box 24, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962: Hearings*, pt 4:422-23; Stares, 115.
166. NSC Actions 1656, 24 Jan 57, and 1859, 6 Feb 58, bound fldrs Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1957 and 1958, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
167. Killian, *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower*, 122-24; memo of disc (Gleason), 357th NSC mtg, 6 Mar 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 233, 242-43. The "Introduction to Outer Space" is printed in Killian, 288-99.
168. "Some Elements Requiring Consideration in Formulating a National Policy on Outer Space," nd, fldr 5814 U.S. Policy on Outer Space (1), Box 24, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 64A-3500. The origin of this paper is unidentified, but memorandums of comment in the same file show that it was the one circulated within OSD. Also in the same file is memo Sprague for Cutler, 26 Mar 58, enclosing a modified version of the original paper.
169. NSC 5814, 20 Jun 58, in John M. Logsdon, ed., *Organizing for Exploration*, vol I in *Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program*, 345-59; memo of disc (Gleason), 376th NSC mtg, 14 Aug 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, II:841-44; NSC 5814/1, 18 Aug 58, *ibid*, 845-63. The evolution of NSC 5814/1 can be followed in documents in fldrs 5814 U.S. Policy on Outer Space (2) and (3), Box 24,

- OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500. The JCS memorandum of comment on NSC 5814 is printed in Logsdon, 359-60.
170. NSC 5814, 20 Jun 58, OSD Hist; briefing by Wade, OASD(ISA), at 24 Jun 58 AFPC mtg, fldr AFPC Jun-Jul 58, Box 4, OASD (C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; Proposed Revisions to NSC 5814, encl with memo Boggs for NSC PB, 30 Jul 58, memo JCS for SecDef, 11 Aug 58: fldr 5814 U.S. Policy on Outer Space (3), Box 24, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 64-A3500; memos of disc (Gleason), 371st NSC mtg, 3 Jul 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL, and 376th NSC mtg, 14 Aug 58, cited in preceding note.
 171. Memo Killian for Pres, 7 Aug 58, fldr Memos and Letters to the President (December 1957-June 1960), Box 12, OASST files, WHO, DDEL; Robert L. Rosholt, *An Administrative History of NASA*, 41-42; Killian, *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower*, 138-40; T. Keith Glennan, *The Birth of NASA: The Diary of T. Keith Glennan*, 2-4.
 172. Text of proclamation in *First Semiannual Report to the Congress of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration*, 86 Cong, 1 Sess (1959), H Doc 187, 66-67; Rosholt, 15.
 173. Mins of NASC mtg, 24 Sep 58, approved by Pres 30 Sep 58, fldr Space Council (1) (Sep-Oct 58), Box 23, Alpha subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; Glennan, 7-8.
 174. Memo of conv with Quarles, by T. K. G[leNNan], 29 Sep 58, fldr ABMA, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769; AFPC mtg notes, 22 Oct 58, fldr AFPC Oct 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; AFPC Advice of Action, 22 Oct 58, OSD Hist; Terms of Reference, Civilian-Military Liaison Cmte to NASA and DoD, fldr Staff Notes Oct 58, Box 36, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
 175. Informal memo (Personal for McElroy from Quarles), 27 Oct 58, fldr Reading File #3—1 Jul-31 Dec 58, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 30 Oct 58, fldr Staff Notes Oct 58, Box 36, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL. A White House PR, 30 Oct 58, in fldr 111 NASA, Box 34, OASD(R&E) files, Acc 61-A1491, announces Holaday's appointment as chairman of the CMCL and lists the other members. On the abolition of the position of DGM, see House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 6:54 (quoting from a report by the committee staff).
 176. AFPC mtg notes, 29 Jul 58, fldr AFPC Jun-Jul 58, and 26 Aug 58, fldr AFPC Aug-Sep 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; Rosholt, 44-45.
 177. Rosholt, 46. For the origin and background of JPL, see Clayton R. Koppes, *JPL and the American Space Program: A History of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory*, 1-93.
 178. Glennan, 9-10; memo of conv with Quarles, by T. K. G[leNNan], 29 Sep 58, fldr ABMA, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 20 Sep 58, fldr Staff Notes Sep 58, Box 36, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
 179. Glennan, 10-11; ltr AdminNASA to SecDef, 15 Oct 58, memo SecA for SecDef, 28 Oct 58, fldr ABMA, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769; Quarles Daily Diary, 21 Oct 58, Quarles papers, DDEL.
 180. The Army position is indicated in a typewritten "Brief" and a list of "Conclusions and Recommendations," both unsigned, fldr Army Support of NASA/October 1958/(1), Box 3, Alpha subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; also in an Army "position paper" prepared for Brucker's signature, fldr ABMA, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769. These documents are undated but were obviously prepared about this time. Further evidence of the Army attitude is given by Medaris, 243-47.
 181. Medaris, 245-46; *Baltimore Sun*, 15, 16, 17, 18 Oct 58; *New York Times*, 19 Oct 58; *Washington Star*, 19 Oct 58.
 182. Memo DGM and DirARPA for SecDef, 28 Oct 58, fldr ABMA, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769.
 183. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 30 Oct 58, fldr Staff Notes Oct 58, Box 36, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
 184. Memo SecA for SecDef, 28 Oct 58, fldr ABMA, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769. On the attitude of personnel at JPL, see Medaris, 247, and Koppes, 96, 98.
 185. Memo for disc with Sec Brucker, by D. A. Q[uarles], 31 Oct 58, fldr ABMA, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769.
 186. Memo D. A. Q[uarles] for Glennan, 3 Oct 58, ltr W. L. Hjernevik (Asst to AdminNASA) to Gen Lemnitzer, 24 Nov 58, memo SecA for DepSecDef, 24 Nov 58, ltr GC to William F. Finan, AsstDirBoB, 26 Nov 58, ltrs Quarles to Glennan, 28 Nov 58, and Glennan to

- McElroy, 1 Dec 58: *ibid*; memo Quarles for Brucker and Dechert, 22 Nov 58, fldr Reading File #3—1 July-31 Dec 58, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769; Glennan, 11.
187. Agreements regarding JPL and AOMC between NASA and DeptA, 3 Dec 58, signed by Glennan and Brucker, fldr ABMA, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 3 Dec 58, fldr Staff Notes Dec 58 (2), Box 38, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Glennan, 12; White House PR, 3 Dec 58, OSD Hist.
188. Senate Cte on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Investigation of Governmental Organization for Space Activities*, 83, 92-93, 119-20, 131-32, 591; Rosholt, 72-73, 104-05.
189. Senate Cte on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Investigation of Governmental Organization for Space Activities: Hearings*, 78-80, 254-55, 277-80, 364-66, 424, 475, 498-519, 582 (quote, 504); Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Governmental Organization for Space Activities*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (25 Aug 59), S Rept 806, 48-52, 54.
190. Holaday testimony in Senate Cte on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Investigation of Governmental Organization for Space Activities: Hearings*, 504-05. The revised terms of reference are printed as an appendix to Senate Cte on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Governmental Organization for Space Sciences*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (25 Aug 59), S Rept 806, 56-58; also, along with the original terms, in House Cte on Science and Astronautics, *To Amend the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958: Hearings*, 115-16, 119-20.
191. For the origin of the Saturn project, see David S. Akens, *Historical Origins of the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center*, 58-61; Roger E. Bilstein, *Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles*, 25-38; and Johnson testimony in House Cte on Science and Astronautics, *To Amend the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958: Hearings*, 403-09.
192. House Cte on Science and Astronautics, *To Amend the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958: Hearings*, 409-10; Medaris, 257-62.
193. Bilstein, 38-40; House Cte on Science and Astronautics, *To Amend the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958: Hearings*, 410; Medaris, 263-64; Kistiakowsky, 75-76.
194. Glennan statements in memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 21 Sep 59, fldr Natl Aeronautics and Space Admin (Sep 1958-Jan 61) (6), Box 18, Alpha subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 99-100.
195. Glennan statements in memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 21 Sep 59, cited in preceding note; Medaris, 266-68.
196. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 21 Sep 59, cited in n 194.
197. Memo ActgSecDef for CJCS, 8 Oct 59, memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Oct 59: fldr 471.96 (Coordination of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations) (18 May 60), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; AFPC mtg notes, 13 Oct 59, fldr AFPC Sep-Dec 59, Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
198. AFPC mtg notes, 13 Oct 59, fldr AFPC Sep-Dec 59, Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; handwritten notes (presumably by Lemnitzer) of same mtg, fldr L-184-71 Meeting Notes Armed Force Policy Cmte [sic], Box 25, Lemnitzer papers, NDU; York, *Race to Oblivion*, 139. York indicates that he gave McElroy a definite recommendation in favor of the transfer, but the contemporary accounts of this 13 October meeting do not indicate that he felt as strongly as he later represented.
199. Memo T. K. G[Glennan] for Gates, 14 Oct 59, w/encl, draft memo for Pres, 13 Oct 59, fldr 471.96 (Coordination of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations) (18 May 60), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; memo AdminNASA and ActgSecDef for Pres, 21 Oct 59, fldr McElroy, Neil 1959 (1), Box 25, Admin ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 21 Oct 59, fldr Staff Notes Oct 59 (1), Box 45, DDED ser, *ibid*; Kistiakowsky, 125; York, *Race to Oblivion*, 139. York's account describes him as playing a considerably larger role than do other sources.
200. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1959, 731-32.
201. Memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Oct 59, JCSM-440-59, memo AdminNASA and ActgSecDef for Pres, 21 Oct 59, bearing signatures dated 30 Oct 59, approved by Pres 2 Nov 59: fldr 471.96 (Coordination of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations) (18 May 60), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093. The second of these documents is

printed in House Cte on Science and Astronautics, *Transfer of the Development Operations Division of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Hearing*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (1960), 28-30 (hereafter cited as House Cte on Science and Astronautics, *Transfer of Development Operations Division*).

202. A preliminary agreement dated 16 November 1959, setting forth "objectives and guidelines" for the transfer, is printed in House Cte on Science and Astronautics, *Transfer of Development Operations Division*, 30-32. The actual transfer plan (11 December 1959), reviewed and approved by Glennan, Brucker, and ActgSecDef Douglas on 16-17 Dec 1959, is in fldr 471.96 (Coordination of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations) (18 May 60), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; also in Akens, Appendix C. For negotiation of the plan, see Akens, 73-75. For the announcement of the transfer, see *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1960-61*, 32-34.
203. House Cte on Science and Astronautics, *Transfer of Development Operations Division*, 3-5, 10, 20; Senate Cte on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Transfer of Von Braun Team to NASA: Hearing*, 3, 27-28, 39; *Congressional Record*, 86 Cong, 2 sess, vol 106, pt 2:2221-27; Rosholt, 119-23; Akens, 76-81; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1960-61*, 689-92.
204. Undated document, "Agenda Item 2" (apparently for NSC meeting 12 Jan 1960), ns, fldr 5814 U.S. Policy on Outer Space (3), Box 24, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
205. NSC 5918, 17 Dec 59, OSD Hist.
206. Mins of joint mtg (431st NSC, 8th NASC), 12 Jan 60, fldr 431st Meeting, NSC records, RG 273, NARA; Kistiakowsky, 225; memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 29 Jan 60, w/encl, copy of "U.S. Policy on Outer Space," fldr 209.9 Guided Missiles—Satellites (1), Box 16, ODDR&E files, Acc 72-A2228. Had it been circulated as an NSC document, the amended version of NSC 5918 would presumably have been designated NSC 5918/1.
207. York testimony in House Cte on Science and Astronautics, *Review of the Space Program: Hearings*, 101, 163-64; Kistiakowsky, 152, 167.
208. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1960-61*, 34-37; text of proposed amendment printed in House Cte on Science and Astronautics, *To Amend the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958: Hearings*, 6-22, 132, 152, 163-64, 195, 196, 201, 219-21; *Congressional Record*, 86 Cong, 2 sess, vol 106, pt 9:12242-56; *ibid*, vol 106, pt 14:18506-09.
209. House Cte on Science and Astronautics, *To Amend the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958: Hearings*, 90, 92, 106, 108, 110, 133-39, 142-51, 155, 199-208, 214-15, 525.
210. Agreement between DoD and NASA concerning Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board, 13 Sep 60, signed by Glennan and Douglas, printed in Senate Cte on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Amending Various Sections of the NASA Act of 1958: Hearings*, 87 Cong, 1 sess (1961), 47-51 (with names of panel members, 51-53). Homer E. Newell, *Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science*, 116-17, erroneously gives the date of establishment of the Board as 1959, although he himself was involved in it.
211. *New York Times*, 15 Apr 60.
212. For the background of the man in space program, see Swenson et al, *This New Ocean*, 3-106; William M. Bland, Jr., "Project Mercury," 212-17; and Kenneth F. Gantz, *Man in Space: The United States Air Force Program for Developing the Spacecraft Crew*, passim. For service proposals at the beginning of 1958 involving manned space flight, see ch VII.
213. Swenson et al, 99-100; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959: Advanced Research Projects Agency, etc.: Hearings*, 307-12; *Baltimore Sun*, 21 Jun 58; *Washington Star*, 22 Jun 58; Quarles Daily Diary, 13 Aug 58, Quarles papers, DDEL.
214. Swenson et al, 101-02; Divine, *Sputnik Challenge*, 150-51, 153-54.
215. Swenson et al, 109-12; Bland, 216-17.
216. Swenson et al, 112-29; Bland, 217-27.
217. Swenson et al, 131-32.
218. *Ibid*, 159-65; *New York Times*, 10 Apr 59.

219. AFPC mtg notes, 14 and 28 Jul 59, memo SecDef for AFPC, 27 Jul 59, fldr AFPC May-Aug 59, Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; AFPC Advices of Action, 14, 29 Jul 59, OSD Hist.
220. Memo DepSecDef for Maj Gen Yates, 10 Aug 59, w/encl, memo DepSecDef for Secs of Mil Depts et al, 10 Aug 59, fldr Secretary of Defense, Box 29, White papers, LC; Swenson et al, 276; *New York Times*, 1 Jun 60.
221. Swenson et al, 272-76, 279; *New York Times*, 30 Jul 60.
222. Swenson et al, 293-301; *New York Times*, 22 Nov, 20 Dec 58.
223. Polmar, 131.
224. Emme, *Aeronautics and Astronautics*, 134.
225. House Cte on Science and Astronautics, *To Amend the National Aeronautics and Space Act: Hearings*, 415.

XIII. CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE

1. For the development of the U.S. continental defense program to 1956, see Kenneth Schaffel, *The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense, 1945-1960*, 1-196; Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 111-48; and Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 269-82. In Samuel Huntington's phrase, continental defense emerged during the early 1950s as a separate "strategic program," i.e., a national mission cutting across service lines: Huntington, *Common Defense*, 326-41. Because it was not thus treated for budgetary purposes, it is difficult to obtain accurate cost figures for continental defense.
2. Directorate of Command History, Command Public Affairs Ofc, Hq NORAD, *Nineteen Years of Air Defense*, 29-35 (hereafter cited as NORAD, *Nineteen Years of Air Defense*); Ronald H. Cole et al, *History of the Unified Command Plan*, 23-26. See also ch II.
3. This description of the continental defense system as of mid-1956 is taken principally from NSC 5611, Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1956, 28 Aug 56, pt 1: 22-29, OSD Hist, and *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1956*, 5. On SAGE, see Thomas A. Sturm, *Command and Control for North American Air Defense, 1959-1963*, 10-12.
4. On the dispersal program, see testimony of Air Force Secretary Douglas in Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, *Military Construction Authorization: Hearings*, 85 Cong (1957), 1 sess, 97, and an Air Force briefing given to NSC on 9 August 1956, as recorded in memo of disc (Boggs), 292nd NSC mtg, 9 Aug 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:339-41.
5. Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 112, 134-35, 141-44.
6. Executive Ofc of the President, Ofc of Defense Mobilization, Technological Capabilities Panel, *Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack*, 37-44.
7. NIE 11-56, 6 Mar 56, NIE 11-4-56, 2 Aug 56, NSC 5611, 28 Aug 56, pt 1:20; OSD Hist. NIE 11-56 estimates are published in Steury, ed., *Intentions and Capabilities*, 19.
8. NSC 5602/1, 15 Mar 56, para 14 and Annex, para 1, OSD Hist.
9. NSC 5606, 5 Jun 56, *ibid*.
10. Memo of disc (Gleason), 288th NSC mtg, 15 Jun 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:321-33.
11. Memo of disc (Boggs), 292nd NSC Mtg, 9 Aug 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:338-45.
12. Memo of disc (Boggs), 293rd and 294th NSC mtgs, 16-17 Aug 56, *ibid*, 345-57 (quote, 356).
13. Memo BoB (ns) for Pres, 3 Dec 56, OSD Hist.
14. Memos of disc, 306th NSC mtg (J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Rep on Internal Security), 20 Dec 56, and 307th mtg (Gleason), 21 Dec 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:379-94 (quotes, 390). For the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, see ch XV.
15. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, pt 1:157.
16. Ch IV; memo SecDef for Pres, 10 Jul 57, fldr FY 1958 File #1A, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
17. NSC 5720, Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1957, pt 1:21-22, OSD Hist; *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1957*, 297; *New York Times*, 6 Jul, 17 Aug 57.

18. "The Guided Missile Program," Jul 57, OSD Hist; memo Goodpaster for DepSecDef, 24 Jan 57, w/encls, including draft public announcement and background fact sheet, and other memos indicating discussion at White House level, *ibid*; DoD NR 147-57, 20 Feb 57, *ibid*; *New York Times*, 21 Feb 57.
19. NORAD, *Nineteen Years of Air Defense*, 34-36; AFPC mtg notes, 3 May 56, fldr AFPC 2nd Quarter 1956, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; AFPC Advice of Action, 3 May 56, OSD Hist.
20. Memo JCS for SecDef, 5 Jun 56, fldr General—Far East Trip, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379.
21. Memo SecA for SecDef, 19 Jun 56, memo ASD(R&D) for SecDef, 19 Jun 56: fldr 373.24 CONAD 28 Jan 57, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372. For statements of the respective views of the Army and the Air Force on air defense, see Walter M. Vann, "Antiaircraft Defense," *Military Review*, XXXVII (Jan 56), 61-66, and Claude Witze, "The Mix-Up in Air Defense," *Air Force*, XLI (Sep 58), 37-41.
22. Memo Holaday for SecDef, 19 Jun 56, fldr 373.24 CONAD 28 Jan 57, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372; AFPC mtg notes, 19 Jun 56, fldr AFPC 2nd Quarter 1956, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; AFPC Advice of Action, 19 Jun 56, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for JCS, 19 Jun 56, fldr General—Far East Trip, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379; memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 31 Aug 56, fldr AFPC 2nd Quarter 1956, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
23. Memo SecDef for SecAF, 21 Jun 56, memo DepSecDef for ASD(R&D), 24 Aug 56, memo SecAF for SecDef, 1 Oct 56, w/encl, ltr CINCONAD to CSAF, 19 Sep 56, memo Glenn V. Gibson for Robertson, 27 Oct 56, memo DepSecDef for SecA and SecAF, 30 Oct 56, memo DepSecDef for SecA and SecAF, 23 Jan 57: fldr 373.24 CONAD 28 Jan 57, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372.
24. Memo SecDef for AFPC members, 26 Nov 56, OSD Hist.
25. NSC 5707/4, 26 Mar 57, OSD Hist; memo of disc (Gleason), 319th NSC mtg, 11 Apr 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:478; NSC 5707/8, 3 Jun 57, para 14, *ibid*, 511-12.
26. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1958*, M31, 124-25; memo of disc (Coyne), 306th NSC mtg, 20 Dec 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:382-84.
27. Memo of disc (Gleason), 318th NSC mtg, 4 Apr 57, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
28. Security Resources Panel, *Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age*, 6-8, 10, 18-22, 24.
29. Memo CJCS for CSA et al, 15 Nov 57, CM-42, w/encl, presentation by CJCS before NSC, 14 Nov 57, fldr Budget-FY 1959 (ID), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
30. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 11 Nov 57, OSD Hist.
31. Memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Nov 57, and encl C, 20-22, fldr 110.01 Budget Guidelines for 1959 (30 July 57), Box 8, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372.
32. Memo DepSecDef for Cutler, 21 Dec 57, fldr 334 Security Resources Panel (9 July 57), BP 334 Security Resources Panel 9 Jul 57, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.
33. Memo of disc (Gleason), 350th NSC mtg, 6 Jan 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
34. Memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Dec 57, fldr 5724 Rept to Pres by Security Resources Panel, File #1, BP 334 Security Resources Panel 9 Jul 57, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.
35. Encl with memo ExecSecNSC for NSC PB, 19 Dec 57; briefing paper for PB mtg, 20 Dec 57, memo, ns, evidently prepared in OASD(MP&R), for ASD(R&E), nd (ca 27 Dec 57), w/encl, coordinated rept of agency views on shelters: *ibid*.
36. Memo of disc (Boggs), 351st NSC mtg, 16 Jan 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
37. NSC 5802, 3 Feb 58, OSD Hist.
38. Comments prepared by OASD(ISA) for use by SecDef in NSC mtg, attached to copy of NSC 5802, fldr 5802 U.S. Policy on Continental Defense (File #1), Box 21, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
39. Memo AsstSecA(FM) (George H. Roderick) for SecDef, 11 Feb 58, memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Feb 58: *ibid*; memo SecAF for SecDef, 13 Feb 58, fldr 381 (US Policy on Continental Defense) 10 Aug 60, Box 21, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
40. Memo of disc (Gleason), 355th NSC mtg, 13 Feb 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
41. NSC 5802/1, 19 Feb 58, OSD Hist.
42. Memos JCS for SecDef, 5, 21 Feb 58, fldr 334 Security Resources Panel (9 July 57), BP 334 Security Resources Panel 9 Jul 57, OSD Sensitive Files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.

43. Memo (ns, probably from DGM) for SecDef, 27 Feb 58, fldr 5724 Rept to Pres by Security Resources Panel, File #1, BP 334 Security Resources Panel 9 Jul 57, *ibid*; presentation (by DGM) to NSC, 27 Feb 58, fldr Missiles and Satellites Vol. II (1) (Jan-Feb 58), Box 6, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; memo of disc (Gleason), 356th NSC mtg, 27 Feb 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
44. Memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Mar 58, fldr 334 Security Resources Panel (9 July 57), BP 334 Security Resources Panel 9 Jul 57, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.
45. Memo JCS for SecDef, 15 Apr 58, fldr 381 1958, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606. The landbased Talos was canceled shortly thereafter.
46. Memo of disc (Gleason), 363rd NSC mtg, 24 Apr 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL. For an account of this meeting, see Philip G. Henderson, "Advice and Decision: The Eisenhower National Security Council Reappraised," in R. Gordon Hoxie et al, eds., *The Presidency and National Security Policy*, 166-69.
47. NSC Action 1842, 16 Jan 58, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1958, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024; NSC 5819, Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1958, A16-A20, OSD Hist.
48. Memo of disc (Gleason), 360th NSC mtg, 27 Mar 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
49. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 346-48; Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, *United States Statutes at Large, 1958*, vol 72, pt 1:1799-1801; *New York Times*, 12 Jul 58. The administration proposed to name the merged agency "Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization"; the change of name was mandated by Congress (PL 85-763, 26 Aug 58).
50. Memo JCS for SecDef, 6 Mar 58, fldr Missiles, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606.
51. Briefing by Black Team, JSPG, for AFPC, 20 May 58, fldr AFPC Apr-May 58, Box 4, OASD (C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
52. AFPC mtg notes, 20 May 58, *ibid*; AFPC Advice of Action, 20 May 58, OSD Hist; memo DepSecDef for SecDef, 20 May 58, fldr 381 1958, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606.
53. NORAD, *Nineteen Years of Air Defense*, 48-49; memo JCS for SecDef, 7 Feb 57, w/encl, Eighth Rept of Canada-U.S. MSG, 19 Dec 56, fldr 322 1958, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606.
54. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 16 Mar 57, fldr 322 1958, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606.
55. Ltr DepUnderSecState to SecDef, 19 Jun 57, *ibid*. For an account of the establishment of NORAD from a Canadian viewpoint, indicating the political problems involved, see Joseph T. Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958*, 91-117.
56. NORAD, *Nineteen Years of Air Defense*, 49-50; DoD NR 777-57, 1 Aug 57, OSD Hist; Cole et al, *History of the Unified Command Plan*, 27.
57. Memo JCS for SecDef, 2 May 58, w/encl, Revised TOR for CINCNORAD, fldr 322 1958, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606.
58. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 7 May 58; ltr DepUnderSecState to SecDef, 16 May 58, memo DepSecDef to CJCS, 26 May 58, *ibid*; *New York Times*, 17, 20 May 58; NORAD, *Nineteen Years of Air Defense*, 50-52.
59. Ltr DepSecDef to Pres, 15 Aug 58, noted approved by Pres, 19 Aug 58, fldr Defense, Department of (14), Box 22, Subj ser, Confidential file, White House Central files, DDEL.
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61. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 529-37; DeptState memcon, 8 Jul 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 1:692-95; *New York Times*, 11 Jul 58; ltr Eisenhower to McElroy, 22 Jul 58, fldr 092.3 Canada-US 30 Sept 59, Box 10, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; editorial note, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 1:373; Summary Record of First Mtg, U.S.-Canada Cmte on Joint Defense, 15 Dec 58, fldr Canada-US Ministerial Committee on Joint Defense, 8-9 Nov 59, Box 28, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1672.
62. Memo SecAF for SecDef, 19 Aug 58, fldr Canada 381 27 Jan 59, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.

63. Memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 5 Sep 58, memo JCS for SecDef, 18 Sep 58, memo AsstGC (Monroe Leigh) for DepSecDef, 3 Oct 58: *ibid*.
64. Ltr MinNatlDef (Pearkes) to SecDef, 15 Sep 58, memrcd D. A. Quarles, 5 Sep 58, recording telcon with Pearkes that day: *ibid*.
65. Text of press release issued 23 Sep by PM of Canada, fldr Canada 381 27 Jan 59, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
66. Memrcd AsstSecAF (Materiel), 14 Oct 58, memo ASD(S&L) for DepSecDef, 24 Nov 58, ltr DepMinNatlDef (F. R. Miller) to Sharp, 23 Dec 58: fldr Canada 381 27 Jan 59, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; Sturm, 18-19; ltr Quarles to Pearkes, 12 Dec 58, fldr Reading File #3—1 Jul-31 Dec 58, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769.
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68. Ltr Chief of Legislative Liaison, DeptA (Maj Gen J. H. Michaelis) to Sen Russell, Chm Senate Armed Svcs Cte, 2 May 58, printed in Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, *Military Construction Authorization Fiscal Year 1959*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (28 Jul 58), S Rept 1982, 20-21. For a comparison between the land-based Talos and Nike-Hercules, see "The Guided Missile Program," Jul 57, OSD Hist, 27-29, 33.
69. US Cong, Senate Cte on Appros, *Military Construction Authorization Fiscal Year 1959*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (28 Jul 58), S Rept 1982, 20-21.
70. Memo SecDef for AFPC members, 26 Nov 56, in Cole et al, *Department of Defense*, 309-10.
71. House Cte on Armed Services, *Investigation of National Defense, Missiles: Hearings*, 4068
72. *Chicago Tribune*, 15 Sep 58.
73. Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, *Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958: Hearings*, 39, 406, 409.
74. S Rept 1982 (cited in n 68), 18-27; *New York Herald Tribune*, 12 Aug 58.
75. PL 85-685 (20 Aug 58, sec 402).
76. For a summary of the arguments on both sides, see *Aviation Week*, XLIX (11 Aug 58), 21. Other news stories on the dispute appear in *New York Herald Tribune*, 12 Aug 58; *Baltimore Sun*, 5 Sep 58; *Washington Star*, 5 Sep 58; *New York Times*, 11 Sep 58.
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78. Memo DGM for SecDef, 14 Aug 58, fldr M-373.24 Defense Against ICBM 16 Jan 58, Box 26, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
79. Ofc memo R. H. Warren for Quarles, 21 Aug 58, fldr Missiles, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606.
80. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 23 Oct 58, CM-218-58, w/atchmt, memo JCS for SecDef, same date: fldr M-470.02 Nike, Bomarc and Hawk (6 Mar 58), Box 26, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
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82. Memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 29 Apr 59, memo JCS for SecDef, 8 May 59, memo SecA for SecDef, 8 May 59: fldr Nike 1960, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
83. Evaluation of Bomarc IM-99B, rept by Ad Hoc Panel, 6 Apr 59, w/ltr of transmittal, 3 Apr 59, fldr 209.10 Guided Missiles—Bomarc IM-99B, Box 13, ODDR&E files 1959, Acc 63-A1885.
84. Memo of conf with Pres (J. S. D. Eisenhower), 28 Nov 58, fldr Staff Notes Nov 58, Box 37, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 1:8-9; Stans testimony in Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, *Major Defense Matters: Hearings, 1959*, pt 2:293.

85. Sturm, 17-18.
86. Memo AsstSecAF(R&D) (Richard E. Horner) for SecDef, 14 Jan 59, memos DDR&E for AsstSecAF(R&E), 14, 21 Jan 59: fldr 209.10 Guided Missiles—Air Defense 1959, Box 13, ODDR&E files, Acc 63-A1885; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 5:492, 804-06, 822-23.
87. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 1:164.
88. Ibid, pt 5:749-59, pt 6:343-44, 350, 203-10.
89. Ltr York to Robert E. Rightmyer, Director, Surveys and Investigations, House Cte on Appros, 12 May 59, w/encl, answers to questions on Bomarc B forwarded by House Cte 6 Apr 59, fldr 209.10 Guided Missiles—Bomarc IM-99B, Box 13, ODDR&E files, Acc 63-A1885.
90. Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, 30-33 (quote, 33).
91. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1959, 385-86 (quote, 385).
92. *New York Times*, 14 May 59; Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, 86 Cong, 1 sess, S Rept 434, 25 Jun 59, 4.
93. US Cong, House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1960*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (28 May 59), H Rept 408, 15-16.
94. *Baltimore Sun*, 4 Jun 59; *New York Times*, 28 May 59.
95. Memo of disc (Gleason), 408th NSC mtg, 28 May 59, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
96. *Baltimore Sun*, 28 May 59; Pearson column in *Washington Post*, 30 May 59.
97. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 19 May 59, fldr Continental Air Defense Master Plan (19 May 59), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
98. Memo JCS for SecDef, 2 Jun 59, *ibid*.
99. Memo SecAF for SecDef, 4 Jun 59, *ibid*.
100. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 8 Jun 59, fldr Staff Notes 1-15 Jun 59 (2), Box 42, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
101. Discussion at the 9 June 1959 meeting is described in memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 9 Jun 59, *ibid*; also, in more fragmentary and cryptic form, in a handwritten memo (perhaps by Goodpaster), ns, nd, OSD Hist. A shorter memorandum by Goodpaster, in fldr Continental Air Defense Master Plan (19 May 59), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574, summarizes the decisions approved by the president (tacitly in most cases) and has notations by Randall recording subsequent discussion with Goodpaster. None of these sources gives in full the force goals approved in the master plan; these are taken from memo SecDef for CJCS, 19 Jun 59, *ibid*. The breakdown of the projected savings is given in Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, *Major Defense Matters: Hearings*, 294 (Stans testimony).
102. *New York Times*, 13 Jun (news story and Baldwin column), 14 Jun 59.
103. *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1959*, III:1011-12 (quote, 1011).
104. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 19 Jun 59, fldr Continental Air Defense Master Plan (19 May 59), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; memo SAGM for SecA and SecAF, 19 Jun 59, fldr 209.10 Guided Missiles—Air Defense 1959, Box 13, ODDR&E files 1959, Acc 63-A1885.
105. Ltrs SecDef for Vinson and Stennis, 18 Jun 59, fldr Continental Air Defense Master Plan (19 May 59), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, 1487-88.
106. US Cong, Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, *Military Construction Authorization for Military Departments, Fiscal Year 1960*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (25 Jun 59), S Rept 434, 3-5 (quotes, 4, 5).
107. US Cong, Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1960*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (7 Jul 59), S Rept 476, 5, 19; US Cong, House Cte of Conf, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (3 Aug 59), H Rept 743, 7; PL 86-166 (18 Aug 59, Title III).
108. PL 86-149 (10 Aug 59, sec 419); memo SecDef for CJCS, 18 Aug 59, fldr 209.10 Guided Missiles—Air Defense 1959, Box 13, ODDR&E files 1959, Acc 63-A1885; memo JCS for SecDef, 3 Sep 59, JCSM-367-59, ltr SecDef to Rep Vinson, 10 Sep 59: fldr Continental Air Defense Master Plan (19 May 59), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
109. Memrcd DJS (Picher), 23 Jun 59, looseleaf binder Defense Presentations to the President, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.

110. Memo DepSecDef for SpecAsstforNatSecAff, 10 Aug 59, memo SpecAsst for DepSecDef, 12 Aug 59, memo SecDef for SpecAsst, 25 Aug 59, memo SpecAsst for SecDef, 26 Aug 59, ltr Gray to McElroy, 21 Sep 59: *ibid*; memo SecDef for SpecAsst, 2 Sep 59, OSD Hist; Kistiakowsky, 63-64; memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 14 Sep 59, fldr Meetings with Pres Jan-Dec 59 (3), Box 4, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL; memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 29 Mar 60, fldr Meetings with Pres Vol. 1 (4), Box 4, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL. For the "four studies," see ch XI.
111. Memo JCS for SecDef, 18 Jan 60, JCSM-19-60, memo ASD(C) for Gen Brown, 19 Feb 60, memo SecDef for CJCS, 26 Feb 60, memo JCS for CINCNORAD, 2 Feb 60, SM-116-60: fldr 381—National Defense Jan-Feb 1960, Box 15, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
112. Testimony of Gen White, 22, 25 Jan 60, House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 2:253-54, 267-68.
113. Statement by Gen Twining, in memo of conf with Pres, 9 Feb 59, fldr Staff Notes Feb 59 (2), Box 39, PP (AWF), DDEL; McElroy statement in press conference, 5 Mar 59, *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1959*, II:608-09.
114. Memo SecAF for SecDef, 4 Sep 59, fldr 373 Airborne Alert 26 Feb 60, Box 15, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; PL 86-166 (18 Aug 59, sec 612 (b)).
115. AFPC mtg notes, 28 Jul 59, fldr AFPC May-Aug 59, Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
116. Memo SecAF for SecDef, 4 Sep 59, memo AsstSecAF (Lyle S. Garlock) for ASD(C), 25 Sep 59: fldr 373 Airborne Alert 26 Feb 60, Box 15, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
117. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 28 Oct 59, CM-418-59, w/encls (views of other JCS members), fldr 381 1960, Box 21, *ibid*.
118. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 5:394, 462-63; memo SecAF for SecDef, 4 Aug 60, fldr 373 Airborne Alert 26 Feb 60, Box 15, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
119. NSC 5912, Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1959, 21-24 and Annex A, OSD Hist; NORAD, *Nineteen Years of Air Defense*, 13, 22, 24-25; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 5:806.
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121. Memo of disc (Gleason), 339th NSC mtg, 10 Oct 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XI:757.
122. NIE 11-4-56, 2 Aug 56, SNIE 11-6-57, 15 Jan 57, NIE 11-4-57, 12 Nov 57: OSD Hist.
123. SNIE 11-7-58, 5 Jun 58, NIE 11-4-58, 23 Dec 58, NIE 11-4-59, 9 Feb 60, NIE 11-8-60, 1 Aug 60, NIE 11-4-60, 1 Dec 60: *ibid*. (Excerpts from SNIE 11-7-58 and NIE 11-8-60 in Steury, ed., 47-53, 109-13.)
124. NIE 11-5-58, 19 Aug 58, NIE 11-4-58, 23 Dec 58, NIE 11-5-59, 3 Nov 59, NIE 11-4-59, 9 Feb 60: *ibid*. (NIE 11-5-58 in Steury, ed., 65-70.)
125. Rept of Ad Hoc Panel on Continental Air Defense (Jerome B. Wiesner, Chm), 6 Nov 59, fldr Air Defense (1), Box 4, OASST files, WHO, DDEL; memo AsstDDR&E(Air Def) for SecDef, 27 Jan 60, w/encl, staff study on SAGE Super Combat Centers, 25 Jan 60, fldr 311 SAGE 8 Jan 60, Box 12, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
126. Memo CINCNORAD for CJCS, 29 Jan 60, fldr 311 SAGE 8 Jan 60, Box 12, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
127. Memo Sharp for SecDef, 21 Jan 60, *ibid*.
128. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Revisions in 1960 and 1961 Air Force Programs: Hearings*, 9, 25-30, 32 (quote, 32).
129. Memo JCS for SecDef, 18 Mar 60, JCSM-113-60, memrcd SecDef, 19 Mar 60, ltr ActgSecDef to Parkes, 22 Mar 60, memrcd, ns, 23 Mar 60 (recording telcon, Douglas and Parkes), ltr Parkes to Douglas, 23 Mar 60: fldr Canada 1960, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
130. Memo ActgSecDef for CJCS, 26 Mar 60, *ibid*.
131. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Revisions in 1960 and 1961 Air Force Programs: Hearings*, 4-6, 18-22, 44, 65-66; Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 2:1531.
132. US Cong, House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1961*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (1960), H Rept 1561, 13-14.
133. Memo DDR&E for DepSecDef, 13 May 60, fldr 209.10 Guided Missiles—Bomarc IM-99B, Box 13, ODDR&E files 1959, Acc 63-A1885.

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135. Memo SpecAsst to CJCS (Whisenand) for AdminSec, OSD, 25 May 60, flldr Continental Air Defense Master Plan (19 May 59), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
136. Memo AsstStaffSec (J. S. D. Eisenhower) for MilAsst to SecDef (Brig Gen Brown), 11 May 60; memo AdminSec for CJCS, 12 May 60: *ibid*.
137. "Effects of Bomarc Cutback on U.S. Air Defense Capabilities and Canadian Defense Posture," encl/w memo SpecAsst to CJCS (Whisenand) for AdminSec OSD, 25 May 60, *ibid*.
138. US Cong, Senate Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1961*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (10 Jun 60), S Rept 1550, 29-30; *New York Times*, 9, 17 Jun 60; ltr ATSD(LA) to Sen Saltonstall, 16 Jun 60, flldr Continental Air Defense Master Plan (19 May 59), Box 18, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; *New York Times*, 1 Jul 60.
139. NSC Action 2151-f, 25 Nov 59, bound flldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1959, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
140. Memo Dir Ofc of Planning, ODDR&E (S. E. Clements) for DepASD(ISA), 19 Jan 60, memo Asst for NSC Aff, DCS/Plans & Program (Col John L. Weber, USAF) for DOD-NSC and JCS-NSC, 28 Jan 60, ISA briefing paper for PB mtg, 19 Feb 60: flldr 5802 U.S. Policy on Continental Defense (File #1), Box 21, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
141. Memo, ODCSOPS (Maj Gen J. K. Woolnough), for SpecAsst to JCS for NSC Aff, 1 Feb 60, *ibid*.
142. Extract of record of PB mtg, 19 Feb 60, draft statement evidently prepared by OASD(ISA), encl with memo DirPBSecretariat (Robert H. Johnson) for NSC PB, 29 Feb 60: *ibid*.
143. JCS Proposed Revisions to NSC 5802/1 Draft Statement of Policy, nd [ca 3 Mar 60], memo Policy Coord Br, OPNAV for SpecAsst to JCS for NSC Aff and DirNSCAff, OSA/ISA, 3 Mar 60, memo Asst for NSC Aff, DCS/Plans and Programs AF, for DOD-NSC and JCS-NSC, 3 Mar 60, memo Dir Plans, ODCSOPS, A, for Def Member of NSC PB and SpecAsst to JCS for NSC Aff, 3 Mar 60, record of PB mtg, 4 Mar 60, memo DirNSCAff, OASD(ISA), for Clements, 7 Mar 60: *ibid*.
144. Memo Komer for DirPBSecretariat, 8 Mar 60, encl/w memo Johnson for PB Assts, 9 Mar 60, *ibid*.
145. Revision of paras 1-12 of 29 Feb 60 draft, by Ofc of Spec Asst for Sci and Tech, encl/w memo Johnson for PB Assts, 9 Mar 60, cited in preceding note.
146. Memo DirPBSecretariat for NSC PB, 15 Mar 60, record of NSC PB mtg, 18 Mar 60, memo DirPBSecretariat for NSC PB, 24 Mar 60: flldr 5802 U.S. Policy on Continental Defense (File #2), Box 21, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
147. Discussion Paper on Continental Defense, encl with memo ActgDirPBSecretariat (A. Sidney Buford) for NSC PB, 3 Jun 60, with memos of comment, 8-27 Jun 60, *ibid*.
148. Briefing papers for PB mtgs 28 Jun and 12 Jul 60, prepared by OASD(ISA), "Position Regarding Continental Defense," nd, evidently prepared by OASD(ISA) for PB discussion at this time, record of PB mtg, 14 Jul 60, Review of NSC 5802/1, "U.S. Policy on Continental Defense," also evidently from OASD(ISA), nd (chronology of discussion 12 Nov 59-14 Jul 60, prepared approximately 15 Aug 60 according to notation on document): *ibid*. For evidence that Gates was expressing JCS views, see Briefing Paper for 459th NSC mtg, 15 Sep 60, flldr 5802 U.S. Policy on Continental Defense (File #3), Box 22, *ibid*.
149. Discussion Paper on Continental Defense, encl with memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 14 Jul 60, flldr 5802 U.S. Policy on Continental Defense (File #2), Box 21, *ibid*.
150. Briefing Paper for PB mtg, 28 Jul 60; record of mtg, 28 Jul 60; draft NSC Action on Continental Defense, encl/w memo ActgDirPBSecretariat for NSC PB, 1 Aug 60, record of PB mtg, 5 Aug 60: flldr 5802 U.S. Policy on Continental Defense (File #3), Box 22, *ibid*.
151. See handwritten comments (unidentified) on a draft record of action, encl/w memo ActgExecSecNSC for NSC, 8 Aug 60, *ibid*.
152. Memo SecA for SecDef, 10 Aug 60, flldr 381 (US Policy on Continental Defense) 10 Aug 60, Box 21, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.

153. Memo JCS for SecDef, 10 Aug 60, JCSM-348-60, *ibid*.
154. Continental Defense, briefing given NSC by John H. Rubel, ActgDDR&E, 15 Sep 60, fldr Nat Sec Council (Vol II) (6) (Aug-Nov 60), Box 19, Alpha subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
155. Memo of disc (Boggs), 459th NSC mtg, 15 Sep 60, 3-4, 6, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
156. NSC Action 2300, 15 Sep 60, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1960, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
157. NSC 6022, U.S. Policy on Continental Defense, 13 Dec 60, 2-5, 8-10, 11-12, 15-17, OSD Hist.
158. The OCDM program is summarized in memo of disc (Boggs), 471st NSC mtg, 22 Dec 60, 5-6, *ibid*. The JCS comments are in memo JCS for SecDef, 21 Dec 60, JCSM-572-60, *ibid*.
159. Memo of disc (Boggs), 471st NSC mtg, 22 Dec 60, 2-6, 9-10, 12, *ibid*.
160. NSC Actions 2360, 22 Dec 60, and 2361, 18 Jan 61, bound fldrs Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1960 and 1961, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
161. Memo SecDef for SecA et al, 29 Sep 60, fldr 5802 U.S. Policy on Continental Defense (File #3), Box 22, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
162. NSC 6013, Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1960 (with memo of transmittal by DepExecSecNSC, 7 Dec 60), pt 1:28, OSD Hist.
163. Memo Gray for Gates, 11 Jan 61, memo SecDef for SecA et al, 19 Jan 61: fldr 381 (US Policy on Continental Defense) 10 Aug 60, Box 21, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
164. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1962*, M54.
165. For a description of the continental defense system as of 30 June 1960, see NSC 6013, Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1960, pt 1:25-27, OSD Hist.
166. *Ibid*, 5.
167. Memo JCS for CINCNORAD, 17 Oct 60, SM-1017-60, fldr 381 National Defense Jan-Feb 1960, Box 15, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
168. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1962*, M24-M26, 484, 509, 517 (quotes, M24, M25).
169. NSC 5720, 23 Sep 57, pt 1:20-21, NSC 5819, 22 Sep 58, pt 1:23, NSC 5912, 26 Oct 59, pt 1:21: OSD Hist.
170. NSC 6013, 1 Dec 60, pt 1:2, *ibid*.

XIV. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. PL 79-585 (Atomic Energy Act of 1946) and PL 83-703 (1954 amendments); Eisenhower statement to NSC, memo of disc (Boggs), 454th NSC mtg, 1 Aug 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
2. DoD Dirs 5148.1 and 5148.2, 5 Oct 54.
3. Rearden, *Formative Years*, 111-12; Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *Atomic Shield, 1947/1952*, vol II in *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, 131-32; Edward N. Parker, "AFSWP . . . Its Role in Nuclear Testing," *Armed Forces Management*, IV (Apr 58), 6-8; memo CSA, CNO, and CSAF for ChAFSWP, 12 Jul 51, atchmt to memo ChAFSWP for ATSD(AE), 2 May 58, fldr ORG—DASA Reports—1958-62, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 67-A4673.
4. Memos ChAFSWP for ATSD(AE), 2, 9 May 58, memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Sep 58, memo JCS for SecDef, 2 Jan 59, memrcd, ns, presumably by ATSD(AE), 6 Jan 59, memo ActgSecDef for CJCS, 24 Feb 59, memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Apr 59, memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 1 May 59, w/encl (DASA charter): fldr Org—DASA 1957-62, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 67-A4673.
5. Ltr SecDef to Pres, 30 Jul 55; memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 31 Aug 56: fldr AW Dispersal Authorizations 1954-57, Box 1, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 63-A1567. For the origin and history of the custody dispute, see Rearden, *Formative Years*, 425-32; Condit, *Test of War*, 463-67; US Department of Defense, OATSD(AE), *History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons, July 1945 through September 1977*, 5-37.
6. Ltr Pres to SecDef, 4 Apr 56, fldr 5 AW Custody (Part II), 1953-63, Box 1, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 68-A6453.

7. Memo JCS for SecDef, 24 Feb 56, memo SecDef for CJCS, 20 Apr 56, ltr SecDef to ChmAEC, 20 Apr 56, memo ATSD(AE) for SecDef, 20 Jul 56: *ibid*; memo of conf with Pres (L. A. Minnich, Jr.), 6 Aug 56, OSD Hist. The 4 June 1956 agreement has not been found but is summarized in the ATSD(AE) memo of 20 July 1956 here cited, also in a typewritten summary of custodial arrangements prepared by ATSD(AE), 10 Nov 60, atchmt to ltr ATSD(AE) to ChmJCAE (Sen Clinton P. Anderson), 10 Nov 60, fldr 4 AW Custody (Part I) 1946-51, Box 1, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 68-A6453.
8. Memo JCS for SecDef, 31 Jul 56, fldr AW Dispersal Authorizations 1954-57, Box 1, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 63-A1567.
9. Memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 22 Aug 56, w/covering brief, ATSD(AE) for DepSecDef, same date, *ibid*.
10. Ltr SecDef to Pres, 21 Nov 56, ltr Pres to SecDef, 24 Nov 56: fldr 5 AW Custody (Part II) 1953-63, Box 1, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 68-A6453; ltr SecDef and ChmAEC to Pres, 21 Nov 56, fldr AW Dispersal Authorizations 1954-57, Box 1, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 63-A1567; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 21 Nov 56, 2:30 pm, fldr Nov 56 Diary—Staff memos, Box 19, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Ferrell, ed., *Eisenhower Diaries*, 336.
11. Ltr SecDef to ChmAEC, 2 Feb 57, AEC-DoD Agreement for Dispersal of High Yield Weapons, 2 Feb 57, encl w/memo Sec JCS for CSA et al, 15 Mar 57, SM-205-1957: fldr AW Transfer and Deployment 1957, Box 1, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 63-A1567.
12. Ltr DepSecDef to Pres, 5 Aug 57, ltr Pres to SecDef, 6 Aug 57: fldr 5 AW Custody (Part II) 1953-63, Box 1, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 68-A6453; memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 9 Aug 57, fldr AW Dispersal Authorizations 1954-57, Box 1, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 63-A1567.
13. Authorization for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons, sgd by Pres, 22 May 57, encl w/memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 29 May 57, fldr 471.6, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-B1672.
14. Ltr DepSecDef to ChmAEC, 2 May 58, fldr 5 AW Custody (Part II) 1953-63, Box 1, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 68-A6453.
15. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 19 Aug 58, fldr Aug 58 Staff Notes (1), Box 35, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
16. Ltr ActgSecDef to ChmAEC, 13 Oct 58, fldr A-471.61 27 Jan 59, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574. The JCS memo of 22 September 1958 is summarized in memo CJCS for SecDef, 22 Dec 58, CM-248-58, forwarding CJCS monthly report, fldr 020 JCS 1958, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
17. Ltr ChmAEC to SecDef, 21 Oct 58, ltr ActgSecDef to Pres, 20 Nov 58, ltr Pres to SecDef, 3 Jan 59: fldr 5 AW Custody (Part II) 1953-63, Box 1, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 68-A6453; memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 19 Dec 58, fldr Staff Notes Dec 58 (1), Box 38, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
18. Ltr SecDef to ChmAEC, 27 Jan 59, ltr ChmAEC and SecDef to Pres, 19 Feb 59, ltr Pres to SecDef, 26 Feb 59: fldr 5 AW Custody (Part II) 1953-63, Box 1, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 68-A6453.
19. Ltr DepSecDef to Pres, 29 Oct 59, *ibid*; ltr Pres to SecDef, 5 Nov 59, fldr A-471.61 27 Jan 59, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
20. Memo of conf with Pres (J. S. D. Eisenhower), 13 Jan 61, fldr Staff Notes Jan 61, Box 55, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL. The president formally approved the dispersal plan on 16 January: OATSD(AE), *History of Custody and Deployment*, 57, 79, A-3.
21. Quoted in Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 35.
22. NSC 5602/1, 15 Mar 56, para 11, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:246.
23. The president's memorandum of 15 March 1956 on this subject is referred to in memo ExecSecNSC for SecState and ChmAEC, 9 Apr 56, fldr 5602 Basic National Security Policy, Box 15, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
24. Ltr SecDef to Pres, 15 Mar 56, encl w/ltr SecDef to SpecAsst (Anderson), 5 Apr 56, *ibid*.
25. Ltr SecDef to SpecAsst (Anderson), 5 Apr 56, memo ExecSecNSC for SecState and ChmAEC, 9 Apr 56, memos ExecSecNSC for SecState, SecDef, and ChmAEC, 10 Apr, 18 Apr 56: *ibid*; *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, I:193-94.
26. Authorization for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons, sgd by Pres, 22 May 57, encl w/memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 29 May 57, fldr 471.6, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen Files 1957, Acc 61-B1672. Available evidence does not indicate when the new authorizations became effective.

27. NSC 5707/8, 3 Jun 57, para 11, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:511; NSC 5810/1, 5 May 58, para 10, NSC 5906/1, 5 Aug 59, para 12: OSD Hist.
28. DoD Dir 5030.2, 15 Oct 54; DoD Instrs 5030.5, 30 Jun 55, and 5128.18, 23 Jul 56; Annexes "B" and "C" to memo ATSD(AE) for Clifford S. Livermore, OASD(C), 6 Dec 56, OSD Hist.
29. Weapons Development and Production Policy, Annex "A" to memo ATSD(AE) for Livermore, 6 Dec 56, *ibid*.
30. Memo JCS for SecDef, 1 Jun 56, memo SecDef for CJCS, 22 Jun 56, with covering brief, ATSD(AE) for SecDef, 15 Jun 56, memo ChmMLC for SecDef, 6 Dec 56: fldr Atomic 400.23 1956, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379.
31. Requests from DoD to AEC for development of these and other warheads, too numerous to cite individually, are in ATSD(AE) files. For an unofficial summary of all nuclear weapons developed between 1943 and 1987, with dates of the beginning of development and of production, see Chuck Hansen, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History*, 106-07.
32. Ltr ChmAEC to ChmMLC, 21 Mar 57, ltr DepSecDef to ChmAEC, 3 Sep 57, w/atchmt covering brief ATSD(AE) for DepSecDef, 27 Aug 57, fldr A-400.23 (Stockpile Composition) 4 Jan 60, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093; Procedure for Establishment of Military Requirements, 17 Feb 56, probably prepared in OATSD(AE), fldr AW General and Production Part III 57, Box 1, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 63-A1567; "Basic Arrangements and Responsibilities for the Determination of Atomic Weapons Requirements. . .," 13 Feb 59, also apparently prepared in OATSD(AE), fldr Atomic 463.2-825 Atomic 1959, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
33. Ltrs SecDef and DepSecDef to ChmAEC, 21 Dec 55 and 14 Feb 56, respectively, quoted in Production and Development Requirements Placed on AEC, encl w/memo ATSD(AE) for Livermore, 6 Dec 56, OSD Hist.
34. Memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Sep 56, fldr 1 Atomic Weapons 1950-61, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 68-A6453; Weapons Development and Production Policy, encl w/memo ATSD(AE) for Livermore, 6 Dec 56, OSD Hist; covering brief, ATSD(AE) for DepSecDef, 27 Aug 57, atchmt to ltr DepSecDef to ChmAEC, 3 Sep 57, fldr A-400.23 (Stockpile Composition) 4 Jan 60, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
35. Ltr ChmAEC to ChmMLC, 21 Mar 57, fldr A-400.23 (Stockpile Composition) 4 Jan 60, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
36. Memo ATSD(AE) for SecDef, 11 Apr 57, memo SecDef for CJCS, 25 Apr 57, memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Aug 57: *ibid*.
37. Memo JCS for SecDef, 25 Oct 57, ltrs DepSecDef to ChmAEC, 3 Sep, 8 Nov 57: fldr 1 Atomic Weapons 1950-61, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 68-A6453.
38. *New York Times*, 14 May 58; JCAE PR 95, 30 Jul 57, OSD Hist.
39. Ltr DepSecDef to ChmAEC, 16 Apr 58, fldr A-400.23 (Stockpile Composition) 4 Jan 60, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
40. *New York Times*, 29 May 58.
41. *New York Times*, 13, 14 May 58. A letter from Representative Durham, JCAE chairman, and Senator Henry M. Jackson, chairman of the JCAE Subcommittee on Military Applications, 10 Jul 58, to Twining refers to testimony given the subcommittee on 21 May 1958 in which Twining told the members that the JCS had submitted a recommendation for additional reactor facilities and that the secretary of defense had returned it for restudy: ltr in fldr A-400.23 (Stockpile Composition) 4 Jan 60, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093. No other record of this testimony has been found.
42. *New York Times*, 25 Jun, 15, 19, 23 Jul 58; statement by Quarles at AFPC mtg, AFPC mtg notes, 29 Jul 58, fldr AFPC Jun-Jul 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
43. Ltr ActgSecDef to ChmAEC, 9 Oct 58, fldr DoD Vol. III (2) (Sep 58), Box 1, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
44. Memos of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 31 Oct 57, 16 Jan, 11 Feb 59, OSD Hist.
45. Memo of conf with Pres (J. S. D. Eisenhower), 12 Feb 59, fldr Staff Notes Feb 59 (2), DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
46. Memo ATSD(AE) for SecDef, 16 Jul 59, fldr Atomic 1959, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
47. Statements of views of JCS members, Annexes "A", "B", and "C" to App "B" to memo

- JCS for SecDef, 20 Oct 59, JCSM-422-59, fldr 1 Atomic Weapons 1950-61, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 68-A6453. For the dispute over targeting policy, see ch XV.
48. Draft of statements to be made by SecDef (or DepSecDef) at 1960 Quantico Conf, atchmt to ofc memo MilAsst to DepSecDef for Gen Whisenand, OCJCS, 31 May 60, fldr Col Black Reading File 6/15/59-7/30/60, Box 4, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-B3078; memo CJCS for SecDef, 20 Oct 59, CM-410-59, w/atchmt, memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Oct 59, JCSM-422-59: fldr 1 Atomic Weapons 1950-61, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 68-A6453.
 49. Ltr SecDef to Pres, 26 Oct 59, w/endorsement by Pres, fldr 1 Atomic Weapons 1950-61, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 68-A6453.
 50. Ltr SecDef to ChmAEC, 4 Dec 59, w/atchmt, covering brief ATSD(AE) for SecDef, 4 Dec 59, ltr SecDef to Pres, 4 Jan 60: *ibid*.
 51. Ltr DepSecDef to Pres, 8 Apr 60, w/endorsement by Goodpaster, *ibid*.
 52. Ltr DepSecDef to ChmAEC, 2 Jun 60, w/covering brief, ATSD(AE) for SecDef, 2 Jun 60, *ibid*.
 53. Memo Black for Douglas, 6 Apr 60, fldr Col Black reading file 6/15/59-7/30/60, Box 4, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-B3078; memrcd OSD Historian (Winnacker), 4 May 60, fldr A471.61 1960, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
 54. Ltr ActgSecDef to ChmAEC, 27 Aug 60, summarizing ltr Actg SecDef to Pres, 8 Aug 60, and the president's reply, memo Goodpaster for SecDef, 12 Sep 60, ltr ActgSecDef to ChmAEC, 13 Dec 60: fldr 1 Atomic Weapons 1950-1961, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 68-A6453.
 55. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings*, pt 1:650. For a history of the Navy's nuclear ship program, see Hewlett and Duncan, *Nuclear Navy*.
 56. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957: Hearings*, 645, and *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959: Overall Policy Statements: Hearings*, 11-12.
 57. Ltr ActgSecDef to ChmAEC, 1 Aug 60, fldr A560-A676.3 1960, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; *New York Times*, 25 Sep 60.
 58. Ltr SecNav for ChmAEC, 2 Dec 59, fldr A560-A676.3 1960, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
 59. US Cong, JCAE, *Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program: Report*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (Sep 59), Jt Cte Print, 3, 5, 19-21; Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 71-74, 489-91, 516-17; memo ASD(AE) for SecDef, 23 Oct 56, fldr Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769. ASD(AE) is the abbreviation for Assistant Secretary (Applications Engineering); it should not be confused with ATSD(AE).
 60. Memo ASD(AE) for SecDef, 23 Oct 56, fldr Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769.
 61. Ltr VCSAF to GenMgrAEC, 31 Oct 57, fldr Reactors MAP 1953-57, #1, Box 2, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 63-A1567; DoD NR 1132-57, 20 Nov 57, OSD Hist.
 62. Statement by Quarles before JCAE, 6 Feb 57, fldr Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769; paper, ANP Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion, by OASD(C), 13 Jan 60, fldr 452.1 1960, Box 17, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
 63. *New York Herald Tribune*, 24 Oct 57; *New York Times*, 22 Oct 57; ltr Rep Price to Pres, 24 Oct 57, fldr Reactors—General Policy 1957, #7, Box 2, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 63-A1567; statement by DepSecDef Quarles in memo of conf w/Pres (Goodpaster), 25 Feb 58, OSD Hist; memo AsstDCS AF (Keirn) for DepSecDef, 27 Nov 57, draft memo for Pres, prepared by OATSD(AE), 15 Jan 58: fldr Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769; Killian, *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower*, 179-80; memo DoD Ad Hoc Panel on Manned Nuclear Acft for DepSecDef, 26 Feb 58, fldr 452.1 Ad Hoc Cmte on ANP Acceleration, Box 19, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; notes (by Killian) for mtg with Pres, 23 Jun 59, fldr ANP (Jan 59-Nov 60) (2), Box 4, OSATS files, WHO, DDEL; JCAE, *Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program: Hearing*, *passim*; memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Jun 59, JCSM-237-59, fldr 452.1 Ad Hoc Cmte on ANP Acceleration, Box 19, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
 65. Memo DirBoB for Pres, 21 Jul 60, w/atchmt, draft ltr Pres to SecDef, fldr Nuclear Powered Aircraft (Feb 58-Oct 60), Box 10, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; paper, ANP—Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion, 7 Oct 60, atchmt to Ofc memo ASD(C) for Gates,

- 14 Oct 60, fldr 452.1 Ad Hoc Cmte on ANP Acceleration (Manned Nuclear Aircraft)
2 Jan 59, Box 19, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; Review of FY 62 Military Budget by PSAC, 23 Nov 60, fldr DoD (Jan 58–Nov 60), Box 1, OSATS files, WHO, DDEL; Killian, 183 (quoting letter from York).
66. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961*, 239.
67. Nuclear Rocket Propulsion (Project Rover), typewritten document, ns, nd (post-12 Jan 57), fldr Missiles—Misc Papers (1957–1958) (2), Harlow papers, DDEL.
68. Nuclear Rocket Propulsion (Project Rover), *ibid*; memo SAGM for SecDef, 15 Apr 57 (summary rept of progress in Ofc of SAGM, 1956–57), fldr 020 DoD Guided Missiles 1957, Box 6, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372; ltr SecDef to ChmAEC, 12 Jan 57, fldr 81 Nuclear Weapons Background Papers 1958–63, Box 4, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 68-A6481.
69. Nuclear Rocket Propulsion (Project Rover), cited in n 67; Gregg Herken, “The Flying Crowbar,” *Air and Space*, V (Apr–May 90), 28–34; AEC, *Annual Report to Congress, 1960*, 69–71, 148–49; US Cong, House, *Third Annual Report in the Fields of Aeronautics and Space*, 87 Cong, 1 Sess (1961), H Doc 36, 31; Kistiakowsky, 182.
70. The tests conducted at the Nevada Proving Ground are described in Richard L. Miller, *Under the Cloud: The Decades of Nuclear Testing*, *passim* (with emphasis on the fall-out effects, as suggested by the title). For the Eniwetok tests, see Hansen, 50–103.
71. AEC, *Twentieth Semiannual Report, July 1956*, 8, *Twenty-first Semiannual Report, January 1957*, 11, *Twenty-second Semiannual Report, July 1, 1957*, 10–12, *Progress in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, July–December 1957* (23rd semiannual report), 274–76; Hansen, 69–75; Miller, 251–303; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1957*, 429–30, 519–20, 523.
72. DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXVI (8 Apr 57), 562.
73. Ltr ATSD(AE) to Chm JCAE (Durham), 14 Feb 57, fldr Atomic 471.61–800 1957, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372; ltr ChmAEC to Pres, 2 Aug 57, OSD Hist; Hansen, 76.
74. Memo of conf with Pres (J. S. D. Eisenhower), 9 Aug 57, atchmt to memo Maj Eisenhower for SecDef, 12 Aug 57, ltr ChmAEC to SecDef, 13 Aug 57; fldr Atomic 400.112 Hardtack Operation 10 Jan 58, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
75. Memo JCS for SecDef, 15 Jan 58, ltr DepSecDef to SecState, 7 Feb 58, ltr UnderSecState to DepSecDef, 18 Feb 58, ltr ChmAEC to SecDef, 29 Mar 58, ltrs SecDef to Canadian, UK, and Australian MilReps in Washington, 15 Mar 58, memo SecDef for US Rep NATO SG, 15 Mar 58, ltrs ATSD(LA) to Sen Russell and Rep Vinson, 27 Mar 58: *ibid*.
76. Memo ATSD(AE) for DepSecDef and ASD(ISA), 18 Mar 58, *ibid*; Hansen, 78, 101 (n 333).
77. Memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Apr 58, memred ATSD(AE), 7 Apr 58, encl w/memo ATSD(AE) for SpecAsst to SecState(AE) and DirDMAEC, 10 Apr 58, memo DepSecDef for SecA et al, 11 Apr 58; fldr Atomic 400 to 471.8 1958, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; Hansen, 77–78.
78. Hansen, 77; aide-mémoire, 28 Apr 58, presumably prepared in OATSD(AE), memred ATSD(AE), 5 May 58; fldr 8 AWT General 1958–62, Box 1, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 68-A6453.
79. Hansen, 79, 101 (n 327).
80. Memo ATSD(AE) for DepSecDef, 22 Aug 58, ltr DepSecDef to ChmAEC, 23 Aug 58, ltr ActgChmAEC to DepSecDef, 26 Sep 58; fldr Atomic 400.112 Hardtack Operation 10 Jan 58, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; Miller, 308; AEC, *Twenty-fifth Semiannual Report*, 174.
81. *New York Times*, 19, 26 Mar 59. Dates of the firings (27 and 30 August and 6 September) were given by Quarles in a press conference on 19 March 1959: *Public Statements, DepSecDef Quarles, 1957–1959*, III:1198.
82. Ltr Sen Anderson and Rep Durham to Loper, 19 Mar 59; memo Richard T. Lunger (unident; apparently on JCAE staff) for James T. Ramey, ExecDirJCAE, 20 Mar 59; statement by Murray Snyder, 19 Mar 59, encl w/memo Loper to ChmAEC (Sen Anderson), nd; fldr Weapons Test Argus—General, 711, JCAE Gen correspondence, RG 128, NARA.
83. Ltr Anderson and Durham to Loper, 15 Mar 59, ltr Loper to Anderson, 20 Mar 59: *ibid*; *New York Times*, 19 Mar 59; *Washington Post*, 19 Mar 59; *Public Statements, DepSec Def Quarles, 1957–1959*, III:1174–1218. The scientific findings were released shortly thereafter: *New York Times*, 26 Mar 59.

84. Ltr SecDef to Pres, 5 Aug 59, ltr Pres to SecDef, 13 Aug 59: fldr McElroy Neil 1959 (2), Box 25, Admin ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; ltr DDR&E to ChmAEC, 12 Jan 60, ltr Kistiakowsky to Gates, 24 Feb 60, Joint Development Plan, ARDC/AEC/NASA, Project Vela Hotel Program, ARPA Order 102-60, 30 Mar 60, ltr SecDef to ChmAEC, 4 Nov 60: fldr 203.5 Atomic Energy—Tests 1960, Box 8, ODDR&E files 1960, Acc 64-A2359. For the test suspension, see ch XXI.
85. *New York Herald Tribune*, 12 Aug 60; *Washington Daily News*, 23 Aug 60.
86. Ltr Rep Porter to SecDef, 7 Nov 57, and reply, Loper to Porter, 27 Nov 57: fldr Atomic 471.61-800 1957, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
87. DoD, "Narrative Summaries of Accidents Involving U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1980," nd, OSD Hist.
88. *New York Times*, 16 Mar 58, 8 Jun 60; *New York Herald Tribune*, 12 Aug 60; *Washington Daily News*, 23 Aug 60; *Aviation Week*, LXXII (20 Jun 60), 141-42; Pat Frank, "Are We Safe from Our Own Bombs?" *Saturday Evening Post*, CCXXXIII (23 Jul 60), 13 ff.
89. Timothy J. Botti, *The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945-1958*, 1-109; Condit, *Test of War*, 458-63.
90. PL 83-703 (30 Aug 54, Atomic Energy Act of 1954). For the background of this legislation, see Botti, 111-41.
91. Botti, 143-50; briefing for SecDef, Nuclear Weapons Support of Allies, prepared by Loper, 26 Jan 61, fldr 88 USP—US/NATO Agreements for Cooperation (1960-61), Box 4, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 69-A1390; memo by Robert N. Margrave, DepChm S-DMICC, 16 Oct 56, fldr 94 USP-S-DMICC Agreements (1959), *ibid*.
92. NSC 5602/1, 15 Mar 56, par 17; NSC 5707/8, 3 Jun 57, par 17, OSD Hist.
93. Memo SecDef for ASD(ISA), GC, and ATSD(AE), 24 Jul 56, memo ATSD(AE) for SecDef, 10 Oct 56: fldr UK 000.1—680.1, Box 25, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1956, Acc 60-A1339. It is not entirely clear what the JCS proposed, since their memorandum to Wilson on the subject has not been found.
94. Botti, 190-92, 206-07.
95. *Ibid*, 199-204; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 25 Oct 57, OSD Hist.
96. DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXVII (22 Nov 57), 740.
97. Memo of disc (Gleason), 340th NSC mtg, 17 Oct 57, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
98. Memo of conf, Dulles with Pres, 22 Oct 57, memo of conf, George W. Perkins (outgoing US Permanent Representative to NAC) with Pres, 26 Oct 57, both by Goodpaster, OSD Hist. The background of this proposal is described in ch XVI.
99. DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXVIII (6 Jan 58), (quotes, 9, 11), 14. For further discussion of this offer in relation to NATO planning, see ch XVI.
100. Ltr ChmAEC for SecState, 25 Nov 57, ltr DepSecDef to ChmAEC, 2 Dec 57, ltr ChmAEC to DepSecDef, 12 Dec 57: fldr Atomic 350.05 4 Jan 58, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
101. Ltr DepSecDef and ChmAEC, to Pres, 27 Jan 58, w/White House route slip, 28 Jan 58, indicating president's approval, fldr Atomic 350.05 4 Jan 58, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; ltr ChmAEC to ChmJCAE, 27 Jan 58, ltr Sen John O. Pastore to ChmAEC, 28 Jan 58: JCAE, *Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954: Hearings*, 2-11 (hereafter cited as *Amending Atomic Energy Act*).
102. JCAE, *Amending Atomic Energy Act*, 1-90 (Strauss), 96-116 (Quarles's quotes, 97-98). For a general summary of the hearings, see Botti, 215 ff, *passim*.
103. JCAE, *Amending Atomic Energy Act*, *passim* (quote, 153).
104. *Ibid*, esp. 114, 203; ltr ActgChmAEC to ChmJCAE, 7 Mar 58, *ibid*, 277.
105. *Ibid*, 275-444; ltr ChmAEC to Pastore, 28 Mar 58, in JCAE, 85 Cong, 2 sess (5 Jun 58), H Rept 1849, 37.
106. JCAE, *Amending Atomic Energy Act*, 445-75 (Dulles), 476-83 (Murray).
107. Memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 1 May 58, memo JCS for SecDef, 12 May 58: fldr Atomic 350.05 4 Jan 58, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
108. Ltr Loper to Pastore, 5 Jun 58 (an unclassified version of an earlier classified letter dated 14 May 58), in JCAE, *Amending Atomic Energy Act*, 525-27.
109. Ltr Norstad to Pastore, 4 Jun 58, *ibid*, 519. The hearings on 15 May at which Norstad testified (referred to in this letter) were not declassified and were not printed with the other hearings cited here.

110. Ibid, 485-86 (ltr ChmAEC to ChmJCAE), 486-509 (Rickover testimony).
111. *New York Times*, 20, 24, 27 Jun 58; JCAE, 85 Cong, 2 sess, H Rept 1849, 5 Jun 58, 1-2; House Cte on Conf, 85 Cong, 2 sess, H Rept 2051, 27 Jun 58, 1-6.
112. Botti, 201-10, 219-27, 231-34, 236-37.
113. JCAE, *Agreements for Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes: Hearings*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (1959), 141-43.
114. Ibid, 177-79, 172-75, 162-65, 153-57, 147-50.
115. Ltr ChmMLC to ChmAEC, 12 Sep 58, memo ChmMLC for SecDef, 19 Sep 58, memo ActgSecDef for SecA et al, 29 Oct 58: fldr 45 Organization—JAIEG 1958-65, Box 2, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 68-A6481.
116. Ltr GenMgrAEC (A. R. Luedercke) to ChmMLC, 6 Feb 59, memo ChiefJAIEG for ATSD (AE), 9 Mar 59, ltr DepSecDef to ChmAEC, 21 Apr 59, w/covering brief, ATSD(AE) for DepSecDef, 16 Apr 59, ltr ChmAEC to SecDef, 8 Jun 59, w/encl, AEC-DoD Agreement for Operation of JAIEG: fldr ORG-JAIEG Part I 1958-60, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 67-A4673.
117. Draft of DoD Dir 5030.14, w/covering brief, ATSD(AE) for SecDef, 17 Jul 59; memo Chm S-DMICC for ATSD(AE), 6 Aug 59, memo for Gen Loper, 11 Aug 59, prepared in OATSD(AE): ibid; AFPC mtg notes, 29 Sep 59, memo Livesay for Gates, 14 Oct 59: fldr AFPC Sep-Dec 59, Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; DoD Dir 5030.14, 15 Oct 59.
118. NSC 5906/1, 5 Aug 59, para 23, 24, OSD Hist.
119. Memos of disc (Boggs), 428th and 429th NSC mtgs, 11 Dec, 16 Dec 59, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
120. Memo DepASD(ISA) for Col James E. Tyler, USA, OASD(ISA), 25 Jan 60, fldr Increased Nuclear Sharing with Allies, Box 5, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
121. Memo ExecSecNSC for SecState, SecDef, and ChmAEC, 3 Dec 59, fldr 5910 U.S. Policy on France, Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500. The study was undertaken in accord with a decision of the NSC on 29 October 1959; see ch XVII (where the JCS views are also described).
122. Memo of disc (Boggs), 454th NSC mtg, 1 Aug 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 380-81.
123. Briefing paper for NSC PB mtg 19 Aug 60, fldr Increased Nuclear Sharing with Allies, Box 5, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024; memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Aug 60, JCSM-337-60, fldr 79 USP—US/France Agreements for Cooperation (1960), Box 4, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 69-A1390; Twining, *Neither Liberty nor Safety*, 82-85.
124. Documents relating to the Dutch submarine request are in fldr USP—Netherlands 1959-60, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 67-A4802.
125. Documents in fldrs 77, 78, and 79, USP—US/France Agreements for Cooperation, 1958, 1959, and 1960, Box 4, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 69-A1390.
126. Ltr ChmJCAE (Sen Anderson) to SecDef, 15 Jun 60, fldr A560-A676.3 1960, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
127. Memo of disc (Boggs), 457th NSC mtg, 25 Aug 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
128. Memo of disc (Lay), 467th NSC mtg, 17 Nov 60, memos of disc (Boggs), 468th and 469th NSC mtgs, 1, 8 Dec 60: NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; NAC communiqué, 19 Dec 60, DeptState *Bulletin*, XLIV (9 Jan 61), 39-40. See ch XVII for further discussion of these subjects.

XV. STRATEGIC TARGETING: THE SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATING PLAN

1. The two preceding paragraphs draw on articles by David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," *International Security*, VII (Spring 83), 12-50, and "A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours': Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954-55," *International Security*, VI (Winter 81/82), 7-11. Aaron L. Friedberg, "A History of the U.S. Strategic 'Doctrine'—1945 to 1980," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, III (Dec 80), 37-71, summarizes targeting policy during the period indicated in the title. For the evolution of target selection under the early JCS plans, see Desmond Ball, *Targeting for Strategic Deterrence*, 3-8.

2. History and Research Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, *History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff: Background and Preparation of SIOP-62*, 1-2 (hereafter cited as Hq SAC, *History of JSTPS*); Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine*, I:434-35; Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, *Study of Airpower: Hearings*, 167-72; quote from memo CJCS for SecDef, 17 Aug 59, CM-380-59, fldr 684 (16 Jun 60 Case) 1959 doc, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
3. For a discussion of these targeting philosophies, see Futrell, I:433-37; Alfred Goldberg, *A Brief Survey of the Evolution of Ideas about Counterforce*, 5-21; George F. Lemmer, *The Air Force and Strategic Deterrence, 1951-1960*, 53-59.
4. Donald A. Quarles, "How Much Is 'Enough'?" *Air Force*, XXXIX (Sep 56), 51-52, and "The Uses of Modern Arms," *Flying*, LXI (Feb 57), 25-26.
5. Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill," 35, 43-44; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 21 Nov 59, fldr Staff Notes Nov 59 (2), Box 45, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 4 Nov 57, OSD Hist; memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 28 Nov 58, fldr Staff Notes Nov 58, Box 37, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
6. NSC 5816, 1 Jul 58, fldr 5816 Net Evaluation Subcommittee, Box 2, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024; ltr Pres to Hickey, 27 Nov 58, fldr Net Evaluation Subcommittee (1957-60), Box 14, Briefing Notes subser, NSC ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL. For the establishment of the NESCS, see Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 139-41.
7. Memo Cutler for Twining, 24 Mar 58, fldr Net Evaluation Subcommittee (1957-60), Box 14, Briefing Notes subser, NSC ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL.
8. Memo Cutler for Pres, 18 Mar 58, fldr Nuclear Policy (1958), Box 14, Briefing Notes subser, NSC ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL; memo Cutler for Twining, 24 Mar 58, cited in preceding note.
9. Memo of disc (Gleason), 387th NSC mtg, 20 Nov 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; NSC Action 2009, 20 Nov 58, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1958, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
10. Memo of mtg at Pentagon (Gray), 6 Feb 59, fldr Defense Presentations to the Pres, Box 6, Briefing Notes subser, NSC ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL; memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 16 Feb 59, fldr Meetings with Pres 1959 (6), Box 4, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL; memo CJCS for SpecAsst (Gray), 19 Feb 59, CM-303-59, OSD Hist; memo CJCS for Hickey, 20 Feb 59, CM-305-59, looseleaf binder Defense Presentations to the Pres, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574. The appraisal became one of the "four studies" launched about the same time: see ch XI.
11. Oral Presentation by Gen Hickey, 6 Nov 59, fldr 684 (16 Jun 1960 Case) 1959 doc, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093. A brief summary of the findings is given in SIOP-62 Briefing, 43.
12. Draft memo CJCS for Pres, CM-449-60, nd (apparently never sent), memo CJCS for Svc Chiefs, 25 Nov 59, CM-434-59; *ibid*.
13. Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill," 52; Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon*, 234.
14. Naval officer quoted in Kaplan, *Wizards of Armageddon*, 233-34; Gates statements as reported in memrcd Burke, 28 Feb 58, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC. Budget Director Stans told the NSC on 18 August 1959 that Navy briefing officers had declared to him that a force of 29 deployed Polaris submarines could destroy 232 targets—enough to destroy the entire Soviet Union. When he asked why, if this were the case, other weapons were needed, he was told that this was "someone else's problem": type-written document, "Polaris," 10 Feb 60, unsigned, summarizing statements regarding Polaris at NSC meetings, fldr DoD IV (3) (Mar-Apr 60), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
15. Memo ActgSecDef for CJCS, 24 Dec 58, fldr Reading File #3—1 Jul-31 Dec 58, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769.
16. Memo JCS for SecDef, 8 May 59, JCSM-171-59, fldr Polaris 560 (Command Arrangements) 23 Jun 59, Box 1, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 63-A1668.
17. Memo Gates for McElroy, 4 Jun 59, memo Randall for CJCS, 30 Jul 59; *ibid*.
18. Memrcd Burke, 16 Jun 59, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; AFPC mtg notes 28 Jul 59, fldr AFPC May-Aug 59, Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
19. Memo of disc (Johnson), 417th NSC mtg, 18 Aug 59, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.

20. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 17 Aug 59, CM-380-59, fldr 684 (16 June 60 Case) 1959 doc, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093; summarized in SIOP-62 Briefing, 42-43.
21. Memo CJCS for JCS, 24 Aug 59, CM-386-59, *ibid*.
22. Memo CNO for CJCS, 30 Sep 59, *ibid*.
23. Draft memo CJCS for Pres, CM-449-60, nd, atchmt to memo CJCS for SvcChiefs, 13 Jan 60, CM-444-60, fldr 684 (16 June 60 Case) Jan-May 60, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
24. Statement by Twining in memo CJCS for SecDef, 22 Jan 60, CM-465-60, *ibid*; draft memo CJCS for Pres, 15 Jan 60, CM-449-60 (a redraft of memo cited in preceding note, though bearing same serial number): *ibid*.
25. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 22 Jan 60, CM-465-60, *ibid*. Attached is an office memo, Twining for Gates, same date, stating that the memorandum is "longer than I would like" owing to the "many interrelated issues involved" and urging that the "entire problem area should be looked at in perspective."
26. Memrcd Burke, 30 Jan 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; memo by SJCS (decision on Hickey report), 30 Jan 60, fldr JMF 3001 (20 Feb 59), Box 11, CDC 1959, JCS files, RG 218, NARA.
27. Memrcd Burke, 12 Feb 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; Kistiakowsky, 253-54. Burke referred to the occasion as an NSC meeting, but it was not so considered for official purposes. Hickey made a second presentation to the president at a 29 April meeting attended by Twining, Gates, Gray, Goodpaster, and Vice President Nixon, following which the president ordered the destruction of all documents pertaining to the study: memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 29 Apr 60, fldr 1960 Meetings with President Volume 1 (3), Box 4, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL.
28. JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 306-08; memo CJCS for SecDef, 8 Jan 60, CM-448-60, w/encl, JSOP-63, fldr 381 JSOP 63 8 Jan 60, Box 1, OASD(C) files, Acc 62-A4671.
29. Memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Apr 60, JCSM-158-60, fldr 381 1960, Box 21, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093: "Decision on JCSM-158-60," memo by SJCS, 19 Apr 60, encl/w memo SJCS for Gen Brown, same date, fldr JMF 3120 (23 Mar 59) Gp 3, Box 13, CDC 1959, JCS files, RG 218, NARA.
30. *New York Times*, 28 Jan, 1 Feb 59; *Washington Post*, 1 Mar 59.
31. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960: Hearings*, pt 1:928-29.
32. *Ibid*, 330. For a similar, and nearly contemporaneous, statement from a naval viewpoint, see P. H. Backus, "Finite Deterrence, Controlled Retaliation," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, LXXXV (Mar 59), 23-29.
33. Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, 181-97, 62, 132; Medaris, *Countdown for Decision*, 279.
34. *Army-Navy-Air Force Journal*, XCVI (27 Jun 59), 14, and (22 Aug 59), 1; Thomas S. Power, with Albert A. Arnheim, *Design for Survival*, *passim*. Pp. 11-12 of this book recount the story of the banning of the manuscript. The Air Force cleared it for publication, but then Power learned, through the *Journal*, that the secretary of defense had held it up; McElroy subsequently conferred with Power and explained the reasons for his decision.
35. For summaries of writings on strategy between 1955 and 1960, see Colin S. Gray, *Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience*, 45-85; Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 123-223; Michael Howard, "The Classical Strategists," 157-77; Marc Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, 3-46; Futrell, I:606-10, 618-29. Howard characterizes the years 1955-60 as "the great period of American intellectual strategic speculation" (174). For nearly contemporary summaries by partisans of one or the other targeting theory, see George E. Lowe, *The Age of Deterrence*, and Richard Fryklund, *100 Million Lives: Maximum Survival in a Nuclear War*, reflecting Navy and Air Force viewpoints, respectively. The discussion was of course related to that involving the role of "limited war": see ch V.
36. Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*, *passim*, esp. 1-39; Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, 227-78, 397, 402 (quotes 277, 402); B.H. Liddell Hart, *Deterrent or Defense: A Fresh Look at the West's Military Position*, 63-64.
37. Baar and Howard, *Polaris!*, 215-17.

38. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 2:118-25 (quote, 119).
39. House Cte on Govt Opns, *Civil Defense: Hearings*, 86 Cong, 2nd Sess (1960), 136-66, 170-208.
40. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 1:26.
41. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 5 May 60, fldr Staff Notes May 60 (2), Box 50, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
42. Memo JCS for SecDef, 6 May 60, JCSM-193-60, fldr 684 (16 June 60 Case) Jan-May 60, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
43. Memo of conf with Pres (J. S. D. Eisenhower), 6 Jul 60, fldr Staff Notes July 60, Box 51, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; *Public Statements, SecDef Gates, 1959-60*, III:684-86; memrcd Burke, 8 Jun 60 (describing mtg with SecDef 7 Jun), Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
44. Memo of conf with Pres (J. S. D. Eisenhower), 6 Jul 60, cited in preceding note. For contemporary news stories on the dispute over strategic targeting, see *Washington Post*, 12 Jun 60, and *Aviation Week*, 20 Jun 60.
45. Memo Brown for Gates, 30 Jun 60, fldr 684 (Sensitive) (SD File) 1960, Box 6, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489. For evidence of further JCS discussion during July 1960, see memo JCS for SecDef, 7 Jul 60, JCSM-280-60, and memo SJCS for JCS Members, 20 Jul 60, SM-696-60: fldr 684 (16 June Case) Jun-Jul 60, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
46. Gates's recollection was that he, Douglas, and Brown drafted the directives: Gates interv, 3 Aug 67, 50, CUOHP. Johnson's views are expressed in memo for Gates, 8 Aug 60, fldr 684 (Sensitive) 1960, Box 6, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489; this document is also the source for the information about Gates's final meeting with the Joint Staff on 4 August.
47. Statement by Burke to Lemnitzer, "Adm. Burke's conversation with Gen. Lemnitzer, 10 August 1960," fldr SIOP/NSTL Briefing, Burke papers, NHC.
48. The drafts presented by SecDef to the JCS included a memo for CJCS, a draft directive to Gen Power (CINCSAC) appointing him DSTP, a circular to the JCS and the commands instituting the NSTL and the SIOP, and a statement of targeting and attack policy containing damage criteria. All but the last of these are enclosed with memo Gates for Goodpaster, 10 Aug 60, fldr DoD Vol. IV (6) (Aug 60), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL. The policy statement (with minor revisions made by the JCS) is enclosed with memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Aug 60, JCSM-352-60, fldr 684 (16 Jan 60 Case) Aug-Sep 60, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093. The substance of the drafts is summarized in msg CNO for CINCPACFLT, CINCLANTFLT, and CINCUSNAVEUR, 121957Z Aug 60, fldr SIOP/NSTL Briefing, Burke papers, NHC. This message says that the meeting took place on "Monday," which would have been 8 August; however, other documents leave no doubt that it occurred on 10 August. The Gates quotation is from Gates interv, 3 Aug 67, 51, CUOHP.
49. The above account of the meeting is from msgs CNO for CINCPACFLT, CINCLANTFLT, and CINCUSNAVEUR, 121957Z and 122347Z Aug 60, fldr SIOP/NSTL Briefing, Burke papers, NHC. Gates's remark about Burke's reaction is quoted from Gates interv, 3 Aug 67, 51, CUOHP. With reference to the warning about even more disruptive changes, Gates, in the same interv (50), represented himself as having told the JCS, either at this meeting or about the same time, that "there's going to be a guy come in here some day with a computer [who] is going to just lay it out on the line and tell you what you're going to do." Some might consider this a remarkably prescient statement in view of the approach taken by Gates's successor, Secretary McNamara.
50. Informal memo for Pres, evidently by Burke but unsigned, 11 Aug 60, fldr DoD Vol. IV (6) (Aug 60), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL. Several earlier drafts of this paper, both typed and handwritten, are in fldr SIOP/NSTL Briefing, Burke papers, NHC.
51. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 11 Aug 60, fldr Staff Notes Aug 60 (3), Box 51, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.

52. Gates interv, 3 Aug 67, 52, 51, CUOHP. The president's son, John Eisenhower, recalled an occasion on the *Sequoia* when, "over a couple of drinks," some of Gates's former Navy associates "lit into him" for his decision in this matter: J.S.D. Eisenhower interv, 22 Oct 84, 54, OSD Hist.
53. Transcript of conv, Burke with Rear Adms Parker and Raborn, 16 Aug 60, minutes of CNO Deputies Conf, 18 Aug 60: fldr Transcripts and Phonecons (NSTL), Burke papers, NHC; Gates interv, 3 Aug 67, 52, CUOHP.
54. Memrcd Burke, 15 Aug 60, fldr SIOP/NSTL Briefing, Burke papers, NHC. For Gates's attitude toward Power, see Gates interv, 3 Aug 67, 51, CUOHP.
55. Transcript of conv, Burke with Rear Adms Parker and Raborn, 16 Aug 60, fldr Transcripts and Phonecons (NSTL), Burke papers, NHC; *Baltimore Sun*, 19 Aug 60.
56. Msg JCS 981332 for CINCAL et al, 12 Aug 60, fldr NSTL/SIOP Messages Other than Exclusives and Personals (1 Aug-31 Dec 60), Burke papers, NHC.
57. Memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Aug 60, JCSM-362-60, fldr 684 (16 Jun 60 Case) Aug-Sep 1960, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093; memo SecDef for CJCS, 16 Aug 60, looseleaf fldr Background for Notes of Briefing at SAC February 4-5, 1961, *ibid*.
58. Minutes of CNO Deputies conf, 18 Aug 60, fldr Transcripts and Phonecons (NSTL), Burke papers, NHC; memo Burke for Op-06, 19 Aug 60, memrcd Rear Adm Claude Ricketts (Op-06), 20 Aug 60, JCSM-372-60: fldr 684 (16 Jun 60 Case) Aug-Sep 60, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
59. *Public Statements, SecDef Gates, 1959-60*, III:753; *New York Times*, 18 Aug 60; *Washington Star*, 18 Aug 60.
60. "National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy," Tab A, memo SJCS for Gen Power, SM-809-60, Tab B; memo JCS for DSTP et al, Tab C, all 19 Aug 60, encls/w memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Aug 60, JCSM-372-60: fldr 684 (16 Jun 60 Case) Aug-Sep 60, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
61. Msg CNO for CINCLANTFLT et al, 192339Z Aug 60, fldr NSTL/SIOP Messages Other than Exclusives and Personals (1 Aug-31 Dec 60), Burke papers, NHC.
62. Memo Rear Adm Claude Ricketts for Burke, 22 Aug 60, fldr Memos and Letters (NSTL), *ibid*; Gates interv, 3 Aug 67, 52, CUOHP.
63. Mins of CNO Deputies Conf, 18 Aug 60, transcript of conv, Burke with Rear Adms Parker and Raborn, 16 Aug 60: fldr Transcripts and Phonecons (NSTL), Burke papers, NHC.
64. Msg Dir of Strategic Target Planning for JCS et al, 231545Z Aug 60, msg JCS 982265 for DSTP, 011511Z Sep 60: fldr NSTL/SIOP Messages Other than Exclusives and Personals (1 Aug-31 Dec 60), *ibid*; memo DSTP for JCS, 27 Aug 60, fldr Memos and Letters (NSTL), *ibid*.
65. Memo DSTP for JCS, 27 Aug 60, fldr Memos and Letters (NSTL), *ibid*; Hq SAC, *History of JSTPS*, 14; mins of CNO Deputies Conf, 18 Aug 60, fldr Transcripts and Phonecons (NSTL), Burke papers, NHC.
66. Gates informed the JCS of his wishes in this matter by memo SecDef for CJCS, 21 Sep 60, fldr 684 (16 Jun 60 Case) Aug-Sep 60, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093. However, he had apparently made his feelings known earlier, since the JCS had told DSTP on 20 September to change the title: msg JCS 983614 for DSTP, 202039Z Sep 60, fldr NSTL/SIOP Messages Other than Exclusives and Personals (1 Aug-31 Dec 60), Burke papers, NHC.
67. For the development of the SIOP and the NSTL, see memos and correspondence in fldrs Memos and Letters (NSTL) and NSTL/SIOP Messages, Burke papers, NHC. Summaries are given in Kaplan, *Wizards of Armageddon*, 266-68; Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill," 7-8; and SIOP-62 Briefing, 44-51.
68. Msg CNO for DSTP, 251613Z Oct 60, msgs CNO for CINCPACFLT, CINCLANTFLT, and CINCUSNAVEUR, 291715Z Oct 60, 0604032 Nov 60: fldr NSTL/SIOP Messages Exclusives and Personals, Burke papers, NHC.
69. Kistiakowsky, 399.
70. *Ibid*, 396.
71. *Ibid*, 400 (reporting conversation with Aurand 6 Oct 60); memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 5 Oct 60, fldr 1960 Meetings with Pres Vol. 2 (5), Box 5, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL.

72. Kistiakowsky, 399; memo of disc (Boggs), 462nd NSC mtg, 6 Oct 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
73. Kistiakowsky, 405-07.
74. Memo Pres for Kistiakowsky, 19 Oct 60, fldr (Dr. Kistiakowsky (6) (Oct-Dec 1960), Box 16, Alpha subser, Subj ser, OSS Files, WHO, DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 407.
75. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 11 Oct 60, fldr Staff Notes Oct 60 (1), Box 53, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 7 Nov 60, fldr Staff Notes Nov 60, Box 54, *ibid*.
76. Kistiakowsky, 413-14 (quote, 414).
77. *Ibid*, 413; Peter Pringle and William Arkin, *S.I.O.P.: The Secret U.S. Plan for Nuclear War*, 103.
78. Memo Kistiakowsky for Pres, 25 Nov 60, w/encl, comments on briefings by JSTPS, 3-5 Nov 60, looseleaf binder Background For Notes of Briefing at SAC, February 4, 5, 1961, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093; Pringle and Arkin, 103; Kaplan, *Wizards of Armageddon*, 268-69.
79. Kistiakowsky, 415-416.
80. Ltr Brig Gen Brown to Power, 23 Nov 60, fldr 684 (Sensitive) (SD File) 1960, Box 6, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.
81. Memo Kistiakowsky for Pres, 25 Nov 60, cited in n 78; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 25 Nov 60, fldr Staff Notes Nov 60, Box 54, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill," 8, citing a document from Burke papers, NHC.
82. Ltr Burke for Flag and Gen Ofcra ("Special Edition Flag Officers Dope"), 4 Dec 60, fldr Memos and Letters (NSTL), Burke papers, NHC; *New York Times*, 1 Dec 60. The agenda for the meeting is given in memo Livesay for AFPC, 28 Nov 60, fldr AFPC Advices of Action (1959-), Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
83. Lemnitzer interv, Nov-Dec 72, 58, CUOHP; *New York Times*, 3 Dec 60.
84. Msg CNO for CINCPACFLT, CINCLANTFLT, and CINCUSNAVEUR, 101849Z Dec 60, fldr NSTL/SIOP Messages Exclusives and Personals, Burke papers, NHC; memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Dec 60, JCSM-560-60, fldr 684 (16 Jun 60 Case) Aug-Sep 60, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
85. Memrcd Burke, 2 Nov 60, fldr Memos and Letters (NSTL), Burke papers, NHC; msg CNO for CINCPACFLT, CINCLANTFLT, and CINCUSNAVEUR, 180023Z Nov 60, fldr NSTL/SIOP Messages Exclusives and Personals, *ibid*.
86. Msgs CNO for CINCPACFLT, CINCLANTFLT, and CINCUSNAVEUR, 101849Z Dec 60, 160247Z Feb 61, fldr NSTL/SIOP Messages Exclusives and Personals, *ibid*; memo Brown for Gates, 28 Dec 60, fldr 337 Conferences and Briefings 1960, Box 14, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; JCS Hist Div, *Chronology of JCS Organization, 1945-1984*, 171-72, 176-77.
87. Hq SAC, *History of JSTPS*, 15-17; ltr Parker to Burke, 7 Jan 61 (source of quote), msg CINCPACFLT for CNO, CINCLANTFLT, and CINCUSNAVEUR, 080005Z Jan 61, msg CINCLANTFLT for CNO, 171348Z Jan 61; fldr NSTL/SIOP Messages Exclusives and Personals, Burke papers, NHC.
88. Memo Goodpaster for SecDef, 12 Jan 61, w/encl, memo SecDef for CJCS, 20 Jan 61, fldr 684 Sensitive (SD File) 1960, Box 6, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.

XVI. WESTERN EUROPE, 1956-1958

1. This chapter and the following one draw very heavily on a draft study by Ronald D. Landa, "The Office of the Secretary of Defense and Western European Defense, 1953-1961," available in OSD Hist. Drafts of chs 4, 6, 7, 8, and part of ch 5 of the Landa study have been used here.
2. The background and origin of NATO are treated in Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance*, 1-49.
3. The two preceding paragraphs are based on North Atlantic Treaty Organization Information Service, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (The NATO Handbook)*, 41-46, (hereafter cited as *NATO Handbook*), and Douglas L. Bland, *The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: A Study of Structure and Strategy*, 113-213.

4. *NATO Handbook*, 46-51, 89-92. For the command arrangements in the Mediterranean, see ch XVII.
5. Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 294-96.
6. *Ibid*, 306, 311-13, 316-20.
7. Statement by Eisenhower to Duncan Sandys, British MoD, 1 Feb 57, memo, "Appointment with Sir Duncan Sandys, British Minister of Defence, Friday, February 1, 1957," ns, nd: OSD Hist. On Norstad in general, see Robert S. Jordan, "Norstad: Can the SACEUR Be Both European and American?", in Robert S. Jordan, ed., *Generals in International Politics: NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe*, 73-92.
8. NATO Information Services, *Facts About NATO*, sec B2, v, 1-3; Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 285.
9. Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 229.
10. *Ibid*.
11. Memo of disc (Gleason), 285th NSC mtg, 17 May 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:306.
12. Memo ASD(ISA) for ASD(S&L) et al, 9 May 56, memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Jun 56: fldr NATO Annual Review 1956, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379.
13. Memoranda and correspondence in *FRUS 1955-57*, IV:84-92.
14. DeptState memcon, 13 Aug 56, *ibid*, 93-95 and n 5 on 95.
15. Ltr SecState to SecDef, 13 Sep 56, Ltr SecDef to SecState, 25 Sep 56, Ltr SecState to DepSecDef, 1 Oct 56, each enclosing draft memo for Pres: fldr U.S. Position on Review of NATO Strategy and Force Levels, Box 3, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 61-A6489. The 1 October draft, with modifications, was sent to the president by Secretary Dulles: *FRUS 1955-57*, IV:96-99. Discussions of these drafts are summarized in Ltr Robertson to Wilson, 29 Sep 56, fldr Reading File #4, July 1956 thru Oct 1956, Box 2, DepSecDef Robertson files, Acc 63-A1767 (Wilson was then in the hospital and had been represented by Robertson in the discussions). The president's decision is recorded in memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 2 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, IV:99-102.
16. U.K. draft directive to NAC, encl with Ltr SecState to DepSecDef, 4 Oct 56, DeptState memcon, 7 Oct 56: fldr U.S. Position on Review of NATO Strategy and Force Levels, Box 3, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 61-A6489; editorial note, *FRUS 1955-57*, IV:102.
17. Ltr C. Burke Elbrick, ActgAsstSecState for EurAff, to ASD(ISA), 7 Sep 56, fldr 334 NATO, Box 23, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1956, Acc 60-A1339; memo JCS for SecDef, 6 Oct 56, memrcd Col H. A. Twitchell (apparently in OASD(ISA)), 1 Nov 56: fldr NATO 373.24 (9 Feb 57), OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372. The draft of MC 14/2 has not been found, but a general idea of its contents can be obtained from the JCS comments.
18. Memo Brig Gen John S. Guthrie, USA, DirEurReg, OASD(ISA), for Irwin, 14 Oct 57, w/encl, brief of NATO political directive, fldr 334 NATO, Box 19, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-B1672.
19. Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, Table 6, 257-61. Information about subsequent (1957-60) NAC decisions on force objectives has not been found.
20. Memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Feb 57, w/encl, memo Lt Gen Alonzo P. Fox, USA, OASD(ISA), for CJCS, 16 Feb 57, memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 12 Mar 57: fldr NATO 373.24 (9 Feb 57), Box 1, OSD CCS 1957 files, Acc 62-B1372; JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 114-15.
21. Memo JCS for SecDef, 26 Mar 57, w/encl, memo USRepSGN (Lt Gen Leon W. Johnson, USAF) for JCS, 27 Feb 57, fldr NATO 373.24 (9 Feb 57), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372; memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 5 Apr 57, fldr 381 Jan-June, Box 9, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-A1672; brief of MC 14/2, atchmt to memo Brig Gen Guthrie for Irwin, 14 Oct 57, fldr 334 NATO, Box 19, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-B1672; JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 116, n 17.
22. Memo JCS for SecDef, 1 Mar 57, memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 14 Mar 57: fldr NATO 373.24 (9 Feb 57), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1672; brief of NSC 48/2, atchmt to memo Guthrie for Irwin, 14 Oct 57, fldr 334 NATO, Box 19, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-B1672.
23. Memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Jul 57, memo ASD(ISA) for DEFREPNAME, 16 Aug 57: fldr NATO AR 57 10 May 57, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.

24. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 3 Oct 57, fldr NATO 320.2 3 July 57, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-1372. See also chs IV and V.
25. Memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Oct 57, w/App "A", Changes to US reply to ARQ(57), and App "B", msg USNMR ALO 953 (from Norstad) for CJCS, nd: fldr NATO 320.2 3 July 57, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372; memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 22 Nov 57, fldr 320.2, Box 19, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-B1672.
26. Memrcd Lt Gen Clovis E. Byers, USA, MilAdv to ASD(ISA), summarizing conf 12 Nov 57, fldr NATO 320.2 3 July 57, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372; msg USNMR Paris ALO 1031 for DeptA (Norstad for SecDef), 181706Z Nov 57, msg OSD DEF 932882 for USRO Paris, 191657Z Nov 57: OSD Hist; statements by Quarles to AFPC, AFPC mtg notes, 13 Nov 57, fldr AFPC Nov-Dec 57, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
27. Statement by McNeil before NSC, 22 Nov 57, fldr FY 1959 Budget—Nov-Dec 57, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; also summarized in memo of disc (Gleason), 346th NSC mtg, 22 Nov 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:689-91. The budget increases are described in chs VI and VII.
28. Memcon Dulles with Pres on USS *Saratoga*, 6 Jun 57, fldr Meetings with the President 1957 (5), Box 6, White House Memorandum ser, JFD papers, DDEL.
29. Ltr Norstad to SecState, 2 Jul 57, encl with ltr SecState to Pres, 19 Jul 57, OSD Hist.
30. Ltr Dulles to Wilson, 7 Aug 57, w/encl, draft memo for Pres, memo JCS for SecDef, 18 Sep 57, ltr DepSecDef to SecState, 10 Oct 57, ltr SecState to DepSecDef, 10 Jan 58: fldr NATO 320.2 3 July 57, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372; ltr SecState to Pres, 19 Jul 57, cited in preceding note; statement by Quarles at AFPC mtg, AFPC mtg notes, 14 Jan 58, fldr AFPC Jan-Feb 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; AFPC Advice of Action, 14 Jan 58, OSD Hist.
31. Memo USRepSGN (Lt Gen Leon W. Johnson, USAF) for JCS, 7 Oct 57, memo ActgASD (ISA) for Quarles, 22 Oct 57, w/atchd summaries of studies by SACEUR, SACLANT, and CINCHAN, memrcd Col Sidney V. Bingham, USA, Asst for NATO-Regional Affairs, Eur Region, OASD(ISA), and memo Brig Gen Guthrie for Sprague et al, both 15 Nov 57: fldr 320.2, Box 19, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-B1672.
32. Memos JCS for SecDef, 14, 27 Feb 58, fldr NATO 320.2 22 Jan 58, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
33. Memo McNeil for Quarles, 1 Mar 58, fldr JSOP-61 (MC 70), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
34. JSOP-61 was formally approved, in writing, for planning purposes on 10 March 1958 (see ch X). The AFPC discussed it on 11 February 1958, but the official record does not indicate any statement by McElroy that could be construed as in conflict with the JCS comments on the MC 70 forces: AFPC mtg notes, 11 Feb 58, fldr AFPC Jan-Feb 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
35. AFPC mtg notes, 4 Mar 58, fldr AFPC Mar 58, Box 4, *ibid*; AFPC Advice of Action, 4 Mar 58, OSD Hist; memo OASD(ISA) for DepSecDef, ns, 4 Mar 58, memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 4 Mar 58: fldr JSOP-61 (MC 70), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
36. Memo CJCS for JCS, 21 Mar 58, CM-96-58 (JCS 2073/1545, 26 Mar 58), fldr CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) (2) Sec 102, Box 171, Geographic file 1958, JCS files, RG 218, NARA; MC 70, Rept by MC to NAC on Minimum Essential Force Requirements, 1958-1963, 29 Jan 58, as amended 14 Mar 58, and Final Dec by NAC, 9 May 58, OSD Hist.
37. Memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Jul 58, w/encl, fldr NATO 000-299 1958, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606.
38. Memo McNeil for McElroy and Quarles, 1 Aug 58, memo AdminSec for DEFREPNAME, 12 Aug 58, *ibid*; AFPC mtg notes, 5 Aug 58, fldr AFPC Aug-Sep 58, Box 4, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
39. Memo of disc (Gleason), 390th NSC mtg, 11 Dec 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 1:366-69.
40. Msg USNMR Paris ALO 1108 for OASD(ISA) (Gruenther for Gray), 031250Z Oct 56, DA IN 257445, OSD Hist.
41. PL 83-703 (30 Aug 54, secs 144-a, 144-b); presentation by ATSD(AE) Loper before NSC PB, 26 Apr 60, fldr Increased Nuclear Sharing with Allies, Box 5, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.

42. NSC 5602/1, 15 Mar 56, para 17, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:248; *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1956*, 52. For the 1958 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, see ch XIV.
43. Marcelle Size Knaack, *Post-World War II Bombers, 1945-1973*, vol II in *Encyclopedia of U.S. Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems*, 62, 81-82; Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 298, 317; statement by Gen Gruenther, 22 Mar 56, House Cte on Foreign Affairs, *Mutual Security Program*, pt 5: *Mutual Security Act of 1955, Mutual Security Act of 1956 (Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1951-56, Historical Series)*, XIII:282; Wilson speech to NAC, 14 Dec 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, IV:159.
44. JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 116-19; White House Staff Notes No. 100, 19 Apr 57, OSD Hist; *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1957*, 56-58.
45. App to memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Nov 57, fldr NATO 1958, Box 5, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
46. Memo by Livesay, "Meeting between Mr. Sandys, British Minister of Defence, and Mr. Wilson, U.S. Secretary of Defense, 28 January 1957, Room 3E869," fldr Minutes of Sandys-Wilson Talks, Jan-Feb 57, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4739; ltrs Sandys to Wilson, 30 Jan 57, and Wilson to Sandys, 1 Feb 57, fldr UK 471.61 22 Jan 60, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093; ltr Eisenhower to Macmillan, 23 Mar 57, OSD Hist.
47. Msg USNMR Paris ALO 1108 for OASD(ISA) (Gruenther for Gray), 031250Z Oct 56, DA IN 257445, OSD Hist. For Norstad's position on this issue (and on other issues as well), see Jordan, "Norstad: Can the SACEUR Be Both European and American?" 73-92.
48. Memo of disc (Gleason), 319th NSC mtg, 11 Apr 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:474; NSC 5707/8, 3 Jun 57, para 17, *ibid*, 512.
49. Memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 24 May 57, fldr 471.2, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-B1672; ltr SecState to SecDef, 26 Jul 57, fldr 471.6 Jan-Sep, Box 11, *ibid*.
50. Ltr SecState to SecDef, 2 Jul 57, fldr 471.6 Jan-Sep, Box 11, *ibid*; msg Paris 6651 for State, 27 Jun 57, OSD Hist.
51. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 26 Jul 57, fldr NATO 1958, Box 5, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
52. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 23 Aug 57, fldr 471.6, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-B1372; memrcd Col Warren, 5 Sep 57, fldr 337 (1957), Box 2, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372; memo ActgASD(ISA) for CJCS, 15 Oct 57, fldr 471.6 Oct thru Dec, Box 11, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-A1672.
53. Memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Oct 57, fldr NATO 1958, Box 5, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
54. DeptState memcon 25 Oct 57, encl/w memo DirExecSecretariat DeptState for Goodpaster, 1 Nov 57, OSD Hist.
55. Ltr Norstad to Pres, 7 Nov 57, encl/w ltr Norstad to SecDef, 7 Nov 57, fldr NATO 1957, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372; interv with Gen Lauris Norstad by Richard D. Challener, 1 Feb 67, 7-9, JFDOHP.
56. The discussion of this matter is recorded in documents in fldrs 8 Oct 57 U.S. Policy on France, Files No. 1 and 2, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500. See especially briefing papers by OASD(ISA) for PB mtg, 10 Sep 57, and for NSC mtg, 17 Oct 57, and memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Oct 57, in File No. 2; and NSC 5721, U.S. Policy on France, 30 Sep 57, and the final version, NSC 5721/1, 19 Oct 57, both in File No. 1. The NSC discussed the subject on 17 October 1957: memo of disc (Gleason), 340th NSC mtg, 17 Oct 57, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
57. Memo ActgASD(ISA) for CJCS, 7 Nov 57, fldr 471.6, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-B1672.
58. Memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Nov 57, fldr NATO 1958, Box 5, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
59. Ltrs SecDef to SecState and to ChmAEC, 26 Nov 57, *ibid*.
60. Text of address by Dulles, 16 Dec 57, DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXVIII (6 Jan 58), 8-9, 11 (quote, 9).
61. Communiqué, *ibid*, 14.
62. Msg USNMR ALO 116 for DeptA (SecDef from Norstad), 081720Z Jan 58, DA IN 83374, OSD Hist; msg USNMR Paris ALO 197 for DeptA (SecDef from Norstad), 040853Z

- Feb 58, DA IN 90424, fldr 23 USP Info and Aid to Allies 1958-1960, Box 1, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 68-A6453.
63. NSC 5810/1, 5 May 58, para 18, OSD Hist.
 64. Ltr ActgSecState to SecDef, 14 Aug 58, fldr 471.6 Jul-Sep, Box 12, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-A1693.
 65. Memo P. E. Barringer, ActgDirEurReg, OASD(ISA), for Haydn Williams, DepASD(ISA), 27 Aug 59, fldr 5910 U.S. Policy on France, Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff Files, Acc 65-A3500.
 66. Memo SecAF for SecDef, 31 Mar 56, fldr 471.6-510, Box 24, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1956, Acc 60-A1339; Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 248.
 67. DeptState memcon 16 Jul 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXXVII:663-65; memo SecAF for SecDef, 24 Jul 56, fldr UK 471.94 (4 Jan 57), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372.
 68. AFPC mtg notes, 29 Aug 56, fldr AFPC Jul-Aug 56, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; memo DepSecDef for AFPC members, 21 Sep 56, memo SAGM for DepSecDef, 30 Aug 56: fldr UK 471.94 (4 Jan 57), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372.
 69. Memo SAGM for SecDef, 18 Sep 56, fldr UK 471.94 (4 Jan 57), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372.
 70. Memo DepSecDef for AFPC members, 21 Sep 56, *ibid*.
 71. Memo Winthrop G. Brown, AmEmb London, for Ambassador, 9 Oct 56, ltr Walworth Barbour, AmEmb London, to C. Burke Elbrick, DeptState, 15 Oct 56: fldr IRBM Top Secret File, Box 2, London Embassy files, Lot 61 F 14, Acc 68-A5159, RG 84, WNRC; ltr Robertson to Aldrich, 2 Nov 56, fldr Reading File 1 Nov 56-29 Apr 57, Box 2, Dep SecDef Robertson files, Acc 63-A1767.
 72. Ltr Head to Wilson, 20 Dec 56, msg SecDef to British MoD, 31 Dec 56, atchmt to memo Randall to ASD(R&D), 31 Dec 56: fldr UK 381 US-UK Discussions 4 Jan 57, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
 73. Memo SAGM for ASD(ISA), 16 Jan 57, fldr UK 471.94 (4 Jan 57), Box 1, *ibid*.
 74. Memo JCS for SecDef, 24 Jan 57, fldr 091.112-470 UK, Box 21, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-B1672.
 75. Ltr Wilson to Pres, 28 Jan 57, OSD Hist.
 76. Memo SAGM for SecDef, 24 Jan 57, fldr UK 471.94 (4 Jan 57), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372; App B to memo JCS for SecDef, 24 Jan 57, fldr UK 381 4 Jan 57, Box 1, *ibid*.
 77. Records of the discussions are in fldrs UK 381 4 Jan 57, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372, and Minutes of Sandys-Wilson Talks, Jan-Feb 57, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4739. Some of the documents have been printed in *FRUS 1955-57*, XXVII: 683-93.
 78. Memos by R. Eugene Livesay, "Meeting between Mr. Sandys, British Minister of Defence, and Mr. Wilson, U.S. Secretary of Defense," and "Meeting in Secretary Wilson's Office Following Luncheon," both 28 Jan 57, fldr Minutes of Sandys-Wilson Talks Jan-Feb 57, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4739; DeptState memo, "Notes on a Discussion between the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) and the British Minister of Defence (Sandys) at the Pentagon, January 28, 1957," *FRUS 1955-57*, XXVII:683-85.
 79. "Notes on United States-United Kingdom Meeting on Missiles, 29 January 1957," by C.S. Weaver, OASD(R&D), and A.G. Waggoner, OSAGM, fldr Minutes of Sandys-Wilson talks, Jan-Feb 57, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4639.
 80. Summary of disc held in ofc of AsstSecAF(R&D), 31 Jan 57, ns (memo dtd 8 Feb 57), fldr Minutes of Wilson-Sandys Talks, Jan-Feb 57, Box 1, *ibid*; memo for files, Edwin M. Martin (alternate permanent representative to NAC), nd, "Duncan Sandys Talks, Thursday and Friday, January 31-February 1, 1957," *FRUS 1955-57*, XXVII:690-93; ltr Wilson to Sandys, 1 Feb 57, fldr UK 471.61 22 Jan 60, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
 81. Ltr Robertson to Murphy, 13 Feb 57, fldr UK 381 4 Jan 57, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
 82. Memo ActgSecState and SecDef for Pres, 14 Mar 57, OSD Hist.
 83. Memrcd ASD(ISA), 1 Apr 57, summarizing mtg 19 Mar 57, fldr U.K. 471.94 (4 Jan 57), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
 84. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 22 Mar 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXVII:733-36.

85. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 22 Mar 57, cited in preceding note; memcon Timmons, DeptState, Eisenhower-Macmillan mtg, 22 Mar 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXVII: 736-42.
86. Memo SecAF for SecDef, 26 Mar 57, w/atchmts, fldr UK 471.94 (4 Jan 57), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
87. Memrcd Henry E. Billingsley, OASD(ISA), 13 Apr 57, fldr UK Thor History, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4739; ltr SecDef to Pres, 17 Apr 57, ltr SecDef to British MoD, 18 Apr 57: fldr UK 471.94 (4 Jan 57), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
88. Memo SecDef for SecAF, 29 May 57, fldr 471.6-680.1 U.K., Box 21, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-B1672.
89. Ltr Sandys to Wilson, 11 Jun 57, w/encl, Note of Points Requiring Further Discussion, fldr UK 471.94 (4 Jan 57), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
90. Memo ActgSecState for Pres, 15 Aug 57, OSD Hist; memrcd Brig Gen Guthrie, 17 Sep 57, summarizing US-UK mtg same date, fldr UK 471.94 (4 Jan 57), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
91. Memrcd Radford, 15 Jul 57, summarizing conversation between Radford and Ely, 11 Jul 57, fldr Memos for the Record, Box 41, Radford papers, NHC; memo CJCS for SecDef, 19 Jul 57, CM-509-57, fldr 337 (1957), Box 2, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
92. Msg State 1186 for AmEmb Paris, 24 Sep 57, OSD Hist; ltr ASD(ISA) to DepUnderSec State (Murphy), 2 Oct 57, memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 2 Oct 57: fldr France 471.94 2 Oct 57, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
93. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 22 Oct 57, OSD Hist.
94. Security Resources Panel, *Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age*, 18, para A3d. See ch VII for a full discussion of the Gaither report.
95. Ltr Norstad to Pres, 7 Nov 57, encl with ltr Norstad to SecDef, same date, fldr NATO 1957, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
96. Memrcd Lt Gen Clovis E. Byers USA, MilAdv to ASD(ISA), 14 Nov 57, fldr NATO 320.2 3 July 57, Box 1, *ibid*.
97. Memo SecDef for SecState, 12 Nov 57, fldr Reading File #1—30 April-31 Dec 57, Box 4, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769.
98. Memo CJCS for DepSecDef, 14 Nov 57, fldr NATO 471.94 12 Nov 57, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
99. Memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Nov 57; ltr DepSecDef to SecState, 7 Dec 57: fldr France 471.94 2 Oct 57, Box 1, *ibid*.
100. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:687-88; memo of disc (Gleason), 346th NSC mtg, 22 Nov 57, *ibid*, 689-95.
101. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 22 Nov 57, attended by Sec Dulles, fldr November 57 Staff Notes, Box 28, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 22 Nov 57, attended by McElroy, Quarles, and Killian, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:688.
102. Memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Nov 57, ltr Quarles to Dulles, 23 Nov 57, ltr Dulles to Quarles, 24 Nov 57: fldr NATO 092.3 Ministers Mtg in December 1957, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372; Dulles press confs, 19 Nov and 10 Dec 57, DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXVII (9 Dec 57), 916, and XXXVII (30 Dec 57), 1023.
103. Memos DGM for SecA and SecAF, both 27 Nov 57, fldr M 471.94 9 Jan 58, Box 26, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
104. Senate Preparedness Subcte, *Satellite and Missile Programs*, 194; House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense: The Ballistic Missile Program: Hearings*, 6.
105. Memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Nov 57, fldr Missiles, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
106. Memo D.A. Q[uarles] for SecDef, 23 Nov 57, fldr UK 471.94 (4 Jan 57), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372; memrcds Brig Gen Warren, 25 and 26 Nov 57, fldr Reading File #1—Gen Warren—1 May 57-1 Oct 58, Box 4, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769; memrcd Brig Gen Guthrie, 29 Nov 57, fldr US-UK IRBM Agreements (Negotiations), Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4656; memrcd Col Edward M. Harris, USA, OASD(ISA), 9 Dec 57, fldr 091.112-470 U.K., Box 21, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-B1672.
107. DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXVIII (6 Jan 58), 8-9, 14; Charles J. V. Murphy, "The NATO Alliance Goes Nuclear," *Fortune*, LVII (Feb 58), 234, 236.

108. Msgs Paris for SecState, 3056, 3058, 3076, 20 Dec 57, OSD Hist; memrcd Guthrie, nd, summarizing mtg in Paris 19 Dec 57, memo Warren for ASD(ISA), 19 Dec 57: fldr France 471.94 2 Oct 57, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
109. Memrcd DepASD(ISA) (Irwin), 26 Dec 57, fldr IRBM General May-Oct 57, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4656.
110. Memrcd Guthrie, 6 Feb 53, fldr US-UK IRBM Agreement (Negotiations), Box 1, ibid; memo ASD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 17 Feb 58, w/atchmts, ltr Amb Caccia to Sec Dulles, 16 Feb 58, forwarding ltr Macmillan to Eisenhower, memo DepSecDef for SecAF, 17 Feb 58: fldr UK 1958, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; memo Dulles for Pres, 21 Feb 58, fldr Missiles and Satellites Vol. I(4) (Feb 57-Jun 58), Box 6, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
111. "Supply of IRBMs to UK, Exchange of Notes 22 Feb 58," TIAS 3990, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, IX (1958), 195-98; Technical Agreement between USAF and RAF on Establishment of IRBM bases in UK, 26 Jun 58, fldr U.S.-U.K. Agreements, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4656; *New York Times*, 9 Sep 58; Progress Rept of ICBM and IRBM Programs, No 34 (30 Sep 58), OSD Hist; Neufeld, *Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force*, 224.
112. Ltr Murphy to Sprague, 31 Jan 58, fldr Missiles, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606.
113. Memo JCS for SecDef, 31 Jan 58, ibid.
114. Memrcd Col William B. Robinson, USAF, OASD(ISA), 13 Feb 58, summarizing State-Defense mtg 12 Feb 58, fldr 471.6, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-B1698.
115. Memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 14 Feb 58, memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Mar 58: fldr Missiles, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606.
116. Memo DepSecDef for SecAF, 4 Apr 58, fldr 471.6 Apr-Jun, Box 12, OASD(ISA) Gen Files 1958, Acc 62-A1698.
117. Ltr G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor, DeptState, to ASD(ISA), 4 Apr 58, w/encl, Views of Dept State on IRBM Deployments to Various Foreign Countries, fldr TCP-ICBM, IRBM and 1500-mile Missile, Box 13, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
118. Memrcd Sprague, 17 Feb 58, fldr 471.6 France, Box 14, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-A1698.
119. Msg SACEUR SH 21343 for DeptA, 061636Z Feb 58 (repeating msg Norstad for OSD, 1 Feb 58), msg USNMR ALO 230 for SecDef, 121150Z Feb 58, msg USNMR ALO 252 for SecDef, 181754Z Feb 58: OSD Hist; memo DepSecDef for SecAF, 29 Apr 58, fldr France 1961, Box 5, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; Views of Dept State on IRBM Deployments to Various Foreign Countries, cited in n 117.
120. Memrcd R. H. W[arren], 23 Apr 58, fldr 471.94, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-B1606; memrcd A. G. Waggoner, 23 Apr 58, fldr M471.94 9 Jan 58, Box 26, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606. See also ch VII.
121. Memo SecAF for SecDef, 25 Jun 58, w/encl, ltr Maj Gen G. P. Disosway, USAF, to VCSAF, 22 May 58, and Rept of Technical Matters used in Discussions between USAF and French AF, fldr France 1961, Box 5, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
122. Memrcd Sprague, 24 Jul 58, fldr UK 091.112-333, Box 21, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-A1698. For the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, see Stebbins, *United States in World Affairs*, 1958, 142-45.
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128. *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1957-58*, IV:1748-51 (quote, 1751).
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156. Bernard Ledwidge, *De Gaulle*, 54-227; Don Cook, *Charles de Gaulle*, 57-312.
157. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 413.
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160. Msg State 5493 for AmEmb Paris, 7 Jun 58; msg Paris 5835 for State, 9 Jun 58, msg USNMR Paris ALO 626 for OSD, 111510Z Jun 58, DA IN 123901: *ibid*.
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162. Memcon Philip E. Barringer, DepDirEurReg, OASD(ISA), 26 Jun 58, fldr France 1961, Box 5, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
163. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 3 Jul 58, OSD Hist.
164. Msg SecState to Pres, 5 Jul 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 2:69-70; memcon, Dulles and de Gaulle, 5 Jul 58, *ibid*, 53-64; msg Paris Secto 2 for State, 5 Jul 58, OSD Hist.
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168. Landa draft ch, "The Challenge of French Nationalism," 22-24, OSD Hist.
169. Ltr Eisenhower to de Gaulle, 20 Oct 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 2:108-09.
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172. Msg Paris Polto 1492 for State, 29 Nov 58, OSD Hist.
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XVII. WESTERN EUROPE, 1959-1960

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2. Jt Secs Advice of Action, 27 Jun 59, w/atchd tables, "FY 1961 Budget - Planning Data for New Obligational Availability" and "Planning Data for Expenditures," fldr FY 1961 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
3. Memo ASD(ISA) for ActgSecDef, nd (probably Oct 59), fldr NATO 1959, Box 6, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 20 Oct 59, (source of

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 5. Ltr Herter to McElroy, 5 Nov 59, fldr NATO 1959, Box 6, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574. See also ch XI.
 6. Briefing note (evidently by Gray) for NSC mtg 26 Mar 59, atchmt to memo of disc (Gleason), 400th NSC mtg, 26 Mar 59, OSD Hist; "NATO Discussion Paper," 26 Nov 58, apparently prepared by Gray for PB mtg, fldr NATO Ministerial Meeting—1958 and 1959, Box 7, Subj subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL; memo Boggs for NSC PB, 28 Nov 58, w/atcmt, "Possible Questions for Discussion on NATO," 28 Nov 58, memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 11 Mar 59: fldr NATO, Box 5, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024; memo of disc (Gleason), 400th NSC mtg, 29 Mar 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 1:442-47.
 7. Briefing paper by OASD(ISA) for PB mtg, 30 Oct 59, fldr NATO, Box 5, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
 8. Memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 5 Nov 59, w/encl, "Issues of U.S. Policy Regarding the Defense Posture of NATO," *ibid*.
 9. Memo Dep ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 10 Nov 59, *ibid*.
 10. Memo of disc (Boggs), 424th NSC mtg, 11 Nov 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 1:506-15.
 11. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 16 Nov 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 1:516-17; Kistiakowsky, *Scientist at the White House*, 157; memo Oliver Gale for ASD(ISA), 16 Nov 59, fldr 471.6 November, Box 14, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1674; memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 20 Nov 59, fldr NATO, Box 5, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
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 13. Memo SecAF for SecDef, 14 Jun 60, fldr NATO ARQ (1960) 23 May 60, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
 14. Memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Jun 60, JCSM-259-60, memo CJCS for SecDef, 16 Jun 60: *ibid*.
 15. Memo SecDef for JCS, 29 Jun 60, *ibid*; Ltr Gates to Herter, 30 Jun 60, fldr FY Budget, ATSD & Dep SecDef files, OSD Hist.
 16. Memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Jul 60, JCSM-316-60, fldr NATO ARQ (1960) 23 May 60, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
 17. Memo ASD(ISA) for ExecSec NSC, 27 Jul 60, memo SecAF for Dep SecDef, 1 Aug 60: *ibid*.
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 19. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 20 Aug 60, fldr NATO ARQ (1960) 23 May 60, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
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27. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 6 Apr 59, CM-324-59, fldr Missiles 470.02, Box 1, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 63-A1668.
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29. Msg, OSD DEF 958716 for USNMR (State-Def msg for Norstad), 250052Z Apr 59, OSD Hist.
30. Memo ActgASD(ISA) (Shuff) for SecDef, 14 May 59, fldr M470.02, Box 2, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 63-A1668; msg SACEUR SH 31978 for SecDef, 060909Z May 59, OSD Hist; memo SecState for Pres, 16 Sep 59, noted approved by Pres 17 Sep 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, X, pt 2:812-13; ODDR&E, Progress Rept of ICBM and IRBM Programs, No 46 (Oct-Dec 59), OSD Hist.
31. Stebbins, *United States in World Affairs, 1959*, 191-92; memo ActgASD(ISA) (Shuff) for SecDef, 14 May 59, fldr M470.02, Box 2, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 63-A1668.
32. Memo Pres for SecDef, 3 Jun 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, X, pt 2:661.
33. Memo SecDef for Pres, 12 Jun 59, OSD Hist.
34. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 16 Jun 59, fldr Staff Notes Jun 16-30 59(2), Box 42, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
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36. Msg ActgSecState Toah 122 for SecState, 17 Jun 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, X, pt 2:663-64.
37. Msg USNMR Paris ALO 810 for OSD (Irwin from Norstad), 051703Z Aug 59, msg State 669 for AmEmb Paris, 12 Aug 59, (State-Defense msg), msg OSD DEF 963745 for USNMR Paris, 122229Z Aug 59, msg Paris 1182 for State, 14 Sep 59: OSD Hist.
38. Msg OSD DEF 965644 for USNMR Paris, 19 Sep 59, *ibid*.
39. Msg USNMR ALO 990 for OSD (personal for Irwin from Norstad), 251426Z Sep 59, *ibid*.
40. Memred A.G. Waggoner, 20 Oct 59, fldr 471.6 October, Box 14, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1672; memo ChiefMilDiv, BoB (W.F. Schaub) for Goodpaster, 20 Oct 59, OSD Hist; ltr ActgSecDef to Pres, 19 Oct 59, w/handwritten note by Goodpaster "Notified Defense of President's approval," 21 Oct 59, fldr McElroy, Neil 1959 (1), Box 25, Admin ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
41. ODDR&E, Progress Rpts of ICBM and IRBM Programs, No 33 (31 Aug 58), No 37 (31 Dec 58), No 41 (30 Apr 59), No 46 (Oct-Dec 59), No 48 (Apr-Jun 60), No 50 (Oct-Dec 60), OSD Hist; Neufeld, *Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force*, 226; Duncan Campbell, *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain*, 72-73.
42. ODDR&E, Progress Rept of ICBM and IRBM Programs, No 50 (Oct-Dec 60), OSD Hist.
43. Memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 13 Jan 61, fldr Staff Notes Jan 61, Box 55, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
44. Neufeld, 232-33.
45. DeptState memcon, 6 Feb 59, OSD Hist.
46. Memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 25 Feb 59; memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Apr 59, JCSM-143-59: fldr NATO 471.61 1960, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
47. Ltr Robert N. Magill, DeptState, to Ray L. Thurston, AmEmb Paris, 18 May 59, OSD Hist. For the Foreign Ministers Conference, see ch XVIII.
48. Ltr Meili for W. Randolph Burgess, USPermRep to NAC, 11 Jun 59, encl/w ltr Joseph J. Wolf, DirOfc of PolAff, USRO, to Russell Fessenden, ActgDir, Ofc of EurRegAff, DeptState, 15 Jun 59, OSD Hist.
49. Memo Haskell for Irwin, 26 Jun 59, atchmt to memo Haskell for Irwin, Shuff, and Knight, 15 Jul 59, fldr 334 NATO, Box 10, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1672.
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51. Paper "NATO Production of European IRBMs," nd, encl/w memo ActgASD(ISA) for CJCS, 4 Aug 59, fldr 471.6, Box 15, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, 63-A1672.
52. Memo cited in preceding note.

53. DeptState memcon, 25 Sep 59, *FRUS 1958-1960*, VII, pt 1:484-88.
54. Landa draft ch, "Joint Weapon Production: Mixed Results," 15, OSD Hist; ltr George S. Vest, AmEmb Paris, to Fessenden, 3 Oct 59, OSD Hist.
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56. "Basic Military Requirement for an ACE Mid-Range Ballistic Missile," encl/w ltr Chief of Staff, ACE (Gen C.V.R. Schuyler, USA) to ChmSGN, 13 Oct 59, OSD Hist.
57. Memo JCS for SecDef, 15 Oct 59, JCSM-427-59, fldr 471.6, Box 14, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1672.
58. Ltr Gates to Merchant, 25 Nov 59, *ibid*.
59. Memo Merchant for Kohler, 5 Dec 59, OSD Hist; "Secretary Gates' NATO Speech (Final Version)," 16 Dec 59, fldr NATO W-1-2, Box 5, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
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61. Memos JCS and CJCS for SecDef, both 8 Jan 60, fldr 471.6, Box 36, *ibid*.
62. Memo SecDef for JCS, 25 Jan 60, w/atchd covering brief, ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 22 Jan 60, fldr 471.6 Jan-Feb, Box 21, *ibid*; memrcd Burke, 1 Feb 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
63. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 19 Feb 60, and Tab 8, "History of Briefings Covering NATO Mid-Range Ballistic Missiles," fldr 471.6 Jan-Feb, Box 21, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
64. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 19 Feb 60, cited in preceding note; memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Jan 60, JCSM-70-60, *ibid*.
65. DeptState memcon, 2 Mar 60, memo Merchant for SecState, 4 Mar 60: OSD Hist; ltr Herter to Gates, 7 Mar 60, fldr 471.6, Box 21, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
66. Msg OSD DEF 974058 for DEFREPNAME, 172336Z Mar 60; memo Merchant for SecState, 18 Mar 60: OSD Hist.
67. DeptState Policy Planning Staff, "A Position for Secretary Gates on MRBMs at Paris" (draft), 21 Mar 60, encl w/memo Brig Gen Frederic H. Miller, USAF, Dir Eur Region, OASD(ISA), for JCS members, 23 Mar 60, fldr 471.6, Box 21, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; memrcd Burke, 22 Mar 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; statements by Irwin to AFPC, AFPC mtg notes, 22 Mar 60, fldr AFPC Mar-Apr 60, Box 6, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; AFPC Advice of Action, 22 Mar 60, OSD Hist.
68. Msg Paris 4481 for State, 30 Mar 60, OSD Hist; memrcd Irwin, 1 Apr 60, fldr U.K. 091.112-092, Box 31, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; memrcd Gates, 6 Apr 60, fldr United Kingdom 1960, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
69. Memo telcons Herter and Gates, 30 Mar 60, 10:45 am and 3:05 pm, msg State 7407 for AmEmb London, 31 Mar 60: OSD Hist.
70. Text of Gates statement at Def Mins mtg, encl w/memo ActgASD(ISA) for SecA et al, 7 Apr 60, fldr 334, Box 13, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; msg Paris Polto Circular 10 for State, 1 Apr 60, msg Paris Polto 2025 for State, 6 Apr 60: OSD Hist.
71. Msg State Topol 2086 for AmEmb Paris, 14 Apr 60, unofficial translation of Spaak note in msg Paris Polto 2394 for State, 4 Jun 60: OSD Hist; memo Irwin for Gates, nd, (with typewritten note that it was handcarried 14 Jun 60 without Irwin's signature but with his oral approval), fldr 333 (Spaak Visit), memcon, OASD(ISA), between Gates and Spaak, 14 Jun 60, fldr 333 April thru June, memrcd Fessenden, 16 Jun 60, fldr 333 (Spaak Visit), Box 11, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; msg OSD 978788 for DEFREPNAME, 152246Z Jun 60, OSD Hist.
72. Landa draft ch, "Joint Weapon Production: Mixed Results," 26, OSD Hist; memrcd, 24 Jun 60, ns, but apparently by Burke, summarizing conversation between JCS and Norstad, same date, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
73. Msg State Topol 2607 for Paris, 28 Jun 60, msg Paris Polto 35 for State, 5 Jul 60, ltr Spaak to Herter, 6 Jul 60: OSD Hist.
74. Msg Paris 426 for State, 29 Jul 60, *ibid*.
75. Ltr SecA to SecDef, 12 May 60, memo Brig Gen Brown for York, 28 Jun 60, memo ActgSec Def for DDR&E and JCS, 1 Aug 60, memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Sep 60, JCSM-440-60: fldr

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76. *Congressional Record*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (27 May 57), vol 103, pt 6:7674-77.
 77. Alastair Buchan, "Britain and the Nuclear Deterrent," 36-47; msg AmEmb London G-693 for State, 11 Feb 60, OSD Hist.
 78. Landa draft ch, "Birth of the Multilateral Force (MLF)," 8-9, *ibid*.
 79. "United Kingdom Record: Anglo/American Defence Talks, Nuclear Matters; Record of Meeting Held in State Department on Friday, March 18 at 3:30 p.m.," fldr UK Skybolt Polaris, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4655. A State Department account of the meeting, evidently based on this British record, is in DeptState memcon, 18 Mar 60, fldr 471.6, Box 36, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
 80. Msg Paris Polto 1928 for State, 27 Mar 60, OSD Hist.
 81. "The Relationship of U.K. and U.S. Strategic Forces to NATO," nd, drafted by Ofc of EurRegAff, DeptState, 25 Apr 60; memo Kohler for Merchant, 25 Apr 60; Landa draft ch, "Birth of the Multilateral Force (MLF)," 10-11: *ibid*.
 82. Memos Smith for SecState, 3, 11 Jun 60, *ibid*.
 83. Memo Hulick for Bell (both in DeptState), 19 Jul 60, memo Robert N. Magill, Ofc of EurRegAff, DeptState, for various State officials, 26 Jul 60, w/encl, "Funding of a NATO MRBM Program": *ibid*; ltr Kistiakowsky to Herter, 22 Jul 60, fldr Missiles (6), Box 12, OASD files, WHO, DDEL.
 84. Msg USNMR ALO 667 for OSD (Norstad for Irwin), 081636Z Jul 60, DA IN 22914, OSD Hist.
 85. DeptState memcon 2 Aug 60, fldr 471.6 Aug-Sep, Box 21, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
 86. Memo Burke for Op-07, 3 Aug 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
 87. This account of the 3 August meeting between JCS and Norstad is from memo Ivan B. White, Ofc of EurRegAff, DeptState, for Merchant, 5 Aug 60, fldr 471.6 Aug-Sep, Box 21, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170. White's information came from Ray Thurston, SHAPE's political affairs officer, who presumably attended the meeting along with Norstad.
 88. Memo JCS for SecDef, 1 Sep 60, JCSM-391-60, fldr NSC 6017 (NATO in the 1960's) File No. 2, Box 29, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
 89. Memo Burke for Op-06, 20 Aug 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
 90. "The North Atlantic Nations: Tasks for the 1960's," Report to SecState by Robert R. Bowie, Aug 60, 8-9, 58-65 (quote, 64), OSD Hist.
 91. Memo Bowie for SecState, 21 Aug 60, printed with Bowie Rept, cited in preceding note; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 16 Aug 60, OSD Hist; memo of disc (Boggs), 457th NSC mtg, 29 Aug 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 1:615.
 92. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 12 Sep 60, OSD Hist; interv with Robert R. Bowie by Ed Edwin, 10 Aug 67, CUOHP, 45-46.
 93. Memcon Col S.W. Downey, USA, Exec to SACEUR, 16 Sep 60, OSD Hist; memrcd Burke, 13 Sep 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; handwritten notes on JCS-Norstad mtg, nd [13 Sep 60], ns, fldr Joint Chiefs of Staff, Box 32, OSD Admin Sec files 1960, Acc 65-A3028.
 94. Paper "NATO Nuclear Capabilities, U.S. Position," encl/w memo Bowie for SecState, 14 Sep 60, OSD Hist.
 95. Memrcd Burke, 14 Sep 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; "Summary of Views Expressed at Meeting of Secretary Herter and Secretary Gates on MRBM's September 14, 1960," encl/w memo Magill for Kohler et al, 15 Sep 60, *ibid*.
 96. Memo Irwin for Gates, 27 Sep 60, w/encls, draft memo Kohler and Irwin for Herter and Gates and paper "NATO MRBM's" drafted by Kohler and Irwin, fldr 471.6 Aug-Sep, Box 21, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
 97. Memo Fessenden for Kohler (both in State), 29 Sep 60, summarizing Gates's reaction to Irwin-Kohler paper as described by Col Billingslea of ISA, OSD Hist.
 98. Ltr Norstad to Irwin, 28 Sep 60, w/encl (draft of paper showing proposed changes), *ibid*.
 99. The ISA view is set forth in draft memo for Pres, ns, prepared 2 Oct 60 by Eur Region, ISA, fldr 471.6 October, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170. This is the

source of the quotes above. Amplification of the views of both departments is contained in Tab A to memo Miller for Shuff, 12 Oct 60, in same folder.

100. Memo Smith for Merchant, 3 Oct 60, OSD Hist.
101. Statements by Col Billingslea, DepDirEurReg, OASD(ISA), and by Gates to AFPC mtg, 11 Oct 60, as recorded in memrcd Burke, 12 Oct 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; AFPC Advice of Action, 11 Oct 60, OSD Hist.
102. DeptState memcon 3 Oct 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 1:633-38; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 3 Oct 60, OSD Hist; ltr Merchant to Irwin, 3 Oct 60, fldr 471.6 October, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170. The redrafted proposal is attached as Tab B to memo Miller for Shuff, 12 Oct 60, *ibid*.
103. Memrcd Fessenden, 4 Oct 60, fldr 333 Sep-Oct, Box 11, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; memrcd Col S.K. Eaton, USA, OASD(ISA), summarizing Spaak-Gates mtg, 4 Oct 60 (partly identical in wording with Fessenden memo), fldr 333 (Spaak Visit), *ibid*.
104. Memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Oct 60, JCSM-467-60, fldr NATO 471.6 1960, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
105. Memo JCS for SecDef, 25 Oct 60, JCSM-478-60, encl w/memo CJCS for SecDef, 25 Oct 60, CM-14-60, fldr 471.6 October, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
106. Memo Irwin for Gates, 3 Nov 60, fldr 471.6 Nov-Dec, *ibid*.
107. Memrcd, ns, prepared in OASD(ISA), recording discussion in Gates's ofc 29 Oct 60, *ibid*. The names of those at the meeting are not indicated.
108. "Summary Record of Meeting Between Secretary Herter and Secretary Gates on NATO MRBM's and Atomic Stockpile (Friday, November 4, 1960)," ns, prepared in Ofc of EurRegAff, DeptState, OSD Hist; handwritten acct of same mtg, ns, Box 29, Lemnitzer papers, NDU; OSD DEF 915434 [or 915431] for USNMR Paris, 050009Z Nov 60 (personal for Norstad from OASD/ISA), and DeptState memcon, 10 Nov 60, both in OSD Hist; memo Irwin for Gates, 14 Nov 60, fldr 471.6 Nov-Dec, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
109. Draft memrcd, Col Eaton, OASD(ISA), "State-Defense-AEC meeting," 16 Nov 60, fldr 471.6 Nov-Dec, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; DeptState memcon, 16 Nov 60, OSD Hist; memrcd Capt Charles N. Shane, USN, Ofc of Planning, OASD(ISA), 16 Nov 60, fldr 471.6, Box 36, *ibid*; handwritten memo of State-Def mtg, 16 Nov 60, ns, Box 29, Lemnitzer papers, NDU.
110. Memo ExecSecNSC (Lay) for NSC, 16 Nov 60, w/encl, revised paper on "NATO MRBM's," same date, fldr NSC 6017 (NATO in the 1960's) File No. 2, Box 29, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; msg USNMR ALO 1006 for OSD (personal for Irwin from Norstad), 161638Z Nov 60, DA IN 58776, OSD Hist.
111. Memo ExecSecNSC (Lay) for NSC, 16 Nov 60, w/encls, agenda for special NSC mtg 17 Nov 60 and redraft of NATO MRBM force proposal, fldr NSC 6017 (NATO in the 1960's) File No. 2, Box 29, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; memo of disc (Lay), 467th NSC mtg, 17 Nov 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 1:648-60; handwritten notes (presumably by Lemnitzer) on same mtg, Box 29, Lemnitzer papers, NDU.
112. Memo ExecSecNSC (Lay) for NSC, 29 Nov 60, fldr NSC 6017 (NATO in the 1960's) File No. 1, Box 29, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; memo of disc (Boggs), 468th NSC mtg, 1 Dec 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 1:661-68; memo for Gates, "MRBM's for NATO," ns but evidently by Irwin, bearing handwritten date "12/5/60?," fldr 471.6 Nov-Dec, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
113. Memo for Gates, ns, cited in preceding note. A handwritten note by Gates indicates that he had discussed the matter by telephone with Dillon on 5 December. Another copy of the same memo bears notation "Prepared 4 Dec 1960."
114. Memo of disc (Boggs), 469th NSC mtg, 8 Dec 60, OSD Hist; memrcd Burke, 8 Dec 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; handwritten notes by Lemnitzer on same NSC mtg, fldr Notes-NSC Meetings, Box 29, Lemnitzer papers, NDU.
115. Memrcds Col Eaton, OASD(ISA), 23 Nov 60, 8 Dec 60, DeptState memcon, 24 Nov 60, summarizing mtg in Paris of Dillon, Irwin, and French Foreign Min Couve de Murville: fldr 471.6 Nov-Dec, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; memrcd Burke, 22 Nov 60, of State-Def mtg 21 Nov 60, OSD Hist.

116. Memrtd Burke, 22 Nov 60, cited in preceding note; ltr Gates to Sen Chavez (Chmn DoD Subcte, Senate Cte on Appros), sent also to Rep Mahon, House Cte on Appros, and others, 6 Dec 60, fldr 334 NATO, Box 13, OASD(ISA) files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; ltr McCone to Sen Anderson, 1 Dec 60, fldr 471.6 Nov-Dec, Box 20, *ibid*; memo Max V. Krebs, DeptState, for unknown addressee (probably SecState), 7 Dec 60, OSD Hist.
117. Text of Herter statement in msg State Topol 846 for AmEmb Paris, 9 Dec 60, OSD Hist; *New York Times*, 17 Dec 60.
118. Herter testimony, 6 Jan 61, Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee* (Historical Series), 87 Cong, 1 sess, XIII, pt 1:2.
119. Text of communiqué, 19 Dec 60, DeptState *Bulletin*, XLIV (9 Jan 61), 40.
120. Landa draft ch, "Birth of the Multilateral Force (MLF)," 42-43, OSD Hist.
121. William H. Stoneman in *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 19 Dec 60; Drew Middleton in *New York Times*, 20 Dec 60; Murray Marder in *Washington Post*, 25 Dec 60.
122. For a detailed account of the U.S.-British negotiations over Skybolt and Polaris, see Ronald D. Landa, "The Origins of the Skybolt Controversy in the Eisenhower Administration," in Roger G. Miller, ed., *Seeing Off the Bear: Anglo-American Air Power Cooperation During the Cold War*, 117-31.
123. Landa draft ch, "Helping the British Out of a Bind," 7-8, OSD Hist.
124. Memo CNO for ASD(ISA) 27 Nov 59, position paper, "President's Good Will Trip, December 1959," 3 Dec 59, encl w/memo CNO for ASD(ISA), 4 Dec 59; fldr U.K., Box 29, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 63-A1672; Landa draft ch, "Helping the British Out of a Bind," 8, OSD Hist.
125. Memo JCS for SecDef, 11 Mar 60, JCSM-93-60, memo Dir Eur Region, OASD(ISA), Miller, for Irwin, 17 Mar 60, w/encl, position paper for talks with British: fldr UK Skybolt-Polaris, 15 Dec 59-27 Oct 60, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4655.
126. "United Kingdom Record, Anglo/American Defence Talks: Nuclear Matters, Record of Meeting in State Department on Friday, March 18, 11 A.M.," fldr U.K. Skybolt-Polaris, 15 Dec 59-27 Oct 60, Box 1, *ibid*; DeptState memcon, 18 Mar 60 (11:00 am mtg), fldr 471.6, box 36, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
127. Msg OSD DEF 974619 for CHMAAG The Hague (Irwin from Williams), 260001Z Mar 60, OSD Hist.
128. *Ibid*; Landa draft ch, "Helping the British Out of a Bind," 12, 13, OSD Hist.
129. Msg OSD DEF 974645 for CHMAAG The Hague (for Irwin and Gates), 262056Z Mar 60, fldr UK Skybolt-Polaris, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4655; msg OSD DEF 974712 for DEFREPNAME (for Irwin and Gates), 282353Z Mar 60, fldr 471.6, Box 21, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
130. Memo for files, 29 Mar 60, prepared by Kohler (DeptState), OSD Hist (printed in *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 2:861-63, but without atchmts).
131. Memo for files, 29 Mar 60, cited in preceding note, and atchmt 1 thereto, draft memorandum from PM to Pres.
132. Memo for files, 29 Mar 60, cited in n 130.
133. Atchmt 2 to memo for files, 29 Mar 60, cited in n 130. Atchmt 2 is printed in *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 2:63.
134. Memo for files, 29 Mar 60, cited in n 130, with atchmts 3 and 4 (successive versions of British memorandum). The final version is printed in *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 2:865.
135. Harold Macmillan, *Pointing the Way, 1959-1961*, 252-53 (quote, 252).
136. Memrtd Gates, 6 Aug 60, fldr United Kingdom 1960, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
137. DeptState memcon, 9 Apr 60 (mtg between Amb Caccia and State officials), fldr 471.6, Box 36, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; memo John E. Calhoun, DirExecSecretariat, DeptState, for Goodpaster, 9 Apr 60, OSD Hist; memo Dir Ofc EurRegAff, ISA (Miller) for Knight, 11 Apr 60, fldr UK Skybolt-Polaris, 15 Dec 59-27 Oct 60, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4655.
138. *New York Times*, 14 Apr 60.
139. Ltr Gates to Watkinson, 14 Jan 60, encl/w memo Miller for Maj Gen Ernest Moore (Chief, MAAG, UK), 15 Jan 60, ltr Watkinson to Gates, 23 Feb 60, encl/w memo ActgASD(ISA) (Knight) to SecA et al, 30 Mar 60: fldr 311.23-333, Box 31, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; msg London 5484 for State, 13 May 60, OSD Hist.

140. Memrcds Burke, 30, 31 May 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
141. Memo by Calhoun, DeptState, 31 May 60, OSD Hist; memo of telcon between Goodpaster and Herter, 31 May 60, fldr Telephone Calls, Box 12, Herter papers, DDEL.
142. "Record of a Meeting Held between Mr. Gates, U.S. Secretary Defense, and the U.K. Minister of Defence on Wednesday, 1st June 1960," fldr Gates-Watkinson Talks 6 Jun 60, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4655; "U.S.-U.K. Talks, 1 June 1960," ns, prepared by OASD(ISA), fldr Gates-Watkinson Talks May 31-June 1 60, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4738; memrcd Merchant, 2 Jun 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 2:869-70.
143. Memo Kohler for Merchant, 4 Jun 60, OSD Hist.
144. Memcon by OASD(ISA), "Gates-Watkinson Defense Talks," ns, 11:00-1:00, 3:30-4:30 6 Jun 60, encl/w memo Billingslea for Col E. S. Leland, USAF, USNMR Paris, 24 Jun 60, fldr 333 UK, Box 38, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; "Record of Meeting Held between Mr. Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, and the U.K. Minister of Defence on Monday, June 6, 1960," prepared by British delegation, w/Annex A, Memo of Understanding agreed on at mtg, fldr Gates-Watkinson Talks 6 Jun 60, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4665; memrcd Capt George C. Bullard, USN, Joint Staff, J-5, 6 Jun 60, fldr Gates-Watkinson talks, Washington, May 31-June 1, 1960, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4738; "Watkinson-Gates Defense Talks, 6 Jun 60, Agreed Minutes, Medium Range Ballistic Missiles for NATO," ns, fldr Polaris Berthing Facilities Dec 57-Jun 60, *ibid*. The memo of understanding mentioned above is printed in *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 2:864, where it is erroneously identified as an annex to Eisenhower's memo of 29 March 1960 to Macmillan.
145. Ltr Caccia to Gates, 28 Jun 60, encl/w memo C. S. Weaver, Dir Ofc of Foreign Programs, ODDR&E, for ATSD(AE) et al, 6 Jul 60, fldr Skybolt Agreement, Box 4, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 69-A1390; memrcd Irwin, 30 Jun 60, fldr UK Skybolt-Polaris 11 Dec 59-29 Jan 61, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4738; memo by EurReg, OASD(ISA), 28 Jun 50, encl/w memo Walter M. Martin (ActgDepDir, EurReg, ISA), for Rear Adm Rufus E. Rose, DEFREPNAME, 7 Jul 60, fldr 350.05 (Adm Rose), Box 14, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; memo Woodbury W. Willoughby, DeptState, for Kohler, 7 Jul 60, OSD Hist; memcon, P. E. Barringer, DepDirEurReg, OASD(ISA), 8 Jul 60, fldr Skybolt Agreement, Box 4, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 69-A1390.
146. Ltr Macmillan to Eisenhower, 24 Jun 60, encl/w memo Thomas W. McElhiney, ActgDirExecSecretariat, DeptState, for Irwin, 25 Jun 60, fldr UK Polaris Berthing Facilities, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4655.
147. Memo Miller for ASD(ISA), 28 Jul 60, w/encl, covering brief, nd, ASD(ISA) for Sec Def, and proposed reply from Pres to PM, *ibid*; memo Kohler for SecState, 29 Jun 60, w/encls (draft memo SecState to Pres, concurred in by Gates and Irwin, and suggested reply Pres to PM), OSD Hist.
148. Ltrs Eisenhower to Macmillan, 30 Jun 60, 15 Jul 60, Ltr Macmillan to Eisenhower, 2 Jul 60: OSD Hist.
149. Ltrs Macmillan to Eisenhower, 30 Jul 60, Eisenhower to Macmillan, 4 Aug 60: *ibid*; memrcd Cdr S.L. Collins, USN, Asst for Northern and Western Eur, OASD(ISA), 4 Aug 60, memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 9 Sep 60, fldr UK Polaris Berthing Facilities, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4655.
150. Memrcd Collins, 4 Aug 60, memo ASD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 5 Aug 60: fldr UK Polaris Berthing Facilities, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, 1Acc 67-A4655.
151. DeptState memcon, 16 Aug 60, OSD Hist.
152. "Status of Negotiations with the U.K. on Skybolt Technical and Financial Agreement and U.S. Polaris Facilities in the Clyde," 18 Aug 60, prepared by J. D. Stoddart, Eur Reg, ISA, fldr UK Polaris Berthing Facilities, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4655.
153. Memo P. E. Barringer, DepDirEurReg, OASD(ISA), for Williams, 19 Aug 60, papers "Skybolt and Polaris," prepared by EurReg, OASD(ISA), w/handwritten date 18 Aug 60 (evidently an error, since text refers to events on 19 Aug): fldr UK Polaris Berthing Facilities, 15 Dec 1959-27 Oct 60, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4655.
154. "Negotiations re U.S. Polaris Facilities in the United Kingdom," 26 Aug 60, prepared by Stoddart, OASD(ISA), encl/w memo Billingslea for Rear Adm Rose, USRO, 31 Aug 60, fldr 350.05 Adm Rose, Box 36, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.

155. Memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 9 Sep 60, w/encl (British draft of proposed announcement), fldr UK Polaris Berthing Facilities, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4655.
156. Memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 9 Sep 60, memo JCS for SecDef, 15 Sep 60, JCSM-411-60: *ibid*.
157. Ltr Gates to Herter, 20 Sep 60, *ibid*; "State and Defense Department Views on Public Announcement Regarding Consultation," encl/w memo ActgSecState for Pres, 23 Sep 60, OSD Hist.
158. "United States Department of the Air Force and United Kingdom Ministry of Aviation Technical and Financial Agreement Concerning the Skybolt," 27 Sep 60, encl/w memo Col R. E. Honeycutt, USA, ActgDir, Ofc of Foreign Programs, OASD(ISA), for Stoddart, 28 Sep 60, fldr 471.6 Aug-Sep, Box 21, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
159. *New York Times*, 28 Nov 60; memos Miller for Irwin, 27, 29 Sep 60, w/atchmt to latter (text of draft announcement), fldr UK Polaris Berthing Facilities, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4655; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 28 Sep 60, fldr United Kingdom (1), Box 14, Internatl ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
160. Memo Miller for Irwin, 29 Sep 60, and memo of conf with Pres, 28 Sep 60, both cited in preceding note.
161. Memo Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., ExecSecretariat, DeptState, for SecState and Under SecState, 19 Oct 60, msgs State for AmEmb London, 2470, 19 Oct 60, 2493, 20 Oct 60, ltr Macmillan to Eisenhower, 26 Oct 60, quoted in msg State 2617 for AmEmb London, 26 Oct 60, ltr Eisenhower to Macmillan, 27 Oct 60, quoted in msg State 2621 for AmEmb London, 27 Oct 60: OSD Hist.
162. Msg London 2060 for State, 1 Nov 60, *ibid*.
163. *New York Times*, 2, 3 Nov 60; msg State 2732 for London, 2 Nov 60, OSD Hist; memo DepASD(ISA) for SecDef, 2 Nov 60, fldr UK Polaris Berthing Facilities, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4655; msg London 2080 for State, 3 Nov 60, quoting message received by British Foreign Ofc from Amb in Washington, *ibid*.
164. Memrcd, 26 Oct 60, ns, recording conversation at UK Ministry of Defence, 21 Oct 60, (probably by Knight, who was present), fldr Polaris Berthing Facilities Dec 57-Jan 60, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4738.
165. Solly Zuckerman, *Monkeys, Men, and Missiles: An Autobiography*, 1946-88, 240-41.
166. Ltr Macmillan to Eisenhower, quoted in msg AmEmb London 2617 for State, 26 Oct 60, OSD Hist; memo Miller for Knight, 27 Oct 60, w/encls, replies to Macmillan drafted by Stoddart (State) and Knight (ISA), fldr UK Skybolt-Polaris, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4655; memo SecState for Pres, 30 Oct 60, w/encl, suggested reply bearing handwritten corrections by Eisenhower, fldr Harold Macmillan, Box 8, Internatl ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; ltr Eisenhower to Macmillan, 31 Oct 60, quoted in msg State 2688 for AmEmb London, fldr Macmillan Vol III (6), Box 14, OSS files, WHO, DDEL. Zuckerman, still in Washington at the time, was shown a copy of the ISA draft, which, he was told, had been "torn up": Zuckerman, 241.
167. Draft ltr Pres to PM, with Gates's handwritten revisions, encl/w memo Irwin for SecDef, 2 Nov 60, fldr UK Polaris Berthing Facilities, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4655. Also attached is a clean typewritten version of Gates's redraft, with notation by Means Johnston (MilAsst to SecDef), "This draft was suggested by Mr. Gates prior to learning that the earlier draft had been signed by the President." Zuckerman, 241.
168. Memrcd, ns, drafted by S.C. Trueheart (AmEmb London) summarizing Gates-Watkinson mtg, 12 Dec 60, fldr UK Skybolt-Polaris 11 Dec 59-29 Jan 61, Box 1, OASD(ISA) files, Acc 67-A4733.
169. Msg AmEmb London 2648 for DeptA and SecState, 22 Dec 60, msg State 3344 for London, 23 Dec 60: *ibid*.
170. NATO Information Service, *NATO Handbook*, 48-49, 82-83, 90; memrcd J.S.D. Eisenhower, 3 Mar 59, OSD Hist.
171. Memo SecState for Pres, 23 Jan 59, msg AmEmb Paris 2784 for State, 3 Feb 60, msg SecState (in Paris) for Pres, 6 Feb 59: *ibid*.
172. Text of French note in msg Paris Polto 2536 for State, 6 Mar 59, memo ActgSecState to Pres, 4 Mar 59: *ibid*.
173. Memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 12 Mar 59, *FRUS 1958-1960*, VII, pt 1: 433-36.

174. Memo USRepSGN (Adm W.F. Boone, USN) for JCS, 24 Dec 59, fldr France 001-091.31, Box 17, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1672; msg Paris for State, 3547, 5 Feb 60, and 991, 8 Sep 60, OSD Hist; Robert S. Jordan, *Alliance Strategy and Navies: The Evolution and Scope of NATO's Maritime Dimension*, 109-10.
175. Landa draft ch, "De Gaulle's Challenge to NATO," 33, OSD Hist.
176. Memrcd Quarles, 14 Jan 59, fldr Sec Quarles Top Secret Material, Box 1, DepSecDef files 1957-59, Acc 63-A1769; msg USNMR Paris ALO 313 for CJCS (Twining from Norstad), 240930Z Mar 59, DA IN 200377, msg JCS 956807 for USNMR (Norstad from Twining), 24 Mar 59; fldr McElroy 9 Oct 57-1 Dec 59, Box 1, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 63-A1770; msg State 4324 for AmEmb Paris, 9 May 59, OSD Hist.
177. Msg Paris 4328 for State, 25 May 59, msg Geneva Secto 126 for State (from SecState for Thurston), 26 May 59: *ibid*; *Public Statements, SecDef McElroy, 1959*, III:1028; memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 9 Jun 59, 2:00 pm, *FRUS 1958-1960*, VII, pt 1:461-64.
178. Msg USNMR ALO 666 for CJCS (Twining from Norstad), 241310Z Jun 59, DA IN 225057, OSD Hist; memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Jun 59, JCSM-251-59, memo DepASD(ISA) for SecDef, 29 Jun 59, memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 7 Jul 59; fldr France 1959, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574; ltr SecDef to SecState, 30 Jun 59, fldr Department of Defense Vol. III (6), Box 1, Subj ser, DoD subser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; msg JCS 962019 for USNMR Paris, 081424Z Jul 59, OSD Hist.
179. Text of statement by CJCS (Gen Twining), 10 Dec 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 1:525-27 (quote, 526).
180. Msg Paris 2691 for State, 12 Dec 59, OSD Hist; *New York Times*, 12 Dec 59.
181. Msg Paris 2688 for State, 11 Dec 59, OSD Hist; memo USRepSGN (Adm Boone) for JCS, 20 Jan 60, fldr 334 NATO, Box 35, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
182. Msg Paris Polto 1168 for State, 16 Dec 59, OSD Hist.
183. Secretary Gates's NATO Speech (Final Version), Paris, 16 Dec 59, fldr NATO, Box 5, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
184. Memo SecDef for Pres, 17 Dec 59, fldr NATO 1959, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
185. Memo SecDef for Pres, 17 Dec 59, fldr NATO 320.2, Box 6, *ibid*.
186. Ltr Norstad to Pres, 7 Jan 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 1:563-64; memo USRepSGN for JCS, 20 Jan 60, fldr 334 NATO, Box 35, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
187. Ltr Eisenhower to Norstad, 11 Jan 60, fldr DDE Dictation Jan 60, Box 46, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
188. Memcon de Gaulle and Norstad, 21 Jan 60, ns, drafted by Lt Col Vernon Walters (who attended the meeting as translator), *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 1:567-71. Walters's brief account of this meeting (misdated 1959) is in his book, *Silent Missions*, 502-03.
189. Ltrs Norstad to Pres, 20 Apr 60, and Pres to Norstad, 29 Apr 60; msg Paris 401 for State, 27 Jul 60: OSD Hist.
190. Msg Paris 427 for State, 29 Jul 60, *ibid*; DeptState memcon, 2 Aug 60, fldr 334 NATO, Box 12, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
191. Msg Paris 993 for State, 8 Sep 60, OSD Hist; *New York Times*, 23 Nov 60.
192. NSC 5906/1, 5 Aug 59, para 24, OSD Hist.
193. NSC 5910, 3 Aug 59, fldr 5910 U.S. Policy on France, Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500. This copy of NSC 5910 (the only one found) is not entirely original, many of the pages having been replaced by later versions. However, the paragraph on nuclear assistance to France was separately circulated by memo Dir PB Secretariat (Johnson) for NSC PB, 5 Aug 59, *ibid*.
194. Memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Aug 59, JCSM-334-59, w/encl (JCS comments on amended version of NSC 5910, which has not been found, though its substance is clear from the comments), briefing paper by OASD(ISA), "U.S. Policy on France," for 417th NSC mtg, 18 Aug 59: *ibid*.
195. Memo of disc (Johnson), 417th NSC mtg, 18 Aug 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 2:243-53.
196. Msg State Topol 316 for AmEmb Paris, 19 Aug 59, OSD Hist. This was not a joint State-Defense message, but Defense had been informed of its substance.

197. Msg Paris Polto 330 for State, 21 Aug 59, *ibid*.
198. DeptState memcons (3), 2 Sep 59, 4:00 pm, 3 Sep 59, 4:15 pm and 7:00 pm, Paris, encl/w memo Johnson for PB, 6 Oct 59, fldr 5910 U.S. Policy on France, Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 424-30.
199. Briefing sheets by OASD(ISA) for PB mtgs, 22 Sep, 8 Oct, 16 Oct 59, memo Johnson for NSC PB, 14 Oct 59, briefing sheet by OASD(ISA) for NSC mtg, 29 Oct 59: fldr 5910 U.S. Policy on France, Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; memo JCS for SecDef, 24 Oct 59, JCSM-443-59, fldr France 1959, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A5174.
200. Memo of disc (Johnson), 422nd NSC mtg, 29 Oct 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 2:290-95; NSC 5910/1, 4 Nov 59, *ibid*, 296-311.
201. Memo of disc (Boggs), 429th NSC mtg, 16 Dec 59, OSD Hist; memo DepASD(ISA) (Williams) for Col James E. Tyler, USA, 25 Jan 60, fldr Increased Nuclear Sharing with Allies, Box 5, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024; memo ExecSecNSC for SecState, SecDef, and ChmAEC, 3 Dec 59, fldr 5910 US Policy on France, Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
202. Memo JCS for SecDef, 26 Jan 60, JCSM-20-60, memo CJCS for SecDef, 26 Jan 60, CM-476-60: fldr France 1959, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
203. *New York Times*, 14 Feb, 2 Apr 60; Herter press conference, 18 Feb 60, DeptState *Bulletin*, XLII (7 Mar 60), 361; *Public Statements, SecDef Gates, 1959-60*, III:543.
204. Memo ATSD(AE) for DirOfcofNSCaff, OASD(ISA), 11 Mar 60, fldr 471.6 France, Box 24, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
205. Ltr Merchant to Irwin, 23 Mar 60, *ibid*; memo ATSD(AE) for DirEurReg, OASD(ISA), 5 Apr 60, fldr France 1960, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
206. Memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Apr 60, JCSM-144-60, fldr 471.6 France, Box 24, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
207. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 8 Apr 60, *ibid*.
208. Twining, *Neither Liberty nor Safety*, 82-86; Lemnitzer interv, 24 Jan 84, 27-28, OSD Hist.
209. Memcon Timothy W. Stanley, SpecAsst to ASD(ISA), 26 May 60, summarizing Gates-Messmer conversation, 20 May 60, fldr France 092-350.05, Box 24, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
210. Kistiakowsky, 381.
211. Memo of disc (Boggs), 454th NSC mtg, 1 Aug 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 380-81.
212. DeptState memcon, 2 Aug 60, fldr Atom-Nucl Policy 60 (2), Box 85, Norstad papers, DDEL.
213. Memo Ivan B. White, DeptState, for Merchant, 5 Aug 60, reporting Norstad-Eisenhower mtg, 3 Aug 60 (apparently on basis of information from Norstad's political advisor, Thurston), fldr 471.6, Box 21, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; NSC Action 2274-d, 1 Aug 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 1:604.
214. NSC Action 2274-c, 1 Aug 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, VII, pt 1:604; memo DepASD(ISA) for SecDef, 11 Aug 60, fldr 79 USP-US/France Agreements for Cooperation (1960), Box 4, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 69-A1390.
215. Memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Aug 60, JCSM-337-60, fldr 79 USP-US/France Agreements for Cooperation (1960), Box 4, ATSD(AE) files, Acc 69-A1390.
216. Memo ATSD(AE) for ASD(ISA), 15 Aug 60, fldr 471.6 France, Box 24, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
217. Memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 23 Aug 60, w/encl, "The Pros and Cons of Increased Nuclear Sharing with Allies," fldr Increased Nuclear Sharing with Allies, Box 5, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
218. DeptState memcon, 24 Aug 60, OSD Hist.
219. Memos of disc (Boggs), 457th NSC mtg, 25 Aug 60, and 441st NSC mtg, 14 April 60: *ibid*.
220. Msg State Circular 828 to all U.S. Diplomatic Posts, 16 Dec 59, *ibid*; NAC communiqué, 17 Dec 59, DeptState *Bulletin*, XLII (4 Jan 60), 3.
221. Memo of telcon, Bowie with UnderSecState Merchant, 9 Mar 60, OSD Hist; memo DepASD(ISA) for SecDef, 12 May 60, ltr Eisenhower to Bowie, 22 Apr 60, encl/w memo Goodpaster for Gates, 7 Jun 60: fldr 334 NATO, Box 12, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.

222. Memo SecDef for Secs of Mil Depts et al, 29 Jun 60, fldr NATO W-1-2, Box 5, OASD (ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
223. "The North Atlantic Nations: Tasks for the 1960's," 27-38, 39-42, 50-51, 56-58, 58-65: cited in n 90.
224. Memcon Col S.W. Downey, USA, Exec to SACEUR, 16 Sep 60, summarizing mtg, 13 Sep 60, OSD Hist; memo Burke for Op-06, 12 Sep 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
225. Ltr Miller to Shuff, 28 Sep 60, and reply Shuff to Miller, 24 Oct 60, fldr 334 NATO (Bowie Report), Box 12, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
226. Memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 5 Jul 60, fldr 334 NATO, Box 12, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; memo DJS for ASD(ISA), 2 Aug 60, DJSM-512-60, w/encl, "Ten-Year Study of NATO," fldr 334 NATO (Bowie), Box 35, *ibid*.
227. "NATO in the 1960's: U.S. Policy Considerations," draft by EurReg, OASD(ISA), encl/w memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 23 Sep 60, fldr 334 NATO, Box 12, *ibid*.
228. Memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 23 Sep 60, cited in preceding note.
229. Memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Oct 60, JCSM-490-60, memo CJCS for SecDef, 28 Oct 60, CM-17-60: fldr NSC 6017 (NATO in the 1960s) File No. 2, Box 29, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
230. Memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Sep 60, JCSM-420-60, fldr NATO 471.61 1960, Box 22, OASD (ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
231. Memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Oct 60, JCSM-467-60, *ibid*.
232. Briefing paper by A. S. Buford (probably in Gray's ofc), apparently intended for Gray, for PB mtg 18 Oct 60, fldr Nuclear Sharing with Allies (1960), Box 14, Briefing Notes subser, NSC ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL.
233. Memrcd Burke, 12 Oct 60, summarizing AFPC mtg 11 Oct 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; handwritten notes on same mtg by Col Black, fldr Col Black's notes 1960, Box 4, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078; AFPC Advice of Action, 11 Oct 60, OSD Hist. Official "meeting notes" for this meeting have not been found.
234. Msg Paris 1511 for State, 15 Oct 60, OSD Hist.
235. Memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 8 Nov 60, fldr Staff Notes Nov 60, Box 54, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
236. NSC 6017, 8 Nov 60, OSD Hist.
237. Briefing paper by OASD(ISA), "NATO in the 1960's," for PB mtg 10 Nov 60, memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Nov 60, JCSM-515-60, memo SecA for SecDef, 15 Nov 60: fldr NSC 6017 (NATO in the 1960's) File No. 2, Box 29, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
238. Memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 15 Nov 60, *ibid*.
239. Msg ASD/ISA DEF 985866 for USNMR and USLO SACLANT (Personal for Norstad, Dennison, and Shuff from Irwin), 160124Z Nov 60, OSD Hist.
240. Msg USNMR ALO 1000 for OSD (personal for Irwin from Norstad), 161502Z Nov 60, DA IN 58752, fldr NSC 6017 (NATO in the 1960's) File No. 2, Box 29, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
241. "Proposal made by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, concerning Nuclear Sharing with France," 16 Nov 60, ns, on OSD letterhead, *ibid*; draft memrcd Col Eaton, OASD(ISA), 17 Nov 60, fldr 471.6 Nov-Dec, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; memrcd Capt Shane, Ofc of Plng, OASD(ISA), 16 Nov 60, fldr 471.6, Box 36, *ibid*; DeptState memcon, 16 Nov 60, OSD Hist.
242. Memo of disc (Lay), 467th NSC mtg, 17 Nov 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
243. Address by Norstad, NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, Paris, 21-26 Nov 60, copy in fldr NSC 6017 (NATO in the 1960's) File No. 1, Box 29, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; *New York Times*, 22 Nov 60.
244. Text of Herter's statement in msg State Topol 846 for AmEmb Paris, 9 Dec 60, OSD Hist.
245. NAC communiqué, 19 Dec 60, DeptState *Bulletin*, XLIV (9 Jan 61), 40.
246. Briefing paper "NATO in the 1960's (NSC 6017)," for NSC mtg 22 Dec 60, fldr NSC 6017 (NATO in the 1960's) File No. 1, Box 29, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; memo of disc (Boggs), 471st NSC mtg, 22 Dec 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.

XVIII. THE PROBLEM OF BERLIN

1. For recent detailed accounts of the Berlin crisis of 1958-1960, see William Burr, "Avoiding the Slippery Slope: The Eisenhower Administration and the Berlin Crisis, November 1958-January 1959," *Diplomatic History*, XVIII (Spring 94), 177-205, and Marc Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, 169-215.
2. For a survey of postwar developments in Germany, including the evolution of the two separate governments, see J.K. Sowden, *The German Question: Continuity and Change*, 45-162.
3. On the rearmament of West Germany, see Condit, *Test of War*, 307-35, and Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 281-321.
4. Jean Edward Smith, *The Defense of Berlin*, 82-84. The zones of access between Berlin and the West are shown on the accompanying map.
5. For postwar developments in Berlin through 1946, including the blockade, see *ibid*, 1-150.
6. NSC 5404/1, 25 Jan 54, OSD Hist; NSC Action 1664-c, 31 Jan 57, bound fldr Record of Actions of the National Security Council 1957, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
7. Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 207-11; JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 496-97.
8. Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 211; JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 495, 498.
9. Smith, *Defense of Berlin*, 147-48.
10. *Ibid*, 151-62. A number of the documents involved in this exchange have been printed in Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1970*, Committee Print, 92 Cong, 1 sess (17 May 1971), 324-49. For the relationship of the Bulganin letter to subsequent arms control discussions, see ch XX.
11. JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 493-94, 499-500.
12. *Ibid*, 500; Smith, *Defense of Berlin*, 157-60.
13. NSC 5803, 7 Feb 58, and Supplement 1, same date, OSD Hist. NSC 5803 (but not the supplement) is printed in *FRUS 1958-60*, IX:631-44.
14. *New York Times*, 11 Nov 58; excerpts from Khrushchev speech in Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, *Documents on Germany*, 350-54.
15. Stebbins, *United States in World Affairs, 1958*, 159-60.
16. Memo of disc (Gleason), 386th NSC mtg, 13 Nov 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
17. Msg USCOB Berlin for DA and CINCUSAREUR, 150035Z Nov 58, OSD Hist.
18. Msg USCINCEUR EC 9-6071 for SecDef (McElroy and Twining from Norstad), 152348Z Nov 58, msgs JCS 951105 and 951106 for USCINCEUR, 172208Z and 172317Z Nov 58, msg State 1035 for AmEmb Bonn, 20 Nov 58: OSD Hist; memcon SecState and Pres, 18 Nov 58, telcon SecState and SecDef, 18 Nov 58: *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:84-85.
19. Memo of disc, State-JCS mtg, 21 Nov 58, State-JCS meetings, Lot 61-D417, DeptState. A less informative account is in memrcd Lt Gen Clovis E. Byers, USA, MilAdv to ASD(ISA), 25 Nov 58, fldr 092 Germany 471.6, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-B1698.
20. Memrcd Col E. M. Harris, USA, EurReg, ISA, 22, 24, 25, 26 Nov 58, fldr 092 Germany 471.6, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-B1698.
21. Msg USCINCEUR EC 9-6265 for JCS, 231252Z Nov 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:115-17.
22. Memo JCS for SecDef, 24 Nov 58, msg JCS 951487 for USCINCEUR, 25 Nov 58: fldr Germany 381 (6 Jan 59) Berlin Contingency Planning, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
23. Dulles press conf, 26 Nov 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:121-23.
24. Msg USCINCEUR EC 9-6253 for DA, 220950Z Nov 58, OSD Hist.
25. *New York Times*, 28 Nov 58; text of Soviet note to U.S. Government in *DeptState Bulletin*, XL (19 Jan 59), 81-89.
26. Memrcd Col Harris, OASD(ISA), 2 Dec 58, fldr 092 Germany, Box 14, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-A1698.
27. Ltr ActgSecDef to SecState, 9 Dec 58, fldr Germany 381 (6 Jan 59), Berlin Contingency Planning, Box 1, OSD CCS files, Acc 63-B1574.

28. Notes of disc (Lay) at special mtg in president's ofc, 11 Dec 58, OSD Hist; memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 11 Dec 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:172-77; ltr ActgSecState to ActgSecDef, 19 Dec 58, fldr Berlin Contingency Planning, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 337-39; Eisenhower, *Strictly Personal*, 213-16.
29. Communiqué by four Western foreign ministers, 14 Dec 58, Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, *Documents on Germany*, 559-60; Declaration by NAC on Berlin, 16 Dec 58, *ibid*, 560.
30. Editorial note, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:224; *New York Times*, 1 Jan 59; text of U.S. note in DeptState *Bulletin*, XL (19 Jan 59), 79-81. Texts of the British and French notes were similar. A separate West German note was delivered on 5 January 1959.
31. Soviet note, 10 Jan 59, in Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, *Documents on Germany*, 585-607.
32. DeptState memcon, 5 Jan 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:240-44.
33. Memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Jan 59, JCSM-16-59, fldr Germany 381 (6 Jan 59) Berlin Contingency Planning, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
34. DeptState memo on substance of discussion at State-JCS mtg, 14 Jan 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:259-65.
35. Memo SecDef for SecState, 15 Jan 59, *ibid*, 269-70.
36. Memo of conf with Pres (J. S. D. Eisenhower), 29 Jan 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:299-305; memo by SecState, "Conclusions of White House Conference re Berlin," *ibid*, 305-06; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 340-42; Eisenhower, *Strictly Personal*, 218-21.
37. Smith, *Defense of Berlin*, 195.
38. Memrcd Lt Gen Byers, 3 Feb 59, summarizing State-JCS mtg 30 Jan 59, fldr 357, Box 27, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1672; memo CJCS for SecDef, 2 Feb 59, CM-289-59, w/encl, fldr Germany 381 Case 6 Jan 59 1959, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574; msg CINCUSAREUR EC 9-964 for JCS, 19 Feb 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:384-85.
39. Memo of conf with Pres (J. S. D. Eisenhower), 29 Jan 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:299-305; memo SecDef for CJCS, 5 Jan 59, memo CJCS for SecDef, 18 Feb 59, CM-301-59; fldr Germany 381 Case 6 Jan 59 1959, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
40. Smith, *Defense of Berlin*, 196-97; msgs USCINCEUR EC 9-619 for JCS, 022200Z Feb 59, CINCUSAREUR SC 1580 for USCINCEUR, 022342Z Feb 59, AmEmb Moscow Niact 1541 for SecState, 4 Feb 59, USCINCEUR EC 9-680 for JCS, 042055Z Feb 59; OSD Hist; text of U.S. protest note in Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, *Documents on Germany*, 411; Eisenhower *Public Papers*, 1959, 157.
41. Statements by Merchant to NSC, memo of disc (Gleason), 396th NSC mtg, 12 Feb 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:358-59; Dulles statement, 9 Feb 59, DeptState *Bulletin*, XL (2 Mar 59), 297; *New York Times*, 17 Feb 59; text of U.S. note of 16 Feb 59, DeptState *Bulletin*, XL (9 Mar 59), 333; DeptState PR, 13 Feb 59, *ibid*, XL (2 Mar 59), 297.
42. Memo on Berlin, 18 Feb 59, handed British and French ambassadors, 18 Feb 59, with corrections suggested by them and acceptable to DeptState, Tab A to memo SecDef and SecState for Pres, 17 Mar 59; fldr Germany 381 (6 Jan 59) Berlin Contingency Planning, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
43. Soviet note of 2 Mar 59, DeptState *Bulletin*, XL (13 Apr 59), 508-11; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 346.
44. Ltr ActgSecState for DepSecDef, 3 Mar 59, fldr Berlin Contingency Planning, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
45. Memo of disc (ns), special NSC mtg, 5 Mar 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:419-25; *New York Times*, 6 Mar 59; Eisenhower, *Strictly Personal*, 222-23.
46. Memos of confs with Pres (J. S. D. Eisenhower), 6 Mar 59, 10:30 am, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:428-37, and, 6 Mar 59, 5:00 pm, fldr Staff Notes Mar 1-15 1959 (2), Box 39, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 347-49; Eisenhower, *Strictly Personal*, 223-27.
47. Statement by Gray in memo of disc with Pres, 9 Mar 59, fldr Meetings with President 1959 (5), Box 4, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL.
48. Memos of disc, Berlin Contingency Planning Group, 9, 14 Mar 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:441-44, 471-78. For background information on the issue of C-130 flights, see memrcd Col James H. Schofield, Jr., USA, EurReg, OASD(ISA), 18 Mar 60, fldr High Altitude Flights to Berlin, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.

49. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 9 Mar 59, fldr Staff Notes Mar 1-15 59 (1), Box 39, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
50. Statement by Twining, memo of disc at special NSC mtg, 5 Mar 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:423; memrcd Goodpaster, 11 Mar 59, Box 1, fldr DoD Vol. III (5) (Mar Apr 59), DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
51. Memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 9 Mar 59, fldr Staff Notes Mar 1-15 59 (1), Box 39, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
52. Memo JCS for SecDef, 11 Mar 59, JCSM-82-59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:454-58.
53. Memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Mar 59, JCSM-93-59, fldr Germany 381 (6 Jan 59) Berlin Contingency Planning, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574; ltr ActgSecState (Murphy) to McElroy, 17 Apr 59, fldr Germany 381 (6 Jan 59) 1959, Box 4, *ibid*.
54. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1959*, 273-82.
55. Memo SecDef and ActgSecState for Pres, 17 Mar 59, fldr Germany 381 (6 Jan 59) Berlin Contingency Planning, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
56. Memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 17 Mar 59, fldr Meetings with Pres 1959 (3), Box 4, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 17 Mar 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:498-99.
57. Msg JCS 956632 for U/S Cmdrs, 20 Mar 59, 201835Z Mar 59, OSD Hist.
58. Memcons, Pres and Macmillan, 20-21 Mar 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:520-29; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 350-56; Eisenhower, *Strictly Personal*, 229-31; text of US note, 26 Mar 59, in DeptState *Bulletin*, XL (13 Apr 59), 507-08; msg Moscow 1966 for SecState, 30 Mar 59, OSD Hist.
59. Memo JCS for SecDef, 26 Mar 59, JCSM-108-59, fldr Germany 381 (6 Jan 59) Berlin Contingency Planning, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
60. Mmos JCS for SecDef, 9 Apr 59, JCSM-128-59, and 10 Apr 59, JCSM-135-59: *ibid*; notes of disc at mtg in White House conf rm, 11 Apr 59, ns, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:601-06. The two studies themselves are attached to memo ActgSecState for Pres, 18 Apr 59, OSD Hist.
61. Memo of disc (Gleason), special NSC mtg (unnumbered), 23 Apr 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:624-34.
62. Msg State 2110 for AmEmb Bonn, 16 Mar 59, OSD Hist; memo DepASD(ISA) for SecDef, 3 Apr 59, w/encl, Rept of Defense-Joint Staff Reconnaissance Group, 31 Mar 59, fldr Germany 311 Case 6 Jan 59, 1959, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
63. Memo of conf with Pres (J. S. D. Eisenhower), 26 Mar 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:533-39.
64. Msg JCS 956971 for USCINCEUR, 262009Z Mar 59, OSD Hist.
65. Msg USAFE Advon Ramstein to USCINCEUR, IDC 25299Z, 272255Z Mar 59, *ibid*.
66. Msgs USCINCEUR for JCS, EC 9-1821, 282110Z Mar 59, and EC 9-1822, 291240Z Mar 59: *ibid*; memo Quarles for Twining, 8 Apr 59, fldr Germany 1959, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574; texts of Soviet and U.S. notes, *Documents on Germany 1944-1985*, 617-20.
67. Msg CINCUSAFE Ramstein RAM IAI 9RM 645 for USCINCEUR, 152338Z Apr 59, OSD Hist.
68. Msg London for SecState, 5465, 20 Apr 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII, 622-24; msgs Bonn for State, 2327, 16 Apr 59, and 2348, 19 Apr 59: OSD Hist; memrcd Col Schofield, 18 Mar 60, fldr High Altitude Flights to Berlin, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
69. Editorial note, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:529; memo of special mtg in president's ofc (Gray), 26 Mar 59, fldr Meetings with Pres 1959 (3), Box 4, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL.
70. Paper headed "Berlin Contingency Planning," 4 Apr 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:584-89; minutes of tripartite discussions, 31 Mar-1 Apr 59, *ibid*, 540-73.
71. Agreed Minute of Four Ministers, 1 Apr 59, and rept to NAC of Western Position on German Reunification, European Security and Berlin, 1 Apr 59, encls with memo DirExecSecretariat, DeptState (John A. Calhoun) for SecDef, 2 Apr 59, fldr Germany 381 (6 Jan 59) 1959, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; four-power communiqué, 1 Apr 59, DeptState *Bulletin*, XL (20 Apr 59), 555.
72. Rept of Four Power Working Grp London, 23 Apr 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:639-41; minutes of foreign ministers mtg, 29-30 Apr 59, *ibid*, 655-72; communiqué in DeptState *Bulletin*, XL (18 May 59), 699.
73. Msgs Paris for SecState, 3200, 5 Mar 59, 3295, 11 Mar 59, and 3410, 17 Mar 59, msg State 2166 for AmEmb Bonn, 18 Mar 59, msg JCS for USCINCEUR, 956537, 182233Z Mar 59, and 957254, 011808Z Apr 59: OSD Hist.

74. Norstad directive, 14 Apr 59, quoted in full in msg USCINCEUR EC 9-10630 for JCS, 171400Z Apr 59, *ibid*.
75. Msg USCINCEUR EC 9-2195 for JCS, 18 Apr 59, *ibid*.
76. Msg JCS 958782 for USCINCEUR, 272149Z Apr 59, *ibid*; JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 608.
77. Msg USCINCEUR EC 9-10710 for CJCS, 131510Z May 59, OSD Hist.
78. Memo JCS for SecDef, 22 May 59, JCSM-193-59, fldr Germany 381 (6 Jan 59) Berlin Contingency Planning, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574; msg JCS 960694 for USCINCEUR, 052236Z Jun 59, msgs USCINCEUR for JCS, EC 9-10835, 190950Z Jun 59, EC 9-10846, 221226Z Jun 59: OSD Hist.
79. DeptState *Bulletin*, XL (1 Jun 59), 781-82; DeptState, *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva*, xii-xiii (hereafter cited as DeptState, *Foreign Ministers Meeting*); msg OSD for AmCon Geneva, DEF 411297, 192242Z May 59, OSD Hist.
80. DeptState, *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, 50-60, 296-300, 63-88. For secondary accounts of this conference, see Smith, *Defense of Berlin*, 203-08; Jack M. Schick, *The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962*, 77-96; Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1959*, 149-57.
81. *New York Times*, 26, 27, 28 May 60; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 360.
82. DeptState, *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, 208; *New York Times*, 4 Jun 59; Schick, 83-84.
83. Msg USCINCEUR EC 9-2977 for JCS, 031157Z Jun 59, msg Paris 4469 for State, 4 Jun 59, msg State 178 for AmEmb Bonn, 8 Jun 59: OSD Hist.
84. DeptState, *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, 261-62, 312-13; Schick, 86-87.
85. Memrcd Col Tyler, OASD(ISA), 23 Jun 59, fldr 092 (Berlin) Germany, Box 18, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1672; memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Jul 59, JCSM-264-59, fldr Germany 381 (6 Jan 59) 1959, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
86. This JCS study has not been found, but is referred to in memo SecDef for SecState, nd, Tab C with ltr SecDef to SecState, 13 Jul 59, fldr Germany 381 (Case 6 Jan 59) 1959, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
87. Memos Burke for SecDef, 11 and 12 Jul 59, atchmts to ltr SecDef to SecState, 13 Jul 59, *ibid*.
88. Memo SecDef for SecState, nd, ns, Tab A with ltr SecDef to SecState, 13 Jul 59, *ibid*. In a separate letter two days later, Gates sent State the JCS views on the reduction of the Berlin garrison: ltr DepSecDef to SecState, 15 Jul 59, *ibid*.
89. Msg USDel Geneva Cahto 148 for State (Herter for Dillon), 16 Jul 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:998-99; memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 13 Jul 59, *ibid*, 983-85.
90. Msg ActgSecState Tocah 151 to USDel Geneva, 17 Jul 59, *ibid*, 1008-09.
91. JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 504; draft msg, McElroy for Irwin, nd, with notation that McElroy had approved on 18 Jul 59, atchmt to memo ASD (ISA) for SecDef, 17 Jul 59, fldr Germany 381 (6 Jan 59) 1959, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; memo DepAsstSecState for European Affairs (Kohler) for ActgSecState, 22 Jul 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:1035-36. The actual message sent to Irwin on 18 July has not been found.
92. Ltr DepUnderSecState to CJCS, 11 Jul 59, memo JCS for Dep UnderSecState, 22 Jul 59, JCSM-292-59: fldr Germany 381 (6 Jan 59) Berlin Contingency Planning, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574; msg JCS 962376 for USCINCEUR, 142132Z Jul 59, OSD Hist.
93. Msg USCINCEUR EC 9-10949 for JCS, 231130Z Jul 59, OSD Hist.
94. Ltr ActgASD(ISA) to DepUnderSecState, 6 Aug 59, fldr Germany 381 (6 Jan 59) Berlin Contingency Planning, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
95. DeptState, *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, 381-511; Schick, 91-96; Smith, *Defense of Berlin*, 206-08; *New York Times*, 29 Jul 59, summarizing offer by Western ministers submitted on 28 July, which is not printed in the DeptState publication here cited.
96. *New York Times*, 9 July 59; Eisenhower *Public Papers, 1959*, 506-07.
97. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 405-07; Eisenhower *Public Papers, 1959*, 560.
98. DeptState, *Foreign Ministers Meeting*, 511-12, 529. The subsequent negotiations were the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference described in ch XXI.
99. *New York Times*, 16 Sep 59; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 441-47.
100. Eisenhower *Public Papers, 1959*, 692-93, 696; *New York Times*, 30 Sep 59.
101. Stebbins, 1959, 164-65, 205-06, 209-10.

102. JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 509-10, 513, 516-17; memo JCS for SecDef, 31 Aug 59, JCSM-355-59, ltr Irwin to Murphy, 23 Sep 59; fldr Germany 381 (6 Jan 59) Berlin Contingency Planning, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574; memo ActgASD(ISA) for JCS, 17 Oct 59, fldr Berlin Contingency Planning, Box 4, *ibid*.
103. Memrcd Col Schofield, OASD(ISA), 18 Mar 60, fldr High Altitude Flights to Berlin, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093; memo of telcon, SecState and SecDef, 22 Jun 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, VIII:934; msg Geneva Secto 465 for SecState (McElroy et al from Irwin), 5 Aug 59, OSD Hist; memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Aug 59, JCSM-338-59, atchmt to memo Randall for Gates, 25 Aug 59, fldr Personal Papers Secretary Gates, Box 32, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078.
104. Memrcd Col Schofield, 18 Mar 60, cited in preceding note; ltr SecDef to Pres, 19 Sep 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, IX:30; memo SecState for Pres, 25 Sep 59, and atchd "talking paper," encl with memo DirExecSecretariat, DeptState for SecDef, 25 Sep 59, fldr Russia 091.112, 7 Aug 59, Box 6, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; memo DepSecDef for CJCS and ASD(ISA), 1 Oct 59, fldr 373.5 Berlin, Box 25, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-2170.
105. Memrcd Col Schofield, 18 Mar 60, cited in n 103; memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 21 Nov 59, DeptState memcon, 11 Feb 60; fldr 373.5 Berlin, Box 25, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; memo SecState for Pres, 2 Dec 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, IX:119-20; msgs Bonn for State, 1580, 18 Feb 60, and 1604, 23 Feb 60, OSD Hist.
106. Msg State Tosec 17 for AmEmb Rio de Janeiro, 25 Feb 60, msg Buenos Aires Secto 11 (signed Herter) for SecState, 26 Feb 60; OSD Hist; memo SecState for Pres, 26 Feb 60, w/atrchd tripartite agrmt, *FRUS 1958-60*, IX:204-05.
107. Memrcd Col Black, 3 Mar 60, fldr High Altitude Flights to Berlin, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093 (date evidently erroneous, since the memo refers to events as late as 8 Mar); interv with James H. Douglas, Jr., by T.H. Baker, 23 Oct 72, 40-41, CUOHP.
108. Memrcd Col Black, 3 Mar 60, cited in preceding note; memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Mar 60, JCSM-84-60, fldr Germany 1959, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
109. Alsop column in *Washington Post*, 29 Feb 60; *New York Times*, 1 Mar 60; *New York Herald Tribune*, 4 Mar 60. Summaries of foreign press reactions are given in msgs London 4285 for SecState, 2 Mar 60, Berlin 705 for SecState, 4 Mar 60, Moscow 2241 for SecState, 4 Mar 60; OSD Hist.
110. Memrcd Col Black, 3 Mar 60, cited in n 107; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 8 Mar 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, IX:212-13; Douglas interv, 23 Oct 72, 42-43, CUOHP.
111. Herter press conference, 9 Mar 59, DeptState *Bulletin*, XLII (28 Mar 60), 488; Eisenhower press conf, 16 Mar 60, *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1960-61*, 299; *Newsweek*, LV (21 Mar 60), 41.
112. *Newsweek*, LV (21 Mar 60), 41; Kistiakowsky, 270.
113. Memo ASD(ISA) for JCS, 15 Mar 60, fldr 320.2, Box 25, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; memo JCS for SecDef, 25 Mar 60, JCSM-123-60, *FRUS 1958-60*, IX:255-56; memo SecDef for SecState, 15 Apr 60, *ibid*, 322-23.
114. Memo ActgSecDef for CJCS, 28 Mar 60, fldr Germany 381 Case (6 Jan 59), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
115. Memo JCS for SecDef, 12 May 60, JCSM-202-60, *ibid*.
116. Memo OASD(ISA) for SecDef, ns, nd, w/atrchmt, Rept on Foreign Mins mtg 13 Apr, prepared by EurReg ISA, 18 Apr 60, fldr 092.3 For Min Mtg (12-14 Apr 60) 1960, Box 7, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; statement on Germany issued by foreign ministers, 13 Apr 60, DeptState *Bulletin*, XLII (2 May 60), 684.
117. Memcons (2) among foreign mins of US, UK, and France, 18 May 60, 11:00 am and 4:30 pm, memcon among heads of govt (US, UK, and France), 18 May 60, 5:00 pm: *FRUS 1958-60*, IX:482, 487-88, 489-93.
118. *New York Times*, 20 May 60.
119. Mins of Coordinating Grp on Berlin, 23 May 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, IX:529.
120. Memo of disc (Boggs), 445th NSC mtg, 24 May 60, *ibid*, 505-13.
121. Msg OSD DEF 978425 for USCINCEUR, 082217Z Jun 60, msg USCINCEUR EC 9-2978 for OSD, 091952Z Jun 60; OSD Hist.
122. Memo Brig Gen L. J. Fields, JCS Repr to US Coord Grp on Berlin, for UnderSecState Merchant (ChmnCoordGrp), 8 Jul 60, OSD Hist; msg USCINCEUR ECJCBT 9-10684

- for CJCS, 251025Z Aug 60, msg USCINCEUR ECLO 9-10772 for JCS, 231330Z Sep 60: *ibid*; JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 517.
123. Ltr USCINCEUR for CJCS, Chief of Defence Staff, UK, and Chief of Staff of Natl Defense, France, 22 Aug 60, quoted in msg USCINCEUR ECJC BT 9-10678 for CJCS, 241352Z Aug 60, OSD Hist; mins Berlin Contingency Planning, Ambassadorial Grp mtg, 16 Sep 60, fldr 092 Germany, Box 25, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 517.
124. Msg JCS 982966 for USCINCEUR 162121Z Sep 60, msg USCINCEUR ECLO 9-10772 for JCS, 231330Z Sep 60: OSD Hist; memo Dir European Region, OASD(ISA) for Irwin and Gen Dabney, 18 Oct 60, fldr 092 Germany, Box 25, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Oct 60, JCSM 473-60, msg USCINCEUR ECJCBT 9-10679 for CJCS, 241353Z Aug 60, OSD Hist; JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 518.
125. United States and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962, nd, fldr Limited Military Operations (5906/1), Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500. For further discussion of this study, see ch XXI.
126. Smith, *Defense of Berlin*, 223-28; Glen D. Camp, Jr., *Berlin in the East-West Struggle, 1958-61*, 121-23.
127. Memo CJS for SecDef, 29 Sep 60, JCSM 439-60, *FRUS 1958-60*, IX:593-94.
128. Ltr Merchant to Douglas, 7 Oct 60, *ibid*, 603-05; memo ActgASD(ISA) for CJCS, 29 Oct 60, fldr 092 Germany, Box 25, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
129. Smith, *Defense of Berlin*, 228; Camp, 126-27.
130. Rept by OCB, 2 Nov 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, IX:697-701.
131. Memo of disc (Boggs), 468th NSC mtg, 1 Dec 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.

XIX. FAR EASTERN PROBLEMS

1. NSC 5429/5, 22 Dec 54, *FRUS 1952-54*, XII:1062-72.
2. NSC 5913/1, 25 Sep 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI:133-44. See ch VIII.
3. Memo JCS for SecDef, 11 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXIII, pt 2:322-25.
4. NSC 5514, 25 Feb 55, *ibid*, 42-48.
5. Text of Armistice Agreement in DeptState, *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, 1:724-50. Sections 13c and 13d dealt with the entry of personnel and materiel into Korea.
6. Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 212, 214-18.
7. Memo AsstSecA (George H. Roderick) for ASD(ISA), 3 Aug 56, fldr 5514 US Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea, Box 11, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
8. Memo JCS for SecDef, 1 Sep 56, fldr Korea 091 (4 Jan 57), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
9. DeptState memrcd, State-Def mtg 11 Sep 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXIII, pt 2:305-09; memo DirOfcofNEAsianAff for AsstSecStateFEAff, 3 Oct 56, *ibid*, 320-22; DeptState memcon, 28 Nov 56, *ibid*, 356-58; memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 6 Dec 56, *ibid*, 360-63; memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 22 Sep 56, fldr Korea 091 (4 Jun 57), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
10. Memo of disc (Gleason), 297th NSC mtg, 20 Dec 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXIII, pt 2:309-14. For the Prochnow Committee, see ch XX.
11. Memo JCS for SecDef, 11 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXIII, pt 2:322-25.
12. Memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Oct 56 (JCS 1776/562), OSD Hist.
13. Memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 2 Nov 56, fldr Korea 091 (4 Jan 57), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
14. Memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Jan 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXIII, pt 2:371-72.
15. Memo of disc, 301st NSC mtg, 26 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, X:124-33.
16. NSC 5702, 14 Jan 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXIII, pt 2:374-84.
17. Memo JCS for SecDef, 24 Jan 57, *ibid*, 389-90; memo SecA for SecDef, 30 Jan 57, memo SecNav for SecDef, 30 Jan 57: fldr Korea 091 (4 Jan 57), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372; memo of disc (Gleason), 311th NSC mtg, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXIII, pt 2:392-402.

18. NSC 5702/1, 18 Mar 57, OSD Hist.
19. Memo of disc (Gleason), 318th NSC mtg, 4 Apr 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXIII, pt 2:420-27.
20. Records of mtgs, DeptState (with reps of State, Defense, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), 23 Apr, 16 May 57, memo AsstSecStateforFEAff for SecState, 5 Jun 57: *FRUS 1955-57*, XXIII, pt 2:427-31, 433-37, 439-41.
21. Memo of disc (Gleason), 326th NSC mtg, 13 Jun 57, *ibid*, 443-54.
22. Text of announcement in DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXVII (8 Jul 57), 58-59.
23. Msg AmEmb Seoul 1080 for State, 21 Jun 57, msg CINCUNC UK 97747CG for DA, 23 Jul 57, DA IN 40537: *FRUS 1955-57*, XXIII, pt 2:459-60, 471-73.
24. Memo ActgExecSecNSC for NSC, 5 Aug 57, fldr 5702 Evaluation of Alternative Military Programs for Korea (File #2), Box 17, OASD (ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
25. Memo JCS for SecDef, 6 Aug 57, memo AsstSecA (Roderick) for SecDef, 6 Aug 57: fldr Korea 091 (4 Jan 57), Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
26. Memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Jul 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXIII, pt 2: 467-68; remarks by Quarles and Radford to AFPC, AFPC mtg notes, 14 Jun 57, fldr AFPC Jun 57, Box 6, OASD (C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
27. Memo of disc (Gleason), 334th NSC mtg, 8 Aug 57, NSC 5702/2, 9 Aug 57: *FRUS 1955-57*, XXIII, pt 2:480-89, 489-98.
28. Joint State-Def msg (sgd Sprague) for CINCUNC and US Chargé d'Affaires Seoul, 7 Jan 58, DEF 834904, OSD Hist. The date of the authorization has not been found, but the decision was probably made in connection with redeployment of forces from Japan, which included an Honest John unit.
29. Memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 17 Jan 58, encl w/JCS 2019/277, 21 Jan 58, memo ASD (ISA) for AsstSecStateforForAff, encl w/JCS 2019/279, 27 Jan 58: OSD Hist.
30. Memo JCS for SecDef, 10 Jan 58, fldr Korea 1958, Box 5, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; State-Def msg for CINCUNC and Amb Seoul, 22 Jan 58, DEF 935870, msg CINCUNC for OSD/ISA, UK 977867, 261000Z Feb 58, DA IN 96784: OSD Hist; briefing sheet for 371st NSC mtg, 3 Jul 58, fldr 5702 Evaluation of Alternative Military Programs for Korea (File #2), Box 17, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; OCB Progress Report on U.S. Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5817), 29 Apr 59, fldr 5817 U.S. Policy Toward Korea, Box 24, *ibid*.
31. Memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 22 Jul 58, fldr 5817 U.S. Policy Toward Korea, Box 24, OASD (ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500: memo of disc (Boggs), 375th NSC mtg, 7 Aug 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; NSC 5817, 11 Aug 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVIII:480-83, 483-91.
32. Memo ActgExecSecNSC for NSC, 17 Jun 59, fldr 5817 U.S. Policy Toward Korea, Box 24, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
33. Memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Jun 59, JCSM-242-59, comments on draft revisions of NSC 5817 prepared for SecDef by OASD(ISA), atchd to draft encl/w memo ActgExec SecNSC for NSC, 17 Jun 59: *ibid*.
34. Memo of disc (Gleason), 411th NSC mtg, 25 Jun 59, and NSC 5907, 1 Jul 59: *FRUS 1958-60*, XVIII:559-70, 571-79.
35. Stebbins, *United States in World Affairs, 1960*, 263-65.
36. Memo DirBoB for SpecAsst (Gray), 30 Aug 60, encl with memo DirPBSecretariat (Robert H. Johnson) for NSC PB, 8 Sep 60, briefing sheet for PB mtg, 9 Sep 60, record of mtg, NSC PB, 9 Sep 60: fldr 5907 U.S. Policy Toward Korea, Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
37. Memos of disc (Boggs), 469th and 470th NSC mtgs, 8, 20 Dec 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVIII: 707-13; NSC 6018, 18 Jan 61, OSD Hist.
38. For the security treaty and administrative agreement, see DeptState, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, 1952*, III, pt 3:3329-62. The peace treaty is printed in DeptState, *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, 425-39.
39. Condit, *Test of War*, 200-04.
40. NSC 5516/1, 9 Apr 55, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXIII, pt 1:52-62.
41. OCB Progress Rept on U.S. Policy Toward Japan, 27 Jun 56, fldr 5516 U.S. Policy Toward Japan (File #3), Box 12, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; memo Dir Ofc of Programming and Control, OASD(ISA) (John L. Holcombe) for ASD(ISA), 13 Jun 57, fldr 000.5-092.3 Japan, Box 4, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-A1672.

42. OCB Progress Rept on U.S. Policy Toward Japan, 6 Feb 57, fldr 5516 U.S. Policy Toward Japan (File #3), Box 12, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
43. Reports of Kishi's conversations with MacArthur are in the following msgs, all in OSD Hist: Tokyo to SecState, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 10 Apr 57; 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 13 Apr 57; 2332 and 2333, 17 Apr 57.
44. Msg Tokyo 2336 for State, 17 Apr 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXIII, pt 1:277-79.
45. Msg CINCFE 805109 for DeptA, 200133Z May 57, DA IN 22417; msg CINCPAC 3514 for CNO, 240221Z May 57: OSD Hist.
46. Msg CINCFE 805103 for DeptA, 190630Z May 57, DA IN 22327, *ibid*.
47. Memo DepASD(ISA) for CJCS, 29 May 57, fldr 000.5-092.3 Japan, Box 14, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-A1672; memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Jun 57 (JCS 2180/95), OSD Hist.
48. Memo JCS for SecDef, 10 Jul 57, w/encls, App "A" and "B", fldr Japan 320.2, 7 June 57, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
49. Memo of conv with Pres (J. F. Dulles), 6 Jun 57, fldr Meetings with the President 1957 (5), Box 6, White House Memoranda ser, JFD papers, DDEL; memo SpecAsst (Cutler) for SecDef, 7 Jun 57, fldr 5516 U.S. Policy Toward Japan, file #2, Box 12, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; statement by Wilson to AFPC, AFPC mtg notes, 10 Jun 57, OSD Hist; memrcd Goodpaster, 12 Jun 57, fldr Manpower and Personnel (2) (Jan 55-Aug 57), DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
50. AFPC mtg notes, 14, 18 Jun 57, fldr AFPC Jun 57, Box 6, (OASD)(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; AFPC Advices of Action, 14, 18 Jun 57, OSD Hist; memrcd Burke, 17 Jun 57, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; memo SecA for SecDef, 22 Jun 57, fldr Japan 320.2, 7 June 57, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
51. Memcon Capt B.A. Robbins, Jr., USN, Regional Director, FE, OASD(ISA), 18 Jun 57 (mtg held 17 Jun), fldr 111-333 Japan, Box 15, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-A1672.
52. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 18 Jun 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXIII, pt 1:357-60.
53. DeptState memcon, 20 Jun 57, *ibid*, 377-86; memcon OASD(ISA) (Capt Robbins), 20 Jun 57, fldr 000.5-092.3 Japan, Box 14, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-A1672.
54. Joint communiqué, 21 Jun 57, DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXVII (8 Jul 57), 51-53.
55. Memo JCS for SecDef, 10 Jul 57, fldr Japan 320.2, 7 Jun 57, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
56. Memo JCS for SecDef, 2 Aug 57, *ibid*; AFPC mtg notes, 13 Aug 57, fldr AFPC 3rd Qtr 1957, Box 3, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; AFPC Advice of Action, 13 Aug 57, OSD Hist.
57. *Baltimore Sun*, 2 Aug 57; memo SecNav for SecDef 8 Aug 57, fldr 111-333 Japan, Box 15, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-A1672.
58. Msg AmEmb Tokyo 466 for State, 17 Aug 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXIII, pt 1:440-52.
59. OCB Rept on U.S. Policy Toward Japan, 23 Jul 58, fldr 5516 U.S. Policy Toward Japan (File #3), Box 12, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
60. Msgs Tokyo for SecState, 63, 12 Jul 58, 224, 31 Jul 58, 444, 26 Aug 58: OSD Hist.
61. Memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 8 Aug 58, fldr Japan 092.2 17 June 59, Box 5, OASD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
62. Memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 8 Sep 58, w/encl, *ibid*.
63. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 9 Sep 58, CM-171-58, *ibid*.
64. Memo JCS for SecDef, 10 Sep 58, *ibid*.
65. Memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 17 Sep 58, *ibid*; joint statements, 11 and 12 Sep 58, Dept State *Bulletin*, XXXVIII (6 Oct 58), 532-33.
66. Memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 17 Sep 58, memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Sep 58: fldr Japan 092.2, 17 June 59, Box 5, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
67. Memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 27 Sep 58, *ibid*.
68. Memrcd ASD(ISA), 29 Sep 58, *ibid*.
69. DeptState memcon, 19 Jan 59, fldr Japan 380.01-800, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1672; Stebbins, 1959, 342-45.
70. Treaty and related documents in DeptState, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, 1960*, XI, pt 2:1632-51.
71. JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 664-65.
72. Memo JCS for SecDef, 1 Dec 58, fldr Japan 092.2 17 June 59, Box 5, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; memo DirFERegion, OASD(ISA), for ASD(ISA), 5 Jan 59, ltr AsstSecState

- (Robertson) to DepASD(ISA), 21 Jan 59: fldr Japan 380.01-800, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1672.
73. Memo JCS for SecDef, 15 May 59, JCSM-188-59, fldr Japan 092.2 17 June 59, Box 5, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, in DeptState, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, 1960, XI, pt 2:652-73.
 74. DeptState *Bulletin*, XLII (8 Feb 60), 179-81 (quote, 180); msg CINC PAC 4558 for JCS, 180543Z Jan 60, JCS 971104 for CINCPAC, 182210Z Jan 60, OSD Hist.
 75. Stebbins, 1960, 269-71.
 76. NSC 6008, 20 May 60, with comments by OASD(ISA) for SecDef inserted, and briefing sheet for 446th NSC mtg, 31 May 60, fldr 6008 U.S. Policy Toward Japan, Box 28, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
 77. Msg CINCPAC 9805 for OSD, 010028Z May 60, msg Tokyo 3615 for State, 10 May 60: fldr 5516 U.S. Policy Toward Japan (File #3), Box 12, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
 78. Memo of disc (Boggs), 446th NSC mtg, 31 May 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVIII:314-24; NSC 6008/1, 11 Jun 60, *ibid*, 335-49.
 79. For a brief history of developments in Vietnam up to 1960, see Gary R. Hess, *Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War*, 1-68. The Geneva Accords are in *FRUS 1952-54*, XVI:1505-39.
 80. Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 255; Condit, *JCS and National Policy, 1955-56*, 221-28.
 81. Ronald H. Spector, *United States Army in Vietnam: Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960*, 256; Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in Laos, *FRUS 1952-54*, XVI:1523.
 82. NSC 5612, 15 Aug 56, fldr 5612 US Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia, Box 16, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
 83. Memo SecA for SecDef, 29 Aug 56, memo SecNav for SecDef, 29 Aug 56: *ibid*; memo JCS for SecDef, 24 Aug 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXI:233-36. For the 1955 Taiwan resolution, see ch VIII.
 84. Memo of disc (Gleason), 295th NSC mtg, 30 Aug 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XXI:240-52; NSC 5612/1, *ibid*, 252-63.
 85. Memo JCS for SecDef, 21 Dec 56, fldr 5612 US Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia, Box 16, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
 86. Stebbins, 1957, 237-38, 293-94, 305-07; George F. Lemmer, *The Laos Crisis of 1959*, 11-19.
 87. Stebbins, 1959, 307-09; Lemmer, *Laos Crisis*, 37-39.
 88. Ltr ASD(ISA) for UnderSecState, 19 Aug 59, fldr Laos 1959, Box 5, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; Joint State-Def msg 232 for CINCPAC and AmEmb Vientiane, 24 Aug 59, OSD Hist; DeptState memcon of State-Def mtg, 24 Aug 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI:567-72.
 89. Lemmer, *Laos Crisis*, 40-43.
 90. DeptState memcon, 4 Sep 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI:592-98; msg ActgSecState for Pres (at Prestwick, Scotland), 5 Sep 59, *ibid*, 598-600.
 91. Msg ActgSecState for Pres, 5 Sep 59, cited in preceding note.
 92. Memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Sep 59, JCSM-374-59, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI:588-89.
 93. Msg State 416 for AmEmb Vientiane, 5 Sep 59, OSD Hist.
 94. Lemmer, *Laos Crisis*, 43; msg JCS 964936 for CINCPAC, 5 Sep 59, OSD Hist; msg ActgSecState for Pres (at Prestwick, Scotland), 6 Sep 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI:602-05.
 95. DeptState memcon, 10 Sep 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI:616-19; DeptState memcon, White House, 11 Sep 59, *ibid*, 620-22; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 11 Sep 59, *ibid*, microfiche supplement, pt 2:fiche 12, doc 262; memo Gray for Lay, 14 Sep 59, fldr Southeast Asia (1953-60), Box 16, Briefing Notes subser, NSC ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL.
 96. Stebbins, 1959, 310-11.
 97. OCB Spec Rept on Southeast Asia, 10 Feb 60, US Cong, House, Cte on Armed Svcs, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense*, Cte Print (1971), (hereafter cited as *U.S.-Vietnam Relations*), X:1249-53, memo of disc (Boggs), 436th NSC mtg, 10 Mar 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI:178-79.

98. NSC 6012, 25 Jul 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI: 209-23; memo of disc (Johnson), 452nd NSC mtg, 21 Jul 60, *ibid*, 203-09.
99. Stebbins, 1957, 236.
100. DoD Report to NSC on Status of U.S. Military Programs as of 30 June 1959 (NSC 5912, Part 1), Box 27, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
101. "Origins of the Insurgency in Vietnam, 1954-1960," *U.S.-Vietnam Relations*, X:21-22; Spector, 329-37; msg Saigon 278 for State, 7 Mar 60, memo Col Lansdale for DepSecDef, 17 Mar 60: *FRUS 1958-60*, I:300-20, 336-38.
102. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1954, 383 (press conf, 7 Apr 54).
103. *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1959, 309-17 (quote, 312-13).
104. Lansdale's appointment as DepATSD(SO) is documented in OSD admin memo, 4 Oct 57, fldr 810 OSD General, Box 36, Lansdale papers, HIWRP. For his career up to 1960, see Cecil B. Currey, *Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American*, 1-206.
105. For the CACG, see ch IX. A memo from Black for Gates, 12 Aug 59, says that CACG "needs a shot in the arm." In another memo for Lansdale et al, 19 Apr 60, Black spoke of "revitalization" of the CACG. Both are in fldr Col Black Reading file 6/15/59-7/30/60, Box 4, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-B3078.
106. Memo of disc (Boggs), 444th NSC mtg, 9 May 60, *FRUS 1959-60*, I:446-48.
107. Memo DirFERegion, OASD(ISA)(Rear Adm O'Donnell) for ASD(ISA), 6 Jun 60, *ibid*, 489-92; memo JCS for SecDef, 6 Jun 60, JCSM-232-60, w/encl, CINCPAC Study, "Counter-Insurgency Operations in South Vietnam and Laos," 26 Apr 60, fldr 383.4, 6 Jun 60, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
108. Memo CINCPAC for JCS, 30 Jun 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, I:512-14; memo JCS for SecDef, 30 Aug 60, *ibid*, 547-48. The plan itself is not printed here but, as approved by DoD with slight revisions, appears as part of msg ASD(ISA) for CINCPAC, 16 Sep 60, *ibid*, 573-75.
109. SNIE 613.1-60, 23 Aug 60, *ibid*, 536-41.
110. Memo JCS for CINCPAC, 1 Sep 60, quoting memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 29 Aug 60, *ibid*, 549.
111. "Actions to Strengthen Stability of Government of Vietnam," paper prepared by MAAG Vietnam, nd (ca 4 Sep 60), *ibid*, 550-56.
112. Msg Saigon for State, 5 Sep 60, ltr Durbrow to AsstSecStateFEAff (Parsons), 6 Sep 60: *ibid*, I:556-60, 564-67 (quotes, 564, 566).
113. Memo Lansdale for DirFERegion, OASD(ISA) (O'Donnell), 13 Sep 60, *ibid*, 570-72.
114. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 5 Oct 60, fldr 334 (A to C) 1960, Box 13, OSD CCS Files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; memo Black for Col John, ISA, 14 Sep 60, fldr Col Black Reading File 8/1/60, Box 4, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-B0378.
115. Memo W. H. Godel, Dir Policy and Plng Div, ARPA, for ASD(ISA), nd (ca 20 Sep 60), w/ atchd handwritten memo Black for Maj Gen Charles H. Bonesteel, Sec Army GS, 20 Sep 60, fldr 334 (A to C) 1960, Box 13, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
116. Msg ASD(ISA) for CINCPAC, 16 Sep 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, I:572-75; ltr ActgSecDef to SecState, 16 Sep 60, ltr O'Donnell to Parsons, 16 Sep 60: fldr 383.4, 6 Jun 60, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1980, Acc 64-A2093.
117. Msg State for AmEmb Vietnam, 19 Oct 60, U.S. Plan for Counterinsurgency in South Vietnam, 27 Oct 60, prepared by MAAG Vietnam: *FRUS 1958-60*, I:604-05, 613-20.
118. The 7 October decree is mentioned in msg Saigon for State, 3 Nov 60, *ibid*, 622-25. The later one (date not given) is mentioned in the draft counterinsurgency plan by the country team: *FRUS 1961-63*, I:7.
119. Stebbins, 1960, 285-86; documents in *FRUS 1958-60*, I:631-66.
120. Memo Lansdale for SecDef, 12 Nov 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, I:653.
121. Msg French for Lansdale, 17 Nov 60, *ibid*, 669-70; memo Lansdale for Gates, 17 Nov 60, fldr Viet-Nam 1960, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
122. *FRUS 1961-63*, I:1-12.
123. Documents in *FRUS 1958-60*, I:457-59, 465-66, 501-02, 729-30; Currey, 213-16; David L. Anderson, *Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961*, 194-95.
124. Memo Lansdale for SecDef and DepSecDef, 17 Jan 61, *U.S.-Vietnam Relations*, XI:1-12. Lansdale was apparently unaware that CINCPAC in 1959 had authorized U.S. advisers to accompany SVN units on operational missions provided they did not become involved in combat: Spector, 332.

125. Ltr Lansdale to Diem, 30 Jan 61, *FRUS 1961-63*, I:20-23.
126. Stebbins, 1960, 277-79; msg USARMA Vientiane 237 for SecState, 091715Z Aug 60, DA IN 785634, msg CHJUSMAG Thailand 7715 for CINCPAC, 101955Z Aug 60: OSD Hist; memo ChCurrentIntelDiv, Intel Directorate, JCS (Col F. M. Rogers, USAF) for Brig Gen Brown, Col Black, and Rear Adm O'Donnell, 10 Aug 60, fldr Laos 1960, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
127. Memo OASD(ISA) (sig illeg) for SecDef, 12 Aug 60, memo ActgSecDef for CJCS, 12 Aug 60: fldr Laos 1960, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; msg State 155 for AmEmb Vientiane, 11 Aug 60, msg JCS 981358 for CINCPAC, 12 Aug 60: OSD Hist.
128. Msg State for AmEmb Paris et al, 18 Aug 60, OSD Hist.
129. Msg Vientiane 315 for State, 17 Aug 60, *ibid*; memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Aug 60, JCSM-373-60, fldr Laos 091 1960, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
130. Msg Vientiane 355 for State, 20 Aug 60, OSD Hist; memo CNO for SecDef, 20 Aug 60, fldr Laos 091 1960, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
131. Msg State 226 for Vientiane, 23 Aug 60, msg OASD(ISA) Def 981786 for CINCPAC, 230341Z Aug 60: OSD Hist; editorial note, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI:822-23.
132. Msgs State 269 for AmEmb Vientiane, 2 Sep 60, Vientiane 462 for State, 4 Sep 60, State 275 for AmEmb Vientiane, 5 Sep 60: OSD Hist.
133. Msg Vientiane 501 for State, 10 Sep 60, *ibid*; *New York Times*, 12 Sep 60.
134. Msg Vientiane 536 for State, 15 Sep 60, memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Sep 60, JCSM-415-60: *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI: 841-45, 846-47; "Chronology—Laos," encl/w memo Irwin for Gates, 10 Nov 60, fldr Laos 091 1960, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
135. Msg Vientiane 677 for State, 5 Oct 60, msg State 375 for Vientiane, 5 Oct 60: OSD Hist.
136. Msg State 384 for Vientiane, 8 Oct 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI:886-88.
137. *New York Times*, 10 Oct 60; msg Saigon 839 for State, 18 Oct 60, OSD Hist; memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 28 Oct 60, fldr Laos 091 1960, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
138. "Chronology—Laos," encl with memo Irwin for Gates, 10 Nov 60, fldr Laos 091 1960, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093; editorial note, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI: 933-34; msg State 466 for Vientiane, 28 Oct 60, Vientiane 861 for State, 2 Nov 60: OSD Hist.
139. Memo Lansdale for ASD(ISA), 4 Nov 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI:938-39; memo Black for Douglas, 8 Nov 60, fldr Col Black Reading File 8/1/60, Box 4, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-B3078; memo Black for Gates, 9 Nov 60, memo Irwin for Gates, 10 Nov 60: fldr Laos 091 1960, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093; msg State 501 and 502 for AmEmb Vientiane, 10 Nov 60, OSD Hist.
140. Msg State 514 for Vientiane, 14 Nov 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI:958-59; msg Bangkok 897 for State, 23 Nov 60, quoted *ibid*, 977; msg Vientiane 1081 for State, 7 Dec 60, *ibid*, 991-93; msg State 690 for Bangkok, 14 Nov 60, Vientiane 964 for State, 21 Nov 60, Bangkok 907 for State, 20 Nov 60, PEO Rep Savannakhet for CINCPAC, 280535Z Nov 60: OSD Hist.
141. Msg CHPEO Laos for CINCPAC, 081605Z Dec 60, msg State 1087, 8 Dec 60; 1091, 9 Dec 60; 1124, 11 Dec 60, 1095, 9 Dec 60, 1102, 9 Dec 60, 1148, 12 Dec 60; msg State circular 878, 19 Dec 60: OSD Hist; *New York Times*, 11, 12, 14 Dec 60.
142. Msg Vientiane 1124 for State, 11 Dec 60, msg USARMA Vientiane CS003 for DA, 040622Z Jan 61, DA IN 71864: OSD Hist; *New York Times*, 12 Dec 60.
143. Msgs exchanged between Vientiane and Washington, 14 Dec 60, msg Paris for Washington et al, 14 Dec 60, memrcd Adm Burke, 14 Dec 60: fldr Laos 1960, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; memo of telcon Pres and Goodpaster, 14 Dec 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI:1008-10; msg State 641 for Vientiane, 14 Dec 60, *ibid*, 1006-08.
144. Msg Bangkok 1042 for State, 17 Dec 60, msg CINCUSARPAC RJ 96671 for CINCPAC, 191605Z Dec 60, DA IN 67844: OSD Hist.
145. Msg CINCUSARPAC RJ 96843 for DA, 242242Z Dec 60, DA IN 69728, msg USARMA Vientiane CX-A2 for DA, 220856Z Dec 60, DA IN 68875, msg USARMA Vientiane CX003 for DA, 040622Z Jan 61, DA IN 71864, msg State 674 for Vientiane et al, 24 Dec 60: OSD Hist; *New York Times*, 28 Dec 60.
146. Memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Dec 60, JCSM-580-60, fldr Laos 091 1960, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.

147. Msg CINCPAC for JCS, 232339Z Dec 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI: 1017-18; msg JCS 987781 for CINCPAC, 24 Dec 60, OSD Hist.
148. Msg State 688 for Vientiane, 27 Dec 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI: 1019-20; msg Vientiane 1207 and 1208 for State, 30 Dec 60, OSD Hist; ltr ActgASD(ISA) for UnderSecState, 30 Dec 60, fldr Laos 091 1960, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
149. Msgs CHPEO for CINCPAC, 130, 311730Z Dec 60, DA IN 71320, and 134, 311130Z Dec 60, DA IN 71214, msg CINCUSARPAC RJ 96965 for ACSI, 312315Z Dec 60, DA IN 71357, msg State 986 for Bangkok et al, 31 Dec 60, msg CINCPAC for JCS, 311430Z Dec 60: OSD Hist; *New York Times*, 31 Dec 60.
150. Memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 31 Dec 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, XVI: 1024-29; msg JCS 988041 for CINCPAC, 31 Dec 60, OSD Hist; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 609-10; *New York Times*, 1 Jan 61.
151. *New York Times*, 1, 2, 3 Jan 61; memos of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 2, 3 Jan 61, fldr Staff Notes Jan 61, Box 55, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; msg State circular 1004, 12 Jan 61, OSD Hist.
152. Msg Vientiane 1285 for State, 7 Jan 61, msg State circular 1018, 14 Jan 61: OSD Hist.
153. *New York Times*, 5, 11, 12 Jan 61; msg CHPEO 175 for CINCPAC, 050850Z Jan 61, DA IN 72342, OSD Hist.
154. Msgs JCS for CINCPAC, 988337, 988339, 7 Jan 61, OSD Hist; *New York Times*, 13 Jan 61.
155. Msg CINCPAC for CHPEO, 130420Z Jan 61, OSD Hist.
156. Handwritten notes by Col Black on AFPC mtg, 17 Jan 61, fldr Col Black's notes 1961, Box 4, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078.
157. Memo of Eisenhower-Kennedy conf regarding Laos, 19 Jan 61, in memo Clark Clifford for Pres Johnson, 29 Sep 67, printed in full in US Department of Defense, *The Senator Gravel Edition, The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam*, XI:635-37 (also in *U.S.-Vietnam Relations*, X:1360-64, where, however, most of the concluding paragraph is missing); memrcd Persons, 19 Jan 61, of Eisenhower-Kennedy mtg (first page missing), fldr Kennedy, John F. 1960-61 (2), Box 2, Augusta-Walter Reed ser, Post-Presidential papers 1961-69, DDEL. There are several other accounts of this meeting; all have been carefully examined by Fred I. Greenstein and Richard H. Immerman, "What Did Eisenhower Tell Kennedy about Indochina? The Politics of Misperception," *Journal of American History*, LXXIX (Sep 92), 568-87, who refute the statement made by some of Kennedy's supporters that Eisenhower recommended unilateral U.S. military intervention in Indochina if necessary.

XX. MILITARY ASSISTANCE

1. For the background and evolution of the Mutual Security Program, see Rearden, *Formative Years*, 489-519, and Condit, *Test of War*, 395-454.
2. PL 83-665 (26 Aug 54); DeptState *Bulletin*, XXXII (30 May 55), 889-96.
3. DoD Dir 5132.3, 14 Jul 55. Military assistance was also referred to as the "Mutual Defense Assistance Program" (MDAP), which is used in this directive. This was an earlier term that had legislative sanction; thus the first comprehensive law on military aid was the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. In 1956 the JCS defined MDAP as including all programs providing materiel, services, and training on a grant basis: memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Apr 56, App A, 1, fldr 091.3 MAP Case File (19 Mar 56), Box 10, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379. Later they redefined it as consisting of military assistance plus defense support: memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Feb 57, App A, 2, fldr 091.3 February, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-C1672. By that time, however, the phrase was already going out of use in favor of the simpler Military Assistance Program (MAP), which was used in subsequent versions of DoD Dir 5132.3.
4. DoD Dir 5132.3, 22 Jul 57.
5. See testimony in House Cte on Foreign Affairs, *Mutual Security Act of 1956: Hearings*, 84 Cong, 2 sess (1956), 35, 600-02, 603-05, 635-38.
6. Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, *Mutual Security Act of 1955: Hearings*, 84 Cong, 1 sess (1955), 97-98.

7. DoD Rept to NSC, Status of Military Assistance Programs as of 30 June 1956 (NSC 5611, pt 2), OSD Hist. In some listings, Turkey and Greece appeared as European countries.
8. DoD Publication "Military Assistance Facts," 1 May 63, 26, OSD Hist.
9. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1956*, M31-37, 77-90.
10. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1956*, 314-23; US Cong, House Cte on Foreign Affairs, *Mutual Security Program*, 84 Cong, 2 sess (19 Mar 56), H Doc 358.
11. *New York Times*, 10, 28 Jul 56; PL 85-726 (18 Jul 56), PL 85-853 (31 Jul 56).
12. Memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Apr 56, w/Apps "A" through "D," fldr 091.3 MAP Case File (15 March 56), Box 10, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379.
13. Memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 6 Feb 57, w/atchmt, interofc control sheet signed by Capt J.A. Adkins, USN, Ofc of Programming and Control, OASD(ISA), fldr 091.3 February, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-C1672. For evidence of disagreement between JCS and SecDef at one stage in the preparation of guidance, see memo SecDef for CJCS, 13 Jun 56, and memo CJCS for SecDef, 9 Jul 56, CM-341-56, fldr 091.3 MAP Case File (15 Mar 56), Box 10, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379. The FY 1957 planning guidance document was DoD Instr S-2110.20, 14 Jul 55, Box 2, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 62-A1810.
14. *The Budget of the United States for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1958*, M13.
15. Relevant documents are in *FRUS 1955-57*, X:25-28, 43-44, 44-64.
16. NSC 5610, 3 Aug 56, w/memo of transmittal, 24 Jul 56, OSD Hist.
17. Memo of disc (Gleason), 301st NSC mtg, 26 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, X:124-33.
18. Memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Nov 56, encl/w memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 21 Nov 56, memo JCS for SecDef, 30 Nov 56, encl/w memo DepASD(ISA) for NSC Affairs and Planning (Karl G. Harr, Jr.) for ExecSecNSC, 4 Dec 56: fldr 5610 Rept by the Interdep Cmte on Certain US Aid Programs, Box 15, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
19. *New York Times*, 6 Sep 56; Report to the President by the President's Citizen Advisers on the Mutual Security Program, 1 Mar 57, Fairless Cte records, DDEL; summary of recommendations, with agency comments, in *FRUS 1955-57*, X:146-70.
20. US Cong, House, Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, *Report on Foreign Policy and Mutual Security*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (11 Jun 57), H Rept 551. This prints both the report and the hearings; pp. 27R-33R contain the conclusions relevant to the military assistance program (quote from 33R).
21. Senate Resolution 285, 11 Jul 56, *Congressional Record*, 84 Cong, 2 sess (11 Jul 56), pt 9:12320; Senate Special Cte to Study the Foreign Aid Program, *Foreign Aid Program: Compilation of Studies and Reports*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (Jul 57), S Doc 52.
22. House Cte on Foreign Affairs, *Mutual Security Act of 1956: Hearings*, 101-02, 267, 1003; Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, *Mutual Security Act of 1956: Hearings*, 47-48, 418, 566-69.
23. Memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 26 Nov 56, memo SecA for DepSecDef, 27 Nov 56, ltr SecDef to Pres, 28 Nov 56, and memo Charles G. Ellington, SpecAsst to DepSecDef, for ASD(ISA), 27 Nov 56, both atchmts to ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 28 Nov 56: fldr 110.01 FY 58-59-60 etc. 1959, Box 11, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
24. Summary of 1956 discussions in memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 3 Apr 59, *ibid*; memo DirICA for Pres, 6 Dec 56, fldr Budget, Military (4) (May-Dec 56), DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1958*, M33.
25. Report by Citizen Advisers on Mutual Security Program, 1 Mar 57, 13, Fairless Cte records, DDEL; ltr Pike to Randall, 11 Mar 57, w/atchmt, comments by SecDef on Fairless Report, 11 Mar 57, fldr 091.3 Mar 1-14, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-C1672; memo Hollister for Pres, 29 Mar 57, encl with memo Hollister for Adams, same date, fldr 091.3 Mar 15-31, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-C1672; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 1 Apr 57, OSD Hist.
26. Senate Special Cte to Study the Foreign Aid Program, *The Foreign Aid Program: Hearings*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (1957), 397, 399, 411, 428-29, 434-36, 459.
27. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1957*, 372-84; House Cte on Conference, *Mutual Security Act of 1957*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (8 Aug 57), H Conf Rept 1042; PL 85-279 (3 Sep 57); *New York Times*, 16, 20, 28, 31 Aug 58.

28. Memo F.D. Higgins, AsstSecA(Logistics), for ASD(ISA), 24 Jan 57, memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 6 Feb 57, w/atchmt, Interoffice control sheet sgd by Capt J.A. Adkins, USN, Ofc of Programming and Control, OASD(ISA): fldr 091.3 February, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-C1672.
29. Memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Feb 57, w/encls, *ibid*; DoD Instr S-2110.20, 13 Mar 57, Box 2, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 62-A1810; DoD Rept to NSC, Status of Military Assistance Programs as of 30 June 1958 (NSC 5819, pt 2, Annex "B"), OSD Hist.
30. Ltrs DirICA to DirBoB, 24 May 57, 11 Jun 57, ltr DirBoB to DirICA, 26 Jun 57, memrcd W.M. Leffingwell, SpecAsst to DepASD(ISA), 22 Aug 57: fldr 370.02 14 Jan 58 (US Security Efforts Overseas), Box 19, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; ltr DirBoB to DirICA, 3 Jun 57, fldr FY 1959 Budget, ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memo ActgASD(ISA) (Irwin) for DepSecDef, 30 Aug 57, fldr 111 Dec-Apr, Box 4, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-A1672; memo DirBoB for DirICA, 12 Sep 57, fldr 091.3, Box 3, *ibid*.
31. Ltr SecState to DirBoB, 14 Nov 57, ltr DirICA to DirBoB, 18 Nov 57: fldr 091.3 November 14-29, Box 2, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-A1672.
32. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 34, 160-68; *New York Times*, 1 Jul, 24 Aug 58; PL 85-477 (30 Jun 58), PL 85-853 (28 Aug 58).
33. Memo ActgASD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 29 Aug 58, fldr China 1958, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
34. Memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Nov 57, w/encls (Apps A, B, and C), fldr 091.3 MAP 1958, Box 10, *ibid*.
35. Memo JCS for SecDef, 30 Jan 58, w/encls (Apps A through G), *ibid*.
36. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 3 Feb 58, CM-77-58, *ibid*.
37. DoD Instr S-2110.21, 15 Jul 58, Box 2, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 62-A1810.
38. Ltr UnderSecState (Dillon) to DirBoB, 5 Nov 58, fldr 091.3 Dec 1-18, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-A1698; ltr ActgASD(ISA) to UnderSecState, 23 Oct 58, fldr 091.3 Oct 17-31, Box 3, *ibid*; memo JCS for SecDef, 31 Oct 58, fldr 091.3 MAP FY 59 Material 24 July 58, Box 10, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
39. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1960*, M39; statement by Dillon, 29 Apr 59, House Cte on Foreign Affairs, *Mutual Security Act of 1959: Hearings*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (1959), 1671-72.
40. Ltr DepSecDef for DirICA, 6 Sep 57, fldr 370.02 14 Jan 58 (US Security Efforts Overseas), Box 19, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; memo of disc (Gleason), 348th NSC mtg, 12 Dec 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, X:198-202.
41. Memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Jan 58, memo DepSecDef for ExecSecNSC, 3 Mar 58: fldr 370.02 14 Jan 58 (US Security Efforts Overseas), Box 19, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
42. Memo SpecAsst (Cutler) to DepSecDef, 2 Apr 58, *ibid*; memo of disc (Gleason), 365th NSC mtg, 8 May 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, IV:416-18.
43. Memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Jul 58, w/atchmt, fldr 370.02 14 Jan 58 (US Security Efforts Overseas), Box 19, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606. For the coup in Iraq, see ch VIII.
44. Memo of disc (Gleason), 388th NSC mtg, 3 Dec 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, IV:434-43. The issues posed by the Planning Board are listed in a briefing note for this meeting, evidently prepared by the special assistant, Gray, attached to a copy of the memo of discussion in OSD Hist.
45. Ltr Sen Green et al to Pres, 25 Aug 58, printed in President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, *Composite Report*, 17 Aug 59, I:185-87 (hereafter cited as President's Cte, *Composite Report*).
46. Memo SecState to Pres, 13 Sep 58, noted "OK in principle" by Pres, Box 8, Dulles-Herter ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
47. Memo CJCS for DepASD(ISA), 19 Sep 58, CM-182-58, memo Brig Gen James F. Whisenand, USAF (SpecAsst to CJCS) for ASD(ISA), 26 Sep 58, ltr ASD(ISA) to James H. Wilson, DepSpecAsst for Mutual Secty Coord, DeptState, 29 Sep 58, memrcd Roger Ernst, Ofc of Plng, OASD(ISA), 30 Sep 58, memo Sprague for Wilson, 30 Sep 58, memo Sprague for Whisenand, 30 Sep 58: fldr 091.3, Sep 11-30, Box 4, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-A1698.
48. President's Cte, *Composite Report*, I:195-97; *New York Times*, 25 Nov 58.

49. Ltr Pres to Draper, 24 Nov 58, President's Cte, *Composite Report*, I:vii-viii; also in *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 849-50.
50. Memrcd Robert E. Merriam, 24 Nov 58, *FRUS 1958-60*, IV:431-32.
51. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1959*, 255-72.
52. First Interim Report of President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, 17 Mar 59, printed as ch I in President's Cte, *Composite Report*, I:1-15 (quote, 13).
53. Ltr ASD(ISA) to Draper, 4 Mar 59, fldr 091.3 Draper Study Mar, Box 5, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1672.
54. Memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Mar 59, JCSM-106-59, *ibid*.
55. Ltr DepASD(ISA) (Shuff) for John O. Bell, SpecAsst for Mutual Security Coordination, DeptState, 25 Mar 59, *ibid*; ltr DepSecDef to Robert E. Merriam, DepAsst to Pres for Internal Affairs, 16 Apr 59, fldr 091.3 Draper Comte Apr-Jun, Box 5, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1672; memo DirBoB for Pres, 13 Apr 59, OSD Hist; AFPC mtg notes, 28 Apr 59, fldr AFPC Apr 59, Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
56. Second Interim Rept, 3 Jun 59, President's Cte, *Composite Report*, I:19-53.
57. Ltr Pres to Pres of Senate and Speaker, House of Rep, 24 Jan 59, *ibid*, I:56.
58. House Cte on Foreign Affairs, *Mutual Security Act of 1959: Hearings*, 67-169, 1269-1301; House Cte on Foreign Affairs, 86 Cong, 1 sess (5 Jun 59), H Rept 440, 2, 8, 52, 67; *New York Times*, 19 Jun 59.
59. Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, *Mutual Security Act of 1959: Hearings*, 86 Cong, 1 sess, 557-59, 663-64, 721-22, 729, 742-43, and *Mutual Security Act of 1959*, 86 Cong, 1 Sess (22 Jun 59), S Rept 412, 2-3, 9-10, 35-36, 44, 63.
60. *New York Times*, 9, 23 Jul 59; House Cte of Conference, *Mutual Security Act of 1958*, 86 Cong, 1 sess (1958), H Conf Rept 695, 3, 18-19; PL 86-108 (24 Jul 59).
61. Third Interim Rept, 13 Jul 59, ch III in President's Cte, *Composite Report*, I:57-123; ltr Draper to McElroy, 2 Aug 59, fldr 091.3 (Draper Cte) (12 Jan 59), Box 10, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; ltr ActgASD(ISA) (Shuff) to Draper, 11 Aug 59, fldr 091.3 Draper Committee Aug and Sept, Box 4, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1672.
62. Final Rept, 17 Aug 59, ch IV in President's Cte, *Composite Report*, I:129, 156.
63. *New York Times*, 16 Sep 59; PL 86-383 (28 Sep 59).
64. Memo Goodpaster for ActgSecDef, 5 Jun 59, fldr 091.3 (Draper Comte) (12 Jan 59), Box 10, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
65. Memo UnderSecAF (MacIntyre) for ASD(ISA), 11 Jun 59; memo AsstSecA(Logistics) (Courtney Johnson) for ActgASD(ISA), 11 Jun 59, memo Chief, Mutual Security Div, Ofc of DCSLOG (Brig Gen W.H.S. Wright) for ASD(ISA), 12 Jun 59: fldr 091.3 Draper Comte Apr-Jun, Box 5, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1672.
66. Memrcd Rear Adm J.W. Cooper, DirMilAssistanceAffairs, JS, 17 Jun 59, memo Rear Adm B.N. Rittenhouse, DirForeignMilAssistanceBranch, OCNO, for W.M. Leffingwell, OASD(ISA), 16 Jun 59: *ibid*.
67. Memo JCS for SecDef, 25 Jun 59, JCSM-247-59, fldr 091.3 (Draper Cte) (12 Jan 59), Box 10, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
68. Memo ActgASD(ISA) (Shuff) for Randall, 18 Aug 59, ltr McElroy to Herter, 14 Sep 59, and reply Herter to McElroy, 15 Sep 59, memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 17 Sep 59: *ibid*.
69. Ltr McElroy to Herter, 14 Sep 59, cited in preceding note.
70. OASD(ISA), Military Assistance Manual, Nov 59, fldr 091.3 Military Assistance Manual Nov 59, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1672; superseded by a later version, 15 May 60, which specified responsibilities in greater detail: fldr 091.3 (MAP) Mutual Aid Programs 1960, Box 7, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093. For a description of the operation of the new procedures (as they had evolved by 1962), see Arnold Kotz, "Planning for International Security," *Public Administration Review*, XXII (Dec 62), 213-20, and, with specific reference to Indochina, Amos A. Jordan, *Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia*, 59-69.
71. *New York Times*, 22 Nov 59. McElroy's approval is specifically indicated by his handwritten notation, "This is urgent", opposite the DMA proposal in a memo listing this and other Draper committee recommendations then under consideration: memo ActgASD(ISA) (Robert H. Knight) for SecDef, 4 Aug 59, fldr 091.3 (Draper Cte) (12 Jan 59), Box 10, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.

72. Ltr Irwin to Dillon, 15 Mar 60, fldr 310.1 Jan-May, Box 4, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; *United States Government Organization Manual, 1960-61*, 132.
73. *New York Times*, 30 Nov 59; memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 14 Mar 60, memo SecDef for ASD(ISA) 17 Mar 60; fldr 091.3 (MAP) Mutual Aid Programs 1960, Box 7, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
74. AFPC mtg notes, 8 Dec 59, fldr AFPC Sep-Dec 59, Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; DoD Dir 5132.3, 29 Feb 60.
75. Memo DepASD(ISA) (Shuff) for CJCS, 29 Oct 58, fldr 091.3 MAP FY 61 14 Jan 59, Box 9, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
76. Memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Jan 59, JCSM-18-59, w/encl, 2, appendix, *ibid*.
77. Country and Regional Programming Guidance, 1 Aug 59, encl with memo DepASD(ISA) (Shuff) for AsstSecA(Logistics), AsstSecNav(Materiel), AsstSecAF(Materiel), 5 Aug 59, fldr 091.3 Aug, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1672; memo DirMil AssistanceAff, Jt Staff (Maj Gen Edwin J. Messenger, USA) for DepDMA (W.M. Leffingwell), 8 Mar 60, JMAAD-129-60, fldr 091.3 Mar 1-15, Box 5, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 267-68.
78. Ltrs DirBoB to SecDef, 30 Apr 59, and SecDef to DirBoB, 21 May 59, fldr 091.3 MAP 1959, Box 9, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
79. *New York Times*, 22, 30 Nov 59.
80. NSC 5910, 3 Aug 59, OSD Hist; briefing sheet by ISA for 417th NSC mtg, 18 Aug 59, fldr 5910 U.S. Policy on France, Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; memo of disc (Robert H. Johnson), 417th NSC mtg, 18 Aug 59, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
81. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 25 Nov 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, IV:469-72.
82. Memo UnderSecState for ICA et al, 30 Nov 59, fldr 091.3 November, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1959, Acc 63-A1672; *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1961*, M16, M24-M26, M27-M31, 515-19. On the inclusion of the Draper committee's proposed \$400 million supplemental program for 1960, see testimony by Irwin, Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, *Mutual Security Act of 1960: Hearings*, 86 Cong, 2 sess, 95, 99-100.
83. NSC 5916, 24 Nov 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, IV:467-68.
84. Briefing papers (by ISA) for 427th NSC mtg, 3 Dec 59, fldr 5916 Commitments for Grant Mil Asst, Box 2, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
85. Memo JCS for SecDef, 2 Dec 59, memo SecA for SecDef, 2 Dec 59, memo DepASD(C) for SecDef, 2 Dec 59; *ibid*.
86. Memo of disc (Boggs), 427th NSC mtg, 3 Dec 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, IV:472-82; Kistiakowsky, 187-88.
87. Memo SecDef and SecState for NSC, 15 Feb 60, fldr 5916 Commitments for Grant Mil Asst, Box 2, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
88. DeptState memcon 3 Feb 60, fldr 091.3 Limited Distribution, Box 6, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
89. Testimony of ISA officials, House Cte on Appros, *Mutual Security Appropriations for 1961 (and Related Agencies): Hearings*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (1960), 2430-56, 2488-89.
90. House Cte on Foreign Affairs, *Mutual Security Act of 1960: Hearings*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (1960), 41, 69-103; Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, *Mutual Security Act of 1960: Hearings*, 93-152.
91. *New York Times*, 13 May 60; Notes on Legislative Leadership mtg, 16 Feb 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, IV:516-18; memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, DepSecDef, and CJCS, 16 Feb 60, fldr 091.3 (MAP) Mutual Aid Program 1960, Box 7, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1960-61*, 378-84 (quote, 382); memo Gale for DDR&E et al, 18 May 60 w/atchmt (copy of ltr drafted by Pres 15 May 60), draft ltr by Irwin, 11 Jun 60; fldr 091.3 May 1-18, Box 5, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; Gates correspondence May-Jun 60, fldr 091.3 MAP Case file (31 May 60), Box 7, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
92. *New York Times*, 14, 18 Jun, 20, 25, 27 Aug 60; House Cte on Appros, *Mutual Security and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1961*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (13 Jun 60), H Rept 1798, 3; Senate Cte on Appros, *Mutual Security and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1961*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (19 Aug 60), S Rept 1849, 2-4; PL 86-704 (2 Sep 60).
93. Military Assistance Basic Planning Document, 31 Mar 60, incorporating MSOP, same date, fldr 091.3 Mar 31 60, Box 5, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.

94. Ltr AsstDirBoB (Ralph W. E Reid) to DMA, 12 Sep 60, w/encl, memo Reid for DMA, 10 Sep 60, summarizing BoB recommendations, ltr DepDMA (W. M. Leffingwell) to Dir BoB, 28 Sep 60: fldr 091.3 Oct 15-31, Box 4, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-B2170.
95. Memo ActgSecState and ActgSecDef for Pres, 8 Jul 60, memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Jul 60, JCSM-319-60: fldr 091.3 (MAP) Mutual Aid Programs 1960, Box 7, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; memo AsstSecA(FM) (George H. Roderick) for SecDef, 22 Jul 60, fldr 5910 Commitments for Grant Mil Asst, Box 2, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
96. Memo of disc (Boggs), 454th NSC mtg, 1 Aug 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, IV:504-12; Kistiakowsky, 380-81.
97. The \$16 billion figure appears in the State-Defense report cited in next note. No such figure has been found in the published reports of the Draper committee, where the only projection of future requirements is \$2 billion each in FYs 1960 and 1961: President's Cte, *Composite Report*, I:177. Presumably the statement was taken from working papers or unpublished reports by the committee.
98. Rept to the NSC on Long Range Military Assistance Plans, including Preliminary FY 62 Budget Estimates, prepared by DoD in conjunction with DeptState, Oct 60, encl/w memo ActgExecSecNSC (Boggs) for NSC, 7 Oct 60, fldr 5916 Commitments for Grant Mil Asst, Box 2, OSD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
99. Chart entitled "Program Estimates for FY 61-62, NATO Europe," in Rept to the NSC on Long Range Military Assistance Plans, cited in preceding note; memo DMA for UnderSecState, 21 Oct 60 (transmitting FY 62 MAP recommended by DoD): fldr 091.3 October 15-31, Box 4, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-B2170.
100. Briefing paper for NSC and memrcd of PB mtg, 7 Oct, ns but evidently prepared in OASD(ISA), 22 Oct 60, memo JCS for SecDef, 27 Oct 60, JCSM-481-60, memo AsstSecA (FM) for SecDef, 28 Oct 60: fldr 5916 Commitments for Grant Mil Asst, Box 2, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
101. Memo of disc (Robert H. Johnson), 465th NSC mtg, 31 Oct 60, OSD Hist; Kistiakowsky, 411-12. The presentations made by Irwin and Lemnitzer at the meeting are in fldr 5916 Commitments for Grant Mil Asst, Box 2, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 68-A4024.
102. Memo SecState for Pres, 13 Nov 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, IV:539-40.
103. Memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 30 Nov 60, *ibid*, 543-47. This records discussion of the overall MSP but does not mention military assistance. However, Irwin's memo of 7 December 1960, cited in next note, states his "understanding" that at a recent meeting of the president, Anderson, Dillon, and Stans, the figure for military assistance was fixed at \$1.8 billion. This was probably the meeting of 30 November 1960.
104. Memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 7 Dec 60, w/atchmt (draft ltr to Pres), and subsequent handwritten notes by Gates and Irwin, 8 and 19 Dec 60 respectively, fldr 091.3 December 1-15, Box 3, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-B2170.
105. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1962*, M21, M29-M30, M34-M35, 566-71.
106. Memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 6 Jan 61, w/atchmt, memo ASD(ISA) for DMA, 23 Dec 60, fldr FY 62 Budg (Orig), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
107. DoD, DMA, Military Assistance Manual, 1 Nov 60, fldr 091.3 (MAP) Mutual Aid Programs 1960, Box 7, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; Military Assistance Basic Planning Document, 20 Nov 60, fldr 091.3 Nov 20 60, Box 4, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-B2170.
108. President's Cte, *Composite Report*, I:165.
109. *Ibid*, 30-32.
110. Memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Jul 60, JCSM-296-60, memo Benjamin Forman, AsstGC, for Irwin and Palmer, 12 Aug 60, memo Forman for Irwin, Knight, and Palmer, 8 Sep 60, w/atchmt, memo DepDirBoB (Staats) for SecDef, 1 Sep 60: fldr 310.1 June-Sep, Box 4, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
111. White House PR, 8 Nov 60, w/encl, Exec Order and memo Pres to Heads of Exec Depts and Agencies, same date, fldr 091.3 (MAP) Mutual Aid Programs 1960, Box 7, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; *New York Times*, 9 Nov 60.

XXI. ARMS CONTROL

1. For a summary of arms control negotiations before 1956, see Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control*, 3-238.
2. Bechhoefer, 290-97; DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, I:456-67.
3. DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-59*, I:486-88, 501-03.
4. Bechhoefer, 308-25.
5. Ibid, 258-60.
6. Ibid, 260; *New York Times*, 2 Mar 57. On the friction between Stassen and Dulles, see Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 401, and H. W. Brands, Jr., *Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy*, 141-61.
7. Bechhoefer, 261-62; "The Executive Branch and Disarmament Policy," Staff Study No 1, Feb 56, in US Cong, Senate, Cte on Foreign Relations (Subcte on Disarmament), *Control and Reduction of Armaments: Final Report*, 85 Cong, 2 sess (13 Oct 58), S Rept 2501, 108.
8. NSC 5602/1, 15 Mar 56, par 38, OSD Hist.
9. DeptState, US Disarmament Administration, *Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests: History and Analysis of Negotiation*, 3-5 (cited hereafter as DeptState, *Geneva Conference*).
10. *New York Times*, 10, 13, 16 Oct 56. Test suspension as an issue in the 1956 election is dealt with more fully in ch II.
11. Ltr Robert Murphy to Harold E. Stassen, 31 Aug 56, fldr Atomic 400.7-486.4 1956, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60-A1379.
12. Memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 6 Sep 56, ltr DepSecDef for SecState, 7 Sep 56, memo JCS for SecDef, 3 Oct 56: *ibid*.
13. DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-59*, I:698-720.
14. Ibid, I:694-96, 697-98 (quote, 697).
15. Ibid, I:720-29 (Bulganin ltr and Soviet declaration, 17 Nov 56), 729-30 (Eisenhower ltr, 31 Dec 56).
16. Memo of disc (Gleason), 284th NSC mtg, 10 May 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XX:393-400; memo SpecAsst to Pres for Disarmament for NSC members, 29 Jun 56, *ibid*, 402-08.
17. Memo JCS for SecDef, 7 Jul 56, memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 12 Jul 56: fldr 388.3 (5 Jan 56) 1957, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
18. Record of Action, special mtg, 21 Nov 56 (Annex to NSC Action 1553), *FRUS 1955-57*, XX:444-46.
19. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 20 Dec 56, fldr 388.3 Dec-May 56, Box 12, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 60-A1339; memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Feb 57, fldr 388.3 Jan-July, Box 10, OASD (ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-A1672.
20. Ltr Stassen to Wilson, 20 Feb 57, fldr 470 20 Feb 57, Box 21, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372.
21. Memo JCS for SecDef, 5 Mar 57, *ibid*; ltr Wilson to Stassen, 20 Mar 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XX:464-66.
22. Memo of disc (Gleason), 315th NSC mtg, 6 Mar 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XX:457-62.
23. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1957*, 210-12.
24. *New York Times*, 18 Mar 57; Bechhoefer, 350-51; Stassen statements as recorded in memrcd Lt Gen Fox, 23 Apr 57, fldr 388.3, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-B1672.
25. Memrcd Lt Gen Fox, 23 Apr 57, summarizing mtg at State, 20 Apr 57, fldr 388.3, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1957, Acc 61-B1672; DeptState memcon, 20 Apr 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XX:474-82; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 23 Apr 57, *ibid*, 486-90.
26. Bechhoefer, 350-53, 356-62, 365-67, 371, 381-86, 395-96.
27. Ltr Dulles to Wilson, 11 May 57, w/encl, fldr 388.3 11 May 57, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372; Policy Recommendation prepared by Stassen, London, 9 May 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XX:504-10.
28. Ltr Wilson to Dulles, 17 May 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XX:510-13.
29. *New York Times*, 17 May 57; ltr Stassen to Wilson, 18 May 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XX:526-28.

30. Memo JCS for SecDef, 22 May 57, w/encl, fldr 388.3 11 May 57, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372, printed in *FRUS 1955-57*, XX:542-43, but without the enclosure.
31. Ltr DepSecDef to SecState, 24 May 57, *FRUS 1955-1957*, XX:539-41.
32. Memrcd Lt Gen Fox, 21 May 57, summarizing mtg at State, 17 May 57, fldr Jan-Oct 57, Additional SecDef Wilson files, Acc 63-A1768; DepState memcon, 17 May 57, and decisions taken at same for SecState, 22 May 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XX:529-32; memo of disc (Gleason), 324th NSC mtg, 23 May 57, *ibid*, 532-38; *New York Times*, 24 May 57.
33. Memo of conf at White House (Cutler), 25 May 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XX:551-55; memo Cutler for SecState, 27 May 57, fldr Jan-Oct 1957, Additional SecDef Wilson files, Acc 63-A1768; *New York Times*, 26 May 57; Robert A. Divine, *Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960*, 144-45; Saville R. Davis, "Recent Policy Making in the United States Government," in Donald G. Brennan, ed., *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security*, 382-83.
34. Editorial notes, *FRUS 1955-1957*, XX:572-73, 589-90; msgs State for AmEmb London, 1 Jun 57, and AmEmb London for State, 2 Jun 57, *ibid*, 583-84; Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 145-46; telcon Eisenhower-Dulles, 4 Jun 57, fldr Memoranda Tel Conv WH Mar 57-30 Aug 57 (2), Box 12, Tel Calls ser, JFD papers, DDEL; *New York Times*, 12, 14 Jun 57.
35. Ltr DepSecDef to SecState, 5 Jun 57, w/encl, draft memo JCS for SecDef, *FRUS 1955-57*, XX:599-604. The JCS memo was signed by the chairman, Radford, and sent to Wilson dated 6 June 1957: fldr 388.3 (1957), Box 2, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-B1372.
36. DeptState position paper, US Position on first phase of disarmament, 11 Jun 57, *FRUS 1955-57*, XX:620-25; memo of disc, Pres and Cutler, 12 Jun 57, *ibid*, 625-26.
37. Bechhoefer, 354-56, 359-64, 367-71, 386-97.
38. DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-59*, II:869-74. For a map illustrating the proposed inspection zones, see Bechhoefer, 383.
39. DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-59*, II:849-68; *New York Times*, 28, 30 Aug 57.
40. Stebbins, *United States in World Affairs, 1957*, 321-25; Bechhoefer, 413-25.
41. *New York Times*, 3 Oct 57; ltr Bulganin to Eisenhower, 10 Dec 57, DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-59*, II: 918-26; note and memo from Polish govt to U.S. govt, 14 Feb 58, and U.S. reply, 3 May 58, *ibid*, 944-48, 1023-25; Bechhoefer, 423-24.
42. Informal memo Stassen for SecState, 23 Sep 57, OSD Hist.
43. Memo Dulles for Stassen, 27 Sep 57, ltr SecState to Pres, ltr DepSecDef to SecState, 30 Sep 57: *FRUS 1955-57*, XX:723-30 (quote 726); memo Strauss for SecState, 28 Sep 57, encl/w ltr SecState to Pres, 29 Sep 57, OSD Hist.
44. Memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 26 Dec 57, w/encl, "Revision of U.S. Policy on Disarmament," OSD Hist.
45. Memo JCS for SecDef, 31 Dec 57, fldr 388.3 11 May 57, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1957, Acc 62-A1372.
46. Memo of disc (Gleason), 350th NSC mtg, 6 Jan 58, OSD Hist. For the proposal to amend the Atomic Energy Act (and its outcome), see ch XIV.
47. Ltr Bulganin to Eisenhower, 10 Dec 57, and reply, Eisenhower to Bulganin, 12 Jan 58, DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-59*, II:918-26, 932-41.
48. Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 177-78; *New York Times*, 16 Feb 58.
49. *New York Times*, 28 Feb 58.
50. Killian, *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower*, 152-53.
51. *Ibid*, 160; Kistiakowsky, 8.
52. Memo DepSecDef for JCS, 27 Feb 58, memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Mar 58: fldr 388.3 1958, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
53. Memo DepSecDef for Chm Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Cessation, 21 Mar 58, fldr Atomic 000-471.8 1958, Box 1, *ibid*.
54. Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 178-97.
55. *Ibid*, 198. Secretary Dulles, in a conference with the president, gave a figure of 11 Soviet tests: memo of conf (Goodpaster), 24 Mar 58, fldr Staff Notes Mar 58 (1), Box 31, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.

56. Statement by Dulles, 24 Mar 57, in memo of conf cited in preceding note.
57. Memo of conf with Pres, 24 Mar 58, cited in n 55. Charles J. V. Murphy, "Nuclear Inspection: A Near Miss," *Fortune*, LIX (Mar 59), 160, gives an account of this meeting but dates it 25 March. For Strauss's plan and his discussion of it with the president, see Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 448-49; Ambrose suggests it may have been an "all-or-nothing approach" intended merely to satisfy the president's desire for some sort of action.
58. Text of Soviet decree in DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-59*, II:978-80.
59. Memo of disc (Gleason), 361st NSC mtg, 3 Apr 58, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Killian, *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower*, 154-56.
60. Murphy, "Nuclear Inspection," 124.
61. DeptState memcons 9, 14 Apr 58, recording working grp mtgs, fldr 388.3, Box 10, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-A1698.
62. Memcon, ns, 28 Apr 58, prepared in DeptState, recording mtg on 26 Apr 58, fldr 388.3 1958, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
63. Memo SecState to Pres, 30 Apr 58, Box 8, Dulles-Herter ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
64. Bechhoefer, 453-54; DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-59*, II:1007-12, 1013-20.
65. Memo JCS for SecDef, 30 Apr 58, fldr McElroy Neil 1957-58 (3), Box 25, Admin Ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; ltr DepSecDef to Pres, 9 May 58, fldr 388.3 1958, Box 3, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
66. Correspondence in DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-59*, II:982-85, 996-1004, 1006-07, 1036-41, 1043-44, 1050-51.
67. DeptState, *Geneva Conference*, 15-19; Bechhoefer, 488-91; Killian, 158-61; Ciro Elliott Zoppo, *Technical and Political Aspects of Arms Control Negotiation: The 1958 Experts' Conference*, 19-101. The final communiqué and report by the conference are in DeptState, *Geneva Conference*, 271-310 (quote, 273).
68. Memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 15 Aug 58, ltr DepSecDef to Pres, 18 Aug 58: fldr 388.3 24 Jan 58, Box 21, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; memo JCS for SecDef, 15 Aug 58, fldr McElroy, Neil 1957-58 (2), Box 25, Admin ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
69. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 18 Aug 58, fldr Aug 58 Staff Notes (1), Box 35, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL. This records the meeting but not the changes made by the president in the draft, which can be inferred from the final public announcement.
70. Memos of conf with Pres (2), 20 Aug 58, 11:15 am and 5:20 pm, fldr AEC Vol II (4) (Aug-Sep 58), Box 3, Alpha subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL. For the 1958 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act and the subsequent agreement with the British, see ch XIV.
71. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 635-36.
72. DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-59*, II:1120, 1126-27; memo JCS for SecDef, 2 Oct 58, ltr ASD(ISA) to SecState, 7 Oct 58: fldr 337 Summit Talks Jun-Dec, Box 9, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-A1698.
73. Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 231-33.
74. DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, II:982-85, 1084-90.
75. Memo Pres for SecDef, 14 Jul 58, memo Kistiakowsky for SecState, SecDef, and SpecAsst for Science and Technology, 28 Jul 58, memo Actg ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 1 Aug 58: fldr 381 (Surprise Attack) 14 Jul 58, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
76. Memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Sep 58, fldr 381, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-B1698; memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 22 Sep 58, memo JCS for SecDef, 24 Sep 58, ltr DepSecDef to SecState, 28 Sep 58, ltr DepSecDef to SecState, 4 Oct 58, memo William C. Foster for SecState, 31 Oct 58: fldr 381 (Surprise Attack) 14 Jul 58, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
77. Memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Aug 58, memo JCS for SecDef, 1 Oct 58, ltr DepASD(ISA) to SecState, 3 Oct 58: fldr 381 (Surprise Attack) 14 July 58, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; *New York Times*, 14 Oct 58.
78. Bechhoefer, 464-87; memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 20 Jan 59, forwarding rept on conference by DoD rep (Gen Weyland), msg Weyland for Twining, 18 Dec 58: fldr 381 (Surprise Attack) 14 Jul 58, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.

79. Encl with memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 20 Jan 59, cited in preceding note.
80. Memrcl Lt Gen Clovis E. Byers, USA, Mil Adviser to ASD(ISA), 16 Oct 58, fldr 471.6, Box 20, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1958, Acc 62-B1698; memo JCS for SecDef, 21 Oct 58, fldr A400.112 19 Sep 58, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
81. Memo Actg SecDef for CJCS, 1 Nov 58, fldr A400.112 19 Sep 58, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
82. Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 237-38; Bechhoefer, 492-94; DeptState, *Geneva Conference*, 22-23; *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1958, 838-39.
83. Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 245-46; Killian, 164; Murphy, "Nuclear Inspection: A Near Miss," 125, 155; DeptState, *Geneva Conference*, 331-34.
84. Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 245-46; Killian, 164; Murphy, "Nuclear Inspection," 125, 155; DeptState, *Geneva Conference*, 331-34.
85. Ltr ActgChmAEC (H. S. Vance) to UnderSecState, 23 Dec 58, w/Tab C, DeptState memcon, 30 Dec 58, ltr ActgSecDef to SecState, 30 Dec 58: fldr A400.112 19 Sep 58, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
86. DeptState memcon, 30 Dec 58, fldr Atomic 400.112-463 1961, *ibid*; memo Killian for DepSecDef, 2 Jan 59, fldr Atomic 334 Seismic Imp Panel (2 Jun 59), Box 3, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; Killian, *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower*, 164-65.
87. DeptState, *Geneva Conference*, 30-31, 331-34.
88. Statement by Herter in DeptState memcon, 30 Dec 58, fldr Atomic 400.112-463 1961, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606; Dulles statement in memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 12 Jan 59, fldr Staff Notes Jan 59 (2), Box 38, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
89. DeptState memcon, 30 Dec 58, cited in preceding note.
90. Ltr ActgSecDef to UnderSecState, 31 Dec 58, fldr A400.112 19 Sep 58, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
91. Memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 12 Jan 59, fldr Staff Notes Jan 59 (2), Box 38, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
92. DeptState, *Geneva Conference*, 29-43.
93. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 350-53; Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 255-56; DeptState *Bulletin*, XL (18 May 59), 704, n 3.
94. Summary of Findings of Panel on Seismic Improvement, 16 Mar 59, DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-59*, II:1367-71; Killian, 165-66; Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 253-54; memo ATSD(AE) for DepSecDef, 26 Mar 59, fldr Atomic 334 Seismic Imp Panel (2 Jun 59), Box 3, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574.
95. Memo ATSD(AE) for DepSecDef, 26 Mar 59, cited in preceding note; Killian, *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower*, 166-67.
96. Memo ATSD(AE) for DepSecDef, 26 Mar 59, cited in n 94.
97. DeptState memcon, 26 Mar 59, ltr ActgSecState to Pres, 28 Mar 59, memrcl Herter, 31 Mar 59: fldr A400.112 19 Sep 58, Box 4, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
98. DeptState, *Geneva Conference*, 52-53; ltr Eisenhower to Khrushchev, 13 Apr 59, and Khrushchev to Eisenhower, 28 Apr 59, *ibid*, 354-55, 356-58.
99. Ltr Khrushchev to Eisenhower, 23 Apr 59, *ibid*, 53-54, 356-58.
100. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 5 May 59, fldr Staff Notes May 59 (3), Box 41, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; ltr Eisenhower to Khrushchev, 5 May 59, and reply 14 May 59, DeptState, *Geneva Conference*, 360-362, 363-365.
101. DeptState, *Geneva Conference*, 56-66.
102. Memo Herter for Pres, 23 Apr 59, fldr Staff Notes Apr 59 (2), DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
103. Memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 23 Jul 59, fldr Staff Notes Jul 59 (1), *ibid*; Kistiakowsky, 17-18, 23.
104. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 405-08, 412-13; *New York Times*, 4 Aug 59; *Eisenhower Public Papers*, 1959, 560-62.
105. Kistiakowsky, 36-37.
106. Memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Aug 59, JCSM-332-59, ltr McElroy to Pres, 14 Aug 59: fldr McElroy Neil 1959 (2), Box 25, Admin ser, PP (AWF) DDEL.
107. Memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Aug 59, JCSM-326-59, *ibid*.

108. Ltr McElroy to Pres, 20 Aug 59, *ibid*; Kistiakowsky, 50.
109. Neither the McRae report nor the JCS memo of 21 Aug has been found. The basic conclusions of the former can be inferred from Kistiakowsky, 49-50, 55-56, 79. The JCS memo is referred to, and its tone indicated, by McElroy's letter to the president on 14 September: fldr McElroy, Neil 1959 (1), Box 25, Admin ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
110. DeptState, *Geneva Conference*, 375-77; *New York Times*, 27, 29 Aug 59.
111. Kistiakowsky, 55-56, 79.
112. Ltr SecDef to Pres, 14 Sep 59, memo Goodpaster for SecDef, same date: fldr McElroy Neil 1959 (1), Box 25, Admin ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
113. Stebbins, *United States in World Affairs, 1959*, 149-57; DeptState *Bulletin*, XLI (24 Aug 59), 269.
114. DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, II:1441-43.
115. *New York Times*, 16 Sep 59; Stebbins, 1959, 29-33. See ch XVIII for the Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks.
116. Stebbins, 1959, 166-67; Bechhoefer, 524-29; partial text of Khrushchev address and of Soviet "declaration" on general and complete disarmament, DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-59*, II:1452-60, 1460-74.
117. Stebbins, 1959, 167-78; Bechhoefer, 529-32.
118. Kistiakowsky, 106, 108-09.
119. DeptState, *Geneva Conference*, 68-80; Rept of Technical Working Group, 18 Dec 59, in DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-59*, II:1558-59.
120. Statement filed by Soviet delegates to working group, DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-59*, II:1561-71; *New York Times*, 20 Dec 59; Kistiakowsky, 211-12; Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 293-94.
121. Kistiakowsky, 195.
122. *Ibid*, 197-98; Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 294.
123. DeptState memcon, 29 Dec 59, fldr 388.3 (Sensitive) 1959 and 1960, Box 16, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489. A 20-kiloton explosion was equivalent to a Richter seismic signal of 4.75: statement by Dr. Wolfgang H. Panofsky, 19 Apr 60, in Jt Cte on Atomic Energy, *Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection Controls of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban: Hearings*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (1960), 74-75. The figure of 4.75 was later chosen to be introduced at Geneva.
124. Memrcd Col Black, 31 Dec 59 (recording mtg, 29 Dec 59), fldr 388.3 (Sensitive) 1959 and 1960, Box 6, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 29 Dec 59, fldr Staff Notes Dec 59 Box 46, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 213-14; Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 295.
125. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1959*, 883.
126. Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 296.
127. Memrcd Col Black, 20 Nov 59, fldr Col Black Reading File 6/15/59-7/30/60, Box 4, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-B3073.
128. Ltr SecState to SecDef, 21 Jan 59, ltr DepSecDef to SecState, 10 Mar 59: fldr 381 (Surprise Attack) 14 Jul 58, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1958, Acc 62-A1606.
129. DeptState memcon, 7 Apr 59, ltr Farley to Irwin, 10 Apr 59, ltr Irwin to Farley, 21 Apr 59: *ibid*. JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 88-89; memo Herter for Pres, 27 Apr 59, OSD Hist.
130. Terms of reference and membership of study group printed in Annex A to Report of the Joint State Department-Defense Department Study on Disarmament, 1 Jan 60, fldr 388.3 (Sensitive) 1960, Box 6, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489; *New York Times*, 30 Jul 59.
131. Report of Joint State Dept-Def Dept Study on Disarmament, 1 Jan 60, fldr 388.3 (Sensitive) 1960, Box 6, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.
132. Memo of disc (Boggs), 426th NSC mtg, 1 Dec 59, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 180-81.
133. Memo of disc (Boggs), 428th NSC mtg, 10 Dec 59, w/atchd briefing note, 9 Dec 59, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 193-94.
134. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 19 Jan 60, fldr 380.01 Sensitive, Box 6, OSD Sensitive files 1951-66, Acc 71-A6489.

135. Memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Feb 60, JCSM-46-60, fldr 388.3 Jan-Feb, Box 18, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
136. Memo Farley (State) for Knight, DepASD(ISA), 20 Jan 60, w/encls, atchmt to memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 22 Jan 60, *ibid*.
137. Memo SpecAsst to JCS for Disarmament Aff (Dudley) for Lt Gen Fox, OASD(ISA), 22 Jan 60, SADAM 21-60, encl with memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 22 Jan 60, *ibid*.
138. Memo, "United States Disarmament Policy," 22 Jan 60, prepared by OASD(ISA), encl/w memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 22 Jan 60, *ibid*.
139. Memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 1 Feb 60, memo Farley for Knight, 4 Feb 60: *ibid*; memo Irwin for Gates, 4 Feb 60, fldr 388.3 (4 Feb 60) Case File, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
140. Memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Feb 60, JCSM-51-60, fldr 388.3 (4 Feb 60) Case File, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
141. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 17 Feb 60, *ibid*; ltr SecState to SecDef, 21 Feb 60, fldr 388.3 Jan-Feb, Box 18, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
142. Kistiakowsky, 257-58; memo of disc (Lay), special NSC mtg, 18 Feb 60, OSD Hist.
143. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 24 Feb 60, memo JCS for SecDef, 2 Mar 60, JCSM-74-60: fldr 388.3 Disarmament of IRBMs and ICBMs, 2 Mar 60, Box 22, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
144. Briefing paper, "Evolution of U.S. Disarmament Position at Ten Nation Conference," nd, U.S. Position for Disarmament Negotiations, 8 Mar 60, Summary of Discussion of Ten Nation Conference, Mar 15-Apr 29 1960, 9 May 60, encls/w Background Papers Relative to Ten Nation Disarmament Talks, 11 May 60: fldr 388.3 Apr-May, Box 18, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
145. Western paper submitted to Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament: A Plan for General and Complete Disarmament in a Free and Peaceful World, 16 Mar 60, DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, 68-71.
146. Summary of Discussion of Ten Nation Conference, Mar 15-Apr 29 1960, 9 May 60, cited in n 144.
147. Bechhoefer, 536-45; Summary of Discussion of Ten Nation Conference, Mar 15-Apr 29 1960, cited in n 144; Soviet proposal 8 Apr 60 and Western proposal 26 Apr 60, DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, 79-80, 81-82.
148. Memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Mar 60, JCSM-117-60, fldr 388.3 (4 Feb 60) Case File, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
149. DeptState, *Geneva Conference*, 81-84.
150. DeptState memcons, 8, 12, 19 Jan 60, fldr 388.3 Disarmament (1 Jan-30 Jun 60), Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; Kistiakowsky, 222-23, 226, 232-33.
151. DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, 31-39.
152. DeptState, *Geneva Negotiations*, 89-90, 420-23; DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, 72-75.
153. DeptState memcons 22, 23, Mar 60, fldr 388.3 (4 Feb 60) Case File, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 24 Mar 60, fldr Staff Notes Mar 60 (1), Box 48, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 279, 281, 282; Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 300-01.
154. Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 300-02; DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, 77-78.
155. DeptState, *Geneva Negotiations*, 91-102.
156. Ltr Kistiakowsky to Douglas, 15 Apr 60, ltr McCone to Kistiakowsky, 28 Apr 60, ltr Kistiakowsky to Pres, 3 May 60: fldr Atomic 334 Seismic Imp Panel (2 Jun 59), Box 3, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-A1574; Kistiakowsky, 261-62, 304, 308, 316; White House PR, 7 May 60, DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, 86-87.
157. Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 298-99; *New York Times*, 14 Feb 60.
158. Stebbins, 1959, 164-65, 205-06, 209-10.
159. Tabs G, H, and J to encl 2 with Background Papers Relative to Ten Nation Disarmament Talks, 11 May 60, fldr 388.3 April-May, Box 18, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
160. The most complete account of the U-2 program is Michael R. Beschloss, *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair*, 67-161. A shorter account is David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The U-2 Affair*, 40-59. For an account by the CIA official in charge of the project, see Bissell, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior*, 92-122.

161. Beschloss, 234-35, 238.
162. Memrcd Goodpaster, 8 Feb 60, summarizing discussion 2 Feb 60, fldr Intelligence Matters (13) (Aug 59-Feb 60), Box 15, Alpha subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
163. Beschloss, 238-39; Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 569.
164. Beschloss, 241-42; Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 569; Bissell, 124-26; memrcd Goodpaster, 25 Apr 60, fldr Intelligence Matters (14) (Mar-May 60), Box 15, Alpha subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
165. Beschloss, 13-28.
166. Beschloss, 32-39; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 543, 547-48; NASA statement 3 May in Dept State *Bulletin*, XLII (23 May 60), 817.
167. *New York Times*, 6 May 60. Khrushchev's speech is extensively quoted in Wise and Ross, 73-75 (without source citation), and Beschloss, 42-45.
168. Beschloss, 45; Kistiakowsky, 317; memo of disc (Boggs), 443rd NSC mtg, 5 May 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; E. Bruce Geelhoed, "Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Spy Plane, and the Summit: A Quarter-Century Retrospective," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, XVII (Winter 87), 97. The Geelhoed article provides the best available short summary of the entire U-2 affair.
169. Beschloss, 47-52; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 549; Gates statements in US Cong, Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, *Events Incident to the Summit Conference: Hearings*, 86 Cong, 2 sess (1960), 128-32 (cited hereafter as *Summit Conference: Hearings*); *New York Times*, 6 May 60; text of NASA statement in DeptState *Bulletin*, XLII (23 May 60), 817-18.
170. *New York Times*, 8 May 60; Beschloss, 58-63.
171. *New York Times*, 8 May 60; Beschloss, 243-50.
172. Beschloss, 251-52.
173. *New York Times*, 9 May 60.
174. Beschloss, 252-55; *Washington Post*, 9 May 60; memo of disc (Boggs), 444th NSC mtg, 9 May 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 551-52; Kistiakowsky, 321; Gates testimony in Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, *Summit Conference: Hearings*, 127-28, 145, 159.
175. DeptState *Bulletin*, XLII (23 May 60), 816-17.
176. Beschloss, 258-59.
177. *New York Times*, 10, 11, 13 May 60.
178. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 12 May 60, fldr Staff Notes May 60 (1), Box 50, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memrcd Goodpaster, 1 Jun 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, X, pt 1, 521-22; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 552-53.
179. *New York Times*, 15, 16 May 60.
180. Beschloss, 276-77; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 553-54.
181. Beschloss, 281; Wise and Ross, 146-47; Peter Lyon, *Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero*, 813; Gates testimony in Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, *Summit Conference: Hearings*, 124-25, 132-33, 135-58, 155 (124, quote); *Washington Post*, 16 May 60. For examples of criticism, see editorial in *Denver Post*, 17 May 60; John G. Norris in *Washington Post*, 18 May 60; Walter Lippmann in *New York Herald Tribune*, 19 May 60; statements by Adlai E. Stevenson, *New York Times*, 20 May 60, and rebuttal by Arthur Krock, *New York Times*, 24 May 60. Gates later defended the alert as "a prudent thing to do"; see his brief summary of the Paris conference, staff mtg notes, 23 May 60, fldr Staff Meetings Jan-Jun 1960, Box 9, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062. For establishment of the Defense Communications Agency, see ch XXII.
182. DeptState memcon, 16 May 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, IX:438-52; Beschloss, 283-90; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 555-56; Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 578-79; *New York Times*, 17 May 60.
183. DeptState memcon, 17 May 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, IX:461-66; Beschloss, 292-97; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 556; *New York Times*, 18 May 60.
184. Beschloss, 297-304; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 556-57; *New York Times*, 20, 21 May 60.
185. Memo of disc (Boggs), 445th NSC mtg, 24 May 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, IX:505-13; Kistiakowsky, 333-36.
186. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1960-61*, 437-45.
187. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 580; quotes from Kistiakowsky, 375. Kistiakowsky does not give the date of this conversation with the president.

188. DeptState, *Geneva Conference*, 101-14.
189. Bechhoefer, 543-47; text of Soviet proposal in DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament*, 1960, 100-11.
190. DeptState memcon 20 Jun 60, fldr 388.3 Jun-Jul, Box 18, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170 (source of quote); Bechhoefer, 548-51; DeptState memcon, 20 Jun 60, fldr 388.3 Jun-Jul, Box 18, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
191. Memo JCS for SecDef, 10 Jun 60, JCSM-250-60, OSD Hist; ltr SecDef to SecState 16 Jun 60, fldr 388.3 Jun-Jul, Box 18, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
192. Brief record, Mtg of Principals on Disarmament, 20 Jun 60, sgd by Lt Col Charles M. Fergusson, Jr., USA, OASD(ISA), fldr 388.3 Disarmament (1 Jan-30 Jun 60), Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; DeptState memcon, 20 Jun 60, memo DAsD(ISA) for SecDef, 22 Jun 60, w/encl (draft revision of Western disarmament plan), memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Jun 60, JCSM 264-60; fldr 388.3 Jun-Jul, Box 18, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-2170.
193. DeptState memcon, 23 Jun 60, fldr 388.3 (4 Feb 60) Case File, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; Bechhoefer, 551-55; text of U.S. proposals and of Khrushchev ltr of 27 Jun in DeptState *Documents on Disarmament*, 1960, 126-36; *New York Times*, 28 Jun 60. The president's approval of the revised draft is mentioned in memo ASD (ISA) for CJCS, 14 Jul 60, fldr 388.3 (4 Feb 60) Case File, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
194. Report by JCS-DoD Rep (Rear Adm Dudley) to SecDef and JCS on Conference of Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, 9 Aug 60, encl/w memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Aug 60, JCSM-371-60, fldr 388.3 (Dudley Rept) 19 Aug 60, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
195. *New York Times*, 13, 14, 27 Jul 60; Douglas Stanglin, Susan Headden, and Peter Cary, "Flights of the Ferrets," *U.S. News and World Report*, CXLIV (15 Mar 93), 50-52; memo of telcon, Pres and SecState, 11 Jul 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, X, pt 1:542-43; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 19 Jul 60, *ibid*, 545-47. For the additional military measures taken in 1960, see ch XI.
196. Memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Jun 60, JCSM-236-60, fldr 388.3 Disarmament (1 Jan-30 Jun) 60, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; ltr ActgSecDef to SecState, 18 Jul 60, fldr 388.3 1960, Box 22, *ibid*.
197. Memo JCS for SecDef, 26 Aug 60, JCSM-374-60, memo ActgSecDef for CJCS, 15 Sep 60: fldr 388.3 1960, Box 22, *ibid*.
198. Memo Brig Gen Brown for ASD(ISA), 12 Oct 60, w/draft ltrs to SecState and Pres, and atchd handwritten ofc memo Brig Gen Whisenand (OCJCS) for Gen Twining, with notation by Twining that JCS had approved, fldr 388.3 Disarmament (1 Jul-31 Dec 60), Box 16, *ibid*.
199. JCS Hist Div, *Chronology of JCS Organization, 1945-1984*, 164-65, 168.
200. Memo Col Black for Douglas, 5 Feb 60, fldr 388.3 (4 Feb 60) Case File, and memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 4 Mar 60, fldr 388.3 Disarmament (1 Jan-30 Jun 60): both in Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
201. Memo Col Black for Douglas, 5 Feb 60, cited in preceding note; memo Col Black for Gates, 25 Feb 60, fldr Col Black Reading File 6/15/59-7/30/60, Box 4, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-B3078; memo Col J.T. Folda, Jr., USA, OASD(ISA), for Maj Gen Dabney, 3 Mar 60, fldr 310.1 Jan-May, Box 4, OASD(ISA) Gen Files 1960, Acc 64-A2170; memo ASD (ISA) for SecDef, 4 Mar 60, fldr 388.3 Disarmament (1 Jan-30 Jun 60), Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
202. Memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 4 Mar 60, cited in preceding note; memo SecDef for Secs of Mil Depts et al, 18 Mar 60, fldr 388.3 Disarmament (1 Jan-30 Jun 60), Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
203. Statements by Herter in ltr Herter to Gray, 11 Apr 60, fldr 388.3 (Disarm Ofc in State) 11 Apr 60, *ibid*.
204. Kistiakowsky, 261, 294; memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 29 Mar 60, fldr 1960 Meetings with Pres Vol 1 (4), Box 4, Presidential subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL; ltr Herter to Gray, 11 Apr 60, fldr 388.3 (Disarm Ofc in State) 11 Apr 60, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; statements by Gates to AFPC, AFPC mtg notes, 19 Apr 60, fldr AFPC Mar-Apr 60, Box 6, OASD (C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.

205. Ltr Herter to Gates, 11 Apr 60, ltr Gates to Herter, 27 Apr 60: fldr 388.3 (Disarm Ofc in State) 11 Apr 60, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; ltr Herter to Gates, 10 May 60, fldr 388.3 April-May, Box 18, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
206. Ltr ActgSecState for SecDef, 29 Aug 60, fldr 388.3 (Disarm Ofc in State) 11 Apr 60, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
207. DeptState PR, 9 Sep 60, DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, 225. Documents recording State-Defense discussions and the final presidential letter of 25 October 1960 promulgating the functions of the new organization are in fldr 388.3 (Disarm Ofc in State) 11 Apr 60, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
208. Ltr Pres to SecDef, 25 Oct 60, w/encl, "Functions of the U.S. Disarmament Administration," memo ActgDepDir, US Disarmament Admin (Gullion) for ASD(ISA), 9 Nov 60, ltr Maj Gen Dabney to Gullion, 17 Nov 60, ltr Gullion to Dabney, Nov 60: fldr 388.3 (Disarm Ofc in State) 11 Apr 60, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093. In his letter to Gates, the president noted that he was sending similar letters to other officials.
209. Stebbins, 1960, 93; Bechhoefer, 461, 555-57.
210. Memo ATSD(AE) for SecDef, 15 Aug 60, draft ltr SecDef to SecState, nd, with covering brief, ATSD(AE) for SecDef, 26 Aug 60, atchmt to ofc memo Brig Gen Brown for Loper, 23 Sep 60, memo Loper for Brown, 26 Sep 60: fldr 388.3 Disarmament (1 Jul-31 Dec 60), Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1960-61*, 716-17.
211. Stebbins, 1960, 340-47; David Haight, "Dwight D. Eisenhower, Nikita Khrushchev and the U.N. 'Summit' Assembly of 1960," in R. Gordon Hoxie et al, eds., *The Presidency and National Security Policy*, 187-95; *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1960-61*, 707-20.
212. Stebbins, 1960, 340-47; Haight, 195-206; DeptState, *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, 229-48; *New York Times*, 24, 27 Sep, 4, 13 Oct 60.
213. DeptState, *Geneva Conference*, 114-21.
214. Memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 14 Jul 60, fldr 388.3 (4 Feb 60) Case File, Box 16, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Oct 60, JCSM-483-60, fldr 388.3 1960, Box 22, *ibid*.
215. Ltr Gray to Herter, 30 Nov 60, ltr Herter to Gates, 8 Dec 60, ltr Dulles to Gates, 10 Dec 60: fldr 388.3 Nov-Dec, Box 18, OASD(ISA) Gen files 1960, Acc 64-A2170.
216. Memo Gray for SecState and SecDef, 14 Dec 60, fldr 388.3 Disarmament (1 Jul-31 Dec 1960), Box 16, OSD(CCS) files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; memo of disc (Boggs), 474th NSC mtg, 12 Jan 61, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; handwritten notes on same mtg, fldr Notes-NSC mtgs, Box 29, Lemnitzer papers, NDU; memo ExecSecNSC for Sec State, SecDef, and ChmAEC, 25 Jan 61, OSD Hist.

XXII. THE FINAL YEAR

1. Jack Raymond, "A Sailor for the Top Defense Job," *New York Times Magazine*, 29 Nov 59, 23 ff; Beverly Smith, Jr., "On the Hottest Spot in the Pentagon," *Saturday Evening Post*, CCXXXII (28 May 60), 19 ff; Roger R. Trask, *The Secretaries of Defense: A Brief History, 1947-1985*, 25-26; John R. Wadleigh, "Thomas Sovereign Gates, Jr.," in Paolo E. Coletta, ed., *American Secretaries of the Navy*, II:877-80.
2. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 1 Aug 60, fldr Staff Notes Aug 60 (3), Box 51, DDE Diary ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
3. Gates interv, 3 Aug 67, 31-32, CUOHP.
4. Memo Rudolph A. Winnacker for [Arthur] Sylvester, ASD(PA), 28 Nov 62, OSD Hist; Raymond, "A Sailor for the Top Defense Job," 23; Richard Fryklund in *Washington Star*, 21 Aug 60; "Defense Secretary Gates: The Man in the News," *U.S. News and World Report*, XLVIII (25 Jan 60), 64.
5. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 1:62 (quote), 172; Vinson quoted in Smith, "On the Hottest Spot in the Pentagon," 120.
6. Mansfield Sprague interv, 15 Oct 68, 52-53, CUOHP; Burke interv, 9 Nov 83, 29-30, OSD Hist; Fryklund in *Washington Star*, 21 Aug 60. General Lemnitzer characterized Gates as "one of the best" and called him "careful, thorough, decisive": Lemnitzer interv, 19 Jan 84, 43, OSD Hist.

7. Raymond, "A Sailor for the Top Defense Job," 122; Gates interv, 3 Aug 67, 38, 50, CUOHP; Kistiakowsky, 181.
8. Randall interv, 27 Apr 88, 87-88, OSD Hist; Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., *George S. Brown, General, U.S. Air Force: Destined for Stars*, 112-13.
9. Gates interv, 3 Aug 67, 39, CUOHP.
10. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 16 Sep 59, fldr Staff Notes Sep 59 (2), Box 44, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
11. *Public Statements, SecDef Gates, 1959-60*, III:684.
12. John S. D. Eisenhower interv, 22 Oct 84, 24-25, OSD Hist.
13. *Baltimore Sun*, 12 Aug 60.
14. Memo of conf with Pres (J.S.D. Eisenhower), 6 Jul 60, fldr Staff Notes July 60, Box 57, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
15. *New York Times*, 16 Aug 60; *Washington Post*, 28 Aug 60.
16. *Public Statements, SecDef Gates, 1959-60*, III:735-44 (quotes, 737, 738).
17. Gates interv, 13 Jul 65, 21, JFDOHP.
18. Senate Cte on Govt Opns, Subcte on Natl Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, I:731. Examples of disagreements between State and Defense in connection with NATO are described in ch XVII.
19. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 1:34-35.
20. Senate Subcte on Natl Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, I:729.
21. Gates interv, 16 Jul 62, 6, CUOHP. Only one of these studies has been found: "Functions, Powers, and Duties of Secretary of Defense," prepared by Ofc of General Counsel, DoD, 1 Oct 60, OSD Hist. The other, as described by Gates in the interview cited here, was a study of the administrative powers of the secretary and what they permitted him to do—"things that he had the power to do but was not necessarily actually doing." This has not been found.
22. DoD Dir 1320.5, 2 Dec 59.
23. Memrcd Burke, 4 Dec 59, on mtg 3 Dec, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 26 May 60, fldr DoD Agencies 1960, Box 5, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
24. JCS Hist Div, *Role and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A Chronology*, 96-98.
25. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 29 Dec 59, printed in House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 1:37-38.
26. Lemnitzer interv, 19 Jan 84, 8, OSD Hist. Lemnitzer's recollection was that the suggestion for regular meetings came from the JCS.
27. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 2:337; Senate Ctes on Armed Svcs and Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Missiles, Space, and Other Major Defense Matters: Hearings*, 472-73.
28. JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-60*, 482-83; memo Paul M. Kearney, AdminAsst to Gen Twining, for Capt Gray, OCJCS, 26 Apr 60, fldr 337 Conferences and Briefings 1960, Box 14, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; Cole et al, *History of the Unified Command Plan*, 30.
29. Memo Kearney for Gray, 26 Apr 60, fldr 337 Conferences and Briefings 1960, Box 14, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
30. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 5 May 60, fldr Staff Notes May 60, Box 50, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
31. *Public Statements, SecDef Gates, 1959-60*, III:684-85.
32. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958*, 281.
33. *New York Times*, 1 May 60; George Fielding Eliot in *New York Herald Tribune*, 8 Jan, 14 Aug 60. Eliot apparently did not fully understand Gates's new procedure; his meetings with the JCS did not obviate the preparation of "position papers" before the meetings.
34. Memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 12 Jan 60, fldr 381 National Defense Jan-Feb 60, Box 15, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
35. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1961: Hearings*, pt 1:11; Senate Subcte on Natl Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, I:752.

36. Memo Col Black for Douglas, 24 Feb 60, fldr Col Black Reading File 6/15/59-7/30/60, Box 4, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-B3078; memos by Col Black, 3, 14, and 22 Nov 60 (the last with handwritten notations by Black), in fldr Cold War, and memo Black for [William P.] Bundy, 26 Jan 61, in fldr Col Black Reading File 8/1/60, *ibid*.
37. James M. Roherty, *Decisions of Robert S. McNamara: A Study of the Role of the Secretary of Defense*, 40-46; John S. D. Eisenhower interv, 22 Oct 84, 54, OSD Hist.
38. For praise of Gates in the press (in addition to the articles cited above), see Louis Kraar, "Managing the Pentagon," *Wall Street Journal*, 27 Apr 60; *New York Journal-American*, 25 Oct 60. On Gates's possible future, see *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 1 Aug 60; *New York Herald Tribune*, 14 Aug 60; *Washington Star*, 21 Aug 60; *New York Journal-American*, 25 Oct 60; Mark S. Watson in *Baltimore Sun*, 15 Nov 60.
39. Memrcd D. A. Q[uarles], 29 May 57, fldr AFPC May-Jun 60, Box 6, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
40. Memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Aug 58, fldr 311 (Management of Defense Comm) 14 Jan 60, Box 12, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
41. Memo JCS for SecDef, 6 Feb 59, JCSM-40-59, w/encl, memo DepSecDef for CJCS, 2 Apr 59, memo JCS for SecDef, 26 Jun 59, JCSM-248-59, memo DepSecDef for JCS, 25 Jul 59: *ibid*.
42. DoD Dir 5600.1, 23 Mar 59; memo JCS for SecDef, 26 Jun 59, JCSM-248-59, cited in preceding note.
43. House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1960*, 85 Cong, 1 sess (28 May 59), H Rept 408, 46.
44. Memo SecA for SecDef, 5 Jun 59, memo AsstSecAF (P. B. Taylor) for SecDef, 31 Jul 59, memo SecNav for SecDef, 10 Oct 59: fldr 311 (Management of Defense Comm) 14 Jan 60, Box 12, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
45. Memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Oct 59, JCSM-428-59, memo CJCS for SecDef, 29 Oct 59, CM-419-59: *ibid*.
46. Memos SecDef for ASD(C) et al, 14 Jan 60, and SecA et al, same date, memo JCS for SecDef, 1 Feb 60, JCSM-42-60, memo CJCS for SecDef, 1 Feb 60, CM-482-60, memo SecDef for CJCS, 15 Apr 60, memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Apr 60, JCSM-172-60: fldr 311 (Management of Defense Comm) 14 Jan 60, Box 12, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; memos of comment by SvcSecs and ASDs 28-29 Apr 60, fldr AFPC May-Jun 60, Box 6, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; AFPC Advice of Action, 12 May 60 (mtg 4 May), OSD Hist.
47. DoD Dirs 5101.19 (Defense Communications Security Agency) and 4600.2 (Defense Communications System), both 12 May 60.
48. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 7 Jun 60, CM-546-60, memo SecDef for CJCS, 7 Jun 60: fldr 311 (Management of Defense Comm) 14 Jan 60, Box 12, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
49. John Prados, *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces*, 122.
50. Memo ATSD(SO) for SecDef, 9 Dec 59, memo SecDef for CJCS, 9 Dec 59, memo JCS for SecDef, 10 Mar 60, JCSM-91-60: fldr 350.09 Intelligence Material, Counterintelligence 1960, Box 14, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
51. Memos ATSD(SO) for SecDef, 4, 11 Mar 60, *ibid*; Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., *The Real CIA*, 216-17.
52. Kirkpatrick, 216-31; Prados, *The Soviet Estimate*, 122-23.
53. Memo JCS for SecDef, 18 Jan 61, JCSM-26-61, fldr 350.09 Intelligence Material, Counterintelligence 1960, Box 14, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
54. Memo of disc (Boggs), 440th NSC mtg, 7 Apr 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
55. Memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 10 Nov 60, fldr 5906 Basic Natl Security Policy File #2, Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
56. NSC 5906/1, para 59 (revised 14 Oct 59), OSD Hist. See also ch XI.
57. Memo ActgSecDef for CJCS, 30 Oct 59, fldr 381 JSOP 63, 8 Jan 60, Box 1, OASD(C) JSOP files, Acc 62-A4671; memo DepSecJCS for Dir J-5, 25 Sep 59, SM-952-59, *ibid*.
58. Memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Jan 60, JCSM-3-60, w/encl, JSOP-63 (incl opposing statements of views), atchmt to memo CJCS for SecDef, 8 Jan 60, CM-448-60: *ibid*. Force tabs appear as Tabs "A", "B", and "C" to the appendix to JSOP-63 (26-28).

59. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 26 Mar 60, *ibid*.
60. Memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Oct 59, JCSM-450-59, memo SecDef for CJCS, 22 Dec 59, memo SecDef for SecA et al, 15 Mar 60: fldr 381 (FY 61/62 Logistic Guidances) (18 Jan 60), Box 15, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093. Memo JCS for SecDef, 18 Jan 60, JCSM-22-60, fldr 381 Nat Def NSC 5819-5906 9 Mar 59, Box 2, OSD CCS files 1959, Acc 63-B1574.
61. "The Military Logistics Planning Base, 1 July 1963," presentation by Perkins McGuire before NSC, 30 Jun 60, fldr Strengthening Free World Position in Science and Technology, Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
62. Memo of disc (Boggs), 449th NSC mtg, 30 Jun 60, OSD Hist.
63. Memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Sep 60, JCSM-410-60, w/atchmts, JSOP-66 and appendixes giving views of CSA, CNO, and CSAF, atchmt to memo CJCS for SecDef, 20 Sep 60, CM-607-60: fldr 381 JSOP 66, Box 1, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 62-A4671.
64. Memo CJCS for SecDef, 20 Sep 60, cited in preceding note.
65. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 17 Nov 60, fldr 381 JSOP 66, Box 1, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 62-A4671.
66. Ltr Gerard C. Smith, DeptState, to Irwin, 28 Sep 60, fldr Limited Military Operations (5906/1), Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; memo DepSecDef for SecState and DCI, 1 Jul 59, w/encl (draft memo for CJCS), ltr Gates to Gray, 1 Jul 59, ltr DCI to ASD(ISA), 29 Sep 59: fldr 381 June-Dec, Box 13, OASD(ISA) Gen Files 1959, Acc 63-A1672. The terms of reference were not submitted to the NSC, as had been done in 1958.
67. Terms of reference for the study are printed as part of the study itself, cited below.
68. Memo JCS for SecDef, 27 Jul 60, JCSM-324-60, fldr 381 27 July 60, Box 21, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
69. Memo Smith for SecState, 26 Jul 60, fldr Limited Military Operations (5906/1), Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
70. "Weapons Technology for Limited Warfare," summary report of Panel, 3 Aug 60, fldr Dr. Kistiakowsky (5) (Aug-Sep 60), Box 16, Alpha subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 31, 74-75, 126-28, 327.
71. Memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 24 Aug 60, fldr Meetings with the President (Aug 58-Sep 60), Box 51, OASST files 1957-60, WHO, DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 386.
72. "United States and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962," prepared by Interdepartmental Study Group of Reps from State, DoD, and CIA, nd, atchmt to memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 26 Sep 60, fldr Limited Military Operations (5906/1), Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
73. Memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 26 Sep 60, fldr 381 27 July 60, Box 21, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
74. AFPC mtg notes, 27 Sep 60, fldr AFPC Jul-Sep 60, Box 6, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; handwritten notes by Col Black on same mtg, fldr Col Black's Notes 1960, Box 4, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 64-A3078; handwritten notes on same, presumably by Gen Lemnitzer, fldr L-184-71 Meeting Notes, AFPC, Box 25, Lemnitzer papers, NDU; memo SecState, SecDef, and DCI for SpecAsstforNatSecAff, 29 Sep 60, fldr 381 27 July 60, Box 21, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
75. Memo Rathjens for Kistiakowsky, 5 Oct 60, fldr Limited War (Sep Oct 60), Box 2, OASST files, WHO, DDEL.
76. Presentation to NSC by ASD Irwin, 6 Oct 60, memrcd Brig Gen Polk, OASD(ISA), 10 Oct 60 (briefly summarizing NSC mtg 6 Oct): fldr Limited Military Operations (5906/1), Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; memo of disc (Boggs), 462nd NSC mtg, 6 Oct 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; Kistiakowsky, 399-400.
77. Memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Oct 60, JCSM-488-60, memo SecDef for CJCS, 8 Nov 60: fldr 381 27 Jul 60, Box 21, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093; memo Polk for Haydn Williams, OASD(ISA), 3 Nov 60, fldr Limited Military Operations (5906/1), Box 26, OASD(ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500.
78. The JCS study was formally transmitted to the secretary of defense by memo JCS for SecDef, 26 Jan 61, JCSM-37-61, fldr 381 27 July 60, Box 21, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093. It was available to the secretary at least a month earlier, having been

- transmitted to Gray by memo from DepSecDef, 28 Dec 60, fldr Limited War (1), Box 12, Briefing Notes subser, NSC ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL.
79. Presentation by CJCS on Possible Deficiencies in U.S. Posture for Limited Military Operations, NSC mtg, 5 Jan 61, fldr Limited Military Operations (5906/1), Box 26, OASD (ISA) Pol Plng Staff files, Acc 65-A3500; memo of disc (Boggs), 473rd NSC mtg, 5 Jan 61, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
 80. AFPC mtg notes, 27 Sep 60, fldr AFPC Jul-Sep 60, Box 6, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
 81. Memo Col Bradford Butler, Jr., USA, Joint Staff, for distribution list [apparently members of study group], 30 Aug 60, w/encl, rept dtd 29 Aug 60, fldr CG file—Counter-Guerrilla General Info 1960, 1961, Box 1, ATSD(SO) files, Acc 63-A1803.
 82. Frederick T. Moore, *Defense Expenditures and the Balance of Payments*, v, 1-7; Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1960*, 4-45.
 83. Statements by Gates and McElroy at AFPC mtg, AFPC mtg notes, 28 Jul 59, fldr AFPC May-Aug 59, Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
 84. NSC 5916, 24 Nov 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, IV:467-68; memo of disc (Boggs), 427th NSC mtg, 3 Dec 59, *ibid*, 472-82.
 85. Ofc memo Col Black for Douglas, 18 Apr 60, fldr Col Black Reading File 6/15/59-7/30/60, Box 4, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-B3078.
 86. Memo of mtg with Pres (Persons), 4 Oct 60, fldr Staff Notes Oct 60 (2), Box 53, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
 87. "Costs of Overseas Deployments," nd, atchmt to ofc memo Lincoln for Gates, 19 Sep 60, fldr Budget CL 100 Jul-Sep 58, Box 5, OASD(C) files, Acc 64-A2375.
 88. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 9 Nov 60, fldr Staff Notes Nov 60, Box 54, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
 89. Memo of conf with Pres (J. S. D. Eisenhower), 15 Nov 60, *ibid*.
 90. "Directive by the President Concerning Steps to be Taken with Respect to the United States Balance of Payments, 16 Nov 60," atchmt to memo SpecAsst to SecDef (R. Eugene Livesay) for AFPC, 17 Nov 60, fldr 334 AFPC 1960, Box 13, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; *New York Times*, 17 Nov 60, *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1960-61*, 861-65.
 91. Msg SecDef for U.S. Cmdrs, 16 Nov 60, fldr AFPC Dec 60, Box 6, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
 92. Msg SecDef for all comds, 17 Nov 60, *ibid*.
 93. Memo SecDef for SecA et al, 25 Nov 60, *ibid*.
 94. Memo ActgSecDef for SecA et al, 15 Dec 60, *ibid*.
 95. DoD NR 1474-60, 20 Dec 60, OSD Hist.
 96. Ltr SecDef to Pres, 18 Jan 61, fldr Gates, Thomas S. Jr., 1959-61 (2), Box 15, Admin ser, PP (AWF) DDEL.
 97. Memo SecDef for SecA et al, 15 Mar 60, fldr 381 (FY 61/62 Logistic Guidances) (18 Jan 60), Box 15, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; memo ASD(MP&R) for AsstSecA et al, 19 Apr 60, fldr 200 (Pers and Budget Actns 1961) 1960, Box 9, *ibid*.
 98. Memo Col Black for Douglas, 7 Apr 60, fldr 110.01 (FY 62) 1960, Box 8, *ibid*.
 99. "Memo DepASD(C) for ASD(C), 20 Apr 60, fldr FY 1962 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. For the 1959 "spring fever" exercise, see ch XI.
 100. Memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 25 Apr 60, fldr AFPC May-Jun 60, Box 6, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
 101. Memo DepASD(ISA) (Haydn Williams), for SecDef, 5 May 60, *ibid*; statement by Gates to Jackson subcommittee, 13 Jun 60, Senate Subcte on Natl Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, I:755.
 102. "Spring Fever 1/62 and 2/62," Apr-May 60, no indication of origin, fldr 110.01 Budget—FY 58, FY 59, FY 60, etc. 1960, Box 8, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 4 Jun 60, fldr FY 1962 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
 103. Memo Lincoln for Gates, 1 Jun 60, fldr 110.01 (FY 62) 1960, Box 8, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
 104. Handwritten mins of Cabinet mtg, 3 Jun 60, fldr C-55(1) June 3, 60, Box 6, Cabinet ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; memo Gale for SecA et al, 9 Jun 60, summarizing instructions given by president at Cabinet mtg 3 Jun, fldr 110.01 (FY 62) 1960, Box 8, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.

105. Jt Secs Advice of Action, 18 Jun 60, OSD Hist. For the manner in which new obligational availability was computed, see statement by Lincoln in House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962: Hearings*, pt 1:1-2.
106. AFPC mtg notes, 28 Jun 60, fldr AFPC May-Jun 60, Box 6, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062; AFPC Advice of Action, 28 Jun 60, OSD Hist.
107. Ltr Herter to Gates, 1 Jul 60, w/encl, fldr FY 1962 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & Dep SecDef files, OSD Hist; Ltr Gates to Herter, 20 Jul 60, fldr AFPC Advices of Action (1959-), Box 5, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
108. Memo SecNav for SecDef, 3 Aug 60, memo SecAF for SecDef, 5 Aug 60, memo SecA for SecDef, 15(?) Aug 60: fldr AFPC Jul-Sep 60, Box 6, OASD(C)(A) files, Acc 77-0062.
109. Memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Aug 60, JCSM-350-60, *ibid*.
110. Memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 22 Aug 60, *ibid*.
111. Presentations by representatives of the services and by the CJCS at 2 Sep 60 AFPC mtg, *ibid*.
112. AFPC mtg notes, 2 Sep 60, *ibid*; handwritten notes by Col Black, same mtg, fldr Col Black's notes 1960, Box 4, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-A3078.
113. See Franklyn Arthur Johnson, *Defence by Committee: The British Committee of Imperial Defence, 1885-1959*. The 2 September AFPC meeting was not unique in having State officials attend; as already noted, Merchant, representing State, attended a meeting on 27 September to discuss the limited war study.
114. App D to memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Sep 60, JCSM-410-60, fldr 381 JSOP 66, Box 1, OASD(C) JSOP files, Acc 72-A4671.
115. Typewritten table of estimates atchd to ofc memo Lincoln for Gates, 5 Oct 60, fldr FY 1962 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
116. Memo Charles A. Haskins (unident, probably from White House or NSC staff) for Gordon Gray, 28 Oct 60, fldr Staff Memos, Box 9, Subj subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL.
117. Notes for Summary Statement by ASD Lincoln on Staff Evaluation of FY 1962 Budget Submission, fldr FY 1962 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. Undated but bears handwritten notation, "For Nov 30 mtg with SecDef."
118. Review of the FY '62 Military Budget, by PSAC, nd, with cover sheet dtd 23 Nov 60, fldr Department of Defense (Jan 58-Nov 60), Box 1, OASST files, WHO, DDEL.
119. Memos MilDivBoB, for DirBoB, 30 Nov, 4 Dec 60, Agreements Reached at Meeting of DirBoB and SecDef, 30 Nov 60, Reconciliation of DoD Positions of 29 Nov and 4 Dec 60, nd, evidently prepared by OASD(C): fldr FY 1962 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
120. Memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 5 Dec 60, fldr Staff Notes Dec 1960, Box 55, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
121. Opening Remarks of Secretary Gates on Presentation of FY 1962 Defense Budget to NSC, 8 Dec 60, statement by ASD Lincoln before NSC, 8 Dec 60, draft statement of SecDef Gates on FY 1962 Budget prepared for House Cte on Appros, 9 Jan 61: fldr FY 1962 Defense Budget (McNeil file), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. Some additional details of the budget, not included in these presentations, have been taken from statements made in the subsequent NSC discussion or from the president's budget message (both cited below).
122. Memo of disc (Boggs), 469th NSC mtg, 8 Dec 60, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; handwritten notes by Lemnitzer on same mtg, fldr Notes—NSC Meetings, Box 29, Lemnitzer papers, NDU.
123. DoD Rept to NSC on Status of United States Military Programs as of 30 Jun 60, 1 Dec 60 (NSC 6013, Part 1), memo of disc (Boggs), 469th NSC mtg, 8 Dec 60: NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memrcd Burke, 8 Dec 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC.
124. Ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 30 Dec 60, and reply, ltr DirBoB for SecDef, 6 Jan 61, fldr 110.01 (FY 62) 1960, Box 8, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; Table EFAD-439, OSAD(C), 17 Jul 62, columns 8, 9, 10, OSD Hist.
125. *The Budget of the United States for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1962*, M22, 477-79; Draft Statement of Secretary Gates on FY 1962 Defense Budget, prepared for Subcte on DoD Appropriations, House Cte on Appros, 9 Jan 61, fldr FY 1962 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.

126. For the 1961 figures, see ch XI. Between December 1959 and December 1960 the consumer price index increased by 1.6 percent and the wholesale index by less than 1 percent: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1961*, 334, 329.
127. *The Budget of the United States for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1962*, M4, M6, M23-M24, M26, M29, 484-85.
128. Ltr Mahon to Gates, 3 Jan 61, draft Statement of SecDef Gates on FY 1962 Defense Budget, prepared for House Cte on Appros, 9 Jan 61, fldr FY 1962 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD & DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. The statement is not published in the committee hearings, but that it was submitted to the committee was stated by Lincoln in his own statement, which is in House Cte on Appros, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962: Hearings*, pt 1:1.
129. NSC 5818, 26 Aug 58, 1-2, OSD Hist.
130. Stebbins, 1960, 175-90. For an analysis of the political factors involved in the Congo crisis, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, "The United States, Belgium, and the Congo Crisis of 1960," 239-56.
131. Telcon Amb Clare H. Timberlake, Leopoldville, w/State, 12 Jul 60, encl w/JCS 2262/20, 12 Jul 60, OSD Hist; Ltr DepSecDef for SecState, 12 Jul 60, memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Jul 60, JCSM-295-60: fldr Africa 322, 2 Sep 60, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093; *Baltimore Sun*, 13 Jul 60.
132. Stebbins, 1960, 178-80; John N. Irwin, "The Role of the Defense Department in the Formulation of National Security Policy," lecture given at ICAE, 3 Oct 60, 15 (copy in OSD Hist); Ltr SecState to SecDef, 20 Jul 60, memo DepASD(ISA) for SecDef, 29 Jul 60, memo ActgSecDef for SecAF, 4 Aug 60: fldr Congo 1960, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
133. Memo CNO for UnderSecDef [sic], 30 Jul 60, memo CNO for SecDef, 20 Aug 60: fldr Congo 1960, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; Stebbins, 1960, 187-88.
134. Memo JCS for SecDef, 18 Aug 60, JCSM-363-60, fldr Congo 1960, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093; Ltr ActgASD(ISA) (Knight) to SecState, 2 Sep 60, fldr Africa 322, 2 Sep 60, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093; JCS Hist Div, *JCS and National Policy, 1957-1960*, 623-24.
135. Memo JCS for SecDef, 24 Sep 60, JCSM-425-60, memo SecDef for CJCS, 6 Oct 60: fldr Africa 322, 2 Sep 60, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
136. Memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Oct 60, JCSM-491-60, memo CJCS for SecDef, 29 Oct 60, CM-19-60: *ibid*.
137. Memo SecDef for CJCS, 21 Nov 60, *ibid*; Cole et al, *History of the Unified Command Plan*, 30-31.
138. Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon*, 202.
139. Memorandum on Command Responsibility for Africa South of the Sahara, 25 Feb 61, ns but originating in DeptNavy, fldr Africa 322, 2 Sep 60, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093; Cole et al, *History of the Unified Command Plan*, 29-30.
140. For a general history of U.S. relations with Latin America, see J. Lloyd Meacham, *The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960*.
141. NSC 5902/1, 16 Feb 59, *FRUS 1958-60*, V:91-103.
142. Hugh Thomas, *The Cuban Revolution*, 413-93; Alan H. Luxenburg, "Did Eisenhower Push Castro into the Arms of the Soviets?" *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, XXX (Spring 88), 41-50; F Parkinson, *Latin America, the Cold War, and the World Powers 1945-1983: A Study in Diplomatic History*, 69-73.
143. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 556.
144. Memo JCS for SecDef, 2 Mar 60, w/encl, "Study and Recommendations for U.S. Action in Cuba," 2 Feb 60, fldr Cuba 091, 2 Mar 60, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1960. The memo (without the enclosure) is printed in *FRUS 1958-60*, VI:822.
145. Memo of disc (Boggs), 436th NSC mtg, 10 Mar 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, VI:832-37; Kistiakowsky, 266-67; memo ASD(ISA) for CJCS, 21 Mar 60, fldr Cuba 091 2 Mar 60, Box 1, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-A2093.
146. Memo of disc (Boggs), 437th NSC mtg, 17 Mar 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, VI:856-59.
147. Memorandum No 1, "Narrative of the Anti-Castro Cuban Operation Zapata," 13 Jun 61, published with other documents in *Operation Zapata: The "Ultrasensitive" Report*

- and *Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs*, 3-4 (hereafter cited as *Operation Zapata*); Peter Wyden, *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story*, 19-25; Stephen E. Ambrose with Richard H. Immerman, *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment*, 308-10; "A Program of Action Against the Castro Regime," 16 Mar 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, VI:850-56; memrcd Burke, 18 Mar 60, Originator file, Burke papers, NHC; memrcd Lansdale, 25 Mar 60, fldr Cuba—Sensitive, Box 1, ATSD(SO) files, Acc 63-A1803; Bissell, 152-54. The secretary of defense's assistant for special operations, General Erskine, served as an alternate member of the 5412 Committee and in effect as the DoD working member; see ch I.
148. Memos of disc of various NSC mtgs during 1960: *FRUS 1958-60*, VI:887-88, 893, 908-09, 925-27, 943, 980-82, 1014-15, 1021-22, 1028, 1039, 1055-56, 1074-75, 1094-95, 1187.
 149. Memrcd Lansdale, 25 Mar 60, fldr Cuba—Sensitive, Box 1, ATSD(SO) files, Acc 63-A1803; Lansdale testimony in *Operation Zapata*, 194-95; Jackson, *Allen Welsh Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence*, III:116-18.
 150. *Operation Zapata*, 5; memo of mtg at White House, 18 Aug 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, VI:1057-60.
 151. Stebbins, 1960, 305-06; *New York Times*, 7 Aug, 27 Sep 60.
 152. Memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Sep 60, JCSM-441-60, ltr SecDef to SecState, 4 Oct 60, ltr SecState to SecDef, 14 Oct 60: *FRUS 1958-60*, VI:1076-77, 1080, 1087.
 153. Msg JCS 984390 for CINCLANT, 16 Oct 60, fldr JCS (9) (Jun-Nov 60), Box 4, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL; memrcd Karl G. Harr, Jr., 17 Oct 60, fldr 1960 meetings with President—Vol 2(4), Box 5, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL. For CINCLANT's responsibility for the Caribbean, see Cole et al, *History of the Unified Command Plan*, 25-26.
 154. Memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Nov 60, JCSM-498-60, fldr Cuba 384.5 4 Nov 60, Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
 155. Memo of disc (Johnson), 466th NSC mtg, 7 Nov 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, VI:1118-20.
 156. Memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 7 Nov 60, *ibid*, 1121-22; memo SecDef for SecA et al, 17 Nov 60, fldr Cuba 384.5 4 Nov 60 Box 20, OSD CCS files 1960, Acc 64-B2093.
 157. *Operation Zapata*, 5-7; Ambrose, *Ike's Spies*, 311-12; Bissell, 154-57.
 158. Memo Lansdale for Douglas, 7 Nov 60, *FRUS 1958-60*, VI:1115-18.
 159. *Operation Zapata*, 8; editorial note, *FRUS 1958-60*, VI:1175.
 160. Statements by Lansdale as recalled by Douglas, in memo by Douglas, 10 May 76, encl/w ltr Douglas to Lansdale, 14 Jun 76, fldr Cuba, Box 10, Lansdale papers, HIWRP (hereafter cited as Douglas memo); Wyden, 72-73.
 161. Memo Lansdale for Bissell, 28 Dec 60; memo Bissell for Lansdale, 5 Jan 61: fldr Cuba—Sensitive, Box 1, ATSD(SO) files, Acc 63-A1803.
 162. Douglas memo, cited in n 160; Wyden, 71-72.
 163. Curry, *The Unquiet American*, 212. For Lansdale's trip to Vietnam, see ch XVIII.
 164. Memo of mtg with Pres (Gray), 3 Jan 61, fldr 1960 Meetings with Pres Vol 2 (2), Box 5, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL. This does not mention Goodpaster's warning, which is described in Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 610, on the basis of an interview with Goodpaster by the author. An account of the meeting by Lemnitzer is in fldr Notes—White House Mtgs 1960-62, Box 29, Lemnitzer papers, NDU.
 165. Walter S. Poole, 1961-1964, vol. VIII in *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, pt 2:6-8 (hereafter cited as *JCS and National Policy, 1961-64*); memo JCS for SecDef, 27 Jan 61, JCSM-44-61, OSD Hist; *Operation Zapata*, 8.
 166. *Operation Zapata*, 8; Poole, *JCS and National Policy, 1961-64*, 3-4; memo Willauer for Merchant, 18 Jan 61, fldr 1960 Meetings with Pres Vol. 2 (2), Box 5, Pres subser, SpecAsst ser, OSANSA files, WHO, DDEL (emphases in original).
 167. Poole, *JCS and National Policy, 1961-64*, 6.
 168. Memrcd Persons, 19 Jan 61, fldr Kennedy, John F. 1960-61 (2), Box 2, Augusta-Walter Reed ser, Post-Presidential papers 1961-69, DDEL; Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 615.
 169. *New York Times*, 13 Jul 60.
 170. *Ibid*, 14, 16 Jul 60. For Kennedy's speeches through 1959 see his book, *The Strategy of Peace*. The Johnson subcommittee hearings are described in preceding chapters.

171. *New York Times*, 9 Jun 60; handwritten notes of Cabinet mtg, 1 Jul 60, fldr C-55 (2) July 1, 1960, Box 5, Cabinet ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
172. *New York Times*, 24 Jul 60.
173. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 597-98; *New York Times*, 27, 28, 29 Jul 60.
174. Speeches and other documents issued during the campaign are printed in US Cong, Senate Cte on Commerce, Subcte of Subcte on Communications, 87 Cong, 1 sess, S Rept 994 (pt I those of Kennedy, pt II those of Nixon). Pt III reprints the joint appearances (the famous "debates") in which little was said on national defense by either candidate.
175. Gates statement in Senate Subcte on Natl Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, I:749; memo of conf with Pres (Goodpaster), 2 Feb 60, fldr DoD Vol IV (2) (2 Feb 60), Box 2, DoD subser, Subj ser, OSS files, WHO, DDEL.
176. *Public Statements, SecDef Gates, 1959-60*, III:740, 758-59, 777.
177. *Ibid*, 718-92 (quotes, 781, 782).
178. Gale, "Post-Sputnik Washington," 247-50, and "Comments," 15; *New York Times*, 10 Apr, 23 Jun 60. On the "truth squad," see ch XI.
179. Henry M. Jackson, "Organizing for Survival," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVIII (Apr 60), 446-56 (quote, 449); Senate Subcte on Natl Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, II:115-298, and I:1-ff; Gary W. Reichard, "The Domestic Politics of National Security," in Norman A. Graebner, ed., *The National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945-1960*, 266. Some of the testimony and related materials were later published in Henry M. Jackson, ed., *The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level*.
180. *New York Times*, 9, 10 Nov 60; Gates remark quoted in Robert Keith Gray, *Eighteen Acres Under Glass*, 325.
181. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*, 129; David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest*, 10; Herbert S. Parmet, *JFK: The Presidency of John F. Kennedy*, 64.
182. *New York Times*, 14 Dec 60.
183. Memo Gates for Asst to Pres [presumably Gray], 17 Jan 61, fldr Reading and Speech Files—Gates, Box 32, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-B3078; Gates interv, 16 Jul 62, 6-7, CUOHP.
184. Memo Douglas for Gilpatric, 30 Jan 61, fldr Organization—Defense, Box 12, Gates papers, Van Pelt Library, University of Pennsylvania.
185. SecDef to Pres, 4 Jan 61, and reply, Pres to SecDef, 6 Jan 61, fldr Gates, Thomas S. Jr., 1959-61 (2), Box 15, Admin ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
186. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1960-1961*, 1054-59; John S.D. Eisenhower interv, 22 Oct 84, 55, OSD Hist.
187. *Washington Post*, 20, 21 Jan 61; *Washington Star*, 19, 20, 21 Jan 61; *New York Times*, 20, 21 Jan 61; Eisenhower, *Strictly Personal*, 287.
188. Memo SecDef for Asst to Pres, 18 Jan 61, fldr Reading and Speech Files—Gates, Box 32, OSD Admin Sec files, Acc 65-B3078; York interv, 31 Dec 84, 36, 52, OSD Hist; York, *Making Weapons, Talking Peace*, 201-03; *New York Times*, 22 Jan 61.

XXIII. OSD AT THE END OF 1960

1. *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1960-61*, 1038.
2. Telcon Eisenhower and Gates, 12 Jan 60, fldr Telephone Calls Jan 60, Box 47, DDED ser, PP (AWF), DDEL. The president took alarm at the heading of a story in the *New York Times*, 12 Jan 60: "Air Chief Scores B-70 Cut." In fact, White, in speaking to the National Press Club, had said that he accepted the decision not to begin production of the B-70 (see ch XI). "I wouldn't be here if I could not," he said. However, White added that he would testify "honestly and according to my convictions" in congressional hearings. When the president called him about this incident, Gates pointed out that the story was "not as bad as the headline indicated" and added that White had discussed the speech with him in advance. On learning that White's term would expire "about a year" after his own, Eisenhower decided to do nothing.

3. Eisenhower statement, 9 Feb 60, quoted in Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 561. On this occasion, the president may have been thinking in part of two recent speeches by General Power openly expressing unhappiness about budget decisions: see ch XI.
4. These figures, for 30 Jun 60, are from *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1959, to June 30, 1960*, 6-11. Figures for the end of 1960 have not been found; those for 30 Jun 61 show that the number of air defense battalions had declined to 77 1/4 and of air wings to 88, while the number of naval vessels had risen to 819: *Department of Defense Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1961*, 367.
5. NSC 6013, Status of National Security Programs on 3 Jun 60, 17, 20, OSD Hist.
6. 1956 figures from *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1956*, 343; those for 1960 from DoD Program Data Book, compiled by OSD Directorate of Statistical Services, OSD Hist.
7. Tab A to "Research Program on Negroes in Military Service," encl/w memo Harold Wool, Director for Procurement Policy and General Research, OASD(M&RA), for DepDDR&E, 14 Feb 68, fldr Research—Negroes in Military Service, Box 3, OASD (M&RA) files, Acc 76-088.
8. Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965*, 473-500.
9. DoD, Directorate for Information, Operations and Reports, *Department of Defense Selected Manpower Statistics, Fiscal Year 1987*, Table 2-19, 99.
10. Condit, *Test of War*, 494-95.
11. On the origin of the New Look, see Watson, *JCS and National Policy, 1953-54*, 1-37 (where Dulles's statement above is quoted), and, at greater length, the forthcoming volume III by Richard M. Leighton in *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*.
12. Figures from various official government publications in John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 359.
13. *Public Statements, SecDef Wilson, 1957*, II:605-06.
14. Senate Subcte on Natl Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, I:729.
15. On the JSSC, see JCS Hist Div, "Joint Strategic Survey Council, November 1942-July 1964," 6 Dec 74, OSD Hist.
16. In the 1961 budget, for example, the requests for NOA for the service departments were as follows (in billions): Army, \$9.546; Navy, \$12.013; Air Force, \$17.737. For the other departments, the largest request was \$10.469 billion for Treasury: *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1961*, 6, 440.
17. Gates interv, 16 Jul 62, 18, CUOHP.
18. According to Parmet (*Eisenhower and the American Crusades*, 189), Wilson on one occasion insisted, over the opposition of Secretary Dulles, on several minor changes in the foreign policy section of one of Eisenhower's state of the union messages, even though the section had already been approved by Dulles. The statement is attributed to a "confidential source."
19. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, 198-99.
20. "Afterthoughts," in Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 632.
21. Telcon 7 Dec 56, fldr Dec 56 Phone Calls, Box 20, DDED Ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.
22. See the criticisms by General Ridgway, General Taylor's predecessor as Army chief of staff, in *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*, 272, 283, 286-87.

Note on Sources and Selected Bibliography

The basic source for this history has been the records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and its components covering the years 1956 through 1960. These are maintained in folders labeled according to a numerical-subject classification based on the Dewey decimal system. Beginning in 1960 and thereafter, the records for each year from 1956 through 1960 were retired to the National Archives. At the time of writing, these were located in the Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland. They are not well indexed, and it was necessary to go through each collection, folder by folder, to select relevant documents.

The most important of these documents are the correspondence and records of the secretary and deputy secretary of defense, filed as records of the OSD Correspondence Control Section (CCS). These cover major subjects dealt with at the secretarial level. There are also smaller collections, constituting separate accessions, for each secretary and deputy secretary.

Next in importance are the records of the assistant secretary for international security affairs. Owing to the wide variety of subjects dealt with by ISA, these partially duplicate the contents of the records of the secretary. The records of the Policy Planning Staff of ISA, which furnished staff support for OSD in its relations with the National Security Council, are separately accessioned. Additional important files are those of other assistant secretaries (and assistants to the secretary) as well as those of the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

All of the above files constitute part of Record Group 330. Where no Record Group (RG) number is indicated in note citations, RG 330 is to be understood.

The files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff constitute Record Group 218 at the National Archives, College Park, Maryland. Those through 1960 have been screened for declassification and incorporated into the Central Decimal (CD) classification system.

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) were obtained from the Central Intelligence

Agency. Many of those cited here have since been declassified and are available in the National Archives.

Indispensable for this history have been the records maintained at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. Most valuable were Eisenhower's Papers as President (also known as the Ann Whitman File, from the name of the president's secretary who maintained it). This is a large body of material divided into a number of series. The DDE Diaries Series contains most of the memorandums of conferences with the president. The White House Office Series includes records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, the special assistant to the president for national security affairs, and the special assistant for science and technology. Other important subdivisions are the NSC Series, the Administration Series, and the Dulles-Herter Series. The other major body of records at the Eisenhower Library is the White House Central Files (not to be confused with the White House Office Series); here the Confidential File proved useful.

Personal papers of the secretaries of defense added little to the story. The Charles E. Wilson Archive fills an entire room at the library of Anderson College in Anderson, Indiana, but for his service as secretary, there is scant information that is not available in official records. Most interesting are letters written to Wilson by members of the general public during his term of office. The Gates papers at the University of Pennsylvania, researched for the writer by Ronald D. Landa, like those of Wilson, shed little light on his career as secretary. McElroy seems to have left no large collection of papers, aside from a few at the Eisenhower Library.

Among papers of JCS members, most informative are those of Admiral Burke at the Naval Historical Center in Washington. Burke prepared debriefs of meetings that he attended, including those of the National Security Council, and retained numerous documents bearing on the establishment of the Single Integrated Operating Plan (SIOP) in 1960, a matter followed by him with great interest. The Naval Historical Center also holds the papers of Admiral Radford. Those of Generals Taylor and Lemnitzer are at the National Defense University and of Generals Twining and White at the Library of Congress. None of these, however, are as informative as those of Burke.

The Eisenhower Library has papers of a number of officials of the Eisenhower administration, including Oliver M. Gale, Gordon Gray, Bryce N. Harlow, Lauris Norstad, and Donald A. Quarles. The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University holds the papers of Edward Lansdale.

Most relevant records of the Department of State have been published in the series *Foreign Relations of the United States*. My colleague, Ronald Landa, has collected numerous unpublished State Department documents relating to U.S. relations with Western Europe in connection with a study he is preparing.

The OSD Historical Office holds a large group of folders from the office of the assistant secretary of defense (comptroller). These constitute an irreplaceable source for following the development of the Defense budget. Other records available in the same office include the secretary's cable messages and materials bearing on the organization and administration of the Department of Defense. DoD directives and instructions, cited without location, are likewise available in the OSD Historical Office.

Among published sources, one must first mention the *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, a basic collection of presidential speeches, press conferences, and statements issued by the White House. Eight volumes cover the Eisenhower years. The OSD Historical Office has compiled the *Public Statements* of the secretaries and some of the deputy secretaries of defense. OSD also published the *Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of Defense*, incorporating reports of the three service secretaries, through June 1957. Thereafter these reports were published annually, covering each fiscal year (1 July-30 June).

Activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are covered in several volumes and studies issued by the JCS Historical Division, notably the series *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*. Volumes V and VI in this series, covering the years 1953-56, have been released. Volume VII (1957-60), with multiple authorship, exists in manuscript form, and was used in the preparation of this history. A revised version, intended for publication, is in progress but was not available when this history was being written.

Two special studies being prepared in the OSD Historical Office also proved of great value. Ronald Landa's work, tentatively entitled "The Secretary of Defense and Western European Defense, 1953-1961," has largely formed the basis of chapters XVI and XVII of this volume, providing a guide through the maze of records bearing on U.S. relations with NATO. Steven L. Rearden's "The Secretary of Defense and Foreign Affairs" is a shrewd and penetrating study of the subject from the establishment of the office of the secretary of defense in 1947 to 1989. My debt to both of these works in progress is greater than indicated by the note citations.

Interviews with leading participants in events described in the volume have supplemented the written record. The largest collection of such interview transcripts is at Columbia University, as part of its extensive oral history project on the Eisenhower administration. They are used here with the permission of Columbia University. Many of these transcripts are also to be found at the Eisenhower Library. The Seeley G. Mudd Library at Princeton University, which holds the papers of John Foster Dulles, has a collection of interviews with officials who were associated with Dulles. Finally, the OSD Historical Office has assembled an oral history collection, including several interviews of importance for this volume.

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